Why Beijing isn’t taking the bait with Trump
Democracy, Conflict, & Governance Diplomacy & Multilateralism Foreign Politics & Elections U.S. Foreign Policy
民主、冲突与治理 外交与多边主义 外交政治与选举 美国外交政策
President Donald J.
总统唐纳德·J.
Trump has shown notable deference in his public comments to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s priorities and concerns.
特朗普在公开评论中对中国领导人习近平的优先事项和关切表现出明显的尊重。
Trump has been publicly praiseworthy of his Chinese counterpart and respectful of China’s rise under Xi.
特朗普一直公开赞扬中国同行，并尊重中国在习近平领导下的崛起。
Rather than reciprocating with gestures to address Trump’s appetite for respect on the world stage, though, Xi has taken a more guarded approach to managing U.S.-China relations.
不过，习近平并没有以姿态回应特朗普在世界舞台上寻求尊重的愿望，而是采取了更加谨慎的态度来管理美中关系。
This has included securing Trump’s acceptance of framing the relationship as one of “constructive strategic stability,” and maintaining consistent leader-level engagement.
这包括确保特朗普接受将两国关系定位为“建设性战略稳定”之一，并保持领导人层面的持续接触。
Beijing’s caution toward Trump may be rooted in several factors, including an expectation that time is on China’s side, an assumption that America will pursue a competitive posture toward China regardless of any rhetorical softening by Trump, and the fact that Xi is focused foremost on domestic priorities.
北京对特朗普的谨慎态度可能源于几个因素，包括对时间站在中国一边的预期，认为无论特朗普的言论有所软化，美国都会对中国采取竞争姿态，以及习近平最关注的是国内优先事项。
As a result, Chinese leaders appear to be calculating the lowest cost they must pay to sustain an uneasy calm in the relationship.
因此，中国领导人似乎正在盘算维持两国关系不稳定的平静所必须付出的最低成本。
Beijing is focused on strengthening its long-term position for competing with the United States, not on securing breakthroughs with Trump.
北京的重点是加强其与美国竞争的长期地位，而不是确保与特朗普的突破。
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China’s leaders have chafed at their perception of America’s ideological zeal.
自 1949 年中华人民共和国成立以来，中国领导人一直对美国的意识形态热情感到恼火。
To varying degrees, American leaders since World War II have encouraged China to become more open, free, and democratic.
二战以来，美国领导人在不同程度上鼓励中国变得更加开放、自由和民主。
Multiple American leaders have lent support to democratic movements to overthrow communist regimes around the world, both during the Cold War and since.
无论是在冷战期间还是此后，多位美国领导人都支持世界各地推翻共产主义政权的民主运动。
China’s leaders from Mao Zedong onward have expressed frustration at American attempts to change China.
自毛泽东以来的中国领导人都对美国改变中国的企图表示失望。
In response, Chinese leaders consistently have vowed that one day China would surpass the United States and prove the superiority of its governance model.
作为回应，中国领导人一贯誓言，有一天中国将超越美国，并证明其治理模式的优越性。
Seen in this light, President Donald Trump and his administration embody many of the traits, instincts, and characteristics that Beijing has long sought in an American counterpart.
从这个角度来看，唐纳德·特朗普总统及其政府体现了北京长期以来在美国同行身上寻求的许多特质、本能和特点。
Gone is any semblance of high-handedness in suggesting what reforms China should undertake.
在建议中国应该进行哪些改革时，不再有任何高压手段。
The Trump administration does not champion human rights, religious freedom, or liberal democratic governance, nor does it pressure China to reform its governance or economic models.
特朗普政府并不拥护人权、宗教自由或自由民主治理，也不向中国施压以改革其治理或经济模式。
It does not demand that China conform to Western civilizational traditions and ideals.
它并不要求中国遵循西方文明传统和理想。
Rather, it approaches China as a different civilization with its own customs and practices.
相反，它将中国视为具有自己的风俗习惯的不同文明。
Trump has provided persistent public displays of respect for Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
特朗普一直公开表达对中国领导人习近平的尊重。
He has bestowed similar respect upon China as a peer of the United States, including by invoking the concept of the United States and China serving as a “G2” to offer joint leadership on the world stage.
他对中国给予了与美国同等的尊重，包括援引美国和中国作为“G2”的概念，在世界舞台上共同领导。
America presently is not organizing to seek to impair China’s future development.
美国目前并没有组织起来寻求损害中国未来的发展。
To the contrary, Trump has watered down policies that were designed to impede China’s technological advances.
相反，特朗普淡化了旨在阻碍中国技术进步的政策。
He also has given a green light for U.S. companies to sell more advanced semiconductor chips to China, provided the United States government gets a cut of revenue from such sales.
他还为美国公司向中国出售更先进的半导体芯片开了绿灯，前提是美国政府从此类销售中获得收入分成。
Trump has no interest in organizing America’s allies to contain or constrain China’s expansion of influence in Asia or globally.
特朗普无意组织美国的盟友遏制或限制中国在亚洲或全球影响力的扩张。
In fact, Trump’s instinctual skepticism of the value of alliances dovetails with China’s preference for the attenuation and eventual dissolution of America’s alliance network.
事实上，特朗普对联盟价值的本能怀疑与中国对美国联盟网络削弱和最终解体的偏好不谋而合。
The U.S. military’s shift in resources away from China’s periphery during the second Trump administration has relieved pressure on Beijing.
特朗普第二届政府期间，美国军方将资源从中国周边地区转移，缓解了北京方面的压力。
By transferring carrier strike groups and missile defense systems from East Asia to the Middle East, Trump has removed a persistent thorn in China’s side.
通过将航母战斗群和导弹防御系统从东亚转移到中东，特朗普已经除去了中国的一根长期眼中钉。
Leaders at the Department of Defense similarly have relaxed pressure on China.
国防部领导人同样放松了对中国的压力。
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth did not mention Taiwan in his 2026 speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue.
国防部长皮特·赫格斯在 2026 年香格里拉对话会上的讲话中没有提及台湾。
Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby did not raise China during a speech on regional strategy in Manila in August.
国防部副部长埃尔布里奇·科尔比八月份在马尼拉发表区域战略演讲时没有提及中国。
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Alvaro Smith lauded warming U.S.-PRC military ties at a speech at the 99th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
国防部副助理部长阿尔瓦罗·史密斯在中国人民解放军成立 99 周年纪念日的讲话中赞扬美中军事关系的升温。
These messages fit a pattern of prioritizing efforts to tamp down tensions with China.
这些信息符合优先努力缓解与中国紧张关系的模式。
Trump has led the way in this regard by embracing Beijing’s preferred framing on Taiwan.
特朗普在这方面率先采取了行动，接受了北京在台湾问题上的首选框架。
Instead of reciting America’s long-standing commitment to its “One China” policy based on the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-China joint communiques, and the Six Assurances, Trump has taken to blaming Taiwan for tensions in the Taiwan Strait, including by suggesting that Taiwan needs to “cool down a bit.” He has raised doubts about whether it makes sense for American forces to “travel 9,500 miles to fight a war” over Taiwan.
特朗普没有重申美国长期以来对基于《台湾关系法》、中美三个联合公报和“六项保证”的“一个中国”政策的承诺，而是将台海紧张局势归咎于台湾，包括暗示台湾需要“冷静一点”。他对美军“长途跋涉9500英里去打台湾战争”是否有意义表示怀疑。
He also has indicated he would consult with Xi on future arms sales to Taiwan.
他还表示，他将与习近平就未来对台军售问题进行磋商。
Members of his administration counter that Trump’s comments do not reflect any change in America’s approach to cross-Strait issues.
他的政府成员反驳说，特朗普的言论并不反映美国对两岸问题的态度发生任何变化。
They stress that Trump has approved more arms sales to Taiwan than any president, and they maintain that U.S.-Taiwan ties remain robust.
他们强调，特朗普批准的对台军售比任何一位总统都多，并坚称美台关系依然牢固。
Even so, the net effect has been to signal that Trump wants to prevent Taiwan from becoming an obstacle to his broader goals with Xi.
即便如此，最终的效果还是表明特朗普希望防止台湾成为他与习近平实现更广泛目标的障碍。
Trump’s stated goals with Xi are largely transactional.
特朗普与习近平的既定目标很大程度上是交易性的。
His consistent refrain to American voters is that he has a uniquely strong relationship with Xi and that he can use that relationship to avoid war and instead deliver economic benefits.
他对美国选民一贯强调的是，他与习近平有着独特而牢固的关系，他可以利用这种关系来避免战争，转而提供经济利益。
Trump also has vowed to narrow America’s trade deficit with China, which he has framed as an issue of fairness.
特朗普还誓言要缩小美国对中国的贸易逆差，他将此视为公平问题。
Alongside these conciliatory statements, the Trump administration has taken competitive actions, such as new restrictions on Chinese drones and robotics imports and pressure on third countries not to transship Chinese products.
除了这些和解声明外，特朗普政府还采取了竞争性行动，例如对中国无人机和机器人进口实施新限制，并向第三国施压，要求其不要转运中国产品。
The Trump administration has issued sanctions and tariff threats against PRC entities, including Chinese companies doing business with Iran.
特朗普政府对中国实体（包括与伊朗开展业务的中国公司）实施了制裁和关税威胁。
The U.S. military is investing in new capabilities for use in a high-end contingency with China.
美国军方正在投资新能力，以应对与中国的高端突发事件。
Through its Pax Silica initiative, Washington is working with partners to reduce dependence on China’s chokehold over key inputs for high-technology supply chains, such as rare earths and magnets.
通过其“二氧化硅”倡议，华盛顿正在与合作伙伴合作，减少对中国在稀土和磁铁等高科技供应链关键投入方面的依赖。
The Trump administration is working to lock other countries into America’s artificial intelligence (AI) tech stack.
特朗普政府正在努力将其他国家锁定在美国的人工智能（AI）技术堆栈中。
The effect of such policies, many of which are directionally opposite to Trump’s more conciliatory gestures, is to increase Chinese skepticism about the coherence and goals of U.S. policy on China.
此类政策中的许多政策与特朗普更为温和的姿态相反，其效果是增加中国对美国对华政策的一致性和目标的怀疑。
Even after Trump reduced pressure on several issues Beijing treats as sensitive matters, China’s leaders continue to behave as though strategic competition remains undiminished.
即使特朗普在北京视为敏感问题的几个问题上减少了压力，中国领导人的表现仍然表现得好像战略竞争并未减弱。
During his visit to Beijing in May, Trump provided effusive praise to Xi in every setting where media was present.
特朗普5月访问北京期间，在媒体出现的每一个场合都对习近平给予了热情洋溢的赞扬。
Xi hardly altered his facial expression during any of these encounters and never reciprocated with any flattering comment about Trump.
在这些会面中，习近平几乎没有改变他的面部表情，也从未对特朗普做出任何奉承的评论。
The imagery provided by official Chinese media of the visit showed Xi pointing in the distance with Trump looking on over Xi’s shoulder, and Xi guiding Trump around various venues in Beijing and providing guidance to Trump on their significance.
中国官方媒体提供的这次访问的图像显示，习近平指着远处，特朗普则在习近平身后注视着，习近平引导特朗普参观北京的各个场所，并就其重要性向特朗普提供指导。
During the visit, Chinese officials did not publicly affirm any understanding between the two leaders on one of Trump’s key priorities: Iran.
访问期间，中国官员没有公开证实两国领导人就特朗普的关键优先事项之一：伊朗存在任何谅解。
Instead, they left it to the White House to characterize an understanding between both leaders that the Strait of Hormuz should remain open and Iran should never have a nuclear weapon.
相反，他们让白宫来确定两位领导人之间的谅解，即霍尔木兹海峡应该保持开放，伊朗永远不应该拥有核武器。
Likewise, Beijing did not arrange any signing ceremonies to highlight commercial deals reached during Trump’s visit, as it had done during Trump’s first state visit to Beijing in 2017.
同样，北京也没有像2017年特朗普首次对北京进行国事访问时那样安排任何签字仪式来强调特朗普访问期间达成的商业协议。
This deprived Trump of the main visual he would have used to show the American people that his relationship with Xi was delivering material benefits for them.
这使得特朗普失去了向美国人民展示他与习近平的关系正在为他们带来物质利益的主要视觉效果。
Rather than treating Trump’s visit as historic, Chinese official media framed it as one of a long line of visits by foreign heads of state.
中国官方媒体并未将特朗普的访问视为历史性的，而是将其视为外国国家元首的一系列访问之一。
In fact, Beijing barely let the sheets cool in Trump’s presidential suite before welcoming Russian President Vladimir Putin for a state visit.
事实上，北京方面刚刚让特朗普总统套房的床单凉了，就欢迎俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京(Vladimir Putin)进行国事访问。
China’s announcement of Putin’s impending arrival in Beijing hit news wires while Trump was still in flight on his return from Beijing to Washington.
当特朗普仍在从北京返回华盛顿的途中时，中国宣布普京即将抵达北京的消息引起了新闻界的关注。
When Trump invoked the concept of a U.S.-China “G2,” instead of acknowledging the idea or staying silent about it, Beijing publicly rejected it.
当特朗普援引美中“G2”概念时，北京不但没有承认这一想法或保持沉默，反而公开拒绝。
Instead, Chinese state media trumpeted Trump’s assent to Xi’s suggested framing for the relationship of “ constructive strategic stability .” Chinese state media rightly framed this outcome as a breakthrough for Xi.
相反，中国官方媒体大肆宣扬特朗普同意习近平提出的“建设性战略稳定”关系框架。中国官方媒体正确地将这一结果描述为习近平的突破。
Since 2012, Xi had sought and failed to enlist support from successive American presidents for his framing of the relationship, first as a “new model of great power relations,” and later, a relationship based on “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation.”
自2012年以来，习近平一直在寻求历届美国总统对中美关系的支持，但未能获得历届美国总统的支持，他首先将中美关系定位为“新型大国关系”，后来又将其定位为“相互尊重、和平共处、合作共赢”的关系。
While the preponderance of China’s public statements and Xi’s gestures toward Trump have been guarded, Beijing has also been cautious not to personally insult Trump or be perceived as making him look bad.
尽管中国的公开声明和习近平对特朗普的态度一直很谨慎，但北京方面也一直小心翼翼，避免对特朗普进行人身侮辱或被认为让他难堪。
Chinese spokespeople generally have not directly criticized Trump for U.S. actions in Iran or elsewhere.
中国发言人一般没有直接批评特朗普美国在伊朗或其他地方的行动。
When Trump requested to postpone his planned state visit to China from March to May due to the Iran war, Beijing obliged .
当特朗普因伊朗战争而要求推迟原定于3月至5月对中国进行国事访问时，北京方面答应了。
When Trump blamed China for election interference in the 2020 election during a primetime address from the White House, Beijing responded with boilerplate recitations of its policy of “noninterference” in the internal political affairs of other countries.
当特朗普在白宫黄金时段发表讲话时指责中国干预 2020 年大选时，北京以“不干涉”其他国家内部政治事务的政策作为回应。
There has also been a significant reduction in articles on “American decline” in Chinese journals and academic journals since Trump took office in 2025.
自2025年特朗普上任以来，中国期刊和学术期刊上有关“美国衰落”的文章也大幅减少。
The record is more mixed on Trump’s policy priorities.
特朗普的政策优先事项的记录更加复杂。
Trump has succeeded in reducing Chinese exports to the United States in furtherance of his pledge to secure a more balanced trade relationship with China.
特朗普成功减少了中国对美国的出口，以兑现他与中国建立更加平衡的贸易关系的承诺。
At the same time, America’s global trade deficit has continued to climb, as has China’s global export volume, and U.S. imports of Chinese-origin content.
与此同时，美国的全球贸易逆差持续攀升，中国的全球出口量以及美国对中国原产内容的进口也是如此。
In other words, Trump’s tariffs seem to have had the effect of a stone in a stream, diverting flows of Chinese goods but not the end destination.
换句话说，特朗普的关税似乎起到了溪流中的石头的作用，转移了中国商品的流动，但没有转移最终目的地。
On Chinese purchases of American exports, Beijing has underperformed expectations.
在中国购买美国出口产品方面，北京方面的表现不及预期。
Rather than meeting the anticipated purchase of 500 Boeing commercial planes during Trump’s May state visit, Beijing signaled it would purchase 200 jets.
北京方面并未实现特朗普 5 月国事访问期间购买 500 架波音商用飞机的预期，而是表示将购买 200 架喷气式飞机。
Chinese authorities also lowballed their pledge to purchase American energy and agricultural products.
中国当局还低估了购买美国能源和农产品的承诺。
And after Trump took political heat at home for greenlighting Nvidia to export H200 semiconductor chips, China did not approve any purchases during Trump’s trip or in its aftermath.
在特朗普因批准英伟达出口 H200 半导体芯片而受到国内政治热议后，中国在特朗普访问期间及访问结束后并未批准任何采购。
In recent weeks, Beijing has quietly allowed several large technology firms to begin purchasing limited quantities of H200 chips.
最近几周，北京悄悄允许几家大型科技公司开始购买有限数量的 H200 芯片。
On perhaps the most central aspect of the October 2025 trade truce between Trump and Xi, Chinese export of rare earths and magnets, American officials have complained publicly that China is “only partly meeting its obligations” on an issue entirely within the control of the Chinese government to solve.
关于特朗普和习近平 2025 年 10 月贸易休战的最核心问题，即中国稀土和磁铁的出口，美国官员公开抱怨称，在一个完全由中国政府控制解决的问题上，中国“只履行了部分义务”。
There has been progress in curbing the flow of fentanyl and fentanyl precursors.
在遏制芬太尼和芬太尼前体的流动方面已取得进展。
This has included new Chinese export control designations for precursor chemicals and joint law enforcement investigations and arrests of Chinese traffickers.
其中包括中国对前体化学品的新出口管制指定以及联合执法调查和逮捕中国贩运者。
After Trump raised the case of detained Pastor Ezra Jin, Chinese authorities released him on humanitarian grounds.
在特朗普提出被拘留的金以斯拉牧师的案件后，中国当局以人道主义为由释放了他。
They did not, however, make any concession in terms of jail time or treatment for the primary individual Trump raised, Hong Kong media tycoon Jimmy Lai.
然而，他们没有在特朗普提出的主要人物、香港媒体大亨黎智英的入狱时间或待遇方面做出任何让步。
Chinese authorities also wrongfully detained an American scholar after Trump’s May state visit.
特朗普五月国事访问后，中国当局还错误拘留了一名美国学者。
Overall, the bilateral relationship is generally stable.
总体来看，两国关系总体稳定。
Public discourse around the possibility of future U.S.-China conflict has receded.
关于未来中美冲突可能性的公开讨论已经减弱。
Meanwhile, both sides continue to take competitive actions against each other while also accelerating their own respective efforts to reduce dependencies on each other for critical inputs.
与此同时，双方继续采取竞争行动，同时加快各自努力，减少对彼此关键投入的依赖。
Viewed holistically, though, even after Trump reduced pressure on a range of issues Beijing has prioritized, China’s leaders continue to treat strategic competition as an enduring and undiminished attribute of the relationship.
不过，从整体上看，即使特朗普减少了对北京优先考虑的一系列问题的压力，中国领导人仍然将战略竞争视为两国关系的持久且不减的属性。
There are at least four reasons for Beijing’s lack of reciprocity for Trump’s public efforts to show attentiveness to China’s leaders’ long-standing concerns.
特朗普公开努力表达对中国领导人长期关切的关注，北京方面却没有给予回应，至少有四个原因。
These reasons are not mutually exclusive or necessarily internally consistent.
这些原因并不相互排斥，也不一定内部一致。
First, Chinese leaders have growing confidence in their country’s relative position to the United States.
首先，中国领导人对其国家相对于美国的地位越来越有信心。
This confidence was bolstered by Beijing’s record of causing Trump to retreat from his 2025 trade war against China.
北京方面曾促使特朗普退出 2025 年对华贸易战，这增强了这种信心。
It was further enhanced by China’s capacity to withstand the global energy shock from the 2026 Iran war.
中国抵御 2026 年伊朗战争全球能源冲击的能力进一步增强了这一能力。
Beijing relied on its existing reserves, its growing renewable energy capacity, and its diversified sources of energy inputs to sustain economic growth while other countries suffered setbacks.
北京依靠现有的储备、不断增长的可再生能源产能以及多元化的能源投入来维持经济增长，而其他国家则遭受挫折。
These and other events have given Beijing confidence that China’s relative position is improving while America’s relative position is weakening .
这些事件和其他事件让北京相信中国的相对地位正在改善，而美国的相对地位正在削弱。
Chinese commentators now describe America and China as being on an equal footing and entering a period of “ strategic stalemate .” Like any good negotiator, Chinese leaders do not want to pay more than is necessary to sustain a period of bilateral stability.
中国评论人士现在将美国和中国描述为处于平等地位并进入“战略僵局”时期。与任何优秀的谈判者一样，中国领导人不想付出超出维持一段时期双边稳定所需的代价。
For China’s leaders, the goal is to buy time and space to strengthen self-reliance, not necessarily to improve relations with the United States.
对于中国领导人来说，目标是为加强自力更生争取时间和空间，而不一定是改善与美国的关系。
Second, and relatedly, there is skepticism in Beijing that durable improvements to the U.S.-China relationship are available.
其次，与此相关的是，北京方面对美中关系能否持久改善持怀疑态度。
Even as Trump represents a welcome reprieve from decades of American moralizing, in Beijing’s view, Trump does not represent a permanent shift in American strategy on China.
尽管特朗普代表美国几十年来的道德说教得到了令人欢迎的缓和，但在北京看来，特朗普并不代表美国对华战略的永久转变。
China still views the United States as “the top strategic threat,” according to Tsinghua University scholars Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng.
清华大学学者严学通和孙雪峰表示，中国仍然将美国视为“头号战略威胁”。
Chinese officials and experts expect America to become more aggressive in seeking to protect its privileged position in the international system as global influence shifts from America to China.
随着全球影响力从美国转向中国，中国官员和专家预计美国将更加积极地寻求保护其在国际体系中的特权地位。
The Ministry of State Security-affiliated think tank China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations flagged this danger in a recent report , warning: “Historical experience shows that conflicts or even wars have often accompanied major transitions in the international order.”
国家安全部下属智库中国现代国际关系研究院在最近的一份报告中指出了这一危险，并警告说：“历史经验表明，国际秩序的重大转变往往伴随着冲突甚至战争。”
Alert to these risks, Chinese officials have encouraged greater U.S.-China leader-level interaction and deeper bilateral efforts to give substance to Trump’s and Xi’s guidance to build a relationship of “constructive strategic stability.” These efforts are built on an assumption that the more actively engaged Trump is in the conduct of the bilateral relationship, the less risk there will be that Trump flips the script on China policy.
中国官员对这些风险保持警惕，鼓励中美领导人加强互动并深化双边努力，以落实特朗普和习近平关于建立“建设性战略稳定”关系的指导方针。这些努力建立在这样一个假设之上：特朗普越积极地参与双边关系，特朗普在对华政策上翻转剧本的风险就越小。
Trump did just that in early 2020, when he went from hailing progress in reaching a “U.S.-China phase-1 trade agreement” to accusing China of unleashing COVID-19 upon the world and spoiling his reelection bid.
特朗普在 2020 年初就是这样做的，当时他从欢呼达成“美中第一阶段贸易协议”的进展，转而指责中国向世界释放了新冠病毒 (COVID-19)，并破坏了他的连任竞选。
In other words, Chinese leaders have a living memory of Trump’s mercurial temperament.
换句话说，中国领导人对特朗普反复无常的脾气记忆犹新。
They also are alert to the fact that a majority of the American national security establishment favors a tougher China policy than the one Trump is pursuing.
他们还警惕这样一个事实，即美国国家安全机构的大多数人都赞成采取比特朗普奉行的更强硬的对华政策。
After Trump steps down from the presidency in January 2029, the next U.S. president may be less willing than Trump to heed China’s priorities and concerns.
特朗普于 2029 年 1 月卸任总统后，下一任美国总统可能比特朗普更不愿意关注中国的优先事项和担忧。
As a result, Beijing is unlikely to let its guard down so long as it lacks confidence in the durability of Trump’s China policy shift or in what Trump could tangibly deliver for China.
因此，只要北京对特朗普对华政策转变的持久性或特朗普能为中国带来什么实际成果缺乏信心，它就不太可能放松警惕。
Third, Beijing may view Trump’s statements as symbolic gestures that do not offset the more substantive competitive measures his administration is taking.
第三，北京可能将特朗普的声明视为象征性姿态，并不能抵消其政府正在采取的更具实质性的竞争措施。
For example, Beijing may put relatively greater weight on published strategies such as the Trump administration’s July 2025 AI Action Plan than on Trump’s words.
例如，与特朗普的言论相比，北京可能会相对更重视特朗普政府2025年7月人工智能行动计划等已发布的战略。
That plan frames AI competition as central to economic and military strength and geopolitical influence.
该计划将人工智能竞争视为经济和军事实力以及地缘政治影响力的核心。
The plan asserts that the United States must maintain “unquestioned and unchallenged global technological dominance.” In other words, from Beijing’s perspective, underneath Trump’s positive rhetoric, American strategy continues to be guided by a zero-sum logic that seeks to secure and sustain advantage over China.
该计划声称，美国必须保持“无可质疑和无可挑战的全球技术主导地位”。换句话说，从北京的角度来看，在特朗普的积极言辞之下，美国的战略仍然遵循零和逻辑，寻求确保和维持对中国的优势。
Even if Trump is transactional and non-ideological, he cannot police every action and statement made by U.S. departments and agencies.
即使特朗普是交易性的、非意识形态的，他也无法监管美国部门和机构的每一个行动和声明。
The most China’s leaders have been able to do is urge Trump to be attentive to their top concerns, such as Taiwan and technology restrictions.
中国领导人最多能做的就是敦促特朗普关注他们最关心的问题，例如台湾和技术限制。
The fourth reason for Beijing’s caution in responding to Trump’s shift in posture is that Xi is preoccupied with challenges other than the United States.
北京对特朗普态度转变持谨慎态度的第四个原因是，习近平专注于美国以外的挑战。
He is overseeing an anti-corruption campaign that is unprecedented in PRC history in terms of its scope and duration.
他正在监督一场反腐败运动，其范围和持续时间在中国历史上是前所未有的。
In the military alone, 101 senior officers in the Central Military Commission, theater command, or theater deputy command have been dismissed or disappeared since 2022, marking roughly half of the PLA’s senior leadership, according to analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in February 2026.
根据战略与国际研究中心 2026 年 2 月的分析，仅在军队方面，自 2022 年以来，中央军委、战区司令部或战区副司令部就有 101 名高级军官被免职或失踪，约占解放军高级领导层的一半。
The anti-corruption campaign also has cut deeply into the ranks of the cadre performing domestic, economic, and foreign policy work.
反腐败运动还深入到执行国内、经济和外交政策工作的干部队伍中。
The net effect of this sweeping campaign has been to discourage cadre from exercising initiative in policy development, lest one expose oneself as holding views that diverge from the direction set by China’s “core leader.” Since China’s policymaking system often is driven by top-down policy direction, much like in the case of Trump in the United States, there have been periods of stasis in the relationship when one or both leaders have had their attention diverted elsewhere.
这场全面运动的最终效果是阻止了干部在政策制定中发挥主动性，以免暴露自己持有与中国“核心领导人”设定的方向不同的观点。由于中国的决策体系往往是由自上而下的政策方向驱动的，就像美国特朗普的情况一样，因此两国关系会出现一段停滞期，其中一位或两位领导人将注意力转移到其他地方。
When bureaucrats become cautious and leaders become preoccupied by domestic challenges, the likelihood of bold diplomatic gambits declines.
当官僚变得谨慎、领导人专注于国内挑战时，采取大胆外交策略的可能性就会下降。
Additionally, Xi has been contending with a slowing and uneven economy, high youth unemployment, and rising debt, particularly at the local level.
此外，习近平一直在应对经济放缓和不平衡、青年失业率高和债务上升（特别是在地方层面）的问题。
Importantly, Xi is also laying the groundwork for a fourth term as leader and ensuring that his preferred advisors secure positions supporting him.
重要的是，习近平还在为第四个领导人任期奠定基础，并确保他喜欢的顾问获得支持他的职位。
As Xi nears the 21st Party Congress in fall 2027, his attention increasingly will be drawn toward China’s domestic politics.
随着习近平于 2027 年秋季召开第 21 次党代会，他的注意力将越来越多地转向中国的国内政治。
In short, Beijing simultaneously feels more confident about its relative position vis-à-vis Washington and more concerned about some of its domestic challenges.
简而言之，北京对其相对于华盛顿的相对地位更有信心，同时也对其国内的一些挑战更加担忧。
The U.S.-China relationship now is characterized by an uneasy calm.
中美关系现在的特点是不稳定的平静。
There are real and growing points of friction between both countries around trade and economic issues as well as geopolitical challenges such as Iran.
两国之间围绕贸易和经济问题以及伊朗等地缘政治挑战存在着真实且日益增长的摩擦点。
Even so, both sides see greater risk than reward in breaking from the fragile stability that both leaders have sustained since their in-person meeting in Busan last October.
即便如此，双方都认为打破两位领导人自去年 10 月在釜山举行面对面会议以来一直维持的脆弱稳定的风险大于回报。
During that meeting, Trump agreed to pause further economic pressure and technological restrictions in exchange for Xi restoring the flow of rare earths and magnets.
在那次会议上，特朗普同意暂停进一步的经济压力和技术限制，以换取习近平恢复稀土和磁铁的流动。
Both sides appear to be preserving their trade war truce out of self-interest and constrained choices.
双方似乎出于自身利益和有限的选择而维持贸易战休战。
There has not been a resolution to any outstanding issues in the relationship.
双方关系中的任何悬而未决的问题尚未得到解决。
Nor have there been any observable efforts to develop a shared affirmative agenda for challenges that both countries could jointly address out of mutual self-interest, such as jointly leading on AI guardrails.
也没有任何明显的努力来制定共同的平权议程，以应对两国可以出于共同利益而共同应对的挑战，例如共同领导人工智能护栏。
Instead, there has been cautious avoidance of blowups.
相反，人们一直在谨慎地避免爆炸。
Both countries have a shared interest in sustaining this uneasy calm because it works for both leaders’ political situations, and importantly, because neither side has “escalation dominance” over the other.
维持这种令人不安的平静符合两国的共同利益，因为这对两国领导人的政治局势都有利，而且重要的是，因为双方都不具备“升级主导权”。
As former Deputy National Security Advisor Daleep Singh has argued , economic escalation dominance requires two simultaneous features.
正如前国家安全副顾问戴利普·辛格（Daleep Singh）所说，经济升级的主导地位需要同时具备两个特征。
First, one nation must produce or supply something the other needs and cannot replace at pace or scale.
首先，一个国家必须生产或供应其他国家需要且无法在速度或规模上替代的东西。
Second, that nation, when it weaponizes its chokepoint, must be able to neutralize or tolerate retaliation from the other.
其次，当该国将其咽喉要道武器化时，必须能够抵消或容忍对方的报复。
By this definition, according to Singh, neither side has dominance over the other.
辛格认为，根据这个定义，任何一方都不具备对另一方的支配地位。
Given these uncomfortable realities, both countries presently are focused foremost on shoring up their own vulnerabilities to expand future freedom of action for competing with the other.
鉴于这些令人不安的现实，两国目前的首要任务是加强自身的脆弱性，以扩大未来与对方竞争的行动自由。
The United States is racing to reduce dependence on China for rare earths and other critical inputs, while China is working to build out its capacity to build airplanes and produce high-end semiconductors, among other items.
美国正在竞相减少对中国稀土和其他关键投入的依赖，而中国正在努力增强其制造飞机和生产高端半导体等产品的能力。
To buy time and space for these efforts toward greater self-reliance, both countries are prioritizing bilateral stability.
为了为实现更大自力更生的努力争取时间和空间，两国都将双边稳定放在首位。
Chinese scholar Wu Xinbo refers to these efforts as a form of “process management” to guard against the relationship tipping into confrontation or conflict.
中国学者吴心伯将这些努力称为“流程管理”的一种形式，以防止两国关系陷入对抗或冲突。
Rather than pursuing breakthroughs with Trump, Xi will continue looking for ways to manage his relationship with the American leader.
习近平不会寻求与特朗普的突破，而是会继续寻找处理与美国领导人关系的方法。
Particularly given Trump’s negotiating track record, Beijing cannot have confidence that any deals reached with him will be permanent or lasting.
特别是考虑到特朗普的谈判记录，北京不能相信与他达成的任何协议都是永久性的或持久的。
For Xi’s upcoming state visit in September, this likely means the Chinese leader will offer symbols of respect and will avoid any appearance of basking in America’s setbacks, whether in Iran or elsewhere.
对于习近平即将于九月进行的国事访问，这可能意味着中国领导人将表示尊重，并避免表现出因美国的挫折而沾沾自喜的样子，无论是在伊朗还是其他地方。
Xi likely will look to address some of the challenges in China’s business environment that American CEOs raised during Trump’s May state visit to Beijing.
习近平可能会寻求解决美国首席执行官在特朗普五月对北京进行国事访问期间提出的中国商业环境的一些挑战。
The Chinese side will almost surely also commit to future purchases of American products, and to processes for identifying products to be exempted from future tariffs.
几乎可以肯定，中方还将承诺未来购买美国产品，并制定确定未来免征关税产品的程序。
The two leaders could signal willingness to work toward addressing safety concerns around AI.
两位领导人可能表示愿意努力解决人工智能的安全问题。
A headline of the visit may be an agreement by Trump and Xi to extend their trade truce first reached in Busan last October.
这次访问的一个头条新闻可能是特朗普和习近平达成协议，延长去年十月在釜山首次达成的贸易休战协议。
In return, Xi likely will request continuing forbearance from Trump on Taiwan, new tariffs, and technology-related restrictions.
作为回报，习近平可能会要求特朗普在台湾、新关税和技术相关限制问题上继续保持克制。
It likely is beyond the reach of America’s and China’s leaders to negotiate AI principles to reduce risks, such as agreeing to partner in preventing nonstate actors from malicious use of AI to create bioweapons.
美国和中国领导人可能无法就人工智能原则进行谈判以降低风险，例如同意合作防止非国家行为者恶意使用人工智能制造生物武器。
It also likely will be beyond the reach of the two leaders to jointly advance any process toward cessation of hostilities in Iran , Ukraine , or elsewhere.
两位领导人也可能无法共同推进伊朗、乌克兰或其他地方停止敌对行动的任何进程。
There likely will not be progress in arms control or efforts to advance rules of behavior in under-governed domains, such as space and cyber.
在军备控制或推进太空和网络等欠治理领域的行为规则方面可能不会取得进展。
In a best-case scenario, the two leaders could agree to joint efforts to reduce the risk of U.S.-China confrontation, including through agreements around military exchanges, reaffirmation of rules of behavior when U.S. and PRC military platforms operate in proximity to each other, and maintenance of open bilateral channels of military-to-military communication.
在最好的情况下，两国领导人可能同意共同努力降低中美对抗的风险，包括通过围绕军事交流的协议、重申中美军事平台邻近行动时的行为规则以及维持开放的双边军事交流渠道。
In closing, even though Trump has taken observable steps to remove irritants in the bilateral relationship, obstacles remain.
最后，尽管特朗普已采取明显措施消除双边关系中的刺激因素，但障碍仍然存在。
Beijing welcomes the current uneasy calm in the relationship but does not expect it will last.
北京对当前两国关系不稳定的平静表示欢迎，但并不认为这种平静会持续下去。
It may be possible for the two leaders to extend their trade war truce beyond the state visit this September.
两国领导人有可能将贸易战休战期延长到今年九月的国事访问之后。
Even so, it is unlikely that they would agree to concrete steps to durably improve relations or put the United States and China in a joint leadership role in addressing global challenges.
即便如此，他们也不太可能同意采取具体措施来持久改善关系，或让美国和中国在应对全球挑战方面发挥共同领导作用。
Beijing is not chasing breakthroughs with Trump.
北京并不寻求与特朗普取得突破。
Nor does China wish to court confrontation with the United States, a country that it views as declining but dangerous.
中国也不希望与美国发生对抗，因为中国认为美国正在衰落但很危险。
Instead, Beijing is working to buy time to build greater capacity to withstand the pressure it expects to face from the United States and others as China accrues more power and influence on the world stage.
相反，随着中国在世界舞台上积累更多实力和影响力，北京正在努力争取时间建设更大的能力，以承受来自美国和其他国家的压力。