The fading efficacy of US shadow fleet sanctions

In a recent post , we documented the substantial increase in the number of Russian shadow fleet oil tankers sanctioned by the EU and UK.

在最近的一篇文章中，我们记录了受到欧盟和英国制裁的俄罗斯影子舰队油轮数量的大幅增加。

Our previous research finds that U.S. sanctions have historically had substantially more impact on shadow fleet activity than EU or UK sanctions.

我们之前的研究发现，历史上美国制裁对影子舰队活动的影响远大于欧盟或英国制裁。

One likely explanation is the threat of U.S. secondary sanctions, which expose anyone conducting business with a sanctioned entity to U.S. action.

一种可能的解释是美国的二级制裁威胁，任何与受制裁实体开展业务的人都会面临美国的制裁。

This likely helps explain why U.S. sanctions have been especially effective at disrupting shadow fleet activity.

这可能有助于解释为什么美国的制裁在扰乱影子舰队活动方面特别有效。

For the threat of secondary sanctions to remain credible, however, the United States must actively enforce them when violations occur.

然而，为了使二级制裁的威胁保持可信度，美国必须在违规行为发生时积极执行这些制裁。

This has not happened under the current administration, which we argue has deteriorated the efficacy of shadow fleet sanctions imposed by the Biden administration as the “fear factor” of U.S. sanctions fades.

在现任政府的领导下，这种情况并未发生，我们认为，随着美国制裁的“恐惧因素”消退，拜登政府实施的影子舰队制裁的效果恶化了。

In this post, we track the degradation of U.S. sanctions on the activity of sanctioned vessels, especially since the start of the war with Iran when global oil supply was constrained, and discuss what needs to be done to reverse it.

在这篇文章中，我们跟踪美国对受制裁船只活动的制裁的恶化，特别是自与伊朗战争爆发以来全球石油供应受到限制，并讨论需要采取哪些措施来扭转这种情况。

Since our last post on August 6 , the UK announced additional sanctions on shadow fleet ships.

自我们于 8 月 6 日发表上一篇文章以来，英国宣布对影子舰队实施额外制裁。

Figure 1 below updates our tracking of ships sanctioned by the U.S., the EU, and the UK.

下面的图 1 更新了我们对受美国、欧盟和英国制裁的船舶的跟踪。

Our updated count for ships sanctioned by the U.S. is 216 (black line), a number that has been unchanged since the final days of the Biden administration in January 2025.

我们更新的受美国制裁的船只数量为 216 艘（黑线），这一数字自 2025 年 1 月拜登政府最后几天以来一直没有变化。

The latest count for ships sanctioned by the EU is 671 (blue line), following an additional wave of vessels sanctioned in July.

继 7 月份又一波制裁船舶之后，最新受欧盟制裁的船舶数量为 671 艘（蓝线）。

The updated count for the UK stands at 627 (red line), reflecting six additional vessels sanctioned on August 6.

英国的最新数量为 627 艘（红线），反映出 8 月 6 日新增 6 艘船只受到制裁。

The EU and the UK have made great strides in shadow fleet sanctions and moved to drastically increase overlap between each other and with the U.S. Figure 2 updates our tracking of this effort, factoring in the additional ships sanctioned by the UK last month.

欧盟和英国在影子舰队制裁方面取得了长足进步，并开始大幅增加彼此之间以及与美国之间的重叠。图 2 更新了我们对这一努力的跟踪，其中考虑了英国上个月制裁的额外船只。

The number of ships sanctioned only by the U.S. has fallen to 15 (blue bars), while the number of ships sanctioned both by the EU and UK has risen to 395 (pink bars) and the number of ships sanctioned by all three jurisdictions stands at 178 (purple bars).

仅受到美国制裁的船舶数量已降至 15 艘（蓝色条形），而受到欧盟和英国制裁的船舶数量已上升至 395 艘（粉色条形），同时受到所有三个司法管辖区制裁的船舶数量为 178 艘（紫色条形）。

The additional six ships targeted by the UK last month don’t overlap with EU or U.S. sanctions, so they add to our tracking of UK-only sanctioned vessels (orange bars) and expand the total universe of sanctioned ships (black line) from 734 in July to 740 in August.

英国上个月针对的另外六艘船舶与欧盟或美国的制裁不重叠，因此它们增加了我们对仅英国受制裁船舶（橙色条）的跟踪，并将受制裁船舶的总数（黑线）从 7 月的 734 艘扩大到 8 月的 740 艘。

To examine whether the Trump administration’s apparent reluctance to pursue secondary sanctions may be harming sanctions efficacy, we use Bloomberg’s AHOY database to track daily oil tanker traffic out of Russian ports starting in January 2015.

为了研究特朗普政府明显不愿实施二级制裁是否可能会损害制裁效果，我们使用彭博社的 AHOY 数据库来跟踪从 2015 年 1 月开始从俄罗斯港口驶出的每日油轮流量。

Of the 216 shadow fleet and other ships sanctioned by the U.S., 134 are present in our data during the period of our analysis.

在我们分析期间的数据中，有 216 艘影子舰队和其他受到美国制裁的船只中，有 134 艘出现在我们的数据中。

Since the vast majority of the 216 ships were targeted in the final days of the Biden administration on January 10, 2025, this allows us to track the fear factor implicit in U.S. sanctions and how well this fear factor has held up through today.

由于 216 艘船只中的绝大多数是在 2025 年 1 月 10 日拜登政府最后几天成为攻击目标的，这使我们能够追踪美国制裁中隐含的恐惧因素，以及这种恐惧因素在今天的持续情况。

Figure 3 tracks monthly volumes of crude and refined product shipped out of Russia’s ports on vessels sanctioned by the U.S. August data go through the 27th and we gross them up to a monthly number.

图 3 跟踪了受美国制裁的船只从俄罗斯港口运出的原油和成品油的每月数量。8 月数据截至 27 日，我们将其总计为每月数据。

The blue bars reflect exports out of Russia’s Baltic ports, the orange bars are exports out of its ports in the Black Sea, and the red bars are shipments out of ports in the Pacific.

蓝色条反映了俄罗斯波罗的海港口的出口量，橙色条代表了黑海港口的出口量，红色条代表了太平洋港口的出口量。

The wave of ships targeted by the Biden administration in its final days was skewed toward ships operating in the Pacific, so this is where the impact on activity was greatest.

拜登政府在最后几天针对的船只浪潮主要集中在太平洋地区，因此这里是对活动影响最大的地方。

Monthly volumes of Russian oil exported on sanctioned tankers fell from an average of 35 million barrels per month in 2023 and 2024 to 7 million on average in 2025, a reduction of over 80%.

受制裁油轮每月出口的俄罗斯石油量从2023年和2024年的平均每月3500万桶下降到2025年的平均每月700万桶，减少了80%以上。

This drastic fall in volumes is testament to the incredible impact of U.S. sanctions, which we attribute to the fear factor exerted by secondary sanctions as we’ve documented in past work .

数量的急剧下降证明了美国制裁的令人难以置信的影响，我们将其归因于二级制裁所产生的恐惧因素，正如我们在过去的工作中记录的那样。

However, volumes on sanctioned vessels have accelerated in recent months, a sign that the fear factor of secondary sanctions is fading.

然而，近几个月来，受制裁船只的数量有所增加，这表明对二级制裁的恐惧因素正在消退。

This phenomenon is recent and most apparent in July 2026.

这种现象是最近出现的，并且在 2026 年 7 月最为明显。

Since our data for August 2026 are incomplete, it is too early to know whether this will persist.

由于我们 2026 年 8 月的数据不完整，现在判断这种情况是否会持续还为时过早。

Strengthening the joint sanctions effort by the U.S., EU, and UK demands two distinct actions by U.S. authorities.

加强美国、欧盟和英国的联合制裁努力需要美国当局采取两项不同的行动。

One, the U.S. must join its allies in continuing to sanction additional shadow fleet tankers, as Russia amasses additional tankers and employs increased use of unscrupulous shipping networks to sidestep Western sanctions and the G7 price cap.

第一，美国必须与其盟友一起继续制裁更多的影子舰队油轮，因为俄罗斯正在集结更多的油轮，并更多地利用不道德的航运网络来规避西方的制裁和七国集团的价格上限。

Specifically, this means that the U.S. should designate the 524 tankers sanctioned by the EU and UK, but not yet sanctioned by the U.S. Ideally, this would occur immediately by unilateral action through the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

具体来说，这意味着美国应指定受到欧盟和英国制裁但尚未受到美国制裁的 524 艘油轮。理想情况下，这将通过美国财政部外国资产控制办公室 (OFAC) 采取单方面行动立即进行。

If enacted, the proposed Lindsey O.

如果法案通过，拟议的 Lindsey O.

Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 would facilitate that process by reducing the evidentiary burden for OFAC to sanction a tanker already designated by the EU or UK.

格雷厄姆《2026 年制裁俄罗斯和伊朗法案》将减轻 OFAC 制裁欧盟或英国已指定油轮的证据负担，从而促进这一进程。

Second, the administration must use more forcefully the threat of secondary sanctions for entities conducting business with a sanctioned tanker.

其次，政府必须更有力地对与受制裁油轮开展业务的实体实施二级制裁威胁。

This effort has precedent in the Trump administration, which has taken action against, for example, Chinese refineries for importing Iranian oil on sanctioned tankers.

这一举措在特朗普政府中已有先例，例如，特朗普政府曾对中国炼油厂通过受制裁的油轮进口伊朗石油采取行动。

In that action, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co. for importing over $1 billion worth of Iranian oil and specified that the oil had been transported on three tankers—the Nyantara, Reston, and Brava Lake—that had recently been sanctioned by OFAC.

在那次行动中，美国财政部制裁了山东盛兴化工有限公司进口价值超过 10 亿美元的伊朗石油，并指出这些石油是通过最近受到 OFAC 制裁的三艘油轮（Nyantara、Reston 和 Brava Lake）运输的。

Applying a similar treatment to Asian refineries and other facilitators of the Russian oil trade would likely dramatically strengthen the force of tanker-specific sanctions imposed by the U.S.

对亚洲炼油厂和俄罗斯石油贸易的其他促进者实行类似的待遇可能会大大加强美国针对油轮实施的制裁力度。