The Iran war and America’s widening strategy gap in Asia

Democracy, Conflict, & Governance Geopolitics U.S. Foreign Policy

民主、冲突与治理 地缘政治 美国外交政策

Center for Asia Policy Studies Center for Middle East Policy

亚洲政策研究中心 中东政策中心

This piece is part of the “ Blowback: How the Iran war may change the world ” series, which features original analyses and policy recommendations by experts on the immediate and prospective long-term fallout from the 2026 Iran war.

本文是“反冲：伊朗战争可能如何改变世界”系列的一部分，该系列的特色是专家对 2026 年伊朗战争的直接和未来长期影响进行的原创分析和政策建议。

The U.S. war with Iran has exposed a widening gap between Washington’s stated prioritization of the Indo-Pacific and the policies it is pursuing.

美国与伊朗的战争暴露了华盛顿所宣称的印太优先事项与其所奉行的政策之间日益扩大的差距。

The diversion of military resources to the Middle East, growing economic pressure, and the increasingly transactional treatment of allies and partners in Asia are raising doubts about the durability of U.S. regional leadership.

军事资源向中东转移、日益增长的经济压力以及亚洲盟友和伙伴日益交易化的待遇，都引发了人们对美国地区领导地位能否持久的怀疑。

On the Korean Peninsula, scaled-back military exercises risk weakening deterrence, while the lessons Pyongyang draws from Iran’s experience may reinforce its conviction that nuclear weapons are essential to regime survival.

在朝鲜半岛，缩减军事演习的风险可能会削弱威慑力，而平壤从伊朗的经历中吸取的教训可能会强化其信念，即核武器对于政权的生存至关重要。

The danger, therefore, is not necessarily a reversal of the U.S. pivot to Asia, but a gradual erosion of the capabilities, credibility, and partnerships needed to sustain it.

因此，危险并不一定是美国转向亚洲的逆转，而是维持这一战略所需的能力、信誉和伙伴关系逐渐受到侵蚀。

For more than a decade, successive U.S. administrations have declared the Indo-Pacific a central priority for America’s long-term security and prosperity.

十多年来，历届美国政府都宣布印度-太平洋地区是美国长期安全与繁荣的核心优先事项。

The second Trump administration is no exception.

特朗普第二届政府也不例外。

Its 2025 National Security Strategy emphasizes maintaining a favorable balance of power in Asia, while the 2026 National Defense Strategy identifies deterring China in the Indo-Pacific as a central priority.

其2025年国家安全战略强调维持亚洲有利的力量平衡，而2026年国防战略则将在印太地区威慑中国作为核心优先事项。

The war with Iran, however, has exposed an increasingly consequential gap between U.S. strategic priorities and its actions.

然而，与伊朗的战争暴露了美国战略重点与其行动之间日益严重的差距。

Critics have described the conflict as contributing to a “ reverse pivot ” away from Asia.

批评人士称，这场冲突导致了美国“反向转向”远离亚洲。

U.S. military assets, including precision-guided ammunition and an aircraft carrier , have left the Indo-Pacific for the Middle East.

包括精确制导弹药和航空母舰在内的美国军事资产已离开印太地区前往中东。

The conflict is also depleting global munitions supplies, raising concerns among Asian allies as the United States cancels joint military exercises with South Korea and delays a nearly $30 billion approved arms sales to Taiwan.

这场冲突还耗尽了全球弹药供应，引发了亚洲盟友的担忧，因为美国取消了与韩国的联合军演，并推迟了已批准的近 300 亿美元的对台军售。

At the same time, U.S. tariffs , the dissolution of the U.S. Agency for International Development , and retreat from regional economic engagement have weakened other pillars of American influence.

与此同时，美国的关税、美国国际开发署的解散以及退出区域经济参与削弱了美国影响力的其他支柱。

But the problem is not necessarily Washington’s abandonment of Asia.

但问题并不一定在于华盛顿放弃亚洲。

China remains the United States’ principal long-term strategic competitor, and the administration’s own strategy documents recognize this reality.

中国仍然是美国主要的长期战略竞争对手，政府自己的战略文件也承认这一现实。

The deeper problem is strategic incoherence .

更深层次的问题是战略不一致。

U.S. officials continue to identify Asia as a priority while pursuing policies that make sustaining that priority increasingly difficult.

美国官员继续将亚洲视为优先事项，同时推行的政策使维持这一优先事项变得越来越困难。

The most visible problem is in the military domain.

最明显的问题是在军事领域。

Although formidable, American power cannot be everything, everywhere, all at once.

美国的实力虽然强大，但不可能同时包揽一切、无处不在。

Aircraft carriers, missile defense systems, precision-guided munitions, bombers, logistics networks, and trained personnel cannot simply be duplicated when simultaneous crises occur.

当危机同时发生时，航空母舰、导弹防御系统、精确制导弹药、轰炸机、后勤网络和训练有素的人员不能简单地复制。

The Iran war has demonstrated how quickly regional contingencies can consume capabilities intended to support a global strategy.

伊朗战争已经证明，地区突发事件能够以多么快的速度消耗旨在支持全球战略的能力。

This matters in Asia because deterrence depends not simply on aggregate U.S. military power, but on an adversary’s assessment that Washington possesses both the capability and political willingness to employ it during a crisis.

这对亚洲很重要，因为威慑不仅取决于美国的总体军事力量，还取决于对手对华盛顿拥有在危机期间使用军事力量的能力和政治意愿的评估。

Adversaries, such as Beijing and Pyongyang, are not just watching to see whether the United States succeeds or fails in Iran, but also what the war reveals about American capacity to manage multiple contingencies simultaneously.

北京和平壤等对手不仅关注美国在伊朗问题上是成功还是失败，还关注这场战争揭示了美国同时应对多种突发事件的能力。

The consequences are also political.

其后果也是政治性的。

Allies, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines, have been encouraged to invest more heavily in their own defense.

日本、韩国、澳大利亚和菲律宾等盟国被鼓励加大对本国国防的投资。

Asking allies to assume greater responsibility is reasonable.

要求盟友承担更大责任是合理的。

But demands for greater burden-sharing become harder to reconcile with policies that raise questions about Washington’s own commitments to the region or suggest that alliances are primarily transactional arrangements.

但加强分担负担的要求变得越来越难以与那些引发人们对华盛顿自身对该地区承诺的质疑或暗示联盟主要是交易性安排的政策相协调。

For Southeast Asian countries , the problem is different but equally significant.

对于东南亚国家来说，问题有所不同但同样重要。

Many already seek to avoid choosing between Washington and Beijing.

许多人已经试图避免在华盛顿和北京之间做出选择。

A United States consumed by another Middle Eastern war while simultaneously restricting trade and imposing economic costs on regional partners makes hedging more attractive.

美国在另一场中东战争中消耗殆尽，同时限制贸易并给地区伙伴带来经济成本，这使得对冲更具吸引力。

China does not automatically inherit American influence when Washington falters.

当华盛顿动摇时，中国不会自动继承美国的影响力。

However, Beijing benefits when countries question whether the United States can offer a durable combination of security, economic opportunity, and political reliability.

然而，当各国质疑美国能否提供安全、经济机会和政治可靠性的持久组合时，北京就会受益。

The Korean Peninsula further illustrates why the Iran war’s consequences extend beyond the diversion of American military resources, as alliance management has also become entangled with the Iran conflict.

朝鲜半岛进一步说明了为什么伊朗战争的后果超出了美国军事资源的转移，因为联盟管理也与伊朗冲突纠缠在一起。

President Donald Trump linked the recent reduction of the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises between U.S. and South Korean forces partly to tensions over South Korea’s unwillingness to support the U.S. war effort.

唐纳德·特朗普总统将最近美国和韩国军队之间“乙支自由之盾”演习的减少部分归因于韩国不愿支持美国战争努力导致的紧张局势。

Treating alliance readiness as leverage over an ally’s position toward an unrelated conflict risks weakening the very deterrence Washington is trying to preserve.

将联盟的准备状态视为对盟友在不相关冲突中的立场的影响力，可能会削弱华盛顿试图维持的威慑力。

Another enduring impact may be the lessons North Korea draws from Iran.

另一个持久的影响可能是朝鲜从伊朗吸取的教训。

For decades, Pyongyang has justified its nuclear program as necessary to prevent the same fate as governments , such as those in Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Libya under Moammar Gadhafi.

几十年来，平壤一直证明其核计划是必要的，以防止与萨达姆·侯赛因领导下的伊拉克和穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲领导下的利比亚等政府同样的命运。

Iran adds another data point.

伊朗添加了另一个数据点。

From North Korea’s perspective, the contrast is stark.

从朝鲜的角度来看，对比是鲜明的。

Iran possesses significant missile capabilities and a budding nuclear program, but not an operational nuclear arsenal capable of credibly threatening the United States or its allies with nuclear retaliation.

伊朗拥有强大的导弹能力和正在萌芽的核计划，但没有能够以核报复可信地威胁美国或其盟友的作战核武库。

North Korean leaders may thus interpret the Iran war as further evidence that nuclear weapons are essential to regime survival, reinforcing the Kim regime’s firm rejection of denuclearization.

因此，朝鲜领导人可能将伊朗战争解读为核武器对于政权生存至关重要的进一步证据，从而强化了金氏政权对无核化的坚决拒绝。

The lessons of Iran also come at the operational level.

伊朗的教训也体现在操作层面。

North Korean military planners will study the vulnerability of Iranian leadership and command structures, air defenses, missile launchers, underground facilities, and communications networks.

朝鲜军事规划者将研究伊朗领导和指挥结构、防空系统、导弹发射器、地下设施和通信网络的脆弱性。

They are likely to place even greater emphasis on leadership survivability, hardened and dispersed command-and-control systems, mobile missile launchers, larger missile inventories, drones, air and missile defenses, and the ability to retaliate after absorbing an initial attack.

他们可能会更加重视领导层的生存能力、强化和分散的指挥控制系统、移动导弹发射器、更大的导弹库存、无人机、空中和导弹防御系统，以及吸收初始攻击后的报复能力。

This creates an uncomfortable paradox for Washington.

这给华盛顿带来了一个令人不安的悖论。

A war intended to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons may not only strengthen Tehran’s resolve to preserve its nuclear program, but also reinforce North Korea’s determination to sustain, if not expand , its own nuclear program.

一场旨在阻止伊朗获得核武器的战争不仅可能会增强德黑兰保留其核计划的决心，而且还会增强朝鲜维持（如果不是扩大）其核计划的决心。

Moreover, if Iran ultimately decides to pursue nuclear weapons, it may look to North Korea as a model.

此外，如果伊朗最终决定发展核武器，它可能会将朝鲜视为榜样。

The United States cannot simply withdraw from every crisis outside of Asia.

美国不能简单地从亚洲以外的每一次危机中撤军。

But prioritization requires choices.

但优先顺序需要选择。

If Washington believes, as its own strategy documents state, that preserving a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is a vital national interest, it must protect the resources and relationships necessary to accomplish that objective.

如果华盛顿相信，正如其自己的战略文件所述，维持印太地区的有利力量平衡是至关重要的国家利益，那么它就必须保护实现这一目标所需的资源和关系。

Three correctives are particularly important.

三个纠正措施尤其重要。

First, Washington should establish clearer limits on the military resources allocated to Iran and accelerate replenishment of munitions and missile defense inventories relevant to Indo-Pacific contingencies.

首先，华盛顿应该对分配给伊朗的军事资源制定更明确的限制，并加快补充与印太突发事件相关的弹药和导弹防御库存。

An Asia strategy, including deterring China, cannot succeed if the capabilities on which it depends are continually diverted elsewhere.

如果亚洲战略所依赖的能力不断转移到其他地方，包括威慑中国，那么该战略就不可能成功。

Second, the administration should reassure Indo-Pacific allies that commitments to their defense will not become bargaining chips in disputes over their participation in outside military operations.

其次，政府应向印太盟友保证，对其防务的承诺不会成为参与外部军事行动争端中讨价还价的筹码。

In the Korean context, Washington should insulate alliance readiness and extended deterrence from disagreements with Seoul over Iran.

在朝鲜问题上，华盛顿应该做好结盟准备，并扩大威慑力，避免与首尔在伊朗问题上存在分歧。

If joint exercises need to be temporarily curtailed, Washington and Seoul should at least coordinate how they might publicly message scaled-down exercises.

如果联合演习需要暂时缩减，华盛顿和首尔至少应该协调如何公开发布缩减演习的消息。

Third, Washington should take visible steps to demonstrate that the diversion of resources to Iran is temporary rather than the beginning of a broader strategic retrenchment from Asia.

第三，华盛顿应该采取明显的步骤来表明，将资源转移到伊朗只是暂时的，而不是更广泛的亚洲战略紧缩的开始。

Congress could take a stronger stand, withholding additional spending for the war in Iran unless the Trump administration presents a coherent exit strategy .

除非特朗普政府提出连贯的退出战略，否则国会可能会采取更强硬的立场，停止为伊朗战争提供额外支出。

As operational demands permit, the United States should restore key naval and air assets to the Indo-Pacific, maintain the tempo of exercises with allies and partners, and sustain senior-level participation in regional forums.

在作战需求允许的情况下，美国应将关键的海军和空军资产恢复到印太地区，保持与盟友和伙伴的演习节奏，并维持高层参与地区论坛。

The Iran war has not necessarily reversed the pivot.

伊朗战争并不一定会扭转这一轴心。

The United States still retains powerful military capabilities, strong allies, and an extensive network of regional partnerships.

美国仍然保留着强大的军事能力、强大的盟友和广泛的区域伙伴关系网络。

More importantly, the Trump administration continues to identify China as America’s long-term pacing challenge and the Indo-Pacific as the priority theater.

更重要的是，特朗普政府继续将中国视为美国的长期挑战，并将印太地区视为优先战区。

The danger of the Iran war may therefore be less a formal American retreat from Asia than the gradual erosion of the credibility, capabilities, and partnerships required to sustain U.S. leadership there.

因此，伊朗战争的危险可能不是美国正式从亚洲撤退，而是维持美国在亚洲领导地位所需的信誉、能力和伙伴关系的逐渐侵蚀。