Envisioning the Legal Fight over NATO Withdrawal
The following is a summary of the special 52nd session of the Congressional Study Group on Foreign Relations and National Security , a program for congressional staff focused on critically engaging the legal and policy factors that define the role that Congress plays in various aspects of U.S. foreign relations and national security policy.
以下是国会外交关系和国家安全研究小组第 52 届特别会议的摘要，这是一项针对国会工作人员的计划，重点是批判性地讨论界定国会在美国外交关系和国家安全政策各个方面所扮演的角色的法律和政策因素。
On July 24, 2026, the Congressional Study Group on Foreign Relations and National Security convened for a special half-day session at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., to discuss what a legal challenge to an attempted U.S. withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would look like.
2026 年 7 月 24 日，国会外交关系和国家安全研究小组在华盛顿特区布鲁金斯学会召开了一次为期半天的特别会议，讨论对美国试图退出北大西洋公约组织 (NATO) 的法律挑战会是什么样子。
During his first term in office, President Trump is reported to have seriously considered withdrawing the United States from NATO.
据报道，特朗普总统在其第一个任期内曾认真考虑过让美国退出北约。
Congress responded in 2023 by enacting a novel statutory provision—now codified at 22 U.S.C.
国会于 2023 年做出回应，颁布了一项新颖的法律条款——现已编入《美国法典》第 22 条。
§ 1928f , and commonly known as the Kaine-Rubio provision—that expressly prohibits the president from exiting the North Atlantic Treaty without prior congressional authorization.
§ 1928f ，通常称为凯恩-卢比奥条款，明确禁止总统在未经国会事先授权的情况下退出北大西洋公约。
Because no one has ever sought to vindicate congressional authority over treaty exit in court, any attempt to leave NATO without complying with that provision would raise constitutional questions that may well require resolution by the Supreme Court—if, that is, a viable legal challenge can be mounted at all.
因为没有人试图在法庭上证明国会对退出条约的权力，任何不遵守该规定而退出北约的企图都会引发宪法问题，这些问题很可能需要最高法院解决——也就是说，如果能够提出可行的法律挑战的话。
Departing from the study group’s usual format, this session brought congressional staff together with a diverse array of leading academic experts, former executive branch and congressional lawyers, and experienced public interest litigators for an extended working discussion organized around three sets of questions: the justiciability of a legal challenge to a hypothetical attempt to remove the United States from NATO, the constitutional merits of any such debate, and potential remedies.
与研究小组通常的形式不同，本次会议将国会工作人员与各种领先的学术专家、前行政部门和国会律师以及经验丰富的公共利益诉讼律师聚集在一起，围绕三组问题进行了广泛的工作讨论：对假设的美国退出北约企图的法律挑战的可审理性、任何此类辩论的宪法优点以及潜在的补救措施。
(A list of outside participants is available here .) Because the convening was structured as an open working discussion rather than a panel presentation, and because the entire session was held under the Chatham House Rule , the summary below reflects the substance of the conversation without attributing particular views to individual participants.
（外部参与者名单可在此处查看。）由于会议的结构是公开工作讨论而不是小组演示，而且整个会议是根据查塔姆研究所规则举行的，因此下面的摘要反映了对话的实质内容，而没有将特定观点归于个别参与者。
The discussion opened with the threshold question of whether a challenge to treaty withdrawal could be heard at all.
讨论以是否可以听取对退出条约的质疑这一门槛问题开始。
Participants returned repeatedly to Goldwater v.
参与者反复回到戈德华特诉。
Carter , the sole Supreme Court case to address the question, which was resolved on justiciability grounds rather than the merits—with Justice Powell concluding the dispute was not ripe and a plurality treating it as a nonjusticiable political question.
卡特案是解决该问题的唯一最高法院案件，该案件是根据可审理性而非实质问题解决的，鲍威尔法官认为该争议尚未成熟，多数人将其视为不可审理的政治问题。
Several participants argued that the political question barrier is weaker than it appears: The unmaking of a treaty is not textually committed to another branch, judicially manageable standards exist, and Zivotofsky v.
几位与会者认为，政治问题障碍比表面上看起来要弱：条约的废除并没有在文本上提交给另一个部门，存在司法上可管理的标准，以及《齐沃托夫斯基诉美国》一案。
Clinton has narrowed the operative Baker v.
克林顿缩小了贝克诉案件的范围。
Carr factors in the foreign affairs context.
卡尔在外交事务方面的因素。
More than one participant emphasized that Goldwater was decided on the emergency docket in 1979 without oral argument, involved a bilateral treaty terminated in accordance with its own terms, and says nothing about the termination of multilateral agreements in the face of a contrary statute—making it, in one view, a thin foundation for a claimed presidential power to exit thousands of treaties at will.
不止一位与会者强调，戈德华特于 1979 年未经口头辩论就被列入紧急议程，涉及根据其自身条款终止的双边条约，并且没有提及在相反的法规面前终止多边协议——在一种观点中，这为声称的总统随意退出数千项条约的权力奠定了薄弱的基础。
Timing was also flagged as a strategic variable in its own right: A case would need to be brought with enough urgency to be taken seriously, but not so much urgency as to encourage the court to resolve it summarily.
时机本身也被标记为一个战略变量：案件需要足够紧迫才能得到认真对待，但又不能紧迫到鼓励法院立即解决问题的程度。
Participants then mapped the temporal window in which a suit could realistically proceed.
然后，参与者绘制了诉讼可以实际进行的时间窗口。
Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty permits withdrawal one year after notice is deposited, and § 1928f layers an additional 180-day notice requirement on top of that—though several participants doubted the executive branch would treat the statutory notice period as binding, pointing to the disregard of a comparable notice requirement in the 2020 withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty .
《北大西洋公约》第 13 条允许在通知提交一年后退出，并且 § 1928f 在此基础上提出了额外的 180 天通知要求——尽管一些与会者怀疑行政部门是否会将法定通知期限视为具有约束力，并指出 2020 年退出《开放天空条约》时忽视了类似的通知要求。
The practical effect, participants observed, is that the period after notice is deposited but before the year runs out is likely the only window in which ripeness and mootness problems can both be avoided.
参与者观察到，实际效果是，通知提交后、一年结束前的这段时间可能是可以避免成熟度和实际问题的唯一窗口。
Others countered that if the withdrawal is unlawful under domestic law, the one-year clock is arguably not running at all—an argument that would counsel against rushing and could support a litigation timeline extending well past a year.
其他人则反驳说，如果根据国内法，撤回是非法的，那么一年的时钟可以说根本就没有运行——这一论点建议不要仓促行事，并可能支持将诉讼时间表延长到一年以上。
Turning to standing, participants noted that most of the United States’ institutional intersection with NATO runs through the executive branch itself, which eliminates a large share of potential plaintiffs at the outset.
在谈到诉讼资格时，与会者指出，美国与北约的大部分机构交集都是通过行政部门本身进行的，这从一开始就消除了很大一部分潜在原告。
Three categories of private plaintiffs were identified as most promising: Americans employed directly by NATO, whose employment is conditioned on citizenship in a member state (a small group, perhaps fewer than 100 people, and one whose injury NATO could blunt through its own personnel policies); the state of Virginia, through Old Dominion University or the City of Norfolk, both of which appear to hold contracts with NATO’s Allied Command Transformation; and defense contractors holding agreements directly with NATO or a NATO support agency rather than through the U.S. government—a group with clear concrete injury but, participants cautioned, little appetite for litigation against the current administration.
三类私人原告被认为是最有前途的： 直接受北约雇佣的美国人，他们的就业条件是以成员国公民身份为条件（一小群人，可能不到 100 人，北约可以通过自己的人事政策来削弱他们的伤害）；弗吉尼亚州，通过奥多明尼恩大学或诺福克市，这两所大学似乎都与北约盟军司令部转型签订了合同；国防承包商直接与北约或北约支持机构而不是通过美国政府签订协议——这一群体受到了明显的具体损害，但与会者警告说，他们对针对现任政府提起诉讼的兴趣不大。
Smaller defense-technology firms with awards under NATO’s DIANA innovation initiative were suggested as more willing potential plaintiffs, given the larger share of revenue at stake.
鉴于所涉收入份额较大，在北约戴安娜创新计划下获得奖项的小型国防技术公司被认为是更愿意的潜在原告。
Participants added several further possibilities: individuals whose U.S. government positions are open to them only by virtue of NATO-member nationality; European contractors who would lose contracts; embedded journalists who might be excluded from access; a service member ordered to conduct an operation outside NATO channels; defense industry associations whose members’ interests are directly implicated; non-U.S.-person NATO employees with family and schooling ties in the United States, whose claims might proceed in the Court of Federal Claims; and NATO itself and other member states, whose participation—whether as parties or as amici—could carry considerable weight with a reviewing court.
参与者还补充了几种进一步的可能性：仅凭借北约成员国国籍才可以在美国政府担任职位的个人；将失去合同的欧洲承包商；可能被排除在外的嵌入记者；被命令在北约渠道之外开展行动的军人；直接涉及会员利益的国防工业协会；在美国有家庭和学校关系的非美国人北约雇员，其索赔可能会在联邦索赔法院审理；以及北约本身和其他成员国，他们的参与——无论是作为当事人还是作为之友——都可以对审查法院产生相当大的影响。
Congressional standing drew extended attention.
国会地位引起了广泛关注。
Participants agreed that Raines v.
与会者同意雷恩斯诉。
Byrd forecloses suits by individual legislators asserting institutional injury and canvassed the recognized exceptions: vote nullification under Coleman v.
伯德取消了个别立法者声称机构损害的诉讼，并探讨了公认的例外情况：科尔曼诉科尔曼案中的投票无效。
Miller , and suits brought by a legislator authorized to represent a chamber.
米勒，以及由授权代表众议院的立法者提起的诉讼。
On that reading, the strongest theory would have Congress authorize litigation on its own behalf—an approach that has apparently never been used and that would require majority support in both chambers.
根据这一解读，最有力的理论是让国会代表自己授权提起诉讼——这种方法显然从未被使用过，并且需要参众两院的多数支持。
A more feasible alternative would be a single-chamber suit authorized by simple resolution, building on litigation over the Affordable Care Act, the border wall, and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States House of Representatives v.
一个更可行的替代方案是通过简单决议授权的单室诉讼，以平价医疗法案、边境墙和华盛顿特区巡回法院在美国众议院诉华盛顿特区一案中的裁决为基础。
Mnuchin , which recognized chamber standing for Appropriations Clause violations—a theory with particular purchase here because § 1928f contains its own appropriations restriction.
姆努钦 (Mnuchin) 承认商会代表违反拨款条款，这一理论在这里具有特殊意义，因为 § 1928f 包含其自己的拨款限制。
A third and more provocative theory would have 34 senators sue in their individual capacities on the ground that, because entry into an Article II treaty required the advice and consent of two thirds of the Senate, a matching minority holds the votes necessary to block exit and has therefore had its vote nullified.
第三种更具挑衅性的理论将由 34 名参议员以个人身份提起诉讼，理由是，由于加入第二条条约需要参议院三分之二的建议和同意，因此匹配的少数派拥有阻止退出所需的选票，因此其投票无效。
Participants noted the tension this creates with the statute itself, since the theory requires arguing that § 1928f is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to permit withdrawal on a simple majority of both chambers.
与会者注意到这与法规本身产生的紧张关系，因为该理论要求论证 § 1928f 是违宪的，因为它声称允许两院简单多数撤回。
A related and recurring difficulty is that the case law suggests Congress cannot establish standing merely to enforce a statute, but must identify an underlying constitutional injury—which sits uncomfortably with the widely shared view that the statutory claim is the stronger claim on the merits.
一个相关且反复出现的困难是，判例法表明国会不能仅仅为了执行一项法规而确立诉讼资格，而必须确定潜在的宪法损害——这与广泛接受的观点不一致，即法定主张是就案情而言更强的主张。
One participant offered a possible resolution: The argument is not simply that the statute should be enforced, but that the statute changes the underlying constitutional posture by placing the president in Youngstown Category Three, such that a plaintiff is vindicating a structural constitutional principle rather than a bare statutory interest.
一位与会者提出了一个可能的解决方案：争论的焦点不仅仅是该法规应该得到执行，而是该法规通过将总统置于扬斯敦第三类来改变潜在的宪法立场，这样原告就可以维护结构性宪法原则，而不是纯粹的法定利益。
Participants also discussed the authority of the House’s Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, tested but not resolved in United States v.
与会者还讨论了众议院两党法律咨询小组的权威，该权威在“美国诉美国”案中得到了检验，但尚未得到解决。
Windsor , and noted pending D.C. Circuit litigation over congressional access to immigration detention facilities as a case to watch for developments on congressional standing generally.
温莎，并指出华盛顿特区巡回法院悬而未决的关于国会使用移民拘留设施的诉讼，可以作为关注国会地位总体发展的一个案例。
The group also considered why the mandatory litigation-authorization language that survived committee markup was ultimately dropped from the enacted provision, with participants describing a combination of institutional concerns about compelling litigation decades into the future and, more decisively, a hard conference-stage choice between dropping that language and losing the provision altogether.
该小组还考虑了为什么在委员会加价后幸存下来的强制性诉讼授权语言最终从颁布的条款中删除，参与者描述了机构对未来几十年强制诉讼的担忧，以及更果断的是，会议阶段在放弃该语言和完全放弃该条款之间做出了艰难的选择。
On the merits, the discussion began from the premise that the Constitution is silent on the process for treaty exit, and as a result, every argument proceeds from text, structure, historical practice, or function.
论的是非曲直，讨论的前提是宪法对条约退出程序没有规定，因此，每一个争论都是从文本、结构、历史实践或功能出发。
Textually, participants observed, the Constitution specifies how treaties are made and says nothing about how they are unmade, which throws the question back to the constitutional default.
与会者指出，从文本上看，宪法规定了条约的制定方式，但没有提及条约如何废止，这使问题又回到了宪法默认问题。
Structurally, the allocation of foreign affairs authority is one of shared power in which unilateral presidential authority is an exception, not the rule—counseling against a default rule of unilateral exit.
从结构上看，外交权力的分配是一种共享权力，其中单边总统权力是一种例外，而不是规则——反对单边退出的默认规则。
Several participants framed the central stake in precisely those terms: whether the president may terminate any treaty at will, or whether the answer is context dependent.
几位与会者正是用这些术语来阐述核心利益：总统是否可以随意终止任何条约，或者答案是否取决于具体情况。
Participants were notably skeptical that historical gloss and interbranch practice carry the weight typically assigned to them.
参与者特别怀疑历史注释和跨部门实践是否具有通常分配给他们的重要性。
Congressional approval for withdrawal was generally viewed as necessary well into the late nineteenth century, with the shift toward unilateral practice only solidifying around the time of the 1979 Taiwan treaty termination.
早在 19 世纪末，国会批准退出就被普遍认为是必要的，单方面做法的转变直到 1979 年台湾条约终止时才得到巩固。
Participants urged narrowing the relevant precedents to contested withdrawals rather than the many uncontroversial terminations the government would cite, and one recounted research showing that a frequently invoked State Department list of unilateral terminations consists largely of the Bancroft naturalization conventions, which were terminated in consultation with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after Supreme Court decisions rendered them unenforceable—a tenuous foundation for a broad unilateral power.
与会者敦促将相关先例缩小到有争议的退出，而不是政府引用的许多无争议的终止，一项研究表明，经常引用的国务院单方面终止入籍清单主要包括班克罗夫特入籍公约，这些公约在最高法院的裁决使这些公约无法执行后与参议院外交关系委员会协商终止——这是广泛的单方面权力的脆弱基础。
Participants also noted that Justice Brennan, the only justice in Goldwater to reach the merits, grounded his position in the president’s recognition power rather than any general withdrawal authority.
与会者还指出，布伦南大法官是戈德华特案中唯一一位提出案情的大法官，他的立场基于总统的承认权，而不是任何一般性的撤回权。
INS v.
INS v。
Chadha was repeatedly offered as the closest analogy: There the court struck down the legislative veto on textual and structural grounds notwithstanding extensive uncontested practice to the contrary.
查达一再被用作最接近的类比：法院以文本和结构为由推翻了立法否决权，尽管存在大量无可争议的相反做法。
There was broad agreement that the Youngstown framework should be front and center.
人们普遍认为扬斯敦框架应该成为首要和中心。
Withdrawal is not an inherent presidential power, and the existence of § 1928f places any unilateral exit squarely at the lowest ebb of presidential authority.
退出并不是总统固有的权力，§ 1928f 的存在使任何单方面退出都直接处于总统权力的最低潮。
One participant expressed confidence that the court would reject an originalist “mirror image” argument but would be receptive to a structural Youngstown analysis in the special case where a statute exists, and urged that this be the lead argument.
一位与会者表示相信法院会拒绝原旨主义的“镜像”论点，但会接受在存在法规的特殊案件中进行结构性扬斯敦分析，并敦促将此作为主要论点。
Participants worked through which precedents the government would invoke and which should be resisted as inapposite—including Zivotofsky because it rests on an inherent textual power over recognition and concerned the narrow exercise of the diplomatic function, as well as the removal-power cases because the appointments analogy does not translate to treaties.
与会者讨论了政府将援引哪些先例，以及哪些先例应予以抵制，因为这些先例不合适——包括齐沃托夫斯基，因为它依赖于固有的文本权力来承认并涉及外交职能的狭隘行使，以及罢免权力的案例，因为任命类比不能转化为条约。
Participants suggested the affirmative argument should run from the premise that a president cannot unilaterally repeal a statute, and therefore cannot repeal a congressional-executive agreement or a treaty approved by a supermajority of the Senate; Dames & Moore v.
与会者建议，肯定性论点的前提是总统不能单方面废除一项法规，因此不能废除国会与行政部门的协议或参议院绝大多数批准的条约；达姆斯与摩尔诉。
Regan was offered as a model for a narrow, fact-bound disposition.
里根被视为狭隘的、受事实约束的处置的典范。
The conversation turned to executive branch precedent, and in particular to two Office of Legal Counsel opinions from the first Trump administration addressing withdrawal from NAFTA and from the Open Skies Treaty .
谈话转向了行政部门的先例，特别是第一届特朗普政府关于退出北美自由贸易协定和开放天空条约的两项法律顾问办公室意见。
The NAFTA opinion took an expansive view of implied presidential authority and a narrow view of Congress’s foreign affairs powers, reasoning that a president who executes a treaty may also execute its withdrawal provision.
北美自由贸易协定的意见对隐含的总统权力采取了广泛的看法，而对国会的外交事务权力采取了狭隘的看法，认为执行条约的总统也可以执行其退出条款。
The Open Skies opinion went further, treating treaty termination as an area of exclusive executive authority such that the statutory notice requirement was itself unconstitutional—a position participants characterized as untenable even under Youngstown Category Three, and one they suggested a future administration should formally withdraw.
开放天空的意见更进一步，将条约终止视为专属行政权力的一个领域，因此法定通知要求本身就是违宪的——即使在扬斯敦第三类下，参与者的立场也被认为是站不住脚的，他们建议未来的政府应该正式撤回这一立场。
Participants observed that the current Office of Legal Counsel is, if anything, more aggressive than the office that produced those opinions.
与会者指出，目前的法律顾问办公室比提出这些意见的办公室更具侵略性。
Against that backdrop, several noted the significance of the Biden administration’s decision, after internal debate, not to issue any statement questioning the constitutionality of the NATO provision when it was enacted—a decision described as resting on policy and political judgment as much as legal analysis, and one that supplies a meaningful argument of executive acquiescence, particularly before a court that has shown itself less deferential when it perceives the executive branch changing positions.
在此背景下，一些人指出了拜登政府在内部辩论后决定不发表任何声明质疑北约条款颁布时的合宪性的重要性——这一决定被描述为基于政策和政治判断以及法律分析，并且为行政部门默许提供了有意义的论据，特别是在法院面前，而法院在认为行政部门改变立场时表现得不那么恭敬。
Functional and comparative considerations, participants argued, now cut against unilateral exit rather than for it.
与会者认为，功能性和比较性考虑现在反对单方面退出，而不是支持单方面退出。
The classic justification—that a president may need to affect a rapid “divorce” from a treaty—has little purchase where there is no urgency, and the modern pattern in which each administration undoes its predecessor’s commitments makes it harder, not easier, for the United States to make credible treaty commitments in the future.
经典的理由——总统可能需要影响迅速“脱离”条约——在没有紧迫性的情况下几乎没有什么意义，而每届政府都撤销前任承诺的现代模式使美国在未来做出可信的条约承诺变得更加困难，而不是更容易。
Comparative constitutional practice was said to favor a mirror principle under which the legislative input required to exit should be commensurate with that required to enter, with the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s Brexit decision—requiring parliamentary approval before the executive could trigger Article 50—offered as the clearest illustration.
据说，比较宪法实践倾向于采用镜像原则，即退出所需的立法投入应与进入所需的立法投入相称，英国最高法院的脱欧决定（在行政部门触发第 50 条之前需要获得议会批准）就是最清晰的例证。
One participant suggested that amending the statute to distinguish suspension from termination could strengthen both the functional and constitutional arguments, by ensuring that genuine exigencies have a remedy short of exit.
一位与会者建议，修改法规以区分中止和终止可以通过确保真正的紧急情况有退出之外的补救措施来加强功能和宪法方面的论点。
Another pointed to the Supreme Court’s decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v.
另一位指出最高法院在 Learning Resources, Inc. v. 案中的判决。
Trump as useful ammunition: a foreign affairs case in which the president lost and the court recognized an exclusive congressional power, which might support protecting particular categories of agreements—trade, tariffs, and defense—even if the mirror principle itself does not carry the day.
特朗普是有用的弹药：在一场外交案件中，总统败诉，法院承认国会拥有排他性权力，这可能支持保护特定类别的协议——贸易、关税和国防——即使镜像原则本身并不成功。
Two participants situated the discussion in current events.
两位与会者将讨论置于时事中。
One urged the group not to lose sight of the Greenland episode, arguing that the threat of force against an ally implicated Congress’s war, funding, and rulemaking powers simultaneously, that such an order should have been treated by the military as facially illegal absent any national security rationale, and that any effort to extinguish Greenlandic self-determination would raise grave human rights concerns.
其中一位人士敦促该组织不要忽视格陵兰岛事件，认为对盟友的武力威胁同时涉及国会的战争、资金和规则制定权，在没有任何国家安全理由的情况下，军方应该将这样的命令视为表面上非法，并且任何消除格陵兰自决的努力都会引起严重的人权问题。
Another, drawing on recent conversations in Europe, reported that allied governments are focused less on formal withdrawal than on the prospect of the United States rendering NATO dysfunctional in practice—by withholding key appointments, blocking exercises and decisions, or actively preventing a European response to Russian aggression—a set of scenarios closer to suspension than to exit.
另一份报告借鉴了欧洲最近的对话，报告称，盟国政府不太关注正式撤军，而是关注美国在实践中导致北约功能失调的前景——通过扣留关键任命、阻止演习和决定，或积极阻止欧洲对俄罗斯侵略做出反应——一系列更接近于暂停而不是退出的情景。
The final segment addressed remedies, beginning with the question of whom to sue.
最后一部分讨论了补救措施，首先是起诉谁的问题。
Suing the president directly raises well-known difficulties, and participants noted that the United States occupies an unusual position as depositary for the North Atlantic Treaty—a ministerial role of transmitting notices and maintaining the list of parties that is discharged by identifiable officials within the State Department.
直接起诉总统会带来众所周知的困难，与会者指出，美国作为《北大西洋公约》的保存国，占据着不同寻常的地位——传递通知和维护缔约方名单的部长级角色，由国务院内可识别的官员解除。
That role, participants suggested, may supply both a cleaner defendant and a more concrete litigation hook, allowing relief to run down the diplomatic chain of command without joining the president.
与会者认为，这一角色可能会提供一个更干净的被告和一个更具体的诉讼钩子，从而允许救济在不加入总统的情况下沿着外交指挥链运行。
Participants also flagged that a threshold fight over whether an injunction may issue against the president at all could be severed and resolved by the Supreme Court before it ever reached the underlying dispute—a prospect that strongly suggested structuring the case so that it does not become a fight about enjoining the president.
与会者还指出，关于是否可以针对总统发布禁令的门槛之争可能会在涉及根本争议之前由最高法院中断并解决——这一前景强烈建议对案件进行结构设计，使其不会成为一场关于禁止总统的争论。
Largely for that reason, participants converged on declaratory relief as the preferred remedy: a declaration that the purported withdrawal was legally insufficient and that the United States therefore has not withdrawn.
很大程度上出于这个原因，与会者一致认为宣布性救济是首选补救措施：声明所谓的撤军在法律上不充分，因此美国没有撤军。
Participants pointed to the World Health Organization as an instructive parallel, where the organization has maintained that the United States has not validly withdrawn because the governing statute conditions exit on payment of outstanding dues, and asked whether the North Atlantic Council might rely on an analogous theory—invoking Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , under which consent may be vitiated by a manifest violation of a rule of internal law of fundamental importance.
与会者指出世界卫生组织是一个具有启发性的类比，该组织坚持认为美国没有有效退出，因为管理法规的条件是在缴纳未缴会费的情况下退出，并询问北大西洋理事会是否可以依赖类似的理论——援引《维也纳条约法公约》第46条，根据该条，如果明显违反具有根本重要性的国内法规则，同意可能会无效。
Participants noted that this is ordinarily a very high bar, but that a judgment from a U.S. court would make it about as strong a case as could be constructed.
与会者指出，这通常是一个非常高的门槛，但美国法院的判决将使它成为一个尽可能强有力的案例。
The related question of reentry was described as genuinely untested: One view holds that a president cannot extinguish the Senate’s original resolution of advice and consent, so that a successor could simply rely on it to rejoin, while others cautioned that the examples usually cited involve organizations Congress has separately authorized the president to join.
相关的重新加入问题被描述为真正未经检验的：一种观点认为，总统不能废除参议院最初的建议和同意决议，以便继任者可以简单地依靠它重新加入，而其他人则警告说，通常引用的例子涉及国会单独授权总统加入的组织。
Participants also warned that a statement about “rejoining” could be read as conceding the validity of the original withdrawal, and that the safer framing is to affirm that the United States never left.
与会者还警告说，有关“重新加入”的声明可能被解读为承认最初退出的有效性，更安全的框架是确认美国从未离开。
The International Criminal Court and the so-called “Indonesian intermezzo”—in which an international organization simply disregarded a member’s absence and welcomed it back—were offered as the closer analogies.
国际刑事法院和所谓的“印度尼西亚间奏曲”——国际组织简单地忽视一名成员的缺席并欢迎其回归——被认为是更接近的类比。
On litigation posture, participants observed that the underlying facts would not be meaningfully in dispute, which should allow the parties to bypass preliminary proceedings and proceed directly to cross-motions for summary judgment, or to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits under Rule 65.
关于诉讼态势，与会者指出，基本事实不会产生有意义的争议，这应该允许双方绕过初步程序并直接进行交叉动议以进行简易判决，或者将初步禁令听证会与第 65 条规定的案情审判合并起来。
Several cautioned, however, that recent practice complicates this calculus: When this administration loses in the lower courts it now moves quickly to seek relief from the Supreme Court on the emergency docket, so litigants should assume from the outset that they may get only one fully briefed opportunity to present the merits.
然而，一些人警告说，最近的做法使这种计算变得复杂：当本届政府在下级法院败诉时，它现在会迅速采取行动，在紧急案件中寻求最高法院的救济，因此诉讼当事人从一开始就应该假设他们可能只有一次充分听取陈述的机会来陈述案情。
Participants also noted a practical limit on injunctive relief—that the North Atlantic Treaty obliges the United States to do very little affirmatively, so an administration determined to hollow out the alliance could comply with an injunction and still accomplish much of what it wanted.
与会者还指出了禁令救济的实际限制——《北大西洋公约》几乎没有要求美国采取积极行动，因此决心掏空联盟的政府可以在遵守禁令的情况下完成其想要的大部分任务。
The session closed on the relationship between the legal campaign and the political one.
会议结束时讨论了法律运动与政治运动之间的关系。
Participants emphasized that building a public constituency is not incidental to the litigation but a precondition for it, and that the message most likely to resonate—echoing both Youngstown and Learning Resources—is that no single person should be able to make a decision of this magnitude this quickly.
与会者强调，建立公众选区并不是诉讼的附带条件，而是诉讼的先决条件，而且最有可能引起共鸣的信息（与扬斯敦和学习资源相呼应）是，任何人都不应该能够如此迅速地做出如此重大的决定。
Several stressed the importance of keeping the issue bipartisan, noting the provision’s bipartisan authorship and the continued Republican support for NATO reflected in recent legislation and accession protocols.
一些人强调了保持该问题两党共同参与的重要性，并指出该条款由两党共同起草，以及共和党对北约的持续支持反映在最近的立法和入盟协议中。
There was some disagreement about how candidates should engage: One view held that candidates should avoid promising particular outcomes while litigation is pending and instead commit to respecting whatever the courts decide, while another responded that litigation is a long shot and that candidates will in practice have to state plainly that a purported withdrawal is unlawful and would not be recognized.
关于候选人应如何参与存在一些分歧：一种观点认为，候选人应避免在诉讼悬而未决时承诺特定结果，而应承诺尊重法院的任何决定，而另一种观点则回应称，诉讼的可能性不大，候选人实际上必须明确声明，所谓的退出是非法的，不会得到承认。
Participants generally agreed that a future administration should be prepared to rescind the relevant Office of Legal Counsel opinions, and one sketched a concrete sequencing strategy: a transition team memorandum that becomes an OLC opinion, released alongside a day-one executive order stating that the purported withdrawal was a nullity and that cooperation with NATO continues uninterrupted—leaving any challenger to overcome a formal opinion of the executive branch’s own lawyers.
与会者普遍认为，未来的政府应准备好撤销法律顾问办公室的相关意见，其中一人勾勒出具体的排序策略：一份过渡团队备忘录，成为 OLC 的意见，与第一天的行政命令一起发布，声明所谓的撤军是无效的，并且与北约的合作将继续不间断，让任何挑战者克服行政部门自己律师的正式意见。
Congressional staff participating in the session closed by noting that the law’s meaning has required patient explanation to allies and to NATO itself since enactment, and that continued public articulation of the legal arguments would be valuable heading into the next election cycle.
参加会议的国会工作人员在结束时指出，自颁布以来，该法律的含义需要向盟友和北约本身进行耐心解释，并且继续公开阐明法律论点对于进入下一个选举周期将是有价值的。
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