Beyond arrests: How ICE enforcement depressed local employment in 2025

逮捕之外：2025 年 ICE 执法如何抑制当地就业

2026-09-04 · Brookings Institution · 原文

In 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) sharply increased enforcement in cities across the U.S. This research paper estimates the ensuing local employment effects.

2025 年，移民和海关执法局 (ICE) 大幅增加了美国各城市的执法力度。本研究论文估计了随之而来的当地就业影响。

In surge cities, where arrests increased most, employment falls below its expected trajectory immediately after enforcement surges.

在逮捕人数增加最多的激增城市，执法激增后就业率立即低于预期轨迹。

The employment shortfall widens in the following months and shows no signs of recovery nearly one year after enforcement began.

就业缺口在接下来的几个月中扩大，并且在执法开始近一年后没有显示出恢复的迹象。

The employment shortfall substantially exceeds direct arrests, a pattern consistent with an enforcement shock whose economic effects accumulate as workers withdraw, businesses face staffing disruptions, and local consumer demand weakens.

就业短缺大大超过了直接逮捕，这种模式与执法冲击一致，随着工人撤离、企业面临人员配置中断以及当地消费者需求减弱，经济影响不断累积。

This report updates Shock, Awe, and Economic Fallout (SAEF) (2026) with additional data and an improved empirical design.

本报告更新了《震惊、敬畏和经济影响》(SAEF) (2026)，提供了更多数据和改进的实证设计。

The new evidence confirms the original finding that employment fell in the cities where enforcement surged most and shows that the shortfall continued to widen for as long as the data allow us to observe it, up to one year after an enforcement surge.

新证据证实了最初的发现，即执法力度最大的城市就业人数下降，并表明只要数据允许我们观察，就业缺口就会继续扩大，直至执法力度激增一年后。

A growing empirical literature has emerged around the 2025-2026 ICE enforcement surge, complementing this paper’s finding that community-facing enforcement generates employment losses well beyond the number of people arrested.

围绕 2025 年至 2026 年 ICE 执法激增，出现了越来越多的实证文献，补充了本文的发现，即面向社区的执法造成的就业损失远远超过被捕人数。

That literature now spans multiple data sources, geographies, and methods but converges on a consistent conclusion: Visible, community-based enforcement depresses local economic activity through channels that extend far past direct removals.

这些文献现在涵盖了多个数据源、地域和方法，但都集中在一个一致的结论上：可见的、基于社区的执法通过远远超出直接驱逐的渠道抑制了当地的经济活动。

The 2025 campaign—built around high volume, visible “shock and awe” tactics rather than the quieter, jail-based handoffs—intensified effects already documented in earlier enforcement episodes.

2025 年的行动围绕着大量、可见的“震惊和敬畏”策略，而不是更安静的、以监狱为基础的交接，强化了早期执法事件中已经记录的效果。

Watson (2014) and Alsan and Yang (2024) found that enforcement produced a “chilling effect” whereby eligible immigrant households, including U.S. citizens, withdrew from programs like Medicaid out of fear of contact with government officials.

Watson (2014) 以及 Alsan 和 Yang (2024) 发现，执法产生了“寒蝉效应”，包括美国公民在内的符合资格的移民家庭因害怕与政府官员接触而退出医疗补助等计划。

East et al.

东等人。

(2023) found that Secure Communities (a 2008-2017 program, much smaller in scale than 2025 enforcement) lowered employment and wages for U.S.-born workers, as firms scaled back operations and local spending weakened.

(2023) 发现，安全社区（一项 2008-2017 年计划，规模比 2025 年实施的规模小得多）降低了美国出生工人的就业和工资，因为企业缩减了运营规模，当地支出减弱。

The far larger, more visible 2025 surge has magnified all of these channels.

2025 年规模更大、更明显的激增放大了所有这些渠道。

Two new studies estimate the direct employment toll.

两项新研究估计了直接就业损失。

Cox and East (2026) use Current Population Survey (CPS) data to show ICE surges reduce the employment rate of likely undocumented immigrants who remain in the U.S. by 1.3 percentage points, with negative employment spillovers to U.S.-born male workers, whose employment rate fell by 0.6 percentage points.

Cox 和 East (2026) 使用当前人口调查 (CPS) 数据显示，ICE 激增使留在美国的可能无证移民的就业率降低了 1.3 个百分点，对美国出生的男性工人产生了负面的就业溢出效应，其就业率下降了 0.6 个百分点。

Zooming into a single metro area, Sojourner and Rosenthal (2026) show that the enforcement surge in the Minneapolis-Saint Paul area caused a 2.8% decline in employment, a 1.9% decline in hours worked, and a 1.7% drop in in open business locations, equivalent to an estimated $106 million in lost wages.

Sojourner 和 Rosenthal (2026) 放大到单个都市区，结果表明，明尼阿波利斯-圣保罗地区的执法激增导致就业率下降 2.8%，工作时间下降 1.9%，开放营业地点下降 1.7%，相当于估计 1.06 亿美元的工资损失。

Together, this body of work points to three mechanisms behind job losses that exceed direct removals.

总之，这项工作指出了失业背后超过直接裁员的三种机制。

First, fear drives workers to withdraw from the labor force even when they are not arrested.

首先，恐惧驱使工人退出劳动力市场，即使他们没有被捕。

Cox and East’s results are themselves evidence of this: Because their CPS sample includes only people who remain in the country, the declines they measure reflect people choosing not to work rather than physical removal.

考克斯和伊斯特的结果本身就证明了这一点：因为他们的 CPS 样本只包括留在该国的人，所以他们测量的下降反映了人们选择不工作而不是搬迁。

De Balanzó, Rodríguez-Planas, and Roff (2026) identify visibility specifically as the trigger.

De Balanzó、Rodríguez-Planas 和 Roff (2026) 将可见性明确视为触发因素。

Comparing areas where ICE surges consisted of arrests made in the community (“at-large”) to areas where the surge was concentrated in jail-based transfers that occur out of public view, they find that only the visible, community-based surges reduced credit card spending by 1.7 to 1.9 percentage points.

将 ICE 激增包括在社区（“在逃人员”）逮捕的地区与激增集中在公众视野之外发生的监狱转移的地区相比，他们发现，只有可见的、基于社区的激增才使信用卡支出减少了 1.7 至 1.9 个百分点。

Wright (2026) delves further into fear as a mechanism by showing that Spanish language and national news coverage of ICE arrests drove down foot traffic, even in the absence of, or prior to, arrests themselves.

Wright（2026）进一步深入探讨了恐惧作为一种机制，表明西班牙语和国家新闻报道对 ICE 逮捕行动会减少人流量，即使在没有逮捕或逮捕之前也是如此。

Second, sudden worker absences can disrupt firm operations.

其次，工人突然缺勤可能会扰乱公司运营。

Many businesses rely on teams of workers with job-specific knowledge, shared schedules, and interlocking tasks.

许多企业依赖于具有特定工作知识、共享时间表和相互关联的任务的员工团队。

When even a small number of workers are detained, stop showing up for work, or become difficult to recruit and retain, employers find themselves unable to operate at normal capacity.

即使少数工人被拘留、停止上班或难以招聘和留住，雇主也会发现自己无法正常运营。

Firms respond by reducing hours, delaying expansion, reducing output, freezing hiring, or in some cases, closing their business outright.

公司的应对措施是减少工作时间、推迟扩张、减少产量、冻结招聘，或者在某些情况下直接关闭业务。

Sojourner and Rosenthal’s finding that 1.7% of Minneapolis-Saint Paul business locations closed after the local surge is direct evidence of this mechanism that cause job losses to exceed direct removals.

Sojourner 和 Rosenthal 发现，明尼阿波利斯-圣保罗地区 1.7% 的商业地点在当地激增后关闭，这是这种导致失业人数超过直接裁员的机制的直接证据。

Finally, ICE enforcement suppresses local demand as consumers curtail everyday activity.

最后，由于消费者减少日常活动，ICE 执法抑制了当地需求。

Hernandez (2026) uses transaction and foot traffic data to show how disruption can spread through local demand suppression.

Hernandez（2026）使用交易和客流量数据来展示破坏如何通过当地需求抑制而蔓延。

He estimates that ICE operations in metro areas reduced weekly visits to establishments by 2.73% and consumer spending by 6.18% equivalent to $3 billion to $14 billion in lost spending nationally in the first year.

他估计，ICE 在都市区的运营使每周的营业额减少了 2.73%，消费者支出减少了 6.18%，相当于第一年全国支出损失 30 亿至 140 亿美元。

Lester, Wilson, and Knaap (2026) document a similarly sharp, more localized pattern: Spending fell 20% to 25% in Los Angeles neighborhoods with large foreign-born populations following announcements of enforcement activity.

Lester、Wilson 和 Knaap（2026）记录了一个类似的尖锐、更加本地化的模式：在宣布执法活动后，拥有大量外国出生人口的洛杉矶社区的支出下降了 20% 至 25%。

Evidence also suggests effects should not be expected to resolve quickly.

证据还表明，不应期望影响会很快消退。

Ciancio and García-Jimeno (2026) find that a 10 percentage-point increase in anticipated enforcement risk reduces consumption among Hispanic, foreign-born households by 5.3%.

Ciancio 和 García-Jimeno（2026）发现，预期执行风险增加 10 个百分点，西班牙裔、外国出生的家庭的消费会减少 5.3%。

Their model suggests that only 42% of the potential consumption rebound would occur within a year of a complete cessation of enforcement.

他们的模型表明，只有 42% 的潜在消费反弹会发生在完全停止执法的一年内。

This result suggests that the economic effects of an enforcement surge can persist well after the arrests themselves subside, consistent with the pattern this paper documents: Surge cities’ employment shortfall kept widening for as long as it could be observed with no signs of recovery nearly a year after enforcement began.

这一结果表明，在逮捕本身消退后，执法激增的经济影响可以持续很长时间，这与本文记录的模式一致：执法开始近一年后，只要可以观察到，激增城市的就业缺口就会持续扩大，而且没有复苏的迹象。

With additional data, a more targeted definition of surge cities, and an improved identification strategy, this paper revisits the central question in Shock, Awe, and Economic Fallout (SAEF): What happened to employment in the cities where ICE enforcement surged relative to the path those cities would otherwise have followed?

通过额外的数据、对激增城市更有针对性的定义以及改进的识别策略，本文重新审视了《震惊、敬畏和经济影响》(SAEF) 中的核心问题：相对于这些城市本来会遵循的路径，在 ICE 执法激增的城市中，就业发生了什么变化？

A subsequent release of Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data extends observable employment through December 2025, 1 11 months after the earliest enforcement surges.

随后发布的就业和工资季度普查 (QCEW) 数据将可观察就业延长至 2025 年 12 月，即最早的执法激增之后的 11 个月。

These additional months allow us to estimate effects over a longer post-surge period and better assess whether surge cities showed evidence of recovery.

这些额外的几个月使我们能够估计激增后较长时期内的影响，并更好地评估激增城市是否显示出复苏的证据。

Alongside improved data, this analysis defines surge cities using increases in ICE arrests both in absolute terms and per worker.

除了改进的数据外，该分析还利用 ICE 逮捕人数的绝对数量和人均逮捕数量的增加来定义激增城市。

The intersection of the two captures both the chilling effect of absolute enforcement as well as the mechanical effect of direct labor-force removals.

两者的交叉体现了绝对执法的寒蝉效应以及直接劳动力转移的机械效应。

Finally, this analysis strips employment data of seasonal patterns and explicitly models surge cities’ upward employment trend prior to the ICE arrest surges, relative to control cities over that same period, and then extrapolates that trend forward to build the post-surge counterfactual against which 2025 surge-city employment is compared.

最后，该分析剥离了季节性模式的就业数据，并明确模拟了 ICE 逮捕激增之前激增城市相对于同期对照城市的上升就业趋势，然后推断该趋势以建立高峰后反事实，并与 2025 年激增城市就业进行比较。

Unless otherwise noted, methods and definitions follow those described in SAEF.

除非另有说明，方法和定义遵循 SAEF 中所述的方法和定义。

We define surge cities using the intersection of two rules: Cities must rank in the top quartile of enforcement growth both in absolute arrests and in arrests per worker, relative to each city’s own 2024 baseline.

我们使用两条规则的交集来定义激增城市：相对于每个城市自己的 2024 年基线，城市必须在绝对逮捕人数和每名工人逮捕人数方面均位于执法增长的前四分之一。

This definition captures two effects.

这个定义体现了两个效果。

The absolute arrests rule captures the chilling effect: The visible presence of ICE agents in communities caused immigrant workers to withdraw from public life, reducing economic activity well beyond the workers directly arrested.

绝对逮捕规则体现了寒蝉效应：社区中 ICE 特工的明显存在导致移民工人退出公共生活，减少的经济活动远远超出了直接被捕的工人的范围。

The per worker arrest rule captures a second, more mechanical channel: Arrests remove people from the labor force directly.

每个工人的逮捕规则抓住了第二个更机械的渠道：逮捕直接将人们从劳动力中剔除。

That channel is strongest where arrests are large relative to a city’s population.

当逮捕人数相对于城市人口而言较多时，这一渠道最为强大。

This intersection definition is more targeted than either measure alone, and it is the specification we carry through the paper.

这种交集定义比单独的任何一种措施都更有针对性，这也是我们在本文中进行的规范。

Of the 341 metropolitan areas in our updated sample, 86 fall in the top quartile of one of the two measures—absolute arrest growth or per worker arrest growth—and 64 of those 86 rank in the top quartile on both, forming our surge group.

在我们更新的样本中的 341 个大都市区中，有 86 个在绝对逮捕增长率或人均逮捕增长率这两项指标之一中排名前四分之一，而这 86 个都市区中的 64 个在这两项指标中均排名前四分之一，构成了我们的激增组。

The remaining metropolitan areas serve as controls.

其余大都市区作为控制区。

Results using absolute arrests only or per worker arrests only are reported as robustness checks and point in the same direction.

仅使用绝对逮捕或仅按工人逮捕的结果报告为稳健性检查并指向同一方向。

SAEF’s original comparison relied on the assumption that surge and comparison cities share the same normal seasonal pattern so that seasonality cancels out of the treatment-control difference.

SAEF 最初的比较基于这样的假设：激增城市和比较城市具有相同的正常季节性模式，因此季节性可以抵消治疗对照差异。

In fact, surge cities tend to be larger and more economically diversified, while comparison cities show sharper seasonal swings.

事实上，激增城市往往规模更大、经济更加多元化，而对比城市则表现出更剧烈的季节性波动。

Since estimated effects are modest relative to normal month-to-month movement in city employment, accounting for seasonal patterns isolates the enforcement effect.

由于相对于城市就业的正常逐月变动而言，估计的影响较小，因此考虑季节性模式可以隔离执行效果。

We adjust for seasonality using each city’s month fixed effects estimated on pre-2025 data.

我们使用根据 2025 年之前的数据估计的每个城市的月份固定效应来调整季节性。

This is the standard approach, but it does not adjust for seasonal patterns which may also evolve year over year.

这是标准方法，但它不会针对也可能逐年变化的季节性模式进行调整。

To address this, we adjust employment data using the Census Bureau’s X-13ARIMA-SEATS (X-13).

为了解决这个问题，我们使用人口普查局的 X-13ARIMA-SEATS (X-13) 调整就业数据。

X-13 removes estimated, predictable seasonal variation, including seasonal patterns that grow or decline year over year.

X-13 消除了估计的、可预测的季节性变化，包括逐年增长或下降的季节性模式。

We report results using the X-13 adjustment.

我们使用 X-13 调整来报告结果。

Appendix E describes the seasonal adjustment in more detail, and Table 3 shows both adjustments produce comparable estimates.

附录 E 更详细地描述了季节性调整，表 3 显示了两种调整产生的可比估计值。

We use the Callaway and Sant’Anna (CS) staggered difference-in-differences estimator, which aligns each surge city according to the month its local enforcement surge began and compares its employment path to control cities.

我们使用卡拉威和圣安娜 (CS) 交错双重差分估计器，根据当地执法激增开始的月份对每个激增城市进行调整，并将其就业路径与控制城市进行比较。

The CS event study (Figure 1) shows employment in surge metros was on a modestly upward path relative to comparison metros before enforcement intensified.

CS 事件研究（图 1）显示，与执法力度加强之前的对比城市相比，激增城市的就业率呈小幅上升趋势。

That path turns downward the same month enforcement arrives, and surge-city employment falls relative to comparison metros thereafter.

这条路径在执法到来的同月开始下降，此后高峰城市的就业率相对于比较大都市有所下降。

To test whether these pre- and post-surge trajectories are statistically distinguishable from each other and from ordinary month-to-month variation, we fit a piecewise-linear (“trend-break”) model to the CS event-study estimates, spanning the year before the local surge through six months after, with the slope allowed to change at enforcement onset.

为了测试这些激增前和激增后的轨迹在统计上是否彼此不同以及与普通的逐月变化是否有区别，我们将分段线性（“趋势突破”）模型拟合到CS事件研究估计中，涵盖当地激增之前的一年到之后的六个月，并允许在执行开始时改变斜率。

This tests whether the effect accumulates over time, not simply whether employment fell after enforcement arrived.

这测试了效果是否会随着时间的推移而累积，而不仅仅是执法到来后就业是否下降。

For example, a single post-surge dip would be more consistent with a short-lived hiring pause, while a compounding effect points to workers continuing to withdraw, firms facing ongoing staffing gaps, and local demand continuing to weaken.

例如，激增后的一次下降更可能与短暂的招聘暂停更一致，而复合效应则表明工人继续退出，企业面临持续的人员缺口，以及当地需求持续疲软。

The trend-break analysis also identifies a distinct pre-surge trend, which forms our counterfactual under the assumption that absent the enforcement surge, employment in surge metros would have been expected to continue along that relative path.

趋势突破分析还确定了一个明显的激增前趋势，这构成了我们的反事实假设，即如果没有执法激增，激增地铁的就业预计将继续沿着相对路径发展。

We estimate this trend using pre-surge CS event-study coefficients.

我们使用激增前的 CS 事件研究系数来估计这一趋势。

Our headline measure is the deviation from this linear extrapolated pre-surge trend six months after a city’s local surge began, the point at which all 64 surge cities can be observed.

我们的主要指标是一个城市本地激增开始六个月后与这种线性推断的激增前趋势的偏差，此时可以观察到所有 64 个激增城市。

We also report the estimates at 10 and 11 months after onset, which show whether the effect keeps accumulating but rely on a smaller set of early-treated metros and should be interpreted more cautiously.

我们还报告了发病后 10 个月和 11 个月的估计值，这显示了效果是否持续累积，但依赖于较小的一组早期治疗的地铁，应更加谨慎地解释。

Appendices A and B report tests designed to rule out alternative explanations for the employment shortfall in surge cities: Results hold when counterfactuals are built from synthetic controls rather than extrapolated trends.

附录 A 和 B 报告了旨在排除激增城市就业短缺的其他解释的测试：当反事实是根据综合控制而非推断趋势构建时，结果成立。

The estimated trend break is fit best at and immediately after the actual surge onset rather than at other points in the window.

估计的趋势突破最适合在实际激增开始时和之后立即出现，而不是在窗口中的其他点。

Randomly assigning cities to surge and control groups produces an effect of similar magnitude in only one of 200 draws.

将城市随机分配到激增组和对照组中，仅在 200 次抽签中的一次就产生了类似程度的效果。

Finally, following De Balanzó, Rodríguez-Planas, and Roff (2026), we test whether effects differ between ICE arrests made in the community (“at-large”) and arrests of people already in criminal-justice custody (CAP/jail transfers).

最后，按照 De Balanzó、Rodríguez-Planas 和 Roff (2026) 的思路，我们测试了 ICE 在社区（“在逃人员”）逮捕和已被刑事司法拘留的人（CAP/监狱转移）逮捕之间的效果是否存在差异。

At-large arrests, the visible arrests our fear-and-disruption channel predicts should matter most, have a substantially larger effect than the less visible CAP/jail arrests.

在逃逮捕，我们的恐惧与干扰渠道预测的可见逮捕应该是最重要的，比不那么明显的 CAP/监狱逮捕具有更大的影响。

The 2025 ICE enforcement surge caused formal employment to fall in the cities where enforcement was most acute.

2025 年 ICE 执法激增导致执法最严厉的城市的正式就业人数下降。

The effect appears at the time of local enforcement onset, grows over subsequent months, and is concentrated in places that saw large increases in at-large arrests, both in absolute terms and per worker.

这种影响在地方执法开始时就出现了，并在随后的几个月中不断扩大，并且集中在逍遥法外逮捕人数大幅增加的地方，无论是绝对数量还是每名工人。

Figure 1 traces employment in surge cities relative to comparison cities from 12 months before a local surge to 11 months after.

图 1 追踪了本地激增之前 12 个月到之后 11 个月期间激增城市相对于对照城市的就业情况。

In the pre-period, the dots hug the dotted trend line closely: The relationship is essentially linear, and there is no sign of the estimates drifting apart from the trend before enforcement arrives.

在前期，这些点与趋势虚线紧密相连：这种关系本质上是线性的，并且在执行之前没有迹象表明估计值偏离趋势。

Six months after the onset of a local enforcement surge, employment in surge cities dropped 0.43% below its estimated no-surge trajectory, shown as the dashed line in Figure 1.

在地方执法激增开始六个月后，激增城市的就业率比预计的无激增轨迹下降了 0.43%，如图 1 中的虚线所示。

By 11 months post surge, the estimated shortfall grew to 0.69% below the counterfactual path.

到激增后 11 个月，估计缺口增长至比反事实路径低 0.69%。

The confidence interval widened at 11 months because only 11 of the 64 surge cities could be observed by then, so the later estimate should be interpreted with caution.

置信区间在 11 个月时扩大，因为到那时只能观察到 64 个激增城市中的 11 个，因此应谨慎解释后来的估计。

Nonetheless, the estimate is a continuation of a trajectory that widens the gap from the counterfactual path with each additional month post surge.

尽管如此，这一估计仍是轨迹的延续，在激增后每增加一个月，与反事实轨迹的差距就会扩大。

Figure 2 shows that estimated employment effects are substantially larger than the number of people arrested.

图 2 显示，估计的就业影响远大于被捕人数。

It compares the employment shortfall to a matched measure of cumulative excess arrests per worker, both expressed as a percent of each city’s employment and using the same comparison cities and CS difference-in-differences design.

它将就业缺口与每名工人累计超额逮捕的匹配衡量标准进行了比较，两者均以每个城市就业的百分比表示，并使用相同的比较城市和 CS 双重差分设计。

See Appendix D for details on this calculation.

有关此计算的详细信息，请参阅附录 D。

Six months post surge, the average surge city’s employment stood 0.43% below its expected path, while excess arrests over the same window equaled just 0.11% of the average city’s employment.

激增后六个月，激增城市的平均就业人数比预期水平低 0.43%，而同一时段内的超额逮捕人数仅相当于平均城市就业人数的 0.11%。

By 11 months, the effect (among the 11 cities whose local surge began in January 2025) widened to 0.69%.

到了 11 个月，影响（在 2025 年 1 月开始本地激增的 11 个城市中）扩大到 0.69%。

If the employment drops were caused solely by the arrested workers being removed from their jobs, then each excess arrest would correspond to roughly one lost job, under the generous assumption that every person arrested held a payroll position.

如果就业下降仅仅是由于被捕工人被解雇造成的，那么在假设每个被捕者都持有工资职位的情况下，每一次额外逮捕将相当于大约失去一份工作。

But the actual employment shortfall is about four times larger than the number of excess arrests.

但实际就业缺口大约是超额逮捕人数的四倍。

That gap is likely an undercount of the true effect since many of those arrested were probably informal sector workers, self-employed, recent arrivals, or otherwise outside the formal labor market to begin with.

这一差距可能低估了真实影响，因为许多被捕者可能是非正规部门工人、个体经营者、新来者或原本就在正规劳动力市场之外的人。

This ratio is consistent with a broader mechanism: Arrests—and the broader disruption that came with them—compound into broader labor withdrawal, business disruption, and weaker consumer demand well beyond the workers who were actually detained.

这一比率与更广泛的机制相一致：逮捕以及随之而来的更广泛的破坏，会导致更广泛的劳动力撤离、业务中断和消费者需求疲软，远远超出了实际被拘留的工人的范围。

Figure 3 supports this interpretation, showing that the excess job loss was driven by visible ICE enforcement in workplaces and communities, consistent with the fear and chilling effects described earlier.

图 3 支持这种解释，表明过度失业是由工作场所和社区中明显的 ICE 执法造成的，这与前面描述的恐惧和寒蝉效应一致。

ICE arrests come in two broad types: (1) “at-large” arrests made in the community, at worksites, homes, and traffic stops, where neighbors, coworkers, and customers can see them and (2) jail-based transfers through the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), where custody changes hands out of public view.

ICE 逮捕分为两大类：(1) 在社区、工作场所、家庭和交通站点进行“在逃”逮捕，邻居、同事和顾客都可以看到他们；(2) 通过刑事外国人计划 (CAP) 在监狱中进行转移，在公众视野之外进行监护权的移交。

Our preferred specification defines surge cities using increases in at-large arrests, reflecting the expectation following De Balanzó et al.

我们的首选规范通过增加在逃逮捕人数来定义激增城市，反映了 De Balanzó 等人的预期。

(2026) that employment effects are tied to visible, community-based enforcement rather than less-visible CAP arrests.

(2026) 认为，就业影响与可见的、基于社区的执法有关，而不是与不太明显的 CAP 逮捕有关。

Consistent with this, Figure 3 suggests that six and ten months post-surge, the employment shortfall was larger in the 64 cities defined by at-large arrests rather than with jail-based, CAP arrests.

与此相一致的是，图 3 表明，在激增后 6 个月和 10 个月，在 64 个因在逃逮捕而定义的城市中，就业缺口更大，而不是因监狱和 CAP 逮捕而定义的城市。

The 2025 ICE enforcement surge caused a meaningful and persistent employment decline in the cities where it intensified the most.

2025 年 ICE 执法激增导致其加剧最严重的城市就业人数出现显着且持续的下降。

Six months after a local surge began, payroll employment fell 0.43% below its expected path.

当地就业人数激增六个月后，就业人数比预期下降了 0.43%。

Data through December 2025 show no sign of recovery.

截至 2025 年 12 月的数据没有显示复苏的迹象。

This employment effect is roughly four times larger than excess arrests.

这种就业效应大约是过度逮捕的四倍。

In other words, the direct labor market removals cannot explain the job losses observed.

换句话说，劳动力市场的直接迁移无法解释观察到的失业情况。

Instead, knock-on effects from the enforcement shock appear to have caused additional job losses as workers withdrew from public life, employers struggled to replace them, and households cut spending.

相反，执法冲击带来的连锁反应似乎导致了更多的失业，因为工人退出了公共生活，雇主难以找到替代者，家庭也削减了支出。

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恐惧和安全网：来自安全社区的证据。

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移民执法可见度和消费者支出。

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IEB 工作文件 2026/10。

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震惊、敬畏和经济影响：美国城市 ICE 执法对就业的影响。

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ICE 执法的寒蝉效应：来自洛杉矶地区高频流动性和支出数据的证据。

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一种更可靠的平行趋势方法。

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响应《信息自由法》对驱逐数据项目的请求而提供。

Berkeley, CA, and Los Angeles, CA: University of California, Berkeley and University of California, Los Angeles.

加利福尼亚州伯克利和加利福尼亚州洛杉矶：加州大学伯克利分校和加州大学洛杉矶分校。

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“特朗普的驱逐议程将摧毁数百万个就业机会：移民和美国出生的工人都将遭受失业，特别是在建筑业和儿童保育领域。”经济政策研究所，2025 年 7 月 10 日。

https://www.epi.org/publication/trumps-deportation-agenda-will-destroy-millions-of-jobs-both-immigrants-and-u-s-born-workers-would-suffer-job-losses-particularly-in-construction-and-child-care/ .

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The authors thank Michael Clemens for thought partnership on methods as well as Pierre Nguimkeu and Greg Wright for helpful comments.

作者感谢 Michael Clemens 在方法方面的思想合作，以及 Pierre Nguimkeu 和 Greg Wright 的有益评论。

Giuseppe Grasso, Chidozie Ezi-Ashi, and Carlos Daboin provided outstanding research assistance, including fact-checking, code review, and replication of our findings.

Giuseppe Grasso、Chidozie Ezi-Ashi 和 Carlos Daboin 提供了出色的研究帮助，包括事实检查、代码审查和我们的研究结果的复制。

All errors remain our own.

所有错误均由我们自己承担。

The Brookings Institution is committed to quality, independence, and impact.

布鲁金斯学会致力于质量、独立性和影响力。

We are supported by a diverse array of funders .

我们得到了众多资助者的支持。

In line with our values and policies , each Brookings publication represents the sole views of its author(s).

根据我们的价值观和政策，布鲁金斯学会的每份出版物均代表其作者的唯一观点。

中文为机器翻译，仅供参考。