As surveillance grows, student privacy protections lag

The surveillance apparatus in the United States has dramatically expanded over the past few decades despite widespread recognition of its threat to American democracy.

尽管人们普遍认识到其对美国民主的威胁，但美国的监控机构在过去几十年里急剧扩张。

Especially following 9/11, the government has increasingly sacrificed Americans’ privacy ostensibly for safety purposes, including federal agencies spending millions of dollars on surveillance technologies to scale immigration enforcement efforts.

特别是在 9/11 之后，政府表面上出于安全目的越来越多地牺牲美国人的隐私，包括联邦机构花费数百万美元购买监控技术，以扩大移民执法力度。

Though this type of investment isn’t new, rapid technological development and the Trump administration’s heightened spending across security domains creates new and urgent policy questions that require thoughtful consideration and action.

尽管这种类型的投资并不新鲜，但快速的技术发展和特朗普政府在安全领域增加的支出产生了新的、紧迫的政策问题，需要深思熟虑并采取行动。

These deliberations are especially important as school districts adopt similar surveillance practices: Administrators are increasingly granting companies access to students’ data in exchange for tools that purport to share insights into their performance and well-being.

随着学区采取类似的监控做法，这些审议尤其重要：管理人员越来越多地允许公司访问学生的数据，以换取旨在分享有关学生表现和福祉的见解的工具。

Personal and school-issued devices now come loaded with software and apps that continuously monitor children’s online activity and collect data, which are only growing more powerful in the age of artificial intelligence (AI).

个人和学校发放的设备现在都装有软件和应用程序，可以持续监控儿童的在线活动并收集数据，这些软件和应用程序在人工智能 (AI) 时代只会变得更加强大。

And even when these tools have no initial explicit surveillance purpose, loopholes still allow law enforcement and data brokers to procure sensitive information without consent or transparency about who is seeking the data, why they are seeking it, and how it is being used.

即使这些工具最初没有明确的监视目的，漏洞仍然允许执法机构和数据经纪人在未经同意或不透明地了解谁在寻求数据、为什么寻求数据以及如何使用数据的情况下获取敏感信息。

The digital dragnet Americans face today presents immense risks, especially to vulnerable populations who may face the weaponization of data collection.

美国人今天面临的数字拉网带来了巨大的风险，特别是对于可能面临数据收集武器化的弱势群体而言。

Grappling with this reality requires us to examine the unique risks students face by expanding surveillance practices into schools.

应对这一现实需要我们通过将监控实践扩展到学校来检查学生面临的独特风险。

Local and national conversations about children’s digital health and safety must acknowledge the risks inherent in expanded monitoring and surveillance without robust transparency and consider what guardrails can protect both children’s data and safety.

关于儿童数字健康和安全的地方和国家对话必须承认在没有强大透明度的情况下扩大监测和监视所固有的风险，并考虑哪些护栏可以保护儿童的数据和安全。

The average American student’s digital footprint has exploded in the 21st century, and the commercialization and commodification of that data creates unique challenges to ensure their privacy and safety.

美国学生的平均数字足迹在 21 世纪呈爆炸式增长，这些数据的商业化和商品化给确保他们的隐私和安全带来了独特的挑战。

A child’s digital trail often starts very early.

孩子的数字足迹通常很早就开始了。

A 2025 Common Sense Media survey found that 40% of American children have a tablet by age 2 and 23% have a cellphone by age 8.

Common Sense Media 2025 年的一项调查发现，40% 的美国儿童在 2 岁时拥有平板电脑，23% 的儿童在 8 岁时拥有手机。

Every digital interaction creates a new data point that must be secured and protected.

每次数字交互都会创建一个必须受到保护的新数据点。

Even seemingly innocuous online activities, like streaming a movie, can create data that is tracked and used by companies.

即使是看似无害的在线活动，例如流媒体电影，也可以创建可供公司跟踪和使用的数据。

“When you watch Netflix, Netflix watches you,” warned Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton in a recent lawsuit against the streaming giant.

“当你看 Netflix 时，Netflix 也在看着你，”得克萨斯州总检察长肯·帕克斯顿 (Ken Paxton) 在最近针对这家流媒体巨头的诉讼中警告道。

Netflix vehemently denied the claims, but Paxton’s complaint that logging data on clicks and even where a young user might linger on the site constitutes a privacy violation illuminates a legal gray area.

Netflix 强烈否认了这些说法，但帕克斯顿抱怨说，记录点击数据，甚至年轻用户可能在网站上逗留的地方，都构成了侵犯隐私的行为，这照亮了法律的灰色地带。

Data collection within school walls is similarly complex.

学校内的数据收集同样复杂。

Technology supports teaching, learning, and school operations in many ways, including through learning management systems to organize classroom assignments and tasks, assessment tools to actively and passively gather real-time insights, curriculum platforms to share content, and a plethora of AI tools.

技术以多种方式支持教学、学习和学校运营，包括通过学习管理系统来组织课堂作业和任务、通过主动和被动收集实时见解的评估工具、共享内容的课程平台以及大量的人工智能工具。

According to a recent report, school districts and individual students accessed an average of 2,982 and 48 distinct edtech tools, respectively, during the 2024-25 school year.

根据最近的一份报告，2024-25 学年，学区和学生个人平均分别使用 2,982 种和 48 种不同的教育科技工具。

Each of these tools may introduce a new vendor, user agreement, and database to manage, and it can be costly and time consuming for districts to thoroughly and critically assess these tools as part of a procurement process.

这些工具中的每一个都可能引入新的供应商、用户协议和数据库来管理，并且对于学区来说，将这些工具作为采购流程的一部分进行彻底和批判性的评估可能既昂贵又耗时。

Reporting shows educators and administrators now receive dozens of emails daily from edtech companies, further complicating their ability to evaluate how each prospective tool might impact a student’s learning, well-being, privacy, and safety.

报告显示，教育工作者和管理人员现在每天都会收到来自教育科技公司的数十封电子邮件，这使得他们评估每种潜在工具如何影响学生的学习、福祉、隐私和安全的能力进一步复杂化。

Increasingly, districts are also employing technologies with an explicit goal of tracking student behavior and movement.

各学区也越来越多地采用技术，其明确目标是跟踪学生的行为和活动。

Student screen monitoring, web content filtering, and tracking of eye and body movements may seem helpful, but various instances of students being wrongly profiled, disciplined, or even arrested for their online behavior demonstrate the tension in this approach.

学生屏幕监控、网络内容过滤以及眼睛和身体运动跟踪可能看起来很有帮助，但学生因在线行为而被错误描述、纪律处分甚至逮捕的各种实例表明了这种方法的紧张性。

Similarly, digital hall passes offer time-bound authorization to move around the school and data that turn “behavioral trends into AI-driven policies.” According to one survey, 88% of teachers report that their school uses some type of student activity monitoring technology, and a second shows 42% report that such monitoring continues off campus.

同样，数字大厅通行证提供在学校内走动的有时限授权和将“行为趋势转化为人工智能驱动的政策”的数据。根据一项调查，88% 的教师表示他们的学校使用某种类型的学生活动监控技术，而另一项调查显示 42% 的教师表示这种监控仍在校外进行。

For instance, Chicago Public Schools has monitored students’ social media accounts for “worrisome online behavior” that can trigger consequences at school.

例如，芝加哥公立学校监控学生的社交媒体帐户，以发现可能在学校引发后果的“令人担忧的在线行为”。

Parents and districts may have good intentions when they turn to technology companies to gather information on students’ performances or assess behavior and well-being, but evidence suggests that a “more is more” approach to data collection at school can undermine health and safety goals: It can increase the risk of mishandling data, prematurely or unfairly involve law enforcement, inadvertently provide data on students to officers or immigration enforcement agents, or simply enable companies to use kids’ data to maximize engagement (and profits).

家长和学区在向科技公司收集学生表现信息或评估行为和福祉时可能有良好的意图，但有证据表明，在学校收集数据的“越多越好”的方法可能会损害健康和安全目标：它可能会增加数据处理不当的风险，过早或不公平地涉及执法，无意中向官员或移民执法人员提供学生数据，或者只是让公司能够利用孩子的数据来最大限度地提高参与度（和利润）。

Districts lacking clear responsible data use policies or capabilities to thoroughly assess technology user agreements may unintentionally leave data exposed to third parties and law enforcement.

缺乏明确的负责任的数据使用政策或彻底评估技术用户协议的能力的地区可能会无意中将数据暴露给第三方和执法部门。

This is especially a concern as the Trump administration’s immigration enforcement efforts carry out the “largest deportation operation in American history.” Immigration enforcement agencies expanding data collection practices and loosening rules governing agents’ access to schools further complicates student privacy.

随着特朗普政府的移民执法工作开展“美国历史上最大规模的驱逐行动”，这一点尤其令人担忧。移民执法机构扩大数据收集做法并放松管理人员进入学校的规则，进一步使学生隐私变得更加复杂。

For example, a recent investigation revealed that police departments accessed school districts’ security footage to aid immigration enforcement efforts, in some cases without the districts’ knowledge , demonstrating how illusory student privacy can be as technology advances.

例如，最近的一项调查显示，警察部门获取了学区的安全录像以协助移民执法工作，在某些情况下，学区并不知情，这表明随着技术的进步，学生的隐私是多么虚幻。

Privacy and safety implications also vary depending on personal or ancestral identities, and there is ample evidence that marginalized students are more susceptible to targeting.

隐私和安全影响也因个人或祖先身份而异，并且有充分证据表明边缘化学生更容易成为攻击目标。

There are several recorded instances of immigration officers contacting students after their activity was flagged by monitoring software.

有几起记录显示，移民官员在学生的活动被监控软件标记后联系学生。

This type of surveillance could further exacerbate students’ fears of being identified by immigration officials, as research has linked heightened immigration enforcement to chronic absenteeism, poorer mental health, lower test scores, and reduced college enrollment, especially for Latino and English learner students.

这种类型的监视可能会进一步加剧学生对被移民官员识别的恐惧，因为研究表明，加强移民执法与长期缺勤、心理健康状况不佳、考试成绩较低以及大学入学率下降有关，尤其是对于拉丁裔和英语学习者的学生。

LGBTQ+ students also face unique risks, especially as more states pass legislation that requires schools to reveal students’ gender identity or sexuality to parents.

LGBTQ+ 学生还面临着独特的风险，尤其是随着越来越多的州通过立法，要求学校向家长透露学生的性别认同或性取向。

Monitoring software and content safeguards frequently flag queer resources or content as inappropriate or sexually explicit and can thus lead to more alerts being issued to districts or law enforcement.

监控软件和内容保护措施经常将酷儿资源或内容标记为不适当或露骨色情，因此可能会导致向地区或执法部门发出更多警报。

This is especially concerning given that LGBTQ+ students are disproportionately at risk of attempting self-harm or suicide.

鉴于 LGBTQ+ 学生尝试自残或自杀的风险过高，这一点尤其令人担忧。

Research from the Center for Democracy and Technology reveals similar implications for students with disabilities, who are disproportionately subject to monitoring software—a pattern that may deepen their already-heightened rates of interaction with law enforcement.

民主与技术中心的研究揭示了对残疾学生的类似影响，他们不成比例地受到监控软件的影响，这种模式可能会加深他们已经很高的与执法部门的互动率。

The same concerns exist for students of color, who are already disciplined at greater rates, especially given that schools predominately attended by Black and brown students are more likely to use surveillance technologies.

有色人种学生也存在同样的担忧，他们已经受到更高比例的纪律处分，特别是考虑到主要由黑人和棕色人种学生就读的学校更有可能使用监控技术。

Despite these risks, laws and policies have struggled to keep pace with technology.

尽管存在这些风险，法律和政策仍难以跟上技术的步伐。

A rapidly expanding surveillance economy, fueled by data produced from fast-evolving technologies, adds urgency to protecting children’s safety and privacy and makes it harder to do.

在快速发展的技术产生的数据的推动下，监控经济迅速扩张，增加了保护儿童安全和隐私的紧迫性，也让保护儿童的安全和隐私变得更加困难。

Assessing how existing student privacy and safety laws interact with a child’s expansive data footprint can help illuminate areas to improve our policy approach.

评估现有的学生隐私和安全法如何与儿童广泛的数据足迹相互作用，有助于阐明改进我们政策方法的领域。

Though the U.S. lacks comprehensive privacy protections, multiple federal laws already govern children’s data and apply to various forms of digital surveillance.

尽管美国缺乏全面的隐私保护，但多项联邦法律已经管理儿童数据并适用于各种形式的数字监控。

These laws include the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (or FERPA, passed in 1974), the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (or COPPA, passed in 1998 and updated via rulemaking on two occasions since), and the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (enacted in 1978 and last amended during the George W.

这些法律包括《家庭教育权利和隐私法》（或 FERPA，1974 年通过）、《儿童在线隐私保护法》（或 COPPA，1998 年通过，此后通过规则制定两次更新）和《学生权利保护修正案》（1978 年颁布，最后一次修订是在乔治·W·布什总统执政期间）。

Bush administration).

布什政府）。

FERPA and COPPA remain the primary federal policy levers on privacy and digital safety for children and students, though they should be seen as the floor and not the ceiling.

FERPA 和 COPPA 仍然是儿童和学生隐私和数字安全的主要联邦政策杠杆，尽管它们应被视为底线而不是上限。

FERPA outlines how educational institutions or agencies that receive federal funding may or may not use or share students’ personally identifiable information (PII) from students’ education records but does not discuss how data is collected.

FERPA 概述了接受联邦资助的教育机构或机构如何可以或不可以使用或共享学生教育记录中的学生个人身份信息 (PII)，但没有讨论如何收集数据。

COPPA sets forth rules on data collection for children under 13 by requiring website operators and online service providers to obtain “verifiable” parental consent before collecting, using, or disclosing personal information about a child (with some exceptions) and allowing parents to revoke their consent and delete information about their children.

COPPA 规定了针对 13 岁以下儿童的数据收集规则，要求网站运营商和在线服务提供商在收集、使用或披露有关儿童的个人信息（有一些例外）之前获得“可验证的”父母同意，并允许父母撤销同意并删除有关其子女的信息。

COPPA’s latest interpretation , which took effect in 2025, added opt-in consent requirements for targeted advertising and implemented restrictions on data retention, among other changes.

COPPA 的最新解释将于 2025 年生效，其中增加了针对定向广告的选择加入同意要求，并对数据保留实施了限制等变化。

Although COPPA does not apply to governmental entities or nonprofits like public and private K-12 schools, it does apply to for-profit vendors that provide their online platforms.

尽管 COPPA 不适用于政府实体或公立和私立 K-12 学校等非营利组织，但它确实适用于提供在线平台的营利性供应商。

Staggering amounts of data are collected on children at home and at school, and the existing laws struggle to keep pace with unforeseen abuses: COPPA does not protect teenagers’ data, and neither FERPA nor COPPA comprehensively mandate data minimization practices—only collecting, using, and retaining the least amount of data necessary.

家庭和学校收集的儿童数据数量惊人，而现有法律难以跟上不可预见的滥用行为：COPPA 不保护青少年的数据，FERPA 和 COPPA 都没有全面强制要求数据最小化做法——仅收集、使用和保留最少量的必要数据。

In fact, one study found most education applications still exposed students’ data despite modest enforcement or protections, which allows companies to create detailed profiles on children’s online behavior that can follow them for decades and be used for targeted advertising or other algorithmic recommendations.

事实上，一项研究发现，尽管采取了适度的执法或保护措施，大多数教育应用程序仍然会暴露学生的数据，这使得公司可以创建有关儿童在线行为的详细档案，这些档案可以跟踪他们数十年，并用于有针对性的广告或其他算法建议。

Consequently, none of these laws fully protect against the disclosure of students’ data.

因此，这些法律都没有充分保护学生数据免遭泄露。

Some information is not sourced from students’ educational records—which FERPA defines as a record “directly related to a student” and “maintained by an educational agency or institution or party acting on behalf of the agency or institution”—and is thus excluded from FERPA protections.

有些信息并非源自学生的教育记录（FERPA 将其定义为“与学生直接相关”且“由教育机构或代表该机构或机构的一方维护”的记录），因此被排除在 FERPA 保护之外。

FERPA also permits disclosure without any consent in some situations.

在某些情况下，FERPA 还允许在未经任何同意的情况下进行披露。

For instance, FERPA allows school officials to access education records without consent, provided that the school has determined the requesting officials have a “legitimate educational interest,” a highly subjective term that schools and agencies handling such information are required to define and share with parents annually.

例如，《家庭教育权利和隐私法》允许学校官员在未经同意的情况下获取教育记录，前提是学校确定提出请求的官员具有“合法的教育利益”，这是一个高度主观的术语，处理此类信息的学校和机构必须每年定义并与家长共享。

Further, FERPA permits—but does not require—the disclosure of PII from education records for a variety of other purposes: to state and local educational authorities in connection with audits, to state and local officials concerning the juvenile justice system, in response to a health or safety emergency, and to comply with a judicial order or lawfully issued subpoena.

此外，FERPA 允许（但不要求）出于各种其他目的从教育记录中披露 PII：向州和地方教育机构披露与审计有关的信息、向州和地方官员披露有关少年司法系统的信息、应对健康或安全紧急情况以及遵守司法命令或合法发出的传票。

Moreover, some data worth safeguarding may fall outside FERPA and COPPA’s protections altogether.

此外，一些值得保护的数据可能完全不属于 FERPA 和 COPPA 的保护范围。

For example, data may not be “from an education record,” such as metadata collected by online platforms.

例如，数据可能不是“来自教育记录”，例如在线平台收集的元数据。

Similarly, videos of school grounds will constitute an education record only under specific circumstances.

同样，校园视频只有在特定情况下才会构成教育记录。

This murkiness is where real safety risks to children lie.

这种黑暗才是儿童真正的安全风险所在。

A recent example involves Flock Safety, a technology company that markets its products and services to schools with a promise of continuous monitoring and early threat detection.

最近的一个例子涉及 Flock Safety，这是一家科技公司，该公司向学校推销其产品和服务，并承诺持续监控和早期威胁检测。

Reports have found that some of Flock’s user agreements stipulated that the company can share video footage captured by their equipment with a simple and warrantless request, and recent reporting revealed this data was accessed by law enforcement agencies to aid immigration enforcement.

报道发现，Flock 的一些用户协议规定，该公司可以通过简单且无授权的请求共享其设备捕获的视频片段，最近的报道显示执法机构获取了这些数据以协助移民执法。

Flock has stated that such access is controlled by customers, and earlier this year, the company added a feature for agencies to toggle off all federal sharing.

Flock 表示，此类访问由客户控制，今年早些时候，该公司为各机构添加了一项功能来关闭所有联邦共享。

Murkier still is metadata that doesn’t constitute PII or a student record but still could be used to train AI models, such as data that tracks how long a student lingers on a specific page.

更模糊的元数据仍然不构成 PII 或学生记录，但仍可用于训练人工智能模型，例如跟踪学生在特定页面上停留时间的数据。

Simply deleting the data after it has already helped train the model may not protect students, and no clear guardrails currently exist to prevent this.

在数据已经帮助训练模型后简单地删除数据可能无法保护学生，并且目前不存在明确的防护措施来防止这种情况发生。

Ongoing attempts by Congress to modernize children’s safety and privacy laws through a package of bills don’t address these loopholes or the broader societal shift toward greater surveillance.

国会不断尝试通过一系列法案使儿童安全和隐私法现代化，但并没有解决这些漏洞，也没有解决更广泛的社会向加强监控的转变。

While bills like COPPA 2.0 (which amends the original law) expand the definition of personal information, include a broader definition of biometric identifiers, and restrict profiling further, the package does not include a fundamental “duty of care” requiring tech companies to build safe-by-design online platforms.

虽然 COPPA 2.0（修订了原始法律）等法案扩大了个人信息的定义，包括更广泛的生物识别标识符的定义，并进一步限制分析，但该一揽子计划并未包括要求科技公司构建设计安全的在线平台的基本“注意义务”。

This puts additional pressure on states, districts, principals, teachers, and parents to keep kids safe.

这给各州、地区、校长、教师和家长带来了额外的压力，要求他们确保孩子的安全。

Some states have attempted to fill these policy gaps, including California, which passed the first comprehensive state law on student privacy over 10 years ago.

一些州试图填补这些政策空白，其中包括加利福尼亚州，该州在十多年前通过了第一部关于学生隐私的全面州法律。

Its Student Online Personal Information Act (SOPIPA) prohibits edtech vendors from using targeted advertising with any information that was acquired because of the use of that operator’s product, using information to amass a profile about a K-12 student beyond an educational purpose, selling students’ information, or disclosing covered information, among other requirements.

其《学生在线个人信息法》(SOPIPA) 禁止教育科技供应商对因使用该运营商产品而获得的任何信息使用定向广告、使用信息收集超出教育目的的 K-12 学生的个人资料、出售学生信息或披露所涵盖的信息等。

At least 20 other states have since passed similar protections.

此后至少还有其他 20 个州也通过了类似的保护措施。

Minnesota has taken another approach, protecting against surveillance activities on school-issued devices.

明尼苏达州采取了另一种方法，防止对学校发放的设备进行监视活动。

Its 2022 law prohibits a government entity or technology provider from accessing location-tracking features, any audio- or visual-receiving or recording features, and any other student interactions with a school-issued device, including web-browsing activity.

其 2022 年法律禁止政府实体或技术提供商访问位置跟踪功能、任何音频或视频接收或记录功能，以及任何其他学生与学校发行的设备的互动，包括网络浏览活动。

Yet, these protections have a few notable exceptions for nondisclosure, including when activity is necessary to respond to an “imminent threat” or comply with federal or state law.

然而，这些保护措施有一些值得注意的保密例外情况，包括当需要采取行动来应对“迫在眉睫的威胁”或遵守联邦或州法律时。

Other states have attempted to directly address how AI affects data collection.

其他州试图直接解决人工智能如何影响数据收集的问题。

California considered amending its existing laws to prevent companies from using student data to train AI models, and Idaho clarified that its existing student data privacy laws apply to generative AI and require districts to adopt a policy that “include[s] safeguards for student privacy” and data security, among other requirements.

加利福尼亚州考虑修改其现有法律，以防止公司使用学生数据来训练人工智能模型，爱达荷州澄清其现有的学生数据隐私法适用于生成式人工智能，并要求学区采取“包括保护学生隐私”和数据安全等要求的政策。

These risks are unlikely to be remedied amid the Trump administration’s largely deregulatory agenda, and especially as parts of the U.S. Department of Education—including its Office for Civil Rights, Office of Educational Technology, and Student Privacy Policy Office—are moved elsewhere , shuttered , or redeployed.

在特朗普政府很大程度上放松管制的议程中，这些风险不太可能得到补救，特别是随着美国教育部的一部分——包括其民权办公室、教育技术办公室和学生隐私政策办公室——被转移到其他地方、关闭或重新部署。

A student’s data footprint is vast and spans data collected by their personal devices, school-issued devices, and schools using tools with a stated goal of keeping learners and educators safe.

学生的数据足迹非常庞大，涵盖其个人设备、学校发行的设备以及学校使用旨在确保学习者和教育工作者安全的既定目标的工具收集的数据。

Yet, it is increasingly clear how, in practice, this data can be used for several other purposes, lead to increased interactions between students and law enforcement, and place marginalized students in even more vulnerable positions.

然而，在实践中，越来越清楚的是，这些数据如何用于其他几个目的，导致学生与执法部门之间的互动增加，并使边缘化学生处于更加脆弱的境地。

Some lawmakers have fully recognized these risks, yet protections remain disparate across the country.

一些立法者已经充分认识到这些风险，但全国各地的保护措施仍然不同。

Districts in many states continue to use tools without fully understanding their risks or having a clear perspective on student privacy in the age of AI and increasing state surveillance.

许多州的学区继续使用工具，但没有充分了解其风险，也没有清楚地了解人工智能时代和国家监控力度加大的学生隐私。

It is necessary, however, to discuss how students can be best protected and how data collected on children may follow them into the future.

然而，有必要讨论如何最好地保护学生以及收集的儿童数据如何跟踪他们的未来。

Though software may put some parents or teachers at ease by giving them visibility into possibly concerning behavior, it may sacrifice their children’s well-being in the process, which undermines any safety or security goals.

尽管软件可以让一些家长或老师了解可能令人担忧的行为，从而让他们放心，但它可能会在此过程中牺牲孩子的福祉，从而破坏任何安全或安保目标。

This demonstrates how data privacy, minimization, and sovereignty are foundational to any safety protections schools or states might consider—protections that could be strengthened through measures already under consideration at the state and federal level.

这表明数据隐私、最小化和主权如何成为学校或州可能考虑的任何安全保护的基础——这些保护可以通过州和联邦层面已经考虑的措施得到加强。

Surveillance harms students in concrete ways.

监视以具体方式伤害学生。

In conversations with students, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) found that classroom surveillance “negatively impacted their interactions with school staff, communications with friends, activity online and on social media, what groups or clubs they consider joining, and how they feel at school broadly.” Other research shows students may not fully express themselves when they are aware of such monitoring.

在与学生的对话中，美国公民自由联盟 (ACLU) 发现，课堂监控“对他们与学校工作人员的互动、与朋友的交流、在线和社交媒体上的活动、他们考虑加入的团体或俱乐部以及他们在学校的整体感受产生了负面影响。”其他研究表明，当学生意识到这种监控时，他们可能无法充分表达自己的想法。

As we’ve become more excited and more skeptical about technology, the boundaries of what we’re willing to accept have also changed.

随着我们对技术变得更加兴奋和怀疑，我们愿意接受的界限也发生了变化。

A central question is whether or not we want our children to live in a world in which they can expect to be monitored, observed, and assessed at all times.

一个核心问题是，我们是否希望我们的孩子生活在一个他们可以随时受到监视、观察和评估的世界。

It may feel like the right thing to do to protect our children’s safety, but safety—or a feeling of safety—may cost our children their sense of agency and self-determination.

保护孩子的安全似乎是正确的做法，但安全——或者说安全感——可能会损害孩子的代理感和自决感。

As former Sen.

正如前参议员。

Robert Byrd (D-W.V.) said in response to President George W.

罗伯特·伯德（D-W.V.）在回应乔治·W·布什总统时说道。

Bush’s warrantless surveillance on U.S. citizens in 2006: “The question is not, is Big Brother watching?

布什在 2006 年对美国公民进行未经授权的监视：“问题不是老大哥在监视吗？

The question is, how many big brothers have we?”

问题是，我们有几个大哥？”