Turning the tide: China seeks to set the rules at sea

Democracy, Conflict, & Governance Foreign Politics & Elections

民主、冲突与治理 外国政治与选举

This is the 17th essay of Assessing China’s “Lost in translation: Decoding Chinese strategic narratives” series.

这是评估中国“迷失在翻译中：解读中国战略叙事”系列文章的第17篇文章。

The full collection of essays can be found here .

完整的论文集可以在这里找到。

Several striking statements about China’s maritime agenda have recently emerged from think tanks directly connected to the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

与中华人民共和国政府直接相关的智库最近发表了一些关于中国海洋议程的引人注目的声明。

Along with a wave of other official and semi-official Chinese statements, they signal that China’s leaders see a window of opportunity to advance China’s maritime and security interests, accelerate its maritime pressure on rival claimants, and assert greater leadership over international law of the sea, both regionally and globally.

与中国一系列其他官方和半官方声明一起，这些声明表明中国领导人看到了推进中国海洋和安全利益、加速对对手声索国施加海上压力以及在地区和全球范围内对国际海洋法发挥更大领导作用的机会之窗。

In June, for instance, the China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA), an internal think tank of China’s Ministry of Natural Resources, produced a report .

例如，6月份，中国自然资源部内部智库中国海洋研究会（CIMA）发布了一份报告。

CIMA is long known for its active involvement in China’s South China Sea policy, and the report celebrates some of the successes of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) while also laying out in detail China’s many complaints.

CIMA长期以来因其积极参与中国的南海政策而闻名，该报告赞扬了《联合国海洋法公约》（UNCLOS）的一些成功，同时也详细阐述了中国的许多抱怨。

The report states China’s time of passivity regarding the law of the sea is over.

报告指出，中国在海洋法方面的被动时期已经结束。

Citing “momentous changes unseen in a century” and a shift in the global balance of power, the report calls for “reform and improvement” of the laws that govern the maritime domain.

报告援引“百年未有之大变局”和全球力量平衡的变化，呼吁“改革和完善”管辖海域的法律。

It appeals for “adapting the legal order of the seas to evolving realities,” and suggests the changes in global power dynamics have created “space for the further development of the international law of the sea.” The report’s tenor makes clear this further development must better account for China’s interests, since its newfound power has given it the right to more actively make the rules.

它呼吁“使海洋法律秩序适应不断变化的现实”，并表示全球权力动态的变化为“国际海洋法的进一步发展创造了空间”。报告的主旨明确表明，进一步的发展必须更好地考虑中国的利益，因为中国新获得的权力赋予了它更积极地制定规则的权利。

In an unsubtle pushback to American naval operations in East Asia, for example, the report calls out “certain states [that] deliberately misinterpret the doctrine of ‘freedom of the seas,’ [and] abuse the concept of ‘freedom of navigation.’” It concludes that international law “entails not merely the existence of rules but requires that such rules must conform to higher principles and values.” These higher principles and values will be China’s principles and values, of course.

例如，报告毫不掩饰地反对美国在东亚的海军行动，指出“某些国家故意曲解‘海洋自由’原则，滥用‘航行自由’概念。”报告的结论是，国际法“不仅意味着规则的存在，而且要求这些规则必须符合更高的原则和价值观。”当然，这些更高的原则和价值观将是中国的原则和价值观。

And the report enlists the support of developing states and those interested in “true multilateralism” to help advance China’s efforts.

该报告还争取了发展中国家和那些对“真正的多边主义”感兴趣的国家的支持，以帮助推进中国的努力。

In July, similarly notable statements were made by Wu Shicun in a South China Morning Post interview .

7月，吴士存在接受《南华早报》采访时也发表了类似的引人注目的言论。

The interview is remarkable in that it suggests Beijing’s South China Sea policy is about to take a more confrontational turn.

这次采访的引人注目之处在于，它表明北京的南海政策即将采取更具对抗性的转变。

Wu is well-positioned to know.

吴有充分的理由知道这一点。

He is a member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Group of China’s Foreign Ministry and leads a Hainan-based think tank sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

他是中国外交部外交政策顾问组成员，并领导外交部主办的海南智库。

Wu portrays Beijing as having been “passive” and attributes any past muscularity on China’s part only as a response to Philippine and American provocations.

吴将北京描述为“被动”，并将中国过去的任何强硬行为归结为对菲律宾和美国挑衅的回应。

Now, however, he says Beijing has moved to “adjust its counter-strategy” to become “even more proactive in the future” because “rival claimants”—he points to the Philippines and Vietnam, with the assistance of Japan and the United States—”are attempting to join forces to counter China.” In return, he says, “Beijing has a comprehensive suite of countermeasures at its disposal,” and “the era when China had its hands tied is gone.” He specifically threatens that “if future challenges make our law enforcement difficult,” Beijing may construct permanent facilities at Scarborough Shoal, the South China Sea feature that triggered the 2013 arbitration case brought by the Philippines and still claimed by it.

然而，现在他表示，北京已经开始“调整其反战略”，“在未来变得更加积极主动”，因为“竞争对手”——他指的是菲律宾和越南，在日本和美国的帮助下——“正试图联手对抗中国”。他表示，作为回报，“北京拥有一整套可供使用的反制措施”，“中国束手无策的时代已经一去不复返了。”他特别威胁说，“如果未来的挑战使我们的执法变得困难”，北京可能会在黄岩岛建造永久性设施。黄岩岛是南海地物，引发了菲律宾 2013 年提起的仲裁案，目前菲律宾仍声称拥有主权。

This is perceived in Manila as a direct threat to Philippine security , since a Chinese construction on the feature could base China’s maritime power about 120 nautical miles off Luzon and just over 200 nautical miles from the Philippine capital.

马尼拉认为这对菲律宾安全构成直接威胁，因为中国在该岛礁上的建设可以将中国的海上力量基地部署在距离吕宋岛约 120 海里、距离菲律宾首都仅 200 海里的地方。

Tensions between the Philippines and China repeatedly spike at Scarborough Shoal as well as further south in the Spratly Islands, where China already has military facilities that lie just over 120 nautical miles from the Philippine island of Palawan.

菲律宾和中国之间的紧张关系在斯卡伯勒浅滩以及更南边的南沙群岛不断加剧，中国已经在距菲律宾巴拉望岛 120 多海里的地方拥有军事设施。

Beijing’s “suite of countermeasures” clearly involves both operational and legal elements.

北京的“一系列反制措施”显然涉及操作和法律要素。

In addition to being about international law of the sea, the CIMA report and Wu’s interview have at least three things in common.

除了涉及国际海洋法之外，CIMA 的报告和吴的采访至少还有三个共同点。

First, they convey a sense of imminent activism to bend international rules toward China’s maritime interests and to put in place forward-leaning legal policies that support China’s interests.

首先，它们传达了一种迫在眉睫的行动主义意识，即让国际规则有利于中国的海洋利益，并制定支持中国利益的前瞻性法律政策。

Second, they indicate that at least some in China perceive the current state of global politics, perhaps accelerated by the recent agreement between Presidents Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping to build “ a constructive strategic stability relationship ,” as giving China an opportunity to make maritime gains at low cost.

其次，它们表明，至少有一些中国人认为，全球政治的现状为中国提供了以低成本获取海上利益的机会，而唐纳德·特朗普总统和中国国家主席习近平最近达成的建立“建设性战略稳定关系”的协议可能加速了这一现状。

Third, they suggest China will continue to employ, and may even accelerate, its operational activism at sea to accompany its legal activism in the sphere of international politics.

第三，他们建议中国将继续运用甚至可能加速其海上行动主义，以配合其在国际政治领域的法律行动主义。

There are multiple possibilities for why this legal activism has accelerated in recent months.

近几个月来这种法律行动主义加速的原因有多种可能。

One possibility is that the timing is simply a matter of bureaucratic responsiveness to broad policies laid out by China’s top leaders over the past few years.

一种可能性是，这个时机只是官僚机构对中国最高领导人过去几年制定的广泛政策的反应问题。

The timing of these statements may reflect the slow gear-turning of bureaucracies as much as Beijing’s assessment of the current state of global power and political opportunities.

这些声明的时机可能反映了官僚机构的缓慢转变，也反映了北京对当前全球实力和政治机会状况的评估。