Don’t let the Iran war distract the United States from Africa

Democracy, Conflict, & Governance Foreign Politics & Elections U.S. Foreign Policy

民主、冲突与治理 外交政治与选举 美国外交政策

The U.S.-Israel war on Iran is reshaping global energy markets, shipping routes, and foreign policy attention in ways that carry significant and underappreciated consequences for U.S.-Africa relations.

美国-以色列对伊朗的战争正在重塑全球能源市场、航运路线和外交政策关注，其对美非关系产生了重大但未被充分认识的后果。

The direct economic shocks to Africa are real, but the United States itself faces great risks of getting strategically distracted at the precise moment when competition for minerals, trade, and alliances with African countries is most intense.

对非洲的直接经济冲击是真实存在的，但美国本身也面临着在矿产、贸易和与非洲国家联盟竞争最激烈的时刻战略分散的巨大风险。

China, France, Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and India are accelerating their engagement on the continent, meaning any retraction or stall in U.S.-Africa engagement will come with a high geopolitical opportunity cost.

中国、法国、俄罗斯、阿联酋和印度正在加速在非洲大陆的接触，这意味着美国与非洲接触的任何撤回或停滞都将带来高昂的地缘政治机会成本。

High uncertainty about U.S. commitment will accelerate African governments’ existing efforts to diversify partnerships.

美国承诺的高度不确定性将加速非洲各国政府实现伙伴关系多元化的现有努力。

France’s recent Africa trade summit resulted in an announcement of $27 billion in investments, while Russia has expanded its security footprint in the Sahel.

法国最近举行的非洲贸易峰会宣布了 270 亿美元的投资，而俄罗斯则扩大了在萨赫勒地区的安全足迹。

The UAE has dramatically surged its investment in Africa, reaching $97 billion, triple China’s total, in 2022 and 2023 , while China remains dominant in infrastructure and minerals and has expanded zero-tariff trade access to all 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic ties.

阿联酋对非洲的投资大幅增加，2022年和2023年将达到970亿美元，是中国投资总额的三倍，而中国在基础设施和矿产领域仍保持主导地位，并将零关税贸易准入扩大到所有与其建交的53个非洲国家。

Together, these relationships give African countries strong alternatives to U.S. engagement.

这些关系共同为非洲国家提供了除美国参与之外的强有力的选择。

While the United States has recently made promising moves, including the Corporate Council on Africa’s U.S.-Africa Business Summit in Luanda and a newly appointed assistant secretary of state for Africa , history suggests that when crises pull American attention elsewhere, Africa pays the price in slower progress and weakened commitments.

尽管美国最近采取了一些有希望的举措，包括在罗安达举行的非洲企业委员会美非商业峰会以及新任命的负责非洲事务的助理国务卿，但历史表明，当危机将美国的注意力转移到其他地方时，非洲就会付出进展缓慢和承诺削弱的代价。

Early concerns in 2003 that the war in Iraq would hamper progress on the just-launched New Partnership for Africa’s Development proved prescient.

2003 年，人们担心伊拉克战争将阻碍刚刚启动的非洲发展新伙伴关系取得进展，事实证明这是有先见之明的。

In addition to the risks to African countries, the Iran war also poses long-term costs for U.S. interests on the continent.

除了给非洲国家带来风险外，伊朗战争还给美国在非洲大陆的利益带来长期成本。

Prior to the start of the war, U.S. engagement in Africa was showing positive momentum, from the $2.5 billion in commercial deals generated at the 17th U.S.-Africa Business Summit in Luanda, Angola, to the new National Security Strategy ’s brief section on Africa.

战争爆发之前，美国在非洲的参与呈现出积极的势头，从在安哥拉罗安达举行的第十七届美非商业峰会上达成的 25 亿美元商业交易，到新的国家安全战略中有关非洲的简短章节。

Though narrow and relegated to the final page, the section nonetheless signaled a commitment to trade, investment, energy, and engagement on critical minerals.

尽管该部分内容狭窄且被放在最后一页，但仍然表明了对贸易、投资、能源和关键矿产参与的承诺。

More recently, an assistant secretary of state for Africa was appointed, suggesting the administration is intent on increasing engagement with the continent.

最近，任命了一位负责非洲事务的助理国务卿，这表明政府有意加强与非洲大陆的接触。

What does the war in the Middle East mean for U.S.-Africa relations?

中东战争对美非关系意味着什么？

The direct economic shock of the war on African countries is real but uneven.

战争对非洲国家的直接经济冲击是真实存在的，但并不均衡。

The International Monetary Fund downgraded its forecast for Sub-Saharan African growth by 0.3 percentage points and predicts regional inflation to rise sharply from 3.4% in 2025 to 5% by the end of 2026.

国际货币基金组织将撒哈拉以南非洲地区的经济增长预测下调了0.3个百分点，并预计该地区通胀率将从2025年的3.4%大幅上升至2026年底的5%。

Rising oil prices hit net food importers the hardest.

油价上涨对粮食净进口国的打击最为严重。

The poorest people in these countries, who spend a greater percentage of their income on food, are particularly vulnerable.

这些国家最贫困的人口将收入的很大一部分花在食品上，因此特别容易受到伤害。

Six countries in the world face the double insecurity of existing food crises and high dependence on food imports, and three of these—Central African Republic, Somalia, and South Sudan—are in Africa.

世界上有六个国家面临着现有粮食危机和高度依赖粮食进口的双重不安全，其中三个国家——中非共和国、索马里和南苏丹——位于非洲。

The oil price increases are also trickling down into higher fertilizer costs, which will extend the impact to the next harvest season.

油价上涨也导致化肥成本上涨，这将影响到下一个收获季节。

Some oil exporting countries such as Nigeria, Angola, or Algeria could see short-term revenue gains , but these will likely not lead to structural development without governance investment and reform.

尼日利亚、安哥拉或阿尔及利亚等一些石油出口国可能会看到短期收入增长，但如果没有治理投资和改革，这些可能不会带来结构性发展。

While the threat of food insecurity is real and costly, overall, Africa is more resilient than often portrayed, meaning the continent as a whole might not face direct catastrophe from the war, but effects will likely concentrate in already fragile states.

虽然粮食不安全的威胁是真实存在且代价高昂的，但总体而言，非洲比通常描述的更有弹性，这意味着整个大陆可能不会面临战争的直接灾难，但影响可能会集中在本已脆弱的国家。

The larger and perhaps longer-lasting risk is that the war serves as a strategic distraction from engaging with the African continent at a critical moment.

更大、也许更持久的风险是，战争会成为在关键时刻与非洲大陆接触的战略干扰。

The war is pulling finite U.S. foreign policy bandwidth, including attention, senior leadership time, diplomatic capital, and likely budget, away from Africa.

这场战争正在将美国有限的外交政策带宽（包括注意力、高级领导时间、外交资本以及可能的预算）从非洲夺走。

The assistant secretary also only recently took his post, meaning he has barely had time to establish relationships.

助理国务卿也是最近才上任的，这意味着他几乎没有时间建立关系。

At the same time, as of August 21, 2026, 19 months into President Donald Trump’s second term, 37 U.S. ambassador posts covering 40 African countries were vacant, including posts for which the Trump administration had nominated candidates who had not yet been confirmed by the Senate.

与此同时，截至2026年8月21日，即唐纳德·特朗普总统第二任期19个月，覆盖40个非洲国家的37个美国大使职位空缺，其中包括特朗普政府提名但尚未得到参议院确认的候选人。

The number of visa-processing U.S. embassies was also reduced from 50 to 20 .

处理签证的美国大使馆数量也从 50 个减少到 20 个。

This diplomatic regression makes it even more difficult for African governments and businesspeople to engage with the United States.

这种外交倒退使得非洲政府和商人与美国接触变得更加困难。

Critical minerals are the clearest vulnerability when it comes to this strategic distraction.

就这种战略干扰而言，关键矿物是最明显的弱点。

The United States identified 50 minerals as critical in 2024 and remains 100% import-dependent for 12 of them and more than 50% net import reliant for another 28, representing a serious economic and security concern.

美国将 50 种矿产确定为 2024 年关键矿产，其中 12 种矿产仍 100% 依赖进口，另外 28 种矿产的净进口依赖度超过 50%，这构成了严重的经济和安全问题。

Yet only 4% of the United States’ foreign direct investment in Africa was for critical mineral projects in 2023, despite Africa holding 30% of the world’s critical mineral reserves.

然而，尽管非洲拥有全球 30% 的关键矿产储量，但到 2023 年，美国对非洲的外国直接投资中只有 4% 用于关键矿产项目。

Comparatively, Chinese companies control up to 80% of critical mineral production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with much of the output processed in China.

相比之下，中国公司控制着刚果民主共和国 (DRC) 高达 80% 的关键矿产生产，其中大部分产品在中国加工。

As Washington concentrates its energies on war with Iran and other global crises, continued U.S. underinvestment in Africa risks widening China’s lead across the critical minerals value chain and weakening U.S. access to the supply chains, partnerships, and influence that will shape the future global economy.

随着华盛顿将精力集中在与伊朗的战争和其他全球危机上，美国对非洲持续投资不足可能会扩大中国在关键矿产价值链上的领先地位，并削弱美国进入供应链、伙伴关系和影响力的机会，而这些将塑造未来的全球经济。

The United States has shown explicit interest in putting energy into partnerships with Africa on critical minerals, as seen through the 2025 National Security Strategy’s focus on them.

从 2025 年国家安全战略对这些矿产的关注中可以看出，美国已表现出明确的兴趣，将能源投入到与非洲在关键矿产方面的伙伴关系。

However, securing those partnerships requires sustained, high-level engagement, which the war in the Middle East is eroding.

然而，确保这些伙伴关系需要持续的高级别接触，而中东战争正在削弱这种接触。

Similarly, while the African Growth and Opportunity Act was renewed until December 2026 , the lack of a long-term renewal continues to increase uncertainty for investors and governments alike, with every month of delay providing more time for China, the European Union, the Gulf states, and other investors to continue filling the gap and deepening their partnerships.

同样，虽然《非洲增长与机会法案》已续签至 2026 年 12 月，但缺乏长期续签继续增加了投资者和政府的不确定性，每延迟一个月，就为中国、欧盟、海湾国家和其他投资者提供了更多时间来继续填补空白并深化合作伙伴关系。

The Iran war’s disruption of global energy and mineral supplies also further elevates Africa’s strategic value as an alternative energy supplier.

伊朗战争对全球能源和矿产供应的干扰也进一步提升了非洲作为替代能源供应国的战略价值。

With concerted thought and action, the crisis could accelerate the case for deeper U.S.-Africa engagement.

通过一致的思考和行动，这场危机可能会加速美国与非洲更深入的接触。

To ensure that this war does not lead to a further erosion of U.S. engagement in Africa, the United States should consider the following recommendations.

为了确保这场战争不会导致美国在非洲的参与进一步受到削弱，美国应考虑以下建议。

Institutionalize high-level U.S.-Africa engagement to avoid strategic distraction and advance mutual economic and security interests.

将美国与非洲的高层交往制度化，以避免战略干扰并促进共同的经济和安全利益。

The 2025 National Security Strategy and comments from the new assistant secretary of state for Africa signal African countries’ importance for U.S. economic and security interests.

2025年国家安全战略和新任非洲事务助理国务卿的评论表明非洲国家对美国经济和安全利益的重要性。

Yet protecting priorities on the continent depends on more than rhetoric.

然而，保护非洲大陆的优先事项不仅仅取决于言辞。

Just as President Barack Obama’s “pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific region was undermined by conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, the current war with Iran jeopardizes attempts at a new Africa policy.

正如巴拉克·奥巴马总统向亚太地区的“支点”因欧洲和中东冲突而受到破坏一样，当前与伊朗的战争也危及了新非洲政策的尝试。

Leveraging the important role of the assistant secretary of state for Africa is one way to ensure these efforts stay on the front burner.

利用负责非洲事务的助理国务卿的重要作用是确保这些努力得到重视的一种方法。

As the top diplomat to Africa in the administration, the assistant secretary of state for Africa can advance U.S. interests by traveling to lead senior discussions with African leaders and by protecting the agency’s budget for Africa-related activities.

作为政府中驻非洲的最高外交官，负责非洲事务的助理国务卿可以通过出差领导与非洲领导人的高级讨论以及保护该机构用于非洲相关活动的预算来促进美国的利益。

The administration should also consider holding another U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, of the sort held in 2022 and 2014 , preferably within the coming year.

政府还应考虑在 2022 年和 2014 年举行另一次美国-非洲领导人峰会，最好是在来年举行。

In the past, these summits have led to millions of dollars in investments, and a renewed summit would build on Trump’s recent engagement with selected African leaders in 2025 .

过去，这些峰会带来了数百万美元的投资，新的峰会将以特朗普最近与选定的非洲领导人在 2025 年的接触为基础。

The administration should also double down on implementing the December 2025 peace accords between the DRC and Rwanda and ensure robust participation in the rescheduled Corporate Council on Africa’s U.S.-Africa Business Summit in Mauritius in December 2026.

政府还应加倍努力执行刚果民主共和国和卢旺达之间 2025 年 12 月达成的和平协议，并确保积极参与重新安排的 2026 年 12 月在毛里求斯举行的非洲美非商业峰会企业理事会。

Together, these efforts would reinforce U.S. credibility, sustain high-level engagement, and demonstrate that strategic commitments to Africa remain a priority despite competing geopolitical crises.

总之，这些努力将增强美国的信誉，维持高层接触，并表明尽管存在相互竞争的地缘政治危机，但对非洲的战略承诺仍然是优先事项。

Turn the Iran crisis into an opportunity to accelerate U.S.-Africa investments in critical minerals and energy security partnerships amid intensifying competition with China.

在与中国的竞争日益激烈的情况下，将伊朗危机转化为加速美国与非洲对关键矿产和能源安全伙伴关系的投资的机遇。

While the United States does not depend on Persian Gulf oil for most of its energy needs, many of its allies in Asia do.

尽管美国的大部分能源需求并不依赖波斯湾石油，但其许多亚洲盟友却依赖波斯湾石油。

The United States can support these allies by building long-term resilience through alternative energy solutions , positioning investment in African critical minerals as a key component of these alternatives.

美国可以通过替代能源解决方案建立长期弹性来支持这些盟友，将对非洲关键矿产的投资作为这些替代能源的关键组成部分。

More directly, the United States must also think about the need for critical minerals in replacing its stock of military equipment depleted in the Iran war.

更直接地说，美国还必须考虑对关键矿物的需求，以替换其在伊朗战争中耗尽的军事装备库存。

A long-term renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act , including a new addendum on critical minerals, would open new markets for importing these materials.

《非洲增长与机会法案》的长期更新，包括关于关键矿物的新附录，将为进口这些材料开辟新市场。

Over time, using U.S. financing and technical knowledge to enhance the processing capabilities of resource-rich African countries could further reduce dependence on China, particularly for cobalt and rare earth elements.

随着时间的推移，利用美国的融资和技术知识来增强资源丰富的非洲国家的加工能力可以进一步减少对中国的依赖，特别是在钴和稀土元素方面。

Develop a coordinated U.S.-Africa strategy and action plan backed by an effective whole-of-government coordination and implementation mechanism.

制定协调一致的美国-非洲战略和行动计划，并以有效的整体政府协调和实施机制为后盾。

The 2025 National Security Strategy correctly identifies the need for greater emphasis on trade and investment and critical mineral partnerships, but the United States needs an action plan for how, in terms of ways and means, it will successfully deliver.

2025 年国家安全战略正确地确定了需要更加重视贸易和投资以及重要的矿产伙伴关系，但美国需要一个行动计划来说明如何在方式和手段上成功实现这一目标。

The first Trump administration created the Prosper Africa initiative to drive two-way trade and investment.

第一届特朗普政府制定了“繁荣非洲”倡议来推动双向贸易和投资。

Although it was later terminated in early 2025 as part of the second Trump administration’s foreign aid cuts, the initiative was a successful coordinating mechanism for 17 U.S. agencies to streamline and accelerate the United States’ commercial ties with African countries.

尽管该计划后来因特朗普第二届政府削减对外援助的一部分而于 2025 年初终止，但该计划是 17 个美国机构的成功协调机制，旨在简化和加速美国与非洲国家的商业关系。

Going forward, the administration should clarify what the coordinating mechanism will be among institutions engaged in Africa—including the Development Finance Corporation, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Small Business Administration, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and others—and include this in the action plan.

展望未来，政府应明确参与非洲事务的机构（包括发展金融公司、美国农业部、美国能源部、美国小企业管理局、千年挑战公司等）之间的协调机制，并将其纳入行动计划。

A specific action plan with an effective implementation mechanism will help prevent the United States from reneging on commitments when an external shock occurs and will signal genuine commitment to African governments.

具有有效执行机制的具体行动计划将有助于防止美国在外部冲击发生时食言，也将表明美国对非洲各国政府的真正承诺。

The Iran war’s greatest risk for U.S.-Africa relations is the strategic distraction that hands competitors a window to deepen their foothold on the continent.

伊朗战争对美非关系的最大风险是战略分散，为竞争对手提供了深化在非洲大陆立足点的窗口。

The cost of repeating the early-2000s mistake of losing momentum in U.S.-Africa engagement would be much higher today, given the global challenges, uptick in geopolitical competition, and alternatives for African countries.

考虑到全球挑战、地缘政治竞争的加剧以及非洲国家的替代选择，今天重蹈 2000 年代初美国与非洲接触失去动力的错误的代价将要高得多。

The supply chain disruptions caused by the Iran war actually strengthen the strategic case for U.S.-Africa critical minerals partnerships if Washington has the focus to act on it, which will require a doubling down on the engagement agenda and matching it with sufficient action and resources.

如果华盛顿有重点采取行动，伊朗战争造成的供应链中断实际上强化了美国与非洲关键矿产伙伴关系的战略理由，这将需要加倍努力，并为其提供足够的行动和资源。