Democrats on track to outperform 2026 House forecasts

Campaigns & Elections Congress Political Parties Political Polarization Presidency Public Opinion

竞选与选举 国会 政党 政治两极分化 总统选举 公众舆论

In this era of rampant online gambling , a fitting way to frame this year’s U.S. House contests is around the odds of Democrats winning a majority.

在这个在线赌博猖獗的时代，确定今年美国众议院竞选的一个合适方式是围绕民主党赢得多数席位的赔率。

To put it bluntly, those odds are about as good as anyone can ever expect to find.

坦率地说，这些可能性几乎是任何人都能找到的。

But just how many seats will they flip?

但他们到底会翻转多少个席位呢？

The smart money sets the number at around 17.

聪明的投资者将这个数字定在 17 左右。

I’d take the over.

我会接手。

The Democrats start five seats down (219-214), with two vacancies in play—Florida’s 20th District and Texas’ 23rd District.

民主党在开局时落后五个席位（219-214），还有两个空缺席位——佛罗里达州第 20 选区和德克萨斯州第 23 选区。

One of the two is a deep blue constituency , which effectively trims the deficit to four (Texas’ 23rd District is majority Hispanic and supported Trump by 15 points but looks more competitive now).

其中两个选区是深蓝色选区，这实际上将赤字削减至四个（德克萨斯州的第 23 选区以拉美裔为主，支持特朗普 15 个百分点，但现在看起来更具竞争力）。

To regain the gavel, then, the Democrats need just three net wins.

那么，为了重新获得胜利，民主党只需要三场净胜。

That’s not a big spread to overcome, but the betting card is short, and the GOP does have a couple more cards to play.

这并不是一个需要克服的大差距，但下注牌很短，而且共和党确实还有几张牌可以打。

To elaborate, district-by-district analysts see 381-395 outcomes as “safely” or “likely” squared away, yielding an effective Republican cushion of seven or eight seats (largely because of its redistricting efforts this year, a point to which I will return).

详细地说，各选区的分析师认为 381-395 的结果是“安全”或“可能”的，从而产生共和党有效的七到八个席位的缓冲（主要是因为今年重新划分选区的努力，我将回到这一点）。

That leaves only about three or maybe four dozen districts that are truly competitive.

这样一来，真正具有竞争力的地区就只剩下大约三到四打了。

Here’s why I’m wagering that the Democrats will win nearly all of them.

这就是为什么我打赌民主党将赢得几乎所有选举。

The race-by-race prognosticators are characteristically cautious , anchoring their estimates on district-level factors like partisan balance, incumbency, and candidate quality and discounting national-level dynamics like economic trends and presidential approval.

逐个种族的预测者通常持谨慎态度，他们的预测主要基于地区层面的因素，如党派平衡、在职情况和候选人质量，而忽视了经济趋势和总统批准等国家层面的动态。

The theory that politics turns on local issues hasn’t been true for some time ; the national trends carry outsized importance now.

一段时间以来，政治取决于地方问题的理论并不成立。国家趋势现在变得异常重要。

As such, some forecasters rely on generic ballot polls , which tally vote intentions for each party without mentioning specific candidates.

因此，一些预测者依赖通用选票民意调查，统计各党派的投票意向，但不提及具体候选人。

They currently favor Democrats by about 6 percentage points , which may not sound seismic, but midterm voters tend to migrate toward the out-party as campaigns progress.

他们目前对民主党的支持率约为 6 个百分点，这听起来可能并不令人震惊，但随着竞选的进展，中期选民往往会转向外党。

In fact, this century, when an out-party has enjoyed a late-summer lead like this, it has netted between 31 and 63 seats .

事实上，本世纪，当一个外党在夏末享有这样的领先优势时，它已经获得了 31 至 63 个席位。

That big of a landslide is probably out of reach nowadays (because the number of districts with any semblance of partisan parity has cratered ).

如今，如此大规模的压倒性胜利可能是遥不可及的（因为任何表面上党派均等的地区数量已经大幅减少）。

Still, those precedents speak to what a 6-point lead really represents.

不过，这些先例说明了 6 分领先的真正含义。

We can reach the same conclusion, though, without even looking at election polls.

不过，我们甚至可以不看选举民意调查就得出同样的结论。

It is something close to an ironclad law that the president’s party loses seats in midterm elections —typically more than two dozen of them .

总统所在政党在中期选举中失去席位——通常超过两打，这几乎是一条铁律。

In fact, in only three such elections since the Civil War has the president’s party not lost seats: 1934 (reflecting New Deal optimism ), 2002 (rallying post-9/11 patriotism ), and 1998 (responding to perceived impeachment overreach ).

事实上，自内战以来，总统所在的政党只有三次这样的选举没有失去席位：1934年（反映了新政的乐观主义）、2002年（集结了9/11后的爱国主义）和1998年（回应了被认为的弹劾越权）。

What did those years have in common?

那些年有什么共同点？

A remarkably popular president.

一位非常受欢迎的总统。

Clinton’s approval stood at 66% .

克林顿的支持率为66%。

Bush’s stood at 63% .

布什的支持率为 63%。

And though FDR’s is less clear because scientific polling had yet to be invented, the robust economic rebound of that year connotes broad public support.

尽管由于科学民调尚未发明，罗斯福的说法不太明确，但当年强劲的经济反弹意味着广泛的公众支持。

Indeed, by contrast, when a president’s approval rating is underwater, his seat loss spikes substantially .

事实上，相比之下，当总统的支持率下降时，他的席位损失就会大幅增加。

Because Trump’s approval (mid/high 30’s) is among the lowest of any president at this point in his term since 1946—when Truman’s Democrats lost 55 seats—history portends an uphill battle.

由于特朗普的支持率（30 多岁中/高）是自 1946 年以来其任期内最低的总统之一（当时杜鲁门的民主党失去了 55 个席位），历史预示着一场艰苦的战斗。

And with gas prices and mortgage rates both up, job growth and consumer confidence both down, and Iran tensions and ICE shootings both unabated, Trump’s numbers are unlikely to rebound anytime soon—certainly not before voting begins in two-to-six weeks .

由于汽油价格和抵押贷款利率双双上涨，就业增长和消费者信心双双下降，伊朗紧张局势和 ICE 枪击事件都有增无减，特朗普的支持率不太可能很快反弹——尤其是在两到六周后投票开始之前。

Truth be told, Trump is probably even less popular than previous presidents were with similar ratings.

说实话，特朗普的受欢迎程度可能甚至低于具有类似支持率的前任总统。

While dissatisfied Democrats are willing to voice that discontent on surveys, modern-day Republicans tend to “cheerlead” and loathe to give pollsters the supposed satisfaction of hearing their disapproval .

虽然不满的民主党人愿意在调查中表达不满，但现代共和党人倾向于“啦啦队”，不愿让民意调查人员因听到他们的不满而获得所谓的满足感。

But their enthusiasm may still be waning, and there’s no guarantee they’ll cast ballots for down-ballot Republicans.

但他们的热情可能仍在减弱，并且不能保证他们会把选票投给共和党。

Thus, the projected seat loss from Trump’s unpopularity may be lowballing it.

因此，预计特朗普因不受欢迎而失去的席位可能是低估了它。

A big part of the presidential party’s midterm seat loss is about turnout.

总统党中期席位流失的很大一部分原因在于投票率。

Unpopular presidents tend to dampen enthusiasm among supporters and boost it among opponents .

不受欢迎的总统往往会抑制支持者的热情，而提高反对者的热情。

In Trump’s case, it applies even when he is more popular; the “ cult of personality ” nature of his appeal draws supporters out of the woodwork when he’s on the ballot but not when he isn’t .

就特朗普而言，即使他更受欢迎，这一点也适用。当他参加选票时，他的呼吁的“个人崇拜”性质会吸引支持者，但当他不在选票时却不会。

Equally important to the turnout story—and often overlooked among pundits—is the “ diploma divide ” that has realigned the two parties’ class identities.

与投票率故事同样重要的是“文凭鸿沟”，它重新调整了两党的阶级身份，这一点经常被专家们忽视。

That upheaval has taken Democrats, as Paul Begala said, “ from the factory floor to the faculty lounge ,” but it has also taken them to the ballot box.

正如保罗·贝加拉（Paul Begala）所说，这场剧变已经将民主党“从工厂车间带到了教职员工休息室”，但也将他们带到了投票箱。

In other words, because (a) education is such a powerful predictor of voting , and (b) Democrats have become the ones who tend to have more of it, they (c) tend to have a turnout advantage in low-visibility elections (non-presidential years ) now.

换句话说，因为（a）教育程度是投票的有力预测因素，并且（b）民主党人往往拥有更多的教育程度，所以他们（c）现在往往在低能见度的选举（非总统年份）中拥有投票率优势。

First, what about the 2022 midterms, when Democrats performed well despite Biden’s unpopularity?

首先，2022年中期选举怎么样，尽管拜登不受欢迎，但民主党表现良好？

Well, while the Democrats did gain a seat in the Senate, the party still lost nine seats in the House—three times what Republicans can afford this year.

好吧，虽然民主党确实在参议院赢得了一个席位，但该党仍然失去了众议院的 9 个席位——是共和党今年所能承受的席位的三倍。

And as I mentioned earlier, Biden’s number then did not mean the same thing that Trump’s does now.

正如我之前提到的，拜登当时的数字与特朗普现在的数字并不相同。

A meaningful share of Biden’s disapprovers were frustrated Democrats who were never going to vote red.

拜登的反对者中有很大一部分是沮丧的民主党人，他们永远不会投票红色。

By contrast, relatively few of Trump’s disapprovers are Republican voters , making his disapproval rating more consequential.

相比之下，特朗普的反对者中共和党选民相对较少，这使得他的反对率更加重要。

But what about the systematic survey bias in favor of Democrats?

但是有利于民主党的系统调查偏见又如何呢？

Swing-state polls overestimated Democratic support in 2016, 2020, and 2024 , so why shouldn’t we take the Democrats’ current polling lead with a grain of salt?

摇摆州民意调查高估了 2016 年、2020 年和 2024 年民主党的支持率，那么我们为什么不应该对民主党目前的民意调查领先地位持保留态度呢？

Because the pattern did not hold in either of the last two midterms: 2018 and 2022 were both relatively accurate polling years ; if anything, the 2022 polls underestimated the Democrats’ showing.

因为这种模式在过去两次中期选举中都没有成立：2018 年和 2022 年都是相对准确的投票年；如果说有什么不同的话，那就是 2022 年的民意调查低估了民主党的表现。

So, what about all the radicals the Democrats have been nominating who stand stiff odds of winning over swing voters?

那么，民主党提名的那些极有可能赢得摇摆选民的激进分子呢？

That narrative doesn’t hold up; leftist victories have received outsized media attention, but just as many centrists have been winning overall, and in the real House battlegrounds, Democratic primary voters have mostly stuck to mainstream candidates .

这种说法是站不住脚的。左派的胜利受到了媒体的广泛关注，但正如许多中间派总体上获胜一样，在真正的众议院战场上，民主党初选选民大多坚持主流候选人。

Even the so-called radicals are not necessarily unelectable.

即使是所谓的激进派也不一定不能当选。

Their leftist rhetoric is usually concentrated on economic issues—reflecting a rising tide of populism among not just Democrats but independents and Republicans as well .

他们的左翼言论通常集中在经济问题上，这反映出民粹主义浪潮不仅在民主党人中兴起，而且在独立人士和共和党人中也日益高涨。

Well, what about the fundraising advantage that Republicans enjoy?

那么，共和党享有的筹款优势又如何呢？

Republican Party committees and allied groups currently hold a half-billion-dollar cash edge over their Democratic counterparts .

共和党委员会和联盟团体目前比民主党委员会和联盟团体拥有五亿美元的现金优势。

But that top-line gap doesn’t show up where it matters most: In the second quarter of 2026, Democratic challengers outraised Republican incumbents in about two-thirds of the toss-up districts .

但这种收入差距并没有体现在最重要的地方：2026 年第二季度，民主党挑战者在大约三分之二的选区中击败了共和党现任议员。

And even where a real gap does exist, money has diminishing returns ; candidates need enough cash to get their message out, but beyond that, those additional millions buy less and less.

即使确实存在差距，金钱的回报也会递减；候选人需要足够的现金来传达他们的信息，但除此之外，额外的数百万美元购买的东西越来越少。

Finally, what about the Republicans’ new gerrymanders?

最后，共和党的新选区划分又如何呢？

Indeed, those mid-cycle redistricting gambits have genuinely hurt Democrats; the median district is about two points more Republican than it was before they redrew the maps.

事实上，这些周期中期重新划分选区的策略确实伤害了民主党人。中间选区的共和党人比重新绘制地图之前高出大约两个百分点。

But that damage is already baked into the competitive-seat math that I laid out at the beginning.

但这种损害已经融入到我一开始列出的竞争席位数学中。

It’s the reason that Democrats will not gain 50 seats.

这就是民主党无法获得 50 个席位的原因。

They are in a pretty good position to gain around 25-30, though, which would amount to a decisive rebuke of the Trump sequel and his many foot soldiers on Capitol Hill.

不过，他们处于相当有利的位置，可以赢得 25-30 左右的选票，这将相当于对特朗普续集和他在国会山的众多步兵的决定性谴责。