How can a ‘Europeanized NATO’ defend Europe with reduced American support?
Diplomacy & Multilateralism Foreign Politics & Elections U.S. Foreign Policy
外交与多边主义 外交政治与选举 美国外交政策
This paper was written for a July 15 Center on the United States and Europe virtual workshop on “The Future of NATO” as part of Brookings’s Reimagining Europe’s security project, along with Michael E.
本文是为 7 月 15 日美国和欧洲中心举办的“北约的未来”虚拟研讨会撰写的，该研讨会是布鲁金斯学会与 Michael E.
O’Hanlon’s “ What is the value of a ‘Europeanized NATO’ for the United States?
奥汉隆的《‘欧洲化的北约’对美国有何价值？
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The Trump administration’s May announcement that it would withdraw some U.S. assets from the NATO Force Model and no longer serve as the primary guarantor of conventional European security in a continental conflict with Russia has tangible consequences for European NATO members.
特朗普政府5月宣布将从北约部队模式中撤回部分美国资产，并不再在与俄罗斯的大陆冲突中充当欧洲传统安全的主要保障者，这对欧洲北约成员国产生了切实的影响。
This brief will examine what reduced U.S. conventional support would mean for Europe’s ability to defend NATO territory on the continent against Russian aggression.
这份简报将探讨美国常规支持的减少对欧洲保卫北约在欧洲大陆领土免受俄罗斯侵略的能力意味着什么。
It focuses on conventional military capabilities rather than questions of deterrence or nuclear escalation.
它侧重于常规军事能力，而不是威慑或核升级问题。
Assessing the ramifications of European NATO members receiving less American involvement in a conventional escalation on the continent requires us to distinguish between different timelines.
评估欧洲北约成员国较少接受美国参与该大陆常规升级的影响需要我们区分不同的时间表。
After all, it makes a difference whether Europe must defend itself with less or no U.S. support tomorrow (“fight tonight”), only in a few years (“2029”), or during the transition period between these two scenarios.
毕竟，欧洲是否必须在明天（“今晚战斗”）、几年后（“2029年”）或在这两种情况之间的过渡期间在更少或没有美国支持的情况下保卫自己，这是有区别的。
Europe may be able to replace much of America’s conventional military capability by the end of the decade.
到本世纪末，欧洲或许能够取代美国的大部分常规军事能力。
The more difficult challenge will be replacing the U.S. role in integrating, commanding, and employing those forces.
更困难的挑战将是取代美国在整合、指挥和运用这些部队方面的作用。
In the “2029” scenario, 1 Europe has been working intensively since 2022—and especially since Donald Trump’s return to office—to significantly improve its defense capabilities before two developments occur: first, the United States withdraws additional military assets and personnel from Europe; and second, Russia regains the capability to launch a military attack on European NATO allies, whether through full-scale conventional aggression or a more limited test of NATO’s resolve.
在“2029”情景中，1 Europe自2022年以来一直在紧锣密鼓地努力，特别是自唐纳德·特朗普重返办公室以来，在两个事态发展发生之前显着提高其防御能力：首先，美国从欧洲撤出更多的军事资产和人员；其次，美国从欧洲撤出更多的军事资产和人员；其次，俄罗斯重新获得对欧洲北约盟国发动军事攻击的能力，无论是通过全面的常规侵略还是对北约决心的更有限的考验。
Europe is broadly on track to fully replace, in the coming years, the conventional capabilities that the United States will withdraw from Europe or would no longer be able to provide to NATO in the event of a military conflict.
欧洲总体上有望在未来几年内完全取代美国将从欧洲撤出或在发生军事冲突时不再能够向北约提供的常规能力。
Across areas such as tanks, fighter jets, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), deep-strike capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, or drones, most European countries are placing orders and ramping up production at full speed.
在坦克、战斗机、情报、监视和侦察（ISR）、纵深打击能力、电子战能力或无人机等领域，大多数欧洲国家都在全速下订单并提高产量。
Domestic political developments—such as electoral victories by right-wing populist, pro-Russia parties or a drastic decline in public support for increased defense spending amid welfare cuts—could slow down or halt this trend.
国内政治事态发展——例如右翼民粹主义、亲俄罗斯政党在选举中获胜，或者在福利削减的情况下公众对增加国防开支的支持急剧下降——可能会减缓或阻止这一趋势。
If they do not, Europe’s challenge will be ensuring these investments translate into the forces and capabilities needed to mount an effective continental defense.
如果他们不这样做，欧洲面临的挑战将是确保这些投资转化为建立有效的大陆防御所需的力量和能力。
However, this progress offers only limited cause for optimism that Europe will be able to defend itself fully and successfully against Russian aggression in 2029 with significantly reduced or no U.S. support.
然而，这一进展并不能让人乐观地认为，在美国支持大幅减少或没有美国支持的情况下，欧洲将能够在 2029 年全面、成功地抵御俄罗斯的侵略。
Two significant gaps remain in Europe’s efforts to mount a successful defense: “mass” and a lack of interoperability among European armed forces.
欧洲在成功防御的努力中仍存在两个重大差距：“大规模”和欧洲武装部队之间缺乏互操作性。
A key component of “mass”—the concentration of combat power at the decisive place and time—is the availability of troops.
“大规模”的一个关键组成部分——在决定性地点和时间集中战斗力——是部队的可用性。
Yet most European countries are reluctant to return to universal conscription.
然而大多数欧洲国家不愿意恢复全民征兵制。
Instead, they hope that programs designed to make military and reserve service more attractive will enable them to replenish their armed forces’ ranks.
相反，他们希望旨在使军队和预备役服役更具吸引力的计划将使他们能够补充武装部队的队伍。
However, trends in Europe’s larger countries raise considerable doubts as to whether this approach will ultimately prove successful.
然而，欧洲大国的趋势对这种方法最终是否会成功提出了很大的疑问。
Even more importantly, without the United States—or with much less U.S. involvement—European armed forces would only be partially capable of effectively coordinating operations.
更重要的是，如果没有美国——或者美国的参与少得多——欧洲武装部队将只能部分地有效协调行动。
For the past 70 years, European armed forces have been structured around U.S. capabilities, both in terms of their operational effectiveness and ability to conduct operations.
过去 70 年来，欧洲武装部队一直围绕美国的能力构建，无论是在作战效能还是开展行动的能力方面。
NATO’s integrated command structure is the alliance’s military “ brain ,” which enabled Europeans to be integrated into the U.S. command structure and the U.S. way of warfighting.
北约的一体化指挥结构是该联盟的军事“大脑”，它使欧洲能够融入美国的指挥结构和美国的作战方式。
Without the United States, Europeans will be “brainless” for the foreseeable future.
没有美国，欧洲人在可预见的未来将是“无脑”的。
However, there is currently little discussion about how Europe—or who within Europe—could assume this central integrating function.
然而，目前关于欧洲——或者欧洲内部的谁——如何承担这一核心整合职能的讨论很少。
Which European country can take on the unifying role currently played by the United States?
哪个欧洲国家能够承担美国目前所扮演的统一角色？
In my view, this task can only be carried out by the United Kingdom or France.
在我看来，这个任务只能由英国或法国来完成。
Both have extensive experience working with the U.S. armed forces and are thoroughly familiar with American structures and doctrines.
两人都拥有与美国武装部队合作的丰富经验，并且非常熟悉美国的结构和条令。
Furthermore, they are the only European nuclear-weapon states.
此外，它们是欧洲唯一的核武器国家。
Whether the other European countries are willing to accept this role, and whether the U.K. and France have the necessary number of officers trained for this purpose, remains an open question.
其他欧洲国家是否愿意接受这一角色，以及英国和法国是否有必要数量的为此目的培训的军官，仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。
Without the interface with the U.S. armed forces, and thus without the U.S. approach to warfare, another question arises: Does Europe have its own way of conducting warfare?
如果没有与美国武装部队的互动，也就没有美国的战争方式，就会出现另一个问题：欧洲是否有自己的战争方式？
This question becomes even more urgent in the “fight tonight” scenario, or during the transition period before Europe can replace U.S. capabilities.
在“今晚战斗”的情况下，或者在欧洲取代美国能力之前的过渡时期，这个问题变得更加紧迫。
In such a scenario, Europe would almost certainly have to defend its territory against Russian aggression with little or no American support.
在这种情况下，欧洲几乎肯定必须在很少或根本没有美国支持的情况下保卫其领土免受俄罗斯的侵略。
Moreover, many of the substitute capabilities that European countries have recently ordered would not yet be available in this scenario.
此外，欧洲国家最近订购的许多替代能力在这种情况下尚不可用。
So, should a conventional conflict with Russia break out in the near future, European armed forces would lack the critical strategic enablers, the manpower, the coordinating and directing role of the United States, and sufficient conventional military equipment of their own.
因此，如果在不久的将来与俄罗斯爆发常规冲突，欧洲武装部队将缺乏关键的战略推动因素、人力、美国的协调和指导作用以及足够的自身常规军事装备。
Meanwhile, they would have to face a Russian military hardened by its war of aggression against Ukraine.
与此同时，他们将不得不面对因侵略乌克兰战争而变得更加坚强的俄罗斯军队。
Under these conditions, it would be nearly impossible for European armed forces to implement the U.S. concept of European defense, which relies on striking quickly, hard, and deep into the Russian rear area.
在这种情况下，欧洲武装力量几乎不可能实施美国的欧洲防御理念，即依靠快速、猛烈、深入的打击俄罗斯后方。
If the U.S. concept of defense becomes infeasible, what alternatives would Europe have?
如果美国的防御理念变得不可行，欧洲还有什么选择？
In my view, two priorities would become essential in such a scenario.
在我看来，在这种情况下，有两个优先事项将变得至关重要。
First, maintaining the political cohesion of the European coalition defending itself; and second, shifting the operational focus away from winning and toward not losing .
第一，保持欧洲联盟自卫的政治凝聚力；第二，将作战重点从赢转向不输。
Maintaining political cohesion is crucial for three reasons.
出于三个原因，保持政治凝聚力至关重要。
First, in a conventional conflict with European states, Russia will draw nuclear red lines quickly.
首先，在与欧洲国家的常规冲突中，俄罗斯将迅速划定核红线。
These red lines could undermine support for active conventional defense among some states and societies within the coalition.
这些红线可能会削弱联盟内一些国家和社会对积极常规防御的支持。
Keeping all coalition members committed to the fight will thus become critical for the broader defense.
因此，让所有联盟成员致力于战斗对于更广泛的防御至关重要。
Second, and closely linked to the nuclear issue, European states are likely to disagree regarding whether and to what extent the defense of European NATO territory should involve strikes into Russia .
其次，与核问题密切相关的是，欧洲国家可能在北约欧洲领土的防御是否以及在何种程度上应涉及对俄罗斯的打击方面存在分歧。
Coalition management will therefore become a priority, but it will constrain defense efforts with regard to strategic and operational issues.
因此，联盟管理将成为优先事项，但它将限制战略和作战问题上的防御努力。
Third, a Russian attack will not necessarily be limited to conventional military means.
第三，俄罗斯的攻击不一定限于常规军事手段。
The more hybrid the conflict’s nature, the more likely it is that European coalition partners will disagree over whether and how to respond militarily.
冲突的性质越复杂，欧洲联盟伙伴就越有可能在是否以及如何采取军事应对方面存在分歧。
In terms of operational strategy, a “fight tonight” scenario would see European states facing significant limitations across three dimensions.
就作战策略而言，“今晚战斗”的情况将使欧洲国家在三个方面面临重大限制。
These constraints would fundamentally shape a European approach to warfare.
这些限制将从根本上塑造欧洲的战争方式。
Most significantly, they would render any defense strategy relying on speed obsolete under such conditions, because European states would lack the capabilities to implement it.
最重要的是，它们将使任何依赖于速度的防御战略在这种情况下变得过时，因为欧洲国家缺乏实施它的能力。
Maneuver warfare, aimed at recapturing or conquering territory through movement, would be replaced by the concept of holding and defending territory in order to delay the enemy’s advance for as long as possible.
旨在通过运动夺回或征服领土的机动战将被占领和保卫领土的概念所取代，以尽可能长时间地拖延敌人的前进。
Given Europe’s limited personnel capacity, sustaining such a strategy over the long term would require the extensive deployment of drones and data-enabled drone swarms near the front lines.
鉴于欧洲的人员能力有限，长期维持这一战略需要在前线附近广泛部署无人机和支持数据的无人机群。
These systems could inflict losses on the enemy, minimize one’s own losses, and help hold territory for as long as possible while simultaneously exhausting the attacker.
这些系统可以给敌人造成损失，最大限度地减少自己的损失，并帮助尽可能长时间地守住领土，同时让攻击者筋疲力尽。
If Europeans want to avoid positional warfare, military operators and planners must develop a strategy for how to restore maneuver warfare under these constraints.
如果欧洲人想避免阵地战，军事行动者和规划者必须制定一项战略，如何在这些限制下恢复机动战。
However, such a strategy must be supplemented by the limited ability to attack targets in the enemy’s geographically proximate rear area to disrupt its reinforcement capabilities.
然而，这种战略必须辅以有限的能力来攻击敌人地理上接近的后方目标，以破坏其增援能力。
Given insufficient ISR capabilities, traditional means of reconnaissance (such as foot patrols, scouting, mounted reconnaissance with light non-mechanized transport, contact and patrol flights, or visual observation) would become necessary to enable the early detection and countering of troop movements in the immediate geographical area.
鉴于情监侦能力不足，传统侦察手段（例如徒步巡逻、侦察、轻型非机械化运输机载侦察、接触和巡逻飞行或目视观察）将成为必要，以便及早发现和反击邻近地理区域的部队行动。
A strategy intended to delay an adversary’s advance would be not only personnel-intensive but also equipment-intensive.
旨在拖延对手前进的战略不仅需要人员密集型，而且需要设备密集型。
It would demand large quantities of equipment, ranging from vehicles to ammunition, to be deployed and subjected to enormous wear and tear.
它需要部署大量的设备，从车辆到弹药，并遭受巨大的磨损。
In a potential war of attrition, it is therefore absolutely essential to replenish stockpiles.
因此，在潜在的消耗战中，补充库存是绝对必要的。
Without the ability to consistently supply frontline troops with equipment and to replace or repair damaged equipment, European militaries will only be able to sustain such a war for a limited time.
如果没有能力持续为前线部队提供装备以及更换或修复损坏的装备，欧洲军队将只能在有限的时间内维持这样的战争。
Having well-stocked warehouses means purchasing more off-the-shelf items and massively expanding ammunition production.
拥有库存充足的仓库意味着购买更多的现成物品并大规模扩大弹药生产。
This brief has explored how European NATO armed forces could defend against a possible Russian aggression with little or no American support.
本简报探讨了欧洲北约武装部队如何在很少或没有美国支持的情况下抵御俄罗斯可能的侵略。
It has considered two scenarios: the frequently discussed 2029 scenario and the possibility of a “fight tonight” scenario.
它考虑了两种情景：经常讨论的 2029 年情景和“今晚战斗”情景的可能性。
With regard to 2029, I argue that Europe might be able to fill many of the capability gaps created by the U.S. withdrawal from Europe.
关于 2029 年，我认为欧洲或许能够填补美国退出欧洲造成的许多能力差距。
However, two major challenges remain: replacing the “plug-in” command structure that the United States has provided within NATO for the past 70 years (which will not be an easy undertaking) and solving the problem of persistent personnel shortages.
然而，两大挑战仍然存在：取代美国过去70年来在北约内部提供的“插件”指挥结构（这不是一件容易的事）和解决持续的人员短缺问题。
A “fight tonight” scenario—or a conflict occurring shortly before European NATO armed forces have replaced U.S. capabilities—would present entirely different challenges.
“今晚战斗”的情况——或者在欧洲北约武装部队取代美国能力之前不久发生的冲突——将带来完全不同的挑战。
It would force Europeans to completely rethink their theories of defense and warfare.
它将迫使欧洲人彻底重新思考他们的防御和战争理论。
This brief has sought to outline what such a European approach would look like, as briefly as possible.
本简报试图尽可能简短地概述这种欧洲方法的样子。