What is the value of a ‘Europeanized NATO’ for the United States?

Diplomacy & Multilateralism Foreign Politics & Elections U.S. Foreign Policy

外交与多边主义 外交政治与选举 美国外交政策

Center on the United States and Europe Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology

美国和欧洲中心 斯特罗布·塔尔博特安全、战略和技术中心

This paper was written for a July 15 Center on the United States and Europe virtual workshop on “The Future of NATO” as part of Brookings’s Reimagining Europe’s security project, along with Carlo Masala’s “ How can a ‘Europeanized NATO’ defend Europe with reduced American support?

本文是为 7 月 15 日美国和欧洲中心虚拟研讨会撰写的，主题为“北约的未来”，作为布鲁金斯学会重新构想欧洲安全项目的一部分，同时还有卡洛·马萨拉的“‘欧洲化的北约’如何在美国支持减少的情况下保卫欧洲？

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NATO has been, and remains, the greatest alliance in human history.

北约过去是、现在仍然是人类历史上最伟大的联盟。

That was true through the Cold War, through the 1990s and Balkans missions, through the 2000s and early 2010s in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now again in the period of great-power rivalry since 2014, when Russia invaded Crimea.

冷战期间，20世纪90年代和巴尔干任务，2000年代和2010年代初的伊拉克和阿富汗，以及现在自2014年俄罗斯入侵克里米亚以来的大国竞争时期，情况都是如此。

Earlier this century, when America’s NATO allies were at their worst in terms of military burden-sharing, they were still with the United States in the struggle against al-Qaida and ISIS, and through the return of Russian revanchism.

本世纪初，当美国的北约盟国在军事负担分担方面处于最差的时候，他们仍然与美国一起打击基地组织和伊斯兰国，并通过俄罗斯复仇主义的卷土重来。

Now, with most European countries starting to do much more to provide for their own security, the benefits of the alliance to the American government and people are even greater.

现在，随着大多数欧洲国家开始采取更多措施来保障自身安全，该联盟给美国政府和人民带来的好处更大。

I don’t believe in the premise of a “Europeanized NATO” literally or completely.

我从字面上或完全不相信“欧洲化的北约”的前提。

A “Europeanized NATO,” to some, might mean non-U.S. members of the alliance taking full responsibility for the continent’s defense.

对一些人来说，“欧洲化的北约”可能意味着该联盟的非美国成员对欧洲大陆的防御承担全部责任。

But to me, that is oxymoronic, because NATO by definition and by treaty is an organization through which members in Europe and North America collectively promise to ensure the defense of each other.

但对我来说，这是矛盾的，因为根据定义和条约，北约是一个欧洲和北美成员国共同承诺确保彼此防御的组织。

So logically, a Europeanized NATO is one in which European members take much more responsibility—even primary responsibility, in an ideal world—for the defense of their own continent.

因此从逻辑上讲，欧洲化的北约是欧洲成员国为保卫自己的大陆承担更多责任的国家，在理想的世界中甚至是主要责任。

If this were to occur, the U.S. (and Canadian) role would then be supplementary rather than foundational.

如果发生这种情况，美国（和加拿大）的作用将是补充性的，而不是基础性的。

Were the European countries of NATO (and Canada) to develop roughly three times today’s deployable conventional combat capacity—including much greater use of drones and counter-drone defenses—they could effectively defend NATO’s exposed eastern flank.

如果北约欧洲国家（和加拿大）能够发展大约三倍于今天的可部署常规作战能力——包括更多地使用无人机和反无人机防御——他们就可以有效地保卫北约暴露的东侧。

That capability would allow such a “Europeanized NATO” to collectively deploy a combined non-U.S. force that would be approximately prepared to defeat Russia in at least certain contingencies there.

这种能力将使这样一个“欧洲化的北约”能够集体部署一支非美国联合部队，至少在某些突发事件中至少准备好击败俄罗斯。

I believe that this capability can be achieved within the 3.5% of GDP target that NATO has adopted for traditional defense spending—indeed, it might well be achievable at slightly lower levels, but in that case, only if European governments are brutally efficient about how they allocate their military resources.

我相信这种能力可以在北约为传统国防开支所采用的GDP 3.5%的目标内实现——事实上，在稍低的水平上也可以实现，但在这种情况下，前提是欧洲政府在如何分配军事资源方面非常高效。

NATO can become more European, with non-U.S. allies seeking to become an equally strong overall pillar of the alliance.

北约可以变得更加欧洲化，非美国盟友寻求成为该联盟同样强大的整体支柱。

But NATO will not and should not become truly Europeanized—with Europe being independently responsible for its own defense—for the following reasons:

但北约不会也不应该真正欧洲化——欧洲独立负责自己的防御——原因如下：

That said, there are a number of ways in which the United States would enormously benefit from a Europe that could do roughly three times more than what it can do now, in the realm of deployable military force structure.

也就是说，美国可以通过多种方式从欧洲获得巨大利益，在可部署的军事力量结构领域，欧洲可以做的事情大约是现在的三倍。

At present, based on estimates by the RAND Corporation, Barry Posen of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology , the Atlantic Council , myself , and others, European countries could collectively muster at most three to four brigades of ground combat power, and commensurate tactical air power, in a forward defense of the Baltics.

目前，根据兰德公司、麻省理工学院的巴里·波森、大西洋理事会、我本人和其他人的估计，欧洲国家最多可以集结三到四个旅的地面作战力量以及相应的战术空中力量，对波罗的海进行前沿防御。

If tripled to 10 to 12 brigades, plus logistics and other support plus airpower, Europe and Canada would possess a plausible capability to mount an initial forward defense of the alliance’s eastern flank, in my estimation.

在我看来，如果将旅的数量增加三倍，达到 10 到 12 个旅，再加上后勤和其他支持以及空中力量，欧洲和加拿大将拥有对联盟东侧进行初步前沿防御的合理能力。

That would not be nearly enough to be confident for all contingencies—hence the continued need for a major American role, too.

这还不足以让我们对所有突发事件充满信心——因此美国也需要继续发挥重要作用。

But it would constitute a credible and serious fighting capacity.

但这将构成一种可信的、严肃的战斗力。

European allies do not need all of their 100+ existing brigades and associated helicopters and fighter jets to be able to operate in the Baltics; they only need to make 10% to 15% of their total force structure deployable and sustainable in distant theaters.

欧洲盟国并不需要他们现有的 100 多个旅以及相关的直升机和战斗机都能够在波罗的海地区作战；他们只需要使总兵力结构的 10% 到 15% 能够部署在遥远的战区并可持续。

To reach this capability, the big countries of Europe should each aim to be able to deploy and sustain at least two brigades of combat ground power in a region like the Baltics—with each brigade having roughly 3,500 soldiers and backed up by a logistics/support tail probably again twice as large, for a total of about 10,000 soldiers per brigade equivalent—plus associated airpower.

为了达到这种能力，欧洲大国的目标应该是能够在波罗的海这样的地区部署和维持至少两个旅的地面作战力量——每个旅大约有3,500名士兵，并由可能是其两倍的后勤/支援尾部提供支持，每个旅当量总共有大约10,000名士兵——加上相关的空中力量。

Most other countries should aim for a single brigade; some of the smallest members might pair up with a neighbor and provide the brigade together.

大多数其他国家应该以单一旅为目标；一些最小的成员可能会与邻居配对并共同组成该旅。

For the United States, there would be enormous benefits from such a European pillar of the alliance that approached America’s own likely capacities for waging war in Europe.

对于美国来说，这样一个欧洲支柱联盟将带来巨大的好处，它接近美国自己在欧洲发动战争的可能能力。

They include the following:

它们包括以下内容：

Last but not least, a Europeanized NATO can reduce the strength of political forces in the United States that see an ungrateful set of allies with low defense spending across the Atlantic and choose to disengage from NATO as a result.

最后但并非最不重要的一点是，欧洲化的北约可以削弱美国政治力量的实力，因为美国看到大西洋彼岸的一群忘恩负义的盟友在国防开支较低的情况下选择脱离北约。

As noted, I do not expect this outcome—but we should all be trying to make it even less likely.

如前所述，我并不期望出现这种结果，但我们都应该努力降低这种结果的可能性。

A tripling in projectable force by NATO’s non-U.S. members, to the point where they could collectively deploy and sustain 10 to 12 brigades of ground power and associated airpower and support, could go far toward achieving this objective.

北约非美国成员国的可投送兵力增加两倍，达到可以集体部署和维持 10 至 12 个旅的地面力量以及相关空中力量和支持的程度，可能会大大有助于实现这一目标。

Right now, Europeans are doing a lot—including not only with their own militaries but, at a level of effort I admire and appreciate, in regard to helping Ukraine.

目前，欧洲人正在做很多事情——不仅包括他们自己的军队，而且在帮助乌克兰方面做出了我钦佩和赞赏的努力。

Yet the politics of sustaining support for NATO remain perilous, and future support for the alliance in America, while likely, is far from assured.

然而，持续支持北约的政治仍然危险，美国未来对北约的支持虽然有可能，但还远未确定。

As long as we collectively avoid giving the impression that Europeanizing NATO translates into American disengagement from Europe, the project makes enormous sense.

只要我们共同避免给人留下北约欧洲化意味着美国脱离欧洲的印象，这个项目就具有巨大的意义。