The US needs a total defence strategy

In order to protect critical national infrastructure from hybrid attacks, the United States should emulate the whole-of-society approach pioneered by Sweden, Finland and the Baltic States.

为了保护关键的国家基础设施免受混合攻击，美国应该效仿瑞典、芬兰和波罗的海国家首创的全社会方法。

Iranian-backed hackers are suspected of attacking water municipalities across more than a dozen US states earlier this month.

本月早些时候，伊朗支持的黑客涉嫌攻击美国十几个州的水务城市。

These are not isolated incidents.

这些并非孤立事件。

Iranian proxies have attacked or seriously threatened the American homeland multiple times since the war began in February, according to a recent report from the Department of Homeland Security.

根据国土安全部最近的一份报告，自二月份战争爆发以来，伊朗代理人多次袭击或严重威胁美国本土。

These latest Iranian-backed incidents are part of a broader trend, whereby US adversaries – including Russia and China – are increasingly attacking the country’s critical infrastructure and way of life using hybrid warfare tactics.

这些最新的伊朗支持的事件是更广泛趋势的一部分，即美国的对手 — — 包括俄罗斯和中国 — — 越来越多地使用混合战争策略攻击该国的关键基础设施和生活方式。

If Washington does not quickly take steps to seriously deter and defend against these threats, it risks losing the ongoing irregular world war.

如果华盛顿不迅速采取措施认真遏制和防御这些威胁，就有可能输掉这场正在进行的非常规世界大战。

Politicians often warn about the dangers of a Third World War , which would clearly be devastating in terms of blood and treasure.

政治家经常警告第三次世界大战的危险，这显然会造成人员伤亡和财产损失。

But policymakers rarely acknowledge that there is another type of global conflict already happening, one fought below the level of traditional armed conflict.

但政策制定者很少承认另一种类型的全球冲突已经发生，这种冲突的程度低于传统武装冲突的水平。

Because the US military remains the most sophisticated in the world in conventional terms, its enemies frequently choose to operate in the irregular warfare domain.

由于美国军队在常规方面仍然是世界上最先进的，其敌人经常选择在非常规战争领域作战。

In this ‘grey zone’ between war and peace, adversaries can deny operations and therefore often escape real consequences or escalation in risk.

在战争与和平之间的这个“灰色地带”，对手可以拒绝行动，因此常常逃避真正的后果或风险升级。

In addition to Iran, more powerful US adversaries – China and Russia – are also ramping up attacks through irregular means such as cyber threats and ‘prepositioning operations’.

除了伊朗之外，美国更强大的对手——中国和俄罗斯——也在通过网络威胁和“预置行动”等非常规手段加大攻击力度。

They are also increasingly targeting US interests abroad as well as Washington’s allies, particularly those in Europe.

他们还越来越多地针对美国的海外利益以及华盛顿的盟友，特别是欧洲的盟友。

Such attacks include recent drone and other incursions into Eastern Europe, the targeting of undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, and weaponising waves of migrants to overwhelm national borders.

此类袭击包括最近对东欧的无人机和其他入侵、针对波罗的海海底电缆的袭击以及将移民浪潮武器化以压倒国界。

Meanwhile, China has used maritime militias and island-building in the South China Sea to strengthen its position within the region.

与此同时，中国利用海上民兵和在南海造岛来加强其在该地区的地位。

These hybrid threats are increasing in frequency, scope and cost.

这些混合威胁的频率、范围和成本都在增加。

Last year, China averaged 2.6 million cyber-attacks on Taiwan government networks every day.

去年，中国平均每天对台湾政府网络发起260万次网络攻击。

Russia’s shadow war on the West has also seen a year-over-year increase in the number of acts of sabotage since 2022.

自2022年以来，俄罗斯对西方的影子战争的破坏行为也逐年增加。

Just as America’s adversaries are intensifying their hybrid warfare capabilities and operations, the US approach to irregular warfare, and the tools at its disposal, remain largely an afterthought.

正如美国的对手正在加强其混合战争能力和行动一样，美国的非常规战争方法及其可使用的工具在很大程度上仍然是事后诸葛亮。

The United States benefits from its geography and distance from adversaries, but the prevalence of hybrid threats specifically minimises this advantage.

美国受益于其地理位置和与对手的距离，但混合威胁的普遍存在特别削弱了这一优势。

A few hackers could exploit vulnerabilities and shut down the country’s power grid for days on end.

一些黑客可能会利用漏洞并连续关闭该国的电网数天。

Significant work remains in getting the broader US government and national security community to fully embrace hybrid warfare approaches and dedicate the attention, resources and personnel needed to compete in and win the war in the shadows.

要让更广泛的美国政府和国家安全界充分接受混合战争方法，并投入在暗中竞争和赢得战争所需的注意力、资源和人员，还有大量工作要做。

What should be done?

应该做什么？

The answer lies in making America more resilient to disruption, a form of ‘deterrence by denial’ known in Northern and Eastern Europe as total defence .

答案在于让美国更能抵御破坏，这是一种在北欧和东欧被称为全面防御的“否认威慑”形式。

Finland, Sweden and the Baltics have adapted to their proximity to Russia with a whole-of-society approach , which includes buy-in from the private sector, emphasises the role of individuals and sharpens public awareness of subversive tactics.

芬兰、瑞典和波罗的海国家已经采取了全社会的方法来适应与俄罗斯的接近，其中包括私营部门的支持，强调个人的作用并提高公众对颠覆策略的认识。

To deter and defend against hybrid threats, Washington should take three major steps to build resilience across the federal, state and local governments – as well as across society more broadly.

为了阻止和防御混合威胁，华盛顿应采取三项主要措施，在联邦、州和地方政府以及更广泛的社会范围内建立抵御能力。

First, the United States should harden its critical infrastructure and build back its now nearly non-existent civil defences.

首先，美国应该强化其关键基础设施，并重建目前几乎不存在的民防。

There are many ways to go about this, including ramping up cybersecurity grants and supercharging military reserve programmes.

有很多方法可以实现这一目标，包括增加网络安全拨款和加强军事储备计划。

Either way, more funding is needed to shore up critical infrastructure.

无论哪种方式，都需要更多资金来支撑关键基础设施。

A $3.7 trillion investment gap in critical infrastructure spending exists in the United States.

美国关键基础设施支出存在 3.7 万亿美元的投资缺口。

Last summer, NATO allies, including the United States, pledged to spend 1.5 per cent of GDP on critical infrastructure.

去年夏天，包括美国在内的北约盟国承诺将 GDP 的 1.5% 用于关键基础设施。

The current US administration is seeking a record-high budget for the Pentagon of $1.5 trillion for 2027, with an emphasis on securing the homeland.

本届美国政府正在为五角大楼寻求2027年创纪录的1.5万亿美元预算，重点是保卫国土安全。

Even if this figure is probably unobtainable, now is the time to invest in resilience at home.

即使这个数字可能无法实现，现在也是投资国内抵御能力的时候了。

Second, America should ramp up efforts to build resilience within its allies and partners, including through US Cyber Command’s ‘hunt forward’ operations, a little known but highly successful effort to build up the cyber security of key partner countries.

其次，美国应该加大力度在盟友和合作伙伴内部建立抵御能力，包括通过美国网络司令部的“向前狩猎”行动，这是一项鲜为人知但非常成功的努力，旨在加强主要伙伴国家的网络安全。

Finally, the United States should also draw on the expertise of the two newest NATO allies: Finland and Sweden .

最后，美国还应该借鉴两个最新的北约盟友：芬兰和瑞典的专业知识。

Finland has long championed investing in civil defence infrastructure, a unique specialisation owing to its geography and history .

芬兰长期以来一直倡导投资民防基础设施，由于其地理位置和历史，这是一个独特的专业领域。

Sweden, meanwhile, has taken steps to reinvigorate its civil defence programmes after dismantling them following the end of the Cold War, offering a template on how to scale and prioritise civil defence from zero.

与此同时，瑞典在冷战结束后取消了民防计划后，已采取措施重振民防计划，并提供了如何从零开始扩展和优先考虑民防的模板。

A novel and as yet unexplored avenue for Washington would be to emulate Finland’s model of a national training course , which teaches civil society and industry leaders how to prepare for war.

对于华盛顿来说，一个新颖且尚未探索的途径是效仿芬兰的国家培训课程模式，该模式教授民间社会和行业领袖如何为战争做好准备。

The United States is at risk of losing the ongoing irregular world war, falling behind in the resilience race that will be key to winning it.

美国正面临着输掉这场正在进行的非常规世界大战的风险，因为在恢复力竞赛中落后，而这将是赢得这场战争的关键。

Iran, Russia and China are leaning into this unconventional warfare at home and abroad.

伊朗、俄罗斯和中国正倾向于在国内外进行这场非常规战争。

America’s leaders cannot afford to wait until after the next large-scale hybrid attack to take necessary action.

美国领导人不能等到下一次大规模混合攻击之后才采取必要行动。