Beyond winning and losing: What Beijing wants from the Iran war
Democracy, Conflict, & Governance Foreign Politics & Elections
民主、冲突与治理 外国政治与选举
This is the 17th essay of Assessing China’s “Lost in translation: Decoding Chinese strategic narratives” series.
这是评估中国“迷失在翻译中：解读中国战略叙事”系列文章的第17篇文章。
The full collection of essays can be found here .
完整的论文集可以在这里找到。
As the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran enters its sixth month, Washington’s debate about China and the Iran war often begins with a deceptively simple question: Is China winning or losing from the conflict?
随着美国和以色列对伊朗的军事行动进入第六个月，华盛顿关于中国和伊朗战争的辩论往往从一个看似简单的问题开始：中国在这场冲突中是赢还是输？
Some argue that the war is a strategic gift to Beijing, weakening U.S. influence in the Middle East while strengthening China’s position as a diplomatic and economic power.
一些人认为，这场战争是送给北京的战略礼物，削弱了美国在中东的影响力，同时加强了中国作为外交和经济大国的地位。
Others contend that because Iran is an important Chinese partner, the weakening of Iran must ultimately weaken China as well.
其他人则认为，由于伊朗是中国的重要合作伙伴，伊朗的削弱最终也必然会削弱中国。
In practice, China does not see the war primarily as a contest over who gains or loses influence.
实际上，中国并不认为这场战争主要是一场谁获得或失去影响力的较量。
Its more immediate concern is whether the conflict produces consequences that threaten China’s economic interests, strategic environment, or room for maneuver.
它更紧迫的担忧是冲突是否会产生威胁中国经济利益、战略环境或回旋余地的后果。
Beijing’s approach is therefore less about exploiting the war than about managing its fallout: containing spillover, reducing risks, diversifying dependencies, avoiding strategic entanglement, and finding areas of overlap.
因此，北京的做法与其说是为了利用战争，不如说是为了管理其后果：遏制溢出效应、降低风险、分散依赖、避免战略纠缠以及寻找重叠领域。
The central question is not who wins or loses, but what kind of regional and international order emerges from the conflict—and how much instability China will have to absorb.
核心问题不是谁赢谁输，而是冲突后会形成什么样的地区和国际秩序，以及中国将不得不承受多少不稳定因素。
China has powerful incentives to see the conflict end as quickly as possible.
中国有强大的动力尽快结束冲突。
As the world’s largest crude oil importer, China imported roughly 11.6 million barrels per day in 2025 and is highly exposed to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.
作为全球最大的原油进口国，2025年中国每天进口约1160万桶原油，并且极易受到霍尔木兹海峡中断的影响。
In June 2026, China’s crude imports fell to 7.12 million barrels per day, the lowest level in almost a decade .
2026年6月，中国原油进口量降至712万桶/日，为近十年来的最低水平。
Yet Beijing has not faced an immediate energy crisis.
然而，北京尚未面临迫在眉睫的能源危机。
Inventories, procurement adjustments, and alternative suppliers— including Russia —have given China considerable room to absorb temporary disruptions.
库存、采购调整和替代供应商（包括俄罗斯）为中国提供了相当大的空间来吸收暂时的供应中断。
The bigger concern is systemic.
更大的担忧是系统性的。
Prolonged conflict can destabilize energy prices, disrupt shipping, increase insurance costs, damage regional infrastructure, and generate broader supply-chain shocks.
长期冲突可能会破坏能源价格稳定、扰乱航运、增加保险成本、破坏地区基础设施并产生更广泛的供应链冲击。
The Strait of Hormuz is part of the infrastructure supporting the global trading system.
霍尔木兹海峡是支持全球贸易体系的基础设施的一部分。
For Beijing, therefore, the problem is not simply energy scarcity.
因此，对北京来说，问题不仅仅是能源短缺。
It is the possibility that a regional war could spill over into wider disruption of global trade and supply chains.
地区战争有可能蔓延，对全球贸易和供应链造成更广泛的破坏。
China’s interest in ending the war is fundamentally an interest in stability.
中国结束战争的利益从根本上来说是稳定的利益。
There is a widespread assumption in Washington that because China helped facilitate the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement in 2023, Beijing should now be able to “deliver peace” in the Middle East.
华盛顿普遍认为，由于中国在 2023 年帮助促进了沙特与伊朗的和解，北京现在应该能够在中东“实现和平”。
This greatly overestimates both China’s capabilities and its ambitions.
这大大高估了中国的能力和野心。
China is trying to help end the conflict, but it is doing so primarily through diplomatic de-escalation rather than coercive intervention.
中国正在努力帮助结束冲突，但主要是通过外交缓和局势，而不是强制干预。
The reason is straightforward.
原因很简单。
China does not possess the alliance network, military infrastructure, or regional command structure that the United States has developed over decades.
中国不具备美国几十年来发展起来的联盟网络、军事基础设施或地区指挥结构。
More importantly, Beijing has little interest in assuming responsibility for being the Middle East’s security guarantor.
更重要的是，北京无意承担中东安全保障者的责任。
The regional security landscape is itself changing.
地区安全格局本身正在发生变化。
On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement.
8月7日，沙特、土耳其、巴基斯坦签署联合防御协议。
Some observers have already compared the arrangement to a potential “ Middle Eastern NATO .” The analogy is premature, but it reflects a broader regional desire to diversify security partnerships rather than rely entirely on a single external security provider.
一些观察家已经将这一安排与潜在的“中东北约”进行了比较。这个类比还为时过早，但它反映了更广泛的区域愿望，即安全伙伴关系多样化，而不是完全依赖单一的外部安全提供者。
Rather than seeking to fill the security vacuum, China has focused on maintaining communication with Iran, the Gulf states, Pakistan, Arab organizations, and other major powers.
中国没有寻求填补安全真空，而是专注于与伊朗、海湾国家、巴基斯坦、阿拉伯组织和其他大国保持沟通。
In May, Foreign Minister Wang Yi explicitly supported Pakistan’s mediation between Washington and Tehran and encouraged Islamabad to continue its efforts to help resolve the Hormuz issue.
今年5月，王毅外长明确支持巴基斯坦在华盛顿和德黑兰之间进行斡旋，并鼓励伊斯兰堡继续努力帮助解决霍尔木兹问题。
This approach resembles China’s position on the Ukraine war.
这种做法类似于中国在乌克兰战争上的立场。
When a conflict involves major military powers and China is not the cause of the war or a party to it, Beijing generally sees neither a particular responsibility nor a realistic possibility of becoming the primary mediator.
当冲突涉及主要军事大国，而中国既不是战争的起因，也不是战争的一方时，北京通常既不认为有特定的责任，也不认为有成为主要调解者的现实可能性。
When the belligerents still believe that military means can improve their bargaining position, mediation has limited room to operate.
当交战方仍然相信军事手段可以提高自己的谈判地位时，调解的运作空间就有限了。
China therefore tends to focus first on preventing escalation, containing spillover, and preserving the possibility of eventual diplomacy.
因此，中国倾向于首先关注防止局势升级、遏制溢出效应并保留最终外交的可能性。
In that sense, China is acting less as a traditional mediator than as a risk-reduction agent.
从这个意义上说，中国与其说是一个传统的调解者，不如说是一个降低风险的代理人。
One of the clearest lessons Beijing is drawing from the crisis is that resilience requires reducing excessive dependence on any single country, route, or chokepoint.
北京从这场危机中汲取的最明显的教训之一是，恢复力需要减少对任何单一国家、路线或阻塞点的过度依赖。
This applies to energy, transportation, trade, and financial connectivity.
这适用于能源、交通、贸易和金融互联互通。
The strategic logic behind projects such as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, the Trans-Caspian Corridor, and Arctic shipping routes is therefore becoming more important.
中吉乌铁路、跨里海走廊、北极航道等项目背后的战略逻辑变得更加重要。
These are not simply economic projects; they can also provide alternative routes when traditional maritime corridors become vulnerable.
这些不仅仅是经济项目；当传统海上走廊变得脆弱时，它们还可以提供替代路线。
The same logic applies to China-Russia relations.
同样的逻辑也适用于中俄关系。
Instability in the Gulf increases the strategic value of Russia as an energy supplier, while disruptions to maritime routes naturally increase the value of land-based energy connections, including the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline project.
海湾地区的不稳定增加了俄罗斯作为能源供应国的战略价值，而海上航线的中断自然增加了陆上能源连接的价值，包括西伯利亚力量2号天然气管道项目。
But it would be a mistake to interpret this as the activation of a Sino-Russian alliance.
但如果将此解读为中俄同盟的启动，那就错了。
China’s energy strategy is based on diversification, not dependence.
中国的能源战略基于多元化，而不是依赖。
Even when Beijing and Moscow share a strong political interest in expanding energy cooperation, China continues to pay close attention to prices, investment structures, commercial terms, and market conditions.
即使北京和莫斯科在扩大能源合作方面有着强烈的政治利益，中国仍然密切关注价格、投资结构、商业条款和市场状况。
China does not want to replace dependence on the Gulf with dependence on Russia.
中国不想用对俄罗斯的依赖来取代对海湾地区的依赖。
Its objective is to have fewer dependencies altogether.
其目标是完全减少依赖关系。
In June, Wang explicitly framed the conflict in terms of four lessons .
6月，王明确地用四个教训来概括这场冲突。
From Beijing’s perspective, the war demonstrates the danger of both initiation and entanglement.
从北京的角度来看，这场战争展示了引发和纠缠的危险。
When major powers confront security challenges, they should place greater emphasis on restraint rather than allowing power to be used without limits according to the logic of the jungle.
大国在面临安全挑战时，应该更加注重克制，而不是按照丛林逻辑无限制地使用权力。
China seeks strategic partnerships that serve its development agenda—not arrangements that automatically draw China into other countries’ confrontations.
中国寻求为其发展议程服务的战略伙伴关系，而不是自动将中国拖入其他国家对抗的安排。
This helps explain why Chinese strategic thinkers have shown relatively little interest in transforming the comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran into a hard-security alliance.
这有助于解释为什么中国战略思想家对将与伊朗的全面战略伙伴关系转变为硬安全联盟表现出相对较小的兴趣。
China has neither provided nor intends to provide weapons to either side in an ongoing armed conflict.
中国从未也无意向正在进行的武装冲突中的任何一方提供武器。
Beijing views overly expansive definitions of “dual-use items” with skepticism, seeing them as a convenient way to assign blame for setbacks on the battlefield.
北京对“军民两用物品”过于宽泛的定义持怀疑态度，认为这是为战场上的挫折归咎的一种便捷方式。
Before the current conflict, China and Iran did engage in arms sales and military exercises, but these were primarily intended to help Iran maintain a credible defensive capability.
在此次冲突之前，中国和伊朗确实进行了军售和军事演习，但这些主要是为了帮助伊朗保持可信的防御能力。
That distinction is particularly important given the broader costs of a protracted war.
考虑到持久战争的更广泛成本，这一区别尤其重要。
The economic, security, and geopolitical consequences of an ongoing conflict in the Middle East would extend well beyond the region, with China itself bearing a significant share of the fallout.
中东持续冲突的经济、安全和地缘政治后果将远远超出该地区，中国本身也将承受很大一部分影响。
Beijing therefore has little interest in allowing the conflict to drag on simply to impose costs on the United States.
因此，北京无意让冲突拖延下去，只是为了让美国付出代价。
Nor does it want the conflict to reach a point at which China’s own security interests become directly entangled in Iran’s confrontation with Washington.
中国也不希望冲突发展到中国自身安全利益直接卷入伊朗与华盛顿对抗的地步。
Contrary to the assumption that China’s position must necessarily conflict with Washington’s, there is actually more overlap than is often acknowledged.
与中国的立场必然与华盛顿的立场相冲突的假设相反，实际上两者的重叠程度比人们通常承认的要多。
Beijing’s approach can be summarized through two sets of three principles: On the nuclear issue, China emphasizes non-proliferation, Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and a negotiated rather than a military solution.
北京的做法可以概括为两套三项原则：在核问题上，中国强调防扩散、伊朗根据《核不扩散条约》享有和平核能的权利，以及通过谈判而非军事解决方案。
On the Strait of Hormuz, China emphasizes freedom and safety of navigation, reopening the waterway through political rather than military means, and addressing the broader security and economic concerns underlying the confrontation.
在霍尔木兹海峡，中国强调航行自由和安全，通过政治而非军事手段重新开放航道，并解决对抗中更广泛的安全和经济问题。
At the underlying level, these principles are not fundamentally incompatible with U.S. objectives of preventing nuclear proliferation, protecting global commerce, and eventually stabilizing the Gulf.
从根本上讲，这些原则与美国防止核扩散、保护全球商业以及最终稳定海湾地区的目标并非根本不相容。
Hormuz itself illustrates the potential for practical cooperation.
霍尔木兹本身就说明了务实合作的潜力。
Discussions of unilateral control, transit fees, or even military escorts run counter to the strait’s character as a global public good—and are hardly the end state that Beijing, and perhaps Washington as well, would want to see.
关于单边控制、过境费甚至军事护航的讨论与该海峡作为全球公共利益的性质背道而驰，而且很难说是北京、也许还有华盛顿希望看到的最终状态。
The more difficult question is Iran’s economic future.
更困难的问题是伊朗的经济未来。
If Washington has genuinely moved away from regime change as an objective, it will eventually have to provide Iran with a credible pathway toward economic survival.
如果华盛顿真正放弃政权更迭这一目标，它最终将不得不为伊朗提供一条实现经济生存的可靠途径。
Some form of U.S. sanctions relief will be essential, and China is likely to play an important role in Iran’s postwar reconstruction.
美国某种形式的制裁解除至关重要，而中国可能在伊朗战后重建中发挥重要作用。
In other words, in ending the war and restoring regional order, there may be more room for practical U.S.-China cooperation than either side is currently willing to acknowledge publicly.
换句话说，在结束战争和恢复地区秩序方面，中美务实合作的空间可能比双方目前愿意公开承认的还要大。
Of course, this overlap has limits.
当然，这种重叠是有限制的。
If Washington continues to seek Iran’s collapse by intensifying its military campaign and broadening the scope of its attacks, thereby further exacerbating the conflict, that would undoubtedly alter Beijing’s current position and strategic calculus.
如果华盛顿继续通过加强军事行动、扩大攻击范围来寻求垮台，从而进一步加剧冲突，这无疑将改变北京目前的立场和战略考量。
The postwar Middle East will be more complicated, not less.
战后的中东将更加复杂，而不是更加复杂。
The conflict has weakened assumptions that Gulf states can simply function as safe havens for capital, talent, energy infrastructure, and global commerce.
这场冲突削弱了人们的假设，即海湾国家可以简单地充当资本、人才、能源基础设施和全球商业的安全港。
Even countries that were not direct participants in the fighting have been forced to reconsider the security premium attached to their geographic location.
即使是没有直接参与战斗的国家也被迫重新考虑与其地理位置相关的安全溢价。
China’s preferred role is likely to be economic and diplomatic: helping reconnect Iran to regional markets, supporting infrastructure recovery, encouraging political dialogue, and working with other countries to reduce the risks of renewed conflict.
中国首选的角色可能是经济和外交：帮助伊朗与地区市场重新建立联系、支持基础设施恢复、鼓励政治对话以及与其他国家合作减少冲突再次爆发的风险。
The Iran war, the Red Sea crisis, the Black Sea disruptions, and recurring concerns about the Panama Canal have all reinforced a Chinese perception that key maritime chokepoints should not become instruments of geopolitical coercion .
伊朗战争、红海危机、黑海动荡以及对巴拿马运河反复出现的担忧都强化了中国的看法，即关键的海上咽喉要道不应成为地缘政治胁迫的工具。
For Beijing, the value of a major maritime corridor ultimately depends on the international community’s ability to preserve it as an open, safe, and predictable artery for global commerce.
对北京来说，主要海上走廊的价值最终取决于国际社会是否有能力将其保护为开放、安全和可预测的全球商业大动脉。
Beijing remains concerned about what it sees as the risks of unrestrained American power, including the use of military force and increasingly assertive approaches toward strategic chokepoints, critical resources, and political affairs abroad.
北京仍然担心美国权力不受限制所带来的风险，包括使用军事力量以及对战略瓶颈、关键资源和海外政治事务采取日益强硬的态度。
But China also recognizes that a complete U.S. retreat could create instability that China itself would have to absorb.
但中国也认识到，美国的彻底撤退可能会造成不稳定，而中国自己也必须承受这种不稳定。
China therefore still has an interest in the United States providing regional public goods—provided that U.S. leadership is exercised with greater restraint and does not repeatedly generate new security crises.
因此，中国仍然对美国提供地区公共产品感兴趣——前提是美国的领导力更加克制，并且不会一再引发新的安全危机。
China sees a dangerous conflict that has created some strategic opportunities but also substantial economic and security risks.
中国看到了一场危险的冲突，它创造了一些战略机遇，但也带来了巨大的经济和安全风险。
Its priority is to limit those risks, diversify its dependencies, preserve diplomatic options, and avoid becoming entangled in another major power’s war.
它的首要任务是限制这些风险，分散其依赖，保留外交选择，并避免卷入另一个大国的战争。
Its preferred role is narrower—and perhaps more sustainable: reduce the temperature, keep the channels open, prevent the crisis from spreading, preserve the openness of critical maritime routes, and be ready to help when the parties are finally prepared to make peace.
它所偏爱的角色范围更窄，或许也更可持续：降低气温、保持渠道畅通、防止危机蔓延、保持关键海上航线的开放，并在各方最终准备实现和平时做好提供帮助的准备。
That may not make China the “winner” of the Iran war.
这可能不会让中国成为伊朗战争的“赢家”。
But it may explain more accurately what Beijing believes a responsible major power should do when the costs of instability extend far beyond the battlefield.
但它可能更准确地解释北京认为，当不稳定的代价远远超出战场时，一个负责任的大国应该做什么。