The hidden tradeoffs of using Trump’s tariffs as leverage with China

This piece references a forthcoming Brookings interactive.

这篇文章引用了即将推出的布鲁金斯互动。

A link will be added here once it is published.

发布后将在此处添加链接。

Trump’s tariffs are broad in reach but complex in structure.

特朗普的关税范围广泛，但结构复杂。

Beneath the headline rates sits a stack of measures imposed under different legal authorities on top of existing U.S. tariffs, with different product coverage and exemptions.

在总体税率之下，除了美国现有关税之外，还有根据不同法律当局实施的一系列措施，包括不同的产品覆盖范围和豁免。

Some of these tariffs date to Trump’s first term and were maintained by the Biden administration, while the second Trump administration has expanded their reach dramatically across countries and industries (see our earlier analysis for the full chronology and our trade data interactive for the major actions in context).

其中一些关税可以追溯到特朗普的第一个任期，并由拜登政府维持，而特朗普第二届政府则大幅扩大了其在各个国家和行业的影响范围（请参阅我们之前对完整时间顺序的分析以及我们对上下文中主要行动的贸易数据互动）。

The administration sees this growing stock of tariffs as leverage.

政府将不断增加的关税视为杠杆。

But using it strategically means balancing multiple—and sometimes competing—objectives embedded in the tariff regime itself.

但战略性地使用它意味着平衡关税制度本身的多个目标，有时甚至是相互竞争的目标。

Most of the additional tariffs apply to the same products regardless of where they come from.

大多数附加关税适用于相同的产品，无论它们来自哪里。

1 But different countries sell different mixes of products to the United States, so their exposure to the tariffs varies.

1 但不同国家向美国销售的产品组合不同，因此它们面临的关税风险也不同。

A forthcoming Brookings interactive will show how imports from the 60 economies subject to the new forced-labor Section 301 action —which functionally replaces the “Liberation Day” tariffs struck down by the Supreme Court—are treated under the different tariff actions now in place.

布鲁金斯学会即将发布的互动节目将展示来自 60 个经济体的进口商品如何受到新的 301 条款强迫劳动行动（该行动在功能上取代最高法院取消的“解放日”关税）的影响，并根据现有的不同关税行动进行处理。

More tariff actions are likely, including a pending Section 301 investigation on overcapacity , and we will update the interactive as they take effect.

可能会采取更多关税行动，包括悬而未决的关于产能过剩的 301 调查，我们将在这些行动生效后更新互动内容。

The interactive applies the tariff regime currently in place to the composition of U.S. import value in 2025.

该互动将现行关税制度应用于 2025 年美国进口价值的构成。

We divide import value into three groups: covered by Section 232 tariffs, covered by the forced-labor Section 301, and exempt from additional duties.

我们将进口价值分为三组：第 232 条关税涵盖范围、第 301 条强迫劳动涵盖范围以及免征附加关税。

The global shares shown in Figure 1 are estimates because some exemptions depend on information we cannot observe directly in trade data.

图 1 中显示的全球份额是估计值，因为某些豁免取决于我们无法直接在贸易数据中观察到的信息。

In calculating them, we count imports from Canada and Mexico as exempt from the forced-labor Section 301, effectively assuming they all meet the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) requirements.

在计算时，我们将来自加拿大和墨西哥的进口视为不受 301 条款强迫劳动约束的对象，实际上假设它们都符合美国-墨西哥-加拿大协定 (USMCA) 的要求。

We do not attempt to capture other conditional exemptions or product-level carve-outs, which therefore remain in the relevant tariff category.

我们并不试图获取其他有条件豁免或产品级别的豁免，因此它们仍属于相关关税类别。

The striking feature at the global level is our estimate that nearly half of U.S. import value is exempt from these additional tariffs.

全球层面的显着特征是我们估计美国近一半的进口价值可免征这些额外关税。

The interactive will allow users to see these shares by trading partner.

交互将允许用户按贸易伙伴查看这些份额。

China, to which we turn next, looks very different from the global aggregate, with less than 20% of 2025 import value exempt from additional duties.

我们接下来要讨论的中国看起来与全球总量有很大不同，2025 年进口额中只有不到 20% 免征额外关税。

Many goods imported from China already faced additional tariffs carried over Trump’s first term.

许多从中国进口的商品在特朗普第一任期内就已经面临额外关税。

These tariffs were imposed following a Section 301 investigation into China’s practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation , and have been maintained, with modifications , since then.

这些关税是在对中国在技术转让、知识产权和创新方面的做法进行 301 调查后征收的，自那时起一直维持并经过修改。

We refer to these as the China Section 301 tariffs.

我们将这些称为中国 301 关税。

The 2025–2026 tariffs stack on top of them.

2025-2026 年的关税叠加在它们之上。

Figure 2 shows both layers: the columns show treatment under the 2025–2026 tariff actions, while the colors show the China Section 301 tariffs underneath.

图 2 显示了两层：柱形显示了 2025-2026 年关税行动下的待遇，而颜色则显示了下面的中国 301 条款关税。

Only 16% of 2025 imports from China are free of both the newer duties and the China Section 301 tariffs.

2025 年从中国进口的商品中，只有 16% 免征新关税和中国 301 条款关税。

At their May summit, President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a new U.S.-China Board of Trade , described by the White House as a mechanism to “manage bilateral trade” in “non-sensitive” goods.

在五月份的峰会上，特朗普总统和中国国家主席习近平宣布成立新的美中贸易委员会，白宫将其描述为“管理非敏感”商品双边贸易的机制。

But what has actually been described so far is much more modest.

但到目前为止所描述的实际上要温和得多。

Through the board, the United States and China plan to negotiate lower tariffs on a set of “non-sensitive” products accounting for up to $30 billion in import value .

美国和中国计划通过该委员会就进口价值高达 300 亿美元的一系列“非敏感”产品进行谈判，以降低关税。

But $30 billion tells us little about how economically meaningful that tariff relief will be.

但 300 亿美元并没有告诉我们关税减免的经济意义有多大。

The administration has not concretely defined “non-sensitive,” but Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described it as “non-critical, non-strategic” goods that the United States is “never going to reshore,” pointing to fireworks and low-end consumer products as examples.

政府尚未具体定义“非敏感”商品，但财政部长斯科特·贝森特将其描述为美国“永远不会回流”的“非关键、非战略”商品，并以烟花和低端消费品为例。

That would seem to rule out products subject to Section 232 tariffs, which are justified on national security grounds.

这似乎排除了受第 232 条关税约束的产品，而该关税以国家安全为由是合理的。

Past tariff choices provide another place to look.

过去的关税选择提供了另一个值得关注的地方。

Products that escaped the China Section 301 tariffs or received the lower 7.5% rate were already treated more favorably than products facing the 25% rate.

逃脱中国301关税或享受较低7.5%税率的产品已经比面临25%税率的产品受到更优惠的待遇。

That makes them plausible places to look for products the administration might consider “non-sensitive” today.

这使得它们成为寻找当今政府可能认为“非敏感”产品的合理场所。

The answer depends not simply on how much tariff relief China receives, but on where that leaves imports from China relative to competing suppliers.

答案不仅取决于中国获得了多少关税减免，还取决于相对于竞争供应商，中国的进口产品处于什么位置。

Figure 2 shows the difference.

图 2 显示了差异。

About $37 billion of 2025 imports from China currently face both the 7.5% China Section 301 tariff and the forced-labor tariff.

2025 年从中国进口的商品中约有 370 亿美元目前面临 7.5% 的中国 301 关税和强迫劳动关税。

Removing the 7.5% tariff would provide relief while leaving the forced-labor tariff in place.

取消 7.5% 的关税将提供缓解，同时保留强迫劳动关税。

The $94 billion gold block is different: those goods escaped the China Section 301 tariffs, so relief from the forced-labor tariff could leave imports from China facing lower additional duties than competing suppliers.

价值 940 亿美元的黄金则不同：这些商品不受中国 301 条款关税的影响，因此免除强迫劳动关税可能会使来自中国的进口产品面临比竞争供应商更低的额外关税。

Meaningful relief for China, then, may also mean improving its position relative to another economy.

那么，对中国来说有意义的缓解也可能意味着提高其相对于其他经济体的地位。

But much of the $37 billion is textiles and apparel, showing why even apparently “non-sensitive” goods may not be straightforward candidates for relief.

但 370 亿美元中的大部分是纺织品和服装，这表明为什么即使是表面上“非敏感”的商品也可能不是直接获得救济的候选者。

The forced-labor Section 301 action suggests the administration is also using tariffs in this sector to favor some foreign suppliers over others.

301 条款中的强迫劳动行动表明，政府还在该领域利用关税来偏袒某些外国供应商。

It exempts qualifying imports from free trade agreement partners in Central America and Jordan —widening existing preferences whose market-share benefits had been limited in part by competition from Asian exporters.

它免除了来自中美洲和约旦自由贸易协定伙伴的合格进口产品，扩大了现有优惠，这些优惠的市场份额利益在一定程度上受到亚洲出口商竞争的限制。

Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Indonesia are slated for tariff-rate quotas designed to encourage greater use of U.S. inputs.

孟加拉国、柬埔寨和印度尼西亚计划实行关税配额，旨在鼓励更多地使用美国投入品。

Providing China relief in this sector could narrow some of those newly widened preferences.

向中国提供该领域的救济可能会缩小一些新扩大的优惠范围。

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, USTR, authors’ calculations *Jordan, El Salvador, and Guatemala receive specific exemptions for textiles/apparel in Annex II (Part O).

资料来源：美国人口普查局、美国贸易代表办公室、作者的计算 *约旦、萨尔瓦多和危地马拉在附件二（O 部分）中获得纺织品/服装的特定豁免。

Textiles/apparel trade from Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic is exempt if CAFTA-DR compliant.

如果符合 CAFTA-DR，来自洪都拉斯、尼加拉瓜、危地马拉、萨尔瓦多、哥斯达黎加和多米尼加共和国的纺织品/服装贸易可获豁免。

That leaves a narrow path: identify enough products to deliver the promised tariff relief without giving China more meaningful market access than the administration is willing to concede.

这就留下了一条狭窄的道路：确定足够的产品来实现承诺的关税减免，而又不给予中国比政府愿意承认的更有意义的市场准入。

The administration may want to avoid appearing to undercut domestic production, exposing sensitive sectors to greater competition, or eroding preferences for other trading partners.

政府可能希望避免出现削弱国内生产、使敏感行业面临更激烈竞争或削弱对其他贸易伙伴的优惠的情况。

The purpose underlying each tariff action may also matter for which tariffs the administration chooses to reduce.

每项关税行动的目的也可能对政府选择降低哪些关税产生影响。

For example, USTR explicitly justifies exemptions from the forced-labor Section 301 tariffs in terms of advancing the purpose of that investigation.

例如，美国贸易代表办公室明确证明了对强迫劳动第 301 条关税的豁免，以推进调查的目的。

The relatively small scale of the initiative may help.

该计划规模相对较小可能会有所帮助。

At $30 billion—about one-tenth of U.S. goods imports from China in 2025—the administration needs to find only a limited set of products to deliver the promised tariff relief.

2025 年，美国从中国进口的商品价值达 300 亿美元，约占美国商品进口额的十分之一，政府只需找到有限的产品即可实现承诺的关税减免。

The potential bargain has an appealing logic: the United States could provide tariff relief on relatively less sensitive imports from China in exchange for better access for U.S. exports.

潜在的讨价还价有一个吸引人的逻辑：美国可以对来自中国的敏感度相对较低的进口产品提供关税减免，以换取美国出口产品更好的准入。

Administration officials have pointed to energy, agriculture, aircraft, and medical devices as areas where they hope to expand U.S. sales.

政府官员指出，能源、农业、飞机和医疗设备是他们希望扩大美国销售的领域。

As on the U.S. side, the value of Chinese tariff relief will depend partly on how U.S. exporters are treated relative to their competitors.

与美国方面一样，中国关税减免的价值将部分取决于美国出口商相对于竞争对手的待遇。

When China retaliated against the original U.S. Section 301 tariffs, it raised tariffs on U.S. goods while lowering tariffs on imports from other countries —widening the tariff gap between U.S. exporters and their foreign competitors.

当中国对美国最初的301条款关税进行报复时，它提高了对美国商品的关税，同时降低了对其他国家进口商品的关税，从而扩大了美国出口商与其外国竞争对手之间的关税差距。

And tariffs were not its only lever.

关税并不是其唯一的杠杆。

Research by Felipe Benguria and Felipe Saffie finds that Chinese state-owned enterprises—which accounted for about 22% of Chinese imports from the United States—reduced purchases of U.S. goods beyond what could be explained by China’s retaliatory tariffs alone, particularly in agriculture and industrial supplies.

Felipe Benguria 和 Felipe Saffie 的研究发现，中国国有企业（约占中国从美国进口的 22%）减少了对美国商品的购买，超出了中国报复性关税所能解释的范围，特别是在农业和工业用品方面。

The Board of Trade is only one move in a broader U.S.-China economic contest, in which both sides continue to wield other forms of leverage—from U.S. restrictions on advanced semiconductors and related technologies to Chinese restrictions on exports of rare earths and other critical minerals.

贸易委员会只是更广泛的中美经济竞争中的一个举措，双方都在继续利用其他形式的影响力——从美国对先进半导体和相关技术的限制到中国对稀土和其他关键矿产出口的限制。

A deal that produces relatively little new market access could still matter by facilitating de-escalation when that is an objective, and modest aggregate effects could matter substantially for particular U.S. consumers, exporters, and importers.

一项产生相对较少新市场准入的协议仍然可能通过促进缓和局势而发挥重要作用（当这是一个目标时），而适度的总体影响可能对特定的美国消费者、出口商和进口商产生重大影响。

Those are important outcomes, but they are distinct from the economic value of the bargain itself.

这些都是重要的结果，但它们与交易本身的经济价值不同。

For now, the board of Trade looks less like a mechanism for managing bilateral trade than a framework for negotiating a relatively small amount of tariff relief.

目前，贸易委员会看起来不太像一个管理双边贸易的机制，而更像是一个谈判相对少量关税减免的框架。

On the U.S. side, providing that relief without undermining other objectives embedded in the tariff regime leaves a relatively narrow set of options.

在美国方面，在不损害关税制度中其他目标的情况下提供这种减免，留下了相对狭窄的选择范围。

On China’s side, equivalent tariff reductions may not translate into equivalent gains for U.S. exporters if relative tariff treatment, other barriers, or state purchasing decisions continue to constrain sales.

就中国而言，如果相对关税待遇、其他壁垒或国家采购决定继续限制销售，同等关税削减可能不会转化为美国出口商的同等收益。

The result could be an exchange of tariff relief that satisfies the terms of the board without material changes in the trade it is ostensibly intended to manage.

结果可能是交换关税减免，满足董事会的条款，而表面上打算管理的贸易不会发生重大变化。

The editors would like to thank Toby Bushley and Himmat Grewal for research assistance.

编辑们要感谢 Toby Bushley 和 Himmat Grewal 的研究协助。

The Brookings Institution is committed to quality, independence, and impact.

布鲁金斯学会致力于质量、独立性和影响力。

We are supported by a diverse array of funders .

我们得到了众多资助者的支持。

In line with our values and policies , each Brookings publication represents the sole views of its author(s).

根据我们的价值观和政策，布鲁金斯学会的每份出版物均代表其作者的唯一观点。