How secure is Taiwan? The view from Taipei

Ryan Hass and Jon Czin are joined by Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Caitlin Talmadge for a special episode of The Beijing Brief from on the ground in Taipei.

瑞安·哈斯 (Ryan Hass) 和乔恩·钦 (Jon Czin) 与布鲁金斯学会非常驻高级研究员凯特琳·塔尔梅奇 (Caitlin Talmadge) 一起在台北现场观看了《北京简报》的特别节目。

Drawing on conversations with Taiwanese counterparts, they unpack how Taiwan is thinking about its own defense, why its technology industry is central to its national security, and where Washington’s read of the situation falls short.

他们利用与台湾同行的对话，揭示了台湾如何思考自己的防御、为什么台湾的科技产业对其国家安全至关重要，以及华盛顿对局势的解读有哪些不足。

In Washington, conversations about Taiwan tend to run on two parallel tracks.

在华盛顿，有关台湾的讨论往往在两条平行轨道上进行。

On one, Taiwan is a potential military flashpoint.

一方面，台湾是一个潜在的军事爆发点。

On the other, Taiwan is the beating heart of global semiconductor industry, and the question is what happens to the world economy if that industry is disrupted.

另一方面，台湾是全球半导体行业的心脏，问题是如果该行业受到干扰，世界经济会发生什么。

But those questions are very much intertwined.

但这些问题是非常交织在一起的。

Taiwan’s security depends upon its technology innovation, and that innovation depends upon its security.

台湾的安全取决于技术创新，技术创新又取决于安全。

The nexus between security and technology is what our delegation came to Taiwan to examine on the ground.

安全与科技的关系，正是我们代表团来台实地考察的内容。

Today we want to step back and assess what we learned from these conversations.

今天，我们想退后一步，评估我们从这些对话中学到的东西。

And after everything we saw and heard, what did this trip reveal about Taiwan’s security situation and its relationship to its technology industry?

经过我们的所见所闻，此行对台湾的安全状况及其与科技产业的关系揭示了什么？

What does the view from the ground tell us about Taiwan’s security that we miss in Washington?

对于台湾的安全，实地的看法告诉我们什么是我们在华盛顿所怀念的？

And I think what’s been so interesting about this trip is that we’re able to hear some of the same storylines, but from very different angles.

我认为这次旅行的有趣之处在于我们能够听到一些相同的故事情节，但角度却截然不同。

Like, you get a different spin on it if you talk to the DPP versus the KMT, but also I think you get a different feel for what’s going on here if you talk to the technology companies versus government officials versus think tankers.

就像，如果你与民进党和国民党交谈，你会对它有不同的看法，但我认为，如果你与科技公司、政府官员和智囊团交谈，你会对这里发生的事情有不同的感觉。

Right?

正确的？

So it allows us to really triangulate and get a wide variety of perspectives that, you know, even following these issues from Washington, it’s just, it’s different from 10,000 miles away, believe it or not.

因此，它使我们能够真正进行三角测量并获得各种各样的观点，无论你相信与否，即使是在华盛顿关注这些问题之后，它也与一万英里外的情况有所不同。

And I I would point to a couple of things that have stood out.

我想指出一些突出的事情。

Of course, I’m interested in in your perspectives on this too, but I think one has to do with, I would say, not the nature of the threats that Taiwan faces, but perhaps the urgency of some of the threats that they face across the Taiwan Strait.

当然，我也对你对此的看法感兴趣，但我认为这与台湾面临的威胁的性质无关，而可能与台湾海峡两岸面临的一些威胁的紧迫性有关。

I would say there’s been quite a fixation in D.C. and in U.S. foreign policy circles on 2027, that a Chinese attack might be imminent, a Chinese invasion might be imminent.

我想说的是，华盛顿特区和美国外交政策界对 2027 年有相当多的关注，即中国的攻击可能迫在眉睫，中国的入侵可能迫在眉睫。

None of us can predict the future, obviously, but I I’d had the sense while I’ve been here this week that, while Taiwanese are by no means relaxed, I think, about the the security environment, there’s less of a fixation on 2027 as “this is the year.”

显然，我们谁都无法预测未来，但我本周在这里的时候有一种感觉，尽管台湾人对安全环境一点也不放松，但我认为，人们对 2027 年的执着较少，因为“今年就是这一年”。

And and, you know, we may want to talk about there may be other years that they’re, that they’re more concerned about.

而且，你知道，我们可能想谈谈他们可能更关心的其他年份。

But, both in terms of polling research that we’ve had a chance to look into in some depth while we’ve been here, and also just anecdotally, the conversations that we’ve had, there’s a sense Taiwan may actually be in a window in which, for for reasons we can discuss, China is less likely to directly militarily confront Taiwan.

但是，无论是从我们在这里期间有机会深入研究的民调研究来看，还是从我们进行的有趣的对话来看，台湾实际上可能正处于一个窗口期，出于我们可以讨论的原因，中国不太可能直接与台湾进行军事对抗。

That’s not to say that it might not do other things that are unpleasant, including gray zone threats, which actually have been escalating, but it it’s a different assessment of of the near-term problem, I think, than what we see in D.C. or what we we typically hear.

这并不是说它可能不会做其他令人不快的事情，包括实际上一直在升级的灰色地带威胁，但我认为，这是对近期问题的不同评估，与我们在华盛顿看到的或我们通常听到的不同。

The other delta that I would just kind of point to, and it it relates to the first point, is i do think there has been skepticism in D.C. and criticism in D.C., frankly, of Taiwan and its approach to defense policy, and the sense that given the threat as perceived in D.C. as being so urgent and so imminent, this imminent risk of military attack in 2027, that Taiwan is not doing enough, or Taiwan doesn’t get it, so to speak, on needing to make defense reforms.

我想指出的另一个三角洲，它与第一点相关，是我确实认为华盛顿一直对台湾及其国防政策方针持怀疑态度和批评，并且认为鉴于华盛顿认为的威胁如此紧迫和迫在眉睫，2027 年迫在眉睫的军事攻击风险，台湾在这方面做得不够，或者可以说，台湾没有得到这一点。需要进行国防改革。

And I think after being here for a week and talking with leaders from industry, leaders from think tanks, leaders from the government, you know, political leaders, thought leaders, I think that is a misnomer.

我认为，在这里待了一周并与行业领袖、智囊团领袖、政府领袖、政治领袖、思想领袖交谈后，我认为这是用词不当。

I mean, I think, I think there is a lot of fresh thinking in Taiwanese defense strategy.

我的意思是，我认为台湾的防御战略有很多新的想法。

I think there’s a recognition that Taiwan does need to respond to the threat and needs to respond asymmetrically, which is a change, and that requires certain defense reforms.

我认为人们认识到台湾确实需要对威胁做出反应，并且需要做出不对称的反应，这是一个变化，需要进行某些国防改革。

So I think there’s actually a very sophisticated understanding of the changes that are needed among subject matter experts.

因此，我认为主题专家实际上对所需的变革有着非常深入的理解。

Now, getting from here to there is, is another question, and we’ve also looked at that, and I’m sure we’ll talk about that.

现在，从这里到那里是另一个问题，我们也研究过这个问题，我相信我们会讨论这个问题。

But I, I think the idea that Taiwan doesn’t get it somehow about its own security situation, I think that is misplaced.

但我认为，台湾不了解自己的安全局势的想法是错误的。

And, you know, this is one of the things I’ve been pondering, and I don’t think it’s just because, you know, we’re national security types from Washington.

而且，你知道，这是我一直在思考的事情之一，我认为这不仅仅是因为，你知道，我们是来自华盛顿的国家安全类型。

The the debates over the special defense budget and about Taiwan’s defense posture really seem to be preoccupying political figures.

关于特别国防预算和台湾防务态势的争论似乎确实引起了政治人物的关注。

Like, everybody we talk to seem to be immersed in the detail in a way that I think would not be the case in the United States if we were not engaged in direct conflict.

就像，与我们交谈的每个人似乎都沉浸在细节中，我认为如果我们不参与直接冲突，在美国就不会出现这种情况。

Like, there was so much talk about the special defense bill and then about what was included in it, and more importantly, what was omitted from it.

比如，人们对特别国防法案进行了很多讨论，然后讨论了其中包含的内容，更重要的是，其中省略了哪些内容。

So I think that was really striking to me.

所以我认为这对我来说真的很令人震惊。

Right?

正确的？

Then there does seem to be, you know, anecdotally from talking to people on the ground, there does seem to be a generational shift that is either underway or is actually in fact already occurred, right, where there is a seriousness about, about the threat that they’re facing.

然后，你知道，从与当地人们的交谈中可以看出，似乎确实存在代际转变，要么正在进行，要么实际上已经发生，对，他们所面临的威胁是严肃的。

And, you know, I hesitate to put it this way because I don’t want to have clientitis after just a week here.

而且，你知道，我犹豫是否要这样说，因为我不想在这里呆一周后就出现客户炎。

You could make the case, I think reasonably, you know, the Trump administration has been very focused on allies and partners picking up more of the slack for for their own defense.

你可以证明这一点，我认为这是合理的，你知道，特朗普政府一直非常关注盟友和合作伙伴为自己的防御承担更多的责任。

Right?

正确的？

And Taiwan does seem serious about it.

台湾似乎对此很认真。

And I think what’s underappreciated in Washington that does not get enough play, like, there has been so much talk over the last decade about decoupling from China, and Taiwan has decoupled in some ways.

我认为华盛顿低估了一些没有得到足够重视的事情，比如过去十年里有很多关于与中国脱钩的讨论，而台湾已经在某些方面脱钩了。

Like, 10 years ago, we kept hearing, you know, 80% of Taiwan’s foreign investment was going to the mainland, and now it’s less than 1%.

就像10年前，我们不断听到，台湾80%的外国投资都流向了大陆，而现在这个比例还不到1%。

Right?

正确的？

I mean, I think the real conundrum that maybe I didn’t really appreciate and others in Washington may not appreciate it is the challenges that create.

我的意思是，我认为真正的难题可能是我并没有真正意识到，华盛顿的其他人也可能没有意识到它所带来的挑战。

Right?

正确的？

Because if they are gonna be serious about these new defense technologies like drones and you’re not able to procure equipment from China, which is totally sensible for Taiwan, right, it’s gonna be expensive.

因为如果他们认真对待无人机等新的防御技术，而你无法从中国采购设备，这对台湾来说是完全明智的，对吧，那就会很昂贵。

And those are some of the, the challenges that, that, that they’re thinking through, but that is a sign that they are quite serious about thinking this through.

这些是他们正在考虑的一些挑战，但这表明他们非常认真地考虑这个问题。

But but first I wanted to dwell upon something that Caitlin referred to, which is the window of time that may be available for Taiwan to implement some of these defense reforms.

但首先我想谈谈凯特琳提到的一些事情，即台湾可能实施其中一些国防改革的时间窗口。

Can you guys elaborate a little bit further what window you’re referring to, and do you think that it is in fact the case?

你们能否进一步详细说明一下您所指的窗口，您认为事实确实如此吗？

Do you, do you agree with that diagnosis?

你同意这个诊断吗？

But I think what’s really clear is that, for Beijing at least, 2028 is gonna be the next pivot point.

但我认为真正清楚的是，至少对北京来说，2028 年将是下一个关键点。

Right?

正确的？

I think Xi is very focused and very serious on getting China’s military modernization right.

我认为习近平非常专注、非常认真地致力于实现中国的军事现代化。

They’ve made incredible strides in the hardware that they’re making, and it’s daunting and formidable.

他们在制造的硬件方面取得了令人难以置信的进步，这是令人畏惧和强大的。

But he seems very discontent with the quote unquote “software side” of it, the organizational piece.

但他似乎对其中未引用的“软件方面”（组织部分）非常不满。

Which is why I think, you know, that he’s, and we’ve talked about this on earlier episodes, he’s had such a thoroughgoing purge of his military high command.

这就是为什么我认为，你知道，他对他的军事高级指挥部进行了如此彻底的清洗，我们在之前的剧集中已经讨论过这一点。

Right?

正确的？

But I think it’s because he feels, number one, confident in his ability to to manage the Trump administration.

但我认为，第一，这是因为他对自己管理特朗普政府的能力充满信心。

Right?

正确的？

And I think he does feel tentatively optimistic maybe about the cross-strait dynamic and that there could be a change in leadership here in 2028.

我认为他确实对两岸动态以及 2028 年领导层可能发生变化持暂时乐观态度。

I think that gave Xi the breathing room to to do a total renovation of his high command.

我认为这给了习近平喘息的空间来彻底改造他的最高指挥部。

Like, I keep joking, like, you don’t do a renovation if you think you’re about to have a major national security crisis, and like, if you’re a homeowner, you don’t do a renovation, like, if you’re feeling the pinch.

就像，我一直在开玩笑，比如，如果你认为自己即将面临重大的国家安全危机，你就不会进行装修，如果你是房主，你就不会进行装修，比如，如果你感到手头拮据。

You do it when you feel a little comfortable and you feel a little plush.

当你感觉有点舒服并且感觉有点豪华时，你就会这样做。

Right?

正确的？

And Xi has clearly gone into the demolition phase with his high command.

习近平的高级指挥显然已进入拆除阶段。

And I think as long as that’s the case, I mean, we did this study with CSIS at the start of the year.

我认为只要情况确实如此，我的意思是，我们在今年年初与 CSIS 进行了这项研究。

It’s like 53% of the high command, as much as 53% of the high command could have been dismissed from office.

就像 53% 的高级指挥人员一样，多达 53% 的高级指挥人员可能会被解职。

Mao era level of of purges in in the military.

毛泽东时代军队中的清洗程度。

Right?

正确的？

So I think there is really a window here.

所以我认为这里确实有一扇窗户。

And I think 2028 is gonna be the next turn of wheel.

我认为 2028 年将是下一个转折点。

And that what’s really going to, to be decisive is what happens, of course, in Washington and who’s the next president in Washington, but also I think more importantly for Xi in some ways in terms of the cross-strait dynamic, who’s the new leadership here in Taipei?

当然，真正具有决定性的是华盛顿会发生什么，谁是华盛顿的下一任总统，但我认为，在某些方面，就两岸动态而言，对习近平来说更重要的是，谁是台北的新领导层？

And I would just say from the the lens that I kind of look at these things at which, it, you know, has more to do with, civil military dynamics, and just, just thinking about sort of military basics, it it takes time to build an effective officer corps and, you know, officers with strategic level thinking that can coordinate and plan, you know, very complex operations.

我只想说，从我的角度来看，这些事情与民用军事动态有更多关系，只是考虑军事基础知识，需要时间来建立一支有效的军官队伍，以及具有战略层面思维的军官，可以协调和计划非常复杂的行动。

And so even putting aside the the political incentives and all, and all of that, which I think you’re, you’re absolutely, you know, bringing really important insights there that I, I strongly agree with, you know, 2028 sounds kind of optimistic if you’ve just gotten rid of, you know, more than half of your high command to have replacements in place who can do the things that you thought your previous commanders couldn’t do.

因此，即使抛开政治动机和所有这些，我认为你绝对是带来了非常重要的见解，我非常同意，你知道，如果你刚刚摆脱了你知道的一半以上的高级指挥人员，并找到了替代者，他们可以做你认为你以前的指挥官不能做的事情，那么 2028 年听起来有点乐观。

And so, you know, from a military technical perspective, I would almost say that that pushes things out even further if the reason for doing these purges really is related to the ability to conduct these very potentially complex operations across the Taiwan Strait.

因此，你知道，从军事技术的角度来看，我几乎会说，如果进行这些清洗的原因确实与在台湾海峡进行这些非常复杂的行动的能力有关，那么这会将事情推得更远。

That’s that’s a very tall order to just completely turn that around.

要彻底扭转这种局面，这是一个非常艰巨的任务。

And and you pointed this out in some of our meetings, these purges have happened.

你在我们的一些会议上指出了这一点，这些清洗已经发生了。

The replacements have not happened.

替换尚未发生。

So it’s, it’s, it’s out with the old, but not in with the new yet.

所以，旧的已经过时了，但新的还没有融入。

But, I don’t think he has an expectation that this military modernization project will be totally completed.

但是，我认为他并不期望这个军事现代化项目能够完全完成。

I mean, he has to now reconstitute the entire Central Military Commission, you know, the the top echelon of the party’s high command.

我的意思是，他现在必须重组整个中央军事委员会，你知道，党的最高指挥部的最高梯队。

Right?

正确的？

And even once people get into place, in any system, it takes a while to learn that job, and it takes longer to learn a job when you’re terrified the boss is gonna put you in jail.

即使人们在任何系统中就位，也需要一段时间来学习这份工作，而当你害怕老板会把你关进监狱时，学习一份工作需要更长的时间。

And the perception, at least on the ground at Taipei, appears to be that Washington is more seized with the high-end spectrum risk of full-scale invasion, whereas Taipei is living day-to-day with some of these lower-end, you know, gray zone and other forms of pressure.

至少在台北当地，人们的看法似乎是，华盛顿更关注全面入侵的高端风险，而台北却每天都面临着一些低端的、灰色地带和其他形式的压力。

Can you help us think through how how this is occurring, why it is occurring, and whether or not it’s a a problem, what to do about it?

您能否帮助我们思考一下这是如何发生的，为什么会发生，以及这是否是一个问题，该怎么办？

I myself have been a bit critical of, for example, Pentagon’s very strong focus on that scenario.

例如，我本人对五角大楼对这种情况的强烈关注就有些批评。

Not that we shouldn’t think about invasion, we absolutely should.

并不是说我们不应该考虑入侵，而是我们绝对应该考虑。

But I think there’s also a bunch of reasons it, it may not be the most likely scenario.

但我认为还有很多原因，这可能不是最有可能的情况。

Now, at times, I’ve actually gotten pushback from Taiwanese friends who basically say we have to worry about invasion because invasion is actually the only scenario in which, like, we don’t get a vote because it’s just it’s just a brute force takeover, whereas the other scenarios are a matter of our will, right, to resist coercion.

现在，有时，我实际上受到台湾朋友的反对，他们基本上说我们必须担心入侵，因为入侵实际上是唯一一种情况，在这种情况下，我们没有投票权，因为这只是暴力接管，而其他情况则取决于我们抵抗胁迫的意愿，对吧。

And so, we have more control in those other scenarios.

因此，我们在其他情况下拥有更多控制权。

It’s what we’re willing to suffer, whereas the invasion scenario, they can literally just take our home from us.

这是我们愿意承受的，而在入侵的情况下，他们实际上可以夺走我们的家园。

So I, I get some of that, but I I think you’re right that in our conversations this week, we’ve, we’ve heard some different perspectives that in many ways, Washington is still fixated on the high end, whereas in the day-to-day, they are living actively with escalated levels of coercion in the strait.

所以我，我明白了一些，但我认为你是对的，在我们本周的对话中，我们听到了一些不同的观点，在很多方面，华盛顿仍然专注于高端，而在日常生活中，他们正在积极地生活在海峡的胁迫水平不断升级的情况下。

And we heard in almost every meeting a discussion of the fact that China’s just doing a lot of things today that they weren’t doing even a year ago.

我们几乎在每次会议上都听到这样的讨论：中国今天做了很多一年前都没有做的事情。

And we heard with quite a lot of specificity about, you know, that the air incursions have decreased a bit, but there’s much greater threat in the naval domain from Coast Guard, including on on Taiwan’s eastern coast, which is, you know, something that’s new.

我们非常具体地听说，空中入侵有所减少，但来自海岸警卫队的海军领域的威胁要大得多，包括台湾东海岸，这是一个新的东西。

And so this is something that they’re actively living with and that they want to push back on, I think, ASAP.

因此，这是他们正在积极接受的事情，并且我认为他们希望尽快予以抵制。

And I think, you know, notwithstanding the comments I made about how a coercion scenario gives them a, you know, a bit more control over their fate in some ways, that also means that they have to be ready to resist a coercion scenario that, you know, perhaps is the more likely thing China would do, and and that potentially involves a a lot of suffering and harm to Taiwan’s people.

我认为，尽管我发表了关于胁迫情景如何让他们在某些方面对自己的命运有更多控制权的评论，但这也意味着他们必须准备好抵制胁迫情景，你知道，这也许是中国更有可能做的事情，并且可能会给台湾人民带来很多痛苦和伤害。

And so of course they’re, they’re very concerned about that.

当然，他们对此非常关心。

And it’s not just about Taiwan, right, like, I hear the same things in Washington about South China Sea, East China Sea.

这不仅仅是关于台湾，对吧，我在华盛顿也听到了同样的关于南中国海、东中国海的事情。

Right?

正确的？

We’re not going to focus on those things because it’s not the high-end fight.

我们不会关注这些事情，因为这不是高端战斗。

We’re going to focus on, on the high-end part of it.

我们将专注于它的高端部分。

But what’s challenging about that is that when you’re dealing with the politics of managing relationships with allies and partners, if you’re not there when they’re dealing with the PLA Navy operating on their eastern coast or the Chinese Coast Guard, it makes it untenable over time to to sustain that kind of approach, right, where you’re just focused on on high-end capability.

但其中的挑战在于，当你处理与盟友和伙伴关系的政治管理时，如果当他们与在东海岸行动的解放军海军或中国海岸警卫队打交道时你不在场，那么随着时间的推移，维持这种只关注高端能力的方法将变得站不住脚。

Right?

正确的？

Because your allies are going to start to wonder, like, ” Is it worth making the investments?

因为你的盟友会开始想知道，“值得进行投资吗？”

Is the United States going to be there?” And I think that makes it very challenging.

美国会去吗？”我认为这使得它非常具有挑战性。

I mean, to put a slightly different spin on it, like one of the things that have been striking to me on this trip is, and that I don’t think I fully appreciated from, again, from Washington, is that if you go through the relationship between Taiwan and the United States right now, what’s really interesting is how close the economic relationship has become.

我的意思是，换个稍微不同的说法，就像这次旅行中令我印象深刻的一件事，而且我认为我没有完全从华盛顿那里得到充分的理解，那就是，如果你现在审视台湾和美国之间的关系，真正有趣的是经济关系已经变得多么密切。

But it’s not just that, it’s a matter of policy too.

但这不仅是一个问题，也是一个政策问题。

Like they have their ART now.

就像他们现在有了自己的艺术一样。

Right?

正确的？

Like they’re one of the first countries to get a trade deal in the region, so the economic relationship is quite tight.

就像他们是该地区最早达成贸易协议的国家之一一样，因此经济关系相当紧密。

The defense relationship, you know, I wasn’t sure what it would look like being on the ground.

防守关系，你知道，我不确定在实地会是什么样子。

It seems to be okay But then what’s really interesting and where I think this is a missed opportunity is the political relationship.

似乎没问题，但真正有趣的是政治关系，我认为这是一个错失的机会。

There’s a lot of anxiety here about about the commitment from the United States to Taiwan, and I think it encapsulates this conundrum we were just talking about, right, like, can you prepare for the high-end fight if your partner doesn’t really feel reassured?

这里有很多关于美国对台湾的承诺的焦虑，我认为这概括了我们刚才谈论的这个难题，对吧，比如，如果你的伙伴真的不放心，你能为高端战斗做好准备吗？

And I think what was really striking about some of our colleagues that we interacted with on the trip, they’re like, “Look, we get politics is politics, rhetoric is rhetoric.

我认为，真正令人震惊的是我们在旅途中接触到的一些同事，他们说：“听着，我们明白政治就是政治，言论就是言论。

We don’t take it that seriously.” But holding up a $14 billion arms sale, because Xi Jinping doesn’t like it, you know, doesn’t make them feel good about where things stand.

我们没有那么认真地对待它。”但因为习近平不喜欢而推迟 140 亿美元的军售，你知道，并不会让他们对现状感到满意。

And I think that’s kind of the elephant in the room in this conversation.

我认为这就是这次谈话中房间里的大象。

Right?

正确的？

Like, why are we not doing that, and why is there hesitation from the United States?

比如，为什么我们不这样做，为什么美国犹豫不决？

It’s not just because we’re only focused on the high-end fight.

这不仅仅是因为我们只专注于高端战斗。

It’s because, you know, the administration’s China policy has not played out the way that they hoped that that would.

这是因为，你知道，政府的对华政策并没有按照他们希望的方式发挥作用。

Right?

正确的？

Beijing has effectively put a lid on some of our competitive actions on the technology front, but I think also our engagement with Taiwan, and that’s the reality, and that’s definitely been on people’s minds here, is what’s going to happen in the run-up to the next summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump.

北京有效地限制了我们在技术方面的一些竞争行为，但我认为我们与台湾的接触也是现实，这肯定是这里人们的想法，也是习近平和唐纳德·特朗普下次峰会前夕将会发生的事情。

Right?

正确的？

I think you can’t discuss these things without talking about that element and the dynamic.

我认为如果不讨论这个元素和动态就不能讨论这些事情。

And I I think that notion was already there to some extent.

我认为这个想法在某种程度上已经存在了。

If you actually look at polling, a lot of Taiwanese have not believed for a while that the U.S. actually was going to come defend them in these sorts of high-end scenarios.

如果你真正看一下民意调查，就会发现很多台湾人有一段时间不相信美国实际上会在这种高端情况下保护他们。

And I, if I’m not mistaken, I think that predates the current administration.

而我，如果我没记错的话，我认为这早于现任政府。

But we heard that, I think, pretty explicitly from quite a few quarters that Taiwan has to be responsible for its own defense.

但我认为，我们从很多方面非常明确地听到，台湾必须对自己的防御负责。

And in fact, in polling and also in conversations that that we had here across a number of venues, there’s a lot of evidence that Taiwanese want to fight for their society, and they, you know, they, they support the status quo.

事实上，在民意调查以及我们在多个场所进行的对话中，有很多证据表明台湾人想要为他们的社会而战，他们，你知道，他们支持现状。

They’re not, they’re not actively looking for, for independence or reunification but, you know, if, if they’re threatened, they they want to fight and to defend that status quo.

他们不是，他们没有积极寻求独立或统一，但是，你知道，如果他们受到威胁，他们想要战斗并捍卫现状。

And so I think that’s, that’s sort of the flip side of everything we’ve been talking about.

所以我认为这就是我们一直在谈论的一切的反面。

Yes, there’s serious concerns about U.S. reliability.

是的，人们对美国的可靠性存在严重担忧。

We haven’t even talked about some of the things they’re taking away from the Iran part, which I think have a lot of implications for U.S. will and capability to to come to the aid of, of other friends and allies.

我们甚至还没有讨论他们从伊朗部分拿走的一些东西，我认为这对美国向其他朋友和盟友提供援助的意愿和能力有很大影响。

But it, it adds, I think, to this sense that we’ve got to take care of ourselves, so we’ve got to get our own defense strategy house in order, and that is part of the impetus to the reforms that we talked about a bit, and we’ll probably talk about some more.

但我认为，它补充了我们必须照顾好自己，所以我们必须让我们自己的国防战略体系井然有序，这是我们谈到的改革的动力的一部分，我们可能还会讨论更多。

And I I think that that was reassuring that there there’s actually been a lot of study of that question, and it’s feeding into these conversations about developing an asymmetric defense strategy, which, as we said at the top, I think is, is kind of the, the ideational shift that has happened.

我认为令人放心的是，实际上已经对这个问题进行了大量研究，并且它正在融入有关制定不对称防御战略的对话，正如我们在顶部所说，我认为这就是已经发生的观念转变。

Now, that’s got to be followed up with implementation, but I think that- that’s part of the thinking.

现在，必须跟进实施，但我认为这是想法的一部分。

We’ve talked some this week, maybe not as much as I would have liked, but I think it’s an emerging topic about the implications of the Iran war and what what Taiwan might learn from that as well.

本周我们谈了一些，也许没有我希望的那么多，但我认为这是一个关于伊朗战争的影响以及台湾可以从中学到什么的新兴话题。

I think there’s there’s lessons there for Taiwan.

我认为台湾有一些教训。

The bad news is kind of what we’ve already been talking about and alluding to, which is that it’s another siphon for U.S. strategic and and political attention and military resources.

坏消息是我们已经在谈论和暗示的，那就是这是美国战略和政治注意力以及军事资源的另一个虹吸管。

Many people are familiar with the depletion of munitions, both offensive and defensive in the Iran war that are exactly the sorts of munitions that will be relevant to the high-end scenarios that we’ve just been talking about in the strait.

许多人都熟悉伊朗战争中进攻性和防御性弹药的消耗，而这些弹药正是与我们刚才在海峡讨论的高端场景相关的弹药。

And so I think, I think that’s, that’s negative.

所以我认为，我认为那是负面的。

I think the war also demonstrates the vulnerability of U.S. fixed basing in the region, which is something Brookings colleague Mara Karlin and I have written about.

我认为这场战争还表明了美国在该地区固定基地的脆弱性，这是我和布鲁金斯学会同事玛拉·卡林所写的。

And, as we’ve said, if you, if you like the Iran war, you’ll love the Western Pacific on this issue because, you know, the U.S. is still heavily reliant on fixed basing and and of course, China has even more capable missiles in terms of just going after fixed targets.

而且，正如我们所说，如果你喜欢伊朗战争，那么在这个问题上你就会喜欢西太平洋，因为你知道，美国仍然严重依赖固定基地，当然，中国在追踪固定目标方面拥有更强大的导弹。

So I think, I think there’s some bad political, military, strategic news there for Taiwan about the U.S. and, and its experience in the war.

所以我认为，对于台湾来说，有一些关于美国及其在战争中的经历的糟糕的政治、军事和战略消息。

But on the flip side, and it’s, it’s a little bit impolitic sometimes to say, “What can we learn from Iran?” Because this isn’t, this isn’t a nice regime that we necessarily consider to be a a role model in in a number of respects.

但另一方面，有时说“我们能从伊朗学到什么？”有点不策略。因为事实并非如此，这不是一个好的政权，我们在很多方面都必须将其视为榜样。

But I think this war has actually demonstrated on the Iranian side the viability of an asymmetric defense strategy for resisting coercion and deterring invasion by a nuclear-armed great power, which incidentally is exactly Taiwan’s security problem.

但我认为这场战争实际上向伊朗方面展示了非对称防御战略的可行性，以抵御核武大国的胁迫和威慑入侵，而这正是台湾的安全问题。

And Iran’s a country that’s full of engineers and got a strong scientific base, like another country we know, and they’ve spent a lot of time developing indigenous defense capabilities, missiles, drones, mines.

伊朗是一个充满工程师并拥有强大科学基础的国家，就像我们所知道的另一个国家一样，他们花了很多时间开发本土防御能力、导弹、无人机和地雷。

And without having their navy or air force intact, they’ve they’ve held off the United States.

在他们的海军或空军没有完好无损的情况下，他们已经阻止了美国。

And I think, you know, frankly, if Donald Trump had known in, you know, January everything he knows now about the nature of Iranian resistance he would face, I don’t think he would’ve launched this war.

我认为，坦率地说，如果唐纳德·特朗普在一月份就知道他现在所知道的有关他将面临的伊朗抵抗性质的一切，我认为他不会发动这场战争。

And the good news for Taiwan is I think Xi Jinping’s actually more rational and analytical than Donald Trump.

对台湾来说，好消息是我认为习近平实际上比唐纳德·特朗普更加理性和善于分析。

And so if Taiwan can signal the development of those sorts of capabilities and the potential for cost imposition, I think that goes a long way towards strengthening deterrence and, and fostering peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

因此，如果台湾能够表明这些能力的发展以及付出成本的潜力，我认为这对于加强威慑以及促进台湾海峡的和平与稳定大有帮助。

Now, of course there’s differences.

现在，当然存在差异。

There’s differences between Ukraine and Iran and Taiwan, and I’m not trying to gloss over those, but nevertheless, it’s really notable in both of those wars that I think there are some some hopeful lessons for Taiwan, and I think they’re paying attention.

乌克兰、伊朗和台湾之间存在差异，我并不是想掩盖这些差异，但尽管如此，在这两场战争中，值得注意的是，我认为台湾可以得到一些有希望的教训，而且我认为他们正在关注。

I think the other thing that jumps out to me more broadly on the back end of this trip is, and this is an idea I’ve been playing around with for a little while, but you know, Xi Jinping has been so preoccupied with the Taiwan issue, right, and that’s very much the vibe in Washington.

我认为在这次旅行的最后，我更广泛地想到的另一件事是，这是我已经考虑了一段时间的一个想法，但你知道，习近平一直非常关注台湾问题，对吧，这就是华盛顿的氛围。

I think that’s a reality.

我认为这是现实。

Right?

正确的？

Xi Jinping’s spent most of his career on the Taiwan Strait and, and seems to keep his own counsel on it.

习近平的大部分职业生涯都在台湾海峡度过，并且似乎对此保持着自己的看法。

But I really wonder and worry almost, there seems to be a real bankruptcy, intellectual bankruptcy at the heart of this Taiwan policy.

但我确实感到好奇和担忧，台湾政策的核心似乎是真正的破产、知识分子的破产。

We saw some polling this week about the Ma Ying-jeou era, the the previous president who was friendlier toward Taiwan, and that was when there was an uptick in sentiment on Taiwan that China was not friendly toward them.

本周我们看到一些关于马英九时代的民意调查，马英九时代的前任总统对台湾更加友好，当时人们对台湾的情绪有所上升，认为中国对他们不友好。

Right?

正确的？

So to know China was not to love them remarkably.

所以了解中国并不是非常爱他们。

Right?

正确的？

So that approach didn’t work, that softer approach didn’t work., And the punitive approach that, and more coercive approach that Xi Jinping has shifted toward over the last eight years or so since President Tsai came into office back in 2016, does not seem to have demoralized the island and had the intended effect.

所以这种方法行不通，那种更温和的方法行不通。自蔡总统2016年上台以来，习近平在过去八年左右的时间里转向了更具强制性的方法，但似乎并没有使台湾士气低落，也没有达到预期的效果。

Right?

正确的？

They do seem to be serious, invigorated about defense reform and taking these challenges seriously in a way that maybe they weren’t a decade ago in the Ma era,

他们似乎确实很严肃，对国防改革充满活力，并以一种不同于十年前马云时代的方式认真对待这些挑战，

So he’s tried the hard approach.

所以他尝试了艰难的方法。

That doesn’t seem to be on a positive trajectory for Xi Jinping.

这对习近平来说似乎并不是一条积极的道路。

He had tried the soft approach, or his predecessor really had tried the soft approach.

他尝试过软方式，或者说他的前任确实尝试过软方式。

That ended in a cul-de-sac and the the election of Tsai Ing-wen.

最终导致了死胡同和蔡英文当选。

So if neither of those approaches work, where does, where did that leave you as Xi Jinping, right?

那么，如果这两种方法都不起作用，那么作为习近平，你会在哪里，对吗？

And you want to get to some kind of political discussion about the cross-strait dynamic and the relationship with Taiwan.

你想就两岸动态以及与台湾的关系进行某种政治讨论。

What would you both be looking for as evidence that Taiwan is using this time effectively to put itself in a stronger position to deter, or if necessary, deal with increasing military pressure from Beijing?

你们两人会寻找什么证据来证明台湾正在有效地利用这段时间使自己处于更有利的地位，以威慑或在必要时应对北京日益增加的军事压力？

And so the the benchmark isn’t is Taiwan doing more than it did last year, it’s is Taiwan doing enough to counter what China’s doing that’s different from last year?

因此，衡量标准不是台湾做得比去年多，而是台湾做得是否足以对抗中国与去年不同的做法？

And that, that’s a tall order because of of what you just laid out.

而且，由于您刚刚提出的内容，这是一项艰巨的任务。

And so as we’ve I think there, there has been this ideational shift, and there has been, I think, particularly in, in the last two years, a focus on defense reforms.

因此，正如我们所认为的那样，观念发生了转变，我认为，特别是在过去两年中，人们开始关注国防改革。

We’re we’re here during the the Han Kuang exercises.

我们在汉光演习期间在这里。

We had a meeting interrupted with a notification on our on our phone.

我们的会议因手机上的通知而中断。

Everyone got it at the same time.

所有人同时得到了它。

We thought it was a typhoon, but it wasn’t.

我们以为是台风，但事实并非如此。

And there’s been an emphasis, for example, on making those more realistic.

例如，人们一直强调让这些变得更加现实。

But, you know, at the same time, over the course of the last year, there has been this debate over the special defense budget, and we could talk for five hours about that, and we have.

但是，你知道，与此同时，在去年的过程中，一直存在着关于特别国防预算的辩论，我们可以就此讨论五个小时，而且我们已经这样做了。

But, you know, the the gist of it is that political division within Taiwan has prevented long-term investment in domestic drone production, even though numerous people that we talked to emphasized how important this technology was, even though there’s evidence from Ukraine and Iran of how important this technology is, and even though we, we know Taiwan can build stuff.

但是，你知道，其要点是，台湾内部的政治分歧阻碍了对国内无人机生产的长期投资，尽管我们采访的许多人都强调这项技术的重要性，尽管乌克兰和伊朗有证据表明这项技术的重要性，尽管我们知道台湾可以制造东西。

I mean, we know they can design high technology and produce what they have.

我的意思是，我们知道他们可以设计高科技并生产他们所拥有的东西。

But yet, for a variety of reasons, that hasn’t happened.

但由于种种原因，这种情况尚未发生。

And so I I think one of the things to be watching is in the upcoming year, you know, there, there’s been these steps.

所以我认为值得关注的事情之一是在即将到来的一年里，你知道，有这些步骤。

Right?

正确的？

It it was at least proposed.

它至少被提议了。

It was at least debated.

这至少是有争议的。

And a big chunk of it was funded, but not this this domestic drone production long-term piece.

其中很大一部分得到了资助，但不是这个国内无人机生产的长期项目。

And so as that comes back up in the LY, you know, what, what happens to that?

当这种情况再次出现在 LY 时，你知道，那会发生什么？

To to put it cruelly, do we see people putting their money where their mouth is?

残酷地说，我们是否看到人们言出必行？

On, on the drones issue, I think also with these exercises, they’ve been becoming more realistic, but I’d be very interested to know in a week or two what’s what’s the readout on these, what do they look like next year?

关于无人机问题，我认为通过这些演习，它们变得更加现实，但我很想知道在一两周内这些演习的读数是什么，明年它们会是什么样子？