Stablecoins after GENIUS: Private money, public debt, and the global dollar

This paper was published by the Aspen Economic Strategy Group.

本文由阿斯彭经济战略集团发表。

The rapid growth of U.S. dollar-backed stablecoins has moved them from the margins of the cryptocurrency ecosystem into the center of debates about the future of money and payments, the global role of the dollar, and the U.S. fiscal position.

美元支持的稳定币的快速增长使其从加密货币生态系统的边缘变成了有关货币和支付的未来、美元的全球作用以及美国财政状况的争论的中心。

The passage of the GENIUS Act in 2025 created the first comprehensive federal framework for payment stablecoins, opening the door for broader adoption and innovation while raising new questions about financial stability and efforts to combat illicit finance and protect our national security.

2025 年《GENIUS 法案》的通过为支付稳定币创建了第一个全面的联邦框架，为更广泛的采用和创新打开了大门，同时提出了有关金融稳定以及打击非法金融和保护国家安全的新问题。

Nellie Liang of the Hutchins Center at Brookings and Brent Neiman of the University of Chicago examine how stablecoins could reshape the U.S. financial system if they become widely used for payments.

布鲁金斯学会哈钦斯中心的内莉·梁和芝加哥大学的布伦特·内曼研究了稳定币如果广泛用于支付，将如何重塑美国金融体系。

Properly regulated stablecoins could deliver meaningful benefits, they argue, but those gains come with tradeoffs that policymakers will need to manage as regulators implement the GENIUS Act and Congress considers future legislation.

他们认为，适当监管的稳定币可以带来有意义的好处，但这些收益伴随着政策制定者需要进行的权衡，因为监管机构实施《天才法案》并且国会考虑未来的立法。

Stablecoins are privately issued digital money that can serve as a substitute for cash or bank deposits.

稳定币是私人发行的数字货币，可以替代现金或银行存款。

Stablecoins circulate on public blockchain networks and can be transferred directly between users without relying on the issuer or any central authority to validate transactions.

稳定币在公共区块链网络上流通，可以直接在用户之间转移，无需依赖发行人或任何中央机构来验证交易。

Unlike volatile cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, payment stablecoins are designed to maintain a stable value, and the vast majority in circulation are pegged to the U.S. dollar.

与比特币等不稳定的加密货币不同，支付稳定币旨在保持稳定的价值，流通中的绝大多数与美元挂钩。

The GENIUS Act requires issuers to back stablecoins at least one-for-one with eligible reserve assets, such as Treasury bills, and establishes a framework governing issuance, redemption, and compliance with anti-money-laundering and sanctions rules.

GENIUS 法案要求发行人以符合条件的储备资产（例如国库券）至少一对一地支持稳定币，并建立了一个管理发行、赎回以及遵守反洗钱和制裁规则的框架。

The total value of the stablecoin market, as of June 2026, was about $270 billion.

截至 2026 年 6 月，稳定币市场总价值约为 2700 亿美元。

Liang and Neiman argue that stablecoins can offer significant advantages for payments and settlement.

梁和内曼认为，稳定币可以为支付和结算提供显着的优势。

Existing payment systems, particularly for international transactions, remain costly, slow, and fragmented.

现有的支付系统，尤其是国际交易的支付系统，仍然成本高昂、速度缓慢且分散。

Domestic payments can involve significant fees and settlement delays, while cross-border payments often pass through multiple correspondent banks operating under different compliance and regulatory regimes.

国内支付可能涉及大量费用和结算延迟，而跨境支付通常通过在不同合规和监管制度下运营的多家代理银行。

Stablecoins have the potential to reduce these frictions by allowing transactions to settle nearly instantly, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

稳定币可以让交易每周 7 天、每天 24 小时几乎即时结算，从而减少这些摩擦。

Stablecoins also can be programmable—enabled through smart contracts embedded in blockchain networks—to automate complex transactions that currently require manual processing by banks and other intermediaries.

稳定币还可以通过嵌入区块链网络中的智能合约进行编程，以实现目前需要银行和其他中介机构手动处理的复杂交易的自动化。

Beyond payments, the authors argue that stablecoins could reinforce the international role of the U.S. dollar.

除了支付之外，作者认为稳定币还可以加强美元的国际地位。

As countries continue developing their own digital payment systems and central bank digital currencies, a widely available digital dollar would help preserve the dollar’s dominance in global trade and finance.

随着各国继续开发自己的数字支付系统和央行数字货币，广泛使用的数字美元将有助于保持美元在全球贸易和金融中的主导地位。

Stablecoins could expand access to dollar-denominated assets in countries with high inflation or weak financial systems while supporting the network effects that have long underpinned the dollar’s international role.

稳定币可以扩大通货膨胀高或金融体系薄弱的国家获得以美元计价的资产的机会，同时支持长期以来支撑美元国际地位的网络效应。

The paper emphasizes, however, that the technological advantages of stablecoins do not necessarily make them suitable for mainstream commerce today.

然而，该论文强调，稳定币的技术优势并不一定使其适合当今的主流商业。

The authors emphasize that the financial regulators still need to set capital and liquidity requirements to ensure that stablecoins can be convertible to a U.S. dollar on demand at any time.

作者强调，金融监管机构仍需要设定资本和流动性要求，以确保稳定币可以随时按需兑换为美元。

In particular, issuers should be required to hold more capital for reserves invested in uninsured bank deposits than in Treasury bills or cash.

特别是，应要求发行人持有更多的资本用于投资于未保险银行存款的准备金，而不是投资于国库券或现金。

Stablecoins also currently lack many of the consumer protections and operational safeguards associated with traditional payment systems, including mechanisms for dispute resolution, fraud recovery, and guaranteed settlement finality, and issuers will need to develop infrastructure that preserves blockchain efficiency while meeting higher trust and reliability standards.

稳定币目前还缺乏与传统支付系统相关的许多消费者保护和运营保障措施，包括争议解决、欺诈追偿和保证结算最终性的机制，发行人将需要开发基础设施，以保持区块链效率，同时满足更高的信任和可靠性标准。

At the same time, the paper identifies an important national security concern.

与此同时，该文件指出了一个重要的国家安全问题。

The current international financial system gives U.S. authorities significant leverage through correspondent banking relationships that support sanctions enforcement and anti-money-laundering efforts.

当前的国际金融体系通过代理银行关系为美国当局提供了巨大的影响力，支持制裁执行和反洗钱工作。

If stablecoins reduce reliance on traditional banking networks, those enforcement mechanisms could become less effective.

如果稳定币减少对传统银行网络的依赖，这些执行机制可能会变得不那么有效。

The authors therefore argue that regulators should require stablecoin issuers and wallet providers to implement compliance systems capable of blocking illicit transactions and cooperating rapidly with law enforcement.

因此，作者认为，监管机构应要求稳定币发行商和钱包提供商实施能够阻止非法交易并与执法部门迅速合作的合规系统。

Maintaining the national security benefits that come from the dollar’s global role, they contend, requires preserving not only the currency’s widespread use but also the connections to U.S. financial institutions that underpin financial sanctions and anti-money-laundering enforcement.

他们认为，要维持美元全球地位所带来的国家安全利益，不仅需要维持美元的广泛使用，还需要维持与支持金融制裁和反洗钱执法的美国金融机构的联系。

The authors highlight that success for mainstream finance is not guaranteed.

作者强调，主流金融的成功并不能得到保证。

Stablecoin usage could grow substantially and co-exist with bank payment products or may languish if financial and national security concerns cannot be addressed.

稳定币的使用可能会大幅增长并与银行支付产品共存，或者如果金融和国家安全问题无法得到解决，稳定币的使用可能会减弱。

Regardless, the greater regulatory clarity has already ignited competition and innovation by banks and fintechs that could bring about significant improvements for payments and blockchain settlement infrastructure.

无论如何，监管的更加明确已经引发了银行和金融科技公司的竞争和创新，这可能会给支付和区块链结算基础设施带来重大改进。

Many foreign governments worry that widespread adoption of U.S. dollar-backed stablecoins could weaken their own monetary sovereignty if residents hold and transact in dollars rather than domestic currencies.

许多外国政府担心，如果居民以美元而非本国货币持有和交易，广泛采用美元支持的稳定币可能会削弱其自身的货币主权。

These concerns have accelerated efforts abroad to develop central bank digital currencies, fast payment systems, and domestic stablecoin frameworks.

这些担忧加速了国外开发央行数字货币、快速支付系统和国内稳定币框架的努力。

The authors argue that U.S. policymakers should engage foreign governments to reduce these spillover effects while recognizing that preserving the status quo in global payments is no longer a realistic option.

作者认为，美国决策者应该与外国政府合作，减少这些溢出效应，同时认识到维持全球支付现状不再是一个现实的选择。

Because the GENIUS Act requires stablecoin reserves to be invested primarily in short-term Treasury securities, strong growth in stablecoins could substantially increase demand for Treasury bills and help our government finances.

由于《天才法案》要求稳定币储备主要投资于短期国债，因此稳定币的强劲增长可能会大幅增加对国库券的需求，并有助于我们的政府财政。

The size of any increase in demand, however, will crucially depend on the source of stablecoin growth.

然而，需求增长的规模将在很大程度上取决于稳定币增长的来源。

For example, if there were substitution away from money market mutual funds, those funds would sell their Treasury holdings, dampening net new demand.

例如，如果货币市场共同基金有替代品，这些基金将出售其持有的美国国债，从而抑制净新需求。

If stablecoin growth largely comes from demand from abroad, net new demand would be larger.

如果稳定币的增长主要来自海外需求，那么净新增需求将会更大。

The authors consider several scenarios developed by private sector forecasters for future stablecoin adoption and show how those scenarios imply first-round net demand estimates for Treasury bills ranging from $400 billion to $2.3 trillion by 2030.

作者考虑了私营部门预测者为未来稳定币采用而制定的几种情景，并展示了这些情景如何暗示到 2030 年国库券第一轮净需求预计将达到 4000 亿美元到 2.3 万亿美元。

(The authors also provide an online tool that can be used to apply other assumptions for stablecoin adoption and sources of growth to estimate net new demand for Treasury bills.)

（作者还提供了一个在线工具，可用于应用稳定币采用和增长来源的其他假设，以估计国库券的净新需求。）

However, greater reliance on Treasury bills would shorten the average maturity of federal debt, exposing taxpayers to more frequent refinancing and greater variability in interest costs.

然而，对国库券的更大依赖将缩短联邦债务的平均期限，使纳税人面临更频繁的再融资和更大的利息成本波动。

Stablecoins could also reduce federal seigniorage revenue if households and businesses substitute privately issued digital money for physical currency.

如果家庭和企业用私人发行的数字货币代替实物货币，稳定币还可能减少联邦铸币税收入。

The authors note that if stablecoins attract deposits away from commercial banks—particularly community banks—they could reduce an important source of credit for small businesses, even if alternative lenders eventually fill much of the gap.

作者指出，如果稳定币吸引商业银行（尤其是社区银行）的存款，它们可能会减少小企业的重要信贷来源，即使替代贷款机构最终填补了大部分缺口。

Recognizing these competing effects, Liang and Neiman recommend that Treasury incorporate stablecoin demand into its debt management strategy and carefully evaluate how additional demand for Treasury bills should influence the maturity structure of federal borrowing.

认识到这些相互竞争的影响，梁和内曼建议财政部将稳定币需求纳入其债务管理策略，并仔细评估国库券的额外需求应如何影响联邦借款的期限结构。

They also recommend maintaining the current prohibition on paying interest on stablecoins, at least initially, to slow potentially disruptive shifts from bank deposits until regulators gain more experience with the new market.

他们还建议维持目前对稳定币支付利息的禁令，至少在最初是这样，以减缓银行存款的潜在破坏性转变，直到监管机构在新市场上获得更多经验。

The authors conclude that well-regulated stablecoins have the potential to improve payment efficiency, strengthen the global role of the dollar, and modestly benefit the U.S. fiscal position.

作者的结论是，监管良好的稳定币有潜力提高支付效率，加强美元的全球地位，并适度有利于美国的财政状况。

But realizing those benefits requires regulators to address difficult tradeoffs involving financial stability, consumer protection, illicit finance, bank intermediation, and debt management.

但要实现这些好处，监管机构需要解决涉及金融稳定、消费者保护、非法金融、银行中介和债务管理等方面的困难权衡。

Looking further ahead, the authors caution that widespread adoption of privately issued digital money could eventually raise more fundamental questions about the relationship between central bank money and private money.

展望未来，作者警告说，私人发行的数字货币的广泛采用最终可能会引发有关央行货币与私人货币之间关系的更根本性问题。

While those challenges remain some distance away, the choices policymakers make as they implement the GENIUS Act will play an important role in determining whether stablecoins become a durable complement to the existing monetary system or introduce new risks that outweigh their promise.

尽管这些挑战仍然存在一定距离，但政策制定者在实施《天才法案》时做出的选择将在决定稳定币是否成为现有货币体系的持久补充或引入超出其承诺的新风险方面发挥重要作用。