The United States and its creditors: Assessing foreign demand for US assets

The U.S. net international investment position exceeded negative 71% of GDP at the end of 2025, four times higher than in 2010.

2025年底，美国净国际投资头寸占GDP的比重超过71%，是2010年的四倍。

While persistent U.S. current account deficits have contributed to this trend, much of the decline reflects the extraordinary rise in U.S. equity prices, which dramatically increased the value of U.S. stocks owned by foreign investors.

尽管美国持续的经常账户赤字促成了这一趋势，但下跌很大程度上反映了美国股价的异常上涨，这极大地增加了外国投资者持有的美国股票的价值。

At the same time, a stronger dollar has reduced the dollar value of U.S.-owned foreign assets denominated in foreign currency.

与此同时，美元走强降低了美国拥有的以外币计价的外国资产的美元价值。

These valuation effects account for much of the worsening in America’s net external position.

这些估值效应是美国净外部头寸恶化的主要原因。

Although equity valuations explain much of the deterioration in the net international investment position, foreign purchases of U.S. debt securities—particularly U.S. Treasury securities—have been the most significant means of financing U.S. current account deficits.

尽管股票估值在很大程度上解释了净国际投资头寸的恶化，但外国购买美国债务证券（尤其是美国国债）一直是为美国经常账户赤字融资的最重要手段。

As federal debt continues to rise and interest rates remain well above the exceptionally low levels of the 2010s, understanding who buys Treasury securities, and why, becomes increasingly important.

随着联邦债务持续上升，利率仍远高于 2010 年代的极低水平，了解谁购买国债以及购买原因变得越来越重要。

Who are U.S. creditors?

谁是美国债权人？

While the U.S. bilateral position with China has not changed much relative to 2017, liabilities to advanced economies in Asia and Europe have risen sharply, reflecting these economies’ large current account surpluses—but also because their large U.S. portfolio equity positions have appreciated as stock prices have risen.

尽管美国对中国的双边立场与 2017 年相比没有太大变化，但对亚洲和欧洲发达经济体的负债却急剧上升，反映出这些经济体拥有巨额经常账户盈余，而且还因为随着股价上涨，这些经济体大量的美国投资组合股票头寸升值。

In contrast, most emerging markets, including China, hold primarily U.S. bonds, whose market value has declined as interest rates have risen.

相比之下，包括中国在内的大多数新兴市场主要持有美国债券，其市值随着利率上升而下降。

Furthermore, China has been diversifying its allocation of external assets since the end of the Global Financial Crisis, reducing its relative exposure to the U.S. while increasing claims elsewhere.

此外，自全球金融危机结束以来，中国一直在实现外部资产配置多元化，减少了对美国的相对敞口，同时增加了其他地方的债权。

Importantly, the growing share of investment intermediated by financial centers has increased uncertainty about the identity of ultimate U.S. creditors.

重要的是，金融中心介入的投资份额不断增加，增加了美国最终债权人身份的不确定性。

Conventional balance-of-payments statistics record foreign holdings according to the residence of the immediate investor rather than who ultimately owns them.

传统的国际收支统计数据根据直接投资者的居住地而不是最终拥有者来记录外国资产。

As a result, financial centers hosting a prominent investment fund industry such as the Cayman Islands, Ireland, and Luxembourg appear to hold enormous quantities of U.S. assets even though these investments ultimately belong to fund shareholders from other countries.

因此，开曼群岛、爱尔兰和卢森堡等投资基金业发达的金融中心似乎持有大量美国资产，尽管这些投资最终属于其他国家的基金股东。

The picture is further blurred by the fact that when U.S. securities are held abroad, U.S. statisticians can only establish the location of the entity that holds them in custody, but this can be on behalf of a resident of a different country.

当美国证券在国外持有时，美国统计人员只能确定保管这些证券的实体的位置，但这可以代表不同国家的居民，这一事实进一步模糊了情况。

This is the case for Belgium, which hosts Euroclear, a very large custodian, and the United Kingdom, where an important share of international investors’ portfolios are managed.

比利时的情况就是如此，比利时拥有非常大的托管机构 Euroclear，而英国则管理着国际投资者投资组合的重要份额。

The paper provides estimates that seek to identify the nationality of ultimate investors rather than simply the location of financial intermediaries, but can only do so for part of foreign holdings of U.S. securities.

该文件提供的估计旨在确定最终投资者的国籍，而不仅仅是金融中介机构的所在地，但只能针对外国持有的部分美国证券。

The composition of foreign owners of Treasury securities has changed dramatically since the Global Financial Crisis.

自全球金融危机以来，国债外国所有者的构成发生了巨大变化。

In the 2000s, foreign official institutions—especially central banks accumulating dollar reserves—accounted for most foreign purchases.

2000年代，外国官方机构——尤其是积累美元储备的央行——占据了大部分外国购买量。

Over the past decade, however, their importance has declined sharply.

然而，在过去十年中，它们的重要性急剧下降。

Today, foreign private investors hold substantially more Treasuries than foreign official institutions.

如今，外国私人投资者持有的国债远多于外国官方机构。

After correcting for previously undercounted hedge fund holdings routed through the Cayman Islands, the shift toward private investors is even larger than official statistics suggest.

在对之前低估的通过开曼群岛的对冲基金持有量进行修正后，向私人投资者的转变甚至比官方统计数据显示的还要大。

Official demand for U.S. Treasuries has weakened for three reasons.

由于三个原因，官方对美国国债的需求减弱。

First, the rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves that characterized the 2000s has slowed considerably.

首先，2000年代特征的外汇储备快速积累已经大幅放缓。

Second, large purchases of Treasury securities by the Federal Reserve reduced the supply available to other investors.

其次，美联储大量购买国债减少了其他投资者的供应。

Third, appreciation of the U.S. dollar encouraged central banks to rebalance their reserve portfolios to maintain relatively stable currency shares.

第三，美元升值促使各国央行重新平衡其储备组合，以维持相对稳定的货币份额。

In addition, geopolitical fragmentation is associated with lower official demand for Treasury securities, suggesting that strategic considerations are increasingly influencing reserve management decisions.

此外，地缘政治分裂与官方对国债的需求下降有关，这表明战略考虑越来越多地影响储备管理决策。

Private investors behave differently than official investors.

私人投资者的行为与官方投资者不同。

Unlike central banks, they continue to increase Treasury holdings during periods of heightened financial stress, reflecting the enduring safe-haven status of U.S. government securities.

与央行不同的是，它们在金融压力加剧期间继续增加美国国债持有量，反映出美国政府证券持久的避险地位。

The paper offers evidence that declining home bias—the growing willingness of investors to hold foreign bonds—has supported private demand for Treasuries.

该论文提供的证据表明，本土偏好的下降（投资者持有外国债券的意愿不断增强）支撑了私人对国债的需求。

However, the growing importance of hedge funds and other leveraged investors raises new concerns.

然而，对冲基金和其他杠杆投资者日益增长的重要性引发了新的担忧。

Such investors can rapidly unwind positions during periods of market stress, as occurred during the Treasury market disruptions of March 2020.

此类投资者可以在市场压力期间迅速平仓，就像 2020 年 3 月国债市场混乱期间发生的那样。

Moreover, because many investments pass through offshore financial centers, policymakers have increasingly limited visibility into who ultimately holds U.S. debt.

此外，由于许多投资都经过离岸金融中心，政策制定者对最终持有美国债务的人的了解越来越有限。

Official demand is unlikely to recover substantially without renewed reserve accumulation or a significant depreciation of the dollar.

如果不重新积累储备或美元大幅贬值，官方需求不太可能大幅复苏。

Private investors have stepped in to fill much of the gap, but their behavior is inherently more heterogeneous and potentially more volatile.

私人投资者已经介入填补了大部分空白，但他们的行为本质上更加异质，而且可能更加不稳定。

As geopolitical fragmentation increases and financial intermediation becomes more opaque, understanding the identity and motivations of America’s creditors will become increasingly important for assessing the resilience of the U.S. financial system.

随着地缘政治碎片化的加剧和金融中介变得更加不透明，了解美国债权人的身份和动机对于评估美国金融体系的弹性将变得越来越重要。

Rising foreign ownership of U.S. equities is not, by itself, a major source of financial risk because most U.S. equities remain domestically owned, and foreign ownership provides a degree of international risk sharing when stock prices fluctuate.

外资对美国股票所有权的增加本身并不是金融风险的主要来源，因为大多数美国股票仍为国内所有，而当股价波动时，外资所有权提供了一定程度的国际风险分担。

By contrast, growing external debt creates more serious vulnerabilities because higher interest rates increase debt-service costs for both the federal government and the country’s external accounts.

相比之下，不断增长的外债会造成更严重的脆弱性，因为利率上升会增加联邦政府和国家对外账户的偿债成本。

If foreign official demand continues to weaken while private investors become more sensitive to geopolitical developments or fiscal concerns, Treasury yields could become more volatile and less likely to decline during periods of economic stress.

如果外国官方需求继续疲软，而私人投资者对地缘政治发展或财政担忧变得更加敏感，美国国债收益率可能会变得更加波动，并且在经济压力时期不太可能下降。