Electrostates vs. petrostates: The US, China, and the Hormuz energy shock
Energy Industry Energy Markets & Governance Energy Security Sustainable Energy
能源行业 能源市场与治理 能源安全 可持续能源
China and the United States have experienced the Hormuz energy crises very differently.
中国和美国经历霍尔木兹能源危机的方式截然不同。
The United States has ramped up oil and gas production, but China has sharply reduced oil imports while surging cleantech exports.
美国提高了石油和天然气产量，但中国大幅减少石油进口，同时大幅增加清洁技术出口。
These divergent trajectories underscore an emerging fundamental difference in the two countries’ energy systems, with China placing greater emphasis on integrating renewables and electric vehicles.
这些不同的轨迹凸显了两国能源系统中正在出现的根本差异，中国更加重视可再生能源和电动汽车的整合。
These cleantech investments have played only a limited role in helping China weather the Hormuz energy crisis so far, but they may produce a more lasting advantage for Chinese firms if they can help them capitalize on growing demand for clean technology in an era of persistently higher fossil energy prices.
迄今为止，这些清洁技术投资在帮助中国应对霍尔木兹能源危机方面发挥的作用有限，但如果它们能够帮助中国企业在化石能源价格持续走高的时代利用对清洁技术不断增长的需求，它们可能会为中国企业带来更持久的优势。
U.S. policymakers need to act now if they are to counter China’s formidable cleantech advantage.
如果美国政策制定者想要对抗中国在清洁技术领域的巨大优势，就需要立即采取行动。
The U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran in late February 2026 triggered the largest oil supply disruption in history .
2026 年 2 月下旬，美国和以色列对伊朗的袭击引发了历史上最严重的石油供应中断。
The effect on natural gas markets has been similarly profound.
对天然气市场的影响同样深远。
Yet this massive disruption unfolded very differently for the world’s two largest economies, the United States and China.
然而，对于世界上最大的两个经济体美国和中国来说，这种巨大的破坏的表现却截然不同。
The United States drew down strategic and commercial oil stocks to export a record 5.6 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude oil in May 2026, partly offsetting reduced production in the Persian Gulf.
2026 年 5 月，美国减少了战略和商业石油库存，每天出口创纪录的 560 万桶原油，部分抵消了波斯湾产量的减少。
China, on the other hand, accelerated oil imports in January and February 2026 before sharply reducing crude oil imports by 3.6 mb/d, a quantity roughly equivalent to Japan’s total demand.
另一方面，中国在 2026 年 1 月和 2 月加速了石油进口，随后大幅减少原油进口 3.6 mb/d，数量大致相当于日本的总需求。
Given pervasive policy concern with U.S.-China competition, these sharply differing impacts invite the question: Did these divergent trajectories advantage one country over the other?
鉴于对中美竞争的普遍政策担忧，这些截然不同的影响引发了一个问题：这些不同的轨迹是否比另一个国家更有优势？
This question is especially relevant because it underscores fundamental, emerging differences between the U.S. and Chinese energy systems, which some commentators term “electrostates versus petrostates.” The former describes an integrated energy system where renewable electricity supplies much of the power—displacing natural gas and coal in generation—while electric vehicles (EVs) displace oil in transportation.
这个问题尤其重要，因为它强调了美国和中国能源系统之间正在出现的根本性差异，一些评论家将其称为“电解国家与石油国家”。前者描述了一个综合能源系统，其中可再生电力提供大部分电力——在发电中取代天然气和煤炭——而电动汽车（EV）在运输中取代石油。
The latter, meanwhile, is just what it sounds like: an economy in which fossil fuels, especially oil and natural gas, make up a large chunk of energy use.
与此同时，后者顾名思义：化石燃料（尤其是石油和天然气）占能源使用的很大一部分的经济体。
Proponents of the electrostate-petrostate dichotomy point to China’s massive investments in EVs, grid modernization, and clean energy as evidence that it is becoming an electrostate, while the United States’ status as the world’s largest oil producer and largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) places it in the petrostate category.
电力国与石油国二分法的支持者指出，中国在电动汽车、电网现代化和清洁能源方面的大规模投资证明其正在成为一个电力国，而美国作为世界上最大的石油生产国和最大的液化天然气（LNG）出口国的地位使其属于石油国类别。
In truth, as this policy brief explains, the electrostate-petrostate dichotomy is greatly exaggerated.
事实上，正如本政策简报所解释的那样，电解国与石油国的二分法被严重夸大了。
China’s continuing reliance on fossil fuels, especially coal, has been its most important buffer against the shock coming out of the Strait of Hormuz.
中国对化石燃料（尤其是煤炭）的持续依赖，是其抵御霍尔木兹海峡冲击的最重要缓冲。
But the distinction does underscore an emerging bifurcation in global energy security, presenting challenges for U.S. policymakers.
但这种区别确实凸显了全球能源安全中正在出现的分歧，给美国政策制定者带来了挑战。
Even as the increasingly unstable Persian Gulf remains the fulcrum of the world’s supply of both oil and natural gas, the global supply chains for the two technology categories that can substitute for those fuels—EVs, which displace oil in transportation, and renewable energy technologies, which displace natural gas in power generation—are deeply and irreversibly centered in China.
尽管日益不稳定的波斯湾仍然是世界石油和天然气供应的支点，但可替代这些燃料的两种技术类别——电动汽车（在交通领域取代石油）和可再生能源技术（在发电领域取代天然气）——的全球供应链却不可逆转地深深地集中在中国。
The Hormuz shock significantly increased demand both for oil and gas as well as for the clean energy technologies that can displace them.
霍尔木兹地震极大地增加了对石油和天然气以及可以取代它们的清洁能源技术的需求。
The U.S. response has been to ramp up its contribution to global fossil fuel supply, while China provides the technology that can eventually supplant those fuels.
美国的回应是加大对全球化石燃料供应的贡献，而中国则提供最终可以取代这些燃料的技术。
In the short term, both countries are making money and helping ease the energy supply crunch.
短期来看，两国都在赚钱并帮助缓解能源供应紧缩。
But over the longer term, without bold policy action, the United States is positioned to benefit only from the immediate scramble for fossil fuels, while China is positioned to benefit from both the crisis and the gradual shift to clean energy.
但从长远来看，如果不采取大胆的政策行动，美国只能从对化石燃料的直接争夺中受益，而中国则可以从危机和逐步转向清洁能源中受益。
An important distinction is that while the Hormuz shock affected both oil and gas supplies, China has different relationships to these energy sources.
一个重要的区别是，虽然霍尔木兹地震影响了石油和天然气供应，但中国与这些能源的关系不同。
The oil shock primarily affects China’s transportation sector, though the impacts have been softened by China’s oil stockpiles, increased Russian oil imports, and EVs.
石油冲击主要影响中国的交通运输业，但中国的石油库存、俄罗斯石油进口增加和电动汽车的影响已经减弱。
The gas shock, meanwhile, primarily affected Chinese power generation but was cushioned by China’s coal fleet and renewable energy generation capacity.
与此同时，天然气冲击主要影响了中国的发电，但受到中国煤炭船队和可再生能源发电能力的缓冲。
As of the time of writing, the underlying U.S.-Israel conflict with Iran remains unresolved, despite the signing of an agreement in June 2026 that was intended to end the fighting.
截至撰写本文时，尽管美国-以色列与伊朗于 2026 年 6 月签署了旨在结束战斗的协议，但潜在的冲突仍未解决。
Accordingly, it remains to be seen how the conflict might affect China’s energy system over the long term.
因此，从长远来看，这场冲突可能如何影响中国的能源系统还有待观察。
The rest of this policy brief unpacks how the Hormuz shock affected China’s economy and energy system, using data from the second quarter of 2026.
本政策简报的其余部分利用 2026 年第二季度的数据揭示霍尔木兹冲击如何影响中国经济和能源系统。
It also examines China’s short-term responses to the Hormuz shock, the three buffers that have helped to insulate it, and the implications for China’s clean energy system and for U.S. policy.
它还研究了中国对霍尔木兹冲击的短期反应、有助于隔离冲击的三个缓冲，以及对中国清洁能源体系和美国政策的影响。
Soon after the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran on February 28, 2026, Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of both global oil supply and global LNG supply flow, closed to virtually all maritime traffic.
2026 年 2 月 28 日，美国和以色列对伊朗发动袭击后不久，伊朗宣布关闭霍尔木兹海峡，该海峡占全球石油供应和全球液化天然气供应的 20%，几乎禁止所有海上交通。
Within a few weeks, commercial traffic through the strait had all but ceased, and the price of benchmark Brent crude oil rose from an average of just over $70 per barrel in February to $100 in March.
几周之内，海峡的商业交通几乎停止，布伦特原油基准价格从 2 月份的平均每桶 70 多美元上涨到 3 月份的 100 美元。
Spot prices for LNG in Asia, a widely used gas benchmark, jumped from roughly $13 to $21 per million British thermal units over roughly the same period.
亚洲液化天然气（广泛使用的天然气基准）的现货价格在大约同一时期从每百万英热单位约 13 美元跃升至 21 美元。
Soon after, the International Monetary Fund revised its 2026 global economic growth forecast downward to 3.1% from 3.3%.
不久之后，国际货币基金组织将2026年全球经济增长预期从3.3%下调至3.1%。
Unlike most of its Asian neighbors and emerging market peers, China was well-prepared for this unprecedented shock to the world oil and gas supply.
与大多数亚洲邻国和新兴市场国家不同，中国已为世界石油和天然气供应遭受的前所未有的冲击做好了充分准备。
China had been bolstering its strategic stockpiles for years as part of a long-standing energy security strategy designed precisely to limit the impact of production disruptions in the Persian Gulf.
作为长期能源安全战略的一部分，中国多年来一直在加强其战略库存，该战略的目的正是为了限制波斯湾生产中断的影响。
Beijing had long been concerned about this scenario occurring, whether due to terrorism, piracy, or U.S. military action.
北京长期以来一直担心这种情况的发生，无论是由于恐怖主义、海盗还是美国的军事行动。
As U.S.-Iran tensions rose prior to the onset of the conflict, China accordingly accelerated its oil purchases , with imports rising 16% year-over-year in January-February 2026.
由于美伊紧张局势在冲突爆发前加剧，中国相应加快了石油采购，2026年1月至2月进口量同比增长16%。
Then, when the conflict began, China promptly slashed oil imports, and in March, the government ordered leading refiners to stop diesel and gasoline exports .
然后，当冲突开始时，中国迅速削减了石油进口，并于三月份下令主要炼油厂停止柴油和汽油出口。
China’s short-term policy responses also appeared to prioritize nonfossil energy.
中国的短期政策应对似乎也优先考虑非化石能源。
Though prepared well before the onset of the Hormuz shock, the 15th Five-Year Plan approved at the March 2026 National People’s Congress increased the target share of renewable energy from 20% in 2025 to 25% in 2030, even as it relaxed carbon-specific targets.
尽管在霍尔木兹地震爆发之前就已做好准备，但 2026 年 3 月全国人民代表大会批准的“十五五”规划将可再生能源的目标份额从 2025 年的 20% 提高到 2030 年的 25%，尽管放宽了具体的碳排放目标。
More dramatically, in remarks broadcast on Chinese television in early April, Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly called for China to quickly develop a new energy system to bolster the country’s energy security.
更引人注目的是，据报道，中国国家主席习近平在四月初在中国电视上播出的讲话中呼吁中国迅速发展新能源体系，以加强国家能源安全。
He boasted that “The path we took in being the first to develop wind and solar power has now proven to be forward-looking.” Yet while renewable energy may present a sustained economic opportunity for China in the aftermath of the Hormuz shock, other features of its energy system played just as big a role in limiting its exposure.
他夸口说：“事实证明，我们率先发展风能、太阳能的道路是具有前瞻性的。”然而，尽管可再生能源可能在霍尔木兹地震之后为中国带来持续的经济机会，但其能源系统的其他特征在限制其风险方面也发挥了重要作用。
Despite its massive investments in renewable energy, EVs, and other clean energy technologies, China’s energy system remains centered on fossil fuels, especially coal.
尽管在可再生能源、电动汽车和其他清洁能源技术方面进行了大量投资，但中国的能源系统仍然以化石燃料（尤其是煤炭）为中心。
While the percentage of electricity generated from renewable sources in China now exceeds the average for high-income countries , at some 22%, coal-fired generation still supplies approximately half of total electricity output.
尽管中国可再生能源发电的比例目前已超过高收入国家的平均水平（约 22%），但燃煤发电仍占总发电量的约一半。
China’s energy policy, including the recently released 15th Five-Year Plan, articulates a significant role for such coal-fired power generation well into the future—despite rapid growth in renewables.
尽管可再生能源快速增长，但包括最近发布的“十五五”规划在内的中国能源政策明确了燃煤发电在未来的重要作用。
China operates the world’s largest coal fleet with over 1,200 gigawatts (GW) of generation capacity —more than half the global total.
中国拥有世界上最大的煤炭发电群，发电容量超过 1,200 吉瓦 (GW)，占全球总量的一半以上。
This massive source of existing capacity, combined with a relatively low cost of coal-fired power generation and abundant domestic coal reserves, has led Chinese policymakers to position coal to meet shortfalls in generation from other sources—a role played by natural gas in many other economies, including the United States.
现有的巨大发电能力，加上相对较低的燃煤发电成本和丰富的国内煤炭储量，促使中国决策者利用煤炭来弥补其他来源的发电不足——天然气在包括美国在内的许多其他经济体中发挥着重要作用。
The use of coal provides critical assurance that, in combination with nuclear power and other nonfossil energy sources, China can meet its power generation needs without relying on imported natural gas.
煤炭的使用与核电和其他非化石能源相结合，为中国在不依赖进口天然气的情况下满足发电需求提供了重要保证。
While coal provides Beijing with an insurance policy for power generation, China’s strategic oil stockpiles helped its transportation sector weather the impact of the Hormuz shock.
虽然煤炭为北京提供了发电保险，但中国的战略石油库存帮助其交通部门抵御了霍尔木兹地震的影响。
Despite an increasing share of EVs, this sector remains heavily reliant on oil.
尽管电动汽车的份额不断增加，但该行业仍然严重依赖石油。
Accordingly, China is both the world’s largest oil importer and holds its largest stockpile of crude oil, totaling some 1.4 billion barrels .
因此，中国既是世界上最大的石油进口国，又拥有最大的原油库存，总计约14亿桶。
Of these, about 360 million barrels are government-held, and the remainder are controlled by state-owned enterprises that effectively operate at Beijing’s direction.
其中，约3.6亿桶为政府持有，其余则由国有企业控制，这些企业实际上按照北京的指示运作。
In combination, these reserves are sufficient to provide for approximately seven months of imports .
这些储备加起来足以满足大约七个月的进口需求。
These estimates may be conservative: China treats the total size of its reserves as a state secret.
这些估计可能是保守的：中国将其储备总规模视为国家机密。
However, whatever their exact size, these reserves played a significant role in allowing China to sharply reduce its oil imports, thereby avoiding a scenario where demand would have massively exceeded available supplies, driving prices markedly higher.
然而，无论其具体规模如何，这些储备在中国大幅减少石油进口方面发挥了重要作用，从而避免了需求大幅超过可用供应、推高价格的情况。
Beijing can also count on an alternative source of oil: its northern neighbor Russia, which has drawn ever closer to China as it has become increasingly estranged from the United States and its allies.
北京还可以依靠另一个石油来源：其北方邻国俄罗斯，随着与美国及其盟友的疏远，俄罗斯与中国的关系越来越密切。
Even before the conflict with Iran began, Russia had become China’s largest source of crude oil supply , accounting for 17.4% of imports, substantially more than any other single country.
甚至在与伊朗的冲突爆发之前，俄罗斯就已经成为中国最大的原油供应国，占进口量的17.4%，远高于任何其他国家。
China relied on Russia for its pre-conflict stockpiling: the volume of Russian oil imports increased by more than 300,000 barrels per day during January-February 2026.
中国依赖俄罗斯进行冲突前储存：2026年1月至2月期间，俄罗斯石油进口量每天增加超过30万桶。
Increases in Russian imports have likely made up the shortfall caused by the almost total collapse in Chinese oil imports from Iran, which were estimated at 1.38 mb/d in 2025, accounting for some 80% of Iranian exports prior to the onset of the conflict.
俄罗斯进口量的增加可能弥补了中国从伊朗的石油进口量几乎完全崩溃所造成的缺口，预计 2025 年中国从伊朗的石油进口量为 1.38 mb/d，约占冲突爆发前伊朗出口量的 80%。
Yet while fossil energy played an important role in reducing China’s exposure to the Hormuz shock, clean technology has also contributed in the form of EV-driven oil demand displacement.
然而，尽管化石能源在减少中国遭受霍尔木兹冲击的风险方面发挥了重要作用，但清洁技术也以电动汽车驱动的石油需求替代的形式做出了贡献。
The International Energy Agency previously estimated that China’s world-leading EV fleet reduced oil demand by approximately 1 mb/d in 2025 and projected this to increase to 2.7 mb/d by 2030.
国际能源署此前估计，中国世界领先的电动汽车车队将在 2025 年将石油需求减少约 1 mb/d，并预计到 2030 年将增加至 2.7 mb/d。
A similar Rhodium Group analysis predicted oil demand displacement to increase approximately 600,000 barrels per day annually, while a third study by the Centre for Economic Policy reached an estimate of some 430,000 barrels per day with the possibility of quadrupling by 2040.
Rhodium Group 的一项类似分析预测，石油需求量每年将增加约 60 万桶，而经济政策中心的第三项研究则估计每天约 43 万桶，到 2040 年可能会增加四倍。
All of these estimates, however, predate the Hormuz shock, and thus may prove to be conservative.
然而，所有这些估计都早于霍尔木兹地震，因此可能被证明是保守的。
One Chinese source reported that EV penetration accounted for 12% of the decrease in China’s oil use post-Hormuz.
一位中国消息人士称，霍尔木兹事件后中国石油使用量减少的 12% 归咎于电动汽车普及率。
1 Regardless, EV-driven oil displacement provides China with a buffer that, given the size of its EV fleet, few other countries can match—least of all the United States, where oil consumption for transportation accounts for some 30% of total energy consumption .
1 无论如何，电动汽车驱动的石油排量为中国提供了缓冲，考虑到其电动汽车车队的规模，很少有其他国家可以与之匹敌——尤其是美国，其交通运输石油消耗约占总能源消耗的 30%。
Indeed, while China’s dominance in clean energy technology played only a partial role in offsetting its exposure to the Hormuz shock, it may give Beijing a lasting economic and technological advantage.
事实上，虽然中国在清洁能源技术方面的主导地位仅在抵消其遭受霍尔木兹冲击的过程中发挥了部分作用，但它可能会给北京带来持久的经济和技术优势。
Chinese producers’ dominant position in most clean energy technology segments distinguishes the 2026 Hormuz shock from previous energy supply disruptions.
中国生产商在大多数清洁能源技术领域占据主导地位，这将 2026 年霍尔木兹冲击与之前的能源供应中断区分开来。
Where past crises left importing states with few near-term alternatives to fossil fuels, Chinese producers today can supply the two categories of technology that most directly substitute for them: EVs, which displace oil in transportation, and renewable energy generation technology, which displaces natural gas and coal in the power sector.
过去的危机使进口国短期内几乎没有化石燃料替代品，而如今中国生产商可以提供最直接替代化石燃料的两类技术：电动汽车，在交通领域取代石油，以及可再生能源发电技术，在电力领域取代天然气和煤炭。
According to 2024 data, China accounted for over 90% of global solar module production, over 80% of batteries and wind turbines, and over two-thirds of EVs.
根据2024年的数据，中国占全球太阳能组件产量的90%以上，电池和风力涡轮机产量的80%以上，以及电动汽车的三分之二以上。
This dominant position was the result of decades of industrial policy measures , which provided substantial policy support to China’s nascent clean technology industries.
这一主导地位是数十年产业政策措施的结果，这些政策措施为中国新兴的清洁技术产业提供了大量政策支持。
Foreign investment also played a significant role, and some foreign firms were subject to intellectual property theft and forced technology transfers .
外国投资也发挥了重要作用，一些外国公司遭到知识产权盗窃和强制技术转让。
The net effect was that by the late 2010s, Chinese producers achieved near-insurmountable cost and scale advantages in many clean energy technologies.
最终的结果是，到 2010 年代末，中国生产商在许多清洁能源技术上取得了近乎不可逾越的成本和规模优势。
While the long-term impact of the shock on demand for Chinese clean energy technology products remains to be seen, initial data show a significant increase.
虽然此次冲击对中国清洁能源技术产品需求的长期影响仍有待观察，但初步数据显示需求显着增长。
In May 2026, China’s EV exports reached a record $9.2 billion , representing a 49% increase from the same period in 2025.
2026年5月，中国电动汽车出口额达到创纪录的92亿美元，较2025年同期增长49%。
This increase was led by surging demand in Thailand and the Philippines—two countries hit hard by the Hormuz oil price shock.
这一增长是由泰国和菲律宾的需求激增带动的，这两个国家都受到霍尔木兹石油价格冲击的严重打击。
An Ember analyst explained these figures directly with reference to the Hormuz crisis, saying, “The disruption to global fuel markets caused by the Middle East conflict and the resulting impacts on fuel prices have accelerated transport electrification” across Southeast Asia.
一位 Ember 分析师直接参考霍尔木兹危机解释了这些数字，他表示：“中东冲突对全球燃料市场造成的干扰以及由此产生的对燃料价格的影响加速了整个东南亚的交通电气化。”
Chinese solar exports, meanwhile, reached a record 68 GW in March 2026 , nearly 50% above the previous monthly high set in August 2025 (see Figure 1).
与此同时，中国太阳能出口量在 2026 年 3 月达到创纪录的 68 吉瓦，比 2025 年 8 月创下的月度高点高出近 50%（见图 1）。
Unlike EVs, solar energy equipment does not directly substitute for oil; the surge instead reflects demand from countries seeking to reduce their exposure to gas-fired generation as LNG prices spiked.
与电动汽车不同，太阳能设备并不直接替代石油；相反，这一激增反映了随着液化天然气价格飙升，各国寻求减少燃气发电的需求。
It likewise illustrates the potential for Chinese producers to gain from Middle East energy crises.
这同样说明了中国生产商从中东能源危机中获益的潜力。
A similar pattern is evident in China’s exports of lithium-ion batteries and wind turbines, which rose 50% and 45%, respectively, underscoring the potential for Chinese firms to benefit from the Hormuz shock.
中国的锂离子电池和风力涡轮机出口也出现了类似的情况，分别增长了 50% 和 45%，这凸显了中国企业从霍尔木兹冲击中受益的潜力。
Pakistan illustrates the potential for continued demand for Chinese clean technology post-Hormuz.
巴基斯坦展示了霍尔木兹之后对中国清洁技术持续需求的潜力。
After importing approximately 50 GW of Chinese solar equipment through August 2025—of which roughly 35 GW is estimated to have been installed —the country’s power sector was significantly less exposed to the LNG price shock than would otherwise have been the case, given Pakistan’s substantial reliance on Qatari LNG imports transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
截至 2025 年 8 月，在进口了约 50 吉瓦的中国太阳能设备后（其中估计已安装约 35 吉瓦），鉴于巴基斯坦严重依赖通过霍尔木兹海峡进口的卡塔尔液化天然气，该国电力行业受到液化天然气价格冲击的影响明显小于其他情况。
Such increased demand for Chinese clean technology has already translated into market gains for Chinese producers.
对中国清洁技术的需求增加已经转化为中国生产商的市场收益。
The share prices of CATL, perhaps China’s foremost battery manufacturer, and BYD, one of its largest EV manufacturers, rose 24% and 11% in March , respectively.
中国最大的电池制造商宁德时代 (CATL) 和最大的电动汽车制造商之一比亚迪 (BYD) 的股价 3 月份分别上涨 24% 和 11%。
These gains all point to sustained confidence in the ability of Chinese clean energy producers to deliver value in a world of heightened oil prices.
这些成果都表明人们对中国清洁能源生产商在油价高涨的世界中创造价值的能力充满信心。
While these producers had only a limited role in mitigating the impact of the Hormuz shock on China, they nonetheless could offer Beijing a strategic advantage in a world where the threat of future energy supply shocks drives continued increases in demand for clean energy technology.
尽管这些生产商在减轻霍尔木兹地震对中国的影响方面作用有限，但在未来能源供应冲击的威胁推动清洁能源技术需求持续增长的世界中，它们仍然可以为北京提供战略优势。
The policy implications of this scenario for the United States are the subject of the next section.
这种情况对美国的政策影响是下一节的主题。
The Hormuz shock has revealed a bifurcation in the world’s energy supply that demands a rethinking of U.S. energy and national security policy.
霍尔木兹地震揭示了世界能源供应的分歧，需要重新思考美国的能源和国家安全政策。
Global oil and gas markets remain highly vulnerable to disruptions and instability in the Persian Gulf.
全球石油和天然气市场仍然极易受到波斯湾的干扰和不稳定的影响。
Yet the two categories of technology that can substitute for these fuels—renewable generation equipment (wind, solar, batteries) that displaces gas and coal in power, and EVs that displace oil in transportation—depend on supply chains heavily concentrated in China.
然而，可以替代这些燃料的两类技术——在电力中取代天然气和煤炭的可再生发电设备（风能、太阳能、电池），以及在交通运输中取代石油的电动汽车——依赖于高度集中在中国的供应链。
U.S. energy policy is structured to respond to the first reality, but not the second.
美国能源政策的构建是为了应对第一个现实，而不是第二个现实。
In order to adapt, U.S. policymakers need to decide whether and how to challenge China’s dominance in clean technology production, including whether or not to invite Chinese investment into the U.S. energy industry .
为了适应这种变化，美国政策制定者需要决定是否以及如何挑战中国在清洁技术生产方面的主导地位，包括是否邀请中国投资美国能源行业。
Three recommendations follow, each of which would require leadership from an administration committed to diversifying U.S. energy supplies and enhancing energy security:
以下是三项建议，每一项都需要致力于美国能源供应多元化和加强能源安全的政府的领导：
Recommendation 1: Negotiate technology transfer and U.S. production requirements in exchange for lifting tariffs.
建议1：就技术转让和美国生产要求进行谈判，以换取取消关税。
It is difficult if not impossible to challenge Chinese producers in most clean technology segments, yet providing access to these technologies can help U.S. businesses and consumers reduce energy costs, especially gasoline consumption.
在大多数清洁技术领域挑战中国生产商即使不是不可能，也是很困难的，但提供这些技术可以帮助美国企业和消费者降低能源成本，特别是汽油消耗。
At the same time, there are legitimate economic and national security concerns about allowing Chinese access to U.S. markets.
与此同时，允许中国进入美国市场也存在合理的经济和国家安全担忧。
The U.S. government should take a page out of China’s playbook and negotiate technology transfer, joint venture, and U.S. manufacturing requirements with Chinese producers, in exchange for lifting tariffs on Chinese EVs, solar panels, wind turbines, and other clean technologies.
美国政府应该效仿中国的做法，与中国生产商就技术转让、合资和美国制造要求进行谈判，以换取取消对中国电动汽车、太阳能电池板、风力涡轮机和其他清洁技术的关税。
Despite geopolitical tensions, the U.S. market remains highly attractive to Chinese producers, which need foreign markets to escape involution in China’s domestic market.
尽管地缘政治紧张，美国市场对中国生产商仍然具有高度吸引力，中国生产商需要外国市场来避免卷入中国国内市场。
Recommendation 2: Create a cleantech strategic reserve.
建议2：建立清洁技术战略储备。
The U.S. government responded to the 1979 oil crisis by creating the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).
美国政府通过建立战略石油储备（SPR）来应对 1979 年的石油危机。
It has no analog for clean technology, though it is in the process of creating a Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve .
尽管它正在创建战略关键矿产储备，但它没有清洁技术的类似物。
A Cleantech Strategic Reserve would serve a different function than the SPR: instead of stockpiling fuel, it would supply components, including batteries, solar wafers and cells, wind turbine gearboxes, transformers, and high-voltage grid equipment, at scale sufficient to sustain accelerated deployment for six to 12 months in the event of supply disruption.
清洁技术战略储备将发挥与 SPR 不同的功能：它将提供组件，包括电池、太阳能晶片和电池、风力涡轮机齿轮箱、变压器和高压电网设备，而不是储存燃料，其规模足以在供应中断的情况下维持 6 至 12 个月的加速部署。
Such scale would help guard against overdependence on clean energy components manufactured in China.
如此规模将有助于防止过度依赖中国制造的清洁能源零部件。
A Cleantech Strategic Reserve could moreover be jointly operated with and made available to U.S. partners and allies who hold similar concerns regarding dependence on Chinese-manufactured components.
此外，还可以与对依赖中国制造的零部件抱有类似担忧的美国合作伙伴和盟友共同运营并提供清洁技术战略储备。
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Recommendation 3: Commercialize next-generation clean energy research and development.
建议3：将下一代清洁能源研发商业化。
China’s leading position in commercial clean energy technology is difficult to counter.
中国在商业清洁能源技术方面的领先地位难以抗衡。
But there are several next-generation energy technologies in which U.S. firms have significant competitive advantages, and federal support for research, development, and commercialization could help realize them.
但在一些下一代能源技术中，美国公司拥有显着的竞争优势，联邦政府对研究、开发和商业化的支持可以帮助实现这些技术。
These technologies include fusion energy, perovskite solar cells, sodium-ion battery chemistries, hydrogen fuel cells, and enhanced geothermal power.
这些技术包括聚变能源、钙钛矿太阳能电池、钠离子电池化学、氢燃料电池和增强型地热能。
Each promises to play a significant role in reducing oil and gas demand into the future, helping the United States to attenuate future oil supply shocks while also giving U.S. companies a slice of the growing clean energy market.
双方都承诺在减少未来石油和天然气需求方面发挥重要作用，帮助美国减轻未来的石油供应冲击，同时也让美国公司在不断增长的清洁能源市场中分得一杯羹。
Many of these technologies are already supported by early-stage federal research support, but they lack clear pathways to achieving commercial scale.
其中许多技术已经得到早期联邦研究的支持，但它们缺乏实现商业规模的明确途径。
The transition from technically viable to commercial technologies has historically been a point of failure for the U.S. clean energy industry and a strength for China.
从技术上可行到商业技术的转变历来是美国清洁能源行业的失败点，也是中国的优势。
New federal policies are needed to support commercialization.
需要新的联邦政策来支持商业化。
Measures could include demonstration projects, technology development hubs, or direct investment in early-stage commercialization.
措施可能包括示范项目、技术开发中心或对早期商业化的直接投资。
All of these measures can help address U.S. weakness in the commercialization of cleantech.
所有这些措施都可以帮助解决美国在清洁技术商业化方面的弱点。
The United States and China are increasingly following different energy policy trajectories, a divergence underscored by their sharply differing responses to the 2026 Hormuz crisis.
美国和中国越来越遵循不同的能源政策轨迹，两国对 2026 年霍尔木兹危机的截然不同的反应凸显了这种分歧。
Yet while it is tempting to view these responses through the prism of electrostates and petrostates, the reality is more complex: China’s clean energy ecosystem played only a partial role in buffering its economy from the impact of the Persian Gulf conflict.
然而，尽管人们很容易通过电解国和石油国的棱镜来看待这些反应，但现实更为复杂：中国的清洁能源生态系统在缓冲其经济免受波斯湾冲突影响方面仅发挥了部分作用。
In the short term, coal and renewables insulated China’s power sector from the LNG price shock, while strategic stockpiling and a rapidly expanding EV fleet cushioned the oil shock.
短期内，煤炭和可再生能源使中国电力行业免受液化天然气价格冲击的影响，而战略储备和快速扩张的电动汽车车队则缓冲了石油冲击。
But China’s dominance in the two technology categories that most directly substitute for oil and LNG—EVs and renewable generation equipment—positioned it to reap the economic benefits of sharply increased global demand for both.
但中国在最直接替代石油和液化天然气的两个技术领域（电动汽车和可再生能源发电设备）的主导地位使其能够从全球对这两种技术的需求急剧增长中获得经济利益。
In the likely event these trends continue and demand increases for clean technology are sustained, U.S. policymakers will need to develop new tools to counter China’s clean technology advantage.
如果这些趋势持续下去并且对清洁技术的需求持续增长，美国政策制定者将需要开发新工具来对抗中国的清洁技术优势。
If they fail to do so, U.S. firms risk being locked out of growing demand for clean energy technology.
如果他们做不到这一点，美国公司就有可能被排除在清洁能源技术不断增长的需求之外。
The U.S. energy system, meanwhile, may become dependent on Chinese-manufactured technology.
与此同时，美国能源系统可能会变得依赖中国制造的技术。
This dependence in turn presents unacceptable economic and national security risks to the United States as a whole.
这种依赖反过来又给美国整体带来了不可接受的经济和国家安全风险。
More broadly, the United States will be left with an energy system—and economy—built for the 20th century rather than the 21st.
更广泛地说，美国的能源系统和经济将是为 20 世纪而不是 21 世纪而建立的。
The fossil fuels that powered the last century aren’t going away any time soon, but it is equally clear that the spread of renewable energy and EVs is here to stay, and these clean energy technologies will make up a significant portion of the 21st-century energy mix.
上个世纪提供动力的化石燃料不会很快消失，但同样明显的是，可再生能源和电动汽车的普及将持续下去，这些清洁能源技术将构成 21 世纪能源结构的重要组成部分。
Whether the United States treats the 2026 shock as an occasion for structural adaptation, or whether it spends the next decade refighting the last energy crisis, will determine whether it leads the energy transition or falls victim to it.
美国是否将2026年的冲击视为结构性调整的契机，或者是否用未来十年的时间来应对上次能源危机，将决定它是引领能源转型还是成为能源转型的受害者。