A UN satellite proposal tests limits of technological sovereignty

Internet & Telecommunications Technology Policy & Regulation

互联网和电信技术政策与法规

Amazon is a general, unrestricted donor to the Brookings Institution.

亚马逊是布鲁金斯学会的一般性、无限制捐助者。

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions posted in this piece are solely those of the authors and are not influenced by any donation.

本文中发布的发现、解释和结论仅代表作者的观点，不受任何捐赠的影响。

Satellite broadband technologies like Starlink have become increasingly central to global conflict mediation.

像星链这样的卫星宽带技术对于全球冲突调解已经变得越来越重要。

From Ukrainian troops using Starlink to stay connected on the battlefield and Russian troops leveraging contraband terminals to initiate drone strikes , to Starlink offering free service to Iranians and Venezuelans during internet blackouts—satellite broadband technology is no longer exclusively a direct-to-consumer service, but one that nation-states depend on for connectivity during geopolitical crises.

从乌克兰军队使用星链在战场上保持联系，俄罗斯军队利用违禁终端发起无人机袭击，再到星链在互联网停电期间向伊朗人和委内瑞拉人提供免费服务——卫星宽带技术不再仅仅是一种直接面向消费者的服务，而是民族国家在地缘政治危机期间依赖的连接服务。

These recent use cases of low-Earth orbital (LEO) technologies during geopolitical crises and the need for governance are reflected in numerous agenda items for the upcoming World Radio Conference (WRC) in 2027.

这些近期低地球轨道 (LEO) 技术在地缘政治危机期间的使用案例以及治理需求都反映在即将于 2027 年举行的世界无线电大会 (WRC) 的众多议程项目中。

Organized by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), WRC is a specialized agency under the purview of the United Nations that meets every three to four years to coordinate international spectrum allocation, orbital satellite governance, and technical standards for communication technologies.

WRC由国际电信联盟（ITU）主办，是联合国职权范围内的专门机构，每三到四年召开一次会议，协调国际频谱分配、轨道卫星治理和通信技术的技术标准。

The 2027 conference, which will be held in Shanghai, offers a forum for delegations from U.N.

2027 年会议将在上海举行，为联合国代表团提供了一个论坛。

member states to deliberate on global telecommunications issues.

成员国审议全球电信问题。

One of the most controversial items on the docket for WRC-27 is agenda item 1.5 (AI 1.5) , a proposal aimed at limiting the unauthorized use of non-geostationary orbit (NGSO) satellite technologies in the orbital space above sovereign territories where the technology is prohibited.

WRC-27 议程中最具争议的项目之一是议程项目 1.5（AI 1.5），该提案旨在限制在禁止非对地静止轨道（NGSO）卫星技术的主权领土上空轨道空间中未经授权使用该技术。

The U.S. and other Western countries are seeking to block the proposal for its potential to facilitate authoritarian control of satellite communications, while countries like Iran and Russia approach 1.5 as an opportunity to expand digital sovereignty.

美国和其他西方国家正在寻求阻止该提案，因为它有可能促进对卫星通信的专制控制，而伊朗和俄罗斯等国家则将 1.5 视为扩大数字主权的机会。

The stakes of AI 1.5 run deep, and despite the intricate geopolitical interests on both sides of the proposal, the item raises essential questions about technological sovereignty in an age of unprecedented orbital expansion.

AI 1.5 的利害关系深远，尽管该提案双方都有错综复杂的地缘政治利益，但该项目在前所未有的轨道扩张时代提出了有关技术主权的基本问题。

The proposal builds on three existing policies in the ITU’s framework: Article 18 and Resolutions 22 and 25 , the latter two of which were adopted at WRC-23 in Dubai .

该提案以国际电联框架内的三项现有政策为基础：第18条以及第22号和第25号决议，后两项在迪拜举行的WRC-23上获得通过。

Under Article 18 of the ITU’s radio regulations, no enterprise is permitted to operate in a territory without authorization from the territory’s government.

根据国际电联无线电法规第18条，未经领土政府授权，任何企业不得在该领土内运营。

Resolution 22 relegates the responsibility for unauthorized transmissions from orbital satellites to ground terminals to the government of the territory experiencing the transmissions.

第 22 号决议将未经授权从轨道卫星向地面终端进行传输的责任归咎于进行传输的领土政府。

Specifically referencing services that provide “transportable terminals” like Starlink, Resolution 25 stipulates that the countries licensing these systems must ensure they’re only operable within countries that have provided authorization.

特别是针对提供 Starlink 等“移动终端”的服务，第 25 号决议规定，向这些系统授予许可的国家必须确保它们只能在已提供授权的国家/地区内运行。

Article 18 enables nations to extend sovereignty to telecommunications technology, while Resolutions 22 and 25 require action from states experiencing unauthorized transmissions and accountability from states licensing those satellite operators.

第 18 条使各国能够将主权扩展到电信技术，而第 22 号和第 25 号决议则要求遭受未经授权传输的国家采取行动，并要求向这些卫星运营商颁发许可证的国家承担责任。

The intervention proposed by AI 1.5 directly addresses issues of enforcement by enabling states to fully exclude their territory from NGSO satellite service areas.

AI 1.5 提出的干预措施使各国能够将其领土完全排除在 NGSO 卫星服务区之外，从而直接解决执行问题。

If adopted, NGSO satellite operators would be required to turn off services over territories where the services are not authorized.

如果采用，NGSO 卫星运营商将被要求在未授权服务的地区关闭服务。

U.S. regulators have outright condemned the agenda item , with members of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) speaking out against it.

美国监管机构公开谴责了该议程项目，联邦通信委员会 (FCC) 和国家电信和信息局 (NTIA) 的成员也公开表示反对。

At an event in early July 2026, NTIA Administrator Arielle Roth said, “there’s a really problematic agenda item being pushed by Iran…[it] raises challenges with respect not only to the cost of deploying global satellites systems, but also potentially public safety repercussions.

在 2026 年 7 月上旬的一次活动中，NTIA 局长阿里尔·罗斯 (Arielle Roth) 表示，“伊朗正在推动一个真正有问题的议程项目……它不仅在部署全球卫星系统的成本方面提出了挑战，而且还带来了潜在的公共安全影响。

And it’s also not necessary for the ITU to be regulating in this area.” Roth’s concerns regarding AI 1.5 reflect the United States’ objective of exporting U.S. NGSO technology, since it’s an “an area where [the U.S.] lead[s] and we want to continue to advance our interests,” Roth stated in the same press conference.

国际电联也没有必要在这一领域进行监管。”罗斯对 AI 1.5 的担忧反映了美国出口美国 NGSO 技术的目标，因为这是一个“[美国]领先的领域，我们希望继续推进我们的利益，”罗斯在同一次新闻发布会上表示。

Given the United States’ market dominance in the NGSO industry—led by LEO broadband providers Starlink and its burgeoning competitor, Amazon Leo—U.S. telecommunication regulators are determined to minimize ITU regulation that limits NGSO expansion.

鉴于美国在 NGSO 行业的市场主导地位（由 LEO 宽带提供商 Starlink 及其新兴竞争对手 Amazon Leo 领导）电信监管机构决心最大限度地减少限制 NGSO 扩张的国际电联监管。

Blocking AI 1.5 and convincing other U.N.

阻止人工智能 1.5 并说服其他联合国机构

member states to do the same is an integral component of the United States’ pursuit of global leadership in satellite communication.

会员国也这样做是美国追求卫星通信全球领导地位的一个组成部分。

But the pursuit of global NGSO market dominance isn’t the only factor steering policymakers away from adopting this item.

但追求全球 NGSO 市场主导地位并不是政策制定者放弃采用该项目的唯一因素。

Others have warned about the effect this proposal could have on the global flow of information.

其他人则警告该提案可能对全球信息流动产生的影响。

A recent report from New America’s LEO Policy Working Group criticizes AI 1.5 for setting an “authoritarian precedent,” asserting that its proponents, Russia and Iran, might leverage authority over satellite communications to limit free speech in their respective countries.

新美国 LEO 政策工作组最近的一份报告批评 AI 1.5 开创了“独裁先例”，声称其支持者俄罗斯和伊朗可能会利用卫星通信的权威来限制各自国家的言论自由。

Starlink proved especially useful to demonstrators amid the Iranian government’s attack on free speech in January, with Starlink even waiving subscription fees for protesters despite lacking authorization to operate in the country.

事实证明，在伊朗政府一月份攻击言论自由的情况下，星链对示威者特别有用，尽管缺乏在该国运营的授权，星链甚至免除了抗议者的订阅费。

The emancipatory utility of LEO broadband technology is undeniably important for citizens living under authoritarian regimes like Iran.

不可否认，低地球轨道宽带技术的解放效用对于生活在伊朗等独裁政权下的公民来说非常重要。

Outside of these censorship considerations, New America and the United States’ official policy statement on the subject point out feasibility issues with the proposal.

除了这些审查考虑之外，新美国和美国关于该主题的官方政策声明还指出了该提案的可行性问题。

New America’s report states, “[s]atellites depend on continuous telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) communications with ground-control facilities,” and that requiring these functions be turned off intermittently during orbit could cause operational and safety risks.

《新美国》的报告指出，“卫星依赖于与地面控制设施的连续遥测、跟踪和指挥 (TT&C) 通信”，要求在轨道上间歇性关闭这些功能可能会导致操作和安全风险。

There are additional concerns that the regulation is aimed at punishing a single commercial provider, Starlink, but would unnecessarily constrain less geopolitically entwined NGSO providers.

还有人担心，该法规旨在惩罚单一商业提供商 Starlink，但会不必要地限制地缘政治关系较少的 NGSO 提供商。

While the free speech and feasibility concerns alone justify non-adoption of AI 1.5, it’s important to consider whether the United States’ position is rooted in safeguarding the free flow of information or in the pursuit of global authority through unilateral control of emerging NGSO technology.

虽然言论自由和可行性问题本身就证明不采用 AI 1.5 是合理的，但重要的是要考虑美国的立场是植根于维护信息的自由流动，还是通过单方面控制新兴 NGSO 技术来追求全球权威。

AI 1.5 addresses a serious issue of technological sovereignty and international telecommunications governance in the emerging NGSO satellite market.

AI 1.5解决了新兴NGSO卫星市场中技术主权和国际电信治理的严重问题。

While adopting AI 1.5 could cause operational and safety issues for the entire market and further limit free speech in authoritarian-led counties, the proposal also identifies a mechanism by which the U.S. has been able to exert hegemonic control over the direction of global conflicts.

虽然采用AI 1.5可能会导致整个市场的运营和安全问题，并进一步限制威权主导国家的言论自由，但该提案还确定了美国能够对全球冲突方向施加霸权控制的机制。

But it’s likely that the threat of decreased economic authority in the emerging space communication market also underlies the United States’ true opposition to this proposal.

但新兴太空通信市场经济权威下降的威胁也可能是美国真正反对这一提议的原因。

Rejecting AI 1.5 shouldn’t halt the development of stronger international oversight regarding the use of NGSO communication technology.

拒绝 AI 1.5 不应阻止对 NGSO 通信技术的使用进行更强有力的国际监督。

The existing ITU framework, specifically Article 14 and Resolutions 22 and 25, provide the scaffolding to regulate uplinks from unauthorized ground terminals but place the onus of regulating NGSO companies on the country in which they are incorporated.

现有的国际电联框架，特别是第 14 条以及第 22 和 25 号决议，提供了监管未经授权地面终端的上行链路的框架，但将监管 NGSO 公司的责任置于其注册地所在国。

Given that the ITU lacks the legal authority to regulate individual companies, it’s up to U.S. regulatory bodies—the FCC and NTIA—to mitigate geopolitical interference by commercial actors in the NGSO market.

鉴于 ITU 缺乏监管个别公司的法律权力，美国监管机构（FCC 和 NTIA）有责任减轻商业参与者对 NGSO 市场的地缘政治干扰。

However, the intimacy of regulators’ relationships with NGSO providers, like Starlink owner Elon Musk’s close ties to the U.S. executive branch, raises questions over whether monopolies like Starlink will be punished for their technological diplomacy.

然而，监管机构与 NGSO 提供商的密切关系（例如 Starlink 所有者埃隆·马斯克与美国行政部门的密切关系）引发了人们的疑问：像 Starlink 这样的垄断企业是否会因其技术外交而受到惩罚。

To counteract the danger of NGSO satellite corporations interfering in or acting as arbiters of global conflict mediation, U.S. legislators need to push for stronger regulation of the emerging NGSO satellite market.

为了抵消 NGSO 卫星公司干预或充当全球冲突调解者的危险，美国立法者需要推动对新兴 NGSO 卫星市场进行更严格的监管。

The rate of innovation has far exceeded the pace of regulation, and unlike sovereign states, corporations like SpaceX, which owns Starlink, are beholden to shareholders, not constituents.

创新的速度远远超过了监管的速度，而且与主权国家不同，拥有星链的 SpaceX 这样的公司对股东而不是选民负责。

Enabling commercial entities to guide foreign policy strategy by subsidizing connectivity when it satisfies secondary goals, like undermining authoritarian regimes, disguises the pursuit of profit as foreign assistance.

当商业实体满足次要目标（例如破坏独裁政权）时，通过补贴连通性来指导外交政策战略，将追求利润伪装成对外援助。

It’s misguided to outright condemn AI 1.5 as a ploy by autocratic countries to invoke censorship and insulate citizens, when in fact, the U.S. is likewise pursuing an alternative agenda through its rejection of the WRC agenda item.

直接谴责 AI 1.5 是独裁国家调用审查制度和隔离公民的策略是错误的，而事实上，美国同样通过拒绝 WRC 议程项目来寻求替代议程。

NGSO technologies provide essential services to citizens living under restrictive regimes and more should be done to safeguard internet access for vulnerable populations.

NGSO 技术为生活在限制性制度下的公民提供基本服务，并且应该采取更多措施来保障弱势群体的互联网接入。

It’s questionable, however, that SpaceX’s Starlink is the only provider capable of offering essential connectivity to civilians in adversarial nations.

然而，值得怀疑的是，SpaceX 的 Starlink 是否是唯一一家能够为敌对国家的平民提供基本连接的提供商。

Objectively speaking, the proposal would likely create service obstacles for all NGSO providers, posing a threat to orbital infrastructure and general safety.

客观地说，该提案可能会给所有非卫星轨道提供商造成服务障碍，对轨道基础设施和总体安全构成威胁。

It likewise falls outside the ITU’s jurisdiction to impose regulations that penalize a single provider.

同样，实施惩罚单一提供商的法规也不属于国际电联的管辖范围。

For these reasons alone, adopting AI 1.5 would be unwise and inappropriate.

仅出于这些原因，采用 AI 1.5 就是不明智和不合适的。

However, it’s important that citizens and legislators alike understand that characterizing the proposition as a threat to U.S. dominance in the NGSO market detracts from the true issue guiding this proposal: U.S. satellite communication providers like Starlink are acting as mediators in geopolitical conflicts without substantive oversight.

然而，重要的是，公民和立法者都明白，将该提案描述为对美国在 NGSO 市场主导地位的威胁，有损于指导该提案的真正问题：星链等美国卫星通信提供商在地缘政治冲突中充当调解人，而不受实质性监督。

It’s essential that steps are taken to minimize corporate interference in global conflicts to protect American democracy from outsized private influence and safeguard our national security.

必须采取措施尽量减少企业对全球冲突的干预，以保护美国民主免受过度私人影响并维护我们的国家安全。