An update on Europe’s Russia sanctions
On July 23 the EU announced its 21 st package of Russia sanctions.
7月23日，欧盟宣布第21轮制裁俄罗斯一揽子计划。
The energy-related measures included a freezing of the price cap on crude oil at $44 per barrel through July 2027, restrictions on transactions with select Russian oil refineries, monitoring of sales of liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers for Russian trade, and bans on the transport of Russian LNG—although this ban was undercut by an exemption for Greek ships to transport arctic-sourced Russian LNG.
与能源相关的措施包括截至 2027 年 7 月将原油价格上限冻结在每桶 44 美元，限制与部分俄罗斯炼油厂的交易，监控用于俄罗斯贸易的液化天然气 (LNG) 油轮的销售，以及禁止运输俄罗斯液化天然气——尽管希腊船只运输来自北极的俄罗斯液化天然气的豁免削弱了这一禁令。
The latest package also sanctioned an additional 40 “ shadow fleet” vessels, a massive fleet built by Russia to circumvent the G7 price cap and export oil on its own terms.
最新一揽子计划还批准了另外 40 艘“影子舰队”船只，这是俄罗斯为规避七国集团价格上限并按照自己的条件出口石油而建造的庞大舰队。
Over the past two years, we have carefully tracked shadow fleet sanctions progress across the G7, documenting the dramatic shift in approach across EU, UK, and U.S. sanctioning authorities.
过去两年，我们仔细追踪了七国集团影子舰队制裁的进展情况，记录了欧盟、英国和美国制裁当局在方法上的巨大转变。
At the end of the Biden administration, the U.S. was leading the effort to sanction shadow fleet tankers, designating 216 such ships compared to 75 and 110 for the EU and UK respectively.
拜登政府结束时，美国带头制裁影子舰队油轮，指定了 216 艘此类船只，而欧盟和英国分别有 75 艘和 110 艘此类船只。
However, an aversion to Russian tanker sanctions by the Trump administration, coupled with relatively aggressive actions by European authorities, has made the EU and UK the global leaders in shadow fleet sanctions.
然而，特朗普政府对俄罗斯油轮制裁的厌恶，加上欧洲当局相对激进的行动，使欧盟和英国成为影子舰队制裁的全球领导者。
The disparate approach to tanker-based sanctions has shed new light on the efficacy of coordinated sanctions.
基于油轮的制裁的不同方法为协调制裁的有效性提供了新的视角。
As we have shown in previous empirical work , comparing the activity of U.S.-sanctioned tankers to those sanctioned only by the EU and/or UK suggests that a United States designation carries outsized weight on the ability of a tanker to transport Russian oil.
正如我们在之前的实证研究中所表明的那样，将美国制裁的油轮的活动与仅受到欧盟和/或英国制裁的油轮的活动进行比较表明，美国的指定对油轮运输俄罗斯石油的能力具有巨大的影响力。
In this post, we update both the relative progress across jurisdictions as well as the overlap across various authorities.
在这篇文章中，我们更新了各个司法管辖区的相对进展以及各个主管部门之间的重叠情况。
We conclude by listing promising sanctions actions to slow Russia’s ability to profit from the oil trade.
最后，我们列出了有希望的制裁行动，以减缓俄罗斯从石油贸易中获利的能力。
Over the past two years, Europe has emerged as the clear leader in terms of the number of shadow fleet ships sanctioned .
过去两年，在受制裁的影子舰队数量方面，欧洲已成为明显的领先者。
Figure 1 plots the number of vessels sanctioned by the EU (blue line), the UK (red line), and the U.S. (black line).
图 1 绘制了欧盟（蓝线）、英国（红线）和美国（黑线）制裁的船舶数量。
As of July 2026, the EU sanctioned a stunning 671 ships, a level that stood at 25 ships as recently as July 2024.
截至 2026 年 7 月，欧盟制裁的船舶数量达到惊人的 671 艘，截至 2024 年 7 月这一数字为 25 艘。
The UK has achieved similar progress and now sanctions 621 ships; vastly higher than the 17 ships it had sanctioned as of July 2024.
英国也取得了类似的进展，目前制裁了 621 艘船舶；远远高于截至 2024 年 7 月制裁的 17 艘船舶。
The EU and UK sanctions wave stands in stark contrast to the U.S., which hasn’t sanctioned any Russian shadow fleet vessels since the conclusion of the Biden presidency.
欧盟和英国的制裁浪潮与美国形成鲜明对比，自拜登总统任期结束以来，美国尚未制裁任何俄罗斯影子舰队。
The indifference towards the shadow fleet has been compounded by the Trump administration’s general lack of action on Russian sanctions.
特朗普政府对俄罗斯制裁普遍缺乏行动，加剧了人们对影子舰队的冷漠态度。
The most notable exception is when the administration joined Europe in sanctioning major Russian energy companies Rosneft and Lukoil , a move that sharply reduced demand for Russian oil and thus markedly widened the discount on Russian crude.
最值得注意的例外是，美国政府与欧洲一起制裁俄罗斯大型能源公司俄罗斯石油公司和卢克石油公司，此举大幅减少了对俄罗斯石油的需求，从而显着扩大了俄罗斯原油的折扣。
However, price pressures owing to the war with Iran prompted the administration to issue waivers for the sale of Russian oil stranded in seaborne storage, which increased demand for Russian crude and offset much of the impact of the initial measure.
然而，由于与伊朗的战争造成的价格压力，促使美国政府对滞留在海运储存中的俄罗斯石油的销售发放豁免，这增加了对俄罗斯原油的需求，并抵消了最初措施的大部分影响。
In addition, while the Lukoil sanction was designed to spur the sale of the company’s assets, the U.S. Treasury has yet to approve a buyer and Lukoil has been allowed to continue much of its operations in the meantime.
此外，虽然卢克石油公司的制裁旨在刺激该公司资产的出售，但美国财政部尚未批准买家，卢克石油公司在此期间已被允许继续其大部分业务。
Source: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office , Official Journal of the European Union , and the U.S. Treasury
资料来源：外交、联邦与发展办公室、欧盟官方公报和美国财政部
Our prior work emphasized the extent of the overlap in shadow fleet sanctions across the U.S., UK, and EU, focusing in particular on the outsized progress by Europe relative to the U.S. The European sanctions wave over the past two years has led to two important changes in the pattern of sanctions coordination.
我们之前的工作强调了美国、英国和欧盟影子舰队制裁的重叠程度，特别关注欧洲相对于美国取得的巨大进展。过去两年的欧洲制裁浪潮导致了制裁协调模式的两个重要变化。
One, Europe has substantially increased overlap with existing U.S. sanctions by designating most of the tankers targeted by the Biden administration.
第一，欧洲将拜登政府针对的大部分油轮指定为目标，从而大大增加了与美国现有制裁的重叠。
Figure 2 shows that the number of vessels sanctioned jointly by the U.S., UK, and EU has grown to 178 ships as of July 2026 (purple bars), up from zero in July 2024.
图 2 显示，截至 2026 年 7 月，美国、英国和欧盟联合制裁的船舶数量已从 2024 年 7 月的零增加到 178 艘（紫色条）。
Two, the EU and UK have moved in the direction of coordinating their sanction activity more and now jointly sanction 395 additional vessels (pink bars), up from seven in July 2024.
第二，欧盟和英国已朝着更多协调制裁活动的方向迈进，现在联合制裁了另外 395 艘船只（粉红色条），而 2024 年 7 月为 7 艘。
Source: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office , Official Journal of the European Union , and the U.S. Treasury
资料来源：外交、联邦与发展办公室、欧盟官方公报和美国财政部
While progress on sanctioning shadow fleet vessels and the improved coordination are undeniable, Europe’s shadow fleet sanctions have had only a limited impact on Russian oil exports—likely due in part to the lack of U.S. involvement.
虽然在制裁影子舰队船只方面取得的进展和改进的协调是不可否认的，但欧洲的影子舰队制裁对俄罗斯石油出口的影响有限——可能部分原因是美国缺乏参与。
The limited impact can be seen by monitoring oil tanker activity out of Russian ports in the Baltic Sea, the exit point for about half of Russia’s seaborne oil exports.
通过监测波罗的海俄罗斯港口的油轮活动可以看出影响有限，波罗的海是俄罗斯约一半海运石油出口的出口点。
Figure 3 shows monthly oil export volumes out of Russia’s Baltic ports broken down by country of ownership.
图 3 显示了俄罗斯波罗的海港口每月石油出口量（按所属国家划分）。
The gray bars represent our proxies for shadow fleet vessels—ships for which we cannot identify the owner and that don’t carry western insurance.
灰色条代表我们对影子舰队船只的代理，这些船只我们无法识别其所有者，并且没有西方保险。
Over the course of Russia’s war on Ukraine, shadow fleet activity and that of non-western ships has grown sharply, rising from roughly 25% of total capacity out of the Baltic to 70% in 2025.
在俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争过程中，影子舰队活动和非西方船只的活动急剧增长，从波罗的海总运力的约 25% 上升到 2025 年的 70%。
While we cannot observe a counterfactual outcome in which no tankers are sanctioned, the shadow fleet continues to carry a substantial share of Russian oil exports from the Baltic, suggesting that European sanctions alone have not significantly constrained its exports.
虽然我们无法观察到没有油轮受到制裁的反事实结果，但影子船队继续从波罗的海运输俄罗斯石油出口的很大一部分，这表明仅欧洲制裁并没有严重限制其出口。
Perhaps the most promising way to put greater pressure on Russia’s revenue from seaborne oil exports would be for the U.S. to sanction all the ships now sanctioned by the UK and the EU.
也许对俄罗斯海运石油出口收入施加更大压力的最有希望的方法是美国制裁目前受到英国和欧盟制裁的所有船只。
As we discussed in earlier work , vessels sanctioned by the U.S. have substantially larger reductions in shipping activity than EU-only or UK-only, a difference that may reflect the deterrent effect of U.S. secondary sanctions, for which there’s no parallel in Europe.
正如我们在之前的工作中讨论的那样，受美国制裁的船舶的航运活动减少幅度比仅欧盟或仅英国的船舶要大得多，这种差异可能反映了美国二级制裁的威慑作用，而这在欧洲是独一无二的。
To achieve comprehensive coverage across these jurisdictions, the U.S. would need to sanction an additional 518 tankers currently sanctioned by the EU and UK.
为了实现对这些司法管辖区的全面覆盖，美国需要另外制裁目前受到欧盟和英国制裁的 518 艘油轮。
This would likely immediately impact shadow fleet activity in the Baltic and force Russia to either increase use of western ships that adhere to price caps or reduce its export volume.
这可能会立即影响波罗的海的影子舰队活动，并迫使俄罗斯要么增加使用遵守价格上限的西方船只，要么减少其出口量。
While such an action by the U.S. Treasury seems unlikely given its established record since January 2025 and the continued pressure on oil prices from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, congressional activity may force the issue.
尽管鉴于美国财政部自 2025 年 1 月以来的既定记录以及霍尔木兹海峡关闭对油价的持续压力，美国财政部似乎不太可能采取这样的行动，但国会活动可能会迫使这个问题发生。
The U.S. Senate recently advanced the Shadow Fleet Sanctions Act as part of a larger effort to target the Russian military and energy sector.
美国参议院最近提出了《影子舰队制裁法案》，作为针对俄罗斯军事和能源部门的更大努力的一部分。
This legislation would mandate the U.S. sanction shadow fleet tankers that circumvent western sanctions and introduce measures that better align American and European sanctions against the shadow fleet, while also targeting a host of other deceptive elements of the Russian oil trade.
这项立法将要求美国制裁规避西方制裁的影子舰队油轮，并采取措施更好地协调美国和欧洲对影子舰队的制裁，同时还针对俄罗斯石油贸易中的许多其他欺骗性因素。
Whether or not Congress ultimately mandates additional U.S. designations, Europe has a strong interest in reinforcing the efficacy of its own sanctions regime.
无论国会最终是否要求美国追加制裁，欧洲都对加强其自身制裁制度的效力有着强烈的兴趣。
One promising option would involve cracking down on shadow fleet activity by holding states like Panama, Liberia, and Barbados accountable for their oversight of flagged vessels.
一种有希望的选择是通过让巴拿马、利比里亚和巴巴多斯等国负责监督悬挂国旗的船只来打击影子舰队活动。
In recent work with scholars at Yale Law School, we elaborate on this strategy and estimate that, if enforced stringently, this approach could reduce Russian revenues from Baltic ports by 14%.
在最近与耶鲁大学法学院学者的合作中，我们详细阐述了这一策略，并估计，如果严格执行，这种方法可能会使俄罗斯从波罗的海港口获得的收入减少 14%。
Collectively, these actions could significantly strengthen enforcement of the G7 price cap and further constrain Russia’s oil revenues.
总的来说，这些行动可能会大大加强七国集团价格上限的执行，并进一步限制俄罗斯的石油收入。
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