Can Europe survive China Shock 2.0?
Center on the United States and Europe John L.
美国和欧洲中心 John L.
Thornton China Center
桑顿中国中心
As China searches for markets to absorb its excess exports, it has increasingly directed much of that manufacturing overcapacity toward Europe, hollowing out the continent’s industrial capacity.
随着中国寻找市场来消化其过剩的出口，它越来越多地将大部分过剩的制造业产能转向欧洲，从而掏空了欧洲大陆的工业产能。
On this episode of The Beijing Brief , Ryan Hass and Jon Czin are joined by Constanze Stelzenmüller and Kari Heerman to examine how Europe reached this point, what it can do to safeguard itself and advance its economic growth, and whether it can unify behind a solution.
在本期《北京简报》中，瑞安·哈斯 (Ryan Hass) 和乔恩·钦 (Jon Czin) 与康斯坦兹·施特尔岑穆勒 (Constanze Stelzenmüller) 和卡里·赫尔曼 (Kari Heerman) 一起探讨欧洲如何走到这一步、它可以采取哪些措施来保护自己并促进其经济增长，以及它是否可以团结起来寻求解决方案。
Hello, you’re listening to The Beijing Brief from the John L.
您好，您正在收听约翰·L·肯尼迪广播电台的《北京简报》。
Thornton China Center at Brookings, part of the Brookings Podcast Network.
布鲁金斯学会桑顿中国中心是布鲁金斯学会播客网络的一部分。
My name is Ryan Hass, director of the China Center.
我叫瑞恩·哈斯（Ryan Hass），中国中心主任。
And I’m Jon Czin, the Michael H.
我是 Jon Czin，即 Michael H.
Armacost Chair in the China Center.
中国中心的阿马科斯特主席。
The Beijing Brief is a biweekly podcast focused on unpacking the forces shaping US-China relations and China’s political, economic, and technological ambitions.
《北京简报》是一个双周播客，重点探讨塑造美中关系的力量以及中国的政治、经济和技术野心。
So while the United States was putting up protectionist walls and waging a trade war with China, China has redirected much of its exports towards open markets, including in Europe.
因此，当美国筑起保护主义高墙并向中国发动贸易战时，中国已将大部分出口转向开放市场，包括欧洲。
Chinese exports to the EU have increased 89% since 2015, quadrupling the trade deficit.
自2015年以来，中国对欧盟的出口增长了89%，贸易逆差翻了两番。
Because of this China shock 2.0, Europe risks losing hundreds of thousands of jobs from deindustrialization.
由于中国冲击2.0，欧洲面临着因去工业化而失去数十万就业机会的风险。
Already, German industry is losing around 10,000 jobs a month, and its industrial sector is being hollowed out.
德国工业每月失去约 10,000 个工作岗位，工业部门正在空心化。
President Macron of France went so far as to say that Chinese exports are, quote, “literally killing a large part of Europe’s industry.”
法国总统马克龙甚至表示，中国的出口“实际上扼杀了欧洲工业的很大一部分”。
So given that backdrop, there are three questions we really want to tackle here today.
因此，考虑到这一背景，我们今天真正想解决三个问题。
Number one, how did Europe come to find itself in this position?
第一，欧洲是如何陷入这样的境地的？
Number two, what should Europe do to protect itself from the broad scale deindustrialization?
第二，欧洲应该如何保护自己免受大规模去工业化的影响？
And number three, what will it actually end up doing?
第三，它最终会做什么？
With us today to help us unpack these questions are two of our longtime Brookings colleagues and friends.
今天，我们的两位布鲁金斯学会的长期同事和朋友将帮助我们解答这些问题。
The first is Constanze Stelzenmüller, who is director of the Brookings Center for the United States and Europe, and a leading expert on German, European, U.S., and transatlantic foreign and security policy and strategy.
第一个是康斯坦兹·施特尔岑穆勒（Constanze Stelzenmüller），他是布鲁金斯美国和欧洲中心主任，也是德国、欧洲、美国和跨大西洋外交与安全政策与战略的顶尖专家。
And we’re also joined by Kari Heerman, senior fellow and director of trade and economic statecraft at Brookings.
布鲁金斯学会高级研究员兼贸易与经济治国之道主任卡里·赫尔曼也加入了我们的行列。
Kari previously served in a variety of senior economic roles across the U.S. government, including in the U.S. Trade Representative, the State Department, and the White House Council of Economic Advisors.
卡里此前曾在美国政府担任过各种高级经济职务，包括美国贸易代表、国务院和白宫经济顾问委员会。
And most recently, she has the misfortune of being my new, new neighbor.
最近，她不幸成为我的新邻居。
She brings deep expertise on trade policy, industrial policy, and economic security.
她带来了贸易政策、产业政策和经济安全方面深厚的专业知识。
So Kari, thanks for joining us, so you don’t have to hide from me in our neighborhood Safeway.
所以卡里，感谢您加入我们，这样您就不必在我们附近的西夫韦躲着我了。
So guys, let’s start with a scaling question.
所以，伙计们，让我们从一个扩展问题开始。
On a scale of one to 10, how severe is the shock that European industries face from China’s surge of exports?
从1到10来衡量，中国出口激增对欧洲工业的冲击有多严重？
Kari, we’ll start with you.
卡里，我们从你开始。
How severe is the shock?
震动有多严重？
Well, I would say, in terms of duration, we’re probably at a a nine or a 10.
好吧，我想说，就持续时间而言，我们可能处于 9 或 10 分。
In terms of one instance, we’re probably at a seven or an eight.
就一个例子而言，我们可能处于七或八。
We’re very accustomed in the world to having to deal with import shocks, the sudden loss of something that we need, but export shocks of this magnitude are something really different.
我们在这个世界上已经习惯了应对进口冲击，即我们需要的东西突然丢失，但如此严重的出口冲击则完全不同。
STELZENMÜLLER: I was kind of waiting for your question number four, which is, how is all of this Germany’s fault?
STELZENMÜLLER：我一直在等你的第四个问题，即这一切怎么都是德国的错？
But, on your actual question, I would say seven to eight because yes, it’s dire, but I don’t think it’s completely irreversible.
但是，关于你的实际问题，我会说七到八，因为是的，这很可怕，但我不认为这是完全不可逆转的。
I do think there are things we can do, and I hope we will discuss those.
我确实认为我们可以做一些事情，我希望我们能够讨论这些事情。
So before we get to that part of the story, we want to go back in time and talk a little bit about how Europe’s perceptions of China have changed over time.
因此，在我们讨论故事的这一部分之前，我们想回顾一下过去，谈谈欧洲对中国的看法如何随着时间的推移而发生变化。
Right?
正确的？
In the 2000s, Europe saw China as a strategic partner and an engine of global growth, which was kind of the widespread conventional view, including here in the United States.
2000年代，欧洲将中国视为战略伙伴和全球增长引擎，这是一种普遍的传统观点，包括美国在内。
When did we start to see a shift really in Europe’s perceptions of China?
我们什么时候开始看到欧洲对中国的看法真正发生转变？
STELZENMÜLLER: I’d say there are four phases since China joined the WTO in 2001, so 25 years.
STELZENMÜLLER：我想说，自中国2001年加入世贸组织以来，即25年以来，经历了四个阶段。
The first one, as you say, Germany, like pretty much the rest of Europe, saw China as an enormous engine and opportunity for for economic growth, trade, and investment.
第一个，正如你所说，德国和欧洲其他国家一样，将中国视为经济增长、贸易和投资的巨大引擎和机遇。
And that in fact, all of that happened.
事实上，这一切都发生了。
But they also assumed, of course, that increasing interdependence with the global economy would change China’s political system.
但当然，他们也认为，与全球经济日益增强的相互依赖将改变中国的政治制度。
The German phrase for this was Wandel durch Handel , change through trade.
对此的德语短语是 Wandel durch Handel，即通过贸易改变。
And as with Russia, that assessment proved to be slightly too optimistic.
与俄罗斯一样，这一评估被证明有点过于乐观。
Second phase was, I think, beginning in 2015 when Beijing published its famous Made in China 2025 strategy.
我认为第二阶段始于 2015 年，当时北京发布了著名的“中国制造 2025”战略。
And people realized that there, you know, this was not so much about reciprocity, and not about China changing, but about China changing Europe and to its advantage.
人们意识到，你知道，这与其说是关于互惠，也不是关于中国的改变，而是关于中国改变欧洲并使其受益。
Which is also something we had seen with Russia.
这也是我们在俄罗斯身上看到的。
Right?
正确的？
Exact same process.
完全相同的过程。
And the European firms and policymakers realized they were being subjected to unfair market practices, and then I think the the high point of that came with the Chinese acquisition of the KUKA Robotics factory in in in Germany.
欧洲公司和政策制定者意识到他们正在遭受不公平的市场行为，然后我认为最高潮是中国收购德国库卡机器人工厂。
Then came 2019, the European Union’s strategic assessment, the one that you just referred to implicitly, where it said China is, as of now, a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival, which is promoting alternative models of governance.
然后是2019年，欧盟的战略评估，你刚才含蓄地提到的，它说中国目前是一个合作伙伴、一个竞争对手和一个系统性竞争对手，它正在推动替代性的治理模式。
And the the developments that were reinforcing this were the, you know, increasingly unfair practices by the Chinese, very strategic investments in physical and digital infrastructure in Europe, Huawei being case in point, unfair trade practices, cyber espionage, human rights violations in Xinjiang and in Hong Kong.
强化这一点的事态发展是，你知道，中国人日益不公平的做法、对欧洲实体和数字基础设施的战略性投资（华为就是一个很好的例子）、不公平贸易行为、网络间谍活动、新疆和香港的侵犯人权行为。
And then the fourth phase, I think, begins with Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, where it becomes increasingly clearer, we’re now in the fifth year, that the Chinese are not just aiding, abetting, but really in full support of this, and, and that the Russians, in fact, would not be where they are without really important Chinese support.
然后，我认为，第四阶段是从俄罗斯于 2022 年全面入侵乌克兰开始的，现在已经是第五年了，这一点变得越来越清楚，中国不仅在帮助、教唆，而且真正全力支持这一点，而且，事实上，如果没有中国真正重要的支持，俄罗斯就不会取得今天的成就。
And the realization on top of that, that the Chinese are willing to weaponize the dependence that we now have on them for political purposes.
除此之外，我们还认识到，中国人愿意将我们现在出于政治目的对他们的依赖武器化。
So Kari, we often talk about China shock 2.0.
所以卡里，我们经常谈论中国冲击2.0。
How how would you define that as a term?
您如何将其定义为一个术语？
There’s a couple of good publications that define it pretty well.
有几本很好的出版物对其进行了很好的定义。
The the dimensions of it are threefold more or less.
它的尺寸或多或少是三倍。
I would say they’re in terms of size, strategy, and support.
我想说的是规模、战略和支持。
So first in terms of size, I mean, now China is the world’s largest manufacturer.
首先就规模而言，我的意思是，现在中国是世界上最大的制造商。
It’s not coming from the margins of global manufacturing, and it’s increasing its share in total but also in expanding the set of industries closer to higher tech industries where they’re competing more head-to-head with firms in the U.S. and Europe and elsewhere in the developed world.
它并非来自全球制造业的边缘，它在总体上所占的份额正在增加，而且也在扩大产业范围，使其更接近高科技产业，在这些产业中，它们与美国、欧洲和其他发达国家的公司进行更多的正面竞争。
And so the thing that is important about the size of this is that when you have a competitor of this size, you’re not just affecting individual firms, but you’re shaping global markets by your presence, and that’s a really important element of the the size factor.
因此，关于规模的重要一点是，当你拥有这种规模的竞争对手时，你不仅会影响单个公司，而且会通过你的存在来塑造全球市场，这是规模因素中非常重要的因素。
And so what happens then is countries just start to conclude they can’t simply adjust to market outcomes, when they’re faced with this kind of a competitor.
因此，当各国面临这种竞争对手时，他们就会开始得出结论，他们不能简单地根据市场结果进行调整。
They have to think about preserving industrial capacity.
他们必须考虑保留工业产能。
In terms of strategy, this isn’t just export-led growth.
就战略而言，这不仅仅是出口拉动型增长。
This is coming from the, concept of dual circulation that I’m sure you all can much better explain than I can.
这来自双循环的概念，我相信你们都能比我更好地解释。
But the idea of dual circulation fundamentally undermines one of the the bargains that is implicit in the post-war trade system, which is that countries are gonna become both bigger producers and larger consumers as they develop.
但双循环的理念从根本上破坏了战后贸易体系中隐含的一项讨价还价的原则，即各国在发展过程中将成为更大的生产者和更大的消费者。
You’re gonna compete more in the export markets, but you’re also going to see larger export markets to send your competitive exports to.
您将在出口市场上更具竞争力，但您也会看到更大的出口市场，可以将您的有竞争力的出口产品发送到更大的出口市场。
Instead, China’s explicitly seeking to become more self-reliant while remaining deeply integrated in everyone else’s markets and expanding their share into export markets.
相反，中国明确寻求变得更加自力更生，同时保持深度融入其他国家的市场并扩大其在出口市场的份额。
And this means that countries can’t rely on openness alone.
这意味着各国不能仅仅依靠开放。
And they start to place greater emphasis on resilience, diversification, and economic security and those kind of things that Constanze was just mentioning.
他们开始更加重视韧性、多元化和经济安全以及康斯坦兹刚才提到的那些事情。
And then the third piece of it is support.
第三部分是支持。
Chinese firms compete with very substantial state-directed support, subsidies, finance, industrial policy, all kinds of forms of government backing.
中国企业凭借大量的国家指导支持、补贴、金融、产业政策和各种形式的政府支持进行竞争。
And this isn’t just applied neutrally across a broad swath of, you know, to support industries more broadly, but in a way that really is driven to accumulate market power.
这不仅是中立地应用于更广泛的领域，以更广泛地支持行业，而且以一种真正驱动积累市场力量的方式。
And that is to have a greater and greater share of global production, of global trade, and the sectors where this has been targeted have been emerging technologies, industries of the future, strategic industries associated with security and many other things.
那就是在全球生产、全球贸易中占据越来越大的份额，而其目标领域是新兴技术、未来产业、与安全相关的战略产业和许多其他领域。
And so that really raises the question of whether this combination of state support and the enormous scale shaping competitive outcomes, but also in ways that broadly open markets just can’t offset.
因此，这确实提出了一个问题：国家支持和巨大规模的结合是否会塑造竞争结果，但同时也以广泛开放的市场无法抵消的方式。
So, governments again are turning to their own industrial policies, trade defense measures, and investment in strategic industries in response to this.
因此，各国政府再次转向本国的产业政策、贸易防御措施和战略产业投资来应对这一问题。
Constanze, is there anything that you would like to add to that definition?
Constanze，您想在这个定义中添加什么内容吗？
And while I have you, let me just also ask, do you view Germany as the epicenter of China shock 2.0 in Europe right now?
在请到您的同时，我也想问一下，您是否认为德国目前是欧洲“中国冲击2.0”的震中？
And how do you see, you know, this metastasizing outwards from there?
你如何看待这种从那里向外的转移？
STELZENMÜLLER: Okay.
施特尔岑米勒：好的。
That’s a lot of different questions, and they’re actually quite complex.
这是很多不同的问题，而且实际上非常复杂。
But let me, let me try and grapple with that.
但让我，让我尝试解决这个问题。
It’s not as though Europe hadn’t been hit by China shock 1.0, right?
欧洲并不是没有受到中国冲击1.0的打击，对吗？
That affected Europeans as well.
这也影响了欧洲人。
What’s different about this round is that it is far more severe, and it’s devastating advanced industrial sectors like automotive machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, green energy with immense job losses and those have political consequences.
这一轮的不同之处在于，它的严重性要大得多，它对汽车机械、化工、制药、绿色能源等先进工业部门造成了毁灭性的打击，造成大量失业，并产生政治后果。
Right?
正确的？
In other words, the magnitude of the shock, and the magnitude of of the sectors affected is much greater.
换句话说，冲击的幅度以及受影响的行业的幅度要大得多。
And these are sectors in which especially the Germans thought had, you know, had a 50-year-long advantage they thought.
德国人尤其认为这些领域拥有长达 50 年的优势。
And the Germans, it has to be said, were slower to comprehend and to to react to these developments because they were more open.
不得不说，德国人对这些事态发展的理解和反应较慢，因为他们更加开放。
Right?
正确的？
They were more exposed to this Chinese strategy than any other European economy.
他们比任何其他欧洲经济体都更容易受到中国战略的影响。
And something that I think also needs to be understood for for non-European listeners and viewers is that, Germany is for better or for worse, the economic powerhouse of Europe.
我认为非欧洲听众和观众也需要理解的是，无论好坏，德国都是欧洲的经济强国。
All its neighboring economies are in interdependent with it.
所有周边经济体都与其相互依存。
And so if bad things happen in the German economy, that immediately has knock-on effects in the rest of Europe, and some of them could be even more severe than in Germany.
因此，如果德国经济发生不好的事情，就会立即对欧洲其他国家产生连锁反应，其中一些甚至可能比德国更严重。
What the Chinese are now doing is competing directly in these sectors where the Germans thought they had a, you know, an unmatched global expertise, especially in these, not just the, sort of the big automotive concerns like the, the big four or five German automotive companies, but all these small SMEs, small and medium enterprises, who are referred to as hidden champions because they had exquisite boutique capabilities that nobody else could emulate.
中国人现在所做的就是在这些领域进行直接竞争，德国人认为他们拥有无与伦比的全球专业知识，特别是在这些领域，不仅是像德国四五家汽车公司这样的大型汽车公司，而且还有所有这些小型中小企业、中小型企业，它们被称为隐形冠军，因为它们拥有其他人无法效仿的精湛精品能力。
And the Chinese have strategically moved into that and are pushing the Germans not just, sort of, out of the competition, but they’re forcing the Germans to produce in China, and they’re forcing the Germans out of other global markets.
中国人已经战略性地进入这一领域，不仅在某种程度上将德国人挤出竞争，而且还迫使德国人在中国生产，并迫使德国人退出其他全球市场。
Right?
正确的？
So it’s it’s really not just the bilateral relationship.
所以这确实不仅仅是双边关系。
It affects the rest of Europe, and it’s affects Germany’s trade relations with the rest of the world.
它影响了欧洲其他国家，也影响了德国与世界其他国家的贸易关系。
And that is, that’s dramatic, and the context for this is an energy crisis in Germany that was set off by the Russian full-scale invasion, and which in turn compounds structural weaknesses in the German economy because of demography, a reluctance to innovate, bureaucratic hindrances, the sort of balkanization of the European single markets in in important respects that made German industry really unwilling to understand what was going on and, and sort of incapacitated it from reacting for the longest time.
也就是说，这是戏剧性的，其背景是俄罗斯全面入侵引发的德国能源危机，这反过来又加剧了德国经济的结构性弱点，因为人口结构、不愿创新、官僚主义障碍、欧洲单一市场在重要方面的割据使得德国工业真的不愿意了解正在发生的事情，并且在很长一段时间内使其无法做出反应。
One, one final point, if I may.
如果可以的话，一，最后一点。
Industry isn’t united on this.
业界对此并不一致。
There are some German companies that by now are basically Chinese, like BASF, the the chemicals giants.
有一些德国公司现在基本上都是中国人了，比如化工巨头巴斯夫。
Right?
正确的？
The, the SMEs, the the global champions have been much more wary and much more alarmist about this for a long time.
长期以来，中小企业和全球冠军企业对此一直更加谨慎和危言耸听。
So I’ve been in conversations with Chinese counterparts where their basic response is, Look, this isn’t about cheating or subsidies or anything else.
所以我一直在与中国同行交谈，他们的基本反应是，看，这与作弊或补贴或其他任何事情无关。
This is about us working harder and innovating better than our European competitors.
这意味着我们比欧洲竞争对手更加努力工作和更好地创新。
Why is that wrong?
为什么这是错误的？
What what would either of you say to to that argument that they make?
对于他们提出的论点，你们两人会怎么说？
STELZENMÜLLER: Well, you know what?
STELZENMÜLLER： 嗯，你知道吗？
I don’t think that’s wrong.
我不认为这是错误的。
Right?
正确的？
I think if we, you know, we’re all good sort of democrats and market capitalists here in this room, and I think those are the rules of the road that we have learned.
我想，如果我们，你知道，在这个房间里，我们都是优秀的民主党人和市场资本家，我认为这些就是我们学到的道路规则。
Right?
正确的？
And the Chinese are biting…
而中国人正在咬……
are, are beating us and biting us, with our own methods.
他们用我们自己的方式打我们、咬我们。
But they’re using some other methods that are slightly less fair.
但他们正在使用一些稍微不太公平的其他方法。
Right?
正确的？
Like espionage, coercion, political pressure, and and that’s, I think, where the objections become legitimate.
比如间谍活动、胁迫、政治压力，我认为这就是反对意见合法化的地方。
We do need to get back at some point to the the differences within Europe.
我们确实需要在某个时候回到欧洲内部的分歧。
You had raised that, but maybe we can leave that for a little later.
你已经提出了这个问题，但也许我们可以稍后再讨论。
I think what we’re, what we’re getting at is, you know, there there are these unfair, non-market practices, some of which you elaborated earlier in your comments, but there’s also the harsh reality, and I I was just having this conversation with a colleague the other day who who has close eyes both on industry in the United States and in China, and he was saying, Look, there are these unfair practices, but we may also have to come to grips with the fact that these companies are also just really good and really competitive.
我认为我们的意思是，你知道，存在这些不公平的、非市场的做法，其中一些你之前在评论中详细阐述过，但也存在残酷的现实，我前几天刚刚与一位密切关注美国和中国行业的同事进行了对话，他说，看，存在这些不公平的做法，但我们可能还必须面对这样一个事实，即这些公司也非常优秀并且非常有竞争力。
Right?
正确的？
So Kari, you know, from from your perspective as a former policymaker, you know, what are the most problematic activities?
所以卡里，你知道，从你作为前政策制定者的角度来看，你知道，最有问题的活动是什么？
And what really is distinct about this aspect of the China challenge from just normal kind of commercial competition?
中国挑战的这一方面与正常的商业竞争有何不同？
Yeah.
是的。
To the extent that China is becoming more productive, more innovative in a market system, that’s a that’s a bonus.
就中国市场体系的生产力和创新性而言，这是一个额外的好处。
Right?
正确的？
The way that markets work are you are faced with some competition, and you have to adjust to survive.
市场运作的方式是你面临着一些竞争，你必须进行调整才能生存。
And if that’s where we are, then we are gonna need to accommodate that.
如果这就是我们现在的处境，那么我们就需要适应这一点。
Unfortunately, I think two things are are occurring that do not reflect those things.
不幸的是，我认为正在发生的两件事并没有反映出这些事情。
One is just the massive amount of state support that is directed at specific industries means that there starts to be a a severing of the link between the supply signal and the demand signal.
一是国家针对特定行业的大量支持意味着供给信号和需求信号之间的联系开始被切断。
So the firms that adjust are the competing firms.
因此，进行调整的公司是竞争公司。
They’re not the firms in China because the firms in China can be sustained by state support.
它们不是中国的公司，因为中国的公司可以通过国家支持来维持。
So that link, that that correction, that competition is broken.
所以那个链接、那个修正、那个竞争就被打破了。
Second thing is the accumulation of market power that China pursues or or has.
第二件事是中国追求或拥有的市场力量的积累。
They have been demonstrated that they’re willing to use it to gain commercial advantage otherwise or to gain other kinds of strategic advantage, and that puts us in a really different position.
他们已经被证明愿意利用它来获得商业优势或其他类型的战略优势，这使我们处于一个非常不同的位置。
We’re not in this sort of neutral market-based competition frame.
我们并不处于这种基于市场的中立竞争框架中。
Let’s shift a little bit from diagnosis of the problem to prescription of what we think Europe should do or what tools are available to it.
让我们从对问题的诊断转向我们认为欧洲应该做什么或可以使用哪些工具的处方。
And just to sort of set the baseline, is there anything that is negotiable between Europe and China on this problem, or is this fundamentally a question of whether or not Europe finds the will to act to protect itself against this surge of of Chinese exports?
为了设定基线，欧洲和中国在这个问题上有什么可以谈判的吗？或者这从根本上来说是一个问题：欧洲是否愿意采取行动保护自己免受中国出口激增的影响？
STELZENMÜLLER: All right, let me start.
STELZENMÜLLER： 好吧，让我开始吧。
Look, it’s very clear that Europe has real work to do to put itself in a position of bargaining strength.
看，很明显，欧洲需要做很多实际工作才能使自己处于议价能力的地位。
Right?
正确的？
That is the order of the hour.
这就是当前的秩序。
But it does have things that it can do, and I’m sure we’ll get to that.
但它确实有它可以做的事情，我相信我们会做到这一点。
It also, I think, has by now understood that it will not change China’s model of governance and that it has very little leverage to change China’s strategic intentions.
我认为，它现在也明白，它不会改变中国的治理模式，也没有什么影响力来改变中国的战略意图。
But it’s notable, and this is something that European analysts of comparative Russian-Chinese behavior have always noticed.
但这是值得注意的，这是欧洲比较俄罗斯和中国行为的分析人士一直注意到的事情。
Putin’s Russia has always had an interest in a chaotic, dysfunctional, illegitimate Europe because that makes Russian, you know, secret service kleptocracy look better.
普京领导下的俄罗斯一直对混乱、功能失调、不合法的欧洲感兴趣，因为这让俄罗斯的特工盗贼统治看起来更好。
Right?
正确的？
The Chinese are actually extremely interested in the functionality of the single market.
中国人实际上对单一市场的功能非常感兴趣。
Right?
正确的？
Because that gives them, it gives them scale and access.
因为这给了他们规模和机会。
Right?
正确的？
So so there is a difference in takes on the kind of Europe that they need.
因此，他们对所需欧洲类型的看法存在差异。
Now, the Chinese clearly think, right, they can have one while undermining the other, right, while undermining political functionality, unity, and so on.
现在，中国人显然认为，对，他们可以拥有一个，同时破坏另一个，对，同时破坏政治功能、团结等等。
But I think the the thing that we should make a point of here is that the Chinese do need access to the European market.
但我认为我们应该在这里强调的是，中国人确实需要进入欧洲市场。
The Chinese do have their own structural vulnerabilities, and that is, in my view, where the space for negotiations resides.
中国确实有自己的结构性弱点，在我看来，这就是谈判的空间所在。
All right?
好的？
That’s a very hard-nosed realist take on where we are, but I think what I’m seeing is is Europeans converging on that.
这是对我们现状的非常顽固的现实主义看法，但我认为我看到的是欧洲人正在向这一点靠拢。
And Kari, from your perspective, I mean, what, what are the available trade tools that Europe has at its disposal to kind of realize that latent leverage.
卡里，从你的角度来看，我的意思是，欧洲拥有哪些可用的贸易工具来实现这种潜在的杠杆作用。
These these things aren’t cost-free when you impose them.
当你强加这些东西时，它们并不是没有成本的。
What are the trade-offs that are involved?
其中涉及哪些权衡？
This is a conversation you and I have a lot around these issues.
这是你和我围绕这些问题进行的一次对话。
Yes.
是的。
Tools exist.
工具是存在的。
Europe has, you know, the traditional trade remedy kind of tools, anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
你知道，欧洲有传统的贸易救济手段，即反倾销和反补贴税。
They’re also developing a suite of additional tools, more calibrated to the kind of challenges they’re facing with China.
他们还在开发一套额外的工具，更适合他们在中国面临的挑战。
I would say that in thinking about this problem, rather than focusing on the tools, I think about the problem, and I think Europe needs to define the problems that it’s facing because many of them kind of get bundled together as a China problem.
我想说，在思考这个问题时，我思考的不是工具，而是问题，我认为欧洲需要定义它所面临的问题，因为其中许多问题都被捆绑在一起作为中国问题。
But they’re facing subsidized competition, sudden import surges, unequal access to each other’s markets, security risks from import dependence , and it’s sort of a deeper competitiveness issues more broadly.
但它们面临着补贴竞争、进口突然激增、进入彼此市场的不平等、进口依赖带来的安全风险，以及更广泛的更深层次的竞争力问题。
Each of these things need specific instruments.
每一件事情都需要特定的仪器。
Most of them exist in some form, but maybe aren’t appropriate for the scale, maybe aren’t appropriate for the lack of transparency in the policy coming from China, aren’t appropriate for the scale, they’re, you know, designed to address a specific problem when it’s really an industry level problem.
它们中的大多数以某种形式存在，但可能不适合规模，可能不适合中国政策缺乏透明度，不适合规模，你知道，它们旨在解决特定问题，而这确实是行业层面的问题。
So I think first deciding what the problem is and then the tool that matches it, is what what Europe really needs to be thinking of.
所以我认为首先确定问题是什么，然后找到与之相匹配的工具，这才是欧洲真正需要考虑的。
But you’re exactly right.
但你是完全正确的。
And, Jon, I guess I have taught you one thing, or I think you probably already knew it, that these things are are costly.
而且，乔恩，我想我已经教了你一件事，或者我想你可能已经知道了，这些东西是昂贵的。
They are costly, both in terms of, you know, there isn’t unlimited fiscal resources, and in fact, fiscal resources are deeply, deeply under pressure.
它们的成本高昂，因为财政资源不是无限的，而且事实上，财政资源面临着巨大的压力。
And some of these involve fiscal outlays.
其中一些涉及财政支出。
But also, you know, dedicating your economic tools and your economic strategy to offsetting competition from China rather than growing your own economy, that’s a little bit of a different problem.
但你也知道，将你的经济工具和经济战略用于抵消来自中国的竞争，而不是发展自己的经济，这是一个有点不同的问题。
And so you might not end up with as strong as economic outcomes if you don’t define the problem that you’re facing really well and be very strategic about how you address it.
因此，如果你没有很好地定义你所面临的问题，并且对解决问题的方法没有非常有策略性，那么你最终可能不会获得像经济成果那样强劲的成果。
STELZENMÜLLER: Can I, can I sort of zoom out on that and with a more geopolitical take?
STELZENMÜLLER：我可以，我可以稍微缩小一下范围，从地缘政治角度考虑一下吗？
I think what we’re looking at and what Europe has to face is that we’re seeing the end of its model of globalization.
我认为我们所看到的以及欧洲必须面对的是，我们正在看到其全球化模式的终结。
Right?
正确的？
An open Europe in an open globalized world, which sort of paradoxically isn’t to say that there is no more independence or that we can in fact achieve autonomy or even autarky.
开放的全球化世界中的开放欧洲，这有点矛盾，但这并不是说我们不再具有独立性，或者我们实际上可以实现自治甚至自给自足。
That’s not on the cards.
那不在卡片上。
We will just have to move to a completely different way of managing an interdependence that is deepening and that is marked by tensions and hostility.
我们必须采取一种完全不同的方式来管理日益加深、充满紧张和敌意的相互依存关系。
So the other geopolitical angle to this is that Europe is facing aggressive systemic revisionism from three great powers: Russia, China, and the United States, each in their own way attempting to reshape the international order, including the international economic order, with dire consequences for Europe’s capability to act, its agency.
因此，另一个地缘政治角度是，欧洲正面临来自俄罗斯、中国和美国这三个大国的激进的系统性修正主义，它们各自以自己的方式试图重塑国际秩序，包括国际经济秩序，这对欧洲的行动能力和机构造成了可怕的后果。
And as Kari was just saying, it is not possible for us to sort of manage this, you know, this set of four goals: cheap goods, industrial employment, decarbonization, and strategic autonomy.
正如卡里刚才所说，我们不可能管理这四个目标：廉价商品、工业就业、脱碳和战略自主。
Right?
正确的？
Trying to move from point A to point B, as I’ve just described, will bring great costs, and those costs have to be distributed fairly, legitimately.
正如我刚才所描述的，试图从A点转移到B点会带来巨大的成本，而这些成本必须公平、合法地分配。
And that will, you know, generate real economic, social, and political tensions that, that are going to be a huge challenge for us going forward.
你知道，这将产生真正的经济、社会和政治紧张局势，这将成为我们前进的巨大挑战。
Which is why the question of growth in Europe, right, innovation, and the ability to compete becomes absolutely central to European survival from this moment.
这就是为什么欧洲的增长、创新和竞争能力问题从此刻起就成为欧洲生存的绝对核心。
Can I just add one thing there too?
我也可以在那里添加一件事吗？
I mean, I think something that’s really important to be thinking about in this setting is that we shouldn’t overlook the strengths of the market system that we have, and rather lean into those rather than try to replicate a system that is closed.
我的意思是，我认为在这种情况下真正需要考虑的事情是，我们不应该忽视我们拥有的市场体系的优势，而应该依靠这些优势，而不是试图复制一个封闭的体系。
And so from my point of view, the overriding objective of a lot of the the changes that must be made in this context is to try to do things that preserve competition as much as possible rather than protect from competition.
因此，在我看来，在这种情况下必须做出的许多改变的首要目标是尝试尽可能保持竞争，而不是防止竞争。
Try to prevent, competition being undermined by a state led economy and eliminating competition.
努力防止国家主导的经济破坏竞争并消除竞争。
Constanze, I want to pick about on on a thread that you were already getting to, I think, in your, in your comments, which is about not just the geopolitical external politics around this, but the internal politics.
康斯坦兹，我想谈谈您在评论中已经谈到的话题，这不仅涉及围绕此问题的地缘政治外部政治，还涉及内部政治。
Right?
正确的？
I was very struck recently, I had a European colleague who talked about how politically unpalatable some of the choices are facing European governments in dealing with China shock 2.0, and he had a very pithy way of putting it.
最近我很震惊，我有一位欧洲同事谈到欧洲各国政府在应对中国冲击2.0时面临的一些选择在政治上是多么令人不快，他的表达方式非常简洁。
He said, “Look, for the German government, they can either screw their producers or they can screw their consumers.” Right?
他说：“看，对于德国政府来说，他们要么可以欺骗他们的生产商，要么可以欺骗他们的消费者。”正确的？
Prices are gonna go up for one or the other if we implement some of the, some of these trade measures.
如果我们实施其中一些贸易措施，其中一项或多项价格都会上涨。
And you also alluded to the the the variety of views, not just in the business community and politically within Germany, but more broadly across Europe.
您还提到了不同的观点，不仅是在德国的商界和政界，而且是整个欧洲。
How do you see that playing into all this, and what are the key kind of fissure points?
您如何看待这一切？关键的分歧点是什么？
STELZENMÜLLER: Let me, let me start with the latter point because that’s really important for for people listening and, and watching this podcast.
STELZENMÜLLER：让我从后一点开始，因为这对于收听和观看这个播客的人来说非常重要。
The Chinese have behaved differently in different regions of Europe, and that has resulted in different assessments, different relationships, and different policy prescriptions.
中国人在欧洲不同地区的表现不同，这导致了不同的评估、不同的关系和不同的政策处方。
Although I will also say I think that those are converging very rapidly because the Chinese very often overplay their hand.
尽管我也会说，我认为这些正在迅速融合，因为中国人经常夸大其词。
And in fact, they’re doing so now.
事实上，他们现在正在这样做。
So let me explain what I mean by by the divergences.
那么让我解释一下我所说的差异是什么意思。
For the Germans, this is about industrial decoupling.
对于德国人来说，这事关产业脱钩。
Right?
正确的？
We’ve leaned all into China.
我们已经把全部精力都投向了中国。
We need to lean back without leaving.
我们需要靠在椅背上，不要离开。
Very complicated because we’ve leaned in far more broadly than with Russia, where it was really all about buying fossil fuel energy, and we didn’t really buy goods from Russia.
非常复杂，因为我们比俄罗斯更广泛地倾向于购买化石燃料能源，而我们并没有真正从俄罗斯购买商品。
They bought some from us, but that was minimal consumer goods.
他们从我们这里买了一些，但那只是最低限度的消费品。
For France, this is about industrial policy and strategic autonomy.
对于法国来说，这事关产业政策和战略自主权。
They’re far less exposed to China than the Germans are.
他们对中国的接触远不如德国人。
Southern Europeans have been subjected to very, very strategic Chinese investments in physical and digital infrastructure; the famous ports, right, the Port of Piraeus in Athens, which in fact the Germans told the Greeks to to sell during the Eurozone crisis.
南欧人一直受到中国在实体和数字基础设施方面非常非常战略性的投资；著名的港口，右图，雅典的比雷埃夫斯港，实际上是德国人在欧元区危机期间告诉希腊人出售的。
Right?
正确的？
So we had a, we had a hand in there too.
所以我们也参与其中。
The Eastern Europeans are really alarmed by the overt Chinese support for Russia, as I was already mentioning.
正如我已经提到的，东欧人对中国公开支持俄罗斯感到震惊。
And the Nordics are concerned about the digital aspect, infrastructure resilience, and of course in the increasing Chinese presence in the Arctic, and around sort of pipelines and installations in the North Atlantic and the North Sea.
北欧人担心数字方面、基础设施的弹性，当然还有中国在北极以及北大西洋和北海的管道和设施周围日益增加的存在。
You would think that that would really fragment Europe, and you could over the past decade really watch the Chinese very carefully deploying different sort of means of coercion or diplomacy to keep things separate.
你可能会认为这真的会分裂欧洲，在过去的十年里你可以真正看到中国人非常小心地部署不同类型的胁迫或外交手段来保持分裂。
That’s no longer working simply because Europe is now, you know, basically at the center of a perfect storm with Russian aggression in the east, with a increasingly menacing Chinese presence in the north, or at least with the Nordics.
这不再有效，因为欧洲现在基本上处于一场完美风暴的中心，俄罗斯在东部发动侵略，中国在北部（或者至少是北欧国家）的存在日益具有威胁性。
I mean, it’s not, it’s, it’s not kinetic at this point, but it’s certainly, not friendly.
我的意思是，它不是，它是，它在这一点上不是动态的，但它肯定是不友好的。
You have a situation in the Middle East of potentially escalating and broadening war that could have massive impacts for not just the Eastern Mediterranean, but the entire south of Europe.
中东的局势可能会升级和扩大战争，这不仅可能对东地中海，而且对整个欧洲南部产生巨大影响。
And you have an American administration that is making predatory grabs for islands in the North Atlantic that other islands are looking at and saying, “Should I join the EU or not?” Like, as Iceland is doing now.
美国政府正在掠夺北大西洋的岛屿，其他岛屿正在关注这些岛屿，并说：“我是否应该加入欧盟？”就像冰岛现在所做的那样。
So that, that means that perceptions are converging.
因此，这意味着观念正在趋同。
Right?
正确的？
And that there is a real, I think the, the, these are all drivers for the Europeans to consider their security holistically.
我认为，这些都是欧洲人全面考虑其安全的真正驱动力。
Right?
正确的？
And to consider China’s behavior holistically, right, because everything is merging.
从整体上考虑中国的行为是对的，因为一切都在融合。
The European Commission recently was tasked by all the member states, right, to come up with options.
最近，所有成员国都责成欧盟委员会提出选择方案。
The only state that that didn’t join in that was Spain, in that tasking.
唯一没有参与这项任务的国家是西班牙。
And the the the Financial Times and other other media have, have been reporting that the French and the Germans have been in negotiations about this, and the Germans and under Chancellor Merz are moving towards a French position of of greater protectionism and greater use of anti-coercion instruments.
英国《金融时报》和其他媒体一直在报道，法国和德国一直在就此事进行谈判，而德国和默茨总理领导下的法国立场正朝着加强保护主义和更多使用反胁迫工具的方向发展。
I think we need to come back at some point to the question of mechanisms.
我认为我们需要在某个时候回到机制问题。
Right?
正确的？
Of options.
的选项。
I think there’s, there’s more, what what Kari laid out is, is really very good, we we could go a little more into that.
我认为还有，还有更多，卡里所阐述的内容真的非常好，我们可以进一步探讨这一点。
But that’s where we are with Europe.
但这就是我们与欧洲的处境。
Obviously, all of this is exacerbating both the fiscal and the political bandwidth problem across Europe.
显然，所有这一切都加剧了整个欧洲的财政和政治带宽问题。
You are seeing, especially in the UK and France and in Germany, a surge of extremist parties, not only, but mostly the hard right, who are surging on a message of establishment politics aren’t working.
你会看到，尤其是在英国、法国和德国，极端主义政党激增，不仅是极端主义政党，而且大多是极右翼政党，他们宣扬建制政治行不通的信息。
They’re impoverishing you, they are making you less secure, and only we, only we can solve it.
它们让你变得贫穷，让你变得更不安全，只有我们，只有我们才能解决这个问题。
We we all know that quote.
我们都知道这句话。
Right?
正确的？
Only I can solve it.
只有我能解决。
And based on the polling we’re seeing, that’s, that’s effective.
根据我们所看到的民意调查，这是有效的。
Right?
正确的？
The the Brits have just elected their seventh prime minister in a decade.
英国刚刚选举了十年来第七位首相。
After the previous one won in a landslide.
在上一场以压倒性优势获胜后。
The French are going to have elections in the spring of next year where the hard right looks extremely, you know, in in in pole position.
法国将于明年春天举行选举，你知道，极右派看起来极其处于领先地位。
And and it’s entirely possible that Marine Le Pen would would win at least the first round, if not the second.
而且玛丽娜·勒庞完全有可能至少赢得第一轮，即使不是第二轮。
But that’s I’m I’m slightly more doubtful about.
但这是我比较怀疑的一点。
And Chancellor Merz is genuinely struggling with traditional politics, which is what he thought he was going to be doing when he when he was elected.
默茨总理确实在与传统政治作斗争，这正是他当选后他认为自己会做的事情。
And we are in a very different world, and it’s and it’s really hard.
我们处在一个非常不同的世界，这真的很难。
So as I’m listening to this conversation, you know, I’m hearing Europe confronts extraordinary geopolitical challenges and internally extraordinarily complex domestic political challenges, and that bandwidth is limited.
因此，当我正在听这次对话时，你知道，我听到欧洲面临着非凡的地缘政治挑战和内部极其复杂的国内政治挑战，而带宽是有限的。
But the time to act is now.
但现在是采取行动的时候了。
And I guess the question is whether or not you guys have a view on whether or not Europe will be able to elevate this issue to the top or near the top of its priority list and form a sort of collective front in dealing with the surge of Chinese exports into Europe.
我想问题是你们是否认为欧洲是否能够将这个问题提升到其优先事项列表的首位或接近首位，并形成某种集体战线来应对中国对欧洲出口的激增。
Or accept the status quo and sort of a gradual, steady, continuing hollowing out of European industry from this point forward.
或者接受现状，从现在开始欧洲工业逐渐、稳定、持续空心化。