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I am excited to present an interview with Tae Kim, author of the ”Nvidia Way”.
我很高兴接受《Nvidia Way》作者 Tae Kim 的采访。
A new book coming out on Tuesday Dec 10th in the US.
一本新书将于 12 月 10 日星期二在美国出版。
I really enjoyed this book.
我真的很喜欢这本书。
You got to read it.
你必须阅读它。
It goes by fast and is hands-down the best history on Nvidia’s rise and its astounding culture.
它过得很快，毫无疑问是英伟达崛起及其令人惊叹的文化的最佳历史。
I lightly edited some of the conversation to remove filler words.
我稍微编辑了一些对话以删除填充词。
Other than that it’s pretty much as I remember it.
除此之外，它和我记忆中的差不多。
Jon: Welcome to the show.
乔恩：欢迎来到这个节目。
I actually don't do a lot of these interviews, but I'm excited to make an exception.
事实上，我并没有做过很多这样的采访，但我很高兴能破例。
So welcome to the show Tae Kim.
欢迎来到金泰秀节目。
How are you doing?
你好吗？
Tae Kim: Good, good.
金泰：好，好。
Jon, thanks so much for having me.
乔恩，非常感谢你邀请我。
I'm so happy to be here.
我很高兴来到这里。
Jon: Yeah.
乔恩：是的。
You have a very interesting book.
你有一本非常有趣的书。
And I just ripped through it.
我刚刚把它撕破了。
It was very fun.
非常有趣。
How did it get started and kind of what's the story behind it?
它是如何开始的以及背后的故事是什么？
Tae Kim: I’ve been following NVIDIA for my whole life.
Tae Kim：我一生都在关注 NVIDIA。
From the 1990s, I was a PC gamer, building my own gaming PCs, and I’ve been following it.
从 20 世纪 90 年代开始，我就是一名 PC 游戏玩家，构建自己的游戏 PC，并且一直在关注它。
When I was on Wall Street, I invested in it at a hedge fund, so I’ve known NVIDIA from the early days.
当我在华尔街时，我在一家对冲基金投资了它，所以我很早就知道 NVIDIA 了。
For the last 10 years, I’ve been in media—Yahoo Finance, CNBC, Barron’s, and Bloomberg Opinion—so I’ve been following it as a journalist also.
在过去的 10 年里，我一直从事媒体工作——雅虎财经、CNBC、《巴伦周刊》和彭博社观点——所以我也以记者的身份关注着它。
I got an email in May of 2023.
我在 2023 年 5 月收到一封电子邮件。
It was a cold email from an editor at Norton, and he said Matthew Ball, who wrote the famous Metaverse book, said that I could do a book on NVIDIA.
这是一封来自 Norton 编辑的冷酷电子邮件，他说著名的 Metaverse 书的作者 Matthew Ball 说我可以写一本关于 NVIDIA 的书。
Would I be interested in that?
我对此感兴趣吗？
The first thing I did was ask, what’s Norton?
我做的第一件事就是问，诺顿是什么？
I didn’t know Norton, and they’re actually a very well-regarded publishing house making books for Nobel Prize-winning academics and Ben Bernanke.
我不认识诺顿，他们实际上是一家非常受尊敬的出版社，为诺贝尔奖获得者学者和本·伯南克制作书籍。
The people in the newsroom were like, yeah, Norton’s a really big deal.
新闻编辑室里的人都说，是的，诺顿真的很重要。
The second thing I did was go to Amazon.
我做的第二件事就是去亚马逊。
I said, there’s no way no one has written a book on NVIDIA.
我说，不可能没有人写过一本关于 NVIDIA 的书。
It’s the biggest chip designer by market cap in history.
按市值计算，它是历史上最大的芯片设计商。
Every internet company in the world has multiple books on Amazon—Facebook, Apple, every major tech company.
世界上每家互联网公司在亚马逊上都拥有多本图书——Facebook、苹果、每家主要科技公司。
There was no book.
没有书。
I couldn’t believe it.
我简直不敢相信。
No book on NVIDIA.
没有关于 NVIDIA 的书。
I’ve been buying their graphics cards for 30 years.
我购买他们的显卡已有 30 年了。
I know the business side, the finance side, and the technology side.
我了解业务方面、财务方面和技术方面。
I’ve been in media for 10 years.
我从事媒体工作已有 10 年了。
I thought, I can do this.
我想，我能做到这一点。
I can write this book.
我可以写这本书。
I had a meeting with the editor at Bryant Park, and within weeks, I had a book deal.
我在布莱恩特公园与编辑会面，几周之内，我就达成了一项出书协议。
It went by so fast, and I was off and running.
时间过得真快，我就跑起来了。
Jon: It’s kind of crazy, right?
乔恩：这有点疯狂，对吧？
You talked a little about how Jensen reluctantly somewhat agreed to the book.
你谈到了詹森是如何不情愿地同意这本书的。
Did he say anything?
他有说什么吗？
Has he read it yet?
他读过了吗？
Tae Kim: No, he hasn’t read it yet.
Tae Kim：不，他还没读过。
I’m sure they’ll read it in a few days.
我确信他们几天后就会读到它。
I’ve known Jensen from the beginning.
我从一开始就认识詹森。
I met him 20 or 30 years ago when he was raising capital with Morgan Stanley on the secondary.
我在 20 或 30 年前认识了他，当时他正在向摩根士丹利二级市场筹集资金。
He probably doesn’t remember me.
他大概不记得我了。
I talked to him a little bit.
我和他聊了一会儿。
He’s a very intense person and takes things personally.
他是一个非常热情的人，把事情看得太个人化。
I wrote negatively about NVIDIA during the whole crypto boom, so I’m sure that’s in the back of his mind.
在整个加密货币热潮期间，我写了一些关于 NVIDIA 的负面文章，所以我确信他心里也有这样的想法。
For the first few months, I’ve had a good relationship with the company.
在最初的几个月里，我与公司的关系很好。
They let me talk to the CFO every quarter.
他们让我每个季度与首席财务官交谈。
But when I told them I was writing this book, they were very noncommittal at first.
但当我告诉他们我正在写这本书时，他们一开始并不置可否。
They were like, “Well, we’re not so sure.” So I just went to work and started interviewing all the early NVIDIA employees and senior management.
他们说，“好吧，我们不太确定。”于是我就去上班并开始采访所有早期的 NVIDIA 员工和高级管理人员。
Surprisingly, they were ecstatic to talk to me.
令人惊讶的是，他们很高兴与我交谈。
They said, “NVIDIA is such a great company.
他们说：“NVIDIA 是一家非常棒的公司。
I had such a great experience there.
我在那里度过了一段很棒的经历。
There are all these amazing stories, and no one has told the story.
有这么多令人惊奇的故事，却没有人讲述过这个故事。
It’s great that someone’s writing a book on it.”
有人写一本关于它的书真是太好了。”
After six or eight calls, word got back to NVIDIA that I was being very serious and substantive about it.
经过六、八个电话后，NVIDIA 收到消息说我对此非常认真且具有实质性。
They decided to cooperate.
他们决定合作。
They gave me access to their senior management team and helped facilitate interviews with co-founders, which was fantastic.
他们让我有机会接触他们的高级管理团队，并帮助我采访联合创始人，这太棒了。
It worked out really well in the end.
最后效果非常好。
Jon: I did a video about NVIDIA a long time ago during their graphics card rise.
Jon：很久以前，我在 NVIDIA 显卡崛起期间制作了一个关于 NVIDIA 的视频。
This is so much more detailed than what I could have done at that time.
这比我当时能做的要详细得多。
There was so little information.
信息太少了。
It is very strange.
这很奇怪。
A lot of that stuff would almost be lost to the sands of time otherwise.
否则的话，很多东西几乎就会消失在时间的沙子里。
Tae Kim: Yeah, it was really difficult the first 10 years because the internet didn’t really take off until the early 2000s.
Tae Kim：是的，前 10 年确实很困难，因为互联网直到 2000 年代初才真正起飞。
There were websites in the late ’90s, but many have disappeared.
20 世纪 90 年代末曾有过网站，但很多都消失了。
There’s some material in internet archives, but it was really hard to even find press releases.
互联网档案中有一些材料，但甚至很难找到新闻稿。
That was difficult, but I got the entire senior management from the first 10 years to talk to me because they were so happy to share their stories.
这很困难，但我让前 10 年的所有高级管理层都与我交谈，因为他们非常乐意分享他们的故事。
It was an honor to compile all this computer history.
编译所有这些计算机历史是一种荣幸。
I’m a big fan of early computers, business history, and strategy, and being able to talk to the co-founders of 3dfx was incredible.
我是早期计算机、商业历史和战略的忠实粉丝，能够与 3dfx 的联合创始人交谈真是令人难以置信。
I don’t know if you were into PC gaming back then, but they were the dominant graphics card company for several years.
我不知道你当时是否喜欢电脑游戏，但他们多年来一直是显卡领域的主导公司。
It’s amazing that NVIDIA was able to overtake them.
令人惊奇的是 NVIDIA 能够超越他们。
Talking to the 3dfx co-founders about why they faltered was so cool.
与 3dfx 联合创始人谈论他们为何步履蹒跚真是太酷了。
Jon: Yeah, it’s actually one of the things I really appreciate about the book.
乔恩：是的，这实际上是我真正欣赏这本书的地方之一。
You get to see the other side—from the competitors competing with NVIDIA.
您可以从与 NVIDIA 竞争的竞争对手中看到另一面。
That’s very unique.
这非常独特。
I don’t see that often, and it’s very thorough here.
我不常看到这样的情况，而且这里讲得很彻底。
Tae Kim: They’re very honest about how they lost.
Tae Kim：他们对于自己的失败非常诚实。
They got too fixated on features instead of the schedule.
他们过于关注功能而不是时间表。
They wanted to make the perfect chip.
他们想要制造完美的芯片。
Jensen was the exact opposite—he made the schedule the feature.
詹森则恰恰相反——他把日程安排作为专题。
They aligned with PC makers and how they buy chips, reducing the cycle from 18 months to six months.
他们与 PC 制造商以及他们购买芯片的方式保持一致，将周期从 18 个月缩短到 6 个月。
It was such a genius strategy.
这是一个非常天才的策略。
They’re doing the same thing now with AI GPUs, going from a two-year to a one-year cycle.
他们现在正在用 AI GPU 做同样的事情，周期从两年变为一年。
Think about AMD trying to compete with this—accelerating product cycles makes it incredibly difficult to keep up.
想想 AMD 试图与之竞争的情况——产品周期的加快使其难以跟上。
That’s exactly what happened to 3dfx, Matrox, and dozens of other graphics companies like S3.
这正是 3dfx、Matrox 以及 S3 等数十家其他图形公司所发生的情况。
They just couldn’t compete with NVIDIA’s relentless execution.
他们只是无法与 NVIDIA 的不懈执行力竞争。
Jon: Did you feel like there were opportunities where other competitors could have done, to sort of beat Nvidia back in video or sort of kind of like, defeat them?
乔恩：你是否觉得其他竞争对手也有机会在视频领域击败 Nvidia，或者击败他们？
Because there were such times that they stumble, right?
因为他们也有跌倒的时候，对吗？
Tae Kim: The two major competitors, I would say, were 3dfx, and 3dfx had really good engineering and made two great graphics cards, but they couldn’t handle the 2D side, which is ironic because that’s the easier part.
Tae Kim：我想说，两个主要竞争对手是 3dfx，3dfx 拥有非常出色的工程设计并制造了两款很棒的显卡，但他们无法处理 2D 方面，这很讽刺，因为那是更容易的部分。
You need both 3D and 2D, and they couldn’t manage the 2D.
你需要 3D 和 2D，但他们无法管理 2D。
Then they made a terrible strategic decision by buying STB Systems, which was 3dfx’s biggest board partner.
然后他们做出了一个糟糕的战略决策，收购了 3dfx 最大的董事会合作伙伴 STB Systems。
When they bought STB, it became hard to manage.
当他们购买了 STB 后，管理就变得困难了。
Board partners buy graphics chips, put them on cards, and sell them to PC makers and consumers.
董事会合作伙伴购买图形芯片，将其安装在卡上，然后将其出售给个人电脑制造商和消费者。
But when 3dfx bought STB, they wanted to become the brand and couldn’t handle the inventory.
但当3dfx收购STB时，他们想成为品牌，但无法处理库存。
It was a complete debacle.
这是一场彻底的失败。
Inventory piled up, and they couldn’t manage the supply chain.
库存堆积，他们无法管理供应链。
And obviously, all the other board makers competing with STB decided to switch to NVIDIA.This actually helped NVIDIA because it gained all the board partners that left 3dfx.
显然，所有其他与 STB 竞争的主板制造商都决定转向 NVIDIA。这实际上帮助了 NVIDIA，因为它赢得了所有离开 3dfx 的主板合作伙伴。
That critical mistake directly led to 3dfx’s bankruptcy, as they couldn’t manage supply chain and inventory effectively.
这个严重错误直接导致 3dfx 破产，因为他们无法有效管理供应链和库存。
Tae Kim: The other big competitor was ATI, and it’s kind of funny how it’s connected to 3dfx.
Tae Kim：另一个大竞争对手是 ATI，它与 3dfx 的联系有点有趣。
Jensen told me that one reason they messed up after acquiring 3dfx was the NV30, the infamous “leaf blower” chip—bloated, overheating, and requiring super loud fans.
Jensen 告诉我，他们在收购 3dfx 后陷入困境的一个原因是 NV30，即臭名昭著的“吹叶机”芯片——臃肿、过热，并且需要超级大声的风扇。
Jensen said the NV30 was a disaster because they hired 100 3dfx engineers at the same time, and it was hard to integrate them.
Jensen 表示 NV30 是一场灾难，因为他们同时雇佣了 100 名 3dfx 工程师，而且很难将他们整合起来。
The NVIDIA team and the 3dfx engineers didn’t communicate well, and they didn’t work closely with game developers.
NVIDIA团队和3dfx工程师沟通不好，与游戏开发者合作不紧密。
They skipped features that were really important to game developers, leading to significant communication and cultural issues.
他们跳过了对游戏开发者来说真正重要的功能，导致了重大的沟通和文化问题。
On top of that, NVIDIA had legal disputes with Microsoft, and Microsoft withheld the DirectX 9 tech specs.
除此之外，NVIDIA 与微软还存在法律纠纷，而微软则扣留了 DirectX 9 的技术规格。
This forced NVIDIA to design the NV30 essentially blind, which was a complete disaster.
这迫使 NVIDIA 基本上盲目地设计 NV30，这完全是一场灾难。
Meanwhile, ATI bought ArtX, the team that made the GameCube chips.
与此同时，ATI 收购了制造 GameCube 芯片的团队 ArtX。
They were skilled at designing graphics chips and created the R300, which outperformed the NV30 in every way.
他们擅长设计图形芯片并创造了 R300，它在各方面都优于 NV30。
It delivered better framerates, was faster, quieter, and sold at the same price.
它提供了更好的帧速率、更快、更安静，并且以相同的价格出售。
Dierks, who heads software engineering at NVIDIA, told me this was a critical moment.
NVIDIA 软件工程主管 Dierks 告诉我，这是一个关键时刻。
If ATI had been more ruthless on the business side, they could have bankrupted NVIDIA.
如果 ATI 在商业方面更加无情的话，他们可能会让 NVIDIA 破产。
The R300, particularly the Radeon 9700, had higher margins, and ATI could have cut prices, which would have crushed NVIDIA, as NVIDIA was barely making money selling the NV30 at $399.
R300，尤其是 Radeon 9700，利润率更高，ATI 可能会降价，这会压垮 NVIDIA，因为 NVIDIA 以 399 美元的价格出售 NV30 几乎赚不到钱。
Dierks said that if Jensen had been running ATI, he would have bankrupted NVIDIA because he would have known exactly what to do.
Dierks 表示，如果 Jensen 一直在经营 ATI，他就会让 NVIDIA 破产，因为他会确切地知道该怎么做。
There were so many near-death experiences like this for NVIDIA, and Jensen’s resourcefulness was key to their survival.
NVIDIA 经历过太多这样的濒临死亡的经历，Jensen 的足智多谋是他们生存的关键。
In 1998, they were literally weeks away from running out of cash.
1998 年，他们的现金差几周就用完。
They had this manufacturing problem with TSMC.
他们与台积电有这个制造问题。
Intel was breathing down their neck, and Jensen was able to convince their three board partners to give them money.
英特尔对他们虎视眈眈，詹森说服了他们的三个董事会合作伙伴给他们钱。
He said, “Our technology is good.
他说：“我们的技术很好。
We’ll give you 10 percent off the IPO when we eventually IPO.
当我们最终 IPO 时，我们会给你 10% 的 IPO 折扣。
Just give us some money now.” He was able to pull that together in weeks.
现在就给我们一些钱吧。”他在几周内就完成了这些工作。
The CFO admitted this was all Jensen, not him.
首席财务官承认这都是詹森干的，不是他干的。
Another big instance was when they had their first couple of chip disasters.
另一个重大例子是他们发生前几次芯片灾难时。
Their first two chips were complete failures, yet Jensen kept raising money.
他们的前两个芯片完全失败了，但 Jensen 继续筹集资金。
Their third chip, the Riva 128, had a critical fault.
他们的第三个芯片 Riva 128 出现严重故障。
Curtis Priem, one of the three co-founders, explained they didn’t have the ability to make a really good VGA core, which was a big problem.
三位联合创始人之一 Curtis Priem 解释说，他们没有能力制造出真正好的 VGA 核心，这是一个大问题。
Doom was the biggest game of the day, and even though it wasn’t a 3D graphics game, people still played Doom and Doom 2, so you needed a solid 2D VGA core.
《毁灭战士》是当时最大的游戏，尽管它不是 3D 图形游戏，但人们仍然玩《毁灭战士》和《毁灭战士 2》，因此您需要一个可靠的 2D VGA 核心。
NVIDIA didn’t have it, nor did they have anyone who could make one.
英伟达没有，他们也没有人可以制造它。
Jensen somehow licensed a 2D core from one of their main competitors, Weitek.
Jensen 以某种方式从他们的主要竞争对手之一 Weitek 获得了 2D 核心的许可。
After securing the license, he hired their top VGA expert, Gopal Solanki, who became critical.
在获得许可后，他聘请了他们的顶级 VGA 专家 Gopal Solanki，后者对此提出了批评。
At a point where the company was about to die, Jensen found a way—convincing someone to give them money, a license, or a solution.
在公司即将消亡的时候，詹森找到了一种方法——说服某人给他们钱、许可证或解决方案。
This happened repeatedly.
这种情况反复发生。
Jensen is relentless, especially in recruiting.
詹森是不懈的，尤其是在招聘方面。
People say no to him again and again, but he keeps pursuing them until they agree.
人们一次又一次地拒绝他，但他不断追求他们，直到他们同意为止。
He’s constantly learning.
他不断学习。
One of the three pillars of the NVIDIA way is insane work ethic.
NVIDIA 方式的三大支柱之一是疯狂的职业道德。
People work like crazy.
人们疯狂地工作。
There’s also talent cultivation and speed and velocity.
还有人才培养和速度。
We’ve discussed speed and velocity, but talent cultivation is equally important.
我们讨论了速度和速率，但人才培养同样重要。
For example, when Jensen was talking to Scott Sellers, co-founder of 3dfx, he was already trying to recruit him before 3dfx even started.
例如，当 Jensen 与 3dfx 联合创始人 Scott Sellers 交谈时，他在 3dfx 成立之前就已经试图招募他了。
He asked, “Who’s really good that you’ve worked with?
他问：“你合作过的谁是真正优秀的人？
Who are the rock stars?” Sellers mentioned Dwight Diercks, who Jensen eventually hired.
谁是摇滚明星？”塞勒斯提到了德怀特·迪尔克斯（Dwight Diercks），詹森最终聘用了他。
Jensen constantly gathers knowledge and uses it later.
Jensen 不断收集知识并在以后使用。
Jensen is the reason NVIDIA has survived in this brutal industry, where nearly every other company either went bankrupt or got acquired.
Jensen 是 NVIDIA 在这个残酷的行业中生存下来的原因，在这个行业中，几乎所有其他公司要么破产，要么被收购。
Out of 80 to 100 companies making graphics chips, NVIDIA is the lone survivor.
在 80 到 100 家生产图形芯片的公司中，NVIDIA 是唯一的幸存者。
Jon: You talked a little bit about Intel.
乔恩：你谈到了一些关于英特尔的事情。
And I actually tweeted about the Intel thing.
我实际上在推特上谈到了英特尔的事情。
They had to kill Intel.
他们必须杀死英特尔。
Kill Intel.
干掉英特尔。
What, what was, what was that?
什么，什么，那是什么？
What went on with that?
这是怎么回事？
Tae Kim: Intel, the big Goliath, was 860 times larger than NVIDIA in revenue at the time.
Tae Kim：英特尔这个巨头，当时的营收是 NVIDIA 的 860 倍。
As the chip king, they noticed NVIDIA making money with the Riva 128 and gaining traction.
作为芯片之王，他们注意到 NVIDIA 通过 Riva 128 赚钱并获得关注。
Intel decided to act like the dominant player, essentially saying, “We’re going to snuff them out.” They told PC makers, “We’re coming out with the i740.
英特尔决定表现得像主导者一样，本质上是在说：“我们要把他们消灭掉。”他们告诉 PC 制造商，“我们将推出 i740。
It will have better image quality, it will be faster, and it will be great.
它将具有更好的图像质量，速度更快，而且非常棒。
Why are you buying chips from NVIDIA?
为什么要购买 NVIDIA 的芯片？
Just wait and buy ours when it comes out in February or March of ’98.”
请等待 98 年 2 月或 3 月上市时购买我们的产品。”
This completely destroyed NVIDIA’s pipeline.
这彻底摧毁了 NVIDIA 的管道。
PC makers hesitated, thinking Intel might offer something better.
个人电脑制造商犹豫不决，认为英特尔可能会提供更好的产品。
Jensen was alarmed and realized the situation was dire.
Jensen 感到震惊并意识到情况很严峻。
At a company meeting, he famously said, “We’re always 30 days away from going out of business.” This time it was true.
在一次公司会议上，他说过一句名言：“我们总是距离破产还有 30 天。”这次是真的。
He told employees, “Intel is out to get us.
他告诉员工：“英特尔是来对付我们的。
They’re out to kill us, and we have to acknowledge that and fight back.
他们想要杀了我们，我们必须承认这一点并予以反击。
We have to kill Intel.”
我们必须杀死英特尔。”
That might sound superficial, but the employees really took it to heart.
这听起来可能很肤浅，但员工们确实把它记在了心里。
One of the unsung heroes of the book, Caroline Landry, who was almost like a moral compass for NVIDIA in their early years, remembers feeling invigorated and riled up after Jensen’s speech.
Caroline Landry 是这本书中的无名英雄之一，早年几乎就像 NVIDIA 的道德指南针一样，她记得 Jensen 演讲后感到振奋和愤怒。
She started working even longer hours than she already was—past midnight, all weekends, waking up at 4 or 5 in the morning.
她开始工作的时间比现在更长——午夜过后，整个周末，凌晨四五点起床。
Even though she wanted to go back to sleep, she’d tell herself, “No, we must kill Intel,” and head back to work to help make the next chip better.
尽管她想回去睡觉，但她会告诉自己，“不，我们必须杀死英特尔”，然后回去工作，帮助改进下一个芯片。
When Intel’s i740 finally came out, it wasn’t that great and faded into oblivion.
当英特尔的 i740 最终问世时，它并没有那么出色，并逐渐被遗忘。
This was a common tactic in the computer industry, though.
不过，这是计算机行业的常见策略。
Microsoft did something similar in the ’80s—it’s called FUD: Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt, and Vaporware.
微软在 80 年代做了类似的事情，称为 FUD：恐惧、不确定性、怀疑和 Vaporware。
If a third-party software company launched a great product, Microsoft would announce a similar product and say, “Why are you buying this?” It would kill the sales of that third-party product.
如果第三方软件公司推出了一款出色的产品，微软就会发布一款类似的产品，并说：“你为什么要买这个？”这将扼杀该第三方产品的销售。
Jensen was able to recognize this tactic and figure out how to rally his employees to respond and do better.
詹森能够认识到这一策略，并找出如何团结员工做出回应并做得更好。
He’s done this throughout NVIDIA’s history.
在 NVIDIA 的整个历史中，他一直在这样做。
Jon: You also mentioned CUDA.
乔恩：您还提到了 CUDA。
I found that really interesting because when I did my video, I barely mentioned it.
我发现这真的很有趣，因为当我制作视频时，我几乎没有提到它。
You gave so much more depth.
你给出了更多的深度。
What sort of direction did they have when they were making CUDA?
他们在做CUDA的时候有什么样的方向？
What drove its adoption?
是什么推动了它的采用？
Tae Kim: CUDA is such an amazing story because it took so long to take off.
Tae Kim：CUDA 是一个非常了不起的故事，因为它花了很长时间才开始发展。
It’s obvious now that it’s a huge part of NVIDIA’s moat and the reason they’re doing so well, but back in 2006, it wasn’t obvious.
现在很明显，这是 NVIDIA 护城河的重要组成部分，也是他们做得如此出色的原因，但在 2006 年，这一点并不明显。
It was a huge expense, a massive R&D cost.
这是一笔巨大的开支，巨大的研发成本。
They dedicated a significant part of the chip die to it, which made it expensive and hurt their gross margins.
他们将芯片芯片的很大一部分专用于此，这使得芯片变得昂贵并损害了他们的毛利率。
Early on, it was just a concept—a parallel computing platform and ecosystem.
早期，这只是一个概念——并行计算平台和生态系统。
It was Jensen thinking about the future and where the computing industry would go.
Jensen 正在思考未来以及计算行业的发展方向。
He believed performance computing would eventually move to parallel computing devices like GPUs that could split workloads across thousands, and later tens of thousands, of cores, compared to CPUs that typically ran serially with only four to eight cores.
他相信性能计算最终将转向 GPU 等并行计算设备，这些设备可以将工作负载分配到数千个乃至数万个核心上，而 CPU 通常只有四到八个核心串行运行。
He knew that as computing became more data-intensive, accelerated computing would win out.
他知道，随着计算变得更加数据密集，加速计算将会胜出。
For the first few years, CUDA didn’t generate any significant revenue.
最初几年，CUDA 没有产生任何可观的收入。
Some scientists used it for simulations, weather prediction, or molecular biology analysis, but it wasn’t bringing in big money.
一些科学家将其用于模拟、天气预报或分子生物学分析，但它并没有带来大笔资金。
Internally, some people thought it was a waste of time, and Wall Street was pressuring him to cut it.
在内部，一些人认为这是浪费时间，华尔街正在向他施压，要求他削减这一开支。
Even in 2011, six or seven years in, it wasn’t a major revenue driver.
即使在六七年后的 2011 年，它也不是主要的收入驱动因素。
But Jensen kept pushing.
但詹森继续推动。
Eventually, it started gaining traction for high-end engineering and scientific simulations.
最终，它开始受到高端工程和科学模拟的关注。
It was a slow grind, but Jensen never gave up.
这是一个缓慢的过程，但 Jensen 从未放弃。
The real breakthrough came when AI started taking off—about three years ago.
真正的突破发生在人工智能开始起飞时——大约三年前。
Even then, it didn’t fully explode until a couple of quarters after ChatGPT came out.
即便如此，直到 ChatGPT 发布几个季度后，它才完全爆发。
That kind of long-term thinking is similar to Reed Hastings at Netflix.
这种长期思维类似于 Netflix 的里德·黑斯廷斯 (Reed Hastings)。
Hastings had an intuitive sense that the market would eventually move to video streaming over the internet.
黑斯廷斯有一种直觉，即市场最终将转向互联网上的视频流。
He didn’t know exactly when the technology or infrastructure would be ready, but he positioned Netflix to take advantage of the opportunity when it came.
他并不确切知道技术或基础设施何时准备就绪，但他让 Netflix 在机会到来时抓住机会。
Meanwhile, he built the DVD rental business as a bridge.
同时，他还搭建了DVD租赁业务作为桥梁。
NVIDIA has done this repeatedly—with 3D graphics, programmable GPUs, CUDA, tensor cores for AI, and full data center solutions with Mellanox.
NVIDIA 已经多次做到了这一点——通过 3D 图形、可编程 GPU、CUDA、AI 张量核心以及 Mellanox 的完整数据中心解决方案。
Jensen is always looking five, 10, 15 years ahead.
Jensen 始终展望未来 5 年、10 年、15 年。
He has an intuitive sense of where the market will go and positions NVIDIA with the best technology, ecosystem, and assets to seize the opportunity when it arises.
他对市场走向有敏锐的洞察力，并为 NVIDIA 提供最好的技术、生态系统和资产，以便在机会出现时抓住机会。
Take DLSS, ray tracing—it took 10 years.
以 DLSS、光线追踪为例——花了 10 年时间。
No other company invests in bleeding-edge R&D like this and successfully commercializes it.
没有其他公司能够像这样投资尖端研发并成功将其商业化。
There are many examples of companies in history, like Kodak inventing the digital camera but failing to capitalize on it, or Xerox creating the Windows GUI.
历史上有很多公司的例子，比如柯达发明了数码相机但未能利用它，或者施乐创建了 Windows GUI。
[NVIDIA, under Jensen, ensures they don’t just innovate but also dominate the markets they create.]
[Jensen 领导下的 NVIDIA 确保他们不仅创新，而且主导他们创造的市场。]
Jon: You talked in one of the most fascinating parts of the book—the email culture at NVIDIA and the “Top 5 Emails” system.
Jon：您谈到了本书中最引人入胜的部分之一——NVIDIA 的电子邮件文化和“前 5 封电子邮件”系统。
Can you explain what that email culture is like at the company?
您能解释一下公司的电子邮件文化吗？
It seems very distinct
看起来很有特色
Tae Kim: It’s called “Top 5 Emails.” This has been around since the beginning.
Tae Kim：这就是所谓的“前 5 封电子邮件”。这从一开始就存在。
Jensen loves email and is constantly on it.
Jensen 热爱电子邮件并且经常使用它。
To this day, people who left NVIDIA 20 years ago can email him, and he’ll instantly respond, often within a minute.
直到今天，20 年前离开 NVIDIA 的人只要给他发电子邮件，他就会立即回复，通常在一分钟之内。
When Blackberry came out, he was on it constantly.
当黑莓问世时，他一直在使用它。
This system was a way for him to break through the bureaucracy that usually happens in large companies.
这个系统是他突破大公司常见的官僚作风的一种方式。
In most companies, as they grow, managers create status reports, and those reports are cleaned up by layers of management to remove anything negative.
在大多数公司中，随着公司的发展，管理人员会创建状态报告，这些报告会由管理层进行清理，以消除任何负面影响。
By the time the CEO sees it, the report is often useless and doesn’t help steer the company.
当首席执行官看到该报告时，该报告通常毫无用处，并且无助于引导公司。
At NVIDIA, they started the “Top 5 Emails” system where, every week or two, every employee writes an email to their team, manager, and various distribution lists that Jensen can access.
在 NVIDIA，他们启动了“前 5 封电子邮件”系统，每两周，每个员工都会向他们的团队、经理以及 Jensen 可以访问的各种通讯组列表写一封电子邮件。
These emails outline the top five things they’re working on or the top five things they’ve observed.
这些电子邮件概述了他们正在做的最重要的五件事或他们观察到的最重要的五件事。
It could be a major competitor’s move, a new technology, or a cool AI paper.
它可能是一个主要竞争对手的举动、一项新技术或一篇很酷的人工智能论文。
Everyone knows what their team is working on, and Jensen reads hundreds of these emails every day.
每个人都知道他们的团队正在做什么，Jensen 每天都会阅读数百封这样的电子邮件。
This gives him the pulse of what’s happening across the company.
这让他了解整个公司正在发生的事情。
No one can hide whether things are going well or poorly.
没有人可以隐藏事情进展顺利还是糟糕。
He knows what people are working on and whether the vision he’s laid out is being executed because he’s constantly reading these emails, often all weekend or on Sunday evenings.
他知道人们在做什么，以及他所制定的愿景是否正在执行，因为他经常在整个周末或周日晚上阅读这些电子邮件。
I don’t think other companies do this.
我认为其他公司不会这样做。
In large companies, bureaucracy often filters out bad news because people don’t want it to reach the top and cause trouble.
在大公司中，官僚机构常常会过滤掉坏消息，因为人们不希望它到达高层并造成麻烦。
At NVIDIA, there’s a strong emphasis on intellectual honesty.
在 NVIDIA，非常重视知识的诚实。
Whether the news is good or bad, you must be honest.
无论消息是好是坏，你都必须诚实。
If someone hides something and it blows up six months later, that’s considered the worst thing you can do.
如果有人隐藏了某些东西，六个月后它就爆炸了，这被认为是你能做的最糟糕的事情。
There’s a saying at NVIDIA: “No one loses alone.” If you’re falling behind, you need to tell your team, and they’ll help you.
NVIDIA 有一句话：“没有人会独自失败。”如果你落后了，你需要告诉你的团队，他们会帮助你。
It’s one of the Jensenisms at NVIDIA.
这是 NVIDIA 的詹森主义之一。
This “Top 5 Emails” system has been his way of staying informed about what employees are working on for decades.
几十年来，这个“前 5 封电子邮件”系统一直是他了解员工工作情况的方式。
It’s not one-way communication either.
这也不是单向沟通。
If Jensen reads a Top 5 Email that interests him, he’ll send a quick reply: “What’s this?
如果 Jensen 阅读了他感兴趣的前 5 封电子邮件，他会快速回复：“这是什么？
What are you doing here?
你在这里做什么？
Why aren’t you doing it this way?” That’s his management style, and it’s why he has 60 direct reports—something unique in corporate America.
你为什么不这样做呢？”这就是他的管理风格，也是他拥有 60 名直接下属的原因——这在美国企业界是独一无二的。
Most CEOs have a small group of five or six executives reporting directly to them.
大多数首席执行官都有一小群由五到六名高管组成的小组，直接向他们报告。
Now, for Jensen, because he has this email culture where he can send quick emails very quickly, all day long, and he works more than anyone else, that’s why he can manage 60 people directly.
现在，对于 Jensen 来说，因为他拥有这种电子邮件文化，他可以整天快速地发送电子邮件，而且他比其他任何人都工作得更多，这就是为什么他可以直接管理 60 个人。
Jon: Does he jump, uh, you kind of mentioned this a little bit in passing, but does he jump, um, titles, I guess, does he jump levels, uh, within the company to reach out to people directly?
乔恩：他是否跳跃，呃，你顺便提到了这一点，但是他是否跳跃，嗯，头衔，我猜，他是否跳跃，呃，在公司内部直接与人们接触？
Tae Kim: Yes, that’s part of the culture as well.
Tae Kim：是的，这也是文化的一部分。
NVIDIA managers tell me that’s just how NVIDIA operates.
NVIDIA 经理告诉我，这就是 NVIDIA 的运作方式。
In most companies, the CEO talks to a manager before engaging with an employee.
在大多数公司中，首席执行官在与员工接触之前先与经理交谈。
At NVIDIA, all levels of the company are in the room at the same time, and Jensen loves talking to entry-level and junior employees because they’re often the ones doing the actual work on the ground.
在 NVIDIA，公司各个级别的员工都会同时在会议室，Jensen 喜欢与初级员工和初级员工交谈，因为他们往往是在现场进行实际工作的人。
He’s constantly peppering them with questions.
他不断地向他们提出问题。
NVIDIA managers say, “If you’re an employee under me, it’s fine if you’re talking to Jensen—just let me know what happened after the fact so I know what he’s asking about in my division.” That level of transparency is part of NVIDIA’s culture and avoids siloed mentalities.
NVIDIA 经理说：“如果您是我手下的员工，与 Jensen 交谈就可以了，只需让我知道事后发生的事情，这样我就知道他在我的部门询问什么。”这种程度的透明度是 NVIDIA 文化的一部分，可以避免孤立的心态。
Jensen is constantly talking to people at all levels of the company.
Jensen 不断与公司各个级别的人员交谈。
Jon: Interesting.
乔恩：有趣。
What kind of productivity or work practices did you take away after interacting with them?
与他们互动后，您获得了哪些生产力或工作实践？
Tae Kim: I’ve tried to be more blunt and direct.
Tae Kim：我尝试更加直率和直接。
That’s difficult in a corporate environment, but it really does save time.
这在企业环境中很困难，但确实节省了时间。
So much of the workplace involves long meetings, followed by more meetings, and concerns about not upsetting or embarrassing colleagues.
工作场所的大部分时间都涉及长时间的会议，然后是更多的会议，并且担心不会让同事感到不安或尴尬。
Then there are offline meetings and calls, all of which waste time.
然后还有线下会议、电话，这些都浪费时间。
If you’re blunt and direct—saying, “I have this issue, and I don’t think we’re going in the right direction”—it saves a lot of effort.
如果你直率而直接地说：“我遇到了这个问题，而且我认为我们没有朝着正确的方向前进”，这样可以节省很多精力。
I applied this during my book process.
我在写书过程中应用了这一点。
It’s better to be straightforward rather than coddling people’s feelings.
与其纵容别人的感受，不如直截了当。
It works.
有用。
It gets everyone on the same page, and your colleague will usually align and move in the same direction because people generally want to be effective.
它让每个人都达成共识，而你的同事通常会朝着同一个方向调整和前进，因为人们通常都希望高效。
After this process, I feel like I have this “AI Jensen” on my shoulder telling me to be blunt and direct.
经过这个过程，我觉得我的肩膀上有一个“AI Jensen”，告诉我要直率和直接。
Two important lessons from the book are: mission is the boss and speed of light.
这本书的两个重要教训是：使命是王，光速。
Mission is the boss means making the right decision for the company and the customer—not what’s good for your boss’s boss.
老板的使命意味着为公司和客户做出正确的决定，而不是为你老板的老板带来好处。
In corporate America, a huge percentage of time—30 to 50 percent—is spent doing things that don’t help the end customer but instead make your boss look good to their boss.
在美国企业界，很大一部分时间（30% 到 50%）花在做那些对最终客户没有帮助、反而让你的老板在他们的老板眼中看起来不错的事情上。
Minimizing that and focusing on the mission, not someone’s bonus, is critical.
尽量减少这种情况并专注于使命，而不是某人的奖金，这一点至关重要。
Speed of light means working with extreme speed and velocity.
光速意味着以极高的速度和速度工作。
At most companies, when you do a project, you have KPIs, and you might say, “I did 10 percent better than last time” or “We’re 10 percent better than the competitor.” If you said that at NVIDIA, you’d get dressed down.
在大多数公司，当你做一个项目时，你有 KPI，你可能会说，“我比上次做得好 10%”或“我们比竞争对手好 10%”。如果你在 NVIDIA 这么说，你就会穿得很随意。
They don’t care about what you did last time or how you compare to competitors.
他们不关心你上次做了什么，也不关心你与竞争对手相比如何。
They care about what’s physically possible.
他们关心物理上可能发生的事情。
If everything were perfect—no queues, no lag—what’s the absolute limit of physics?
如果一切都很完美——没有队列，没有滞后——物理的绝对极限是多少？
For example, if there’s lag between one factory process and another or inventory issues, NVIDIA asks how to eliminate that lag entirely to the limits of physics.
例如，如果一个工厂流程与另一个工厂流程之间存在滞后或库存问题，NVIDIA 会询问如何在物理极限范围内完全消除这种滞后。
By operating this way, no competitor can match them.
通过这种方式运作，没有竞争对手可以匹敌。
If everything is benchmarked to the ultimate possible speed and quality, they’re already operating at the fastest and most productive level.
如果一切都以最终可能的速度和质量为基准，那么他们已经以最快和最高效的水平运行。
If you do those two things— mission is the boss and speed of light —you’ll outperform nearly everyone.
如果你做到了这两件事——使命是王，光速——你几乎会超越所有人。
In large technology companies, there are horror stories.
在大型科技公司里，也有一些恐怖的故事。
At Google, you need approval from five different stakeholders.
在 Google，您需要获得五个不同利益相关者的批准。
At Intel, you might do the same PowerPoint presentation to half a dozen people, and nothing moves forward.
在英特尔，你可能会向六个人做同样的 PowerPoint 演示，但没有任何进展。
At NVIDIA, you do one presentation to Jensen, with everyone relevant in the room, they make a decision, and you go execute.
在 NVIDIA，您向 Jensen 做一次演示，房间里的每个相关人员都会做出决定，然后您就去执行。
There’s no delay, no indecision paralysis.
没有延迟，没有犹豫不决的瘫痪。
Tae Kim: It’s primarily a whiteboard, right?
Tae Kim：它主要是一块白板，对吧？
Jensen loves the whiteboard and hates PowerPoint.
Jensen 喜欢白板，讨厌 PowerPoint。
At most companies, you go through slides and talk through them.
在大多数公司，您会浏览幻灯片并进行讨论。
At NVIDIA, they want you to take a marker, go up to the whiteboard, explain everything, and defend every single thing you say.
在 NVIDIA，他们希望你拿起记号笔，走到白板前，解释一切，并为你所说的每一句话辩护。
If you propose a product or strategy, you must defend it with data and facts.
如果你提出一个产品或策略，你必须用数据和事实来捍卫它。
It’s a very active process, and it’s completely different.
这是一个非常活跃的过程，而且完全不同。
I’ve been involved in companies where, as a management consultant, the end product was just PowerPoints.
作为管理顾问，我曾参与过一些公司，这些公司的最终产品只是 PowerPoint。
That’s not NVIDIA.
那不是英伟达。
Jon: You mentioned he likes a specific brand of marker sold in Taiwan.
乔恩：你提到他喜欢台湾销售的一个特定品牌的记号笔。
Do you know what it is?
你知道它是什么吗？
Tae Kim: I do have a photo of it.
Tae Kim：我有一张照片。
I can send it to you afterward.
我可以稍后发给你。
It doesn’t have English on it, so I can’t read the name, but I’ll share the photo.
上面没有英文，所以我看不清名字，但我会分享照片。
Jon: I asked all my friends in Taiwan if they knew the brand or recognized it.
Jon：我问了所有台湾的朋友是否知道或者认可这个品牌。
They were so confused.
他们很困惑。
Do you have a favorite Jensenism other than the two you mentioned?
除了你提到的两个之外，你还有最喜欢的詹森主义吗？
He’s so quotable.
他太值得引用了。
Tae Kim: He’s very quotable.
金泰：他的名言非常值得引用。
One Jensenism I like is: “Second place is the first loser.” I think he took it from the founder of Ferrari.
我喜欢的詹森主义是：“第二名就是第一个失败者。”我认为他是从法拉利创始人那里学来的。
He does not want to be in second place.
他不想屈居第二。
This story comes from a marketing manager who came from S3, another graphics chip company.
这个故事来自另一家图形芯片公司S3的营销经理。
In PC gaming magazines, they rank graphics cards based on benchmarks—naming the best, second-best, and so on.
在电脑游戏杂志中，他们根据基准对显卡进行排名——列出最好的、第二好的等等。
One magazine ranked NVIDIA number two.
一本杂志将 NVIDIA 评为第二名。
At his prior company, being number two was fine.
在他之前的公司，排名第二就很好了。
The manager showed it to Jensen, and Jensen didn’t like it.
经理把它拿给Jensen看，Jensen不喜欢它。
He said, “No, we have to win.
他说：“不，我们必须赢。
We have to be number one.
我们必须成为第一。
Second place is the first loser.” That shows his extreme competitiveness and why he works so hard—he always wants to win.
第二名是第一名失败者。”这显示了他极度的竞争力以及他为何如此努力——他总是想赢。
There’s also a funny story about one of NVIDIA’s CFOs in the early years, Jeffrey Barr, who was ranked in the top 50 chess players in the U.S. earlier in his life.
还有一个有趣的故事，是关于英伟达早年的一位首席财务官杰弗里·巴尔(Jeffrey Barr)，他早年曾跻身美国前 50 名国际象棋棋手。
Jensen knew this and wanted to beat him at chess.
Jensen知道这一点并且想在国际象棋上击败他。
He studied like crazy, memorizing openings and strategies, and played against him.
他疯狂地学习，记住开局和策略，并与他比赛。
But Barr could tell what Jensen was doing, so he’d play unpredictably, doing things out of the ordinary.
但巴尔可以知道詹森在做什么，所以他会打得不可预测，做一些不寻常的事情。
Jensen couldn’t react and got beaten every time.
Jensen每次都反应不过来，就挨打。
Jensen couldn’t handle losing.
詹森无法承受失败。
Every time he lost, he’d flip the chessboard over and say, “Jeff, we’re playing ping pong now.” Jensen had been a ping pong champion growing up and was very good at it.
每次他输了，他都会把棋盘翻过来说：“杰夫，我们现在正在打乒乓球。”詹森从小就是一名乒乓球冠军，而且非常擅长。
He’d play Barr in ping pong and beat him badly, just to feel better.
他会和巴尔打乒乓球，然后狠狠地击败他，只是为了感觉好一点。
Jensen needs to win—he’s extremely competitive.
詹森需要赢——他非常有竞争力。
It shows his character.
这显示了他的性格。
Even when playing chess with a co-worker, something relatively unimportant, he needed to win.
即使是和同事下棋，这是相对不重要的事情，他也需要赢。
Jon: When you talk to other people at NVIDIA, do you feel like you’re speaking to mini Jensens?
Jon：当您与 NVIDIA 的其他人交谈时，您是否感觉自己正在与迷你 Jensens 交谈？
Do they repeat what he says?
他们重复他说的话吗？
Tae Kim: There are a couple of people who adore Jensen and want to be like him.
Tae Kim：有一些人崇拜 Jensen，并希望成为像他一样的人。
For them, it’s a life goal.
对于他们来说，这是一个人生目标。
But beyond that, there’s a wide variety of personality types at NVIDIA.
但除此之外，NVIDIA 的性格类型多种多样。
The one consistent thing is the work ethic.
唯一一致的是职业道德。
People who stay at NVIDIA have an unbelievable work ethic.
留在 NVIDIA 的员工有着令人难以置信的职业道德。
Those who don’t usually burn out within a few years.
那些通常不会在几年内精疲力尽的人。
Personality-wise, there’s diversity in how people relate and work, so the company isn’t full of “mini Jensens.” But everyone appreciates his work ethic and the culture at NVIDIA.
就个性而言，人们的交往和工作方式存在多样性，因此公司中并不充满“迷你詹森”。但每个人都欣赏他的职业道德和 NVIDIA 的文化。
Many people who leave NVIDIA struggle to adjust at other organizations.
许多离开 NVIDIA 的人很难适应其他组织。
It’s hard to be blunt and direct at other companies because people get easily offended.
很难对其他公司直言不讳，因为人们很容易被冒犯。
It’s also hard to move fast with decisions because you have to get buy-in from multiple people.
快速做出决策也很困难，因为你必须得到多人的支持。
That’s the big takeaway—people often have a tough time working elsewhere after working at NVIDIA.
这是一个重要的收获——人们在 NVIDIA 工作后往往会在其他地方工作一段艰难的时光。
Tae Kim: I’ve been asked this a few times.
金泰：我已经被问过好几次了。
I think it really depends on the CEO who takes over.
我认为这实际上取决于接任的首席执行官。
I don’t think that’s happening anytime soon because Jensen keeps saying he loves NVIDIA, it’s his life, and he loves working.
我认为这不会很快发生，因为 Jensen 一直说他热爱 NVIDIA，这是他的生活，而且他热爱工作。
I don’t see him leaving NVIDIA anytime soon.
我认为他不会很快离开 NVIDIA。
But eventually, someone will take over, and it really depends on who that person is.
但最终，会有人接管，这实际上取决于那个人是谁。
Are we going to get a Satya Nadella?
我们会得到萨提亚纳德拉吗？
Or are we going to get a Steve Ballmer or John Sculley?
或者我们会得到史蒂夫·鲍尔默（Steve Ballmer）或约翰·斯卡利（John Sculley）？
Every major tech giant’s future depends on the quality of its CEO.
每个主要科技巨头的未来都取决于其首席执行官的素质。
It’s hard to speculate on who could fill Jensen’s shoes at this point.
目前很难猜测谁可以接替詹森的位置。
Jon: What do you think motivates him to keep going?
乔恩：你认为是什么激励他继续前进？
He’s one of the longest-tenured CEOs, and now NVIDIA is one of the biggest companies in the world.
他是任期最长的首席执行官之一，而现在 NVIDIA 是世界上最大的公司之一。
What drives him?
是什么驱使他？
Tae Kim: I think he’s just very competitive, and he loves what he does.
Tae Kim：我认为他非常有竞争力，而且他热爱他所做的事情。
He feels he’s having a huge positive impact on the world.
他觉得自己正在对世界产生巨大的积极影响。
He’s super excited about how NVIDIA is enabling digital biology, potentially curing diseases and cancers.
他对 NVIDIA 如何实现数字生物学、有望治愈疾病和癌症感到非常兴奋。
I think that drives him.
我认为这是他的动力。
He’s also extremely proud of what he’s built with his corporate family.
他还对自己与企业家族所建立的一切感到非常自豪。
He truly sees NVIDIA employees as his family.
他确实将 NVIDIA 员工视为自己的家人。
He’s very hard on himself about the few layoffs NVIDIA has had in its history—he still feels bad about them.
对于 NVIDIA 历史上的几次裁员，他对自己非常严厉——他仍然对此感到难过。
But he’s proud of how he’s helped his employees and their families succeed.
但他为自己如何帮助员工及其家人取得成功感到自豪。
He knows his work enables them to pay off college educations and support their families financially.I think that pride in helping his employees and their families keeps him motivated.
他知道他的工作使他们能够支付大学学费并在经济上支持他们的家庭。我认为帮助员工及其家人的自豪感让他充满动力。
Jon: When speaking with him, when you're interviewing, what sort of questions you feel got him most worked up?
乔恩：当你和他交谈时，当你面试时，你觉得什么样的问题让他最兴奋？
Tae Kim: He didn’t like how the early employees kind of look back at NVIDIA's early years nostalgically.
Tae Kim：他不喜欢早期员工怀念 NVIDIA 早年的方式。
He did not like that.
他不喜欢那样。
He even joked that he was kind of embarrassed by all the mistakes and mismanagement.
他甚至开玩笑说，他对所有的错误和管理不善感到有点尴尬。
He doesn’t view NVIDIA’s first 10–15 years as a great origin story, even though I think it is.
他并不认为 NVIDIA 的前 10-15 年是一个伟大的起源故事，尽管我认为如此。
It was strange having to defend those early years to him.
对他来说，必须为早年辩护是很奇怪的。
I told him, “You grew faster than any other chip company in history, and you’re calling it a mismanaged company.” But that’s part of why he does well—he’s so afraid of becoming overconfident and complacent that he tricks himself into believing, “You suck.
我告诉他，“你们的成长速度比历史上任何其他芯片公司都快，而你们却称其为管理不善的公司。”但这就是他表现出色的部分原因——他非常害怕变得过于自信和自满，以至于他欺骗自己相信：“你很糟糕。
You’re terrible.
你太糟糕了。
You’re not good enough.”
你还不够好。”
There’s a story where they had a blowout quarter, and Jensen walked into the room and said, “In the mirror today, I told myself, ‘You suck, Jensen.’” On the flip side, when things are really hard and he’s worried about how to tackle something, he tells himself, “How hard can it be?
有一个故事，他们有一个井喷的季度，詹森走进房间说，“今天在镜子里，我告诉自己，‘你很糟糕，詹森。’”另一方面，当事情真的很困难并且他担心如何解决某些事情时，他告诉自己，“这能有多难？
We’ll figure it out.”
我们会想办法的。”
He uses these mental tricks not only on himself but also with others, using catchphrases like “How hard can it be?” It often turns out to be pretty hard, but by convincing himself mentally to avoid both overconfidence and despair, he finds balance.
他不仅对自己使用这些心理技巧，还对他人使用这些心理技巧，使用诸如“这能有多难？”之类的口号。这往往是相当困难的，但通过在精神上说服自己避免过度自信和绝望，他找到了平衡。
It’s almost like he’s his own personal psychologist.
这几乎就像他是他自己的私人心理学家。
Jon: One of my favorite conversations you had was the one with Rick Tsai from TSMC.
乔恩：我最喜欢的谈话之一是与台积电的 Rick Tsai 的谈话。
You mentioned the concept of “rough justice.” Can you explain more about that?
您提到了“粗暴正义”的概念。你能解释一下吗？
Tae Kim: That conversation with Rick was one of the coolest things, and we had a nice, long conversation about other stuff too.
Tae Kim：与 Rick 的谈话是最酷的事情之一，我们也就其他事情进行了愉快的长时间谈话。
That’s one of the coolest things about this book—you get access to these major historical figures, and you can ask them questions about everything, and they’re very open.
这是这本书最酷的事情之一——你可以接触到这些主要的历史人物，你可以向他们询问一切问题，他们非常开放。
Rick said that when he was the main contact at TSMC for NVIDIA, he came to meet Jensen pretty often.
Rick 表示，当他担任 NVIDIA 在台积电的主要联系人时，他经常来见 Jensen。
They went to a mid-level restaurant—not quite Denny’s, but above that.
他们去了一家中层餐厅——不完全是丹尼餐厅，但也比丹尼餐厅高。
They were having some issues with manufacturing.
他们在制造方面遇到了一些问题。
This was one of the early meetings between Jensen and Rick, and Jensen said, “Let me tell you this, I have this business philosophy of rough justice.”
这是 Jensen 和 Rick 之间的早期会面之一，Jensen 说：“让我告诉你，我有这种粗暴正义的商业理念。”
What that means is sometimes, in any particular deal or interaction, one side might get 60 percent of the benefit, and the other side gets 40 percent.
这意味着有时，在任何特定交易或互动中，一方可能获得 60% 的利益，而另一方获得 40%。
But next time, it might flip, where the other side gets 60 percent, and you get 40 percent.
但下一次，情况可能会翻转，对方获得 60%，而你获得 40%。
It’s never going to be perfectly 50/50.
它永远不会是完美的 50/50。
But if you work together and have a strong, trusted relationship, where over time it balances out to about 50/50, that’s a great partnership.
但如果你们一起工作并拥有牢固、值得信赖的关系，随着时间的推移，这种关系会达到大约 50/50 的平衡，这就是一个很好的合作伙伴关系。
Rick thought that was really brilliant.
里克认为这真是太棒了。
He said sometimes TSMC might need to get the better end of an interaction, or NVIDIA might need extra help, like during low yields or other problems.
他表示，有时台积电可能需要在互动中取得更好的结果，或者英伟达可能需要额外的帮助，比如在低产量或其他问题期间。
The key was being there for the other partner at different times, and over a few years, it balances out to even.
关键是在不同的时间陪伴另一位伙伴，几年后，它就会达到平衡。
Rick said that’s exactly what happened.
里克说，事情正是如此。
Rick also said this is one of the strongest partnerships in technology history, lasting nearly 25 years.
Rick 还表示，这是技术史上最牢固的合作伙伴关系之一，持续了近 25 年。
He compared it to a friendship—when your friend is having issues, you’re there for them, and they’ll be there for you when you’re going through problems.
他将其比作友谊——当你的朋友遇到问题时，你会在他们身边，当你遇到问题时，他们也会在你身边。
That’s how they did business.
他们就是这样做生意的。
Jon: What things do you think NVIDIA didn’t do that were significant to their success?
Jon：您认为 NVIDIA 没有做哪些对他们的成功至关重要的事情？
What missteps did they avoid?
他们避免了哪些失误？
Tae Kim: They did try to get into mobile chips.
Tae Kim：他们确实尝试进入移动芯片领域。
There are stories about them trying to get Samsung to use their chips.
有报道称他们试图让三星使用他们的芯片。
I don’t know if they ever got the Samsung Galaxy contract, but I don’t think being a supplier, like Qualcomm in smartphones, would have helped them.
我不知道他们是否获得了三星 Galaxy 的合同，但我不认为作为供应商，就像智能手机领域的高通一样，会对他们有帮助。
That’s not really what they do.
那不是他们真正做的。
Their products tend to be high-performance and high-power, not low-power.
他们的产品往往是高性能、高功率，而不是低功率。
It’s kind of funny because NVIDIA is likely to do some AI PC stuff within a year, but mobile wasn’t their strength.
这有点有趣，因为 NVIDIA 可能会在一年内做一些人工智能 PC 的事情，但移动并不是他们的强项。
It would have diverted focus and management if they had succeeded with Tegra.
如果 Tegra 取得成功，他们的注意力和管理就会转移。
They didn’t, aside from the Nintendo Switch, which is a very small part of their business.
除了任天堂 Switch 之外，他们没有这样做，这只是他们业务的一小部分。
Jon: Do you find it’s a challenge now that the company is so different?
乔恩：现在公司如此不同，你觉得这是一个挑战吗？
How does Jensen instill fear and drive when the employees are so successful, with many likely being multimillionaires from NVIDIA stock?
当员工如此成功（其中许多人可能是 NVIDIA 股票的千万富翁）时，Jensen 如何向员工灌输恐惧和动力？
I think he just retains the right people.
我认为他只是留住了合适的人。
Many senior employees I’ve talked to have stayed for 15, 20, 25 years.
我采访过的许多高级员工已经在公司工作了 15 年、20 年、25 年。
They’ve been wealthy for a long time, yet they still work like crazy.
他们已经富有了很长时间了，但他们仍然疯狂地工作。
These are people for whom this is their life.
对这些人来说，这就是他们的生活。
They love designing and engineering great products that are changing the world in so many ways, especially now with AI.
他们喜欢设计和制造在很多方面改变世界的伟大产品，尤其是现在的人工智能。
We’re not talking about video games anymore.
我们不再谈论视频游戏了。
We’re talking about robotics, digital biology, and other technologies that could change the world.
我们谈论的是机器人技术、数字生物学和其他可能改变世界的技术。
Jensen brings in people passionate about the mission.
詹森吸引了对这一使命充满热情的人们。
From what I’ve seen, the people I’ve talked to are not slacking off at all.
据我观察，与我交谈过的人并没有丝毫懈怠。
And if you do slack off, Jensen will be all over you.
如果你真的偷懒了，Jensen 就会盯上你。
People who do want to slack off retire—many have retired.
那些确实想偷懒的人退休了——许多人已经退休了。
Jon: What do you want readers to take away from the book?
乔恩：你希望读者从这本书中学到什么？
What do you want them to think about and reflect on after reading it?
您希望他们读完之后能够思考和反思什么？
Like I said, the ideas of “mission is the boss” and “speed of light” are more effective ways to work and be productive.
就像我说的，“使命就是老板”和“光速”的想法是更有效的工作方式和生产力。
I believe that.
我相信这一点。
I also want people to reflect on corporate culture.
我还希望人们反思企业文化。
In many large corporations, the people who become CEOs are nothing like Jensen.
在许多大公司中，成为首席执行官的人都不像詹森。
They’re schmoozers, MBAs, and finance types.
他们是闲聊者、MBA 和金融人士。
I wish every company would put technically competent people in leadership roles to make decisions, not just marketing or finance professionals.
我希望每家公司都能让技术上有能力的人担任领导角色来做出决策，而不仅仅是营销或财务专业人员。
Finally, NVIDIA’s story shows there are no shortcuts.
最后，NVIDIA 的故事表明没有捷径。
Jensen talks about how success requires pain and suffering.
詹森谈到成功需要痛苦和磨难。
It’s funny but true.
这很有趣，但却是事实。
It’s through trials that you learn, pocket those lessons, and improve.
通过尝试，你可以学习、吸取教训并提高。
I want people to understand that.
我希望人们能够理解这一点。
The internet is full of ads and influencers promoting “get rich quick” schemes.
互联网上充斥着宣传“快速致富”计划的广告和影响者。
The Jensen story and NVIDIA’s history show you have to work hard, endure pain, and put in effort.
Jensen 的故事和 NVIDIA 的历史表明，你必须努力工作、忍受痛苦并付出努力。
Only then do you get the reward.
只有这样你才能得到回报。
Jon: Thanks.
乔恩：谢谢。
That really stuck with me as well.
这也深深地困扰着我。
Tae, thank you so much for taking the time.
泰，非常感谢您抽出时间。
I really appreciate it.
我真的很感激。