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I got interviewed by Ben Thompson of Stratechery.
我接受了 Stratechery 的 Ben Thompson 的采访。
The interview is below.
采访如下。
But first, a few updates to write about.
但首先,需要写一些更新。
I am moving the Asianometry Newsletter to Passport and adding it to the Stratechery Plus bundle.
我正在将 Asianometry Newsletter 移至 Passport 并将其添加到 Stratechery Plus 捆绑包中。
Released video scripts and the audio feed will be accessible to Stratechery Plus subscribers (and we have a trial offer for you below).
Stratechery Plus 订阅者将可以访问已发布的视频脚本和音频源(下面我们为您提供了试用优惠)。
YouTube videos will remain free, as they always have been.
YouTube 视频将一如既往地保持免费。
As you know, video transcripts were posted somewhat sporadically.
如您所知,视频文字记录是零星发布的。
Moving forward transcripts and podcasts will be first class citizens: they will be available the same day as my public YouTube videos for Stratechery Plus subscribers.
今后的文字记录和播客将成为一等公民:它们将与我的公开 YouTube 视频在同一天向 Stratechery Plus 订阅者提供。
To manage your account, including adding the podcast feed to your podcast player, and to manage your email settings, go here (link).
要管理您的帐户,包括将播客提要添加到您的播客播放器,以及管理您的电子邮件设置,请转到此处(链接)。
You can use the same email that you used to subscribe to this Substack.
您可以使用订阅此子堆栈时使用的同一电子邮件地址。
To be clear, this is in addition to my YouTube channel.
需要明确的是,这是我的 YouTube 频道的补充。
That is the core of my work, and if you want early access you can still subscribe to my Patreon.
这是我工作的核心,如果你想抢先体验,你仍然可以订阅我的 Patreon。
Nothing will change in that regard, other than the fact this is officially now my full-time job.
在这方面什么都不会改变,除了现在正式成为我的全职工作这一事实之外。
I have also been working with Ben to make YouTube videos for his public Articles.
我还一直与 Ben 合作,为他的公开文章制作 YouTube 视频。
You can see those videos here.
您可以在这里观看这些视频。
I am a big fan of Ben Thompson and Stratechery and have long wanted to work with him.
我是 Ben Thompson 和 Stratechery 的忠实粉丝,长期以来一直想与他合作。
We’ve also arranged a one month trial to Stratechery Plus for all of you:
我们还为大家安排了为期一个月的 Stratechery Plus 试用:
You can opt in to receive Stratechery emails or add the Stratechery podcast here
您可以选择接收 Stratechery 电子邮件或在此处添加 Stratechery 播客
You also have access to Sharp Tech, Sharp China, Dithering, and Greatest of All Talk; click any of those links to add the podcasts to your podcast player
您还可以访问 Sharp Tech、Sharp China、Dithering 和 Greatest of All Talk;单击其中任何链接将播客添加到您的播客播放器
This one month trial is completely free, and you don’t need a credit card, but if you do decide to join the entire bundle is $15/month (including the Asianometry podcast and transcripts).
这一个月的试用是完全免费的,并且您不需要信用卡,但如果您决定加入,整个捆绑包的费用为每月 15 美元(包括 Asianometry 播客和成绩单)。
You can of course cancel at any time.
您当然可以随时取消。
This Substack and its URL will remain open, but it’ll be mostly just for directing you guys to the new Asianometry site .
这个 Substack 及其 URL 将保持开放,但主要只是为了引导你们访问新的 Asianometry 网站。
Go there for the latest work.
去那里看看最新的工作。
This is a big transition and there will be some bumps along the way.
这是一个重大转变,一路上会遇到一些坎坷。
Hope you guys can bear with us as we make this update, but I think it’s going to be great.
希望大家能够耐心等待我们进行此更新,但我认为这会很棒。
And, to be clear, if you just want to watch the videos, those are and will remain free forever.
而且,需要明确的是,如果您只想观看视频,这些视频将永远免费。
There's going to be a nice long intro here before this interview, introducing you and your work to the Stratechery readers.
在这次采访之前,我们将有一个很好的长篇介绍,向 Stratechery 读者介绍您和您的工作。
Not just your work, but also your work for Stratechery, which we can get to in a moment.
不仅仅是您的工作,还有您为 Stratechery 所做的工作,我们稍后会介绍。
But I always like to start these interviews by learning more about the person themself.
但我总是喜欢通过更多地了解这个人本身来开始这些采访。
Where'd you grow up?
你在哪里长大?
What inspired you to start a YouTube channel focused on technology in Asia?
是什么促使您在亚洲开设一个专注于技术的 YouTube 频道?
Was that always a focus?
这一直是焦点吗?
Or did you sort of stumble onto this?
或者你是偶然发现这一点的?
It was always the focus.
它始终是焦点。
I grew up in Southern California, and then worked in the Valley for about 10 years after college.
我在南加州长大,大学毕业后在硅谷工作了大约 10 年。
I was just like an ordinary guy on the street, and then kind of burnt out and thought to myself, "You know what?
我就像街上的一个普通人,然后有点精疲力竭,心想:“你知道吗?
I should go to Asia" — I didn't even know, I just called it Asia.
我应该去亚洲”——我什至不知道,我只是称之为亚洲。
Yup.
是的。
I wrote an Article a few weeks ago about building things.
几周前我写了一篇关于构建事物的文章。
There's different aspects, some are China-specific, some are in Taiwan or Indonesia and I'm like, "You know what?
有不同的方面,有些是中国特有的,有些是台湾或印度尼西亚的,我想,“你知道吗?
I'm just going to use Asia, and we're going to roll with it".
我将使用亚洲,我们将随之发展”。
It's way too broad, but it works sometimes.
它太宽泛了,但有时确实有效。
I know, right?
我知道,对吧?
I would go to these cities, and I had no idea necessarily the difference between these cities.
我会去这些城市,但我并不知道这些城市之间有什么区别。
I just picked one and then jumped, ended up — Taiwan gave me the best offer work-wise, so flew over there thinking I would be there for six months, and that was eight years ago.
我只是选了一个然后就跳了,最后——台湾给了我最好的工作机会,所以飞到那里以为我会在那里呆六个月,那是八年前的事了。
So, I ended up staying for a while.
所以,我最终还是停留了一段时间。
I think about a few months in, I went on a trip to Japan with my mother, and my mother asked me, "I don't really know what you're doing over there in Asia, in Taiwan, and you should share that with us".
我想几个月后,我和妈妈去日本旅行,我妈妈问我,“我真的不知道你在亚洲、台湾做什么,你应该与我们分享”。
I was like, "Okay, mom, I'll open a YouTube channel for you".
我当时想,“好吧,妈妈,我会为你开设一个 YouTube 频道”。
Asianometry started out as a tourism channel, where basically I would go to some — like the Daxi Statue park , and I would film the video , and I would say, "Mom, this is this statue and that's that statue", and eventually you just run out of things to film, to visit.
Asianometry最初是一个旅游频道,基本上我会去一些地方——比如大溪雕像公园,我会拍摄视频,我会说,“妈妈,这是这个雕像,那是那个雕像”,最终你就没有东西可以拍摄、可以参观。
Oh, immensely expensive.
哦,非常昂贵。
The return on invested cost is already terrible on a YouTube video, and then suddenly, we're spending hundreds of dollars to travel.
YouTube 视频的投资成本回报率已经很糟糕了,然后突然间,我们要花费数百美元去旅行。
Anyways, you run out of things to talk about, and I still had the channel, so I figured, "Hey, I'll make videos about Asia".
不管怎样,你已经没有什么可谈的了,而且我还有这个频道,所以我想,“嘿,我会制作有关亚洲的视频”。
I started out only about China and Taiwan, but then the comments, YouTube comments were just so brutal.
我一开始只谈论中国和台湾,但后来的评论,YouTube 上的评论真是太残酷了。
They're just like, "This channel should be called Chinanometry, not Asianometry." That forced me, I was forced to export my research to other countries.
他们就像是,“这个频道应该被称为 Chinaanometry,而不是 Asianometry。”这迫使我,我被迫将我的研究成果出口到其他国家。
Well, I mean, you're pretty well-known , I think, amongst — some of my readers know who you are in Silicon Valley, particularly for your work on semiconductors and things along those lines.
嗯,我的意思是,我认为,你在硅谷非常有名,我的一些读者知道你是谁,特别是因为你在半导体和类似领域的工作。
Was that just a, "This is something that Asia is really good at", you sort of stumbled into it?
这只是你偶然发现的“这是亚洲真正擅长的事情”吗?
Well, half and half, I think.
嗯,我想一半一半。
If you're in Asia, in Taiwan in particular, it's really hard to avoid, to not notice TSMC so I covered TSMC pretty early on.
如果你在亚洲,特别是在台湾,很难避免不注意到台积电,所以我很早就介绍了台积电。
But then also secondarily, my father is an analog chip designer, and occasionally, we'll talk about the work that he did and the work that he does for a while.
但其次,我的父亲是一名模拟芯片设计师,偶尔,我们会谈论他所做的工作以及他一段时间所做的工作。
So, it was in the blood but in the environment too.
所以,它存在于血液中,也存在于环境中。
Yeah.
是的。
Well, I was going to ask you what's been the most surprising part of your YouTube experience, but I think the fact that you're sitting here and you have hundreds of thousands of views on your videos these days about chips, when you started out doing a sort of tourism channel for your mom, that might be the answer.
好吧,我本来想问你 YouTube 经历中最令人惊讶的部分是什么,但我认为,当你开始为你妈妈制作一个旅游频道时,你坐在这里,这些天你的有关芯片的视频有数十万次观看,这可能就是答案。
But beyond that, what has been the most interesting thing about being a YouTuber?
但除此之外,作为 YouTuber 最有趣的事情是什么?
You get really into the dynamics of the algorithm, you get an understanding of the shortfalls of the algorithm, you can grow really fast.
你真正了解算法的动态,了解算法的缺点,你可以快速成长。
But people, it's kind of a dog-eat-dog world out there.
但是人们,这就是一个狗咬狗的世界。
I've learned a lot from you, especially in terms of consistency and continuing to bring something to the table every week or every few days.
我从你身上学到了很多东西,特别是在一致性以及继续每周或每隔几天提供一些东西方面。
So, that's something that's really surprised me, and I think that's also just surprised that I can keep going at this pace.
所以,这真的让我感到惊讶,我想这也让我惊讶于我能继续以这样的速度前进。
It's been eight years now, so it's a while.
现在已经过去八年了,时间也很长。
Yeah.
是的。
There's a lot I could relate to.
有很多事情与我相关。
I was only going to come to Taiwan for a year, and here we are both sitting here.
我本来只打算来台湾一年,而我们都坐在这里。
And yeah, the job I've had longer than anything else, and it's like if you would've told me in 2013, "Are you still coming me up with stuff to write about?", at the beginning, you're like, "Wait, once I cover what I want to write about, then what?", turns out the technology sector is a good foundation for always having new things to explore and explain.
是的,我从事这份工作的时间比其他任何事情都长,就像你在 2013 年告诉我,“你还在给我想出一些东西来写吗?”,一开始,你会说,“等等,一旦我写完了我想写的东西,然后呢?”,事实证明,技术行业是一个很好的基础,总是有新的东西可以探索和解释。
Yeah.
是的。
But I do feel sometimes I go back to my older videos, I would go to some beautiful topic and I look to myself, and I'd be like, "Man, I wish I could do that again with what I know now", it would probably be three times longer, but it would be beautiful.
但我确实觉得有时我会回到以前的视频,我会回到一些美丽的话题,然后我看着自己,我会说,“伙计,我希望我能用我现在所知道的再做一次”,它可能会长三倍,但它会很美丽。
Well, that's kind of what I want to do in this interview, because I write a lot about semiconductors , and obviously TSMC .
嗯,这就是我在这次采访中想做的事情,因为我写了很多关于半导体的文章,显然是台积电。
I was going through, number one, everything I want to ask you about, you already have a video about, so we'll have lots of links throughout this interview.
我正在经历,第一,我想问你的一切,你已经有一个视频,所以我们在整个采访中会有很多链接。
But at the same time, I'm like, some of these videos, like your current videos have, like I said, hundreds of thousands of views.
但与此同时,我想,其中一些视频,比如您当前的视频,正如我所说,有数十万的观看次数。
Some of these ones that are really pertinent have 50,000 views.
其中一些真正相关的内容有 50,000 次浏览。
I'm like, "Wait, you guys have to go back and go through this library".
我说,“等等,你们必须回去浏览一下这个图书馆”。
I don't know, maybe you have an excuse to remake some of them.
我不知道,也许你有借口重做其中一些。
Yeah, that would be fun, but there's always new ideas coming up.
是的,那会很有趣,但总会有新的想法出现。
One thing I'm surprised me, I guess to go back to your question, there's always more ideas.
让我感到惊讶的一件事是,我想回到你的问题,总是有更多的想法。
My list is hundreds of topics long, I'm going insane every day I add more.
我的列表有数百个主题,每天添加更多主题我都会发疯。
Has YouTube changed?
YouTube 改变了吗?
Is there a bit where chasing the algorithm and that changes, and you mentioned the comments being brutal and bullying you into covering more things.
是否有一些地方追逐算法并且发生了变化,你提到这些评论是残酷的,并欺负你报道更多的事情。
Is that a consistency of the YouTube experience, or has it changed in the eight years you've been doing it?
这是 YouTube 体验的一贯性吗?还是说在您从事这件事的八年里它发生了变化?
I think early on, the YouTube channel, it was much easier to just go big with certain topics.
我认为在早期,YouTube 频道更容易在某些主题上大肆宣传。
I think there's still certain keywords or things or topics, strategies that sort of work.
我认为仍然有某些关键词、事物或主题、策略可以发挥作用。
For example, calling out a country still works to some extent.
比如喊出一个国家,在一定程度上还是有作用的。
Analyzing deeply something that no one else has looked at, good to some extent.
深入分析别人没有看过的东西,在某种程度上是好的。
I think that's still tried and true, and I still like to do that.
我认为这仍然是经过尝试的并且是正确的,而且我仍然喜欢这样做。
I noticed that I don't do as well if I make an Nvidia video nowadays-
我注意到,如果我现在制作 Nvidia 视频,我的表现就不那么好了 -
Yup.
是的。
JY: But no one else is going to do a video about the [ Japanese whisky ].
JY:但是没有人会制作有关[日本威士忌]的视频。
Anyone wants to search that, I'm there.
任何人想搜索它,我都在那里。
In some ways, it's still the same, but in some ways, it's just more challenging because there are a lot of more people.
在某些方面,它仍然是一样的,但在某些方面,它只是更具挑战性,因为有更多的人。
Yeah, that makes sense.
是的,这是有道理的。
Like I said, what I think would be interesting is go through — I've noticed as people become more interested in semiconductors, you start out with a very reductive view.
就像我说的,我认为有趣的是经历——我注意到,随着人们对半导体越来越感兴趣,你会从一个非常简化的观点开始。
It's like, "Well, Nvidia is the most valuable company in the world, oh, TSMC makes video chips, they must be the most valuable.
就像,“嗯,英伟达是世界上最有价值的公司,哦,台积电生产视频芯片,它们一定是最有价值的。
Oh, TSMC depends on the ASML, I've heard that name, that must be the most valuable".
哦,台积电就靠ASML了,我听过这个名字,那肯定是最值钱的”。
I think it'd be interesting to explore and lay out the overall process and market constraints around this that drives differentiation.
我认为围绕这个推动差异化的整体流程和市场限制进行探索和布局会很有趣。
So I was thinking about, "Okay, where to start?", I want to talk through the semiconductor process.
所以我在想,“好吧,从哪里开始?”,我想谈谈半导体工艺。
We could start with silicon and the Czochralski process .
我们可以从硅和直拉法开始。
Let's do this.
让我们这样做吧。
Sand.
沙。
How does sand become a wafer?
沙子是如何变成威化饼的?
Let's start at the very beginning.
让我们从头开始吧。
And like I said, let's talk about it, and the historical aspect, we can sort of dip in and out on each one.
就像我说的,让我们谈谈它和历史方面,我们可以深入探讨每一个。
Yeah.
是的。
I think if you want to go back to it, a lot of people will start with the transistor, the first transistor , which is a solid state switch essentially.
我想如果你想回到它,很多人都会从晶体管开始,第一个晶体管,它本质上是一个固态开关。
Now, switches existed within history to build electronics, and people have been building electronics since, I would say, the 1800s.
现在,开关已经存在于制造电子产品的历史中,我想说,从 1800 年代起,人们就一直在制造电子产品。
I would say the thing is that the solid state transistor was a interesting thing because it used a semiconductor material, which is at the time I believe it was germanium or something.
我想说的是,固态晶体管是一件有趣的事情,因为它使用了半导体材料,当时我相信它是锗或其他东西。
The germanium one didn't quite work out in the market because it had difficulties at higher temperatures and higher frequencies, and that's why silicon becomes more prominent in that feature.
锗在市场上不太受欢迎,因为它在更高的温度和更高的频率下遇到困难,这就是为什么硅在这一特性上变得更加突出。
Now, silicon is not the best semiconductor.
现在,硅并不是最好的半导体。
It's not perfect for a lot of different things for transporting charge carriers, like electrons or electron holes, but what it is good is that it scales, and it has good — its derivatives are really good for protecting the transistor from outside contamination.
它对于传输电荷载流子(如电子或电子空穴)的许多不同事物来说并不完美,但它的好处是它可以扩展,而且它有好处——它的衍生物非常适合保护晶体管免受外部污染。
I think that helped the industry latch onto it as a process.
我认为这有助于行业将其作为一个过程来抓住。
You would see these introductions of various historical events, for example, like the planar process and Fairchild Semiconductor, that would help develop silicon as this core product within the industry.
你会看到这些对各种历史事件的介绍,例如平面工艺和仙童半导体,这将有助于将硅开发为行业内的核心产品。
So at the very heart of it, at the very beginning, you create the silicon, and you turn it into a melt and you can use as melt the dip using a sea crystal to build what is called a boule and it's this massive thick thing.
所以在它的核心,一开始,你创造了硅,然后把它变成熔体,你可以使用海晶体来熔化浸料来构建所谓的晶锭,它是一个巨大而厚的东西。
Yeah.
是的。
And that's a special part of silicon that helps make it special in the industry.
这是硅的一个特殊部分,有助于使其在行业中脱颖而出。
For example, there are other materials, like silicon carbide .
例如,还有其他材料,如碳化硅。
Silicon carbide doesn't necessarily turn into a boule, you can't dip it, you can't use the Czochralski process to create this massive single crystal that basically you can chop up and turn into wafers.
碳化硅不一定会变成晶锭,你不能浸渍它,你不能使用直拉工艺来制造这种巨大的单晶,基本上你可以将其切碎并变成晶圆。
Right.
正确的。
And just for context, silicon carbide, that's the material that Meta is using for the lenses in their AR glasses and actually, what you just said is one of their biggest challenges in bringing these AR glasses to market, which is it's really hard to make silicon carbide.
就上下文而言,碳化硅是 Meta 用于 AR 眼镜镜片的材料,实际上,你刚才所说的是将这些 AR 眼镜推向市场的最大挑战之一,那就是制造碳化硅真的很困难。
It doesn't have this reproducible way that traditional silicon does where you can make these long crystals that are easily sliced up into wafers, and they're like, "Can other people use silicon carbide, so people can figure out a good process here?", that's one of their big challenges.
它没有传统硅那样的可复制方式,可以制造这些很容易切成晶圆的长晶体,他们会想,“其他人可以使用碳化硅,这样人们就可以在这里找到一个好的工艺吗?”,这是他们面临的一大挑战。
I know, right?
我知道,对吧?
And I think it reminds you of the fact that silicon is sort of a miracle material and that's why it's been so consistently used throughout history.
我认为它提醒您这样一个事实:硅是一种神奇的材料,这就是为什么它在历史上一直被如此广泛使用的原因。
It really has all these special properties that help make it a unique material for all these scalable processes.
它确实具有所有这些特殊特性,有助于使其成为适用于所有这些可扩展工艺的独特材料。
No, it's a good point.
不,这是一个好点。
This applies to electronics generally.
这通常适用于电子产品。
You might have something that is, in a narrow technical sense, not the best, but manufacturability is really important and durability is really important.
从狭义的技术意义上来说,您可能拥有的东西不是最好的,但可制造性非常重要,耐用性也非常重要。
Those are some of the things that really, really set silicon apart.
这些是真正让硅与众不同的一些东西。
Yeah, I agree.
是的,我同意。
Fabricating a Chip Well, let's go through this.
制造芯片 好吧,让我们来看看这个。
You have a set of companies, they make the wafers, they deliver them to TSMC.
你有一群公司,他们制造晶圆,然后将其交付给台积电。
This is just a piece of, it's not glass, but it's a piece of silicon.
这只是一块,不是玻璃,而是一块硅。
How is the transistor actually created and put on that?
晶体管实际上是如何创建并安装在其上的?
What are the steps?
步骤是什么?
What companies are involved in that?
有哪些公司参与其中?
I just want to get deeper into this actual process for people who, particularly people who don't really know how this works.
我只是想让人们更深入地了解这个实际过程,特别是那些不真正知道它是如何工作的人。
I think what they'll do is that they'll, at first — silicon manufacturing is basically broken down into a bunch of repeated processes.
我认为他们首先要做的是——硅制造基本上被分解为一系列重复的过程。
It's a bunch of recipes put together by TSMC.
这是台积电整理的一堆配方。
TSMC is the integrator of all this equipment, and the equipment comes from various different companies like you mentioned.
台积电是所有这些设备的集成商,这些设备来自像你提到的各种不同的公司。
And I found it really helpful to break it down into a framework of what those steps would be.
我发现将其分解为这些步骤的框架确实很有帮助。
You have deposition.
你有证词。
What is deposition?
什么是沉积?
JY: I do love this about the semiconductor industry, at least the terms make sense.
JY:我确实喜欢半导体行业,至少这些术语是有意义的。
It's about laying down or depositing a thin layer of material.
这是关于铺设或沉积一层薄薄的材料。
Now, what that material layer is going to be is then specified in the type of deposition.
现在,该材料层将是什么,然后在沉积类型中指定。
These tools are provided usually by Applied Materials or Tokyo Electron, and what they do is they have these certain sub-sectors of different deposition techniques.
这些工具通常由应用材料公司或东京电子提供,他们所做的就是拥有不同沉积技术的某些子部门。
You would have, for example, oxidation, which is where you take advantage of silicon's ability to grow and oxide by reacting it with water to create an oxide layer to protect the transistor or whatever is on the silicon from outside contamination, now that's deposition.
例如,您可以进行氧化,即利用硅的生长和氧化能力,通过与水反应来形成氧化层,以保护晶体管或硅上的任何物体免受外部污染,现在这就是沉积。
And then you would move that to — you would pattern a layer, whatever that layer would be with lithography .
然后你可以将其移动到 - 你可以对一个层进行图案化,无论该层是什么,都可以使用光刻技术。
Got it.
知道了。
And this is the one that most people know about, which is where ASML enters the game.
这是大多数人都知道的,也是 ASML 介入的地方。
Yeah.
是的。
But then there's also an underrated product that I should mention is photoresist.
但我还应该提到一种被低估的产品,那就是光刻胶。
Photoresist is provided by company JSR, which is one of the dominant photoresists of our current generation.
光刻胶由 JSR 公司提供,该公司是当代占主导地位的光刻胶之一。
In fact, Japanese companies almost have, they have a monopoly on photoresist , a complete monopoly I think for 20 years.
事实上,日本公司几乎已经垄断了光刻胶,我认为完全垄断了20年。
And this photoresist, that's another layer that's sort of put on before the lithography?
这个光致抗蚀剂是在光刻之前添加的另一层?
It's a liquid that you pour onto the wafer and then it absorbs the light in a way to preserve the pattern from the light because you have to preserve it, you can't just dump it on the silicon.
它是一种液体,您将其倒在晶圆上,然后它以某种方式吸收光线以保护图案免受光线影响,因为您必须保留它,而不能只是将其倒在硅上。
If you do it on the photoresist and the photoresist is baked to resist, ergo the name, an acid that comes later, which is the etch layer or step, which we'll talk later.
如果你在光致抗蚀剂上进行此操作,并且光致抗蚀剂被烘烤以抵抗,因此名称,稍后出现的酸,这是蚀刻层或步骤,我们稍后会讨论。
Got it.
知道了。
This Japanese angle is interesting.
日本人的这个角度很有趣。
And actually the other thing I'm getting from you and I think is underrated is a lot this stuff isn't just equipment, it's a lot of chemicals and it's a lot of material science is probably the more underrated IP aspect, which is very, very well hidden and sort of preserved to your point about these companies retaining very dominant positions.
事实上,我从你那里得到的另一件事我认为被低估了,这些东西不仅仅是设备,还有很多化学品和材料科学,可能是更被低估的知识产权方面,它被隐藏得非常非常好,并且在某种程度上保留了你关于这些公司保留非常主导地位的观点。
Yeah.
是的。
TSMC splits their supply chain into equipment and materials and I've been told the materials is basically almost all Japanese.
台积电将其供应链分为设备和材料,我听说这些材料基本上几乎都是日本的。
The Japanese have a very, very tight grip on materials, photoresist, all these different things for reasons that we can go into later, but it's part cultural part economics and stuff like that.
日本人对材料、光刻胶以及所有这些不同的东西有着非常非常严格的控制,原因我们稍后会讨论,但这部分是文化部分是经济之类的。
The lithography is, basically the goal is to transfer the pattern of the design or the pattern where the transistors would be, how they'll actually look, and transfer that onto the wafer, onto the deposited layer that you have here and that's one half of another step called etch .
光刻的基本目标是转移设计图案或晶体管所在的图案,它们的实际外观,并将其转移到晶圆上,转移到此处的沉积层上,这是称为蚀刻的另一个步骤的一半。
They used to call it litho-etch-litho-etch.
他们过去称之为光刻-蚀刻-光刻-蚀刻。
Litho is you put the pattern down, etch is that you basically solidify it into the layer.
光刻是将图案放下来,蚀刻是将其基本上固化到层中。
Could be silicon, could be another metal layer, could be different things.
可能是硅,可能是另一个金属层,可能是不同的东西。
That's why I think etch is very underrated, but I think litho is probably — it consumes a lot of the value chain, but it probably shouldn't consume so much of the attention.
这就是为什么我认为蚀刻被严重低估,但我认为光刻可能是——它消耗了大量的价值链,但它可能不应该消耗这么多的注意力。
Generally it's a bunch of different players because etch is very varied, but yes, Lam is one of the big ones.
一般来说,这是一群不同的球员,因为蚀刻是非常多样化的,但是,是的,林是其中的大人物之一。
I think you actually probably gave the answer.
我想你实际上可能已经给出了答案。
Etch might be really hard, but there's more competitors in the space and especially once we moved to DUV, there was, again, the Japanese dominated that for a long time.
蚀刻可能真的很难,但是这个领域有更多的竞争对手,特别是当我们转向 DUV 时,日本人再次在很长一段时间内占据主导地位。
ASML was more behind and came up, but then you got to EUV and that's where ASML leaped ahead sort of in conjunction with TSMC, it was really a hand-in-hand thing there.
ASML 落后了一些,但后来又上升了,但后来到了 EUV,这就是 ASML 与台积电合作取得领先的地方,这确实是一种携手并进的事情。
Well, I think it's important to note that also DUV, one of the breakthrough products of ASML was during the DUV days and their big innovation within the DUV space was the focus on productivity.
嗯,我认为值得注意的是 DUV,ASML 的突破性产品之一是在 DUV 时代,他们在 DUV 领域的重大创新是对生产力的关注。
ASML really focused on not necessarily making the most incredible litho machine, but making a machine that was very productive, which was their TWINSCAN thing where they would be able to process more wafers per hour than even the Japanese could do and that really caught them off guard, especially in the early 2000s.
ASML 真正关注的不一定是制造最令人难以置信的光刻机,而是制造一台非常高效的机器,这就是他们的 TWINSCAN 东西,他们每小时能够处理的晶圆数量比日本人还要多,这确实让他们措手不及,尤其是在 2000 年代初期。
And this really happened with the shift from 200 millimeter wafers to 300 millimeter wafers?
从 200 毫米晶圆到 300 毫米晶圆的转变真的会发生这种情况吗?
Yeah.
是的。
And one of the big failings I think of Canon and Nikon was partially that they didn't really handle that transition well, and also because they were all vertically integrated and ASML is a much more horizontally integrated supplier that was able to take the best stuff and kind of use that where Canon and Nikon kind of fell short there.
我认为佳能和尼康的最大失败之一是他们没有真正很好地处理这种转变,而且因为它们都是垂直整合的,而 ASML 是一个水平整合程度更高的供应商,能够采用佳能和尼康在这方面有所不足的最好的东西和使用方式。
Well, I think the other thing too is because Canon and Nikon were big Intel suppliers, and Intel just wasn't that worried about productivity because they made so much margin on their chips, and they were only making it for themselves and so Intel wasn't really pressuring Canon and Nikon to sort of go faster, whereas at TSMC it's like it's a pure direct line from our productivity to our revenue numbers and so there was a real meeting of the minds there where TSMC wanted less vertical integration because they wanted to be able to incorporate best of breed up and down the stack, and they also wanted to go way faster, and so it was a real opening and opportunity.
嗯,我认为另一件事也是因为佳能和尼康是英特尔的大供应商,而英特尔并不那么担心生产力,因为他们在芯片上赚了很多利润,而且他们只是为自己制造芯片,所以英特尔并没有真正向佳能和尼康施压,要求他们走得更快,而在台积电,这就像从我们的生产力到我们的收入数字的纯粹直接关系,所以那里有一个真正的思想会议,台积电希望减少垂直整合,因为他们希望能够整合最好的技术堆栈上上下下繁殖,他们也想走得更快,所以这是一个真正的开放和机会。
ASML is really important for TSMC with EUV, but TSMC was really important for ASML in terms of ASML getting to its large market share in the first place by capitalizing on that wafer transition.
ASML 对于拥有 EUV 的台积电来说非常重要,但台积电对于 ASML 来说也非常重要,因为 ASML 首先通过利用晶圆转型获得了巨大的市场份额。
Yeah, it's a very weird relationship between these two companies.
是的,这两家公司之间的关系非常奇怪。
They're technically corporately siblings, and you have the sibling tensions of all that entails.
从技术上讲,他们是公司的兄弟姐妹,因此你会面临兄弟姐妹之间的紧张关系。
Its fun.
很有趣。
Is that a real thing?
这是真的吗?
Because they're both downstream from Philips , that's sort of the relationship you're talking about.
因为它们都是飞利浦的下游,所以这就是您所说的关系。
Why isn't Philips a dominant sort of semiconductor name today when you had these two companies come out of them?
当这两家公司脱颖而出时,为什么飞利浦今天没有成为半导体行业的主导品牌呢?
Oh, that's a funny story.
噢,这是一个有趣的故事。
To hear it from the ASML people, Philips was just a failure of a company.
在 ASML 的人看来,飞利浦只是一家失败的公司。
They were too bureaucratic, too solidified in their ways.
他们的做法太官僚化、太僵化。
They're almost like, I guess the Japanese in the 1990s and they really deserve to, Philips kind of lived their life and deserve to wind down and they sold those stakes way too early as it turns out.
他们几乎就像,我想 20 世纪 90 年代的日本人,他们确实应该这样做,飞利浦过着他们的生活,应该放松下来,但事实证明,他们太早卖掉了这些股份。
But they weren't the first, they wouldn't be alone in believing that TSMC and ASML had reached the peak a little bit too early.
但他们不是第一个,也不是唯一一个认为台积电和 ASML 已经达到顶峰的人有点太早了。
Is there an aspect where this 200 to 300 millimeter wafer transition and the increase in efficiency and speed that it allowed for, was that actually, if you were to really zoom out, was that when TSMC started to pass Intel?
从 200 毫米到 300 毫米晶圆的转变以及它所带来的效率和速度的提高是否有一个方面,实际上,如果你真的缩小范围,那是台积电开始超越英特尔的时候吗?
This was still a good decade before their process surpassed Intel, but is there a bit where just the speed and efficiency, and the learning and the iteration that was downstream from increased velocity was in the long run when this changing of the guard began?
在他们的工艺超越英特尔之前,这仍然是一个很好的十年,但是从长远来看,当这种转变开始时,速度和效率以及速度提高下游的学习和迭代是否有一点点?
I think it's kind of tough to make a call like that.
我认为拨打这样的电话有点困难。
I think someone at Intel once told me that TSMC wasn't necessarily faster than or ahead of Intel in the sense that their digital logic products, they're making better digital logic products.
我想英特尔的某人曾经告诉我,台积电不一定比英特尔更快或领先,因为他们的数字逻辑产品正在制造更好的数字逻辑产品。
I think because the market that they were operating in at the time incentivized them to go for lagging-edge and trailing-edge chips, but in that area they were very good at that.
我认为是因为他们当时所处的市场激励他们去寻找落后和落后的芯片,但在那个领域他们非常擅长。
They built a flow and a process and nodes that were customized to serving external customers.
他们构建了一个定制的流程、流程和节点来为外部客户提供服务。
This changed when the mobile industry started to become more of a thing and Intel missed that, but once it became more clear that mobile chips needed to get more speed, that's when Intel or TSMC decided that, yes, we need to actually start going up this node process.
当移动行业开始变得更加重要而英特尔错过了这一点时,这种情况发生了变化,但一旦移动芯片需要获得更快的速度变得更加明确,英特尔或台积电就决定,是的,我们需要真正开始提升这个节点工艺。
I think trying to distinguish when TSMC would start to surpass Intel, that's tough to kind of find that because they was always so different from one another in these early years, and you wouldn't really say that they were competing basically until what, 2007, 2008.
我认为试图区分台积电何时开始超越英特尔,这是很难发现的,因为他们在早期总是彼此如此不同,而且你不会真正说他们基本上在竞争,直到 2007 年、2008 年。
Yeah, they're hardly competing today, in some respects.
是的,在某些方面,他们今天几乎没有竞争。
I guess the most direct place of competition until Intel's foundry really gets going is via AMD and Intel to a sense.
我认为,在英特尔代工厂真正启动之前,最直接的竞争场所在某种意义上是通过 AMD 和英特尔。
But here's another question.
但这里还有另一个问题。
There's a bit where Intel famously, a lot of these technologies, they brought them to market first, and you think about how do you bring new technologies?
英特尔有一个著名的地方,很多这样的技术,他们首先将它们推向市场,你想一想如何引入新技术?
Being highly integrated is at least theoretically an advantage, but you have this bit where TSMC is not highly integrated, they're looking for all these different pieces, but they're very process-oriented and they're very efficient and setting it all up, but is there just a bit where the complexity got so high that the integration tax was too large and process actually mattered, iteration speed mattered more than anything else?
高度集成至少在理论上是一个优势,但是台积电的集成度不高,他们正在寻找所有这些不同的部分,但他们非常注重流程,而且非常高效,并且将其全部设置好,但是是否有一点复杂性变得如此之高,以至于集成税太大,而流程实际上很重要,迭代速度比其他任何事情都重要?
Integration tax, I think it's debatable, I think right up until the 10 nanometer or 14 nanometer fiasco.
集成税,我认为这是有争议的,直到 10 纳米或 14 纳米惨败为止。
Right before the 14 nanometer fiasco, you could argue that Intel was two generations ahead of TSMC and they were going so fast.
就在 14 纳米惨败之前,你可能会说英特尔比台积电领先了两代,而且他们的发展速度如此之快。
I think what happened wasn't less of an organization failure in the sense that they were too arrogant to push ahead of the technology, but I think if there's one aspect where I say the integration of Intel failed them was that when 10 nanometer really started to fall apart, the product side of the company had already built products for a 10 nanometer spec that was not feasible, was not possible.
我认为所发生的事情不亚于组织的失败,因为他们太傲慢,无法推动技术的进步,但我认为,如果我说英特尔的整合在某个方面让他们失败的话,那就是当 10 纳米真正开始崩溃时,该公司的产品方面已经为 10 纳米规格构建了不可行、不可能的产品。
And that basically froze the company as they had to break down the product, redesign it, and that took two years.
这基本上冻结了公司,因为他们不得不分解产品,重新设计它,这花了两年时间。
You could say that's when the vertical integration of Intel really started biting them in the butt.
可以说,从那时起,英特尔的垂直整合才真正开始痛击他们。
But prior to that, I would say 2011, as recently as 2011, when they were doing 22 nanometer, the second generation FinFET and all that, they were really killing it.
但在此之前,我想说的是 2011 年,就在 2011 年,当他们在做 22 纳米、第二代 FinFET 之类的时候,他们真的在扼杀它。
No, I mean they were so far ahead with FinFET.
不,我的意思是他们在 FinFET 方面遥遥领先。
It's under-appreciated how relatively recent that was.
人们没有充分认识到这是相对较新的。
You actually said something really interesting about the sort of arrogance bit, because I think the common perception of Intel is they refused to leap ahead and they didn't adopt EUV.
事实上,你说了一些关于傲慢的事情,非常有趣,因为我认为英特尔的普遍看法是他们拒绝向前迈进,也没有采用 EUV。
But actually there's an underrated aspect here, which was there were other aspects they were trying to go ahead too far too quickly.
但实际上这里有一个被低估的方面,那就是他们在其他方面试图走得太远太快。
Yeah, well, they really thought themselves as the purveyors of Moore's Law .
是的,他们确实认为自己是摩尔定律的传播者。
They were the most advanced manufacturing company in the world, Moore's Law was theirs, and they had to keep pushing the boundaries.
他们是世界上最先进的制造公司,摩尔定律是他们的,他们必须不断突破界限。
And they've already done it many, many times the tick-tock —
他们已经做过很多很多次了——
The tick-tock strategy, yes.
滴答策略,是的。
Improve design, improve process, improve design, improve process.
改进设计,改进流程,改进设计,改进流程。
That had really gone well for a couple years and that was really killing it.
几年来这确实进展顺利,这真的很糟糕。
That arrogance jumped ahead of what the technology was capable of in 2012, 2013, when Intel was working out 14 nanometer, 10 nanometer because they do that in parallel.
这种傲慢的态度超越了 2012、2013 年该技术的能力,当时英特尔正在开发 14 纳米、10 纳米,因为他们是并行进行的。
The EUV was not ready and EUV wasn't even close to ready.
EUV 还没有准备好,而且 EUV 甚至还没有接近准备好。
EUV because of the power source, the power source wasn't even close to ready and it was really flat, flat, flat for years and then suddenly it was a huge jump.
EUV 因为电源的原因,电源甚至还没有接近准备好,而且多年来它真的很平坦,平坦,平坦,然后突然出现了巨大的跳跃。
It was a mess-up, but they probably-
这是一团糟,但他们可能——
What were some of those leaps they were trying to make in a world where EUV was not ready?
在 EUV 尚未做好准备的世界中,他们试图实现哪些飞跃?
They were trying to get to EUV eventually, but there was a cobalt issue and some other things along those lines.
他们最终试图实现 EUV,但存在钴问题和其他一些类似问题。
What were some of the roadblocks that they ran into?
他们遇到了哪些障碍?
I would generally say it's like we don't really know.
我通常会说我们真的不知道。
Intel has never been really clear.
英特尔从来没有真正明确过这一点。
Dylan [Patel]'s pretty clear, pretty insistent that it was cobalt, but I think in generally, you could just say the whole spec was ambitious.
Dylan [Patel] 非常明确、非常坚持认为它是钴,但我认为总的来说,你可以说整个规范是雄心勃勃的。
There was a slide that I saw from the Intel Technology Investor meeting where they looked at density, and they're saying 14 nanometer is going to be another two-time shrink within two years or something on top of 14, or 10 would be a double shrink on 14 and that simply was too much and it was too far ahead of what was possible.
我在英特尔技术投资者会议上看到了一张幻灯片,他们研究了密度,他们说 14 纳米将在两年内再次缩小两倍,或者在 14 纳米之上再缩小一次,或者 10 纳米将是 14 纳米的两倍缩小,这实在是太多了,而且远远超出了可能的范围。
TSMC would never do that sort of thing because they're much more incremental and they would go year after year, very slow and now that sort of taking too much step is kind of the reason why they couldn't do it.
台积电永远不会做这类事情,因为他们的增量要大得多,而且会年复一年地进展,非常缓慢,而现在采取太多步骤是他们无法做到这一点的原因。
Right.
正确的。
And of course they're trying to recover by taking massive amounts of steps in a very short amount of time.
当然,他们正试图通过在很短的时间内采取大量步骤来恢复。
I guess maybe the cure will work out better than the disease.
我想也许治疗方法会比疾病本身更有效。
All right, let's go back to the process.
好吧,让我们回到流程。
You have the silicon wafer, you have this deposition step, you have the mask, which is the pattern for the chip that the light source shines through, you etch it onto the chip.
你有硅晶片,你有这个沉积步骤,你有掩模,它是光源照射的芯片图案,你将其蚀刻到芯片上。
Then you mentioned once you've etched a layer on, it's going through multiple times.
然后你提到一旦蚀刻了一层,它就会经历多次。
How many times is the step generally repeated as you're sort of building up a chip?
当你构建芯片时,这个步骤通常会重复多少次?
Hundreds of times I think, and I've heard N2 is something like 20% more steps than N3 and N3 was something like 700, 800 steps.
我想了数百次,我听说 N2 比 N3 多 20% 的步数,N3 大约 700、800 步。
It's a lot of steps and these include a lot of different things and they also have to have incredibly high yields each individual step or else the end product will be terrible.
这是很多步骤,其中包括很多不同的东西,而且每个步骤都必须具有令人难以置信的高产量,否则最终产品将很糟糕。
Is this where a lot of the yield problems happen, is in this sort of recycling of steps?
这是很多良率问题发生的地方吗?是在这种步骤的回收中吗?
I think yield problems — I mean they're never going to tell me, but I generally understand the yield problems come from the new introduced steps or interactions between different steps that don't end up working well or they come out of the end as they have no idea where it is and then they have to go back and they revert.
我认为产量问题——我的意思是他们永远不会告诉我,但我通常理解产量问题来自于新引入的步骤或不同步骤之间的相互作用,这些步骤最终不能很好地工作,或者他们从最后出来,因为他们不知道它在哪里,然后他们必须返回并恢复。
It's a lot of different things that they introduced into — if you think about it, the TSMC node is basically an accumulation of nodes that work basically from the very beginning.
他们引入了很多不同的东西——如果你仔细想想,台积电节点基本上是从一开始就工作的节点的积累。
They're slowly extending it, testing it, see if it's going to work.
他们正在慢慢扩展它,测试它,看看它是否有效。
If it doesn't work, they'll cut it off and then they're adding these new steps to see if you can achieve a better process.
如果它不起作用,他们会切断它,然后添加这些新步骤,看看是否可以实现更好的流程。
You still have to connect these transistors together.
您仍然需要将这些晶体管连接在一起。
It used to be different pieces you would actually wire them together.
过去它是不同的部分,你实际上将它们连接在一起。
What is that layer made of and how is that actually accomplished where you have all these transistors etched on a chip, but you have to connect them?
该层是由什么组成的?在将所有这些晶体管蚀刻在芯片上但必须连接它们的情况下,它实际上是如何实现的?
There's a communication layer, there's a power layer.
有一个通信层,有一个电源层。
How does all that work?
这一切是如何运作的?
That's done using something called metalization and metalization is kind of like, that's a whole journey in of itself.
这是使用一种叫做金属化的东西来完成的,金属化有点像,这本身就是一个完整的旅程。
It used to be they used aluminum to deposit, they would pattern where the wires go and then deposit aluminum in between the transistors as if it's just another thing, but then they moved to copper because the resistance of the aluminum wires got too high that you started getting delays in how the signals were sent.
过去他们使用铝进行沉积,他们会在电线的走向上进行图案化,然后在晶体管之间沉积铝,就好像这只是另一件事一样,但后来他们转向铜,因为铝线的电阻太高,信号发送方式开始出现延迟。
So they moved to copper, but copper has its own problems where it leaches into the silicon.
因此他们转向铜,但铜有其自身的问题,它会渗入硅中。
So what they did is that they had IBM develop this wonderful copper lining that protects the copper from leaching to the silicon, and the whole industry followed what IBM did and copper has to be done in a weird inverse way, but that's served us well for 20 more years and now I think the industry is probably looking more at ruthenium , which is going to be the next big jump in interconnects beyond copper.
所以他们所做的是让IBM开发了这种奇妙的铜衬里,可以保护铜免于浸出到硅中,整个行业都遵循IBM的做法,铜必须以一种奇怪的相反方式完成,但这为我们服务了20多年,现在我认为该行业可能更多地关注钌,这将是铜之外互连的下一个重大飞跃。
Is lithography used for these interconnects or is that different?
这些互连是否使用光刻技术,或者有何不同?
How is the actual pattern established and laid down?
实际的模式是如何建立和制定的?
Yeah, it used lithography.
是的,它使用了光刻技术。
EUV is used for what very small percentage of the steps within—
EUV 用于以下范围内极小比例的步骤:
Right.
对。
They still use the old DUV for as much as possible because it's much cheaper.
他们仍然尽可能地使用旧的 DUV,因为它便宜得多。
Yeah.
是的。
Like 80, 90% I would say much higher levels of the metal layer.
我想说的是 80%、90% 的金属层含量要高得多。
So it's M1, M2, M3, M4, all that M1, M2 layers might be done with EUV and then the rest would be done with DUV.
所以是 M1、M2、M3、M4,所有 M1、M2 层都可以用 EUV 完成,然后其余的将用 DUV 完成。
So then how does the power layer into this?
那么电源层是如何融入其中的呢?
Right now — we can get to backside power in a moment — but right now you have the transistor layer, you have the communications layer, and then power goes on top of that?
现在——我们马上就可以讨论背面电源——但是现在你有晶体管层,你有通信层,然后电源在上面?
Power is interspersed with the communication wires.
电源散布在通信线上。
They also go through the same wires and they go through the same thing.
他们也通过相同的电线,并通过相同的东西。
You have these big interconnects or big wires at the beginning and then they slowly get smaller and smaller until they finally reach the individual transistor, and you mentioned backside power .
一开始就有这些大互连或大电线,然后它们慢慢变得越来越小,直到它们最终到达单个晶体管,并且您提到了背面电源。
That is the situation where they got to take that whole network, split it out and move that underneath the wafer and save a lot of space.
在这种情况下,他们必须将整个网络分开,然后将其移动到晶圆下方,从而节省大量空间。
But the problem is, now you've done a lot of work.
但问题是,现在你已经做了很多工作。
If the most difficult layer is the transistor layer, but you already laid down all the power bit, then you're throwing a lot more away if the chip screws up or if something goes wrong in that middle layer.
如果最困难的层是晶体管层,但你已经放下了所有的电源位,那么如果芯片坏了或者中间层出了问题,你就会扔掉更多的电源。
Is that right?
是这样吗?
Yeah, and it is a wafer bonding technology and wafer bonding is relatively young.
是的,它是一种晶圆键合技术,而且晶圆键合相对较年轻。
What is wafer bonding?
什么是晶圆键合?
JY: Wafer bonding is where you take two wafers and you smack them together and there's various ways to do it.
JY:晶圆键合是指将两块晶圆焊接在一起,有多种方法可以实现。
It really, it blows your mind how much detail they've gone into this, but you can bond them using Van der Waals forces .
确实,他们对此进行了如此多的细节,这让你大吃一惊,但你可以使用范德华力将它们结合起来。
You can heat them up, you can use glue, you can use a whole bunch of different things.
你可以加热它们,你可以使用胶水,你可以使用一大堆不同的东西。
But at the core of it, the concept is you take two wafers and you smack them together and you would take, in the case of backside power, you're taking this power network and you're just melding it to the bottom of the transistor layer and making it into a thinned transistor layer to connect the transistors to the power.
但其核心概念是,你将两块晶圆放在一起,在背面电源的情况下,你将使用这个电源网络,将其融合到晶体管层的底部,并将其制成薄薄的晶体管层,以将晶体管连接到电源。
Hope that makes sense.
希望这是有道理的。
How do you find out about this stuff?
你是怎么知道这个东西的?
And to what extent is the knowledge of how to do this kept internal versus it becomes shared across the industry and people know how to do that?
如何做到这一点的知识在多大程度上保留在内部,而不是在整个行业中共享并且人们知道如何做到这一点?
What is the give and take in terms of, "I want to learn from other people, they can learn from me", versus, "This is super important intellectual property that keeps us unique and no one else can know?".
“我想向其他人学习,他们也可以向我学习”,而“这是一个超级重要的知识产权,它使我们保持独特,其他人无法知道”,这之间的给予和接受是什么?
It's a very interesting question.
这是一个非常有趣的问题。
I think it's like, one example that comes to mind is the copper interconnect technique.
我认为,我想到的一个例子是铜互连技术。
As you mentioned, the way to keep the copper from leaching into the silicon is very strange, it doesn't really make sense.
正如您提到的,防止铜浸入硅的方法非常奇怪,这实际上没有意义。
It's called Damascene and IBM developed it, but all the other American semiconductor companies quickly developed it afterwards.
它被称为大马士革,IBM 开发了它,但所有其他美国半导体公司随后都迅速开发了它。
Partially it's because of diffusion through employees, there's inter-corporate organizations where they all mix and they chat, there's like a feeling within the industry that it's time to adopt this and they all work towards it.
部分原因是通过员工进行传播,在公司间组织中,他们都混合在一起聊天,行业内有一种感觉,是时候采用这一点了,他们都在努力实现这一点。
But then they all have their own different styles, I guess, to fill their own proprietary specialty in it and you can definitely see this within definitely the packaging industry for sure.
但我想,他们都有自己不同的风格,以填补他们自己的专有专业,你肯定可以在包装行业中看到这一点。
So I would say you have big ideas and concepts that are shared within conferences, within conversations over the years, but then the small details, which is where the juice is squeezed, that is developed within the companies and they'll keep that to themselves.
所以我想说的是,你有一些大的想法和概念,可以在会议中、在多年来的对话中分享,但小细节,也就是榨汁的地方,是在公司内部开发的,他们会保守秘密。
Actually, I want to tie this into the question about the Japanese companies before.
其实我想把这个问题和之前关于日本企业的问题联系起来。
Is there an aspect where almost the more mechanical bits are, "Look, if you know what to do, you can internally then figure out how to actually do that", but is it a bit about chemicals and that nature?
是否有一个方面,几乎更多的机械部分是,“看,如果你知道要做什么,你可以在内部弄清楚如何实际做到这一点”,但这是否与化学品和自然有关?
You might know what to do, but if you don't actually have the recipe, you're not going to figure it out.
你可能知道该怎么做,但如果你实际上没有食谱,你就不会弄清楚。
Is that tied into why that's been so much more resistant to competition?
这是否与它对竞争的抵抗力如此之大有关?
Precisely.
恰恰。
It's one of the big ones, and the other thing is that no one just wants to spend their life spending 20 years studying a chemical or cycling through all these chemical recipes to find out what might work.
这是其中一件大事,另一件事是,没有人愿意花一生时间研究一种化学物质或循环研究所有这些化学配方来找出可能有效的方法。
A lot of these are like there's one person in America who might know this type of resist, this chemically-activated resist or whatever — maybe okay, maybe 5 or 10.
其中很多就像在美国有一个人可能知道这种类型的抗蚀剂,这种化学激活的抗蚀剂或其他什么——也许可以,也许有 5 或 10 个。
But then in Japan you can take a whole bunch of PhDs and say, "This is your life now, you will study this for 30 years" — and they'll do that.
但在日本,你可以拿一大堆博士学位,然后说:“这就是你现在的生活,你将研究这个问题 30 年”——他们就会这么做。
Then that's how these companies like JSR build immense, immense moats that are basically impenetrable because no one else wants to do that work and no one else has an IP.
这就是像 JSR 这样的公司如何建立巨大的、巨大的护城河,这些护城河基本上是不可逾越的,因为没有其他人愿意做这项工作,也没有其他人拥有知识产权。
Oh, that's a tough one.
噢,那是一件很难的事情。
I would say yes.
我会说是的。
In some ways Tokyo Ohka and JSR are more moat-y than ASML because there are alternatives.
从某些方面来说,Tokyo Ohka 和 JSR 比 ASML 更有护城河,因为还有其他选择。
But as far as the steps go, are the same chemicals used from the chemical perspective?
但就步骤而言,从化学角度来看是否使用相同的化学品?
Are those all used in trailing-edge as well as leading-edge, or is there any differentiation in that regard?
这些是否都用于后缘和前缘,或者在这方面有什么区别吗?
Whereas obviously for the equipment, EUV is only used on the leading-edge.
但显然对于设备来说,EUV 仅用于前沿。
You're not going to use it for your 28 nanometer chip or whatever it might be.
你不会将它用于 28 纳米芯片或任何其他芯片。
The chemicals is that just — that's a commonality, it's used for everything?
这些化学品就是——这是一个共性,它可以用于一切?
No, the chemicals are tuned for the process.
不,化学品是针对该过程进行调整的。
So what will happen with TSMC is TSMC's people will work with the JSR, Tokyo Ohka's people.
那么台积电将会发生什么,台积电的人员将与 JSR、东京 Ohka 的人员合作。
They'll be like, "Okay, this is what the node's going to do, I have a good idea of what we want with this resist", and the JSR guys will say, "Oh yes sir, yes sir", and they'll come up with this very special formulation that works precisely with the dose that you want it to with all that, and then once TSMC accepts it for the node, then JSR starts raising prices.
他们会说,“好吧,这就是节点要做的事情,我很清楚我们想要用这种抗蚀剂做什么”,JSR 的人会说,“哦,是的,先生,是的先生”,他们会想出这种非常特殊的配方,它可以精确地满足您想要的剂量,然后一旦 TSMC 接受了它用于节点,JSR 就开始提高价格。
TSMC knows what they're getting into.
台积电知道他们正在面临什么。
But I think actually I love that example because I think it speaks to what is unique about TSMC.
但我认为实际上我喜欢这个例子,因为我认为它说明了台积电的独特之处。
It's this, I've talked about they're a customer service organization for fabless chip companies and they're very collaborative and they're going to work with you to, they have the IP libraries, but they're going to get it working on their process.
就是这样,我已经谈到他们是无晶圆厂芯片公司的客户服务组织,他们非常协作,他们将与您合作,他们拥有 IP 库,但他们将使其在他们的流程中发挥作用。
But what you're speaking to is this deep level of collaboration on the process side and actually you say systems integrator, that sounds low brow, but in fact it's essential to how this all works and comes together.
但你所说的是流程方面的这种深层次的协作,实际上你说的是系统集成商,这听起来很低调,但实际上这对于这一切如何运作和结合起来至关重要。
Yeah, and I think a lot of this stuff is so optimized now.
是的,我认为现在很多东西都已经优化了。
You can't really just pull something off the shelf and I think these chemicals are insane.
你真的不能直接从架子上拿东西,我认为这些化学物质是疯狂的。
You can imagine.
你可以想象。
They look, if you imagine these are insane molecules made of a whole bunch of different things and you have arms of molecules, they're designed to do certain things when the light activates them or something like that.
他们看起来,如果你想象这些是由一大堆不同的东西组成的疯狂分子,并且你有分子臂,它们被设计成当光激活它们或类似的东西时做某些事情。
The chemical part I think is very underrated, I would say I underrated it, this has been actually pretty illuminating.
我认为化学部分被严重低估了,我想说我低估了它,这实际上很有启发性。
I do have one question — what is ion doping?
我确实有一个问题——什么是离子掺杂?
So what you would do is that you would use an ion beam to basically dope the parts of a transistor because a transistor silicon by itself won't send a current from one side to the other.
因此,您要做的就是使用离子束来基本上掺杂晶体管的各个部分,因为晶体管硅本身不会将电流从一侧发送到另一侧。
So what you need to do is that you need to embed certain elements within that silicon at different sides to make it electrically active.
因此,您需要做的是在硅的不同侧面嵌入某些元素,以使其具有电活性。
And this is done with an ion beam .
这是通过离子束完成的。
Oh, that's a good question.
哦,这是个好问题。
There's a lot of different companies, I wasn't able really to find a big company that does it, it's not like a new technology.
有很多不同的公司,我无法真正找到一家这样做的大公司,这不像一项新技术。
So you have these three layers.
所以你有这三层。
You have the transistor layer, you have the communications layer, you have the power layer.
你有晶体管层,你有通信层,你有电源层。
Is this when you can start testing it and see when it actually works?
这是您可以开始测试它并查看它何时真正起作用的时候吗?
How is the whole testing, dicing, and binning or can you be testing throughout so you know when you can toss it and when you cannot?
整个测试、切块和分箱的情况如何,或者您是否可以进行全程测试,以便知道何时可以扔掉它,何时不能扔掉?
My understanding is that they do testing more at end of certain stages, they'll do checkpoints and because they never want to have a situation where you do the whole thing and then you test it at the end and you're like, "Okay, this doesn't work", and we don't know why.
我的理解是,他们在某些阶段结束时会进行更多测试,他们会做检查点,因为他们永远不想出现这样的情况:你完成了整个事情,然后在最后进行测试,然后你会说,“好吧,这不起作用”,而我们不知道为什么。
But I know that that does happen.
但我知道这种事确实会发生。
Got it.
知道了。
So with these big five companies, where do they fit in this stack?
那么对于这五家大公司来说,它们在这个堆栈中处于什么位置呢?
And I know you mentioned JSR, who I don't have in my big five, but I guess I'm more focused on the manufacturing aspect.
我知道您提到了 JSR,我的五巨头中没有他,但我想我更关注制造方面。
In the steps we talked about, so where is, I mentioned it, but where is LAM Research?
在我们讲的步骤中,那么在哪里,我提到了,但是LAM Research在哪里?
These companies, they just all interact with each — they're all merged with each other nowadays, so they all do the same thing.
这些公司,他们只是互相互动——现在他们都互相合并了,所以他们都做同样的事情。
So you could look it up and it'd be like LAM has a deposition product, Applied as a deposition product, Tokyo Electron has a deposition product and that's what I generally have seen.
所以你可以查一下,就像 LAM 有一个沉积产品,Applied 作为一个沉积产品,Tokyo Electron 有一个沉积产品,这就是我通常看到的。
And it seems strange as a deliberate strategy, I would say, on the side of the semiconductor makers, but they all have their own products to step on each other's sides.
我想说,对于半导体制造商来说,作为一种深思熟虑的策略似乎很奇怪,但他们都有自己的产品来互相攻击。
So in a typical process, do you go all in with one company or you pick best of breed from all the different ones?
因此,在典型的流程中,您是全力投资一家公司,还是从所有不同的公司中挑选最好的公司?
TSMC tends to do, what they will do is that they never want a single supplier.
台积电倾向于做的,他们会做的就是他们永远不要单一的供应商。
So what they'll do is that if one supplier is working for a deposition, right, they do CVD for a particular deposition product.
因此,他们要做的是,如果一家供应商正在从事沉积工作,那么他们就会对特定的沉积产品进行 CVD。
What they'll do is that they'll go to another company, another one of their, like Tokyo Electron for example.
他们要做的是去另一家公司,他们的另一家公司,例如东京电子。
They'll say, "We are using Applied for this" or "We're using LAM for this", "Can you make a product to do this as well and hit this spec at this price, and we'll buy it from you?", so what they do is that they really play each other off in the center of such a way and they do this for almost every supplier with the exception of two.
他们会说,“我们为此使用Applied”或“我们为此使用LAM”,“你能制造一种产品来做到这一点,并以这个价格达到这个规格,我们会从你那里购买它吗?”,所以他们所做的是,他们确实以这种方式相互竞争,他们对几乎所有供应商都这样做,除了两家之外。
Got it.
知道了。
So TSMC is really breeding this commonality of competition to keep their costs down.
因此,台积电确实正在培育这种共性竞争,以降低成本。
Well, I'm sure that drives them crazy as far as ASML goes.
嗯,我确信这会让 ASML 感到疯狂。
You mentioned two, what's the other one?
你提到了两个,另外一个是什么?
If ASML is one that's unique, what's the other one?
如果 ASML 是独一无二的,那么另一家是什么?
Within the company they have something called "Shuang A".
公司内部有一个叫“双A”的东西。
So "Shuang" means double, so there's ASML and Applied Materials.
所以“双”就是双,所以就有了ASML和应用材料公司。
Oh, very interesting.
哦,很有趣。
That is interesting.
这很有趣。
So with this understanding and perspective, what does that mean in the context of China?
那么这样的理解和视角,在中国的背景下意味着什么呢?
I will say one thing.
我要说一件事。
I mean there's the chemical aspect, which I think is very interesting and probably under-appreciated.
我的意思是化学方面,我认为这非常有趣,但可能没有得到充分重视。
The other thing though is there's a bit where TSMC breeding multiple suppliers in different areas, in some respects it's a diffusion of the technology that maybe makes it harder to control or that also speaks to the possibility of Chinese companies learning how to do these different steps.
但另一件事是,台积电在不同领域培育了多个供应商,在某些方面,这是技术的扩散,这可能会使其更难以控制,或者也说明中国公司有可能学习如何执行这些不同的步骤。
What's your overall view of China's prospects in coming up in semiconductors broadly?
您对中国在半导体领域的整体发展前景有何看法?
I think the core concept is that the core concept is not secret.
我认为核心理念是核心理念不是秘密。
So the product and what the machine and the equipment will do, most people will already know.
所以产品以及机器和设备将做什么,大多数人都已经知道了。
There's so much documentation on EUV , how it works, how the layers are built on the mirrors, all that is already known.
关于 EUV 的文档太多了,它是如何工作的,如何在镜子上构建层,所有这些都是已知的。
The secret is how to turn that into a commercial venture and how to turn that into a profitable commercial venture.
秘密在于如何将其转变为商业企业以及如何将其转变为有利可图的商业企业。
TSMC can guarantee a second source, a potential second source because they say, "We'll buy that from you, if that passes our test, we'll buy that from you and we'll pay money for it".
台积电可以保证第二个来源,潜在的第二个来源,因为他们说,“我们会从你那里购买它,如果通过我们的测试,我们会从你那里购买它,我们会为此付费”。
So I think in the case of China's, they'll probably know how to do this stuff and I've read their textbooks and they seem to know it pretty well.
所以我认为就中国而言,他们可能知道如何做这些事情,我读过他们的教科书,他们似乎对此非常了解。
So I think the secret more is, can they move that from an academic sense to an actual doing it sense?
所以我认为秘密更多的是,他们能否将其从学术意义转变为实际的实践意义?
That is much more challenging because that requires volume, that requires manufacturing, that requires wafers, and also lots of capital risk on behalf of the buyer.
这更具挑战性,因为这需要产量,需要制造,需要晶圆,而且还代表买方面临大量资本风险。
So I get this question a lot in terms of what China can rise up for.
所以我经常被问到这个问题,即中国可以为了什么而崛起。
I think nothing's impossible, it's made by man, it can be done.
我认为没有什么是不可能的,这是人为的,是可以做到的。
It's required to be done economically, exportably, to be in a way to export, that's much more challenging and I think right now the wafer volumes aren't there yet.
它需要经济地、可出口地、以出口的方式完成,这更具挑战性,我认为目前晶圆产量还没有达到。
Where can China realistically get to?
中国究竟能走到哪里?
I guess there's two questions.
我想有两个问题。
Number one is if they have access to western equipment, SMIC can make a 7 nanometer chip.
第一,如果他们能够获得西方设备,中芯国际可以制造7纳米芯片。
They might not be able to make it profitably or with high yields, but they can make it versus the, "We don't have access to equipment anymore, we have to actually make the equipment itself".
他们可能无法实现盈利或高产量,但他们可以做到这一点,而不是“我们不再能够获得设备,我们必须自己制造设备”。
What are the barriers there?
那里有什么障碍?
What's the hardest part to catch up with?
最难赶上的部分是什么?
Or is it actually, we're missing the whole point because it's actually the chemicals and the materials engineering?
或者实际上,我们错过了整个重点,因为它实际上是化学品和材料工程?
The chemicals, I think they're so far behind, I can't even imagine anyone catching up to Japan in terms of chemicals.
在化学品方面,我认为他们远远落后,我什至无法想象有人在化学品方面赶上日本。
It really is interesting to me is the role that the equipment makers play in building the process node.
我真正感兴趣的是设备制造商在构建工艺节点中所扮演的角色。
A guy at TSMC's lithography bay, even the manager, even a higher level manager, has no idea how the machine works.
台积电光刻车间的一个人,甚至经理,甚至更高级别的经理,都不知道机器是如何工作的。
Conceptually, they don't know how to use it necessarily, they rely on to be told by other people within the ecosystem, the equipment manufacturer or their R&D guy to say how to use this machine.
从概念上讲,他们不一定知道如何使用它,他们依靠生态系统内的其他人、设备制造商或其研发人员告诉他们如何使用这台机器。
So surprisingly little fundamental core knowledge of that is within the industry.
令人惊讶的是,行业内对此的基本核心知识很少。
So cutting that off to some extent will be immensely damaging because you can't just say, "We're going to just rebuild this node with a different machine", that basically, that introduces so much new uncertainty into the flow that makes even me anxious.
因此,在某种程度上切断它将会造成巨大的破坏,因为你不能只是说,“我们将用另一台机器重建这个节点”,这基本上会给流程带来很多新的不确定性,甚至让我感到焦虑。
So it's pretty crazy.
所以这很疯狂。
So do you think that, I don't want to put you on the spot, but broadly from a timeframe perspective, if China did get Western equipment, is it maybe a bit longer to catch up than people might think?
那么你是否认为,我不想让你陷入困境,但从广义上讲,从时间框架的角度来看,如果中国确实获得了西方设备,追赶的时间是否可能比人们想象的要长一些?
It probably will.
可能会的。
I've done videos on how the Soviets and the East Germans managed to procure special banned equipment over the years.
我制作了有关苏联人和东德人多年来如何设法采购特殊违禁设备的视频。
They're pretty good at it.
他们很擅长。
So it's like I would not be surprised to see these things starting to pop up and I would not be super surprised to see a gap to be like three years and that three years will be gone before you know it, right?
所以,看到这些事情开始出现,我不会感到惊讶,看到三年的差距,我也不会感到非常惊讶,而三年就会在你意识到之前就过去了,对吧?
Three to five years gone before you know it.
不知不觉间已经过去三五年了。
You will never know.
你永远不会知道。
You'll say, "Oh my gosh, they caught up so fast".
你会说,“天哪,他们追得这么快”。
Well, from the beginning you already said it was going to be three to five years and now it's three to five years.
嗯,从一开始你就说过要三到五年,现在是三到五年。
So where is Intel in all this?
那么英特尔在这一切中处于什么位置呢?
We touched on that a little bit, where they went wrong.
我们稍微谈到了他们出错的地方。
They got stuck at the 14 to 10 nanometer transition, EUV wasn't ready at the beginning.
他们陷入了 14 纳米到 10 纳米的过渡,EUV 一开始就没有准备好。
Then had to rework it, the ways they tried to leap ahead didn't work.
然后不得不返工,他们试图跨越的方式并没有奏效。
Can they catch up?
他们能赶上吗?
Are you feeling good about 18A, can they actually leap ahead as you talked about?
您对18A感觉良好吗?他们真的能像您所说的那样实现跨越吗?
I'm not going to answer that, I feel 18A looks good on a conceptual level, but Intel has always been really good at introducing concepts to the industry that no one will pick up.
我不打算回答这个问题,我觉得 18A 在概念层面上看起来不错,但英特尔一直非常擅长向业界介绍没有人会接受的概念。
So it's very, they don't know how to do Foundry, that is for sure.
所以他们非常不知道如何做 Foundry,这是肯定的。
What's the bigger failing here because when it comes to Foundry?
对于 Foundry 来说,最大的失败是什么?
We just talked about two sides, there's the customer service side, which they're not great at, but there's also the integration bit.
我们刚刚讨论了两个方面,即客户服务方面,他们不擅长这一点,但也有集成方面。
Is there a bit where they're actually, they're not sufficiently used to leveraging and leaning on and depending on suppliers to the extent that TSMC was because they wanted to do it all themself and know it all themself?
实际上,他们是否有一点没有像台积电那样充分习惯于利用、依赖和依赖供应商,因为他们想自己做所有事情并自己了解一切?
Or am I overrating that?
还是我高估了这一点?
There is an arrogance I think on the case of Intel at least for last couple years, up to a certain couple of years.
我认为至少在过去几年,甚至在某些几年里,英特尔的情况都存在着一种傲慢。
How is it now?
现在怎么样了?
Who knows?
谁知道?
I mean, a lot of people say Pat Gelsinger changed the culture, did they change that part of the culture?
我的意思是,很多人说帕特·基辛格改变了文化,他们改变了文化的那一部分吗?
I don't know, but I think the main issue is that like Morris Chang said it best, "TSMC has learned to dance with 400 different partners, Intel has only danced alone".
我不知道,但我认为主要问题是,就像张忠谋说得最好的那样,“台积电已经学会了与 400 个不同的合作伙伴共舞,英特尔只是独自跳舞”。
So I struggle to really understand how you can really re-engineer an entire company to become so vertically focused and so focused on this one thing to becoming so broad and ecosystem oriented.
因此,我很难真正理解如何才能真正重新设计整个公司,使其变得如此垂直、专注于这一件事,从而变得如此广泛和面向生态系统。
It's very strange.
这很奇怪。
I am not going to say they can't do it because the Intel bulls will come after me, but I think it's going to be interesting ride.
我不会说他们做不到,因为看好英特尔的人会追随我,但我认为这将是一段有趣的旅程。
I really actually think this has been a very illuminating, I think to your point.
我真的认为这对你的观点很有启发。
There is this bit about this integration background, and to your point when you're describing this TSMC process about TSMC, not even people at TSMC knowing how particular steps work, but bringing in and depending on other entities to do that and you can see why they did that before when they were behind because that was the way to catch up and it turned out in the long run that ended up to be the way to get ahead as well.
关于这种集成背景有一点,就你的观点而言,当你描述关于台积电的台积电流程时,甚至台积电的人都不知道特定步骤是如何工作的,而是引入并依赖其他实体来做到这一点,你可以明白为什么他们在落后时这样做,因为这是赶上的方式,从长远来看,这最终也是取得领先的方式。
That's a cultural learning for TSMC that's been embedded for 40 years and it's just totally the opposite way that Intel has always sort of operated.
这是台积电 40 年来根深蒂固的文化学习,而这与英特尔一贯的运作方式完全相反。
It definitely is, and I think it's like what they'll do is that they're so perceptive on pushing problems up to back to the company.
确实如此,我认为他们会如此敏锐地把问题推回到公司。
I think I recall that one of the bigger breakthroughs within EUV was discovered, on how to keep the container lenses clean was discovered not within the R&D section, but basically by accident and it's circulated from there.
我想我记得 EUV 领域的一项更大的突破是被发现的,关于如何保持容器透镜清洁不是在研发部门发现的,而是基本上是偶然的,并且它是从那里传播的。
So it's like these bringing in the equipment vendors, bringing in your ecosystem partners to work with them and help develop your process node is such a clear, it's so important and that's very difficult for a lot of different companies and it takes humility with a dose of you have to be humble and confident at the same time and that's very challenging.
因此,就像这些引入设备供应商、引入您的生态系统合作伙伴与他们合作并帮助开发您的工艺节点一样,这是非常明确的,它非常重要,这对于许多不同的公司来说非常困难,并且需要谦虚,同时您必须保持谦虚和自信,这是非常具有挑战性的。
Do you think TSMC — or is this going to fall on the equipment vendors and the chemical manufacturers — can push innovation in the long run?
您认为台积电(或者这会落在设备供应商和化学品制造商身上)能够长期推动创新吗?
Because I think the flip side of the Intel arrogance is a lot of that arrogance was well-earned.
因为我认为英特尔傲慢的另一面是很多傲慢都是应得的。
Like we mentioned FinFET before, a tremendous breakthrough.
就像我们之前提到的 FinFET,这是一个巨大的突破。
You're basically making these transistors 3D and Intel pushed that forward.
基本上,你正在使这些晶体管 3D 化,英特尔推动了这一进程。
Intel birthed the idea of EUV way back when and ASML brought it to market.
早在 ASML 将其推向市场时,英特尔就提出了 EUV 的想法。
But can TSMC in the long run push us through similar barriers or does this approach only work as fast following to a certain extent?
但从长远来看,台积电能否推动我们跨越类似的障碍,还是这种方法只能在一定程度上起到快速跟随的作用?
Yeah, I think that's one of the big questions, even the people within TSMC are aware of this.
是的,我认为这是一个大问题,甚至台积电内部的人也意识到了这一点。
There's a need for crazy left field thinking that Intel brought to the table, very ambitious, like moonshot thinking that Intel really did bring to the table.
英特尔需要带来疯狂的左翼思维,非常雄心勃勃,就像英特尔确实带来的登月思维一样。
Everyone wants to see Intel succeed and become a viable second option.
每个人都希望看到英特尔取得成功并成为可行的第二选择。
I think the question is can they do it?
我认为问题是他们能做到吗?
I don't know.
我不知道。
But the ideas I think for that they brought were always illuminating and always pushed the industry forward and I don't think TSMC has the culture for that.
但我认为他们带来的想法总是具有启发性,并且总是推动行业向前发展,我不认为台积电有这样的文化。
Is there a bit, we're a little too hard on Intel where they just kept making these huge leaps and one of the leaps, they didn't cross the chasm, they fell down and maybe we should have a little more grace for the fact that they ran into a wall because at least they were trying to jump over it, as it were?
有没有一点,我们对英特尔有点太严厉了,他们只是不断地做出这些巨大的飞跃,其中一个飞跃,他们没有跨越鸿沟,他们跌倒了,也许我们应该对他们撞到了一堵墙这一事实有更多的宽容,因为至少他们试图跳过它,就像事实一样?
Yeah, there's one half of that I agree, but then there's other half is that there were also, we should never forget that they were a monopolist, an arrogant monopolist that tried to kill competitors and did anti-competitive pricing things against AMD.
是的,我同意其中一半,但另一半是,我们永远不应该忘记他们是一个垄断者,一个傲慢的垄断者,试图杀死竞争对手并对 AMD 进行反竞争定价。
We should never forget that part that they were also trying to evade other markets and they victimized Compaq and all these other companies, so let's not forget that part too.
我们永远不应该忘记他们还试图逃避其他市场,他们使康柏和所有其他公司受害,所以我们也不要忘记这一点。
I have a somewhat related question, but what is Japan doing with Rapidus ?
我有一个有点相关的问题,但是日本正在用 Rapidus 做什么?
Do they have any chance to build this other alternative supplier?
他们有机会建立另一个替代供应商吗?
They're trying to build a two nanometer process in Hokkaido?
他们正试图在北海道建立一个两纳米工艺?
Any takes on that?
有什么看法吗?
Dylan and I like to say, basically we have a group chat and where all of us together and we like to call Rapidus, the maker of fine artisanal wafers.
迪伦和我喜欢说,基本上我们有一个群聊,我们所有人都在一起,我们喜欢打电话给 Rapidus,这是一家精致的手工威化饼制造商。
We're going to make these beautiful artisanal wafers like Samurai swords and each one's going to be absolutely perfect and I have full confidence that Japan can make an absolutely perfect N2 wafer, like 10, but then it's like can they make 10,000?
我们将制作这些美丽的手工威化饼,例如武士刀,每个威化饼都绝对完美,我完全有信心日本可以制造绝对完美的 N2 威化饼,例如 10 个,但他们能制作 10,000 个吗?
That's a bigger question.
这是一个更大的问题。
I don't know if they're there yet, but they're going to spend a lot of money on it.
我不知道他们是否已经到了,但他们会花很多钱。
I think they're going to try, we're going to see.
我认为他们会尝试,我们会看看。
They'll have customers, but I don't think they're not going to be ultra successful.
他们会有客户,但我认为他们不会取得巨大成功。
It's not exactly SMIC.
这不完全是中芯国际。
Are these TSMC fabs in America a viable second source or is it one of those things where, "Once TSMC Taiwan goes down, these fabs are not worth nearly as much"?
美国的这些台积电晶圆厂是可行的第二来源还是“一旦台积电台湾倒闭,这些晶圆厂的价值就不那么值钱了”?
I'm sure they'll have value.
我确信它们会有价值。
There's so many Taiwanese over there working on it , I'm sure they have some value, I hope so.
那里有很多台湾人在做这件事,我相信他们有一定的价值,我希望如此。
But you could argue there is a very viable argument to say that without the R&D flowing from Hsinchu, the fab won't be commercially viable within two years.
但你可能会说,有一个非常可行的论点说,如果没有来自新竹的研发,该晶圆厂将无法在两年内实现商业可行性。
But then, in such a scenario where you're saying what you're saying is happening, then I think there's very different things going on and all the assumptions should be reconsidered.
但是,在这种情况下,你所说的正在发生,那么我认为正在发生非常不同的事情,所有的假设都应该重新考虑。
Then there will be much bigger problems you have to think about.
那么你就会有更大的问题需要考虑。
What makes memory different from logic?
记忆与逻辑有何不同?
Why isn't TSMC just manufacturing all the memory?
为什么台积电不直接生产所有内存?
Why is that SK Hynix or Samsung or Micron?
为什么是 SK 海力士、三星或美光?
What is different about that process versus making logic chips?
该工艺与制造逻辑芯片有何不同?
Memory is a lot more repetitive and there's a lot more emphasis on materials, there's a lot more emphasis on processes than necessarily innovation.
记忆更加重复,更加注重材料,更加注重流程,而不是创新。
Taiwan tried to build a memory industry, a DRAM industry and ITRI [Industrial Technology Research Institute] couldn't make it happen.
台湾试图建立存储器产业、DRAM产业,但工研院未能实现这一目标。
The failure of ITRI post-TSMC is actually something to be talked about someday, but it's like they tried to get all these small memory makers to come work together to challenge Samsung and it was a massive failure.
台积电之后工研院的失败实际上是有一天会被谈论的事情,但就像他们试图让所有这些小型内存制造商一起合作来挑战三星一样,这是一个巨大的失败。
Memory is so much more economies of scale oriented and Samsung has Samsung money, so they really carved the market there.
内存更加注重规模经济,而三星有三星的钱,所以他们确实在那里占领了市场。
Samsung just famously, every time there was a down market, which happens with memory because it's more of a commodity, they would just invest through it.
三星的名言是,每当内存市场出现下滑时,因为内存更像是一种商品,他们就会通过内存进行投资。
And so, every time the market came back they'd have a larger and larger share.
因此,每当市场复苏时,他们就会拥有越来越大的份额。
Is logic at that point?
这时候逻辑还成立吗?
I think one of the most interesting parts of TSMC history was 2008 when the great financial crisis hit, TSMC management wants to pull back and Morris Chang comes back to the company and he's like, "No. Did you see what Apple just introduced?
我认为台积电历史上最有趣的部分之一是 2008 年,当时金融危机袭来,台积电管理层想要撤出,张忠谋回到公司,他说:“不。你看到苹果刚刚推出的产品了吗?
We're actually doubling down", that was a bit where they invested through a downturn and really emerged on top.
我们实际上正在加倍下注”,这就是他们在经济低迷时期进行投资并真正脱颖而出的地方。
Was that a transformation where logic was more a specialty thing that's why Intel moved to logic, they abandoned memory, and now it became more of a commodity and that was also it became more memory-like than it used to be or does that not make sense?
这是一种转变,逻辑更像是一种特殊的东西,这就是英特尔转向逻辑的原因,他们放弃了内存,现在它变得更像是一种商品,而且它也变得比以前更像内存了,或者这没有意义?
It's interesting, this funny thing about that.
这很有趣,这件事很有趣。
Morris Chang saw the opportunity from the iPhone, he also didn't think the iPhone itself would be successful.
张忠谋从iPhone身上看到了机会,他也不认为iPhone本身会成功。
He was one of those guys like Steve Ballmer, this is what I've heard, he was one of those guys that Steve Ballmer were being like , "This is the $600 phone, no one will buy it".
他是像史蒂夫·鲍尔默这样的人之一,这就是我所听到的,他是史蒂夫·鲍尔默这样的人之一,“这是一款 600 美元的手机,没有人会买它”。
I'm amenable to the belief that logic will always have value at some point, there'll always be differentiation.
我相信逻辑在某些时候总是有价值的,总是有差异的。
So you could say maybe you could make an argument that TSMC thought N2 wouldn't be a valuable node, that's why they built a smaller fab for it, but then suddenly AI became a thing and now they're pivoting on that as fast as we can possibly see.
所以你可以说,也许你可以提出这样的论点:台积电认为 N2 不会是一个有价值的节点,这就是为什么他们为其建造了一个较小的晶圆厂,但后来人工智能突然成为一种事物,现在他们正在以我们所能看到的最快速度转向这一点。
So it's really fascinating, I don't buy the fact that logic will become like memory.
所以这真的很令人着迷,我不相信逻辑会变得像记忆一样。
But the volumes are becoming almost more memory-like particularly in some regards.
但这些卷正变得越来越像记忆,尤其是在某些方面。
In some regards, yeah, maybe because memory is becoming more like logic in some ways.
在某些方面,是的,也许是因为记忆在某些方面变得更像逻辑。
That's interesting.
那很有意思。
How so?
为何如此?
Use it like the high bandwidth memory and things like that?
像高带宽内存之类的东西使用它吗?
Yeah.
是的。
They'll have elements of logic where you need to manage the flow of data and stuff like that, and they're very complicated too, they're very complicated stacks and there's a lot of crossover now, tt's very fascinating.
它们将具有逻辑元素,您需要在其中管理数据流之类的东西,它们也非常复杂,它们是非常复杂的堆栈,并且现在有很多交叉,这非常令人着迷。
Well, we've dived super deep into the old Jon Y catalog.
好吧,我们已经深入研究了乔恩·Y 的旧目录。
You've been doing a lot recently about cars and electric cars.
您最近在汽车和电动汽车方面做了很多工作。
Is this just a, "They're computers on wheels", is that the framing or what do you find interesting about this space and that is piquing your interest?
这只是“它们是带轮子的计算机”吗?这是框架还是您对这个空间感兴趣并激发了您的兴趣?
A couple years ago, I think I was, someone who visited from China told me that these cars are coming and these cars are — when Xiaomi started making cars themselves, I was like, they're trying to make cars more like consumer electronics.
几年前,我想我是,一个从中国来访的人告诉我,这些汽车即将到来,这些汽车即将到来——当小米开始自己制造汽车时,我当时想,他们正试图让汽车更像消费电子产品。
They're trying to make it like drones or Bluetooth stereos and I think that's something I wanted to call out and I tried to call out as soon as I can, and I've been really interested, I was like I'll pull it on the side because it's a technology that integrates all these different things together and you could argue that turning it into a consumable is kind of anathema to what the United States has really seen what cars would be, and can be, and I think that's something that's very fascinating.
他们试图把它做得像无人机或蓝牙立体声音响,我想这是我想要大声疾呼的东西,我试图尽快大声疾呼,我真的很感兴趣,我想我会把它放在一边,因为它是一项将所有这些不同的东西集成在一起的技术,你可以说,把它变成一种消费品是对美国真正看到的汽车将是什么和可以是什么的一种诅咒,我认为这是非常令人厌恶的事情。令人着迷的。
That's a very Asia-focused car philosophy in my opinion and these cars are coming.
在我看来,这是一种非常注重亚洲的汽车理念,这些汽车即将问世。
I mean, everyone keeps saying it, everyone keeps talking about it, and I feel like there's not enough movement from domestic old legacy car makers to change and it makes me sad.
我的意思是,每个人都在说,每个人都在谈论,我觉得国内老牌汽车制造商没有足够的行动来改变,这让我很难过。
And this is thinking about cars as almost more like the OEM model like consumer electronics, "We're going to just build out a standard platform", whatever differentiation there is can come from software and that's how you have a Xiaomi car, right?
这就是将汽车视为更像是消费电子产品等 OEM 模式,“我们将构建一个标准平台”,无论有什么差异化都可以来自软件,这就是你拥有小米汽车的方式,对吗?
I've been in some of the Luxgen vans, but I haven't actually driven any of them.
我曾经乘坐过一些纳智捷货车,但我并没有真正驾驶过其中任何一辆。
The new n7 is built on their Foxconn platform or whatever, and it's like an amazing car.
新的 n7 是在富士康平台或其他平台上构建的,它就像一辆令人惊叹的汽车。
When I rode that and it's like $30,000, it's a very good car.
当我骑上它时,它的价格大约是 30,000 美元,这是一辆非常好的车。
It's $30,000 and I rode that car, I'm like, "This is not a Chinese car", Chinese didn't make this — Taiwanese Foxconn made it.
这是 30,000 美元,我骑着那辆车,我想,“这不是中国车”,中国人没有制造它 - 台湾富士康制造了它。
They're new to the cars, this is a really good car and I'm just like, I mean you would think that the Chinese know something special, but I would argue that it's the concept of the car as this electronics thing is that's the true differentiator.
他们是汽车新手,这是一辆非常好的汽车,我的意思是,你会认为中国人知道一些特别的东西,但我认为这是汽车的概念,因为这种电子产品才是真正的差异化因素。
And if so, it would require so much more work, I would think, on the behalf of the product makers to make a better car here, a competitive EV.
如果是这样,我认为,代表产品制造商需要做更多的工作才能在这里制造出更好的汽车,有竞争力的电动汽车。
It's almost what they don't know and it's precisely because the traditional automakers, because making an engine was really hard, and so it's very difficult to accept the idea that your highly differentiated expertise and what you're good at is actually now an obstacle to success because of the cost that goes into it and the wear and tear inherent to that.
这几乎是他们不知道的,正是因为传统汽车制造商,因为制造发动机真的很困难,所以很难接受这样的想法:你高度差异化的专业知识和你擅长的东西现在实际上是成功的障碍,因为它所涉及的成本和固有的磨损。
And actually no, the solution is to make it as simple as possible and then consumers just want cool software, that can be enough.
事实上不是,解决方案是让它尽可能简单,然后消费者只需要很酷的软件,这就足够了。
And that makes me sad that in some ways that Apple left the car industry , it would've been really fascinating to see.
这让我感到难过,从某些方面来说,苹果离开汽车行业真是令人着迷。
I think the Foxconn connection there was clear.
我认为富士康与那里的联系是显而易见的。
It's like, yeah, you build us the standard platform, we will do our software on top.
就像,是的,您为我们构建了标准平台,我们将在其上开发我们的软件。
I agree, it's almost like the TV thing, they were rumored to do a TV for years and years, 10, 15 years ago is always the talk and you wonder maybe they should have done that because what platform does that give you to do other stuff in the future?
我同意,这几乎就像电视的事情一样,多年来一直有传言说他们要做电视,10、15 年前总是人们谈论的话题,你想知道也许他们应该这样做,因为这会给你未来做其他事情的平台带来什么?
You have to run the same thing about a car.
你必须对汽车进行同样的操作。
Even if it was started out not being fully self-driving, that gets you down the road to eventually do that.
即使一开始并不是完全自动驾驶,这也会让你最终做到这一点。
Yeah, I mean, maybe that's one of the downsides of the Tim Cook era, they did good on extending the life of their single core product, but I don't know, they didn't have the, I felt like maybe they fell short going as crazy as doing some crazy stuff.
是的,我的意思是,也许这是蒂姆·库克时代的缺点之一,他们在延长单核产品的寿命方面做得很好,但我不知道,他们没有,我觉得他们可能没有像做一些疯狂的事情一样疯狂。
I think [John] Gruber mentioned that before — one of the losses of Jobs is that they didn't do weird stuff enough.
我想[约翰]格鲁伯之前提到过——乔布斯的损失之一是他们没有做足够多的奇怪的事情。
All right, well if anyone wanted to jump into the Jon Y library, the semiconductor stuff's amazing.
好吧,如果有人想进入 Jon Y 图书馆,半导体的东西就太棒了。
We're going to have a ton of links to it, you're doing more on cars.
我们将有大量的链接,您将在汽车上做更多的事情。
Are there any other pet topics that just stick out to you?
还有其他让您印象深刻的宠物话题吗?
This is some of my favorite stuff to do.
这是我最喜欢做的一些事情。
You mentioned actually the Soviet economic issues.
你实际上提到了苏联的经济问题。
Those were some really interesting videos, what else is in the must-see list?
这些都是一些非常有趣的视频,还有哪些是必看列表中的?
I have an extended series on water desalination technologies and that turned out to be looking at the water desalination progression from the economics of desalinating water at a scale to feed a country is fascinating and I think people should learn that.
我有一个关于海水淡化技术的扩展系列,结果是从大规模淡化水以养活一个国家的经济角度来研究海水淡化的进展,这是令人着迷的,我认为人们应该学习这一点。
One of my favorite videos in recent days was looking at the Saudi and Middle Eastern water supply technologies to desalinate water at millions and millions of gallons of scale and looking at a lot of that is basically filled by cheap energy and it's probably not economical, and I think it was fun.
最近几天我最喜欢的视频之一是观看沙特阿拉伯和中东的供水技术,以数百万加仑的规模淡化海水,并看到其中很多基本上都是由廉价能源填充的,这可能不经济,但我认为这很有趣。
I think water is something that a lot of people need to pay attention to and where your water comes from and how it's being made.
我认为水是很多人需要关注的事情,水是从哪里来的以及它是如何制造的。
And I have what, 12 videos on it, it's really fun.
我有 12 个视频,真的很有趣。
Well, I mean, what I think is clear in this conversation, and I think everyone should pay attention to, is if you want to understand how something works and you want it in a 20, 25-minute or an adjustable video, Jon is your resource.
好吧,我的意思是,我认为在这次谈话中很清楚,而且我认为每个人都应该注意的是,如果你想了解某件事是如何工作的,并且你希望它在 20、25 分钟或可调整的视频中,乔恩就是你的资源。
I've learned a ton from you, I started out asking you questions that I already knew the answer to, but I knew the answer because I watched your videos.
我从你身上学到了很多东西,我开始问你我已经知道答案的问题,但我知道答案是因为我看了你的视频。
So everyone should follow, you can now get access.
所以每个人都应该遵循,您现在就可以访问。
You can listen via podcast, you can actually read the transcripts, but the YouTube videos are the bread and butter, everyone should go and subscribe.
你可以通过播客收听,你实际上可以阅读文字记录,但 YouTube 视频是面包和黄油,每个人都应该去订阅。
Jon, it's great to have you on board.
乔恩,很高兴你加入。
You've done a great job with Stratechery videos and I'm super excited to be working together going forward.
你们在 Stratechery 视频方面做得非常出色,我非常高兴能够继续合作。
Thank you.
谢谢。
I'm really excited to be working with you and it's going to be fun.
我真的很高兴能和你一起工作,这会很有趣。
It's going to be a great 2025 and beyond.
2025 年及以后将是美好的一年。