Nixon's China Game

January, 1969: A week into his presidenc y, Richard Nixon calls his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger into his office.

1969 年 1 月：就任总统一周后，理查德·尼克松 (Richard Nixon) 把他的国家安全顾问亨利·基辛格 (Henry Kissinger) 叫到办公室。

NIXON: I sent a note to Dr. Kissinger indicating that among the many other projects we had on the table for the NSC staff to consider that I wanted China to be given very high priority.

尼克松：我给基辛格博士发了一封照会，表示在我们摆在桌面上供国家安全委员会工作人员考虑的许多其他项目中，我希望中国得到高度重视。

HAIG : I recall Henry coming down from the Oval Office...

黑格：我记得亨利从椭圆形办公室下来......

"Al, this fellow wants to open relations with the China.

“艾尔，这个家伙想与中国建立关系。

And Kissinger says -- "I think he has lost control of his senses." NARR: The shock inside the White House was understandable.

基辛格说——“我认为他已经失去了对自己感官的控制。”纳尔：白宫内部的震惊是可以理解的。

China had been isolated since 1949, when the communist Mao Tse Tung took control, and the U.S. cut diplomatic ties.

自1949年共产党毛泽东掌权以来，中国一直处于孤立状态，美国也断绝了外交关系。

In the 1960s, Mao's brutal Cultural Revolution crushed all but his hard-line supporters.

20 世纪 60 年代，毛泽东残酷的文化大革命压垮了除了他的强硬派支持者之外的所有人。

They called President Nixon as "a gangster," who wielded "a blood-dripping butcher's knife." In 1969, the chances for any relationship between the United States and China seemed slim.

他们称尼克松总统为“流氓”，挥舞着“一把滴血的屠刀”。 1969年，美国和中国建立关系的机会似乎很小。

KISSINGER: If they acted the way they talked in the Cultural Revolution, then it was not doable.

基辛格：如果他们按照他们在文化大革命中所说的那样去做，那就是不可能的。

I had no way of knowing what we were dealing with the Chinese.

我不知道我们在和中国人打交道。

NARR: Nixon had conceived an elaborate secret plan that would shock America's allies and, and alter the global balance of power.

纳尔：尼克松构思了一项精心设计的秘密计划，该计划将震惊美国的盟友，并改变全球力量平衡。

It was one of the most stunning surprises of the Cold War - the pivotal move in a game that changed the world.

这是冷战时期最令人震惊的惊喜之一——这场改变世界的游戏中的关键一步。

NIXON: We can see that China is the basic cause of all of our troubles in Asia.

尼克松：我们可以看到，中国是我们亚洲所有麻烦的根本原因。

If China had not gone Communist, we would not have had a war in Korea.

如果中国没有成为共产主义国家，我们就不会在朝鲜发生战争。

If China were not Communist, there would be no war in Indochina.

如果中国不是共产党，印度支那就不会有战争。

NARR: Since the 1950s, Richard Nixon had been a staunch anti-Communist.

纳尔：自 20 世纪 50 年代以来，理查德·尼克松 (Richard Nixon) 一直是坚定的反共主义者。

But by the time he had become president in January 1969, his thinking had changed.

但当他于 1969 年 1 月就任总统时，他的想法发生了变化。

In the increasingly dangerous atmosphere of the Cold War, Nixon wanted to bring the Soviet Union to the bargaining table.

在冷战日益危险的气氛下，尼克松想把苏联拉到谈判桌上。

And he worried that China - the most populous nation on earth - was living in "angry isolation." Stanley Karnow : The dogma, especially among right-wing Republicans like Nixon, was that communism was a monolith.

他还担心中国这个地球上人口最多的国家正生活在“愤怒的孤立之中”。斯坦利·卡诺：共产主义是一块巨石，尤其是像尼克松这样的右翼共和党人。

That there was somebody at a control panel in Moscow, who pressed buttons and Communists all over the world responded to that.

莫斯科的控制面板上有人按下按钮，全世界的共产党人都会做出反应。

Now he gets evidence that there is a growing split between the Russians and the Chinese, and he's going to use this as a lever.

现在他得到的证据表明俄罗斯人和中国人之间的分歧日益扩大，他将利用这一点作为杠杆。

By making a move toward the Chinese, that would increase his leverage with the Russians, at the same time, he's going to maintain with relations with the Russians, as a leverage against the Chinese.

通过向中国人靠近，这将增加他对俄罗斯人的影响力，同时，他将维持与俄罗斯人的关系，作为对抗中国人的影响力。

NARR: In March 1969, a border dispute between China and the Soviet Union came close to sparking full-scale war.

纳尔：1969年3月，中国和苏联之间的边界争端差点引发全面战争。

That conflict gave Nixon the opportunity to begin his China game.

那场冲突给了尼克松开始他的中国游戏的机会。

NARR: The President proposed to make contact through diplomatic channels in Warsaw, Poland.

纳尔：总统提议通过波兰华沙的外交渠道进行接触。

But the American ambassador, Walter Stoessel raised questions.

但美国大使沃尔特·斯托塞尔提出了疑问。

KISSINGER: I urged Stoessel to make some contacts first.

基辛格：我敦促斯托塞尔先进行一些接触。

But he wouldn't do it because it was so against orthodoxy and in a sense so dangerous.

但他不会这样做，因为这非常违背正统观念，而且在某种意义上非常危险。

So I brought him back and took him into the President.

所以我把他带回来并带他去见总统。

NIXON: Ambassador Stoessel, I remember -- came in to say good-bye and I said to him with Dr. Kissinger present, I said, ‘you know the next time you’re at a social gathering in Warsaw, if the Chinese ambassador, your counterpart is there, I would suggest you walk up and say hello to him.’ NARR: Saying hello was not that simple: no one in the U.S. embassy had any idea what the Chinese ambassador even looked like.

尼克松：斯托塞尔大使，我记得 - 进来向他道别，当时基辛格博士在场，我对他说，“你知道吗，下次你在华沙参加社交聚会时，如果你的对手中国大使也在场，我建议你走上去向他打个招呼。”纳尔：打招呼并不是那么简单：美国大使馆里没有人知道中国大使长什么样。

THOMAS SIMONS : The danger was that Ambassador Stoessel would approach the Mongolian, or even worse, the Vietnamese and tell him that the President of the United States wanted to improve relations with his country.

托马斯·西蒙斯：危险在于斯托塞尔大使会接近蒙古人，甚至更糟糕的是越南人，并告诉他美国总统希望改善与他的国家的关系。

NARR: A fashion show at the Yugoslavian embassy in Warsaw provided the social setting Nixon was looking for.

纳尔：南斯拉夫驻华沙大使馆举行的时装秀提供了尼克松正在寻找的社交场所。

As the show ended, American officials spotted the Chinese delegation.

演出结束后，美国官员发现了中国代表团。

SIMONS: I caught this Chinese on the steps of the Palace of Culture and held him and said to him "My Ambassador has a message for you." JING ZHICHENG (subtitles): These Americans ran after us shouting in Polish: "We are from the American Embassy"…

西蒙斯：我在文化宫的台阶上抓住了这个中国人，把他抱住并对他说：“我的大使有话要告诉你。”景志成（字幕）：这些美国人追着我们用波兰语喊着：“我们是美国大使馆的”……

The ambassador panted, "I saw President Nixon in Washington.

大使气喘吁吁地说：“我在华盛顿见到了尼克松总统。

"He wants to establish relations with China." NARR: Two initial meetings were held in Warsaw.

“他想与中国建立关系。”纳尔：两次初步会议在华沙举行。

Back in Washington, the State Department raised concerns about the damaging effect the initiative could have on America's allies.

回到华盛顿，国务院对该倡议可能对美国盟友造成的破坏性影响表示担忧。

Nixon's response was to cut the State Department out.

尼克松的回应是取消国务院的介入。

NARR: The President and his National Security Advisor would pursue China on their own.

纳尔：总统和他的国家安全顾问将独自追击中国。

KISSINGER: We talked to a number of countries.

基辛格：我们与许多国家进行了交谈。

In fact we first talked to some Communist countries like Rumania.

事实上，我们首先与罗马尼亚等一些共产主义国家进行了交谈。

But the Chinese didn't trust Communists.

但中国人不信任共产党。

And we also talked to the Pakistanis.

我们还与巴基斯坦人进行了交谈。

NARR: Pakistan was friendly with both the U.S. and China.

纳尔：巴基斯坦对美国和中国都很友好。

Its presid ent, Yahya Khan, had dinner with President Nixon in October, 1970, and with the Chinese premier, Chou Enlai, a month later.

1970 年 10 月，该国总统叶海亚·汗 (Yahya Khan) 与尼克松总统共进晚餐，一个月后又与中国总理周恩来共进晚餐。

NARR: Yahya Khan told Chou Enlai that Pakistan was willing to be America’s secret channel to China.

纳尔：叶海亚·汗告诉周恩来，巴基斯坦愿意成为美国通往中国的秘密渠道。

And Khan instructed his Foreign Secretary to take the lead.

汗指示他的外交大臣带头。

SULTAN MUHAMMED KHAN : He said that, ‘I want to entrust to you - something important and very sensitive and from now on only you and I will know about it in Pakistan.

苏丹穆罕默德·汗：他说，“我想委托给你一些重要且非常敏感的事情，从现在开始，在巴基斯坦只有你和我会知道这件事。”

All messages would be hand-written to reduce the risk of leakage through secretaries, no copies would be kept.

所有消息都将手写，以减少通过秘书泄露的风险，不会保留任何副本。

JI CHAOZHU : Yahya Khan told the Premier he had a message from President Nixon.

季朝柱：叶海亚·汗告诉总理，他收到了尼克松总统的来信。

He wanted to send an American emissary to China.

他想派一名美国特使去中国。

Nixon wanted America and China to become friends.

尼克松希望美国和中国成为朋友。

Premier Chou said, "I'll consider it - and reply later" NARR: Nixon was forced to wait…

周总理说，“我会考虑 - 稍后回复” NARR：尼克松被迫等待......

while Mao prepared the way for change.

而毛泽东则为变革做好了准备。

ZHANG HANZHI : During all those -- meetings that I personally attended, I think, repeatedly Mao would say, "you people should know that now our major threat is from the Soviet Union." And this is why he wanted to break this ice with the U.S., because otherwise, he said, China would face enemies on both fronts.

张汉之：在我亲自参加的所有这些会议上，我想，毛泽东会反复说：“你们应该知道，现在我们的主要威胁来自苏联。”这就是为什么他想打破与美国的僵局，因为否则他说，中国将在两条战线上面临敌人。

NARR: Mao had another motivation - Taiwan.

纳尔：毛泽东还有另一个动机——台湾。

Traditionally a part of China, the island was ruled by Mao's old enemy, Chiang Kai Shek .

该岛传统上是中国的一部分，由毛泽东的宿敌蒋介石统治。

Mao wanted Taiwan back.

毛泽东想要夺回台湾。

For twenty years, America had defended Chiang Kai Shek's island.

二十年来，美国一直保卫着蒋介石的岛屿。

Mao thought that a new relationship with Richard Nixon could change that.

毛认为与理查德·尼克松的新关系可以改变这一点。

NARR: But there were risks.

纳尔：但也存在风险。

China's communist ally, North Vietnam was at war with the U.S. Hardliners within Mao's government would view a Mao-Nixon meeting as consorting with the enemy, and they might rebel.

中国的共产主义盟友北越正在与美国交战。毛泽东政府内部的强硬派会认为毛泽东与尼克松的会晤是与敌人勾结，他们可能会叛变。

NARR: Mao moved forward indirectly.

纳尔：毛泽东间接地向前推进了。

In April 1971, he sent an invitation to the U.S. ping-pong team, then in Japan, to tour China.

1971年4月，他向当时在日本的美国乒乓球队发出来华访问的邀请。

Mao's offer conveyed "the regards of the Chinese people to the American people." The tour showed the new friendly face of China to the world.

毛泽东的提议传达了“中国人民对美国人民的问候”。这次巡演向世界展示了中国友好的新面貌。

NARR: In the U.S., Vice-President Spiro Agnew criticized the trip, calling it a "propaganda triumph" for the Chinese.

纳尔：在美国，副总统斯皮罗·阿格纽批评了这次访问，称其为中国人的“宣传胜利”。

Agnew, who had no idea of Nixon's secret plan, was promptly told to keep quiet.

阿格纽对尼克松的秘密计划一无所知，但很快就被告知保持沉默。

NARR: After six months of waiting, on June 2, 1971, Nixon finally received a top secret message from Beijing.

纳尔：经过六个月的等待，1971 年 6 月 2 日，尼克松终于收到了来自北京的绝密信息。

KISSINGER: I brought it to him in the Lincoln sitting room NIXON: "Mr. President", he says - "this is the most important message that a President has received since World War II and the ending of World War II." Henry read it to me with his voice trembling.

基辛格：我在林肯客厅里把它带给他。 尼克松：“总统先生”，他说，“这是自二战和二战结束以来总统收到的最重要的信息。”亨利用颤抖的声音读给我听。

KISSINGER: I did tell him that I thought this was a diplomatic revolution.

基辛格：我确实告诉他，我认为这是一场外交革命。

NIXON: I went down and found some old brandy that somebody had given me right after the inauguration.

尼克松：我下去发现了一些陈年白兰地，是就职典礼后有人给我的。

Never been opened.

从来没有被打开过。

Courvoisier, one of the better Courvoisiers, there are many you know.

Courvoisier，最好的Courvoisier之一，你知道的有很多。

NARR: The message carried Chairman Mao's personal invitation to President Nixon to visit China But first, an American envoy would be dispatched to Beijing to make the delicate arrangements.

纳尔：该电文载有毛主席对尼克松总统访问中国的个人邀请，但首先将派遣一名美国特使前往北京做出微妙的安排。

NIXON: There could be only one person to handle some of these major issues, and where secrecy was involved, I mean secret negotiations, it had to be Henry.

尼克松：这些重大问题可能只有一个人来处理，如果涉及保密，我的意思是秘密谈判，那就必须是亨利。

NARR: Kissinger embarked on an elaborate deception plan.

纳尔：基辛格开始实施一项精心设计的欺骗计划。

On July 1, he set out on a public tour of Asia.

7月1日，他开始了亚洲公开之旅。

As Kissinger’s entourage arrived in Pakistan, President Yahya Khan put the secret plan, code-named Marco Polo, into action.

当基辛格的随行人员抵达巴基斯坦时，叶海亚·汗总统将代号为“马可波罗”的秘密计划付诸实施。

KISSINGER: Yahya invited us to dinner -- and in the course of the dinner, I - I allegedly fell ill and he allegedly urged me to go to the mountain station he had for recuperation.

基辛格：叶海亚邀请我们共进晚餐，据称在晚餐过程中，我生病了，据称他催促我去他的山地车站休养。

SULTAN MUHAMMED KHAN: We announced that he was exhausted by this long trip and by the heat, enervating heat of the sub-continent, and needed a couple of days rest and would be going to this beautiful hill station, nine thousand feet high.

苏丹穆罕默德·汗：我们宣布，这次长途旅行和次大陆的炎热使他筋疲力尽，需要休息几天，然后将前往这个九千英尺高的美丽山站。

It's called Nathia Gali, about two hours’ drive from Islamabad.

它叫纳西亚加利（Nathia Gali），距伊斯兰堡约两小时车程。

NARR: A Kissinger stand-in headed for the hill station.

纳尔：基辛格的替身前往山站。

The world’s press, the U.S. embassy staff, and all the members of Nixon’s cabinet, were kept in the dark.

世界媒体、美国大使馆工作人员以及尼克松内阁的所有成员都被蒙在鼓里。

Muhammad Khan was assigned to drive the real Kissinger to a waiting plane at a military airfield, but he couldn't find his car keys.

穆罕默德·汗被指派开车送真正的基辛格到军用机场等待的飞机，但他找不到自己的车钥匙。

SULTAN MUHAMMED KHAN: Finally, I woke up my son -- who had been using the car the evening before, and he had them under his pillow.

苏丹穆罕默德·汗：最后，我叫醒了我的儿子——他前一天晚上还在用车，他把它们放在枕头下。

And he fished them out and said, "What's the matter, is mother not well, are you fetching a doctor or something?

他把它们捞出来，说道：“怎么了，妈妈身体不舒服吗，你去请医生什么的吗？

What's the crisis?" I said.

有什么危机？”我说。

He looked at his watch said, "Two-thirty, good Lord".

他看了看表，说道：“老天，二点三十分。”

So I said, "No, we are just going to Nathia Gali for a rest for a few days".

所以我说，“不，我们只是去 Nathia Gali 休息几天”。

He woke up wide-awake and said, "At two-thirty in the morning?" He said, "I'll never understand your generation." JOHN HOLDRIDGE : We rolled up to the airplane, one engine of which was already turning over and the other one was just waiting to be turned on.

他猛地醒了过来，问道：“凌晨两点三十分？”他说：“我永远无法理解你们这一代人。”约翰·霍尔德里奇：我们驶向飞机，其中一台发动机已经转动，另一台正等待启动。

We dashed up the - the gangway into the forward entrance to this aircraft.

我们冲上舷梯，进入这架飞机的前入口。

And there were four Chinese waiting for us.

还有四个中国人在等我们。

TANG LONGBIN : When I first saw Kissinger, I wasn't sure who it was.

唐龙斌：当我第一次看到基辛格时，我不确定他是谁。

He was wearing a big black hat…

他戴着一顶黑色的大帽子……

he had dark glasses on…

他戴着墨镜……

and a big black raincoat.

还有一件黑色的大雨衣。

KISSINGER: We found four Chinese in Mao suits sitting there, whom Chou Enlai had sent to escort me into China, but we didn't know this.

基辛格：我们发现四个穿着中山装的中国人坐在那里，他们是周恩来派来护送我进入中国的，但我们并不知道这一点。

SULTAN MUHAMMED KHAN: I saw a look of horror on the face of the man who was a security guard for Dr Kissinger, because when he saw the Chinese sitting in the plane he nearly had a fit.

苏丹穆罕默德·汗：我看到基辛格博士的保安脸上露出惊恐的表情，因为当他看到坐在飞机上的中国人时，他几乎要抽搐了。

He thought they were being kidnapped HOLDRIDGE: So off we went into the darkness.

他以为他们被绑架了。 霍德里奇：于是我们走进了黑暗。

HOLDRIDGE: Well we hadn't been gone altogether too long, when Wong Hiron came to me and says, "Dr. Kissinger, would like to speak to you." She didn't speak English, so she said ( Chinese phrase ).

霍德里奇：我们离开没多久，黄希伦就走过来对我说：“基辛格博士，想和你谈谈。”她不会说英语，所以她说（中文短语）。

So I popped up and went back -- and there was Kissinger in splendid isolation.

于是我突然出现，然后又回去了——基辛格处于极好的孤立状态。

But he said to me -- "John, do you have any shirts?" KISSINGER: One of the problems on these high level trips is the little things like do you have enough shirts along?

但他对我说——“约翰，你有衬衫吗？”基辛格：这些高级别旅行的问题之一是一些小事情，比如你带了足够的衬衫吗？

Well anyway, I put I think two or three shirts aside - put them in a separate bag, carefully preserved.

不管怎样，我把两三件衬衫放在一边——把它们放在一个单独的袋子里，小心地保存起来。

SMYSER: And in the morning at four a.m.

SMYSER：早上四点。

Kissinger, like any normal human being, doesn't remember, and so he went there with no shirt except the one that was on his back.

基辛格和任何正常人一样，不记得了，所以他去了那里，除了背上的那件外，没有穿衬衫。

LORD: I said, "Henry you're going to negotiate with these top Chinese, and before you even sit down and talk with them you've lost your shirt." And then Kissinger was going absolutely crazy.

洛德：我说，“亨利，你要和这些中国高层谈判，在你坐下来和他们交谈之前，你就已经输光了。”然后基辛格就彻底疯了。

NARR: The two governments had agreed that Henry Kissinger’s presence be kept secret.

纳尔：两国政府同意对亨利·基辛格的出席保密。

If the mission failed to produce a diplomatic breakthrough, no one would know.

如果这次访问未能取得外交突破，没有人会知道。

But the Chinese insisted on preserving the visit on film .

但中国人坚持将这次访问保留在影片中。

NARR: The National Security Advisor had only 48 hours to lay the groundwork for Nixon's visit.

纳尔：国家安全顾问只有 48 小时的时间为尼克松的访问奠定基础。

NARR: Soon after the Americans arrived, word came that the Chinese premier, Chou Enlai, was on his way.

纳尔：美国人抵达后不久，就有消息称中国总理周恩来即将来访。

JI CHAOZHU : Up until then, Kissinger was quite relaxed But then he became very nervous.

纪朝柱：之前基辛格还是很放松的，但后来他就变得非常紧张。

NARR: Kissinger was about to greet the Prime Minister of a government America did not officially recognize -- in a borrowed shirt several sizes too big.

纳尔：基辛格正准备迎接美国未正式承认的政府总理——穿着一件借来的衬衫，尺寸大了好几号。

SMYSER: And there's a famous photograph that was taken of him and Chou Enlai shaking hands, and whenever you...

史迈瑟：有一张他和周恩来握手的著名照片，每当你......

whenever one asked Henry about that, he said, "I am wearing that shirt, you know," and he was very, very unhappy.

每当有人问亨利这件事时，他都会说：“你知道，我穿着那件衬衫。”他非常非常不高兴。

KISSINGER And on top of everything else, it was made in - Taiwan and had a label: ‘Made in Taiwan’.

基辛格 最重要的是，它是在台湾制造的，并且有一个标签：“台湾制造”。

And I used to joke that when I said to the Chinese, on that trip, that Taiwan was close to me I really meant it.

我曾经开玩笑说，在那次旅行中，当我对中国人说台湾离我很近时，我是认真的。

NARR: Just how close to Taiwan America intended to stay was the critical question.

纳尔：关键问题是美国打算与台湾保持多密切的关系。

All along, Nixon and Kissinger knew the Chinese would not cooperate unless the U.S. took a step away from Taiwan.

尼克松和基辛格一直都知道，除非美国从台湾撤出一步，否则中国不会合作。

The Chinese were waiting to hear the magic words.

中国人正等待着听到这些神奇的话语。

Nixon and Kissinger were ready to say them.

尼克松和基辛格已经准备好说出这些话了。

HOLDRIDGE: I drafted this opening statement for Kissinger which said the United States did not support two Chinas.

霍德里奇：我为基辛格起草了这份开场白，其中表示美国不支持两个中国。

Nor one China, one Taiwan, nor an independent Taiwan.

没有一个中国，没有一个台湾，也没有一个独立的台湾。

And I sat there, on the edge of my chair, waiting for him to repeat this little bit about Taiwan and finally he did.

我坐在椅子边上，等着他重复一遍有关台湾的事，最后他重复了。

At which point, Chou Enlai said, "Good, these discussions may now proceed." NARR: Kissinger spoke carefully, from thick briefing books.

这时，周恩来说：“好，现在可以开始讨论了。”纳尔：基辛格根据厚厚的简报小心翼翼地讲话。

His counterpart Chou En-lai appeared relaxed and more spontaneous.

他的对手周恩来显得更加放松和自然。

SMYSER: He spoke from only one or two little hand-written pieces of paper.

斯迈瑟：他只用一两张手写的小纸片说话。

It's obvious that he'd written them himself, and he referred to his notes very, very rarely.

很明显，这些都是他自己写的，而且他很少提及他的笔记。

HOLDRIDGE: Kissinger felt that he was being upstaged.

霍德里奇：基辛格觉得自己被抢了风头。

Here he was, with these several books piled in front of him.

他就在这里，面前堆着这几本书。

So he slammed it, and shoved it aside, and that was the last we saw of the book.

于是他砰的一声把它扔到一边，这是我们最后一次看到这本书。

NARR: Kissinger then asked the Chinese for help in ending the war in Vietnam.

纳尔：基辛格随后请求中国帮助结束越南战争。

SMYSER: Chou Enlai's reply was about what you might have expected.

史迈瑟：周恩来的答复正如你所预料的那样。

GUO JIADING : No deal!

郭家丁：没成交！

U.S. troops must go.

美军必须走。

LI LIANQUING: You must just get out.

李连庆：你必须出去。

Let the Vietnamese solve their own problems.

让越南人自己解决自己的问题。

SMYSER: But at the same time, the very fact that he was meeting with us could be seen by the Vietnamese as an act of treachery.

史迈瑟：但与此同时，他与我们会面这一事实可能被越南人视为一种背叛行为。

NARR: The next morning, the Chinese took Kissinger sightseeing.

纳尔：第二天早上，中国人带基辛格观光了。

He had just one day left, and did not have the invitation for President Nixon in hand.

他还剩一天的时间，手里还没有给尼克松总统的邀请函。

The trouble was the wording.

问题在于措辞。

LORD: The Chinese wanted this brief announcement in effect to say President Nixon was dying to go to China, and we're gracious enough to let him come visit.

洛德：中国人希望这个简短的声明实际上表明尼克松总统非常想去中国，我们很慷慨地让他来访。

United States wanted to say China would like to have Nixon come ...Nixon's delighted to accept their invitation.

美国想说中国希望尼克松来……尼克松很高兴接受他们的邀请。

NARR: The delegations worked all night to find the words.

纳尔：各代表团通宵努力寻找措辞。

At dawn, they had them.

黎明时分，他们得到了它们。

"Once the announcement is made," Chou Enlai told Kissinger, "it will shake the world, which won't be able to sleep." NIXON: The announcement I shall now read is being issued simultaneously in Peking and in the United States: "Knowing of President Nixon’s expressed desire to visit the Peoples Republic of China, Premier Chou Enlai, on behalf of the government of the Peoples Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China.

“一旦宣布，”周恩来告诉基辛格，“这将震动世界，让世界无法入眠。”尼克松：我现在宣读的公告是在北京和美国同时发布的：“得知尼克松总统表达了访问中华人民共和国的愿望，周恩来总理代表中华人民共和国政府，向尼克松总统发出访问中国的邀请。

President Nixon has accepted the invitation with pleasure." NARR: The reaction was swift.

尼克松总统愉快地接受了邀请。”纳尔：反应很快。

Taiwan's ambassador James Shen accused Nixon of selling out his country.

台湾大使沈俊杰指责尼克松出卖了他的国家。

JAMES SHEN: I got 20 minutes notice last night from Mr. Rogers, the Secretary of State, he called from California." HOLDRIDGE: My friend --Jimmy Shen who was the ambassador, oooph, he was so really taken aback - just shattered by this.

詹姆斯·沉：昨晚我收到了国务卿罗杰斯先生 20 分钟的通知，他从加利福尼亚州打来电话。” 霍尔德里奇：我的朋友——吉米·沉，他是大使，哦，他真的大吃一惊——被这件事吓坏了。

JAMES SHEN: I said ‘We -- we -- we regret this, and we - we lodge a protest, a strong protest’.

JAMES SHEN：我说‘我们-我们-我们对此感到遗憾，我们-我们提出抗议，强烈抗议’。

REPORTER: Do you expect on the basis of your protest, are you asking that the president not go to Peking?

记者：根据您的抗议，您是否希望总统不要去北京？

JAMES SHEN: Well, that’s the whole purpose of the protest.

JAMES SHEN：嗯，这就是抗议的全部目的。

NARR: Nixon tried to reassure Taiwan and quiet the critics within his own Republican party.

纳尔：尼克松试图安抚台湾，并平息共和党内部的批评者。

He persuaded Conservative leader Senator Barry Goldwater to support the China trip, and sent California Governor Ronald Reagan to explain the new policy to Chiang Kai Shek.

他说服保守党领袖参议员巴里·戈德华特支持访华，并派加州州长罗纳德·里根向蒋介石解释新政策。

NARR: "Personally, I think the Communist Chinese are a bunch of murdering bums," Reagan wrote in a letter to a friend, "but in the big chess game going on, where Russia is still head man on the other side, we need a little elbow room." NARR: There was one reaction Henry Kissinger wanted to hear for himself.

纳尔：“就我个人而言，我认为共产党中国是一群杀人的流浪汉，”里根在给朋友的信中写道，“但在正在进行的大型国际象棋比赛中，俄罗斯仍然是另一边的头号人物，我们需要一点回旋余地。”纳尔：亨利·基辛格想亲耳听到一种反应。

He placed a call to the Soviet Ambassador.

他给苏联大使打电话。

DOBRYNIN : Kissinger called me and said," Anatoly, I've been on a trip.

多勃雷宁：基辛格打电话给我说：“阿纳托利，我出差了。

I knew he had been to Asia.

我知道他去过亚洲。

But China - that was a surprise GEORGII ARBATOV : At the Central committee, the news hit us like a bolt from the blue.

但中国——这是一个惊喜 乔治·阿尔巴托夫：在中央委员会，这个消息就像晴天霹雳一样击中了我们。

My colleagues said, "America will be China's ally." "Kissinger - what else has he agreed?

我的同事说，“美国将成为中国的盟友”。 “基辛格——他还同意了什么？

"When Nixon visits Beijing, anything could happen.

“当尼克松访问北京时，任何事情都有可能发生。

"All this will make things very difficult for us.

“所有这些都会让我们的事情变得非常困难。

"Where will it all end?" NARR: Nixon's gamble worked.

“这一切将在哪里结束？”纳尔：尼克松的赌博成功了。

Four days after his announcement, the Kremlin invited the President to Moscow.

在他宣布这一消息四天后，克里姆林宫邀请总统访问莫斯科。

Long-stalled arms talks would now proceed.

长期停滞的军备谈判现在将继续进行。

KISSINGER: As we moved closer to China, the Soviet Union didn’t want to be left behind, they moved closer to us.

基辛格：当我们向中国靠拢时，苏联不想被抛在后面，他们向我们靠拢。

NIXON: So, the Russian game made the Chinese game work, and the Chinese game made the Russian game work.

尼克松：所以，俄罗斯游戏让中国游戏成功，中国游戏让俄罗斯游戏成功。

NARR: But in September 1971, events in China threatened Nixon's strategy .

纳尔：但是 1971 年 9 月，中国发生的事件威胁到了尼克松的战略。

After an alleged coup attempt, Mao's handpicked successor, Lin Biao, was killed in a suspicious plane crash.

在一次所谓的政变之后，毛泽东精心挑选的继任者林彪在一次可疑的飞机失事中丧生。

Many high-ranking military leaders were replaced.

许多高级军事领导人被替换。

Washington worried that the upheaval could jeopardize the President's visit.

华盛顿担心动荡可能会危及总统的访问。

NARR: To test the waters, a full-scale dress rehearsal of Nixon's China trip was mounted in January 1972.

纳尔：为了试水，尼克松的中国之行于 1972 年 1 月进行了一次全面的彩排。

Once again, the President bypassed his State Department and chose Kissinger's Deputy, General Alexander Haig to represent him.

总统再次绕过国务院，选择基辛格的副手亚历山大·黑格将军代表他。

HAIG: Much to the surprise of everyone, including -- myself the president reached down and asked me to do it.

黑格：令所有人（包括我自己）感到惊讶的是，总统主动要求我这样做。

I suspect he was trying to keep peace in the family and I didn't represent a threat to anyone.

我怀疑他是想维持家庭和睦，而我并不对任何人构成威胁。

NARR: Home movies of the trip were taken by Nixon's Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman - and his aide, Dwight Chapin .

纳尔：这次旅行的家庭录像是由尼克松的幕僚长鲍勃·霍尔德曼（Bob Haldeman）和他的助手德怀特·查平（Dwight Chapin）拍摄的。

CHAPIN: It was very striking to get off the airplane and to have these great huge poster signs saying -- "capitalist pigs" and so on, just these - these -- these slogans that were putting down America or putting us down, is the way we took it, and we saw them as we drove into town.

查平：一下飞机，看到这些巨大的海报标语，上面写着“资本主义猪”等等，这些标语是非常令人震惊的，这些口号正在贬低美国或贬低我们，这就是我们的看法，当我们开车进城时，我们看到了它们。

NARR: In Shanghai, China’s great trading port, the party leadership was dominated by hardliners who despised Nixon’s America.

纳尔：在中国最大的贸易港口上海，党的领导层由鄙视尼克松美国的强硬派主导。

Haig’s host used the welcoming ceremony to attack American imperialism around the world.

黑格的东道主利用欢迎仪式在世界各地攻击美帝国主义。

HAIG: When he concluded, I sat there.

黑格：当他结束时，我坐在那里。

I was not going to return that toast because I didn't want that fellow, or the Chinese government, to think that that would be acceptable for an American president to be exposed to.

我不会还敬酒，因为我不想让那个家伙或中国政府认为美国总统接触到这样的事情是可以接受的。

ZHANG HANZHI: And after the dinner, the Shanghai leaders rushed into our office and, you know, really protested and said, General Haig was insulting the Shanghai leaders HAIG: And I can remember my state department experts saying -- "You, you're in real trouble, you have probably destroyed the president's visit." NARR: General Haig's next stop was Hangzhou - Mao's summer retreat.

张汉之：晚宴结束后，上海领导人冲进我们的办公室，你知道，他们真的抗议说，黑格将军侮辱了上海领导人。 黑格：我记得我的国务院专家说——“你，你真的有麻烦了，你可能破坏了总统的访问。”纳尔：黑格将军的下一站是杭州——毛泽东的避暑胜地。

There, on a sightseeing cruise, the President's stand-in was snubbed again.

在那里，在一次观光游轮上，总统的替身再次遭到冷落。

ZHANG HANZHI: We got on the boat and I found that ah, there was, ah, really, ah, nothing to eat on the table.

张含之：我们上了船，我发现啊，啊，真的啊，桌子上没有吃的。

There were only tea, nothing else, no fruit, no snacks.

只有茶，没有别的，没有水果，没有零食。

Of course there was no heating in the boat, so ...

当然船上没有暖气，所以......

everything was so cold.

一切都是那么冷。

And the Hangzhou leaders didn't say anything.

而杭州的领导也没有说什么。

So nobody spoke.

所以没人说话。

NARR: Translator Zhang Hanzhi was baffled.

NARR：译者张含之很困惑。

She asked the head of protocol in Hangzhou why Haig’s reception was so frigid.

她询问杭州礼宾部负责人，为何对黑格的接待如此冷淡。

ZHANG HANZHI V/O: He told me, "last night - we laid the table, we prepare the boat and, ah, you should have come and last night to see, you know.

张含志 V/O：他告诉我，“昨晚 - 我们摆好了桌子，我们准备了船，啊，你应该昨晚来看看，你知道。

There were sumptuous food on the table, everything on the table." He said, "it’s not our decision.

桌子上摆满了丰盛的食物，所有的东西都摆满了。”他说：“这不是我们的决定。

The Shanghai leaders called us and said we must lower the temperature NARR: The Beijing officials accompanying Haig’s party decided to intervene.

上海领导打电话给我们，说我们必须降低温度 NARR：陪同黑格一行的北京官员决定进行干预。

ZHANG HANZHI: In the end the younger ones really decided to call Beijing, you know - and we did.

张含之：最后，年轻人真的决定给北京打电话，你知道的——我们也这么做了。

And Premier Chou said - I would report to Chairman Mao Tse Tung immediately.

周总理说——我会立即向毛泽东主席汇报。

CHAPIN: We left Hangzhou and we took a train back to Shanghai and we had some meetings on the train at which time we tried to untangle what was, what was going on with the Chinese ZHANG HANZHI: And then news came to say that Chairman Mao thinks it was all wrong that General Haig and his group should be treated that way.

查宾：我们离开杭州，乘火车返回上海，我们在火车上开了一些会，当时我们试图弄清楚中国人的情况。 张含志：然后有消息说，毛主席认为黑格将军和他的团队应该受到这样的对待，这是完全错误的。

Chou Enlai really criticized us very, very seriously.

周恩来对我们的批评真的非常非常严重。

And he said what happened in Shanghai and Hangzhou, almost upset the whole strategy of Mao Tse Tung's plan of break the ice between the U.S. and China.

他说，上海和杭州发生的事情，几乎打乱了毛泽东打破中美关系坚冰计划的整个战略。

NARR: Chairman Mao’s last-minute instructions saved the day.

纳尔：毛主席最后一刻的指示挽救了局面。

The Chinese hardliners’ attempt to head off President Nixon's visit had failed.

中国强硬派阻止尼克松总统访华的企图失败了。

NARR: On February 17, 1972, Richard Nixon set out on his historic trip to China.

纳尔：1972 年 2 月 17 日，理查德·尼克松开始了他历史性的中国之行。

Two years of effort had led to the moment, yet no one knew if the Chinese were prepared to agree to anything.

经过两年的努力才迎来了这一刻，但没有人知道中国人是否准备好同意任何事情。

Secretary of State William Rogers tried to lower expectations.

国务卿威廉·罗杰斯试图降低期望。

ROGERS: We hope that our relations with the Peoples’ Republic of China will be improved as a result of the trip.

罗杰斯：我们希望这次访问能够改善我们与中华人民共和国的关系。

We’re not sure what outcome will be and we certainly don’t want any exaggerated hopes to develop NARR: Accompanying Nixon on the trip would be a carefully chosen group of journalists….

我们不确定结果会是什么，我们当然不希望对 NARR 的发展抱有任何夸大的希望：陪同尼克松出访的将是一群精心挑选的记者……。

And television crews.

还有电视台工作人员。

KARNOW: The Chinese were very reluctant to have the press come.

卡诺：中国人非常不愿意让媒体来。

They just didn't want it.

他们只是不想要它。

They wanted to have this thing quietly.

他们想安静地拥有这件事。

On the other hand, Nixon wanted a television spectacular.

另一方面，尼克松希望电视上能有一场精彩的表演。

First of all , it's 1972, it's an election year.

首先，现在是 1972 年，这是一个选举年。

He wants to advertise this great triumph.

他想宣传这一伟大的胜利。

So, after some negotiations, the Chinese agree, and we have about 85 journalists…

所以，经过一番谈判，中国人同意了，我们有大约 85 名记者……

Almost all of them were television people.

他们几乎都是电视人。

This was going to be a television show.

这将是一个电视节目。

NARR: But the script had yet to be written.

纳尔：但是剧本还没有写完。

Nixon did not even know if there would be a meeting with Chairman Mao.

尼克松甚至不知道是否会见毛主席。

"We were embarking," Nixon remembered , "on a voyage of philosophical discovery as uncertain, and in some ways as perilous, as the voyages of geographical discovery of an earlier time." WALTER CRONKITE: And there's Mrs. Nixon and the President.

尼克松回忆道：“我们正在踏上一次哲学发现之旅，它与早期的地理发现之旅一样充满不确定性，在某些方面也同样危险。”沃尔特·克朗凯特： 还有尼克松夫人和总统。

NARR: American television networks interrupted their regular programming to broadcast the President's arrival live.

纳尔：美国电视网络中断了常规节目，直播总统的到来。

WALTER CRONKITE: First hand shake with Chou Enlai.

沃尔特·克朗凯特：第一次与周恩来握手。

NARR: The Chinese surprised Nixon almost immediately.

纳尔：中国人几乎立刻就让尼克松感到惊讶。

Taken to the government's guest house to rest before the evening's banquet, Nixon was interrupted just as he was about to enter the shower.

尼克松在晚上的宴会前被带到政府招待所休息，正当他准备洗澡时被打断。

Chairman Mao wanted to meet the President.

毛主席想见主席。

The Chairman had Taiwan - and its leader, Chiang Kai Shek - on his mind.

主席关心的是台湾及其领导人蒋介石。

NIXON: He said,"I see where your friend Chiang Kai-Shek called me a bandit." After the translation, I said, "what does the Chairman call Chiang Kai-Shek?" And he said, "well, I call him a bandit too." And then Chou Enlai says, "we just abuse each other." Then they both threw back their heads and laughed.

尼克松：他说：“我明白你的朋友蒋介石称我为强盗了。”翻译完后我说：“主席怎么称呼蒋介石？”他说：“好吧，我也称他为强盗。”然后周恩来说：“我们只是互相辱骂。”然后他们俩都仰着头笑了起来。

KISSINGER: He acted as if he absolutely had no other assignment in the world except to deal with his American counterpart.

基辛格：他表现得好像除了与美国同行打交道之外，他在世界上绝对没有其他任务。

NIXON: I said, you're quite aware of my...

尼克松：我说过，你很清楚我的……

ah...

啊...

sentiments with regards to Communism.

对共产主义的感情。

I'm considered to be a rightist.

我被认为是右派。

And he says, "Oh, I like rightists." He said, "I like Prime Minister Heath." I said, "well sometimes those on the right can do things which those on the left can only talk about." I could do it because no one could question my so-called anti-Communist credentials.

他说：“哦，我喜欢右派。”他说：“我喜欢希思总理。”我说：“有时候，右派可以做左派只能说说而已的事情。”我能做到这一点，因为没有人可以质疑我所谓的反共资格。

He had to be helped to stand up for the handshake.

握手时必须有人帮助他站起来。

These rather pretty Chinese girls lifted him up and helped him walk over.

这些相当漂亮的中国女孩把他扶了起来，扶着他走了过去。

LORD: As the meeting concluded the Chinese came in with instant photographs of the meeting all of us sitting there.

洛德：会议结束时，中国人带着我们坐在那儿的会议即时照片进来了。

Nixon and Kissinger began whispering to each other.

尼克松和基辛格开始窃窃私语。

NARR: The two men had an embarrassing problem.

纳尔：这两个人遇到了一个尴尬的问题。

They had excluded Secretary of State Rogers from the meeting, but had brought along a young member of Kissinger’s staff, Winston Lord .

他们排除了国务卿罗杰斯参加会议，但带来了基辛格幕僚中的一位年轻成员温斯顿·洛德。

JI CHAOZHU: Kissinger realized if Rogers saw the photo, he would be very angry.

季朝柱：基辛格意识到如果罗杰斯看到这张照片，他会非常生气。

We solved the Lord problem.

我们解决了主的问题。

NARR: In the published version, the Chinese simply cropped Winston Lord out of history.

纳尔：在出版的版本中，中国人只是将温斯顿·洛德从历史中删除了。

NARR: For Americans back home, it was breakfast time as they watched live television coverage of the welcoming banquet in the Great Hall of the People.

纳尔：对于回到家乡的美国人来说，早餐时间是他们观看人民大会堂欢迎晚宴的电视直播。

Attending that evenings function was the influential conservative journalist, William F.

出席当晚活动的有颇具影响力的保守派记者威廉·F·肯尼迪 (William F.

Buckley, Jr. NIXON: On behalf of all of your American guests, I wish to thank you…

小巴克利·尼克松：我谨代表所有美国客人感谢你们……

BUCKLEY: He rose at sort of toast time and delivered a toast; very florid language.

巴克利：他在敬酒时间起身并祝酒；非常华丽的语言。

NIXON: Chairman Mao has written, "So many deeds cry out to be done and always urgently." BUCKLEY : There was, I kid you not, a fleeting reference to George Washington and his similarities to Mao Tse Tung.

尼克松：毛主席曾写道：“许多事情都迫切需要完成。”巴克利：我没骗你，其中短暂地提到了乔治·华盛顿以及他与毛泽东的相似之处。

And then, with his little glass in hand, he went and shook the hands of everybody in that table.

然后，他手里拿着他的小玻璃杯，走过去和那张桌子上每个人都握手。

This was -- this was kind of astonishing.

这有点令人惊讶。

These were people who had fielded and were supervising the Cultural Revolution, massive executioners.

这些人曾参与并监督文化大革命，是大规模的刽子手。

NARR : The next day, Nixon visited the Great Wall.

纳尔：第二天，尼克松参观了长城。

TANG LONGBIN: Chairman Mao says, "You're not a man...

唐龙斌：毛主席说：“你不是一个人......

until you've climbed to the top" NIXON: We will not climb to the top today.

直到你爬到顶峰” 尼克松：我们今天不会爬到顶峰。

We are -- we are already meeting at the Summit -- in Peking.

我们已经在北京举行峰会了。

NARR: The Chinese skillfully handled the American press corps.

纳尔：中国人巧妙地应对了美国记者团。

STANLEY KARNOW: To keep us out of mischief, the Chinese organized bus tours for the journalists to go to the Great Wall, or the Ming Tombs, or Peking University.

斯坦利·卡诺：为了让我们免遭恶作剧，中国人组织记者乘坐巴士前往长城、十三陵或北京大学。

They dished up pretty Red Guards, probably came from Central Casting, and you could have your picture taken with them.

他们送来了漂亮的红卫兵，可能来自中央铸造厂，你可以和他们合影。

I mean, the food was absolutely sensational, the toasts, and the dancing girls, and the music and the anthems, and all that sort of thing, all that was terrific.

我的意思是，食物绝对棒极了，祝酒词、舞女、音乐和国歌，以及所有诸如此类的东西，都很棒。

But try to find out what was really going on, and you were in the dark.

但当你试图找出到底发生了什么时，你却一无所知。

NARR: Nixon's desire to keep the on-going talks with the Chinese secret extended even to his own Secretary of State.

纳尔：尼克松希望对与中国正在进行的会谈保密，这一愿望甚至延伸到了他自己的国务卿身上。

MARSHALL GREEN (Ass't Sec'y of State): Secretary Rogers and I were with Nixon on this trip to represent the State Department but we were cut out of almost all of the specifics of the negotiation.

马歇尔·格林（助理国务卿）：罗杰斯国务卿和我代表国务院与尼克松一起出访，但我们几乎没有参与谈判的所有细节。

NARR: Behind closed doors, two countries were crafting a joint communique.

纳尔：两国正在闭门起草一份联合公报。

A statement that would both recognize Mao's claim to Taiwan, and honor the American commitment to defend Taiwan.

这份声明既承认毛泽东对台湾的主权主张，又履行美国保卫台湾的承诺。

KISSINGER: So we began the negotiation on the Communiqué HOLDRIDGE: We had to say that, work out a formula that would give Taiwan a separate status while at same time not negating the position of the People's Republic of China that Taiwan was a part of the PRC.

基辛格：所以我们开始了公报谈判。 霍尔德里奇：我们不得不说，制定一个方案，给予台湾独立地位，同时不否定中华人民共和国关于台湾是中华人民共和国一部分的立场。

HANG HANZHI: We said, to us, it’s a principle, you cannot put in the Communiqué that you -- you will continue to protect Taiwan while establishing a relationship with China.

杭汉志：我们说，对我们来说，这是一个原则，你不能在公报中写下你将在与中国建立关系的同时继续保护台湾。

KISSINGER: We realized we had to adjust our relationship on Taiwan.

基辛格：我们意识到必须调整我们在台湾问题上的关系。

NARR: Nixon could not publicly desert a long-time ally for the sake of his new relationship with China.

纳尔：尼克松不能为了与中国的新关系而公开抛弃长期盟友。

And he had not come this far to walk away without an agreement.

他走到这一步也不是为了在没有达成协议的情况下走开。

With negotiations still underway, the Chinese took their American guests to the ballet.

谈判仍在进行中，中国人带着美国客人去看了芭蕾舞。

NARR: Nixon’s private notes, hand-written in preparation for his meeting with Chou En-Lai, confirm his intention to back away from Taiwan, and his dilemma.

纳尔：尼克松为准备与周恩来会面而手写的私人笔记，证实了他退出台湾的意图以及他的困境。

He referred toTaiwan -- and Vietnam as -- "irritants" in the way of the new course.

他将台湾和越南称为新路线中的“刺激物”。

NARR: "Taiwan: …our policy is:…

纳尔：“台湾：……我们的政策是：……

one China, Taiwan is a part of China.

一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分。

Won’t support Taiwan independence.

不会支持台独。

Will seek normalization." NARR: Nixon added: But if it appears we sold out Taiwan, Left egged on by Soviets and Right will make it an issue -- …..no secret deals.

将寻求正常化。” NARR：尼克松补充道：但如果我们出卖了台湾，左派在苏联的怂恿下，右派将使它成为一个问题——……没有秘密交易。

NARR: The ballet was written by Mao's wife, Jiang Jing, a hard-liner.

纳尔：这部芭蕾舞剧是由毛泽东的妻子江静创作的，她是一位强硬派。

Nixon found her "unpleasantly abrasive and aggressive." "Why didn’t you come to China before?," she asked.

尼克松发现她“粗鲁且咄咄逼人，令人不快”。 “你之前为什么不来中国？”她问道。

NARR: The delegations finally found artful words for their communiqué: The document stated that "all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe there is one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." It did not address who should govern this ‘one China’.

纳尔：各代表团终于为公报找到了巧妙的措辞：文件称，“海峡两岸所有中国人都相信有一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分”。它没有解决谁应该统治这个“一个中国”的问题。

LORD: We've approved the Communiqué with the Chinese.

洛德：我们已经批准了与中方的公报。

The President approves it in the middle of the night.

总统半夜就批准了。

The Chinese Politburo approved it on the Chinese side.

中方同意了这一决定。

NARR: Only on the flight from Beijing to their next stop Hangzhou were members of the State Department shown the Communiqué.

纳尔：只有在从北京飞往下一站杭州的航班上，国务院成员才看到了这份公报。

GREEN: And I saw a very serious flaw that I couldn’t believe had not been seen by people up the line.

格林：我看到了一个非常严重的缺陷，我不敢相信一线人员没有发现这个缺陷。

And when I showed this to Rogers, he could immediately see what a terrible blunder this was.

当我把这个给罗杰斯看时，他立刻就意识到这是一个多么可怕的错误。

We’d said that we will continue to give our support through our mutual security treaties with Japan, Korea.

我们说过，我们将继续通过与日本、韩国的共同安全条约提供支持。

It said nothing about our -- our treaty obligations to the Republic of China on Taiwan.

它没有提及我们对台湾中华民国的条约义务。

NARR: Rogers and Green knew that a firestorm of protest would result if the Communique stayed as it was.

纳尔：罗杰斯和格林知道，如果公报保持原样，将会引发激烈的抗议。

But they also knew the negotiations had been concluded.

但他们也知道谈判已经结束。

HANG HANZHI: You could feel that although everybody was smiling, everybody, you know -- Nixon still did the tour of the park, you could see all those pictures of looking at the goldfish, you know, and, Kissinger and Nixon still, you know, cracked jokes, but nobody felt easy.

杭汉之：你可以感觉到，虽然每个人都在微笑，每个人，你知道——尼克松仍然参观了公园，你可以看到所有那些看金鱼的照片，你知道，基辛格和尼克松仍然，你知道，开玩笑，但没有人感到轻松。

NARR: Rogers held his tongue until he returned to his villa.

纳尔：罗杰斯在回到别墅之前一直保持沉默。

There, he summoned his whole departmental team.

在那里，他召集了整个部门的团队。

ZHANG HANZHI: When I got there to their villa, they were heatedly, very heatedly talking about something.

张含之：我到他们别墅的时候，他们正在非常非常激烈地谈论着什么。

I'm sure you know they were taking some action.

我相信你知道他们正在采取一些行动。

GREEN: Rogers tried to get Nixon and he got Haldeman on the line and Haldeman said "Oh, the president is sleeping, he’s tired and can’t be disturbed." But Rogers said, "This is a matter of critical importance, immediate importance." ZHANG HANZHI: They probably shouldn't have said anything in front of a Chinese, but they were too excited that they couldn't really stop themselves.

格林：罗杰斯试图联系尼克松，他给霍尔德曼打电话，霍尔德曼说：“哦，总统正在睡觉，他很累，不能被打扰。”但罗杰斯表示，“这是一个至关重要、迫在眉睫的问题。”张含之：他们可能不应该在中国人面前说任何话，但他们太兴奋了，无法真正阻止自己。

GREEN: This is outrageous.

格林：这太离谱了。

The Secretary of State, the press- the president’s principal adviser, under the Constitution, on foreign affairs, not having access to the president at a critical moment.

国务卿、新闻界——根据宪法，总统在外交事务上的首席顾问，在关键时刻无法接触总统。

ZHANG HANZHI: They were saying that we cannot accept that, how could it be that it was agreed without letting us know?

张含之：他们说我们不能接受，怎么可能不通知我们就同意了呢？

NARR: Following that evening's banquet, Rogers confronted Kissinger.

纳尔：那天晚上的宴会结束后，罗杰斯与基辛格对质。

HOLDRIDGE: And this is where the explosion took place.

霍德里奇：这就是爆炸发生的地方。

NIXON: There were some very spirited discussions between Rogers and Kissinger.

尼克松：罗杰斯和基辛格之间进行了一些非常激烈的讨论。

HOLDRIDGE: Nixon was unhappy at the fact that his people had not given him a complete wrapped up final Communiqué and he was stamping around in his underwear saying things in a rather loud tone of voice.

霍德里奇：尼克松很不高兴，因为他的人民没有给他一份完整的最终公报，而且他穿着内衣跺脚，用相当大的语气说话。

GREEN: There was a pounding on my door at two o’clock in the morning, "All hell’s broken loose in the guest house -- and you’re the cause of it".

格林：凌晨两点，有人敲我的门，“宾馆里一片混乱——而你就是造成这一切的原因”。

And I said "What’s --what’s gonna happen?" He says, "I don’t know what’s going to happen, but I know the president is furious." LORD: The president was insistent, and even Kissinger understood that we couldn't have a split in our delegation in terms of American press coverage, and therefore he, with great reluctance, realized he had to go at least through the motions of trying to get some changes.

我说“会发生什么？”他说：“我不知道会发生什么，但我知道总统很愤怒。”洛德：总统很坚持，就连基辛格也明白，我们的代表团不能在美国媒体报道方面出现分歧，因此，他非常不情愿地意识到，他至少必须采取行动，试图做出一些改变。

MARSHAL GREEN: Kissinger was sent back to the negotiating table with the Vice Foreign Minister.

格林元帅：基辛格被送回与外交部副部长的谈判桌前。

NARR: The State Department refused to back down: all America’s commitments to its allies in the region must be mentioned - including the commitment to Taiwan.

纳尔：国务院拒绝让步：必须提及美国对该地区盟友的所有承诺——包括对台湾的承诺。

The Chinese negotiator would have none of it.

中国谈判代表不会接受这些。

ZHANG HANZHI: So finally he said to Doctor Kissinger, he said, "well -- maybe we should stop here, you know.

张含志：最后他对基辛格博士说，“好吧——也许我们应该就此打住，你知道。

If we cannot agree on the Communiqué, for the Chinese that's okay, we can do without a Communiqué.

如果我们不能就公报达成一致，对中国人来说没关系，我们可以不发表公报。

KISSINGER: I have always found in dealing with the Chinese that complete frankness is the better course, since they're probably smarter than we are anyway.

基辛格：我一直发现，在与中国人打交道时，完全坦诚是更好的做法，因为无论如何，他们可能比我们更聪明。

If I try to out maneuver them I'm bound to be in difficulties.

如果我试图超越他们，我一定会遇到困难。

HOLDRIDGE: And so what it ended up with -- with all references to mutual defense treaties were -- were eliminated and that was ok for the Chinese, they accepted that.

霍德里奇：所以最终的结果——所有提到共同防御条约的内容都被删除了，这对中国人来说没关系，他们接受了这一点。

NARR: But was it acceptable to the State Department?

NARR：但是国务院可以接受吗？

Chou Enlai joined Nixon on his flight to Shanghai, the last stop of the trip.

周恩来与尼克松一起搭乘飞往此行最后一站上海的航班。

He was aware of the rift in the American camp.

他意识到美国阵营中的裂痕。

If Rogers publicly broke rank to protest, the Republican right might desert Nixon in an election year.

如果罗杰斯公开破格抗议，共和党右翼可能会在选举年抛弃尼克松。

China might lose its new friend.

中国可能会失去新朋友。

Chou Enlai decided to act.

周恩来决定采取行动。

ZHANG HANZHI: He said, "Oh, this is actually the internal affairs of the Americans but it looks that we probably can help them a little bit to solve their internal problems." MARSHALL GREEN: He realized that the president had played very fast and loose with the State Department JI CHAOZHI: For the Premier to visit a Foreign Minister's room broke all protocol.

张汉之：他说，“噢，这其实是美国人的内政，但是看起来我们或许可以帮助他们一点点解决他们的内部问题。”马歇尔·格林：他意识到总统与国务院玩弄得非常随意。 季超志：总理访问外交部长室违反了所有礼节。

ZHANG HANZHI: We knocked on the door.

张含之：我们敲了门。

When they opened the door, they could never imagine at the doorway Chou Enlai appeared NICHOLAS PLATT (Ass't Sec'y of state): I hid my surprise and said, "Premier Chou, Welcome, what can we do for you today?

当他们打开门的时候，他们万万没想到周恩来出现在门口。 尼古拉斯·普拉特（国务助理）：我掩饰惊讶地说：“周总理，欢迎光临，今天我们能为您做点什么？

And he said, "I'd like to see Secretary Rogers, is he in?" I said yes and so I went and knocked on the door said, "Secretary Rogers, Premier Chou is here." "Oh," he said, "I'll be right out." ZHANG HANZHI: Chou Enlai said that "it’s so important, our two countries have come together and this is the major thing and we hope that Mr. Rogers would understand that and would fully give the support." JI CHAOZHU: When Rogers saw Premier Chou to the door…he was obviously a happier man.

他说：“我想见罗杰斯部长，他在吗？”我说是，就去敲门说：“罗杰斯部长，周总理来了。” “哦，”他说，“我马上就出去。”张汉之：周恩来说，“这非常重要，我们两国走到了一起，这是一件大事，我们希望罗杰斯先生能够理解并全力支持。”纪朝柱：当罗杰斯看到周总理到门口时……他显然是一个更快乐的人。

NARR: Rogers agreed to support the communiqué.

纳尔：罗杰斯同意支持该公报。

At the closing banquet, the President was triumphant.

在闭幕宴会上，总统得意洋洋。

Nixon got up rather tipsy from all of the toasts they were drinking at these banquets, and drinking this fierce liquor called Ma Tai…

尼克松在这些宴会上喝了一杯酒，喝得有点醉了，喝了这种叫马泰的烈酒……

ZHANG HANZHI: He really made a speech on the spur of the moment.

张含之：他确实是一时兴起发表讲话。

That was the most difficult part for the interpreter of course.

这对于口译员来说当然是最困难的部分。

NIXON: We have been here a week.

尼克松：我们来这里已经一周了。

This was the week that changed the world.

这是改变世界的一周。

KARNOW: And I thought either he was drunk or it was a bit of hyperbole, and he was right.

卡诺：我认为他要么喝醉了，要么这有点夸张，他是对的。

It was.

是的。

It had tremendous impact on things.

它对事物产生了巨大的影响。

It was a confirmation in a way that we were abandoning this whole notion of the monolithic Communist bloc.

这在某种程度上证实了我们正在放弃整个共产主义集团的概念。

NIXON: I express my appreciation to my Chinese voice, to Mrs. Zhang.

尼克松：我对我的中国声音、对张女士表示赞赏。

I listened to her translation.

我听了她的翻译。

She got every word right.

她每句话都说对了。

BUCKLEY: We felt that he had been overcome by the delirium of the event.

巴克利：我们觉得他已经被这件事的疯狂所征服了。

NARR: As Nixon said his last good byes, public reaction in the U.S. to the Shanghai Communiqué was mixed.

纳尔：当尼克松最后道别时，美国公众对上海公报的反应不一。

One headline read, "They got Taiwan - We Got Eggrolls." LORD: There was a definite undercurrent on Air Force One as we flew back, where Nixon and -- Kissinger were worried about the reaction to this Communiqué.

其中一个标题是：“他们得到了台湾——我们得到了蛋卷。”洛德：当我们飞回空军一号时，尼克松和基辛格担心人们对这份公报的反应。

KISSINGER: This was so against orthodoxy and, in a sense, so dangerous, vis-à-vis the Taiwan lobby or China lobby.

基辛格：对于台湾游说团体或中国游说团体来说，这非常违背正统观念，从某种意义上说，非常危险。

BUCKLEY: I made it plain to everybody that the - that American conservatives were gonna raise holy hell if indeed this evolved into a dismissal of Taiwan.

巴克利：我向大家明确表示，如果这确实演变成对台湾的排斥，美国保守派将会大喊大叫。

NARR: But Americans, who had shared the President's journey on television, supported Nixon's breakthrough.

纳尔：但是在电视上分享了总统的旅程的美国人支持尼克松的突破。

And gradually, the success of Nixon's new course could be seen.

尼克松新方针的成功逐渐显现。

NARR: In May, the Russians signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty - for the first time, the two nations agreed to limits on nuclear weapons.

纳尔：五月，俄罗斯签署了《战略武器限制条约》——两国首次同意限制核武器。

NARR: China secured a place in the world community.

纳尔：中国在国际社会中获得了一席之地。

And, by the 1980s, there was a curious new slogan in Communist Beijing: "To get rich is glorious." NARR: Taiwan would flourish economically and retain its tenuous hold on independence .

到了 20 世纪 80 年代，共产主义北京出现了一条奇怪的新口号：“致富光荣”。纳尔：台湾将在经济上繁荣并保持其脆弱的独立地位。

NARR: In February, 1972, "The New York Times" wrote that no matter what else occurred, Richard Nixon would always be remembered for his journey to China.

纳尔：1972年2月，《纽约时报》写道，无论发生什么，理查德·尼克松的中国之行将永远被人们铭记。

But his achievement would soon be overshadowed.

但他的成就很快就被掩盖了。

In June, the Watergate burglars were arrested, and the scandal that would bring down the Nixon Presidency had begun.

六月，水门事件窃贼被捕，导致尼克松总统下台的丑闻也随之拉开序幕。