The radicalization of J.D. Vance
Let’s start with the beard.
让我们从胡子开始吧。
J.D.
J.D.
Vance didn’t used to have one.
万斯以前没有这样的东西。
The Vance who in 2016 achieved incandescent literary fame with his memoir “Hillbilly Elegy” was all baby fat and rounded edges.
万斯在 2016 年凭借回忆录《乡巴佬挽歌》而在文学界名声大噪，他全身都是婴儿肥，边缘圆润。
The Vance I’m watching now, from the back of a coffee shop in the depressed steel town of Steubenville, Ohio, has covered up his softer side.
我现在在俄亥俄州斯托本维尔这座萧条的钢铁小镇的一家咖啡馆后面看到的万斯，已经掩盖了他温柔的一面。
In small-format events like this one, addressing a couple dozen primary voters, he spends about 15 minutes attacking corporate and governmental elites for failing the country, then answers questions and mingles for maybe another 45 minutes.
在像这样的小型活动中，他向几十名初选选民发表讲话，他会花大约 15 分钟的时间攻击企业和政府精英，指责他们让国家失败，然后回答问题，并与人交流大约 45 分钟。
Vance, 37, is comfortable in the folksy idiom of GOP campaigning (e.g., “she loved the Lord, she loved the f-word — that’s what Mamaw was”) but he tends to gloss over his famously traumatic childhood, immortalized on screen in Ron Howard’s 2020 film adaptation of his book.
37 岁的万斯对共和党竞选活动中的民间用语很满意（例如，“她爱上帝，她爱脏话——阿嬷就是这样的”），但他倾向于掩盖自己著名的创伤童年，这一点在朗·霍华德 2020 年根据他的书改编的电影中永垂不朽。
In Steubenville, he paces the room with a Big Gulp-sized foam cup in his hand, an Everyman touch that accentuates his new aesthetic.
在斯托本维尔，他手里拿着一个大口杯大小的泡沫杯在房间里踱步，这种普通人的风格凸显了他的新审美。
I’m not the only one thinking about J.D.
我不是唯一一个想到 J.D. 的人。
Vance’s beard.
万斯的胡子。
Recently, I asked one of his law school friends to tell me about his personality.
最近，我请他的一位法学院朋友向我介绍一下他的性格。
“He’s lovely,” the friend said, describing Vance’s smile and laugh.
“他很可爱，”这位朋友在描述万斯的笑容时说道。
Then he paused.
然后他停了下来。
He wanted to talk about Vance’s facial hair.
他想谈谈万斯的面部毛发。
Even as a slightly older law student — Vance had served four years in the Marines before enrolling at Ohio State as an undergraduate — he came across as guileless, boyish.
即使作为一名年纪稍大的法学院学生——万斯在进入俄亥俄州立大学读本科之前曾在海军陆战队服役四年——但他给人的印象却是天真、孩子气。
No longer.
不再。
“He looks different,” the friend said.
“他看起来不一样了，”朋友说。
“He’s going for a kind of severe masculinism thing.
“他正在追求一种严重的男性主义。
He looks like Donald Trump Jr.” Toward the end of our conversation, which was mostly about the way the culture shock of Yale Law School informed Vance’s politics, I asked the friend if he wanted to discuss anything else.
他看起来像小唐纳德·特朗普。”我们的谈话主要是关于耶鲁大学法学院的文化冲击如何影响万斯的政治，在谈话快结束时，我问这位朋友是否想讨论其他事情。
He returned to the beard.
他又回到了胡子上。
“That’s honestly occupied an outsized amount of my attention,” he said.
“老实说，这占据了我大量的注意力，”他说。
The beard isn’t a bad symbol for Vance’s U.S. Senate campaign — or at least for how that campaign is being received.
对于万斯的美国参议院竞选活动来说，胡子并不是一个坏象征——或者至少对于这场竞选活动的反响来说是这样。
Discourse around the race centers mostly on the idea that Vance is a changed or fraudulent person.
围绕种族的讨论主要集中在万斯是一个改变的或欺诈的人的想法上。
Five years ago, Vance was eloquently decoding Donald Trump supporters for liberal elites, while lamenting the rise of Trump himself.
五年前，万斯雄辩地将唐纳德·特朗普的支持者解读为自由派精英，同时感叹特朗普本人的崛起。
Vance, whose mother is a recovering heroin user, compared Trump to an opioid, calling him an “easy escape from the pain.” Now, since announcing his run, he’s reversed himself on Trump and adopted a bellicose persona at odds with the sensitive, bookish J.D.
万斯的母亲是一名正在康复的海洛因吸食者，他将特朗普比作阿片类药物，称他“可以轻松摆脱痛苦”。现在，自从宣布参选以来，他对特朗普的态度发生了转变，采取了好战的形象，与敏感、书生气十足的 J.D. 格格不入。
of his memoir.
他的回忆录。
On Veterans Day, 48 hours after the Steubenville event, Vance tweeted that LeBron James — of Akron, Ohio — is “one of the most vile public figures in our country.” (James had joked that Kenosha, Wis., shooter Kyle Rittenhouse “ate some lemon heads” before crying on the stand during his trial.) Watching Vance campaign, I felt him straining to deliver his talking points in an angry register.
在退伍军人节，斯托本维尔事件发生 48 小时后，万斯在推特上表示，来自俄亥俄州阿克伦的勒布朗·詹姆斯是“我们国家最卑鄙的公众人物之一”。 （詹姆斯开玩笑说，威斯康星州基诺沙的枪手凯尔·里滕豪斯（Kyle Rittenhouse）在受审期间在法庭上哭泣之前“吃了一些柠檬头”。）看着万斯的竞选活动，我感觉到他在愤怒地表达他的谈话要点。
It wasn’t just that steel jobs had been offshored; they were outsourced by “idiots” in Washington, to countries that “hate us.”
不仅仅是钢铁工作岗位被外包；他们被华盛顿的“白痴”外包给“恨我们”的国家。
Commentary about Vance from Never-Trumpers and liberals tends to strike a note of personal chagrin about his evolving image.
从不特朗普的支持者和自由派人士对万斯的评论往往会带有个人对他不断变化的形象的懊恼。
Pundit Mona Charen, writing about Vance as if he had died, called him an “extremely bright and insightful man who could have been a fresh voice for a fundamentally conservative view of the world.” Frank Bruni of the New York Times predicted that a Vance tweet about Alec Baldwin’s recent accidental shooting incident would “endure as one of the boldest markers of his descent.” In Ohio, meanwhile, the pressure on Vance runs entirely in the opposite direction.
专家莫娜·查伦（Mona Charen）在描述万斯时就好像他已经去世一样，称他是一个“极其聪明和富有洞察力的人，他本可以成为根本上保守的世界观的新声音”。 《纽约时报》的弗兰克·布鲁尼预测，万斯关于亚历克·鲍德温最近意外枪击事件的推文将“成为他血统最大胆的标志之一”。与此同时，在俄亥俄州，万斯面临的压力完全相反。
Every campaign stop he makes, he patiently tries to explain away his past Never-Trumpism, which has been exhumed in the form of deleted tweets and “Charlie Rose” clips.
他每次竞选停止时，都会耐心地试图解释自己过去的“从不特朗普主义”，这种主义已经以删除的推文和“查理·罗斯”剪辑的形式被挖掘出来。
An attack ad playing his anti-Trump sound bites ends with a woman saying, “That’s the real J.D.
一则攻击性广告播放了他的反特朗普原声片段，最后一位女士说道：“这才是真正的 J.D.
Vance.”
万斯。”
Vance’s friends split the difference: They say he’s the same guy but he’s been radicalized.
万斯的朋友们对此持不同意见：他们说他是同一个人，但他已经变得激进了。
“I think he’s gotten a lot more bitter and cynical — appropriately,” conservative blogger Rod Dreher told me.
“我认为他变得更加痛苦和愤世嫉俗——这是适当的，”保守派博主罗德·德雷尔告诉我。
To Dreher, the change in tone is justified by the course of American politics over the past five years.
对于德雷尔来说，过去五年美国政治的进程证明了这种语气的改变是合理的。
“Trump remained Trump — but the Left went berserk,” he wrote in a post defending Vance.
“特朗普仍然是特朗普，但左派变得疯狂，”他在为万斯辩护的帖子中写道。
Still, Dreher — who attended Vance’s 2019 baptism into the Catholic Church — worries about the toll campaigning is taking on his friend.
尽管如此，参加了万斯 2019 年加入天主教会的洗礼的德雷尔仍然担心竞选活动给他的朋友带来的损失。
“S--t-posting has become the signature style of young radicals on the right, and this is particularly a hazard I think for Christians,” he told me.
他告诉我：“发贴色情内容的帖子已经成为年轻右翼激进分子的标志性风格，我认为这对基督徒来说尤其是一个危险。”
The surface-level changes are indeed striking.
表面上的变化确实是惊人的。
Yet the more I watched him, the more it seemed to me that the emerging canon of “what happened to J.D.
然而，我越看他，就越觉得“J.D. 发生了什么”这一新兴经典。
Vance” commentary was missing the point.
万斯”的评论没有抓住要点。
Vance’s new political identity isn’t so much a façade or a reversal as an expression of an alienated worldview that is, in fact, consistent with his life story.
万斯的新政治身份与其说是一种表象或逆转，不如说是一种异化世界观的表达，而这种世界观实际上与他的人生故事是一致的。
And now there’s an ideological home for that worldview: Vance has become one of the leading political avatars of an emergent populist-intellectual persuasion that tacks right on culture and left on economics.
现在，这种世界观有了一个意识形态的归宿：万斯已经成为新兴民粹主义知识分子信仰的主要政治化身之一，这种信仰在文化上右倾，在经济上左倾。
Known as national conservatism or sometimes “post-liberalism,” it is — in broad strokes — heavily Catholic, definitely anti-woke, skeptical of big business, nationalist about trade and borders, and flirty with Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban .
它被称为民族保守主义，有时也被称为“后自由主义”，大体上来说，它是虔诚的天主教徒，绝对是反觉醒的，对大企业持怀疑态度，在贸易和边境问题上是民族主义者，并且与匈牙利总理欧尔班·维克托调情。
In Congress, its presence is minuscule — represented chiefly by Sens.
在国会中，它的存在微乎其微——主要由桑斯代表。
Josh Hawley and Marco Rubio — but on Fox News, it has a champion in Tucker Carlson, on whose show Vance is a regular guest.
乔什·霍利和马可·卢比奥——但在福克斯新闻上，它的冠军是塔克·卡尔森，万斯是他的节目的常客。
And while the movement’s philosopher-kings spend a lot of time litigating internal schisms online, the project is animated by a real-life political gambit: that as progressives weaken the Democratic Party with unpopular cultural attitudes, the right can swoop in and pick off multiracial working-class voters.
尽管该运动的哲学家国王们花费了大量时间在网上对内部分裂进行诉讼，但该项目却受到现实生活中的政治策略的推动：当进步派以不受欢迎的文化态度削弱民主党时，右翼可以趁虚而入并挑选多种族工人阶级选民。
Vance’s Senate race is an almost perfect test of these ideas because the front-runner in the Republican primary, former state treasurer and tea party product Josh Mandel — who, according to recent polling, leads Vance by 6 points — is the candidate of traditional conservative tax-cutters.
万斯的参议员竞选几乎是对这些想法的完美考验，因为共和党初选的领跑者、前州财政部长和茶党产品乔什·曼德尔（根据最近的民意调查，他领先万斯 6 个百分点）是传统保守派减税者的候选人。
To those watching the Vance-Mandel slugfest from afar, it may just look like two candidates trying to out-flank each other on the right; but the fissures between them run deep.
对于那些从远处观看万斯-曼德尔大战的人来说，这可能看起来就像是两名候选人试图在右侧包抄对方；但实际上，这只是一场胜利。但他们之间的裂痕很深。
The Club for Growth, known for its free-market zealotry, is supporting Mandel and has spent roughly $1.5 million on anti-Vance attack ads.
以对自由市场的狂热而闻名的增长俱乐部正在支持曼德尔，并花费了大约 150 万美元用于反万斯攻击广告。
One TV spot highlights a tweet in which Vance says he “loved @MittRomney’s anti-Trump screed.” The narrator does not linger on the rest of the message, which reads: “too bad party will do everything except admit that supply-side tax cuts do nothing for its voters.” Before Vance deleted his old anti-Trump tweets, he tended to attack Trump for abandoning his stated commitment to economic populism.
一个电视广告突出显示了一条推文，其中万斯说他“喜欢@米特罗姆尼的反特朗普长篇大论”。旁白没有停留在信息的其余部分，其中写道：“太糟糕了，政党会做一切事情，除了承认供给侧减税对其选民没有任何帮助。”在万斯删除之前的反特朗普推文之前，他倾向于攻击特朗普放弃了对经济民粹主义的承诺。
In a 2020 interview with anti-establishment pundits Krystal Ball and Saagar Enjeti, Vance contended that Trump’s great political failure wasn’t his handling of the pandemic, but his signature corporate tax cut and his attempts to undo Obamacare.
在 2020 年接受反建制专家 Krystal Ball 和 Saagar Enjeti 采访时，万斯认为，特朗普最大的政治失败不是他对流感大流行的处理，而是他标志性的企业减税和废除奥巴马医改的尝试。
A couple of weeks after I saw him in Steubenville, Vance called me from the road, on his way to an event in Toledo.
我在斯托本维尔见到他几周后，万斯在去托莱多参加一个活动的路上给我打电话。
I asked about his sudden estrangement from polite society.
我问他突然与上流社会疏远的原因。
“The price of being beloved by the establishment is you don’t say anything interesting,” he told me.
“受到当权派喜爱的代价是你不会说任何有趣的话，”他告诉我。
“And if you don’t say anything interesting, you’re not going to be a useful part of solving any of the problems we have in this country.” What Vance is saying now may or may not prove appealing to voters, but it certainly meets the test of being interesting.
“如果你不说任何有趣的话，你就不会成为解决我们这个国家所面临的任何问题的有用部分。”万斯现在所说的话可能会也可能不会吸引选民，但它确实符合有趣的标准。
“Dominant elite society is boring, it is completely unreflective, and it is increasingly wrong,” he told me.
“占主导地位的精英社会很无聊，完全不反思，而且越来越错误，”他告诉我。
In other words: “I kind of had to make a choice.”
换句话说：“我必须做出选择。”
In “Hillbilly Elegy,” Vance acknowledged the economic forces that had hollowed out the industrial base of his hometown and wrought problems like domestic violence and opioid abuse.
在《乡巴佬挽歌》中，万斯承认经济力量掏空了他家乡的工业基础，并造成了家庭暴力和阿片类药物滥用等问题。
Yet he was reluctant to blame “faceless companies” for the self-destructive impulses of people like his mother, who worked regularly as a nurse until she started stealing prescription narcotics and getting high.
然而，他不愿意将像他母亲这样的人的自我毁灭冲动归咎于“不知名的公司”。他母亲经常担任护士，直到她开始偷窃处方麻醉药并开始吸毒。
Raised in chaos, Vance attributes his success largely to the interventions of his fierce grandmother, Mamaw, the only real source of stability in his life.
万斯在混乱中长大，他的成功很大程度上归功于他凶猛的祖母阿嬷的干预，她是他生活中唯一真正的稳定来源。
As the memoir continues, Vance is propped up by a handful of other parental surrogates: the paternalistic Marine Corps and the Tiger Mother herself, his law school mentor Amy Chua, who guided the book to publication.
随着回忆录的继续，万斯得到了其他一些家长代理人的支持：家长式的海军陆战队和虎妈本人，他的法学院导师蔡美儿，她指导了这本书的出版。
Vance’s family had moved to the Ohio Rust Belt from rural Kentucky, and the book’s focus on what he deemed Appalachian culture was key to its broad appeal.
万斯的家人从肯塔基州农村搬到了俄亥俄州锈带，这本书对他认为的阿巴拉契亚文化的关注是其广泛吸引力的关键。
Published in the summer of 2016, it was pitched as a generous but unsentimental portrait of the disaffected White working class — though not one that drifted into potentially off-putting populist territory.
该书于 2016 年夏天出版，被定位为对心怀不满的白人工人阶级的慷慨但不感情用事的描绘——尽管它并没有陷入可能令人反感的民粹主义领域。
In a rapturous Times review, Jennifer Senior wrote that Vance had situated the problems of his community in a “fatalistic belief, born of too much adversity, that nothing can be done to change your lot.” What he was really writing about, she said, was “despair.”
在一篇令人兴奋的《泰晤士报》评论中，詹妮弗·西尼尔写道，万斯将他所在社区的问题置于“宿命论的信念中，这种信念源于太多的逆境，认为任何事情都无法改变你的命运”。她说，他真正写的是“绝望”。
When “Hillbilly Elegy” came out, Trump wasn’t expected to win the presidency, which made soft-focus TV segments and book-club conversations about his supporters feel like abstract exercises in empathy.
当《乡巴佬挽歌》问世时，人们并不认为特朗普会赢得总统职位，这使得有关他的支持者的软焦点电视片段和读书俱乐部的对话感觉像是抽象的同理心练习。
After the election, the liberal mentality of urgent resistance no longer coexisted easily with these exercises.
选举后，紧急抵抗的自由主义心态不再能轻易与这些活动共存。
In August 2017, after the Charlottesville white supremacist march , journalist Frank Rich tweeted , “Hillbilly elegies have now officially reached their expiration date.” Vance replied, “This is unbelievably stupid.
2017 年 8 月，夏洛茨维尔白人至上主义游行结束后，记者弗兰克·里奇 (Frank Rich) 在推特上写道：“乡下人的挽歌现已正式到期。”万斯回答说：“这真是愚蠢得令人难以置信。
The alt-right is primarily a movement of spoiled rich babies who turned to hate.
另类右翼主要是由被宠坏的富家宝宝转向仇恨的运动。
Don’t blame hillbillies.”
不要责怪乡下人。”
Vance, who was writing regular columns for the Times, felt his relationship with liberals was growing untenable.
万斯定期为《泰晤士报》撰写专栏，他感到自己与自由派的关系越来越难以维持。
“For a few weeks, a few months, there was this sort of empathetic moment,” he later told conservative podcaster Ben Shapiro, about the 2016 election.
“在几周、几个月的时间里，一直有这种感同身受的时刻，”他后来对保守派播客本·夏皮罗 (Ben Shapiro) 谈到 2016 年大选时说道。
But then, he argued, the narrative shifted: Liberals became convinced Trump’s win was not correlated to economic strife, but rather delivered by Russian interference and Republican racial animus.
但随后，他认为，叙述发生了转变：自由派开始相信特朗普的胜利与经济冲突无关，而是由俄罗斯的干涉和共和党的种族敌意造成的。
Whatever the ultimate strength of this diagnosis — which at minimum seemed to discount some portion of voters who had previously supported Barack Obama or Bernie Sanders — it meant that blue-collar voters didn’t need to be won back after all.
无论这一诊断的最终力度如何——至少似乎让之前支持巴拉克·奥巴马或伯尼·桑德斯的部分选民打了折扣——这意味着蓝领选民毕竟不需要重新赢回。
Which, functionally, gave cosmopolitan America permission to look away from the troubles of rural White America.
从功能上来说，这让国际化的美国得以摆脱美国农村白人的麻烦。
When the “Hillbilly Elegy” movie came out on Netflix in 2020, it was not just critically panned but greeted with intense online mockery, and the tenuous cultural diplomacy achieved by the book seemed to unravel for good.
当电影《乡巴佬挽歌》于 2020 年在 Netflix 上映时，它不仅遭到批评，还遭到网络上的强烈嘲笑，而这本书所实现的脆弱的文化外交似乎永远瓦解了。
(Rotten Tomatoes audience score: 83 percent.
（烂番茄观众评分：83%。
Critics’ score: 25 percent.) According to Vance’s best friend from Yale, Jamil Jivani, the wounding commentary was the “last straw” in his falling-out with elites.
评论家的评分：25%。）万斯在耶鲁大学最好的朋友贾米尔·吉瓦尼 (Jamil Jivani) 表示，这些伤人的评论是他与精英闹翻的“最后一根稻草”。
Ironically, this breakup seemed to bring Vance closer to certain critics who had accused him of blaming low-income Appalachians for their own problems.
具有讽刺意味的是，这次分手似乎让万斯更接近某些批评者，他们指责他将低收入的阿巴拉契亚人自己的问题归咎于他们。
In his book, Vance cited the research of Harvard economist Raj Chetty, which found that a region’s lack of social mobility was strongly correlated to its percentage of single-parent households.
万斯在书中引用了哈佛大学经济学家拉杰·切蒂的研究，该研究发现一个地区缺乏社会流动性与其单亲家庭的比例密切相关。
Subsequently, he has been more likely to cite MIT economist David Autor’s work on globalization, which estimates that imports from China cost the United States about a million manufacturing jobs in the first decade of the 21st century.
随后，他更有可能引用麻省理工学院经济学家大卫·奥托关于全球化的研究，该研究估计，在 21 世纪的第一个十年，来自中国的进口产品使美国失去了约 100 万个制造业工作岗位。
By 2020, Vance was tweeting that the legacy of Reaganite-Thatcherite conservatism was “the rise of China, the decimation of the American family, and a lot of tax cuts for the rich.” As his friend Sohrab Ahmari — one of the leading intellectual proponents of national conservatism — suggested to me, Vance had eventually come around “to the correct conclusion of his memoir.”
到 2020 年，万斯在推特上表示，里根-撒切尔式保守主义的遗产是“中国的崛起、美国家庭的毁灭以及对富人的大量减税”。正如他的朋友索拉布·艾哈迈里（Sohrab Ahmari）——民族保守主义的主要知识分子支持者之一——向我建议的那样，万斯最终“对他的回忆录做出了正确的结论”。
When we spoke on the phone, I told Vance I found it noteworthy that his book dissected the “learned helplessness” of Scotch-Irish hillbilly culture, while now he plays up external factors.
当我们在电话中交谈时，我告诉万斯，我发现值得注意的是，他的书剖析了苏格兰-爱尔兰乡巴佬文化的“习得性无助”，而现在他却强调了外部因素。
He pushed back on my characterization, arguing that it made sense to talk about one thing in a memoir and the other in a Senate race.
他反驳了我的描述，认为在回忆录中谈论一件事，在参议院竞选中谈论另一件事是有意义的。
Besides, they weren’t mutually exclusive.
此外，它们并不相互排斥。
Take “trade and industrial policy and fatherlessness,” he said.
他说，以“贸易和工业政策以及无父无亲”为例。
“We should understand deindustrialization as, in part, something that decimates working-class families, and, of course, when you destroy working-class families, then a whole lot of social pathologies move in.”
“我们应该将去工业化理解为，在某种程度上，它会摧毁工人阶级家庭，当然，当你摧毁工人阶级家庭时，就会出现很多社会病态。”
Vance argues that his alienation from polite society isn’t about him; it’s about them.
万斯认为，他与上流社会的疏远并不是因为他自己，而是因为他自己。这是关于他们的。
When his memoir came out, he said, “people like Ezra Klein or David Brooks, you know, establishmentarians, center-right, center-left, however you want to describe their politics, they were sort of interesting people who were willing to challenge their social caste.” After Trump won, he contends, they retreated to their tribe.
当他的回忆录出版时，他说，“像埃兹拉·克莱因或大卫·布鲁克斯这样的人，你知道，建制派、中右翼、中左翼，无论你想描述他们的政治观点，他们都是一些有趣的人，愿意挑战他们的社会阶层。”他声称，特朗普获胜后，他们就撤退到了自己的部落。
“Anybody who departs from the standard neoliberal orthodoxy ends up getting blasted, either from right or the left,” he went on.
“任何背离标准新自由主义正统观念的人最终都会受到炮轰，无论是来自右翼还是左翼，”他继续说道。
“The institutions that enforce conventional wisdom are incredibly hostile right now.” In effect, Vance is still framing himself as a conservative champion of the dispossessed — one who’s no longer fixating on the perceived failings of the people he grew up with, but of the professional class to which he ascended.
“执行传统智慧的机构现在充满了令人难以置信的敌意。”事实上，万斯仍然把自己描绘成一名被剥夺者的保守派捍卫者——他不再关注与他一起长大的人的缺点，而是关注他所晋升的专业阶层。
In November, Vance delivered the closing speech at the second annual national-conservatism conference, held at a Hilton in Orlando near SeaWorld.
11 月，万斯在第二届全国保守主义年度会议上发表了闭幕词，该会议在奥兰多海洋世界附近的希尔顿酒店举行。
Called “Universities Are the Enemy,” the speech wasn’t exclusively about the campus — the title echoes a famous Richard Nixon line — but the priorities of progressive elites.
这篇演讲的主题是“大学是敌人”，它不仅仅涉及校园（标题呼应了理查德·尼克松的一句名言），还涉及进步精英的优先事项。
The left, he argued, pushed for lax border control while average Americans were the ones overdosing on fentanyl from Mexico.
他认为，左派主张放松边境管制，而普通美国人则过量服用来自墨西哥的芬太尼。
Grocery and gas bills were skyrocketing, but Janet Yellen escaped blame for inflation because she is the first female Treasury secretary.
食品杂货和煤气费飞涨，但珍妮特·耶伦却逃脱了通货膨胀的责任，因为她是第一位女财政部长。
“So long as we’re trailblazing on diversity, equity and inclusion,” Vance complained, “it doesn’t matter if normal people get screwed.” After the speech, Dreher says, Vance texted him: “When you realize that culture war is class warfare, everything becomes easy.”
万斯抱怨道：“只要我们在多样性、公平性和包容性方面保持开拓性，普通人是否被坑了也没关系。”德雷尔说，演讲结束后，万斯给他发短信：“当你意识到文化战争是阶级战争时，一切都变得容易了。”
National conservatism is the intellectual version of Trumpism, committed to the populist reorienting of the GOP away from free markets and interventionist foreign policy.
国家保守主义是特朗普主义的思想版本，致力于通过民粹主义重新调整共和党的方向，远离自由市场和干预主义外交政策。
As Trump never fully pursued his own project, the movement has taken on a slightly anarchic quality; surveying the conference’s speakers, it could be difficult to tell what linked Orban-defender Dreher to, say, Orlando Magic power forward Jonathan Isaac.
由于特朗普从未完全推行自己的计划，该运动呈现出一种略显无政府主义的性质。通过调查会议的发言者，可能很难说出欧尔班后卫德雷尔与奥兰多魔术队大前锋乔纳森·艾萨克之间的联系。
Still, what the key factions agree on, as Sam Adler-Bell wrote in a recent New Republic essay, is that “classical liberalism — of the sort embraced by previous generations of conservatives — has a big hole in the middle of it where a substantive concept of the Good should be.”
尽管如此，正如萨姆·阿德勒-贝尔在最近的《新共和》文章中所写的那样，关键派别一致认为，“古典自由主义——前几代保守派所拥护的那种——中间有一个大洞，而本质上的善概念应该在这个洞里。”
Vance’s immersion in this universe can be traced to his close relationship with billionaire venture capitalist Peter Thiel, a NatCon eminence who delivered the conference’s opening speech — and has plunked $10 million into a pro-Vance super PAC.
万斯对这个世界的沉浸可以追溯到他与亿万富翁风险投资家 Peter Thiel 的密切关系，Peter Thiel 是 NatCon 的知名人士，他在会议上发表了开幕演讲，并已向支持万斯的超级政治行动委员会投入了 1000 万美元。
Vance met Thiel about a decade ago, after he gave a lecture at Yale that spoke to a dissatisfaction Vance felt with Ivy League life.
大约十年前，万斯遇见了蒂尔，当时蒂尔在耶鲁大学做了一次演讲，表达了万斯对常春藤盟校生活的不满。
Thiel’s reputation on the left has become a word-salad of villainous associations — from the demise of Gawker to the rise of “surveillance capitalism” and Trumpist nationalism.
泰尔在左翼的声誉已成为邪恶联想的代名词——从 Gawker 的消亡到“监控资本主义”和特朗普主义民族主义的兴起。
But before he was associated with politics, he was largely known as a critic of technological stagnation, captured by his famous line, “we wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters.”
但在涉足政治之前，他主要以技术停滞的批评者而闻名，这被他的名言所俘获：“我们想要飞行汽车，但我们得到了 140 个字符。”
That stagnation, Thiel claimed in his lecture at Yale, was linked to the credentialist rat race Vance and his classmates were engaged in.
泰尔在耶鲁大学的演讲中声称，这种停滞与万斯和他的同学们所从事的证书争夺战有关。
“If technological innovation were actually driving real prosperity, our elites wouldn’t feel increasingly competitive with one another over a dwindling number of prestigious outcomes,” Vance wrote in a spring 2020 essay in the Catholic publication the Lamp.
万斯在 2020 年春季天主教刊物《The Lamp》上发表的一篇文章中写道：“如果技术创新确实推动了真正的繁荣，那么我们的精英们就不会因为享有盛誉的成果数量不断减少而感到彼此之间的竞争日益激烈。”
In that piece, he called Thiel’s talk “the most significant moment of my time at Yale Law School,” helping him see that he “was obsessed with achievement …
在那篇文章中，他称蒂尔的演讲是“我在耶鲁大学法学院期间最重要的时刻”，帮助他认识到自己“痴迷于成就......
not as an end to something meaningful, but to win a social competition.”
不是为了有意义的事情的结束，而是为了赢得社会竞争。”
Vance’s law school friend, the one who talked about his beard, told me that Vance was wrestling with the values of his new milieu throughout his time at Yale.
万斯的法学院朋友，也就是那个谈论他的胡子的人，告诉我，万斯在耶鲁大学期间一直在与新环境的价值观作斗争。
“He is thoroughgoingly illiberal in his instincts,” he said.
“他的本能是彻底不自由的，”他说。
“I don’t mean it as a slur.
“我并不是说这是诽谤。
I mean it in a technical sense.
我的意思是技术意义上的。
He is skeptical of the political project of enlightenment liberalism, like, We’re all just autonomous individuals trying to self-actualize and maximize our own interests .”
他对启蒙自由主义的政治计划持怀疑态度，比如，我们都是自主的个体，试图自我实现并最大化我们自己的利益。”
Jivani, who grew up in Toronto but shared Vance’s low-income background, says Vance drew a connection between Yale’s careerism and its liberal politics: “You’re sitting in a seminar room, you’ve got a professor who’s written a million books, surrounded by 20 students from San Francisco, New York, mostly, all pontificating about how to help poor people in America.” Their solutions, Jivani says, reflected the atomized enclaves they came from: “Yale’s approach is that judges, senators, policymakers can save the world.
吉瓦尼在多伦多长大，但与万斯有着相同的低收入背景，他说万斯将耶鲁大学的事业心和自由主义政治联系起来：“你坐在一个研讨室里，你的教授已经写了一百万本书，周围有 20 名学生，大部分来自旧金山和纽约，他们都在谈论如何帮助美国的穷人。”吉瓦尼说，他们的解决方案反映了他们来自原子化飞地的情况：“耶鲁大学的方法是法官、参议员、政策制定者可以拯救世界。
They completely omit the role of family, community and culture in people’s lives.”
他们完全忽略了家庭、社区和文化在人们生活中的作用。”
After graduating in 2013, Vance clerked for a federal judge in Kentucky and worked a stint in corporate law.
2013 年毕业后，万斯在肯塔基州担任联邦法官的书记员，并在公司法领域工作了一段时间。
(At Yale, he began dating Usha Chilukuri, who would clerk for then-D.C. Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh and later Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts, before joining the white-shoe firm Munger, Tolles, and Olson.
（在耶鲁大学，他开始与乌莎·奇卢库里（Usha Chilukuri）约会，乌莎·奇卢库里后来担任华盛顿特区巡回法官布雷特·卡瓦诺（Brett Kavanaugh）和后来的最高法院首席大法官约翰·罗伯茨（John Roberts）的书记员，然后加入了芒格、托尔斯和奥尔森白鞋公司。
Now married, they have three children.) He soon left the field and moved to San Francisco to join Mithril Capital, one of Thiel’s firms.
现在他们已婚，育有三个孩子。）他很快就离开了这个领域，搬到了旧金山，加入了泰尔旗下的公司之一秘银资本 (Mithril Capital)。
From there, he became a partner at AOL founder Steve Case’s venture-capital fund Rise of the Rest, which invests in start-ups not based on the coasts.
从那时起，他成为 AOL 创始人 Steve Case 的风险投资基金 Rise of the Rest 的合伙人，该基金投资于非沿海地区的初创企业。
Vance called the idea “geographic arbitrage,” a sublimely insider-y way of describing an effort to help outsiders.
万斯将这个想法称为“地理套利”，这是一种崇高的内部方式，用来描述帮助局外人的努力。
After that, he moved back to southwest Ohio, settling in an exclusive Cincinnati neighborhood where Sen.
之后，他搬回俄亥俄州西南部，定居在辛辛那提的一个高档社区。
Rob Portman — whom he is vying to replace — used to live.
罗伯·波特曼（Rob Portman）——他正在竞相取代的人——曾经住过。
Vance started a flyover fund of his own, called Narya Capital; its portfolio includes a service that lets you invest in farmland, a Catholic prayer-and-meditation app and a right-leaning video platform.
万斯创立了自己的立交桥基金，名为 Narya Capital；其产品组合包括一项可让您投资农田的服务、一款天主教祈祷和冥想应用程序以及一个右倾视频平台。
(Vance has aped Thiel’s grating habit of borrowing names from “The Lord of the Rings.” According to the website One Wiki to Rule Them All, Narya is a Ring of Power forged to inspire Elves “to resist tyranny, domination and despair.”)
（万斯效仿了蒂尔借用《指环王》名字的习惯。根据 One Wiki to Rule Them All 网站的说法，Narya 是一枚力量之戒，旨在激励精灵“抵抗暴政、统治和绝望”。）
If you read Vance’s career progression in the context of his Yale-era anomie, you can see a coherent philosophy emerging.
如果你在耶鲁时代失范的背景下阅读万斯的职业发展，你会发现一种连贯的哲学正在出现。
Technological stagnation wasn’t just producing a self-centered striver class, but a frayed national fabric.
技术停滞不仅产生了以自我为中心的奋斗者阶级，而且还产生了磨损的国家结构。
Wealth and cultural capital, after all, were concentrated in the coastal knowledge sectors, and not in once-vibrant manufacturing regions.
毕竟，财富和文化资本集中在沿海知识部门，而不是曾经充满活力的制造业地区。
Vance’s concerns dovetail with a number of recent polemics from across the political spectrum, including Daniel Markovits’s “ The Meritocracy Trap ,” Michael Sandel’s “ The Tyranny of Merit ,” Patrick Deneen’s “ Why Liberalism Failed ” and Ross Douthat’s “ The Decadent Society .” (Vance has said Douthat’s book, which can be read as an expansion on the “flying cars” lament, is the work that best encapsulates his belief system.) American Affairs, the comically dense quarterly journal that informs national conservatism’s policy side, and which Vance reads, is in some ways a never-ending critique of the “professional managerial class.” All these sources, in turn, borrow from a previous generation of, well, proto -post-liberals, including the critic Christopher Lasch, who attacked ostensibly tolerant yuppies for believing they’d earned their spoils and therefore feeling little need to give back to their communities.
万斯的担忧与最近来自各个政治领域的一些争论相吻合，包括丹尼尔·马科维茨的“精英统治陷阱”、迈克尔·桑德尔的“精英暴政”、帕特里克·德尼恩的“自由主义为何失败”和罗斯·杜塔特的“颓废社会”。 （万斯表示，杜塔特的书可以看作是对“飞行汽车”哀叹的扩展，是最能概括他的信仰体系的作品。）万斯读的《美国事务》是一本滑稽、内容丰富的季刊，为国家保守主义的政策方面提供信息，在某种程度上，它是对“职业管理阶层”永无休止的批评。反过来，所有这些来源都借鉴了上一代的原始后自由主义者，其中包括批评家克里斯托弗·拉什（Christopher Lasch），他攻击表面上宽容的雅皮士，因为他们相信自己赢得了战利品，因此感觉不需要回馈社区。
For Vance, the story of the past few decades is that the social permissiveness of the left fused with the free-market creed of the right to create the soulless ethic known as neoliberalism.
对于万斯来说，过去几十年的故事是，左派的社会宽容与右派的自由市场信条融合在一起，创造了被称为新自由主义的没有灵魂的道德。
It’s why Vance will decry unregulated capitalism in one breath and porn in the next.
这就是为什么万斯会一口气谴责不受监管的资本主义，下一秒就会谴责色情。
It’s also why so many national conservatives are drawn to Catholic social teaching, as opposed to Protestant work-ethic individualism.
这也是为什么如此多的国家保守派被天主教的社会教义所吸引，而不是新教的工作伦理个人主义。
In his NatCon speech, you could hear Vance articulating both sides of the argument: “The fundamental lie of American feminism of the past 20 or 30 years is that it is liberating for women to go work for 90 hours a week in a cubicle at Goldman Sachs.”
在 NatCon 演讲中，你可以听到万斯阐述了双方的观点：“过去 20 或 30 年美国女权主义的基本谎言是，女性每周在高盛的小隔间里工作 90 个小时是一种解放。”
Ahmari — also a Catholic convert, as well as a refugee from the market-oriented Wall Street Journal editorial page — thinks that the “meritocratic, neoliberal world is in some ways an aberration” that basically just benefits educated Western elites.
艾哈迈里——也是一名天主教皈依者，也是以市场为导向的《华尔街日报》社论版的难民——认为“精英统治的新自由主义世界在某种程度上是一种反常现象”，基本上只对受过教育的西方精英有利。
“An open border,” for instance, “is a bonanza to the kind of managerial class people in my milieu, who like, say, cheap nannies and so forth.
例如，“开放的边界对于我周围的管理阶层来说是一笔财富，他们喜欢廉价的保姆等等。
Not so good for workers on the low end.”
对于低端工人来说不太好。”
Vance’s solution is economic and spiritual nationalism.
万斯的解决方案是经济和精神民族主义。
On the campaign trail, he riffs that in the old days “what was good for GM was good for America.” The winners of the new economy, in his formulation, are bad for America: liberal-leaning tech companies that cover up for hiring cheap foreign labor with “woke” posturing about gender and race.
在竞选过程中，他反复强调过去“对通用汽车有利的事情对美国也有利”。在他看来，新经济的赢家对美国不利：倾向自由主义的科技公司在性别和种族问题上摆出“觉醒”姿态，掩盖雇佣廉价外国劳动力的事实。
The political forefather of this vision is probably Pat Buchanan, who inveighed against free trade and multiculturalism in the 1990s.
这一愿景的政治鼻祖可能是帕特·布坎南 (Pat Buchanan)，他在 20 世纪 90 年代猛烈抨击自由贸易和多元文化主义。
But it also draws from the milder “Reformicon” blueprints of 10 years ago, as well as older strains of leftism, such as the anti-globalism of the Seattle WTO protests.
但它也借鉴了十年前较为温和的“改革派”蓝图，以及更古老的左派主义，例如西雅图世贸组织抗议活动中的反全球主义。
One unlikely text Vance has cited is Elizabeth Warren’s 2004 book “ The Two-Income Trap ,” about the financial pressures families experience when two parents enter the workforce.
万斯引用的一个不太可能的文本是伊丽莎白·沃伦 (Elizabeth Warren) 2004 年出版的书《双收入陷阱》(The Two-Income Trap)，该书讲述了当两个父母进入劳动力市场时家庭所经历的经济压力。
If you look for it, elements of Vance’s current critique were in “Hillbilly Elegy” too.
如果你仔细寻找的话，你会发现万斯当前的批评元素也出现在《乡巴佬挽歌》中。
People like his grandfather, who moved to southwest Ohio to work in the then-bustling Armco Steel plant, strengthened the local social fabric as producers.
像他的祖父这样的人搬到俄亥俄州西南部，在当时繁忙的阿姆科钢铁厂工作，加强了当地作为生产者的社会结构。
A generation later, with jobs disappearing, his mom and his neighbors were not just isolated and angry but also, he wrote, “consumerist.”
一代人之后，随着工作岗位的消失，他的母亲和邻居不仅感到孤立和愤怒，而且，他写道，“消费主义者”。
Just before the pandemic, Vance and Jivani recorded an episode of a podcast together.
就在大流行之前，万斯和吉瓦尼一起录制了一集播客。
Jivani asked whether Vance’s nationalist vision could devolve into a more jingoistic or bigoted form.
吉瓦尼询问万斯的民族主义愿景是否会转变为更加沙文主义或偏执的形式。
Vance acknowledged the risk but countered that a healthy nationalism was an antidote to right-wing grievance politics.
万斯承认存在风险，但反驳说，健康的民族主义是右翼不满政治的解药。
“What this hyper-atomized approach to living has done is it’s denied people a sense of solidarity,” he said.
他说：“这种高度原子化的生活方式剥夺了人们的团结感。”
“I think some people go and find it in their racial identity or ethnic identity, and I think that’s especially dangerous.”
“我认为有些人会在他们的种族身份或族裔身份中寻找它，我认为这特别危险。”
But what does a national-conservative vision look like in a primary campaign that doubles as an audition for Trump’s endorsement?
但是，在兼作特朗普支持试镜的初选活动中，国家保守派的愿景是什么样的呢？
The answer, often, has been Vance’s own coarse brand of identity politics.
答案往往是万斯自己粗俗的身份政治。
In July, he gave a sneering speech about the “childless left,” including Rep.
7月，他发表了一篇关于“没有孩子的左派”的嘲讽演讲，其中包括众议员。
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg (whose twins were delivered about a month later).
亚历山大·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯和交通部长皮特·布蒂吉格（他的双胞胎大约一个月后出生）。
On Twitter, he called Times columnist Paul Krugman “one of the many weird cat ladies with too much power in this country.” In the most charitable reading, Vance was trying to echo Ahmari’s point about a political class that caters to urbane McKinsey consultants.
在推特上，他称《泰晤士报》专栏作家保罗·克鲁格曼是“这个国家众多拥有太多权力的怪异猫女士之一”。在最慈善的读物中，万斯试图呼应艾哈迈里的观点，即迎合温文尔雅的麦肯锡顾问的政治阶层。
In practice, he came across like the relative who spams you with uncomfortable political memes, or worse.
实际上，他给人的印象就像是一个向你发送令人不安的政治表情包的亲戚，甚至更糟。
One thing that struck me as I checked out Vance’s campaign events was how rarely voters wanted to talk about topics of local relevance.
当我查看万斯的竞选活动时，令我震惊的一件事是，选民很少愿意谈论与当地相关的话题。
One night, Vance held an event in Boardman, a suburb not far from the Lordstown GM plant that closed in 2019.
一天晚上，万斯在博德曼举办了一场活动，博德曼是距离 2019 年关闭的洛兹敦通用汽车工厂不远的郊区。
That day, a federal trial was taking place in Cleveland that would result in the first-ever jury decision finding chain pharmacies responsible for exacerbating the opioid crisis .
那天，一项联邦审判正在克利夫兰进行，陪审团将首次做出裁决，认定连锁药店对加剧阿片类药物危机负有责任。
One of the two plaintiffs in the trial was Trumbull County, 10 miles north of where we were.
审判中的两名原告之一是特朗布尔县，位于我们所在地以北 10 英里处。
Yet nobody in the room — or any other event I went to — asked about drug addiction.
然而，房间里的人——或者我参加的任何其他活动——没有人询问毒瘾的问题。
It’s not that voters didn’t grill Vance.
选民并不是没有拷问万斯。
They just preferred to ask about his past anti-Trumpism, or his relationship with Thiel, or any number of more unexpected national concerns, such as term limits.
他们只是更愿意询问他过去的反特朗普主义，或者他与泰尔的关系，或者任何更多意想不到的国家问题，例如任期限制。
After the event, I drifted over to a folding table where other candidates had dropped off campaign paraphernalia.
活动结束后，我走到一张折叠桌前，其他候选人已经在那里放下了竞选用具。
A placard for Josh Mandel read “ELECTION INTEGRITY NOW!” on one side and “ STOP DEMOCRAT CHEATING!” on the other.
乔什·曼德尔的标语牌上写着“现在选举诚信！”一方面是“停止民主党作弊！”另一方面。
I picked up a calendar and learned that former Trump adviser Kellyanne Conway would be stopping by the area for a Christmas party.
我拿起日历，得知前特朗普顾问凯莉安·康威将前往该地区参加圣诞派对。
To get a different lens, I drove to Vance’s home city of Middletown, 35 miles north of Cincinnati.
为了获得不同的镜头，我开车去了万斯的家乡米德尔敦，位于辛辛那提以北 35 英里处。
In some sense, it resembles what you’d expect from a community of 50,000 that has lost virtually all the steel and paper mill jobs that once sustained it: the familiar ruin-porn of vacant buildings bearing picturesque signs for long-gone hotels or furniture stores; a windswept main drag announced by the perversely glorious-looking Richie’s Pawn Central; a Dollar General where the family-owned Dillman Foods (which had employed Vance in high school) used to be.
从某种意义上说，它就像你对一个拥有 50,000 人的社区所期望的那样，该社区几乎失去了曾经维持它的所有钢铁和造纸厂工作岗位：熟悉的废墟色情的空置建筑，上面挂着早已消失的酒店或家具店的精美标志；看起来异常光荣的 Richie's Pawn Central 宣布了一条被风吹过的主要阻力；家族企业迪尔曼食品公司（万斯在高中时曾受雇于该公司）曾经是一家达乐百货公司（Dollar General）。
The vast Armco steel mill — now known as AK Steel — is still in business, though it has many fewer employees than in its peak years.
庞大的 Armco 钢厂（现称为 AK Steel）仍在营业，尽管其员工比鼎盛时期少了很多。
Still, a fledgling retail comeback has taken place downtown, anchored by a town-square-type coffee shop called the Triple Moon.
尽管如此，市中心的零售业已经开始卷土重来，以一家名为“Triple Moon”的城镇广场型咖啡店为中心。
There, I met up with 52-year-old Rodney Muterspaw, until recently the city’s police chief.
在那里，我遇到了 52 岁的罗德尼·穆特斯帕 (Rodney Muterspaw)，他直到最近才担任该市的警察局长。
The axis along which Vance is debated locally has less to do with his politics and more to do with whether he betrayed his hometown by depicting everyone as a bunch of degenerates.
万斯在当地引起争论的轴心与他的政治观点关系不大，而更多地与他是否通过将每个人描绘成一群堕落者而背叛了自己的家乡有关。
“People in town were saying, ‘That’s not Middletown,’ ” Muterspaw told me.
“镇上的人说，‘那不是米德尔敦，’”穆特斯帕告诉我。
“Well, hell yeah, that’s Middletown, 100 percent.” Muterspaw is 15 years older than Vance but shares a nearly identical lineage.
“好吧，是的，那是米德尔敦，100%。”穆特斯帕比万斯年长 15 岁，但有着几乎相同的血统。
His grandmother moved to the area from Appalachian Kentucky; his dad worked at Armco steel and didn’t end up raising him.
他的祖母从阿巴拉契亚肯塔基州搬到了该地区。他的父亲在 Armco 钢铁公司工作，最终没有抚养他长大。
Muterspaw lived with his mom, shuffling between apartment complexes, getting evicted, stealing from stores.
穆特斯帕和他妈妈住在一起，在公寓楼之间穿梭，被驱逐，从商店偷东西。
We went for a drive in his Dodge Ram.
我们开着他的道奇公羊去兜风。
He showed me Vance’s modest childhood home on McKinley Street.
他带我参观了万斯位于麦金利街的朴素童年住宅。
Then we drove to the neighborhood where Ron Howard shot scenes for the movie.
然后我们开车去了朗·霍华德拍摄电影场景的附近。
He showed me where Amy Adams, playing Vance’s mom, Beverly, ran into the street with a bloody gash on her wrist.
他向我展示了艾米·亚当斯（Amy Adams）饰演万斯的母亲贝弗利（Beverly），她跑到街上，手腕上有一道血淋淋的伤口。
“J.D.’s lucky his mom is still alive, you know,” he said.
“J.D. 很幸运，他妈妈还活着，你知道，”他说。
“In the movie, you’ll see the Parkway Inn — that’s where she was getting her fix at.
“在电影中，你会看到百汇旅馆——那是她休息的地方。
We’ve had problems there for years.” (When I reached Beverly, she told me she had to check with Vance before speaking to me, and I never heard back.
多年来我们在那里一直遇到问题。” （当我到达贝弗利时，她告诉我在和我说话之前她必须先咨询万斯，但我再也没有收到回复。
Muterspaw texted Vance’s sister, Lindsay, who still lives in Middletown, to give her my phone number.
穆特斯帕给万斯的妹妹林赛（她仍然住在米德尔敦）发短信，告诉她我的电话号码。
I didn’t hear from her, either.)
我也没有收到她的消息。）
The book came out close to the peak of the local opioid epidemic, which lasted from 2015 to 2017.
这本书出版时正值 2015 年至 2017 年当地阿片类药物流行的高峰期。
Muterspaw was chief then: “Three years of nothing but opioid calls, overdoses and deaths.” There were stretches of 2017 when more people died of overdoses — typically heroin, laced with fentanyl — than of natural causes in Butler County, where Middletown is located.
穆特斯帕当时是负责人：“三年来，除了阿片类药物的求助、过量服用和死亡之外，什么都没有。” 2017 年，在米德尔敦所在的巴特勒县，有段时间死于吸毒过量（通常是含有芬太尼的海洛因）的人数超过了自然原因死亡的人数。
The overdose problem started to slow in 2018, Muterspaw explained, after the city began sending three-person teams — police officer, medic, social worker — to house calls.
穆特斯帕解释说，2018 年，在该市开始派遣三人小组（警察、医务人员、社会工作者）上门服务后，吸毒过量问题开始放缓。
The rates also slowed, he said, because so many addicts had died.
他说，由于许多瘾君子死亡，发病率也有所下降。
(The city’s big problem now, he noted, is meth.)
（他指出，这座城市现在的大问题是冰毒。）
National conservatism sells itself as a philosophy that could save these places, with its child subsidies and steel tariffs.
国家保守主义将自己标榜为一种可以通过儿童补贴和钢铁关税拯救这些地方的哲学。
But just how committed are national conservatives to the parts of their platform that are more traditionally left-wing — the infrastructure investments, the social-service interventions?
但全国保守派对其纲领中传统上左翼的部分——基础设施投资、社会服务干预——的承诺程度如何？
Vance himself seemed to take a stab at on-the-ground social work around addiction, starting an anti-opioid nonprofit with Jivani called Our Ohio Renewal in 2017.
万斯本人似乎也尝试过围绕毒瘾开展实地社会工作，并于 2017 年与 Jivani 共同创办了一个名为“我们的俄亥俄州复兴”的抗阿片类非营利组织。
Yet virtually nothing came of it, aside from the sponsorship of a year-long fellowship for Sally Satel — an American Enterprise Institute scholar who has long maintained that prescription pain meds are unlikely to turn the average person into an addict — to work at a drug treatment clinic in southeast Ohio.
然而，除了为莎莉·萨特尔（美国企业研究所学者，长期以来一直认为处方止痛药不太可能使普通人变成瘾君子）提供为期一年的奖学金赞助，让她在俄亥俄州东南部的一家药物治疗诊所工作之外，几乎没有任何结果。
(When I asked her what came of the fellowship, Satel pointed to two lengthy essays she wrote about addiction, based on her time there.) In 2018, Jivani was diagnosed with cancer (he is now in remission), which seems to have crippled the nonprofit’s efforts.
（当我问她这项奖学金的意义时，Satel 指着她根据在那里的经历写的两篇关于毒瘾的长篇文章。）2018 年，Jivani 被诊断出患有癌症（他现在处于缓解期），这似乎削弱了该非营利组织的努力。
But the whole venture was puzzling from the start.
但整个冒险从一开始就令人费解。
In the Senate, Josh Hawley crusades against “the tyranny of big tech,” while Marco Rubio pushes for an industrial policy to revive domestic manufacturing.
在参议院，乔什·霍利 (Josh Hawley) 致力于反对“大型科技公司的暴政”，而马可·卢比奥 (Marco Rubio) 则推动产业政策以重振国内制造业。
Meanwhile, NatCon junior member Mitt Romney used the emergency of the pandemic to break with party orthodoxy on spending, authoring widely praised legislation offering parents up to $15,000 a year to defray child-rearing costs.
与此同时，NatCon初级成员米特·罗姆尼(Mitt Romney)利用大流行的紧急情况打破了党派在支出方面的正统观念，起草了广受赞誉的立法，为父母提供每年高达15,000美元的育儿费用。
(The bill went nowhere.) But they haven’t meaningfully tilted the GOP’s direction.
（该法案毫无进展。）但他们并没有有意义地改变共和党的方向。
“I mean, Donald Trump was elected, and the only thing the Republican Party accomplished in two years with control of Congress was a big tax cut,” says Oren Cass, who runs a new national-conservative think tank, American Compass.
“我的意思是，唐纳德·特朗普当选，共和党在控制国会的两年内完成的唯一一件事就是大幅减税，”新的国家保守派智囊团“美国指南针”的负责人奥伦·卡斯说。
Worth noting: Rubio, Hawley and Romney all supported Trump’s corporate tax cut.
值得注意的是：卢比奥、霍利和罗姆尼都支持特朗普的企业减税政策。
I went to see Vance in the picturesque, troubled river town of Marietta, Ohio, across the border from West Virginia.
我去俄亥俄州玛丽埃塔风景如画、麻烦不断的河边小镇拜访万斯，该小镇与西弗吉尼亚州接壤。
He had a 9 a.m.
他上午 9 点
event at a little GOP headquarters on the main drag.
活动在主要街道上的一个小共和党总部举行。
Not including me and his three-person team, there were 12 very committed political junkies there.
不包括我和他的三人团队，那里有 12 个非常忠诚的政治迷。
I sat down at a table covered with coloring-book images of nuzzling elephants that local elementary students had apparently been conscripted into drawing.
我坐在一张桌子旁，桌子上摆满了用鼻子蹭大象的涂色本图像，这些图像显然是当地小学生被征召来画的。
The event was a nice window into the indignities of Republican primary campaigning.
这次活动是了解共和党初选竞选中的侮辱行为的一个很好的窗口。
At one point during the Q&A, a guy called Trump “caring.” Vance concurred: “He was a caring guy.
在问答环节，一名男子称特朗普“很有爱心”。万斯表示同意：“他是一个很有爱心的人。
He made us laugh.”
他让我们开怀大笑。”
A more compelling exchange happened a little later.
稍后发生了更引人注目的交流。
A woman commented that Democrats “hate Trump”; here, Vance got excited: Actually, they didn’t all hate Trump, and that gave Republicans an opportunity.
一位女士评论说民主党人“讨厌特朗普”；说到这里，万斯兴奋起来：其实，他们并不都讨厌特朗普，这给了共和党人一个机会。
“You know, Mamaw and Papaw, the people who raised me, they were classic blue-dog Democrats, union Democrats, right?
“你知道，阿嬷和阿公，养育我的人，他们都是典型的蓝狗民主党人，工会民主党人，对吧？
They loved their country, they were socially conservative.” Now, Vance said, Democrats were turning off these voters.
他们热爱自己的国家，在社会上持保守态度。”万斯说，现在民主党正在拒绝这些选民。
They “talk more about these ridiculous identity politics issues than they do about people’s jobs,” he argued.
他认为，他们“更多地谈论这些荒谬的身份政治问题，而不是人们的工作”。
Liberals would retort, of course, that they care about social and economic issues.
当然，自由主义者会反驳说，他们关心社会和经济问题。
And it’s the Republicans, not the Democrats, who have spent the past year voting against pandemic relief and social-safety-net spending.
过去一年里，投票反对流行病救助和社会安全网支出的是共和党，而不是民主党。
Yet it’s clear that for many voters, working-class priorities don’t seem like Democratic ones.
但很明显，对于许多选民来说，工人阶级的优先事项似乎并不像民主党的优先事项。
In 2020, Florida voted for Trump, along with a significant minimum-wage hike .
2020 年，佛罗里达州投票支持特朗普，同时大幅提高了最低工资。
The recent drift of voters of color to the GOP — despite, or possibly thanks to, liberal efforts at cultural progressivism — has been hard to ignore.
最近有色人种选民转向共和党——尽管或可能得益于自由派在文化进步主义方面的努力——一直难以忽视。
The focus of the 2021 NatCon conference was the identitarian “Great Awokening” of recent years.
2021年NatCon会议的焦点是近年来的身份主义“大觉醒”。
While Vance engaged plenty on that topic in his speech, he is privately more downbeat about the obsession with political correctness.
尽管万斯在演讲中大量讨论了这个话题，但他私下里对政治正确性的痴迷更为悲观。
“I think anti-wokeness is probably enough to win elections,” he told me.
“我认为反觉醒可能足以赢得选举，”他告诉我。
“But I don’t think it can actually bring the country together to solve some of our big problems.”
“但我认为它实际上不能让整个国家团结起来解决我们的一些重大问题。”
Moreover, if Vance and company argue that neoliberal elites use the language of social justice to advance their interests, they also worry that mainstream conservatives will attack social justice to advance their own.
此外，如果万斯等人认为新自由主义精英利用社会正义的语言来推进自己的利益，他们也会担心主流保守派会攻击社会正义来推进自己的利益。
“I would lament if the post-liberal movement became just a new skin or new mask for the same old GOP agenda,” Ahmari says.
艾哈迈里说：“如果后自由主义运动只是为同样的旧共和党议程披上新皮或新面具，我会感到遗憾。”
In other words, Mitch McConnell and company would push for goodies for the rich, while memorizing words they learned at a NatCon conference.
换句话说，米奇·麦康奈尔和他的公司会为富人提供好东西，同时记住他们在 NatCon 会议上学到的单词。
“Like, ooh we’re against Ibram X.
“就像，哦，我们反对 Ibram X。
Kendi , how edgy, you know?” Mandel — Vance’s main opponent in Ohio — fits this bill, Ahmari says.
肯迪，有多急躁，你知道吗？”艾哈迈里说，万斯在俄亥俄州的主要对手曼德尔符合这一要求。
“That’s a classic case of someone using the language of American populism, but you look beneath it, and it’s just the same old establishment consensus.”
“这是一个使用美国民粹主义语言的典型案例，但你仔细一看，就会发现这只是老一套的建制共识。”
Another way of framing the dilemma for the NatCons is this: From a certain angle, anti-wokeness just ends up looking like classic liberalism.
界定国家保守派困境的另一种方式是：从某种角度来看，反觉醒运动最终看起来就像经典的自由主义。
If your general critique of the social justice left is that it’s doctrinaire, it becomes harder to push for a top-down “common good” conservatism that probably requires some level of indoctrination.
如果你对社会正义左派的总体批评是教条主义，那么推动自上而下的“共同利益”保守主义就会变得更加困难，而这可能需要一定程度的灌输。
“What social progressives have accomplished over the last couple of decades is to deprive our country of any real shared — any real shared anything, right?” Vance told me.
“社会进步人士在过去几十年里所取得的成就是剥夺了我们国家任何真正的共享——任何真正共享的任何东西，对吗？”万斯告诉我的。
“We don’t have a shared sense of our own history.
“我们对自己的历史没有共同的认识。
We don’t have a shared sense of our own great monuments and figures.
我们对自己的伟大纪念碑和人物没有共同的认识。
We do not have a shared religion.” (Maybe that’s a good thing for a Catholic NatCon in a country that’s only about 22 percent Catholic.) Later in our conversation, he returned to the point: “You look into some of the social justice people, [and] you realize what they’re doing is responding to a world without norms and without borders.
我们没有共同的宗教信仰。” （也许这对于天主教徒占全国 22% 的国家的天主教 NatCon 来说是一件好事。）后来在我们的谈话中，他回到了正题：“你调查一些社会正义人士，[并且]你会意识到他们正在做的是回应一个没有规范和没有边界的世界。
And they’re trying to reconstruct this stuff from nothing.
他们正试图从无到有重建这些东西。
And I sometimes want to shake them and say, ‘There is a philosophy out there that worked pretty good for Western civilization at erecting norms and erecting social borders.
有时我想摇动他们并说，‘有一种哲学在建立规范和建立社会边界方面对西方文明非常有效。
Maybe you should try that out.’ ”
也许你应该尝试一下。’”
It’s not totally clear which philosophy he meant, or how far back in Western civ he hoped to go.
我们并不完全清楚他指的是哪种哲学，也不清楚他希望追溯到西方文明多久。
The Federalist Papers?
联邦党人文集？
“The City of God”?
“上帝之城”？
I asked him how national conservatives might accomplish all this without drifting into their own versions of dogma.
我问他全国保守派如何才能实现这一切而不陷入他们自己的教条版本。
“Ah, I mean, honestly,” he replied, “I don’t know.”
“啊，老实说，”他回答道，“我不知道。”
This past summer, Times columnist Ross Douthat, a NatCon fellow traveler, appeared on the podcast of his colleague Ezra Klein.
去年夏天，《泰晤士报》专栏作家、NatCon 同行罗斯·杜塔特 (Ross Douthat) 出现在他同事埃兹拉·克莱因 (Ezra Klein) 的播客上。
Klein asked him, essentially, What happened to J.D.
克莱因问他，本质上是，J.D. 发生了什么事。
Vance?
万斯？
Douthat had a few answers, among them a stylistic point: If you need to play to the Trump base — which Vance suddenly, desperately, needs to do — it’s not a bad idea to do so via online trolling: “You can own the libs without going on long paranoid spiels about all your enemies within the Republican Party who have failed to steal the election for you.”
杜塔特有几个答案，其中有一个风格上的要点：如果你需要迎合特朗普的支持者——万斯突然、迫切地需要这样做——通过网上恶搞来做到这一点并不是一个坏主意：“你可以拥有自由，而不必对共和党内所有未能为你窃取选举的敌人进行长篇偏执的滔滔不绝。”
Vance’s media strategy seems to be that by playing Don Jr. on the Internet, he can push for more substantive populism in real life.
万斯的媒体策略似乎是，通过在互联网上扮演小唐，他可以在现实生活中推动更实质性的民粹主义。
The success of that tactic may depend on how far removed he truly seems from the Brookings Institution-to-Netflix pipeline he was riding until recently.
这一策略的成功可能取决于他距离布鲁金斯学会到 Netflix 的管道有多远，直到最近他才一直在使用这条管道。
In November, Vance tweeted an invitation to join him and Peter Thiel for an exclusive dinner — to whoever donated $10,800 by the next day.
11 月，万斯在推特上发出邀请，邀请他和 Peter Thiel 一起参加一场独家晚宴——邀请第二天捐赠 10,800 美元的人参加。
“This will be a small group, with good food and better company,” Vance wrote.
“这将是一个小团体，有美味的食物和更好的陪伴，”万斯写道。
On Twitter, Mandel replied with a picture of himself outside a Denny’s.
曼德尔在推特上回复了一张自己在丹尼店外的照片。
He wrote : “BERKSHIRE, OH — For $10.80 anyone can join me eating fries off the hood of the car from a gas station Denny’s at midnight.”
他写道：“俄亥俄州伯克郡——只要花 10.8 美元，任何人都可以和我一起在午夜从丹尼加油站吃掉汽车引擎盖上的薯条。”
In late November, the Ohio Republican Party held a very awkward candidate forum in an evangelical church near Middletown.
11月下旬，俄亥俄州共和党在米德尔敦附近的一个福音派教堂举行了一场非常尴尬的候选人论坛。
None of the seven candidates were allowed to rebut one another.
七名候选人中没有一人被允许互相反驳。
The statements from Vance’s opponents were a procession of uninspired to alarming GOP tropes.
万斯的反对者的言论是一系列平庸到令人震惊的共和党比喻。
Party fixture Jane Timken pledged to “fight back against the socialists.” Mandel thundered that the election had been stolen and that America was not a country for “atheism” or “Muslim values.” (Mandel, who is Jewish, is for “Judeo-Christian values.”)
党内常客简·铁姆肯 (Jane Timken) 承诺“反击社会主义者”。曼德尔怒斥选举被盗，美国不是一个“无神论”或“穆斯林价值观”的国家。 （曼德尔是犹太人，支持“犹太基督教价值观”。）
Vance, seated on the edge of the stage, tried to move the conversation onto his turf.
万斯坐在舞台边缘，试图将谈话转移到他的地盘上。
Censorship, opioids: not just the fault of Democrats, but of multinational corporations.
审查制度、阿片类药物：不仅是民主党的错，也是跨国公司的错。
Fielding a question about “fiscal sanity,” he pivoted away from the national debt and gave an answer about buying American-made, instead of Chinese-made, goods.
在回答有关“财政理智”的问题时，他放弃了国债，并给出了购买美国制造而不是中国制造的商品的答案。
Blaming big business certainly distinguished him from his opponents, but it did not appear to thrill the die-hards in the pews.
指责大企业确实使他有别于他的对手，但这似乎并没有让坐在座位上的顽固派感到兴奋。
Eventually, however, Vance landed on something that got the audience going: He called for Republicans to shut down the government until President Biden ended his vaccine mandate for federal workers .
然而，最终万斯提出了一些让观众兴奋的事情：他呼吁共和党人关闭政府，直到拜登总统结束对联邦工作人员的疫苗授权。
A vaccine mandate is exactly the sort of idea that a “common good” national conservative like Vance should support.
强制接种疫苗正是像万斯这样的“共同利益”全国保守派应该支持的想法。
Yet a few days after the forum, I got a text message from his campaign, raising money off the line.
然而，论坛结束几天后，我收到了他的竞选活动的一条短信，在线筹集资金。