第 473 期·中文精读

伊朗战争辩论:核武器、特朗普、和平、权力与中东

Iran War Debate: Nuclear Weapons, Trump, Peace, Power & the Middle East

围绕伊朗核问题与战争风险展开辩论,涉及特朗普的政策取向、中东权力格局与和平的可能。

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辩论开始不到二十分钟,两位嘉宾已经吵到主持人必须插话的程度。Mark Dubowitz 说伊朗有一个叫 AMAD(阿玛德)的秘密计划,目标是造五枚核弹。Scott Horton 接过来就说:“我要反驳他刚才说的几乎每一个字,全是假的。”Mark 反问:“真的每一个?一件事都不对?就一件?”Scott 回答:“伊朗是个国家,这一点你说对了。”

这就是 Lex Fridman 第 473 期节目的开场。接近五个小时,两个人几乎在所有事实上都不一致。但如果你耐心听到最后,会发现他们在几个最关键的判断上,其实是重合的。

先把两个人的底牌亮出来

Scott Horton 是 antiwar.com 的编辑主任,主持《Scott Horton Show》,过去三十年一直在批评美国的外交政策和军事干预。他是德州人,写过一本叫《Enough Already》的书,讲美国如何一步步被拖进一场又一场战争。节目里 Lex 念了书的推荐语,Daniel Ellsberg 说“毁灭性”,Ron Paul 说“必读”。

Mark Dubowitz 是 FDD(保卫民主基金会)的首席执行官,主持《Iran Breakdown》播客,研究伊朗核问题二十二年。他被俄罗斯和伊朗都制裁过,Lex 在节目里还专门恭喜了他一句。他的立场很清楚:伊朗政权是中东最大的不稳定来源,必须用压力和威慑让它放弃核能力。

两个人吵得这么凶,根源在事实层面。他们对同一批历史事件有完全相反的叙述,连事件的基本轮廓都对不上。

三个数字撑起整场辩论的技术地基

Mark 花了几分钟解释浓缩铀的分级,这是理解整场争论的钥匙。

铀浓缩到 3.67%,是民用核电站的燃料。做到这一步,你已经完成了通往武器级铀的大约 70% 的工作量。20% 用于医疗同位素,伊朗在德黑兰有一座研究反应堆。60% 是民用领域的上限。90% 是武器级。

Mark 的关键论点是:做到 60%,你已经走完了 99% 的路。而且 60% 的铀理论上可以造一个粗糙的核装置,历史上有人这么干过。伊朗目前累积的 60% 浓缩铀,按他的说法够做 15 到 17 枚核弹。

“一旦你有 60% 的浓缩铀,你就完成了所有步骤的 99%,包括 Scott 刚才说的那些步骤。” (Mark Dubowitz)

Scott 的反驳干脆利落:“这毫无意义。”

他的理由是,这个 99% 的算法里塞进了太多不相关的东西。从矿山开采,到把矿石炼成黄饼,到转化成六氟化铀气体,到装车运到离心机厂房,再到真正开始旋转离心机。把这一整套都算进去说“你走完了 99%”,是在玩统计游戏。真正剩下要做的那一步,是从 60% 提到 90%,而这一步的速度取决于你有多少台离心机、它们转得多快、你愿不愿意承担被发现的风险。

这场争论之所以重要,是因为它直接决定了后面所有政策讨论的前提。如果 60% 就等于 99%,那么伊朗离核弹只有一步之遥,任何拖延都是危险的。如果 60% 只是漫长链条上的一个节点,那么外交还有空间。

2018 年那批档案,到底是不是摩萨德伪造的

辩论中最尖锐的时刻,是 Mark 抛出那个问题。

2018 年,以色列从德黑兰一个仓库里搬出了大量文件,声称是伊朗核武器计划的完整档案。Mark 说这批档案有几千页,图纸、蓝图、试验数据,全部交给了国际原子能机构和美国政府。核扩散专家 David Albright 获得完整访问权限,写了一整本书,结论是伊朗确实有一个叫 AMAD 的活跃武器计划,目标是造五枚原子弹。

Mark 逼问:“你是说摩萨德把这一切都伪造了?”

Scott 回答:“是的。”

他给出的逻辑是:这批档案里的核心内容和 2000 年代初那个著名的“冒烟笔记本电脑”是同一套东西。所谓“冒烟笔记本电脑”,是据称从伊朗偷出来的一台电脑,里面存着核弹设计图纸。Scott 说这批材料由伊朗人民圣战者组织(MEK)转手,而这个组织历史上炮制过至少十次重大假情报。他引用 Gareth Porter 的《Manufactured Crisis》一书,说 2007 年美国国家情报评估之所以认定伊朗在 2003 年前有武器计划,依据之一就是国防情报局对一批双用途物资发票的误读,比如一些特殊磁铁。

Mark 的回应是,他见过档案原件,那是一整个巨大的实体档案库,跟当年那台笔记本电脑完全是两回事,摩萨德不可能凭空造出几千页互相印证的工程文档。他反复建议听众去读 Albright 的书,说那是“一丝不苟的工作”。

两个人到这里已经没办法再往前走。Scott 承认自己没读过 Albright 的书,但他坚持不采信以色列单方面提供的材料。Mark 则认为这种怀疑已经变成了一种反射,凡是美国、以色列、沙特说的都是谎话,凡是敌人说的都可信。

JCPOA:两个人都骂特朗普退出,但理由完全相反

这是整场辩论里最值得中国读者注意的部分,因为两个人的立场呈现出一种奇特的对角线。

2015 年的伊核协议(JCPOA),奥巴马政府牵头,联合国安理会其他常任理事国加德国一起签署。核心条款是:伊朗把库存的浓缩铀全部运出国外,法国负责转化成燃料棒再运回来;离心机数量大幅削减;接受国际原子能机构的严格核查;作为交换,制裁逐步解除。协议里有一些“日落条款”,部分限制在 10 到 15 年后到期。

Scott 的立场:这是一份不错的协议,虽然可以更好。特朗普 2018 年退出是巨大的错误。他讲了一个技术细节:在协议框架下,即使伊朗把核查人员全部赶走、全力冲刺,也大约需要一整年才能攒够一枚枪式核弹所需的武器级铀。这一年时间,就是外交和军事手段的反应窗口。

Mark 的立场更微妙。他说自己当年在 JCPOA 辩论中两头挨骂。左派骂他,因为他批评协议的致命缺陷:一是承认了伊朗的浓缩能力,二是日落条款到期后伊朗会成为一个工业规模的核门槛国家,届时谁也拦不住。右派也骂他,因为他反对直接退出,主张拉着欧洲人一起去谈判,延长协议、取消日落条款,付出更多制裁减免的代价换一个更好的版本。

“我试着采取一个细致的立场,结果我被左边骂,也被右边骂。” (Mark Dubowitz)

所以出现了这个局面:两个人在“特朗普不该撕毁协议”这件事上一致,但 Scott 认为协议本身够好,Mark 认为协议有致命缺陷但该谈不该撕。

后面还有一段交锋非常能说明问题。Scott 问:如果当年你是国家安全顾问,在伊朗还在往外运浓缩铀的前提下,你愿意接受某种程度的浓缩吗?Mark 的回答是不愿意,浓缩能力本身就是红线。

Scott 追问:可是《不扩散核武器条约》(NPT)赋予了和平利用核能的权利,很多解读认为包括浓缩。

Mark 的回答是:NPT 的解读有争议。连奥巴马政府在签 JCPOA 时都不愿意承认伊朗有浓缩的“权利”,只是承认了“事实”。他还提出一个概念,叫“黄金标准”:世界上有 23 个国家有民用核电站,它们都没有浓缩能力,也没有后处理能力。燃料棒从国外买,用完运走。为什么伊朗要例外?

伊拉克战争的幽灵:那些炸弹到底是谁造的

辩论进行到大约三分之一,话题转到了伊拉克。这是理解 Scott 为什么对情报机构如此不信任的关键。

争议点是 EFP(爆炸成型弹丸),一种能穿透装甲的铜芯炸弹,在伊拉克战争期间造成大量美军伤亡。Mark 说这些技术和训练来自伊朗革命卫队圣城旅,指挥官是卡西姆·苏莱曼尼。

Scott 的说法完全不同。他引用《纽约时报》记者 Alissa Rubin 的报道,说美军在伊拉克南部的什叶派地区发现了制造这些炸弹的工厂,工人是伊拉克阿拉伯人,零件上标着“阿联酋制造”“伊拉克制造”。当时大卫·彼得雷乌斯将军准备开新闻发布会展示证据,记者们围着看,发现零件产地标签后,发布会取消了。他还引用了当时国家安全顾问斯蒂芬·哈德利的承认:我们手上没有能拿得出手的证据。

Scott 还补了一刀:这项技术最早来自黎巴嫩真主党,而真主党是从爱尔兰共和军那里学来的。

另一场争论是 1996 年沙特科巴塔塔楼爆炸案,19 名美国空军人员死亡。Mark 说是伊朗支持的真主党干的。Scott 说是基地组织,本·拉登本人对记者 Abdel Bari Atwan 详细吹嘘过这次行动,CIA 本·拉登部门前负责人 Michael Scheuer 也持这个判断。

这些历史争论表面上和今天的伊朗无关,实际上是整场辩论的底层结构。Scott 的所有判断都建立在一个前提上:美国的情报机构在伊拉克问题上系统性地错了,而且错得很有方向性。Mark 的所有判断建立在另一个前提上:犯了错不等于永远会犯错,不能因为伊拉克就否定所有情报。

午夜之锤:一次打击能解决什么

节目的现实背景是 2025 年 6 月那场持续十二天的以色列与伊朗战争。美国发动了代号“午夜之锤”(Operation Midnight Hammer)的行动,B-2 轰炸机投下十几枚三万磅的 GBU-57 巨型钻地弹,潜艇发射战斧巡航导弹,目标是福尔多、纳坦兹、伊斯法罕三处核设施。福尔多建在深山岩石下约八十米深处。

Mark 的判断是这次行动精准、有限、压倒性。打一天就收手,然后让以色列也停手,回到阿曼的谈判桌。

“他打疼了哈梅内伊,但他也对内塔尼亚胡说,‘够了,够了。’然后说,好,现在回阿曼,临时停火,开始谈。” (Mark Dubowitz)

Scott 的态度是:现在下结论太早。战损评估还没有定论,有报道说伊朗的离心机大量幸存,也有人说伊朗已经开始在别处建新设施。更根本的问题是,这次打击会把伊朗推向哪个方向?是放弃,还是加速?

他提出了整场辩论里最反直觉的一个判断:哈梅内伊其实非常谨慎。

他的论证是这样的。伊朗在反击时向卡塔尔的美国基地发射了导弹,但提前通过渠道通知了美方,结果零伤亡。特朗普公开感谢了这次“预警”。Scott 说这说明哈梅内伊在做一个姿态:我必须回应,但我不能真的打。他清楚美国有能力把伊朗的基础设施从地图上抹掉,而伊朗没有任何能力真正威胁美国本土。所以每次升级,他都在给自己找台阶下。

利比亚和乌克兰:为什么每个独裁者都想要核弹

辩论后半段有一段对话,双方罕见地互相靠近。

Mark 说:如果你是哈梅内伊,你会看两个案例。卡扎菲 2003 年放弃核计划,七年后被推翻、被虐杀。乌克兰 1994 年放弃境内的苏联核武器,换来的是布达佩斯备忘录的领土完整承诺,然后俄罗斯在 2014 年和 2022 年两次入侵。你会得出什么结论?

Scott 在细节上反驳了利比亚的部分,说卡扎菲买的那批东西只是 AQ Khan 网络的库存,利比亚既没有工程师也没有科学家,根本算不上核计划。乌克兰的部分他也纠正说,布达佩斯备忘录给的只是“尊重领土完整”的政治承诺,远没有到军事保护的程度,而且那些核武器的发射密码在莫斯科手里,乌克兰本来也用不了。

但他没有反驳那个核心推论。事实上他往前推了一步:正是美国对伊拉克、利比亚的做法,让伊朗认定拥核才是唯一的保险。这次轰炸只会强化这个认知。

Mark 的回应是:那反过来看,如果这次打击成功了,如果伊朗最终签了一个零浓缩、完全拆除的协议,传递的信号就完全倒过来了,你不需要核武器,你也不该试图拥有。

两个人对同一个事件推导出完全相反的多米诺骨牌。

节目里最失控的十分钟

辩论进行到大约一半,Scott 说了一句话,Lex 直接打断了他。

Scott 说 Mark 是“在这里为一个外国势力服务,用我们的代价替他们说话”。Lex 的反应非常激烈,几乎是吼出来的:“这是‘不美国’那套鬼话,别在这里说。这个暗示是我,是我,不美国。我像通俄门那套一样被攻击过,被说成是普京的走狗。我是美国人。”

接着是一段很沉的对话。Mark 说自己二十二年前来到美国,十年前入籍,成为美国公民,被指控不爱国是极大的冒犯。Lex 说他自己也是移民,如果有人说他因为出身就不美国,那是他不能接受的。

这一段之所以值得单独拎出来,是因为它暴露了这场辩论最深的裂缝。Scott 的所有论证都指向一个结论:美国的中东政策被一个外国利益集团绑架了。这个论证在事实层面有可以讨论的空间,但在表述上很容易滑向对具体个人的忠诚审判。而 Lex 作为一个移民,对这条线的敏感度显然高于对任何具体政策的敏感度。

有意思的是,两人在另一件事上居然达成了共识:特朗普被“通俄门”冤枉了。Mark 说那是“彻头彻尾的诬陷”,瘫痪了特朗普两年多的总统任期,让他在第一任期内没法真正跟俄罗斯谈判。Scott 说这正是他一直在讲的,情报机构一旦被政治化,代价是整个外交空间。

两人最后同意的事,比想象中多

听到最后,你会发现有几件事是重合的。

第一,最好的结局是谈判。Mark 说最好的情况是伊朗回阿曼,签一个零浓缩、完全拆除、国际原子能机构全程监督的协议,美国帮它建民用核电站。Scott 说最好的情况是现在停手,特朗普想办法重新回到类似 JCPOA 的框架里。两个人对“最好”的具体条款不同,但对“走向谈判桌”这件事没有分歧。

第二,都不支持出动地面部队。Mark 明确说,他不认为应该推动美国对伊朗政权进行斩首行动,因为那可能把美国拖进五十万机械化部队入侵伊朗的灾难,那是伊拉克战争最大的教训之一。他主张的是里根在冷战中的策略:对政权保持最大压力,对人民提供最大支持。

第三,都认为沙特和伊朗应该和解。Scott 提到中国几年前促成的沙伊复交,说美国本可以加倍努力做这件事。他甚至翻出 1993 年布热津斯基的建议:美伊关系正常化,修一条穿过伊朗的石油管道,让双方都赚钱。

第四,都对军工复合体有警惕。Mark 说这是个严肃的问题,武器越多,使用它的诱惑就越大,而且里面有钱可赚。

核扩散这道题,两种答案

节目接近尾声时,Lex 问了那个大问题:如果人类文明在未来七十五年被毁掉,大概率是世界大战或者核战争。怎么避免?

Scott 的回答回到了自由主义的地基:不侵略原则。他引用他心目中的理想国防配置,说两艘好的潜艇就够了。一艘美国的三叉戟核潜艇,理论上可以摧毁俄罗斯所有的城市和军事基地。所以防守本土、威慑任何想动手的人,这个配置足够。他还提到 1986 年雷克雅未克,里根和戈尔巴乔夫几乎达成彻底核裁军,最后被幕僚拦住。他说那是人类历史上最大的遗憾之一。

Mark 的回答是另一套框架:美国是不可或缺的力量。二战之后的规则秩序、欧洲的重建、亚洲的重建,背后都是美国的力量。真正的问题在于怎么学、学到什么程度,用不用力量本身没有疑问。他说特朗普的做法代表了一种平衡:不因为伊拉克和阿富汗就瘫痪,也不因为要显示强硬就全面开战。打一天,收手,谈。

“我们不能过度学习过去的教训,但也不能不学。” (Mark Dubowitz)

这两种答案背后是两种世界观。Scott 相信,一个国家的安全最终来自克制和正常的国际关系。Mark 相信,规则需要有人执行,而执行者手里必须有武器。

整场辩论最诚实的一刻,可能是 Mark 说的那句话:我们花了五个小时谈伊朗的核计划、谈中东、谈战争史,但几乎没怎么谈伊朗那八千万普通人。他说 80% 的伊朗人憎恨这个政权,伊朗人在美国、加拿大、欧洲都极其成功,唯一成功不了的地方是伊朗国内。

这句话说完,Scott 罕见地没有反驳。他只是补了一句:所以更不应该用一场战争把他们的国家炸烂。

两位嘉宾走出录音室时,谁也没说服谁。但如果你把五个小时压缩成一句可以带走的话,大概是这个:关于伊朗是否在造核弹这件事,专家之间的事实分歧大到你无法用“谁更专业”来裁决。你唯一能做的,是回到原始文件,亲自去看。

  • 把浓缩铀的三个数字记牢:3.67% 民用、60% 民用上限、90% 武器级。听到任何人说“99% 的进度”时,先问这个百分比的分母是什么,是从挖矿算起还是从离心机算起,两种算法得出的结论完全不同。
  • 想自己判断 2018 年伊朗核档案的真伪,去找 David Albright 那本书读,同时也去读 Gareth Porter 的《Manufactured Crisis》。两本书的结论相反,但都建立在可查证的原始材料上,比任何一方的口头结论都更值得花时间。
  • 看到任何关于伊朗核问题的新闻,先去 IAEA.org 查最新的核查报告原文。所有二手转述都会丢信息,尤其是“伊朗是否在违约”这类问题,报告原文的措辞精确到每个动词。
  • 用利比亚和乌克兰这两个案例做思维模型。任何一个国家在讨论是否放弃核武器时,都会参考这两个先例。理解这一点,你就理解了为什么朝鲜不会弃核,也理解了为什么伊朗谈判代表每次坐下来时腰杆都很硬。
  • 警惕“谁在替谁说话”这类论证。它可能指向真实的问题,但它也最容易滑向对具体个人的忠诚审判,而忠诚审判从来不解决任何政策问题。把注意力放在条款、数据和先例上,比放在动机上更有产出。
中英对照:英文为官方 Transcript 原文,中文为逐句机器翻译(Google 神经机器翻译),仅供学习英文参考,请以英文原文为准。
Mark Dubowitz00:00

We want to avoid wars, we have to have serious deterrence because our enemies need to understand, we will use selective, focused, overwhelming military power when we are facing threats like an Iranian nuclear weapon.

我们想要避免战争,我们必须拥有严重的威慑力,因为我们的敌人需要明白,当我们面临伊朗核武器等威胁时,我们将使用有选择性的、集中的、压倒性的军事力量。

Scott Horton00:12

I’m not seeing the peace through strength.

我没有通过力量看到和平。

00:12 I’m seeing permanent militarism and permanent war through strength.

我看到通过实力实现永久的军国主义和永久的战争。

Mark Dubowitz00:16

Do you ever hold our adversaries responsible or do you just don’t think we have any adversaries?

你是否曾认为我们的对手负有责任,或者你只是认为我们没有对手?

Scott Horton00:22

The easiest kind of nuke to make out of uranium is a simple gun type nuke.

用铀制造的最简单的核武器是简单的枪型核武器。

Mark Dubowitz00:26

Are you saying that Mossad fabricated it?

你是说摩萨德捏造的吗?

Scott Horton00:29

Yeah.

是的。

Mark Dubowitz00:30

That’s what you’re claiming.

这就是你所主张的。

00:30 Here’s the offer, take it to leave it.

这是优惠,拿走吧。

Zero enrichment full dismantlement.

零浓缩全面拆解。

Scott Horton00:34

Through the Iranians, told the IAEA, you can inspect any five out 10 facilities here, carte blanche, go ahead and they did and found nothing.

伊朗人告诉国际原子能机构,你可以检查这里十个设施中的任何五个,全权委托,他们照做了,但什么也没发现。

Mark Dubowitz00:41

Experts in Iran’s nuclear program, including David Albright, who actually saw the archive, went in there, wrote a whole book on it, and there’s a lot of detail about how Iran had an active nuclear weapons program called AMAD to build five nuclear weapons.

伊朗核计划专家,包括大卫·奥尔布赖特(David Albright),他实际上看到了档案,并在那里写了一整本书,其中有很多关于伊朗如何实施名为 AMAD 的核武器计划来制造五枚核武器的细节。

Scott Horton00:55

I have to refute virtually everything he just said, which is completely false.

我必须反驳他刚才所说的几乎所有内容,这完全是错误的。

Mark Dubowitz00:58

I mean really everything?

我的意思是真的一切?

00:58 There was not one thing I said that was true?

我说的没有一件事是真的吗?

Just one thing.

只是一件事。

Scott Horton01:02

I mean Iran is a nation over there somewhere.

我的意思是伊朗是那里某个地方的一个国家。

01:02 You got that part right.

你说对了。

Mark Dubowitz01:05

22 years of working on Iran and I got that right.

我在伊朗问题上工作了 22 年,我做对了。

Lex Fridman01:07

But do you know the population of Iran?

但你知道伊朗有多少人口吗?

Mark Dubowitz01:09

92 million.

9200万。

Lex Fridman01:10

Okay.

好的。

Scott Horton01:11

Give me a pound, dude.

给我一磅,伙计。

Lex Fridman01:12

There we go, agreement.

就这样吧,协议。

01:16 The following is a debate between Scott Horton and Mark Dubowitz on the topic of Iran and Israel.

以下是斯科特·霍顿和马克·杜博维茨关于伊朗和以色列话题的辩论。

Scott Horton is author and editorial director of Ntwar.com, host of the Scott Horton Show and for the past three decades, a staunch critic of US foreign policy and military interventionism.

斯科特·霍顿 (Scott Horton) 是 Ntwar.com 的作家和编辑总监,也是《斯科特·霍顿秀》的主持人,在过去三十年里,他一直是美国外交政策和军事干预主义的坚定批评者。

Mark Dubowitz is a chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, host of the Iran Breakdown Podcast, and he has been a leading expert on Iran and its nuclear program for over 20 years.

马克·杜博维茨 (Mark Dubowitz) 是保卫民主基金会的首席执行官、伊朗崩溃播客的主持人,20 多年来他一直是伊朗及其核计划方面的顶尖专家。

This is the Lex Fridman podcast.

这是莱克斯·弗里德曼播客。

To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description and consider subscribing to this channel.

为了支持它,请查看说明中的赞助商并考虑订阅此频道。

If you do, I promise to work extremely hard to always bring you nuanced, long-form conversations with a very wide range of interesting people from all walks of life, and now, dear friends, here’s Scott Horton and Mark Dubowitz.

如果你愿意,我保证会非常努力地为你带来与各行各业的各种有趣的人进行细致入微的长篇对话,现在,亲爱的朋友们,这是斯科特·霍顿和马克·杜博维茨。

02:18 Gentlemen.

先生们。

All right, it’s great to have you here.

好吧,很高兴你能来到这里。

Let’s try to have a nuanced discussion/debate and maybe even steal man-opposing perspectives as much as possible.

让我们尝试进行细致入微的讨论/辩论,甚至尽可能地窃取反对人类的观点。

All right, as a stands now, there’s a barely stable ceasefire between Iran and Israel.

好吧,就目前情况而言,伊朗和以色列之间的停火勉强稳定。

Let’s maybe rewind a little bit.

让我们回顾一下。

Can we first lay out the context for this Iran-Israel war and try to describe the key events that happened over the past two weeks, maybe even a bit of the deep roots of the conflict?

我们能否先阐述一下这场两以战争的背景,并尝试描述过去两周发生的关键事件,甚至可能是冲突的一些深层根源?

Mark Dubowitz02:50

Sure.

当然。

02:50 First of all, thanks so much for having me on.

首先,非常感谢您邀请我参加。

Great to be on with Scott.

很高兴和斯科特在一起。

I know he and I don’t agree on a lot, but I certainly admire the passion and the dedication to stopping wars.

我知道我和他在很多方面意见不一致,但我当然钦佩他对制止战争的热情和奉献精神。

So that’s something we want to talk about.

这就是我们想要讨论的事情。

So let’s talk about how we got to this war.

那么让我们来谈谈我们是如何进入这场战争的。

So President Trump comes into office and immediately lays out that his Iran strategy is maximum pressure on the regime and he will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon, and he makes that clear.

所以特朗普总统上任后立即提出,他的伊朗战略是对伊朗政权施加最大压力,他不会允许伊朗拥有核武器,他也明确表示过这一点。

Consistently, I think made it very clear during his first term, made a clear throughout his career and thus begins this process with the Iranians, which has kind of multiple tracks, but the one that Trump sees most interested in at the time is the diplomatic track, and he makes it very clear from the beginning and a sort of Oval Office remark.

一直以来,我认为他在第一个任期内就明确表达了这一点,在他的整个职业生涯中也明确表达了这一点,从而从伊朗人开始了这一进程,这个过程有多种轨道,但特朗普认为当时最感兴趣的是外交轨道,他从一开始就说得很清楚,有点像椭圆形办公室的言论。

Scott Horton06:21

Sure.

当然。

06:21 Well, he started with January, right?

嗯,他从一月开始,对吧?

Trump’s second term here and the maximum pressure campaign essentially as should be clear to everyone.

特朗普的第二个任期和极限施压竞选基本上是每个人都应该清楚的。

Now, all these negotiations were just a pretext for war.

现在,所有这些谈判都只是战争的借口。

Trump and his entire cabinet must have known that the Ayatollah is not going to give up all enrichment.

特朗普和他的整个内阁一定知道阿亚图拉不会放弃所有的财富。

That is their latent nuclear deterrent.

这就是他们潜在的核威慑力。

Their posture has been heavily implied, “Don’t attack us and we won’t make a nuke.” While America’s position was if you make a nuke, if you start to we’ll attack you.

他们的姿态已被强烈暗示:“不要攻击我们,我们就不会制造核武器。”美国的立场是,如果你制造核武器,如果你开始制造核武器,我们就会攻击你。

So it was the perfect standoff, but what happened was, and you might remember a few weeks ago, there was some talk about, “Well, maybe we could find a way to compromise on some enrichment.

所以这是一次完美的对峙,但发生的事情是,你可能还记得几周前,有人在谈论,“好吧,也许我们可以找到一种在某些浓缩方面妥协的方法。

Maybe they could do a consortium with the Saudis.” And then nope, the pressure came down.

也许他们可以与沙特组成一个财团。”然后不,压力下降了。

No enrichment, zero enrichment, but that’s a red line.

没有浓缩,零浓缩,但这是一条红线。

Lex Fridman11:00

Maybe a good question to ask here is what is the goal for the United States in Iran in relation to Iran’s nuclear program?

也许这里要问的一个好问题是,美国在伊朗核计划方面的目标是什么?

11:00 What is the red line here?

这里的红线是什么?

Does Iran have this need for latent nuclear deterrent and what is the thing that’s acceptable to the United States and to the rest of the world?

伊朗是否有这种潜在核威慑的需要?什么是美国和世界其他国家可以接受的?

What should be acceptable?

什么应该是可以接受的?

Mark Dubowitz11:24

Yeah, so there was a lot to unpack there.

是的,所以那里有很多东西需要解开。

11:24 So let’s sort of just back up a little bit.

所以让我们稍微备份一下。

Let’s talk about first of all, the regime itself.

我们首先谈谈政权本身。

Islamic Republic of Iran came into power in 1979.

伊朗伊斯兰共和国于1979年执政。

It has been declared a leading state sponsor of terrorism by multiple administrations dating back to the Clinton administration, by Obama, by Biden, by Trump and it is a regime that has killed and maimed thousands of Americans, not to mention obviously hundreds of thousands of Middle Easterners.

自克林顿政府以来的多届政府、奥巴马政府、拜登政府、特朗普政府都宣称它是恐怖主义的主要支持者,这个政权已经杀害和残害了数千名美国人,更不用说数十万中东人了。

It is a regime that has lied about its nuclear program and never actually disclosed its nuclear sites.

这个政权对其核计划撒了谎,而且从未真正披露过其核设施。

All these sites were discovered by Iranian opposition groups, by western intelligence agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is the UN agency responsible for preventing proliferation has come out again and again over many years in very detailed reports describing Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

所有这些地点都是由伊朗反对派团体、西方情报机构和国际原子能机构发现的。国际原子能机构是负责防止扩散的联合国机构,多年来一再发布非常详细的报告,描述伊朗的核武器计划。

Lex Fridman18:35

Yeah, that is one of the fascinating questions, whether this Operation Midnight Hammer increase or decreased the chance that the Iran will develop a nuclear weapon.

是的,这是令人着迷的问题之一,这次午夜之锤行动是否会增加或减少伊朗发展核武器的机会。

Scott Horton18:44

Before you ask any more questions, I have to refute virtually everything he just said, which is completely false.

在你问更多问题之前,我必须反驳他刚才所说的几乎所有内容,这完全是错误的。

Mark Dubowitz18:49

I mean really everything, there was not one thing I said that was true.

我的意思是真的一切,我说的没有一件事是真的。

18:49 Just one thing.

只是一件事。

Scott Horton18:52

I mean Iran is a nation over there somewhere.

我的意思是伊朗是那里某个地方的一个国家。

18:52 You got that part right.

你说对了。

Mark Dubowitz18:56

All right, 22 years of working on Iran and I got that right.

好吧,在伊朗问题上工作了 22 年,我是对的。

Lex Fridman18:59

But do you know the population of Iran?

但你知道伊朗有多少人口吗?

Mark Dubowitz19:00

92 million.

9200万。

Lex Fridman19:01

Okay.

好的。

Scott Horton19:02

So first of all, they were trying to buy a light water reactor from the Europeans or the Chinese in the 1990s, and Bill Clinton wouldn’t let them and put tremendous pressure on China to prevent them from selling them a light water reactor, a turnkey reactor that produces waste that’s so polluted with impurities that you can’t make nuclear weapons fuel out of it.

首先,他们在20世纪90年代试图从欧洲或中国购买轻水反应堆,但比尔·克林顿不让他们这么做,并对中国施加了巨大压力,阻止他们向他们出售轻水反应堆,这是一种交钥匙反应堆,产生的废物污染严重,无法制造核武器燃料。

19:02 By the way, they never have to this day had a reprocessing facility for reprocessing plutonium.

顺便说一句,他们迄今为止从未拥有过用于后处理钚的后处理设施。

Even their current plutonium waste from their heavy water reactor at Boucher to make weapons fuel out of that.

甚至他们目前从布歇重水反应堆中排出的钚废物也用来制造武器燃料。

They have no plutonium route to the bomb under the JCPOA.

根据联合全面行动计划,他们没有获得核弹的钚路线。

Mark Dubowitz19:37

At Iraq, not Boucher.

在伊拉克,不是布歇。

19:37 There’s a difference.

这是有区别的。

Scott Horton19:40

Iraq is where they pour concrete into the reactor and shut it down.

伊拉克是他们向反应堆浇注混凝土并关闭反应堆的地方。

Mark Dubowitz19:45

And the reason they pour concrete-

他们浇筑混凝土的原因是——

Scott Horton19:47

Under the JCPOA.

根据联合全面行动计划。

Mark Dubowitz19:48

Not they, but the Obama administration, he’s right, under the JCPOA poured concrete into the Kalindria in order to prevent them from using that reactor to reprocess plutonium.

不是他们,而是奥巴马政府,他是对的,根据《联合全面行动计划》向卡林德里亚浇筑了混凝土,以阻止他们使用该反应堆来后处理钚。

19:48 So there’s a distinction between Iraq and Boucher.

所以伊拉克和布歇之间是有区别的。

Scott’s exactly right.

斯科特说得完全正确。

Boucher is a heavy water reactor provided by the Russians as I described for the generation of electricity.

正如我所描述的,布歇是俄罗斯人提供的用于发电的重水反应堆。

Its proliferation proof.

它的扩散证明。

Iraq is the opposite.

伊拉克则相反。

It’s a heavy water reactor that was built for a plutonium pathway to nuclear weapons, which is exactly why under the JCPOA, they literally had to pour concrete into the middle of it to prevent it from reprocessing plutonium.

这是一个重水反应堆,是为制造核武器的钚途径而建造的,这正是为什么根据《联合全面行动计划》,他们必须在其中浇注混凝土,以防止其对钚进行再处理。

Scott Horton20:25

I think we’re going to need a scientist to come in here and split the difference or maybe we need to go and look up some IAEA documents because I don’t believe that Iraq ever had a reprocessing facility for their plutonium waste and the deal under the JCPOA, the Russians would come and get all their plutonium waste, which the waste comes out all polluted and not useful.

我认为我们需要一位科学家来到这里来解决分歧,或者也许我们需要去查找一些国际原子能机构的文件,因为我不相信伊拉克曾经有过钚废物的后处理设施,而根据联合全面行动计划,俄罗斯人会来获取他们所有的钚废物,这些废物都被污染了,没有用处。

20:25 You need the reprocessing facility to get all of the impurities out.

您需要再处理设施来清除所有杂质。

Mark Dubowitz20:51

Just to clarify-

只是为了澄清 -

Scott Horton20:52

It could be that I’m wrong about that, but I don’t believe that they ever had a reprocessing facility at Iraq that they could use to remove all those impurities and then have weapons-grade plutonium fuel as the North Koreans do.

也许我的想法是错的,但我不相信他们在伊拉克有过后处理设施,可以用来去除所有这些杂质,然后像朝鲜那样拥有武器级钚燃料。

Mark Dubowitz21:05

So the Obama administration was very clear under the JCPOA, we are going to pour concrete into the Iraq facility as Scott acknowledged because we are concerned that Iraq can be used for reprocessing plutonium, for plutonium pathway to a nuclear weapon.

因此,奥巴马政府根据联合全面行动计划非常明确,正如斯科特所承认的那样,我们将向伊拉克设施浇筑混凝土,因为我们担心伊拉克可用于后处理钚,用于制造核武器的钚途径。

Lex Fridman21:21

Can be used, but we don’t know if it was used.

可以用,但不知道有没有用过。

Scott Horton21:24

Oh, we know it never was.

哦,我们知道从来没有。

21:24 There never was any reprocessing of weapons fuel there.

那里从未进行过任何武器燃料的后处理。

Lex Fridman21:28

But there was concrete poured.

但浇筑了混凝土。

Scott Horton21:30

There’s no indication

没有任何迹象表明

Mark Dubowitz21:31

For your viewers who are interested and not to plug my own podcast, Lex so I apologize.

对于那些有兴趣而不是插入我自己的播客的观众,莱克斯,所以我深表歉意。

Lex Fridman21:35

It is a very good podcast.

这是一个非常好的播客。

Mark Dubowitz21:36

I just recently had David Albright on my podcast who is actually a physicist and a weapons inspector and goes into a lot of detail about the Iranian nuclear program.

最近,大卫·奥尔布赖特(David Albright)出现在我的播客上,他实际上是一名物理学家和武器检查员,他详细介绍了伊朗核计划。

21:36 Please listen to the podcast.

请收听播客。

Lex Fridman21:47

Iran Breakdown by the way is the name of the podcast.

顺便说一句,伊朗崩溃是播客的名称。

Mark Dubowitz21:50

And David’s the president of the Institute for Science International Security and by the way, spent decades on this and to his credit, he was one of the deep skeptics of the Bush administration’s rush to war with Iraq.

大卫是国际安全科学研究所所长,顺便说一句,他在这方面花了几十年的时间,值得赞扬的是,他是布什政府匆忙对伊拉克开战的深深怀疑者之一。

Scott Horton22:00

That’s not true.

那不是真的。

22:00 He vouched for claims that there were chemical weapons in Iraq and later said he was sorry for it.

他为伊拉克存在化学武器的说法提供了担保,后来表示对此感到抱歉。

Mark Dubowitz22:06

Again, I mentioned the Bush administration’s rush to war based on their claims that Saddam was building nuclear weapons.

我再次提到布什政府声称萨达姆正在制造核武器而仓促发动战争。

Scott Horton22:11

He did debunk the aluminum tubes though.

不过,他确实揭穿了铝管的真相。

Mark Dubowitz22:14

He debunked it and it was a deep skeptic again of the rush to war in Iraq.

他揭穿了这一说法,这再次引发了人们对匆忙发动伊拉克战争的深深怀疑。

22:14 The argument today, Lex, which I think is the more interesting argument, because there are very few people left today who don’t believe that the Iranians were building the nuclear weapons capability that gave them the option to build nuclear weapons.

今天的争论,莱克斯,我认为这是更有趣的争论,因为今天很少有人不相信伊朗人正在建设核武器能力,这使他们可以选择建造核武器。

Scott Horton22:33

I already said that.

我已经说过了。

Mark Dubowitz22:35

We can debate whether they had decided to, and I’m interested to hear Scott’s opinion on this, but the recent intelligence that has come out that the Iranian nuclear weapons scientists have begun preliminary work on building a warhead.

我们可以讨论他们是否决定这么做,我很想听听斯科特对此的看法,但最近的情报显示,伊朗核武器科学家已经开始制造弹头的初步工作。

Scott Horton22:49

Came out from where?

从哪里出来的?

22:49 This intelligence that came out, who put that?

这个情报出来了,是谁放的?

Israeli claims.

以色列声称。

Not verified by the US and the Wall Street Journal anywhere, right?

没有得到美国和《华尔街日报》任何地方的验证,对吗?

Let’s talk about all of my list of refutations of all your false claims from 10 years ago.

让我们来谈谈我对10年前你们所有虚假说法的反驳清单。

Mark Dubowitz23:04

The Wall Street Journal did verify.

《华尔街日报》确实证实了这一点。

Scott Horton23:06

That’s a lot of [inaudible 00:23:08] to refute.

有很多 [听不清 00:23:08] 需要反驳。

Lex Fridman23:08

One at a time.

一次一个。

Mark Dubowitz23:09

Lawrence Norman actually wrote a piece and this was during the Biden administration because the Biden DNI had actually come out and for the first time in their annual threat assessment had removed a line that said Iran is not currently working on developing any capabilities that would put it in a position to actually deliver a nuclear warhead, and what became the Norman piece in the Wall Street Journal was that there actually was initial work done on metallurgy and on computer modeling, and so those actually were defined terms in Section T of the 2015 JCPOA, which defined weaponization in that section, and metallurgy and computer modeling were some of the initial steps so that the DNI was very concerned under Biden that these initial steps meant that either Khamenei had given the green lights or nuclear weapons scientists in order to get ahead of the boss so they could be in a position if he decided to move forward on this, were in a position and their timelines were therefore expedited.

劳伦斯·诺曼实际上写了一篇文章,这是在拜登执政期间,因为拜登国家情报总监实际上已经出来了,并且在他们的年度威胁评估中第一次删除了一条线,即伊朗目前没有致力于开发任何能够使其能够实际运载核弹头的能力,诺曼在《华尔街日报》上发表的文章是,实际上已经在冶金和计算机建模方面完成了初步工作,因此这些实际上是在 2015 年联合全面行动计划 T 节中定义的术语,该节定义了该部分的武器化、冶金和计算机建模是最初的一些步骤,因此国家情报总监在拜登领导下非常担心,这些最初的步骤意味着哈梅内伊或核武器科学家已经开绿灯,以便领先于老板,这样如果他决定在这方面取得进展,他们就可以处于有利地位,因此他们的时间表会加快。

Scott Horton24:29

Who’s the dog that didn’t bark there?

那里没有叫的狗是谁?

24:29 The current director of National Intelligence who issued her threat assessment, Trump’s director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard who issued her threat assessment in February that repeated the exact same language that from the National Intelligence estimate of 2007, and that the CIA and the NIE, the National Intelligence Council have reaffirmed repeatedly ever since then, which is that supreme leader has not decided to pursue nuclear weapons.

现任国家情报总监发布了威胁评估,特朗普的国家情报总监图尔西·加巴德(Tulsi Gabbard)在2月份发布了威胁评估,其中重复了2007年国家情报评估中完全相同的语言,中央情报局和国家情报局,国家情报委员会此后一再重申,最高领导人没有决定追求核武器。

He has not made the political decision to pursue nuclear weapons.

他尚未做出追求核武器的政治决定。

She testified in fact under oath in front of the senate in March and then according to CNN and the New York Times, there was a brand new assessment that was put together the week before the attack was launched reaffirming the same thing and at least in history, if you read it in Haaretz, Massad agreed with the CIA.

事实上,她三月份在参议院宣誓作证,然后据美国有线电视新闻网(CNN)和《纽约时报》报道,在袭击发生前一周,有一个全新的评估,重申了同样的事情,至少在历史上,如果你在《国土报》上读到,马萨德同意中央情报局的观点。

Mark Dubowitz25:19

I’d like to just sort of quote CIA director John Radcliffe because Scott brought up the CIA and the intelligence committee.

我想引用中央情报局局长约翰·拉德克利夫的话,因为斯科特提到了中央情报局和情报委员会。

25:19 I think Radcliffe had a good way of looking at this and that he said is when you’re in the 99 yard line as a football team, you have the intention of score a goal, and what he was actually pointing to is let’s not talk about this debate about whether Khamenei had given the order or not given the order, because Khamenei knows that if he gives an order, the US and Israeli intelligence community will pick up on that order and that will be the trigger for strikes.

我认为拉德克利夫对此有一个很好的看法,他说,当你作为一支足球队在 99 码线内时,你有进球的意图,他实际上指出的是,我们不要谈论关于哈梅内伊是否下达命令的争论,因为哈梅内伊知道,如果他下达命令,美国和以色列情报界将接受该命令,这将引发袭击。

What Radcliffe is saying is that Khamenei had built the nuclear weapons capability.

拉德克利夫所说的是哈梅内伊已经建立了核武器能力。

He’s at the 99 yard line, and both the CIA and European leaders, the European Intelligence Committee has said for yours that if Iran has that capability and they’re on the 99 yard line, at that point, it’s going to be too late to stop them.

他在 99 码线上,中央情报局和欧洲领导人,欧洲情报委员会都已经为你们说过,如果伊朗有这种能力,而且他们在 99 码线上,到那时,阻止他们就太晚了。

Once that decision is made to assemble the final warhead, which by the way is the final piece of what you need for a deliverable nuclear weapon.

一旦决定组装最终弹头,顺便说一下,这就是可运载核武器所需的最后一块。

Scott Horton26:18

That’s not true at all, right?

这根本不是真的,对吧?

26:18 They have to resort to a crude analogy about football yard lines because they can’t say the truth, which is that they had zero weapons grade uranium, they were not producing it.

他们不得不诉诸于足球场线的粗略类比,因为他们不能说出真相,即他们拥有零武器级铀,他们没有生产它。

They were trying to get the United States back in the deal that they are still officially within the JCPOA with the rest of the UN Security Council wherein they shipped all of their enriched uranium stockpile out of the country to France to be transferred to fuel rods.

他们试图让美国回到与联合国安理会其他成员签署的联合全面行动计划的正式范围内,其中他们将所有浓缩铀库存从该国运到法国,以转移到燃料棒中。

Their insistence was on their continued ability to enrich uranium, and so this goes to one of the things that he at least sort of brought up that deserves addressing.

他们坚持认为他们有继续浓缩铀的能力,因此这涉及到他至少提出的值得解决的问题之一。

When Trump came into power in 2017, he decided on this Israeli influence maximum pressure campaign, and he said the JCPOA was the worst deal in the history of any time any two men ever shook hands and all these kinds of things in his hyperbolic way, which of course made it very difficult for him to figure out a way to stay in the thing or to compromise along its lines.

当特朗普2017年上台时,他决定对以色列施加最大的影响力,他说联合全面行动计划是历史上任何两个人握手以来最糟糕的协议,以及所有这些以他夸张的方式做出的事情,这当然让他很难找到一种方法来留在这件事上或按照它的方式妥协。

31:00 Claims credit he was first and said this is a facility.

他声称自己是第一个,并说这是一个设施。

However, they were not in violation of their safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

然而,它们并没有违反与国际原子能机构签订的保障协定。

They were still six months away from introducing any nuclear material to that facility.

距离向该设施引入任何核材料还有六个月的时间。

When it was revealed, they weren’t in violation of anything.

当事情被揭露时,他们并没有违反任何规定。

And then on com we had a huge fight about this at the time.

然后我们当时在网络上为此发生了一场激烈的争吵。

The party line came down from all the government officials in the media that they had just exposed the facility there.

所有政府官员都在媒体上发布了党的路线,称他们刚刚曝光了那里的设施。

Com is Fordo.

Com 是福尔多。

Same thing.

同样的事情。

When in fact that wasn’t true.

事实上那不是真的。

The Iranians had announced to the IAEA that we had built a new facility here, and we are going to introduce nuclear material into it within six months.

伊朗人已向国际原子能机构宣布,我们在这里建造了一座新设施,我们将在六个月内向其中引入核材料。

Here’s your official notification.

这是您的官方通知。

And then a few days later, they just pretended to expose it, when it was the Iranians themselves who had admitted to it in going along with their obligations under their safeguards agreement.

几天后,他们只是假装揭露了这一点,而伊朗人自己也承认了这一点,并履行了保障协议规定的义务。

Lex Fridman36:39

Enough Already.

已经够了。

Scott Horton36:40

Thank you.

谢谢。

36:40 I have a solid dozen sources including Michael Gordon’s own colleague, Alissa Rubin at the New York Times, and many others where they found these bomb factories in Shiite Iraq.

我有十几个消息来源,包括迈克尔·戈登自己的同事、《纽约时报》的艾丽莎·鲁宾,以及许多其他在什叶派伊拉克发现这些炸弹工厂的人。

They were being made by Shiite Arab Iraqis.

它们是由什叶派阿拉伯伊拉克人制造的。

When David Petraeus was going to have a big press conference, and they laid out all the components, all the reporters gathered around, and they started noticing that the components said “Made in UAE.

当大卫·彼得雷乌斯(David Petraeus)要召开大型新闻发布会时,他们摆出了所有组件,所有记者都聚集在一起,他们开始注意到这些组件上写着“阿联酋制造”。

Made in Haditha.” That is Iraq.

哈迪萨制造。”那就是伊拉克。

In other words, there was no evidence whatsoever that these came from Iran.

换句话说,没有任何证据表明这些来自伊朗。

And then they called off the press conference.

然后他们取消了新闻发布会。

And Stephen Hadley, George Bush’s second national security advisor, admitted that we didn’t have the evidence that we needed to present that.

乔治·布什的第二任国家安全顾问斯蒂芬·哈德利承认,我们没有足够的证据来证明这一点。

And I also quote two, one Marine and one high-level Army intelligence officer in there, who were deeply involved in Iraq war reconfirming that there was never any evidence that these bombs were coming across from Iran or especially that then, even if they were, that that was at the direction of the Quds Force or the Ayatollah.

我还引用了其中两名深入参与伊拉克战争的两名海军陆战队高级情报官员和一名陆军高级情报官员的话,他们再次确认,从来没有任何证据表明这些炸弹来自伊朗,尤其是即使是来自伊朗,也是圣城军或阿亚图拉指挥的。

Lex Fridman39:21

First, let me say on the cover of Enough Already, “Devastating,” Daniel Ellsberg, “Outstanding,” Daniel L.

首先,让我在《Enough Already》的封面上说一下丹尼尔·艾尔斯伯格的“毁灭性”,以及丹尼尔·L·埃尔斯伯格的“杰出”。

39:21 Davis, “Essential,” Ron Paul.

戴维斯,“必不可少”,罗恩·保罗。

You are respected by a very large number of people.

你受到很多人的尊重。

You have decades of experience.

你有几十年的经验。

And the same thing with Mark.

马克也是如此。

Extremely respected by a very large number of people.

受到很多人的极度尊重。

Experts.

专家们。

There’s a lot of disagreements here, and we’re going to unfortunately leave a lot of the disagreements on the table for the aforementioned nuclear scientist to deconstruct later.

这里存在很多分歧,不幸的是,我们将把许多分歧留在桌面上,供上述核科学家稍后解构。

Let’s not try to …

我们不要尝试……

Every single claim does not have to be perfectly refuted.

不必完全反驳每一个主张。

Let’s just leave it on the table, the statements as they stand, and let’s try to also find things we kind of agree on and try …

让我们把它留在桌面上,保留现有的声明,让我们尝试找到我们同意的事情并尝试……

I know this might be difficult, but to steelman the other side.

我知道这可能很困难,但对另一边的钢铁侠来说。

That’s the thing I would love to ask you.

这就是我想问你的事情。

Scott Horton40:20

I think that, in my opening statement, quite frankly, I don’t carry any brief for the Ayatollah.

我认为,坦率地说,在我的开场白中,我没有向阿亚图拉做任何简报。

40:20 I’m a Texan.

我是德克萨斯人。

I don’t give a damn about what some Shiite theocrat says about nothing, right?

我一点也不在乎某些什叶派神权主义者所说的无事生非,对吧?

My interest is the people of this country and its future and what’s true.

我感兴趣的是这个国家的人民及其未来和真相。

And so I don’t mind telling you.

所以我不介意告诉你。

Even though the Iranians never said, “We’re building a latent nuclear weapons capability,” that’s clearly what they’re doing is showing that they can make a nuke, so don’t make me make a nuke.

尽管伊朗人从未说过,“我们正在建设潜在的核武器能力”,但这显然是他们正在做的事情,表明他们可以制造核武器,所以不要让我制造核武器。

That has been their position.

这就是他们的立场。

Their position has not been, “I’m making a nuke so I can wipe Israel off the map.” Their position has been, “Look, if you guys don’t attack us, we could just keep this civilian program the way it is.” And again, there’s always the implication that they’re just building up this uranium stockpile, but no, they’re not.

他们的立场并不是“我正在制造核武器,这样我就可以将以色列从地图上抹去”。他们的立场是,“听着,如果你们不攻击我们,我们就可以让这个民用项目保持原样。”再说一次,总有人暗示他们只是在建立铀库存,但不,他们没有。

Lex Fridman41:52

Point made.

点已成。

41:52 Let’s try, if possible, to keep it to a minute and two of back and forth-

如果可能的话,让我们尝试将时间控制在一分钟和两分钟内——

Scott Horton41:58

I said the problem is we’re talking about nuclear stuff, which is all very complicated, and most people don’t know much about it, which is what the war party is relying on, that people just hear nuclear, afraid, and mushroom cloud and give the benefit of the doubt to the hawks.

我说问题是我们正在谈论核问题,这一切都非常复杂,大多数人对此了解不多,而这正是战争一方所依赖的,人们只是听到核、恐惧和蘑菇云,并把怀疑的好处给了鹰派。

41:58 And so we got to get into the details of this stuff.

所以我们必须深入了解这些东西的细节。

Lex Fridman42:13

Details 100%, but I like the tension between two people with different perspectives exploring those details.

100% 细节,但我喜欢两个以不同视角探索这些细节的人之间的紧张关系。

42:13 And the more we can go back and forth, the better.

我们可以来回越多越好。

And there’s a lot of disagreement on the table.

桌面上存在很多分歧。

I personally enjoy learning from the disagreement, I think, a lot-

我个人认为,我非常喜欢从分歧中学习——

Scott Horton42:28

That was a very long list of claims that he made, though, where I felt I had to go down the list as much as I could because there was a lot-

不过,这是他提出的一长串主张,我觉得我必须尽可能详细地列出清单,因为有很多——

Lex Fridman42:34

I think you addressed maybe one or two claims, and it took 15 minutes.

我认为您可能解决了一两个索赔,并且花了 15 分钟。

42:34 That’s why I’m just commenting on-

这就是为什么我只是评论——

Scott Horton42:40

That’s fair.

这很公平。

Lex Fridman42:40

…

……

42:40 let’s do one at a time.

让我们一次做一个。

I like the tension of the debate of back and forth.

我喜欢来回辩论的紧张感。

That’s all.

就这样。

Mark, do you want to comment on stuff a little bit here?

马克,你想对这里的事情发表一些评论吗?

Pick whichever topic you want to go with here.

在这里选择您想要讨论的主题。

Mark Dubowitz42:51

There’s a lot there.

那里有很多。

42:51 Just couple of things, I think, that are worth your viewers knowing.

我认为,有几件事值得观众了解。

Because Scott’s right.

因为斯科特是对的。

I mean, the nuclear physics is complicated, and it’s also important.

我的意思是,核物理很复杂,但也很重要。

The Iranians have assembled about …

伊朗人聚集在一起……

They say about 15 to 17 bombs worth of 60% enriched uranium.

他们说大约有 15 到 17 枚炸弹,含有 60% 的浓缩铀。

And I think it’s always important for your listeners to understand, what does this all mean?

我认为让听众理解这一切意味着什么总是很重要的?

Enriched to 3.67%, to 20%, to 60%, and then to 90% weapons-grade uranium.

浓缩到3.67%、20%、60%,然后是90%武器级铀。

What does this actual process mean?

这个实际过程意味着什么?

Lex Fridman43:35

That’s fascinating.

这很有趣。

43:35 Yes.

是的。

Mark Dubowitz43:37

I think it’s, again, important just to understand the sort of basics before we jump into the allegations and claims and counterclaims.

我认为,在我们开始讨论指控、主张和反主张之前,了解这些基础知识很重要。

43:37 If you’re going to enrich to 3.67% enriched uranium, that’s for civilian nuclear power.

如果你要把浓缩铀浓缩到 3.67%,那是为了民用核电。

But when you do that, you’re basically 70% of what you need to get to weapons grade.

但当你这样做时,你基本上已经完成了达到武器等级所需的 70%。

You’ve done all the steps, 70% of the steps, in order to get to weapons-grade uranium.

为了获得武器级铀,您已经完成了所有步骤,70% 的步骤。

Scott Horton44:15

Medical isotopes.

医用同位素。

Mark Dubowitz44:16

Correct.

正确的。

44:16 Iran has a Tehran research reactor for medical isotopes.

伊朗拥有德黑兰医用同位素研究反应堆。

By the way, you can buy those isotopes from abroad, or you can produce them at home.

顺便说一句,你可以从国外购买这些同位素,也可以在国内生产。

If you’re going to enrich to 60%, then you’ve done 99% of what you need to get to weapons-grade uranium.

如果你打算浓缩到 60%,那么你已经完成了获得武器级铀所需的 99%。

And then 90% is quote weapons-grade uranium.

然后90%是武器级铀。

By the way, you can use 60% to actually deliver a crude nuclear device.

顺便说一句,你可以用 60% 来实际交付一个原始核装置。

That has been done in the past, but you want to get to quote 90%.

过去已经这样做过,但你想得到 90% 的报价。

That’s weapons-grade uranium, as Scott’s defining it.

正如斯科特所定义的那样,这就是武器级铀。

But just again, to clarify, these huge stockpiles of 60% that Iran has accumulated, this 16, 17 bombs worth of 60%, is 99% of what they need for weapons-grade.

但再次澄清一下,伊朗积累的60%的巨大库存,这16、17枚炸弹的价值为60%,是他们武器级所需的99%。

I just wanted to explain that.

我只是想解释一下。

Scott Horton45:03

But when you say …

但当你说……

45:03 You’re saying if you include the mining, the refining of the ore into yellow cake, the transformation of that into uranium hexafluoride gas, the driving of it in a truck over to the centrifuge, and then spinning it, this is where we get this 90% number from, right?

你是说,如果你把采矿、将矿石精炼成黄饼、将其转化为六氟化铀气体、用卡车将其开到离心机,然后将其旋转,这就是我们得到这个 90% 的数字的地方,对吗?

In place of 90% enriched uranium or 80% enriched uranium.

代替90%浓缩铀或80%浓缩铀。

It’s 90% of the way on some chart that includes picking up a shovel and beginning to mine.

在某些图表上,这已经完成了 90%,包括拿起铲子并开始采矿。

Right?

正确的?

Mark Dubowitz45:34

Again, just to clarify, I just think it’s important to understand the definition of terms.

再次澄清一下,我认为理解术语的定义很重要。

45:34 Once you have 60% enriched uranium, you’ve done 99% of all the steps, including some of the steps that Scott’s talking about.

一旦你拥有了 60% 的浓缩铀,你就完成了 99% 的所有步骤,包括斯科特谈到的一些步骤。

You’ve done 99% of what you need to have weapons-grade-

你已经完成了武器级所需任务的 99%——

Scott Horton45:48

That’s just meaningless.

那毫无意义。

Lex Fridman45:49

Why is that meaningless?

为什么这毫无意义?

Scott Horton45:51

Well, as I’ve already established numerous times here, under the JCPOA, they shipped out every bit of their enriched uranium stockpile.

嗯,正如我已经多次指出的那样,根据联合全面行动计划,他们运出了所有浓缩铀库存。

45:51 The French turned it into fuel rods and then shipped it back.

法国人把它变成燃料棒然后运回来。

That’s the deal they’re trying to get the US back into and were obviously clearly willing to do.

这就是他们试图让美国重新加入的协议,而且显然他们也愿意这么做。

And again, the only reason they were enriching up to 60% was to put the pressure on the Americans to go ahead and get back into the deal.

再说一次,他们致富高达 60% 的唯一原因是向美国人施加压力,要求他们继续达成协议。

And bad bet.

而且赌注不好。

It gave them an excuse to bomb based on the idea that people are going to listen to him, pretend that somehow that’s 99% of the way to the bomb, when you’re including driving to the mine and mining it and converting it to yellow cake and all these other things.

这给了他们轰炸的借口,因为人们会听他的,假装这就是 99% 的炸弹方法,当你开车去矿井开采它并将其转化为黄蛋糕和所有其他东西时。

Mark Dubowitz46:28

You’re going to have a deliverable nuclear weapon, so you need the weapons-grade uranium.

你将拥有可运载的核武器,所以你需要武器级铀。

46:28 And just to repeat, they have multiple bombs worth of the 60% enriched uranium, which, again, is 99% of the steps you need to take for weapons grade.

再说一遍,他们拥有多枚相当于 60% 浓缩铀的炸弹,这也是武器级所需步骤的 99%。

They’re very close to weapons grade.

它们非常接近武器等级。

It’s 1% more that they need to do to enrich to weapons grade.

他们需要多做 1% 才能丰富到武器等级。

Scott Horton48:35

If I can jump in here on this point, too, and I’ll turn it back over to you, but I actually have a bit of a correction to make.

如果我也能在这里谈谈这一点,我会把它转回给你,但实际上我有一些更正要做。

48:35 For anyone who’s seen me on Piers Morgan or a Saagar and Krystal, I actually oversimplified and made a mistake.

对于任何看过我在 Piers Morgan 或 Saagar and Krystal 上的人来说,我实际上过于简单化并犯了一个错误。

I’ve been off of the Iran nuclear beat for a little while doing other things, and so I’d like to take this opportunity to clarify, and I’m going to try to clarify with them on their shows, too, was I have …

我已经离开伊朗核问题一段时间了,而在做其他事情,所以我想借此机会澄清一下,我也将尝试在他们的节目中向他们澄清,我是否……

An old friend of mine used to make nuclear bombs, Gordon Prather, and I only just found out that he died two years ago, unfortunately.

我的一位老朋友戈登·普拉瑟曾经制造过核弹,我直到两年前才得知他不幸去世了。

He used to write for us at antiwar.com.

他曾经在 antiwar.com 上为我们撰稿。

He’s a brilliant nuclear physicist and H-bomb developer, and he had really taught me all about this stuff.

他是一位出色的核物理学家和氢弹开发商,他确实教会了我所有这些东西。

Lex Fridman50:11

They could drop it as a bomb?

他们可以把它当作炸弹扔掉吗?

Scott Horton50:13

They could test it in the desert and beat their chest, but essentially that’s all they could do.

他们可以在沙漠中进行测试并捶胸顿足,但基本上这就是他们所能做的。

Mark Dubowitz50:16

Or you could drop it from a plane like we did, as Scott said, in with Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

或者你也可以像我们在广岛和长崎那样,把它从飞机上扔下来,正如斯科特所说。

Scott Horton50:22

Well, very slim chance of Iranian heavy bombers getting through Israeli airspace, but anyway.

好吧,伊朗重型轰炸机穿过以色列领空的可能性很小,但无论如何。

Mark Dubowitz50:49

The blueprints were given.

蓝图已经给出。

50:49 Just to clarify, it’s just interesting just in the terms of the history of proliferation.

需要澄清的是,就扩散历史而言,这很有趣。

Iran’s initial nuclear program, which is built on centrifuges, as Scott and I have been talking about …

正如斯科特和我一直在谈论的那样,伊朗最初的核计划是建立在离心机基础上的……

That was actually given to …

那实际上是给了……

The designs of that were given to them by AQ Khan who was really the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, and he actually stole those designs from the Dutch and handed it to the Iranians.

该设计是由 AQ Khan 提供给他们的,他实际上是巴基斯坦核计划之父,他实际上从荷兰人那里窃取了这些设计并将其交给了伊朗人。

He also handed it to the North Koreans and the Libyans and others.

他还将其交给了朝鲜、利比亚和其他国家。

They were able to illicitly acquire this technology, or at least the blueprints for this technology, from the father of the Pakistani bomb.

他们能够从巴基斯坦炸弹之父那里非法获取这项技术,或者至少是这项技术的蓝图。

I think that’s an interesting point, but if you don’t mind-

我认为这是一个有趣的观点,但如果你不介意的话——

Scott Horton51:31

As I said earlier, because Bill Clinton clamped down on the Chinese and wouldn’t let them sell or anyone else wouldn’t let them sell them light water reactors, so then they went to AQ Khan and bought the stuff on the black market.

正如我之前所说,因为比尔·克林顿(Bill Clinton)压制中国人,不让他们出售轻水反应堆,或者其他任何人也不让他们向他们出售轻水反应堆,所以他们就去找AQ Khan并在黑市上购买了这些东西。

Mark Dubowitz51:41

And they obviously bought heavy water reactors from the Russians, which they’ve been using for electricity.

他们显然从俄罗斯人那里购买了重水反应堆,并一直用它来发电。

51:41 I want to just get to the second thing.

我想谈谈第二件事。

I think it’s just important for listeners to know, and then I want to get to JCPOA-

我认为让听众知道这一点很重要,然后我想谈谈联合全面行动计划——

Scott Horton51:52

I was in the middle of saying, though, when you’re trying to make a uranium implosion bomb or a plutonium implosion bomb, it’s a much more difficult task than putting together a gun-type nuke.

不过,我想说的是,当你试图制造铀内爆炸弹或钚内爆炸弹时,这比组装枪型核武器要困难得多。

51:52 Takes an extraordinary amount of testing.

需要进行大量的测试。

And that’s why he repeated, probably unknowingly, some false propaganda about Iran having this advanced testing facility.

这就是为什么他可能在不知情的情况下重复了一些关于伊朗拥有这种先进测试设施的虚假宣传。

I think he was implying …

我认为他是在暗示……

Correct me if I’m wrong.

如果我错了请纠正我。

I’m pretty sure you’re implying at Parchin that they were testing these implosion systems, but that’s completely debunked.

我很确定你是在暗示 Parchin 他们正在测试这些内爆系统,但这完全被揭穿了。

It’s completely false.

这是完全错误的。

Mark Dubowitz54:05

First of all, I’m glad Scott knows about what’s going on at Parchin because the IAEA doesn’t, and they’ve been asking the Iranians-

首先,我很高兴斯科特知道帕尔钦发生的事情,因为国际原子能机构不知道,而且他们一直在问伊朗人-

Scott Horton54:10

That’s not true.

那不是真的。

54:10 That’s not true.

那不是真的。

The Iranians told the IAEA, “You can inspect any five out of 10 facilities here carte blanche.

伊朗人告诉国际原子能机构,“你可以全权检查这里十个设施中的任何五个。

Go ahead.” And they did and found nothing.

继续吧。”他们确实这么做了,但什么也没发现。

Then they made up the lies about the implosion chamber later.

后来他们又编造了有关内爆室的谎言。

And the IAEA …

还有国际原子能机构……

Again, Robert Kelly is the American IAEA guy.

罗伯特·凯利再次是美国原子能机构的负责人。

Debunked that in the Christian Science Monitor.

在《基督教科学箴言报》中揭穿了这一点。

Mark Dubowitz54:27

All right.

好的。

54:27 I want to just, again, just put it out there for your listeners.

我想再一次把它放在那里给你们的听众。

They should just Google AMAD, A-M-A-D, program, and they should learn about the AMAD program because it’s detailed in US government documents, experts in Iran’s nuclear program, including David Albright who actually saw the archive, went in there, wrote a whole book on it, and there’s a lot of detail about how Iran had an active nuclear weapons program called AMAD to build five nuclear weapons.

他们应该用谷歌搜索 AMAD、A-M-A-D 计划,他们应该了解 AMAD 计划,因为美国政府文件中有详细介绍,伊朗核计划专家,包括实际看到档案的大卫·奥尔布赖特 (David Albright),进入那里,写了一整本书,其中有很多关于伊朗如何拥有一个名为 AMAD 的活跃核武器计划来制造五枚核武器的细节。

Scott Horton59:23

Somebody give me a screenshot of this.

有人给我这个的截图吗?

59:23 Give me a pound, dude.

给我一磅,伙计。

Mark Dubowitz59:26

There we go.

我们开始吧。

Lex Fridman59:27

Agreement.

协议。

Mark Dubowitz59:28

There we go.

我们开始吧。

Scott Horton59:28

That’s fine.

没关系。

Lex Fridman59:29

That makes my heart feel-

这让我的心感到——

Scott Horton59:30

And I think the Ayatollah would’ve gone for it too.

我认为阿亚图拉也会这么做。

Mark Dubowitz59:32

Well, I’m not sure if he would’ve, but let’s …

好吧,我不确定他是否愿意,但让我们……

59:32 Just a little bit of history.

只是一点点历史。

I think it’s just useful for the viewers to know, again, the context, especially when Scott and I agree.

我认为这对于观众来说再次了解背景很有用,尤其是当斯科特和我同意的时候。

A process was begun-

一个过程开始了——

Lex Fridman59:43

I’m loving this so much.

我非常喜欢这个。

Mark Dubowitz59:44

…

……

59:44 by the Trump administration.

由特朗普政府。

Trump appointed Brian Hook, or Secretary Pompeo actually appointed Brian Hook, who was the lead Iran envoy, and he began a process of talking to the Europeans.

特朗普任命了布莱恩·胡克,或者国务卿蓬佩奥实际上任命了伊朗首席特使布莱恩·胡克,他开始了与欧洲人对话的过程。

Now, the Europeans actually rejected this idea.

现在,欧洲人实际上拒绝了这个想法。

And so at some point Trump said, “Look, if the Europeans aren’t prepared to get onside, then I’m out of the deal.

因此,特朗普在某个时候说:“听着,如果欧洲人不准备加入,那么我就退出这项协议。

I’m out of the deal.” And if you’re interested, I can talk about why I thought we should have stayed in the deal.

我退出了这笔交易。”如果你有兴趣,我可以谈谈为什么我认为我们应该留在这笔交易中。

Because I thought it gave us some important restrictions in the short term, certain leverage, but Trump decides to withdraw from that agreement because he recognizes that the fatal flaw of the agreement, the fatal flaws of the agreement are, one, giving them any enrichment capability, especially at an industrial size, within 15 years.

因为我认为它在短期内给了我们一些重要的限制,一定的影响力,但特朗普决定退出该协议,因为他认识到该协议的致命缺陷,该协议的致命缺陷是,第一,在15年内赋予他们任何浓缩能力,特别是工业规模的浓缩能力。

Scott Horton1:00:39

I’d like to go ahead and quickly accuse the FBI and the CIA of framing Trump for treason with Russia and pushing the Russiagate hoax.

我想继续快速指责联邦调查局和中央情报局指责特朗普背叛俄罗斯并推动“通俄门”骗局。

1:00:39 I’m trying to agree with my friend here.

我试图同意我朋友的观点。

Because what it is is that that completely ruined Donald Trump’s ability to engage in real diplomacy with Russia for his entire first term.

因为这完全毁掉了唐纳德·特朗普在其整个第一个任期内与俄罗斯进行真正外交的能力。

Certainly, for the first three years of it, he was completely handcuffed.

当然,在最初的三年里,他是完全被戴上手铐的。

It was terrible, as I’m sure you’re well aware, for the future, now our past, and current history of Ukraine, as well as for this deal too.

我相信你很清楚,这对未来、我们的过去、乌克兰当前的历史以及这笔交易来说都是可怕的。

Mark Dubowitz1:01:39

Actually, can I just say one thing interesting?

其实我能说一件有趣的事吗?

1:01:39 And again, I think it’s going to be a later topic, and so it’s going to be a provocative statement, but I think let’s put it on the table.

再说一遍,我认为这将是一个稍后的话题,因此这将是一个挑衅性的声明,但我认为让我们把它放在桌面上。

I absolutely agree with Scott.

我完全同意斯科特的观点。

I think it was a travesty of the accusations against Donald Trump as a Russian agent.

我认为这是对唐纳德·特朗普作为俄罗斯特工指控的嘲讽。

I mean, completely debunked, but it did …

我的意思是,完全被揭穿了,但它确实……

I think it paralyzed.

我觉得是瘫痪了

1:02:00 I mean, completely debunked.

我的意思是,完全被揭穿了。

But it did, I think it paralyzed his presidency for two, two and a half years.

但它确实发生了,我认为这使他的总统任期瘫痪了两年、两年半。

I agree with Scott.

我同意斯科特的观点。

The idea that you would accuse the President of the United States of being a foreign agent for Vladimir Putin, I think is unfounded.

我认为你指责美国总统是弗拉基米尔·普京的外国代理人的想法是没有根据的。

And I thought at the time, disgraceful, and I thought it was really important.

我当时就想,这很丢脸,但我觉得这真的很重要。

I think Scott did really good work in debunking that.

我认为斯科特在揭穿这一点方面做得非常好。

Scott Horton1:02:54

Now, I was making a point.

现在,我正在表达一个观点。

1:02:54 That’s hyperbole, making a point.

这是夸张的说法,有道理。

But he did.

但他做到了。

In fact, could you Google this for me?

事实上,你能帮我谷歌一下吗?

Because I always forget exactly how many hundreds of millions of dollars that he took from Sheldon Adelson and Miriam Adelson.

因为我总是忘记他到底从谢尔登·阿德尔森和米里亚姆·阿德尔森那里拿走了多少亿美元。

Mark Dubowitz1:03:04

Who are Americans by the way.

顺便说一下谁是美国人。

Scott Horton1:03:06

Who are Americans.

谁是美国人。

1:03:06 Who, Sheldon Adelson said his only regret in life is that he served in the American Army instead of the IDF, and said America should nuke Iran in order to get them to give up their nuclear weapons.

谢尔登阿德尔森说,他一生中唯一的遗憾是他在美国陆军服役,而不是在以色列国防军服役,并表示美国应该对伊朗进行核打击,以让他们放弃核武器。

He said, “I have one issue, one.

他说:“我有一个问题,一个。

Israel.

以色列。

And they gave Trump hundreds of millions of dollars over three campaigns.” That’s not just a, “Geez, I really hope you’ll think of me in the future.”

他们在三场竞选活动中为特朗普提供了数亿美元。”这不仅仅是“天啊,我真的希望你将来能想到我。”

Lex Fridman1:03:27

Scott, first of all, a couple of things.

斯科特,首先,有几件事。

1:03:27 So one, there’s a lot of people that are friends with Trump and try to gain influence.

因此,有很多人是特朗普的朋友,并试图获得影响力。

I believe that Trump, as an American, is making his own decisions.

我相信特朗普作为一个美国人,正在做出自己的决定。

Let’s, for the purpose of this conversation, just focus on that and see what are the right decisions and what are the wrong decisions, and maybe-

为了这次对话的目的,让我们专注于这一点,看看什么是正确的决定,什么是错误的决定,也许-

Scott Horton1:03:45

I wonder what decisions I could get you to make if I gave you hundreds of millions of dollars.

我想知道如果我给你数亿美元,我能让你做出什么决定。

Lex Fridman1:03:49

Well, me personally, you couldn’t give me…

好吧,就我个人而言,你不能给我……

1:03:49 It doesn’t matter.

没关系。

Scott Horton1:03:52

I couldn’t get you to drop in on a vert ramp or nothing for a hundred million bucks.

我无法花一亿美元让你去垂直坡道或什么都没有。

Lex Fridman1:03:56

Nothing.

没有什么。

1:03:56 You cannot control my decisions with money.

你无法用金钱来控制我的决定。

Scott Horton1:03:59

It’s the American system, Lex.

这是美国的制度,莱克斯。

1:03:59 That’s how it works.

这就是它的工作原理。

It’s money.

这是钱。

Lex Fridman1:04:02

I appreciate that, yeah.

我很欣赏这一点,是的。

Scott Horton1:04:03

Right.

正确的。

Lex Fridman1:04:03

We can go down that route.

我们可以沿着那条路走。

Scott Horton1:04:04

It’s the same if we were talking about Archer Daniels Midland company throwing hundreds of millions of dollars around.

如果我们谈论阿彻丹尼尔斯米德兰公司投入数亿美元,情况也是如此。

1:04:04 They get policies based on their hundreds of millions of dollars.

他们根据自己的数亿美元获得保单。

The squeaky wheel gets the grease, right?

吱吱作响的轮子沾上了油脂,对吗?

All that.

所有这些。

Mark Dubowitz1:04:14

So Lex, I think you’re right.

所以莱克斯,我认为你是对的。

1:04:14 I mean, I think Elon Musk spent what, $400 million helping Trump get elected.

我的意思是,我认为埃隆·马斯克花了 4 亿美元帮助特朗普当选。

And obviously, there are a number of philanthropists.

显然,有很多慈善家。

I think, clearly his son, Don Jr’s had a lot of influence in who gets selected in these positions in the Pentagon, NSC, and Tucker Carlson has had a lot of influence.

我认为,显然他的儿子小唐对五角大楼、国家安全委员会这些职位的选择有很大的影响力,而塔克·卡尔森也有很大的影响力。

So I think as you say, he surrounds himself with people who have certain ideas, ideologies, policies.

所以我认为正如你所说,他周围都是有某些想法、意识形态和政策的人。

The President makes his own decisions.

总统自己做出决定。

Scott Horton1:05:10

It’s a Mossad officer’s accusation.

这是摩萨德官员的指控。

Mark Dubowitz1:05:12

Yeah.

是的。

Scott Horton1:05:13

Victor Ostrovsky, is his name.

维克多·奥斯特洛夫斯基,是他的名字。

Mark Dubowitz1:05:15

Yeah.

是的。

1:05:15 I know exactly who he is, and he has been widely discredited and having an ax to grind with Mossad.

我确切地知道他是谁,他已经被广泛抹黑,并与摩萨德有别扭的关系。

But anyway, not only ’83, but all through the 90s, the 2000s, 2010s, 2020s, there have been hundreds of attacks, of assassinations, of hostage taking.

但无论如何,不​​仅是83年,整个90年代、2000年代、2010年代、2020年代,都发生了数百起袭击、暗杀、劫持人质事件。

There are thousands Americans who have been killed and maimed by the regime.

有数千名美国人被该政权杀害和残害。

Scott Horton1:05:41

Can you be specific what you’re talking about here?

您能具体说明一下您在这里谈论的是什么吗?

Mark Dubowitz1:05:43

Yeah, I mean, I can give you a whole list.

是的,我的意思是,我可以给你一份完整的清单。

Scott Horton1:05:44

Sure.

当然。

Mark Dubowitz1:05:45

Literally, I’m happy to pull it up.

从字面上看,我很高兴把它拉起来。

1:05:45 Lex, I shared it with you.

莱克斯,我和你分享了。

It’s a long list of attacks all through the 80s and 90s.

这是整个 80 年代和 90 年代的一长串攻击。

Lex Fridman1:05:46

Yeah, yeah.

是啊是啊。

1:05:46 You sent me a link.

你给我发了一个链接。

Mark Dubowitz1:05:52

I mean, everything from the Khobar Towers.

我的意思是,来自胡拜尔塔的一切。

Scott Horton1:05:57

The Khobar Towers was Al-Qaeda.

胡拜尔塔是基地组织的基地。

Mark Dubowitz1:05:57

Well, can I-

好吧,我可以——

Scott Horton1:05:59

That was Osama bin Laden and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

那是奥萨马·本·拉登和哈立德·谢赫·穆罕默德。

Lex Fridman1:06:01

Let him lay it out, please.

请让他把它摆出来。

Scott Horton1:06:02

All right.

好的。

1:06:02 Let’s hear them.

让我们听听他们的声音。

Mark Dubowitz1:06:03

Yeah.

是的。

Scott Horton1:06:04

I got my pen in my hand.

我手里拿着笔。

1:06:04 Go ahead.

前进。

Mark Dubowitz1:06:05

Yeah, and again, according to US intelligence findings, it was actually Hezbollah that worked with Al-Qaeda, trained Al-Qaeda in that attack in the Khobar Towers.

是的,根据美国情报部门的调查结果,实际上是真主党与基地组织合作,在胡拜尔塔袭击事件中训练了基地组织。

1:06:05 They were kidnapping our diplomats in Beirut.

他们正在绑架我们驻贝鲁特的外交官。

They launched attacks against our soldiers while in Iraq.

他们在伊拉克对我们的士兵发动了袭击。

The notion that somehow-

不知怎的,这个想法——

Scott Horton1:06:27

I already debunked that.

我已经揭穿了这一点。

Mark Dubowitz1:06:27

No, I don’t think, well, you say you debunked it, you just made your claim.

不,我不认为,你说你揭穿了它,你只是提出了你的主张。

1:06:27 But those were Iran-backed militias, backed by Qasem Soleimani, who Scott referred to, who was the commander of the IRGC Quds Force, who supplied them with those IEDs or those EFPs, actually, those explosives.

但这些都是伊朗支持的民兵组织,得到了斯科特提到的卡西姆·苏莱马尼(Qasem Soleimani)的支持,他是伊斯兰革命卫队圣城部队的指挥官,为他们提供了那些简易爆炸装置或电子爆炸装置,实际上是那些爆炸物。

Scott Horton1:06:49

[inaudible 01:06:49].

[听不清 01:06:49]。

Mark Dubowitz1:06:48

Well, again, this has been all confirmed.

好吧,这一切都已经被证实了。

Scott Horton1:06:52

Why don’t you search Alyssa Rubin, New York Times EFP factory?

为什么不搜索《纽约时报》EFP 工厂的 Alyssa Rubin?

1:06:52 Or you can look in the Christian Science Monitor for Operation Eagle Claw where-

或者你可以在基督教科学箴言报中查看鹰爪行动,其中-

Mark Dubowitz1:06:52

Yeah.

是的。

Scott Horton1:06:59

…

……

1:06:59 they found these things.

他们发现了这些东西。

Mark Dubowitz1:07:01

Yeah.

是的。

Scott Horton1:07:02

It’s easy to find in my book.

在我的书中很容易找到。

1:07:02 You can flip right to Soda Straws and EFPs.

您可以向右翻到汽水吸管和 EFP。

And you see where I have all my citations for the solid dozen American newspaper reporters who were embedded with American soldiers who found these factories in Iraqi Shiaistan with Iraqi Arabs working the machines, not Iran.

你看,我在哪里引用了十几名与美国士兵在一起的美国报纸记者,他们在伊拉克什叶斯坦发现了这些工厂,而伊拉克阿拉伯人在操作机器,而不是伊朗。

Mark Dubowitz1:07:23

So I’d like your viewers to Google not just a couple of sources, but actually Google the US government reports that did a whole after-action report on the Iraq War.

所以我希望你们的观众不仅谷歌几个来源,而且实际上谷歌美国政府的报告,该报告对伊拉克战争做了完整的事后报告。

1:07:23 All the mistakes were made in the Iraq war, and there were legion of mistakes made.

所有的错误都是在伊拉克战争中犯下的,而且犯下的错误还有很多。

But it was very clear that Iran had actually provided the technology, the training, the funding for these Iran-backed militias to kill Americans.

但很明显,伊朗实际上为这些伊朗支持的民兵杀害美国人提供了技术、培训和资金。

I mean, I could see, Scott-

我是说,我看得出来,斯科特-

Scott Horton1:07:48

In fact they learned a method from Lebanese, Hezbollah that got it from the IRA.

事实上,他们从黎巴嫩真主党那里学到了一种从爱尔兰共和军那里得到的方法。

Mark Dubowitz1:07:52

Well-

嗯-

Scott Horton1:07:52

They didn’t even get the technique from the Iranians at all.

他们甚至根本没有从伊朗人那里得到这项技术。

Mark Dubowitz1:07:55

Yeah.

是的。

1:07:55 So Lebanese, Hezbollah, as I’m sure all your listeners know, has been trained, financed-

所以黎巴嫩真主党,我相信你们所有的听众都知道,已经接受过培训、资助——

Scott Horton1:08:00

It’s true-

这是真的——

Mark Dubowitz1:08:01

…

……

1:08:01 and supported by-

并由以下机构支持——

Scott Horton1:08:01

…

……

but they got it from the IRA.

但他们是从爱尔兰共和军那里得到的。

Mark Dubowitz1:08:01

…

……

Iran for many years.

伊朗很多年了。

Scott Horton1:08:02

The copper core bombs-

铜芯炸弹——

Mark Dubowitz1:08:02

Yeah.

是的。

Scott Horton1:08:03

…

……

1:08:03 and that design did not come from Persia.

而且这个设计并非来自波斯。

Mark Dubowitz1:08:05

Yeah.

是的。

1:08:05 So again, I think we all admit, Scott admits as well that Hezbollah was trained, financed, and supported by Iran.

所以,我想我们都承认,斯科特也承认真主党受到伊朗的训练、资助和支持。

Hezbollah’s been responsible for many of these terrorist attacks.

真主党对许多恐怖袭击负有责任。

Scott Horton1:08:15

Where does Hezbollah come from?

真主党从哪里来?

1:08:15 It’s a reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon where they went after the PLO and horribly mistreated the poor local Iraqi Shiites until they rose up and created these militias to fight in self-defense.

这是对以色列入侵黎巴嫩的反应,他们追捕巴解组织,并可怕地虐待当地贫穷的伊拉克什叶派,直到他们起来并创建这些民兵进行自卫。

Mark Dubowitz1:08:26

Again-

再说一遍——

Scott Horton1:08:26

That’s where Hezbollah comes from.

这就是真主党的由来。

Mark Dubowitz1:08:27

Hezbollah was actually created by the IROGC before the Israeli invasion.

真主党实际上是由伊斯兰革命卫队在以色列入侵之前创建的。

1:08:27 Why-

为什么-

Scott Horton1:08:30

This was the CIA’s Bin Laden unit.

这是中央情报局的本拉登单位。

1:08:30 Mike Scheuer says it was Osama bin Laden and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed that did the Khobar Towers attack.

迈克·肖尔表示,是奥萨马·本·拉登和哈立德·谢赫·穆罕默德发动了胡拜尔塔袭击事件。

And who did they kill?

他们杀了谁?

They killed 19 American airmen who were stationed there to bomb Iraq from bases in Saudi Arabia under the Israeli insisted upon Dual Containment Policy-

在以色列坚持双重遏制政策的情况下,他们杀死了19名驻扎在那里从沙特阿拉伯基地轰炸伊拉克的美国飞行员——

Mark Dubowitz1:08:49

What’s amazing-

有什么了不起的——

Scott Horton1:08:49

…

……

1:08:49 of Bill Clinton.

比尔·克林顿的。

Mark Dubowitz1:08:49

What’s amazing, Scott-

令人惊奇的是,斯科特——

Scott Horton1:08:50

That came from Yitzhak Shamir who had sent his man Martin Indyk to work for Bill Clinton and push the Dual Containment Policy, is where that comes from in the first place.

这来自伊扎克·沙米尔(Yitzhak Shamir),他派他的手下马丁·因迪克(Martin Indyk)为比尔·克林顿(Bill Clinton)工作并推行双重遏制政策,这就是它的首要来源。

1:08:50 The main reason Al-Qaeda turned against the United States, and the Khobar Towers attack was Bin Laden, and he bragged about it himself to Abdel Bari Atwan, the reporter from Al-Quds, Al-Arabi in London, and spent days with him and bragged all about it and blessed the martyrs and the rest of that and has widely discredited the claim that it was Iranian-backed Shiite Hezbollah that did the Khobar Towers attack.

基地组织转而反对美国以及胡拜尔塔袭击事件的主要原因是本·拉登,他亲自向伦敦《圣城报》的记者阿卜杜勒·巴里·阿特万吹嘘此事,并与他一起度过了几天,吹嘘这一切,祝福烈士和其他人,并广泛否认伊朗支持的什叶派真主党发动了胡拜尔塔袭击事件。

Mark Dubowitz1:09:51

So what we know now from Scott, because he’s given certainly a lot of context to how he actually sees things, is here’s who lies to you and here’s who doesn’t.

所以我们现在从斯科特那里知道,因为他确实给出了很多关于他如何看待事物的背景,谁对你撒谎,谁没有撒谎。

1:09:51 US government lies to you.

美国政府对你撒谎。

Israeli government lies to you.

以色列政府对你撒谎。

The Israelis clearly lie to you.

以色列人显然对你撒谎。

Mendacious bunch.

一群虚伪的人。

Saudis lie to you.

沙特人对你撒谎。

But you know who doesn’t lie to you, actually?

但你知道谁不会对你撒谎吗?

Hezbollah doesn’t lie to you.

真主党不会对你撒谎。

AL-Qaeda doesn’t lie to you.

基地组织不会对你撒谎。

Scott Horton1:10:16

I didn’t cite Al-Qaeda or-

我没有引用基地组织或-

Mark Dubowitz1:10:17

The Ayatollah-

阿亚图拉——

Scott Horton1:10:17

…

……

1:10:17 or Hezbollah.

或真主党。

I cited Osama himself.

我引用了奥萨马本人的话。

Mark Dubowitz1:10:18

And the Ayatollah of Iran won’t lie to you.

伊朗阿亚图拉不会对你撒谎。

Scott Horton1:10:20

I cited Michael Scheuer, the chief of the CIA’s bin Laden unit.

我引用了中央情报局本拉登部门负责人迈克尔·肖尔的说法。

1:10:20 Right?

正确的?

Mark Dubowitz1:10:24

So make it clear here.

所以这里说清楚。

1:10:24 The Iranians-

伊朗人——

Scott Horton1:10:25

[inaudible 01:10:25] Hezbollah-

[听不清 01:10:25] 真主党-

Mark Dubowitz1:10:27

The Iranians-

伊朗人——

Scott Horton1:10:28

Did you get that?

你明白了吗?

Lex Fridman1:10:28

Scott, straight up, I hear you, but you’re interrupting and please, just honestly, it’s not about the content, but honestly.

斯科特,说实话,我听到了你的声音,但你打断了,请说实话,这不是内容的问题,而是诚实的。

Scott Horton1:10:34

How come you’re not saying to him, isn’t that weird that you just said he trusts Hezbollah even though he didn’t say anything about trusting Hezbollah?

你为什么不对他说,你刚才说他信任真主党,尽管他没有说任何关于信任真主党的事情,这不是很奇怪吗?

Lex Fridman1:10:39

I’m not calling out the content.

我不会喊出内容。

1:10:39 I’m calling out the interruptions.

我正在大声疾呼。

He hasn’t interrupted you.

他没有打扰你。

It’s great.

这很棒。

I’m loving the back and forth.

我喜欢来回。

Scott Horton1:10:45

Yeah.

是的。

Lex Fridman1:10:46

It is great.

太棒了。

1:10:46 But just a little less talking over each other.

但只是少了一点彼此的闲聊。

That’s all.

就这样。

Mark Dubowitz1:10:49

Yeah.

是的。

1:10:49 So I mean, again, the sort of view of the regime in Iran, and I think Scott wisely said at the beginning of this discussion, what did you say?

所以我的意思是,再说一遍,对伊朗政权的看法,我认为斯科特在讨论开始时明智地说,你说什么?

“I don’t have any love for the Ayatollah.

“我对阿亚图拉没有任何爱。

I’m a Texan.

我是德克萨斯人。

I don’t have any love for the Ayatollah in Iran.” And yet, despite the fact, Scott, doesn’t have love for the Ayatollah, I agree with him and I think he’s being sincere, in every discussion that we’ve had on every topic, it’s always about everyone’s lying except the Ayatollah in Iran.

我对伊朗的阿亚图拉没有任何爱。”然而,尽管事实上,斯科特并不爱阿亚图拉,但我同意他的观点,我认为他是真诚的,在我们就每个话题进行的每一次讨论中,除了伊朗的阿亚图拉之外,每个人都在撒谎。

He’s not lying about having a nuclear weapons program.

他并没有在核武器计划方面撒谎。

Lex Fridman1:14:59

Actually, that’s a good cue.

事实上,这是一个很好的暗示。

Mark Dubowitz1:15:01

Take a bathroom break.

上个厕所休息一下。

Lex Fridman1:15:01

Let’s take a bath and break.

我们去洗个澡​​休息一下吧。

Mark Dubowitz1:15:02

All right.

好的。

Lex Fridman1:15:04

Okay.

好的。

1:15:04 We took a quick break and now, Scott.

我们短暂休息了一下,现在,斯科特。

Scott Horton1:15:07

Yeah.

是的。

1:15:07 Okay.

好的。

So a few things there.

所以有一些事情。

First of all, on Ahmad, the pre-2003 nuclear weapons research, the CIA estimate in 2007 concluded that all research had stopped in 2003, and Seymour Hersh reported that the reasoning behind that was mainly that America had gotten rid of Saddam Hussein for them.

首先,关于艾哈迈德,2003年之前的核武器研究,中央情报局2007年的估计结论是所有研究在2003年就停止了,西摩·赫什报告说,其背后的原因主要是美国为他们除掉了萨达姆·侯赛因。

Now, in Gareth Porter’s book Manufactured Crisis, he shows that the major conclusion that the DIA had made, that the Iranians were researching nuclear weapons, was based on some invoices that they had intercepted for some dual use materials, some specialty magnets and things that they thought, “Boy, this looks like this could be part of a weaponization program, a secret program here.”

现在,在加雷斯·波特的《制造危机》一书中,他表明,国防情报局得出的主要结论,即伊朗人正在研究核武器,是基于他们截获的一些双重用途材料、一些特种磁铁和他们认为的东西的一些发票,“天哪,这看起来可能是武器化计划的一部分,这里是一个秘密计划。”

Mark Dubowitz1:17:24

Scott, can I ask you a question?

斯科特,我可以问你一个问题吗?

1:17:24 Not a comment by me, but a question.

不是我的评论,而是一个问题。

Scott Horton1:17:24

Sure.

当然。

Mark Dubowitz1:17:25

Just your perspective.

只是你的观点。

1:17:25 So just so I understand this, so the nuclear archive, this massive archive that the Israelis were able to take out of Tehran, bring to the United States, bring to the IAEA, which is very detailed blueprints.

因此,正如我所理解的那样,核档案,以色列人能够从德黑兰取出的大量档案,带到美国,带到国际原子能机构,这是非常详细的蓝图。

Scott Horton1:17:39

It’s just the alleged studies documents again, it’s the same stuff from the smoking laptop.

这又是所谓的研究文件,与冒烟的笔记本电脑中的内容相同。

Mark Dubowitz1:17:43

Yeah.

是的。

1:17:43 So let me just ask you, because it’s huge, and it’s very detailed, and it shows clearly that Iran had an active nuclear weapons program, certainly until 2003.

所以让我问你,因为它很大,而且非常详细,它清楚地表明伊朗有一个活跃的核武器计划,当然直到 2003 年。

And then we can have a discussion about what happened after that.

然后我们可以讨论之后发生的事情。

Are you suggesting that that’s all been forged by Israel?

你是说这一切都是以色列伪造的吗?

Scott Horton1:18:01

Yes.

是的。

1:18:01 Nothing in this smoking laptop held up.

这台冒烟的笔记本电脑里没有任何东西能挡住。

Mark Dubowitz1:18:03

All four?

全部四个?

1:18:03 Not the laptop, but this entire archive that they pulled out with the stats-

不是笔记本电脑,而是他们提取的整个档案以及统计数据-

Scott Horton1:18:08

You’re thinking of-

你在想——

Mark Dubowitz1:18:09

…

……

1:18:09 and blueprints?

和蓝图?

Scott Horton1:18:09

…

……

the big photo op with all the folders of documents-

包含所有文档文件夹的大照片-

Mark Dubowitz1:18:12

No, no-

不,不——

Scott Horton1:18:13

…

……

1:18:13 behind them and all.

在他们和所有人的身后。

Mark Dubowitz1:18:13

…

……

I’ve seen it.

我见过。

I’ve seen it.

我见过。

I’ve seen many-

我见过很多——

Scott Horton1:18:15

How many pages were?

有多少页?

Mark Dubowitz1:18:15

…

……

1:18:15 many of the documents.

许多文件。

There’s thousands of pages.

有数千页。

I’m asking, this is not what I’m claiming.

我问的是,这不是我所主张的。

Is that all forged by Israel?

这都是以色列捏造的吗?

Scott Horton1:18:21

Is that not all about the uranium tetra fluoride and the warhead that David Albright debunked and all the same claims that were in the smoking laptop from the Bush years?

这不就是大卫·奥尔布赖特揭穿的四氟化铀和弹头以及布什时代冒烟的笔记本电脑中所有相同的说法吗?

Mark Dubowitz1:18:31

David Albright actually wrote an entire book.

大卫·奥尔布赖特实际上写了一整本书。

1:18:31 It’s a very detailed book your listeners should Google.

这是一本非常详细的书,你的听众应该谷歌一下。

It’s David Albright in the archive where he goes in, he went in detail and he confirms the information in that archive that Iran had an active program under something called Ahmad to develop five atomic weapons.

大卫·奥尔布赖特(David Albright)进入了档案馆,详细了解了档案中的信息,并确认了档案中的信息,即伊朗在名为艾哈迈德(Ahmad)的项目下有一项积极的计划,旨在开发五种原子武器。

So again, you and I can debate this all day.

再说一遍,你和我可以整天争论这个问题。

Scott Horton1:18:53

Now, this would’ve been before Natanz was even dug and before a single centrifuge was spinning right?

现在,这应该是在纳坦兹被挖掘之前,在一台离心机旋转之前吧?

Mark Dubowitz1:18:53

And again, forget all that.

再说一遍,忘记这一切。

Scott Horton1:18:58

I’m just making sure everybody understands, assuming that was true, we were talking about a piece of paper?

我只是确保每个人都明白,假设这是真的,我们正在谈论一张纸?

Mark Dubowitz1:19:01

It’s not a piece of paper.

它不是一张纸。

1:19:01 It’s a massive archive.

这是一个巨大的档案。

I’m just asking the question.

我只是问一个问题。

You believe Mossad fabricated all of this as a lie to deceive the United States, the IAEA, and the international community?

你认为摩萨德编造的这一切是为了欺骗美国、国际原子能机构和国际社会的谎言吗?

That’s just my question.

这只是我的问题。

Scott Horton1:19:13

My understanding is that there’s nothing significant in the 2018 archive that was not already in the debunked claims from the laptop.

我的理解是,2018 年档案中所有重要的内容都已经存在于笔记本电脑的被揭穿的声明中。

Mark Dubowitz1:19:22

But my question is not that it’s debunked because we can argue about whether it’s debunked or not, but are you saying that Mossad fabricated it?

但我的问题不是它被揭穿了,因为我们可以争论它是否被揭穿,但你是说摩萨德捏造了它吗?

1:19:22 That’s what you’re claiming?

这就是你所主张的?

Scott Horton1:19:32

Yeah.

是的。

1:19:32 Yeah.

是的。

Yeah, because the CIA admitted that there was no laptop and Oli Heinonen admitted-

是的,因为中央情报局承认没有笔记本电脑,奥利·海诺宁也承认——

Mark Dubowitz1:19:33

Not the laptop.

不是笔记本电脑。

Scott Horton1:19:37

…

……

1:19:37 that he got it from the MEK.

他是从 MEK 那里得到的。

Mark Dubowitz1:19:37

I’m not asking about laptop.

我不是在问笔记本电脑。

I’m not asking for-

我不是在要求——

Scott Horton1:19:37

He got it from the MEK.

他从 MEK 那里得到了它。

Where did the MEK get it?

MEK 从哪里得到的?

The MEK got it from the Israelis.

MEK 从以色列人那里得到了它。

Mark Dubowitz1:19:43

Scott, I’m not asking about the laptop.

斯科特,我不是在问笔记本电脑。

1:19:43 I’m asking about this huge archive that was sitting in a warehouse in Tehran full of-

我问的是德黑兰仓库里的这个巨大档案,里面装满了——

Scott Horton1:19:49

I don’t know the truth behind those documents.

我不知道这些文件背后的真相。

1:19:49 I don’t believe Israeli claims of what they were and where they came from without, for example, reading Albright’s book and seeing what he has to say about all of that.

我不相信以色列关于它们是什么以及它们来自哪里的说法,例如,如果没有读过奥尔布赖特的书并看看他对所有这些都说了些什么。

I don’t take Netanyahu’s claims.

我不接受内塔尼亚胡的说法。

Okay, so what’s so significant in there?

好吧,那么这里面有什么重要的呢?

You say that there’s a document that has a plan to make five bombs, but isn’t the rest of the proof the same green salt experiments and the warhead for the missile that David Albright showed was obviously fake, because the warhead was purportedly being designed for a missile that was now going to have an entirely different nose cone on it?

你说有一份文件计划制造五枚炸弹,但其余的证据难道不是同样的绿盐实验吗?大卫·奥尔布赖特展示的导弹弹头显然是假的,因为据称该弹头是为一枚导弹设计的,而该导弹现在将有一个完全不同的鼻锥?

Mark Dubowitz1:20:26

No.

不。

1:20:26 So David Albright, again, we should bring David Albright here.

所以大卫·奥尔布赖特,我们应该再次把大卫·奥尔布赖特带到这里。

Lex Fridman1:20:29

David Albright is a prominent physicist nuclear proliferation expert known for his detailed research and publication on nuclear weapons.

大卫·奥尔布赖特是一位著名的物理学家核扩散专家,以其对核武器的详细研究和出版物而闻名。

Mark Dubowitz1:20:35

Yeah.

是的。

Lex Fridman1:20:35

He has a bunch of books Peddling Peril, Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996 and so on.

他有一堆书《兜售危险》、《伊朗危险地追求核武器》、《钚和高浓缩铀》,1996 年等等。

Mark Dubowitz1:20:43

Yeah, so folks should read the book on the archive because David had full access to the archive, all the detailed documents and blueprints, and he writes a book that, again, the conclusion of which is Iran had an active nuclear weapons program.

是的,所以人们应该阅读有关档案的书,因为大卫可以完全访问档案、所有详细文件和蓝图,而且他写了一本书,其结论是伊朗有一个活跃的核武器计划。

Scott Horton1:21:00

No, no, no.

不,不,不。

1:21:00 The conclusion of which was they were researching it right before 2003.

结论是他们在 2003 年之前就在研究它。

They had no nuclear material to introduce into a single machine, right?

他们没有核材料可以引入一台机器,对吧?

Mark Dubowitz1:21:08

Well, they actually-

嗯,他们实际上——

Scott Horton1:21:09

Active program, meaning they had- a piece of-

活跃计划,意味着他们有——一部分——

Mark Dubowitz1:21:10

No, they had already built a covert enrichment facility, which was only-

不,他们已经建造了一座秘密浓缩设施,只是——

Scott Horton1:21:13

No they hadn’t.

不,他们没有。

Mark Dubowitz1:21:13

It was closed.

它已经关门了。

Scott Horton1:21:14

Natanz was empty until the end of 2006, right?

纳坦兹直到 2006 年底都是空的,对吗?

1:21:14 They didn’t even start spinning centrifuges in there until ’06.

他们直到 06 年才开始在那里旋转离心机。

Mark Dubowitz1:21:21

They had gotten centrifuges for AQ-Khan.

他们为 AQ-Khan 准备了离心机。

1:21:21 They’d built a deeply buried underground facility at Natanz.

他们在纳坦兹建造了一个深埋的地下设施。

They were putting in place the component parts for a nuclear weapons capability.

他们正在安装核武器能力的零部件。

And Ahmad showed, conclusively, unless you believe Mossad fabricated all-

艾哈迈德最终表明,除非你相信摩萨德捏造了这一切——

Scott Horton1:21:21

We’ll see.

我们会看到的。

Mark Dubowitz1:21:39

…

……

1:21:39 that they actually had the plan to build nuclear warheads.

他们实际上有制造核弹头的计划。

Scott Horton1:21:42

Again, Seymour Hersh says that it was when-

西摩·赫什再次说道,当时——

Mark Dubowitz1:21:43

Well, Seymour Hersh is not a nuclear weapons expert.

好吧,西摩·赫什不是核武器专家。

1:21:43 David Albright has, he saw the archive.

大卫·奥尔布赖特有,他看到了档案。

Scott Horton1:21:48

Hersh’s sources said-

赫什的消息来源说——

Mark Dubowitz1:21:50

You’re claiming that America fabricated-

你声称美国编造了——

Scott Horton1:21:51

…

……

1:21:51 that when America invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein for them, that was when they gave up, even considering the need for it.

当美国入侵伊拉克并为他们推翻萨达姆·侯赛因时,他们就放弃了,即使考虑到了这样做的必要性。

Remember, the Iranians held a million-man vigil for the Americans on September 11th.

请记住,9 月 11 日,伊朗人为美国人举行了百万人守夜活动。

The Iranians hated the Taliban.

伊朗人憎恨塔利班。

In fact, the Americans thought Iran might invade Afghanistan earlier in 2001, and they hated Saddam Hussein.

事实上,美国人早在2001年就认为伊朗可能会入侵阿富汗,他们对萨达姆侯赛因怀有仇恨。

Mark Dubowitz1:22:10

Yeah.

是的。

Scott Horton1:22:10

So they had every reason in the world to want to work with the United States-

所以他们有充分的理由想要与美国合作——

Mark Dubowitz1:22:13

No, that’s a distraction.

不,那是一种干扰。

Scott Horton1:22:14

…

……

1:22:14 after September 11th.

9月11日之后。

And the American-

还有美国人——

Mark Dubowitz1:22:15

My questions to you.

我向你提出的问题。

1:22:15 It’s a distraction.

这是一种干扰。

My question-

我的问题-

Scott Horton1:22:17

It is-

它是——

Mark Dubowitz1:22:18

…

……

1:22:18 let’s not go to al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 9/11 and the Iranians, and the Million People Vigil.

我们不要去基地组织、塔利班、9/11、伊朗人和百万人守夜活动。

Let’s just stay on the topic.

让我们继续主题吧。

Scott Horton1:22:23

You’re asking me what I already answered.

你问我我已经回答过的事情。

Mark Dubowitz1:22:25

Do you believe Mossad fabricated that entire-

你相信摩萨德捏造了整个-

Scott Horton1:22:28

I already told you-

我已经告诉过你了——

Mark Dubowitz1:22:28

…

……

1:22:28 archive?

存档?

Scott Horton1:22:29

…

……

1:22:29 I don’t take their word for anything.

我不相信他们的话。

And as far as I understand, the accusations in there are the same ones from the laptop that are already discredited.

据我了解,其中的指控与笔记本电脑中已经不可信的指控相同。

And I haven’t read David Albright’s book.

我还没有读过大卫·奥尔布赖特的书。

You’re distracting from me refuting this giant list of false claims that you made previously that I haven’t got a chance-

你驳斥了你之前声称我没有机会的一大堆虚假声明,这分散了我的注意力——

Mark Dubowitz1:22:44

Okay.

好的。

1:22:44 Let’s all agree.

让我们都同意吧。

Let’s all agree, you’re going to read the book?

我们都同意,你要读这本书吗?

Maybe Lex, you’re going to read the book.

也许莱克斯,你会读这本书。

Viewers, you should read the book.

各位观众,你们应该看看这本书。

I think David Albright has done a meticulous job.

我认为大卫·奥尔布赖特做得很细致。

By the way, just warning, it’s a big book, very detailed, hundreds of pages.

顺便说一句,只是警告一下,这是一本大书,非常详细,有数百页。

And he goes through it in meticulous detail in analyzing this archive, and showed again that Iran had an active nuclear weapons program designed to build five atomic warheads.

他在分析这份档案时进行了一丝不苟的细节,并再次表明伊朗有一个积极的核武器计划,旨在制造五枚原子弹头。

Now we can talk about what happened after 2003, and did they make the decision to totally stop it?

现在我们可以谈谈2003年之后发生的事情,他们是否做出了完全停止的决定?

Scott Horton1:23:10

Yeah, God changed his mind after the Neoconservatives lied America into war with Iraq for Ariel Sharon.

是的,在新保守派为了阿里尔·沙龙而欺骗美国与伊拉克开战后,上帝改变了主意。

Lex Fridman1:23:16

So just to clarify, you, Mark, and David Albright believed that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon.

澄清一下,你、马克和大卫·奥尔布赖特相信伊朗正在研制核武器。

1:23:16 And you, Scott are saying they were not before 2003?

而你,斯科特,是说 2003 年之前就没有?

Scott Horton1:23:28

I’m saying-

我是说——

Lex Fridman1:23:28

That’s just to summarize what we were just talking about.

这只是总结我们刚才讨论的内容。

Scott Horton1:23:31

Well, I could tell you that, so Gareth’s book came out in 2014, which is before this archive was supposedly revealed in Tehran.

好吧,我可以告诉你,Gareth 的书于 2014 年出版,也就是这个档案在德黑兰被披露之前。

1:23:31 But in Gareth’s book, he shows that the CIA and National Intelligence estimate of 2007 that said that there was a program before 2003, and was halted after America invaded Iraq was based on one, the DIA’s mistaken, but sincere interpretation of these invoices for these dual use technologies.

但在加雷斯的书中,他表明中央情报局和国家情报局 2007 年的估计称 2003 年之前有一个计划,并在美国入侵伊拉克后停止,这是基于国防情报局对这些双重用途技术发票的错误但真诚的解释。

And then the smoking laptop, which was completely fake and funneled into the stream by the Mujahideen e-cult, communist terrorist cult.

然后是冒烟的笔记本电脑,它完全是假的,由圣战者电子邪教、共产主义恐怖邪教流入流中。

The same people who’ve come off with 10 major hoaxes.

这些人犯下了 10 个重大骗局。

The NCRI, the National Council for Resistance in Iran, that’s the MEK.

NCRI,伊朗全国抵抗委员会,即 MEK。

They just put out a fake story, what, three, four weeks ago about a big secret nuclear weapons site in Iran.

他们刚刚发表了一个假故事,三、四个星期前,关于伊朗的一个大型秘密核武器基地。

Don’t you remember?

你不记得了吗?

And then nothing happened with that because it was another lie by the MEK.

然后一切都没有发生,因为这是 MEK 的另一个谎言。

It happens all the time.

这种事经常发生。

Mark Dubowitz1:24:28

So Lex, maybe we should talk about what happened after 2003.

所以 Lex,也许我们应该谈谈 2003 年之后发生的事情。

1:24:28 What about this 2007 NIE?

2007年的NIE怎么样?

What does it mean?

这是什么意思?

Did it mean Iran had now abandoned its nuclear weapons program or did something else happen?

这是否意味着伊朗现在已经放弃了核武器计划,还是发生了其他事情?

Scott Horton1:24:38

They never had a nuclear weapons program.

他们从未有过核武器计划。

Mark Dubowitz1:24:40

All right, but let’s talk about that.

好吧,但我们来谈谈这个吧。

1:24:40 They had-

他们有——

Scott Horton1:24:42

[inaudible 01:24:42]-

[听不清 01:24:42]-

Mark Dubowitz1:24:42

…

……

1:24:42 interesting history.

有趣的历史。

Scott Horton1:24:43

According to NIE, They had a nuclear weapons research program that never made anything at all.

根据 NIE 的说法,他们有一个核武器研究计划,但从未制造过任何东西。

1:24:43 So you can try to conflate that if you want.

因此,如果您愿意,可以尝试将其合并。

Mark Dubowitz1:24:51

No.

不。

1:24:51 That’s not-

那不是——

Scott Horton1:24:51

But I think everybody can see what you’re doing there.

但我认为每个人都可以看到你在那里做什么。

Mark Dubowitz1:24:53

…

……

1:24:53 what the 2007 NIE says.

2007 年 NIE 所说的话。

But the 2007 NIE says is that, and you are correct, according to the 2007 NIE is Iran made the decision after the invasion of Iraq not to pursue an active nuclear weapons program anymore.

但2007年的NIE说的是,你是对的,根据2007年的NIE,伊朗在入侵伊拉克后做出了不再继续实施核武器计划的决定。

Scott Horton1:25:09

Because we were putting their best friends in power in Baghdad for them.

因为我们让他们最好的朋友在巴格达为他们掌权。

Mark Dubowitz1:25:13

Well, because the United States had gone in-

好吧,因为美国已经介入-

Scott Horton1:25:14

So they didn’t need to worry no more.

所以他们不需要再担心了。

Mark Dubowitz1:25:15

And in a matter of 100 days, had taken down the Iraqi army.

并在短短100天内击溃了伊拉克军队。

Scott Horton1:25:19

And put in Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s faction-

并加入阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹·哈基姆的派系——

Mark Dubowitz1:25:21

That’s fine.

没关系。

Scott Horton1:25:22

…

……

1:25:22 the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq who’d been living in Iran for 20 years.

伊拉克伊斯兰革命最高委员会已在伊朗生活了 20 年。

Mark Dubowitz1:25:26

That’s why you and I did not publicly support the Iraq War, did we?

这就是为什么你我没有公开支持伊拉克战争,不是吗?

Scott Horton1:25:30

I publicly opposed it.

我公开反对。

Mark Dubowitz1:25:31

Good for you.

对你有好处。

Scott Horton1:25:31

As far as I possibly could.

尽我所能。

1:25:31 Thank you.

谢谢。

Mark Dubowitz1:25:32

I should have publicly opposed it rather than just working on Iran in 2003.

我应该公开反对它,而不是在 2003 年就只关注伊朗问题。

1:25:32 But you’re right, it redounded to the benefit of Iran, that invasion.

但你是对的,这次入侵有利于伊朗的利益。

But that’s not actually what I’m talking about.

但这实际上不是我要说的。

What I’m talking about is 100 days the Iranian Sea that the US military has taken down the Iraqi army, that they had fought an eight-year war with where almost a million people, Scott, as you know, had been killed.

我所说的是伊朗海,美军在100天之内击垮了伊拉克军队,他们与伊拉克军队进行了长达八年的战争,斯科特,如你所知,几乎一百万人被杀。

So they were afraid that the United States was going to march from Baghdad to Tehran.

所以他们害怕美国要从巴格达向德黑兰进军。

So they make a decision to end their active Ahmad program.

因此,他们决定结束正在进行的艾哈迈德计划。

They make a decision to build up the key capabilities they need to retain an Iranian nuclear weapons option, specifically the enrichment capabilities at Natanz, and then Fordow, and at Iraq given them the plutonium route.

他们决定建立保留伊朗核武器选择所需的关键能力,特别是纳坦兹、福尔多和伊拉克的浓缩能力,为他们提供了钚路线。

And then what they do is they take the members of the Ahmad program, the nuclear weapons scientists that have worked on this, and they disperse them.

然后他们所做的就是带走艾哈迈德计划的成员,以及致力于此的核武器科学家,然后驱散他们。

So they’re now no longer in a formal weapons program.

所以他们现在不再参与正式的武器计划。

They’re put in a number of different research centers and universities.

它们被放置在许多不同的研究中心和大学中。

Scott Horton1:27:57

But-

但是——

Mark Dubowitz1:27:58

But, sorry, just to finish.

但是,抱歉,只是为了结束。

1:27:58 So just understand the brilliance of Iranian nuclear deception, right?

那么就了解一下伊朗核欺骗的高明之处吧?

I think it’s really interesting to get in the minds of the Ayatollah and understand this, because he doesn’t want to provoke the United States.

我认为深入阿亚图拉的内心并理解这一点真的很有趣,因为他不想激怒美国。

He doesn’t want to see another Iraq-style invasion, this time of his country.

他不想看到另一场伊拉克式的入侵,这次是对他的国家的入侵。

He’s building this capability on the enrichment side and on the reprocessing side.

他正在浓缩方面和后处理方面建立这种能力。

He is framing this as I’m only building a civilian nuclear program.

他之所以这么说,是因为我只是在建设一个民用核计划。

He’s taken the weapons scientists who are building part of an active nuclear weapons program, and he’s dispersing them, putting them under the guidance and direction of Fakhrizadeh and starting to build out these capabilities.

他带走了正在构建活跃核武器计划一部分的武器科学家,并将他们分散,将他们置于法赫里扎德的指导和指导下,并开始建立这些能力。

Lex Fridman1:29:45

Two things.

有两件事。

1:29:45 One, can you go and respond to certain things that you heard?

第一,你能去回应一下你听到的某些事情吗?

And two, can we generally move in the direction of the modern day and trying to see what is the right thing now, our analysis of the situation now, we’ve been kind of staying in the context of history, which is really important, but sort of moving it forward?

第二,我们能否总体上朝着现代的方向前进,并试图看看现在什么是正确的事情,我们对现在情况的分析,我们一直停留在历史的背景下,这确实很重要,但有点推动它前进?

But yeah, go ahead please.

但是,是的,请继续。

Scott Horton1:30:08

I’m not sure how much time we have.

我不确定我们还有多少时间。

1:30:08 I kind of hoped-

我有点希望——

Lex Fridman1:30:10

unlimited.

无限。

Scott Horton1:30:11

…

……

1:30:11 you’d let me talk about Israel’s role in Iraq War, too, and for that matter in Barack Obama’s dirty war in Syria that led to the rise of the bin Ladenites there.

你也可以让我谈谈以色列在伊拉克战争中的角色,以及巴拉克·奥巴马在叙利亚的肮脏战争中所扮演的角色,这场战争导致了本·拉登分子的崛起。

It’s all part of America’s Israel policy.

这都是美国以色列政策的一部分。

So I don’t want to, I’d rather go back before we go forward.

所以我不想,我宁愿先回去再继续。

But I also do, I need to go back over so many claims that he’s made here that I’d like to address.

但我也这样做,我需要回顾他在这里提出的许多我想解决的主张。

Lex Fridman1:30:31

So I strongly prefer we go, because there’s so much history, we’re going to lose ourselves in it.

所以我强烈建议我们去,因为那里有太多的历史,我们会迷失其中。

1:30:31 There’s not enough hours.

时间不够。

We should take certain moments in history that instruct the modern day, but let’s not get lost there if it’s okay.

我们应该以历史上的某些时刻来指导现代,但如果可以的话,我们也不要迷失在那里。

Scott Horton1:30:45

Sure.

当然。

Lex Fridman1:30:45

This is such a fascinating conversation, Iraqi-

这是一次如此有趣的对话,伊拉克-

Scott Horton1:30:47

We talked about the JCPOA and the time between then and now quite a bit already too.

我们也已经多次谈论了联合全面行动计划以及从那时到现在的时间。

Lex Fridman1:30:52

Yes.

是的。

Scott Horton1:30:52

So we’ll be going back over some of that.

所以我们将回顾其中的一些内容。

Lex Fridman1:30:54

Well, no, I mean modern day, I don’t mean-

嗯,不,我是说现代,我不是说-

Scott Horton1:30:56

You’re talking about this week.

你说的是本周。

Lex Fridman1:30:57

…

……

1:30:57 I mean this week.

我是说这周。

Scott Horton1:30:58

Okay.

好的。

Lex Fridman1:30:58

A lot of stuff happened this week and a lot of stuff will happen tomorrow and the next week.

这周发生了很多事情,明天和下周也会发生很多事情。

1:30:58 And everyone wants to know what is going to happen.

每个人都想知道会发生什么。

What is the worst case, what is the best case?

最坏的情况是什么,最好的情况是什么?

Should we be freaking out?

我们应该惊慌失措吗?

What do we need to understand about today?

今天我们需要了解什么?

That’s all.

就这样。

Scott Horton1:31:13

All right, so there’s a lot of things to address here.

好吧,这里有很多事情需要解决。

1:31:13 So first of all, something that me and Mr. Dubowitz agree about.

首先,我和杜博维茨先生都同意这一点。

Mark Dubowitz1:31:19

Please call me Mark.

请叫我马克。

Scott Horton1:31:19

Mark.

标记。

1:31:19 Something that Mark and I agree about is that there actually is not a threat of an aggressive first strike by Iran.

马克和我一致认为,伊朗实际上不存在首先发动侵略性打击的威胁。

I’m a little surprised to hear him say that, but I’m grateful to hear him say that.

听到他这么说我有点惊讶,但我很高兴听到他这么说。

It is honest.

这是诚实的。

I would advise you, you may be unfamiliar with this, but I can tell you anyone in America who drives for a living and listens to AM radio have heard claims that Iran was making nuclear weapons probably 50,000 times in the last 25 years.

我建议你,你可能对此不熟悉,但我可以告诉你,在美国,任何一个以开车为生并收听 AM 广播的人都听说过伊朗在过去 25 年里可能制造了 50,000 次核武器的说法。

Over and over and over again, we hear this propaganda.

我们一遍又一遍地听到这种宣传。

Mark Dubowitz1:33:02

No, they never said that.

不,他们从来没有这么说过。

Scott Horton1:33:03

He didn’t say-

他没有说——

1:33:00 …

……

out for a nuke.

出去寻找核武器。

I’ll nuke them if I have to.

如果有必要的话我会用核武器攻击他们。

Mark Dubowitz1:33:02

No, they never said that.

不,他们从来没有这么说过。

Scott Horton1:33:03

He didn’t say that, but the implication was-

他没这么说,但言下之意是——

Mark Dubowitz1:33:05

By the way, no US president ever said they’re going to obliterate Iran.

顺便说一句,没有哪位美国总统说过他们要消灭伊朗。

1:33:05 US president said-

美国总统说——

Scott Horton1:33:08

Hillary Clinton did.

希拉里·克林顿做到了。

Mark Dubowitz1:33:09

…

……

1:33:09 all options are on the table.

所有的选择都摆在桌面上。

Scott Horton1:33:11

Anyone can Google her word.

任何人都可以用谷歌搜索她的话。

Mark Dubowitz1:33:12

She was never our president.

她从来都不是我们的总统。

Scott Horton1:33:13

No, I said she was running for president.

不,我说她正在竞选总统。

Mark Dubowitz1:33:15

But she was never our president.

但她从来不是我们的总统。

1:33:15 But no US president ever said they’re to obliterate Iran.

但没有一位美国总统说过他们要消灭伊朗。

Nobody ever said they could drop a nuke on Iran.

没有人说过他们可以对伊朗投下核武器。

Scott Horton1:33:20

The implication was clear under W.

W 下的含义很明确。

1:33:20 Bush, Barack Obama, Trump, Biden, and Trump again-

布什、巴拉克·奥巴马、特朗普、拜登,又是特朗普——

Mark Dubowitz1:33:25

That they would strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

他们将袭击伊朗的核设施。

Scott Horton1:33:27

If they broke out toward a nuclear weapon, America would do whatever it took to prevent that from happening.

如果他们爆发核武器,美国将不惜一切代价阻止这种情况发生。

Mark Dubowitz1:33:34

Strike their nuclear facilities.

打击他们的核设施。

Scott Horton1:33:36

That was always the case there.

那里的情况总是如此。

Mark Dubowitz1:33:38

But please clarify, just to be accurate, I was talking about nuking Iran.

但请澄清一下,为了准确起见,我说的是用核武器攻击伊朗。

Scott Horton1:33:38

I’m almost certain no one’s-

我几乎可以肯定没有人——

Mark Dubowitz1:33:42

No one’s talking about bombing Iran to smithereens or obliterating or any of that.

没有人谈论将伊朗炸成碎片或消灭之类的。

Scott Horton1:33:46

That’s really not true.

这确实不是真的。

1:33:46 I mean.

我是说。

Mark Dubowitz1:33:46

US presidents-

美国总统——

Scott Horton1:33:48

Barack Obama changed America’s nuclear posture to say, because it used to say we reserve the right to use a nuclear first strike against any country.

巴拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)改变了美国的核姿态这一说法,因为它过去常说我们保留对任何国家首先使用核打击的权利。

1:33:48 He changed that to say, “No, we promise not to use a nuclear first strike against any non-nuclear weapon state except maybe Iran.” That’s true.

他将其改为:“不,我们承诺不会对任何无核武器国家使用核打击,也许除了伊朗。”这是真的。

In fact, that was the threat.

事实上,这就是威胁。

Mark Dubowitz1:34:48

I think it’s really important.

我认为这非常重要。

1:34:48 I agree with that.

我同意这一点。

Scott Horton1:34:49

I’m just agreeing with you so you don’t have to stop me.

我只是同意你的观点,所以你不必阻止我。

Mark Dubowitz1:34:51

But I’m agreeing with you.

但我同意你的观点。

Scott Horton1:34:52

I know, but I’m agreeing with you so it’s all right.

我知道,但我同意你的观点,所以没关系。

1:34:52 Netanyahu told Jeffrey Goldberg that he was not concerned about a first strike, that his only concern was that talented young Israelis would move to Miami, that there would be a brain drain.

内塔尼亚胡告诉杰弗里·戈德堡,他并不担心第一次打击,他唯一担心的是有才华的年轻以色列人会搬到迈阿密,从而导致人才流失。

That was his words, a brain drain from Israel.

这是他的话,以色列的人才外流。

That also then Hezbollah, as this is what he put it, and I agree with this, that conventional forces would have a bit more freedom of action in the region if Iran was sitting on an A-bomb.

真主党也是如此,正如他所说的那样,我同意这一点,即如果伊朗拥有原子弹,常规部队将在该地区拥有更多的行动自由。

Neither of them said that there was a threat of an offensive first strike against Israel.

他们两人都没有表示存在对以色列发动先发制人攻击的威胁。

I would point out, and I’m skipping ahead to Trump, but I’m skipping back here again in a second because I got more things to refute.

我想指出的是,我会跳到特朗普,但我稍后会再次跳回到这里,因为我还有更多东西要反驳。

But Trump just said the other day when he announced American airstrikes there that this has neutralized a threat to Israel.

但特朗普前几天宣布美国对那里进行空袭时表示,这已经消除了对以色列的威胁。

He did not even pretend that it was a threat to the United States that he had ended in doing so.

他甚至没有假装他这样做的结果是对美国的威胁。

Mark Dubowitz1:35:43

Actually, he said exactly that.

事实上,他确实是这么说的。

Scott Horton1:35:44

Well, actually you can Google the state [inaudible 01:35:47].

好吧,实际上您可以通过 Google 搜索该州 [听不清 01:35:47]。

Mark Dubowitz1:35:47

He actually said, president Trump has said that an Iranian nuclear weapon is a threat to the United States.

他实际上说,特朗普总统已经说过,伊朗核武器对美国构成威胁。

1:35:47 [inaudible 01:35:53].

[听不清 01:35:53]。

He said that over and over again.

他一遍又一遍地这么说。

Scott Horton1:35:53

Not in the state [inaudible 01:35:53].

不在状态 [听不清 01:35:53]。

1:35:53 He announced his great victory in bombing, which is what I just said, right?

他宣布了轰炸的伟大胜利,这就是我刚才所说的,对吗?

Mark Dubowitz1:35:57

President Trump sends out 20 Truth posts a day.

特朗普总统每天发布 20 个真相帖子。

1:35:57 Let’s look at the many, many, many things that he said.

让我们看看他说了很多很多很多的话。

Scott Horton1:36:03

Then we have this whole thing about how I always believe Hezbollah, and I always believe the Ayatollah, when in fact, I did not quote the Ayatollah and I did not quote Hezbollah on anything.

然后我们就知道我如何始终相信真主党,我始终相信阿亚图拉,而事实上,我没有引用阿亚图拉的话,我也没有在任何事情上引用真主党的话。

1:36:03 I did quote Osama bin Laden taking responsibility for the Khobar Towers attack, which he shared that with Abdul Bari Atwan.

我确实引用了奥萨马·本·拉登对胡拜尔塔袭击负责的说法,他与阿卜杜勒·巴里·阿特万分享了这一点。

Anyone can read it.

任何人都可以阅读。

He agrees with Michael Scheuer, the former chief of the CIA’s Bin Laden unit, who also said that it was a hoax, that it was Iranian-backed Saudi Hezbollah that did that attack.

他同意中央情报局本·拉登部门前负责人迈克尔·舒尔的观点,他也表示这是一个骗局,是伊朗支持的沙特真主党发动了这次袭击。

Again, who did they attack?

再说一遍,他们袭击了谁?

They killed 19 American airmen, which was the number one complaint of al-Qaeda against the United States that we had air forces and Army stationed in Saudi Arabia in order to bomb and blockade Iraq, which again, and this was the thing that you had asked about before, was part of the dual containment policy in the 1990s.

他们杀死了 19 名美国飞行员,这是基地组织对美国的第一大抱怨,即我们在沙特阿拉伯驻扎空军和陆军,以便轰炸和封锁伊拉克,这也是你之前问过的,是 20 世纪 90 年代双重遏制政策的一部分。

Mark Dubowitz1:36:54

Scott, you’re saying-

斯科特,你是说——

Scott Horton1:36:54

Goddamn, man.

该死的,伙计。

Lex Fridman1:36:55

No, wait a second.

不,等一下。

Mark Dubowitz1:36:56

All right.

好的。

Lex Fridman1:36:56

Let Scott talk.

让斯科特谈谈。

Scott Horton1:36:57

The fact is you’re sitting here saying that I trust them all so much.

事实上,你坐在这里说我非常信任他们所有人。

1:36:57 Well, what do you think, Lex, what do you think Ronald Reagan meant by trust but verify?

好吧,你觉得怎么样,莱克斯,你认为罗纳德·里根所说的“信任”和“验证”是什么意思?

He meant don’t trust but be polite.

他的意思是不要信任,但要有礼貌。

That’s what he meant.

这就是他的意思。

Verify means we know with sensors and cameras and inspections what’s going on.

验证意味着我们通过传感器、摄像头和检查了解正在发生的情况。

No one can find a quote that I said here about how we can trust the Ayatollah because he promised this or that or the other thing.

没有人能找到我在这里所说的关于我们如何信任阿亚图拉的一句话,因为他承诺了这个或那个或其他事情。

I didn’t say that.

我没这么说。

What I’m talking about is the process.

我说的是过程。

They sign agreements and then we have inspectors to verify their claims.

他们签署协议,然后我们派检查员核实他们的说法。

As anyone can search at IAEA.org, they have continued to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material in Iran to any military or other special purpose.

正如任何人都可以在 IAEA.org 上搜索到的那样,他们正在继续核实伊朗的核材料没有被转用于任何军事或其他特殊目的。

Mark Dubowitz1:37:39

The IAEA has now said that they actually can no longer do this before this war started.

国际原子能机构现在表示,在这场战争开始之前他们实际上不能再这样做了。

Scott Horton1:37:43

Because America withdrew from the-

因为美国退出了——

Mark Dubowitz1:37:46

I mean, at the end of the day, let’s just be factually accurate.

我的意思是,归根结底,我们还是要实事求是。

1:37:46 The fact of the matter is anybody who knows anything about nuclear weapons program knows that we do not have 100% certainty on anything.

事实上,任何了解核武器计划的人都知道,我们对任何事情都没有 100% 的确定性。

I mean, Scott is making claims here that Mossad is fabricating the CIA is fabricating, everybody’s fabricating, but he’s also assuming that we have 100% certainty about what Iran is doing inside a country more than two and a half times the size of Texas.

我的意思是,斯科特在这里声称摩萨德正在捏造,中央情报局正在捏造,每个人都在捏造,但他也假设我们对伊朗在一个面积是德克萨斯州两倍半以上的国家内所做的事情有100%的确定性。

Scott Horton1:38:23

[inaudible 01:38:23] refuted that an hour ago.

[听不清 01:38:23] 一小时前驳斥了这一点。

1:38:23 You can rewind it.

你可以倒回它。

Mark Dubowitz1:38:24

Anyone can refute it, but the fact of matter is they did it.

任何人都可以反驳,但事实是他们做到了。

1:38:24 It’s there.

它就在那里。

Scott Horton1:38:26

We know the facilities are there.

我们知道那里有设施。

1:38:26 By the way, you keep saying that I just say lies, lies, lies.

顺便说一句,你一直说我只是说谎、谎言、谎言。

But I have explained exactly what I meant.

但我已经准确地解释了我的意思。

I’ve cited my sources and I haven’t just sat here and said, “Uh huh, that’s a lie,” because I don’t like it.

我引用了我的消息来源,我并没有只是坐在这里说,“呃,这是一个谎言,”因为我不喜欢它。

I sat here and explained to you exactly how I know who was building those EFP bombs in Iraq, exactly how I know what the IAEA said about the state of inspections here, or what Robert Kelly told the Christian Science Monitor about Parchin and the rest and on and on and on.

我坐在这里,向你们准确地解释了我如何知道谁在伊拉克制造了这些 EFP 炸弹,我如何知道国际原子能机构对这里的检查状况有何评价,或者罗伯特·凯利如何向《基督教科学箴言报》讲述了关于帕尔钦等人的事情,等等。

I don’t sit here like I’m just saying, “Well, that’s not true because I like it,” when in fact I’m explaining exactly why your claims are not true, which they’re not.

我不会坐在这里,就像我只是说,“好吧,这不是真的,因为我喜欢它”,而事实上,我正在准确解释为什么你的说法不是真的,而事实并非如此。

Just like saying that I said I trust Hezbollah when anyone can rewind that and break their finger trying to find the part where I said that because I never did.

就像我说我相信真主党一样,任何人都可以倒带并打破他们的手指试图找到我说的那部分,因为我从来没有这样做过。

Mark Dubowitz1:40:57

But Scott, this is the constant theme in your analysis.

但是斯科特,这是你分析中不变的主题。

1:40:57 Again, want to look at it, maybe steel man it, maybe challenge it, but the constant theme is the United States and Israel and the West, we constantly aggress against North Korea, against Iran, against Russia, against these countries, and they respond to us.

再说一遍,想看看它,也许是钢铁侠它,也许是挑战它,但不变的主题是美国、以色列和西方,我们不断侵略朝鲜、伊朗、俄罗斯、这些国家,而他们回应我们。

They respond to us in ways that they build nuclear weapons programs that are peaceful, but we force them to develop nuclear weapons.

他们对我们的回应是,他们建立和平的核武器计划,但我们却强迫他们发展核武器。

They don’t actually mean to kill us.

他们实际上并不是想杀我们。

Scott Horton1:41:34

Look, it’s not right that I’m saying everything anyone does-

听着,我说任何人所做的一切都是不对的——

Mark Dubowitz1:41:34

Can I finish?

我可以完成吗?

Scott Horton1:41:34

No.

不。

Mark Dubowitz1:41:38

[inaudible 01:41:38].

[听不清 01:41:38]。

Scott Horton1:41:38

You’re saying that everything I say is that everyone anyone else does is the reaction, but that’s not true.

你是说我所说的一切都是其他人所做的反应,但事实并非如此。

1:41:38 The subject here is what has America done to make things worse rather than better?

这里的主题是美国做了什么让事情变得更糟而不是更好?

Mark Dubowitz1:41:48

That’s not the topic here.

这不是这里的主题。

Scott Horton1:41:49

I’m citing provocations.

我指的是挑衅。

1:41:49 That doesn’t mean I’m saying that everything that happens in the world is only an equal and opposite reaction to an American provocation, and you can’t find me saying that.

这并不意味着我说世界上发生的一切只是对美国挑衅的同等和相反的反应,你找不到我这么说。

You can only somehow try to paraphrase me claiming that somehow or something like that.

你只能以某种方式尝试解释我声称的某种方式或类似的东西。

But that’s what’s at issue is as I said, for example, there’s the Reuters story that says that after Israel did the sabotage, which they bragged about at Natanz in April of ’21, that was when they started enriching up to 60%.

但这就是问题所在,正如我所说,例如,路透社的报道称,以色列在 21 年 4 月在纳坦兹吹嘘的破坏活动之后,他们开始将浓缩度提高到 60%。

now I’m saying that, and I’m just denying the agency of the Iranians or anything except that, no, I’m not.

现在我这么说,我只是否认伊朗人的代理权或其他任何东西,不,我不是。

I’m just citing the Reuters news agency saying that this proactive action by Israel caused a negative reaction by your own lights, a very negative reaction in their beginning to again enrich up to 60% uranium.

我只是援引路透社的说法,以色列的这一主动行动引起了你们自己的负面反应,这是他们开始再次浓缩高达60%铀的非常负面的反应。

Mark Dubowitz1:42:56

He did try.

他确实尝试过。

Scott Horton1:42:57

The US government has made numerous mistakes in many of these countries.

美国政府在其中许多国家犯下了无数错误。

Mark Dubowitz1:43:01

If this podcast was all about the American government and the mistakes that’s made, then we’d spend four hours on it.

如果这个播客都是关于美国政府及其所犯错误的,那么我们会花四个小时。

Scott Horton1:43:06

It’s a huge [inaudible 01:43:06].

这是一个巨大的[听不清 01:43:06]。

Lex Fridman1:43:06

Can we please-

我们可以吗-

Mark Dubowitz1:43:08

Get to today.

到今天为止。

Lex Fridman1:43:10

…

……

1:43:10 use everything we just talked about and talk about today, what is maybe Mark, can you lay out what is the best case and the worst case in Scotland?

使用我们刚才讨论和今天讨论的所有内容,也许马克是什么,你能列出苏格兰最好的情况和最坏的情况是什么吗?

Lay out the best case and the worst case that can happen now.

列出现在可能发生的最好情况和最坏情况。

Mark Dubowitz1:43:22

Lex, I think the best case, and something I’ve advocated for, I’ve been working on this for 22 years, is that the Iranians return to negotiations at Oman, sit down with the United States and conclude an agreement that peacefully and permanently and fully dismantles their nuclear program.

莱克斯,我认为最好的情况是,伊朗人重返阿曼谈判,与美国坐下来,达成一项和平、永久、全面废除其核计划的协议,这也是我在这方面工作了 22 年所倡导的。

1:43:22 They agree to that, which means they shut down any remaining facilities.

他们同意这一点,这意味着他们关闭了所有剩余的设施。

They give up all the remaining centrifuges and enriched material that they could use to develop nuclear weapons.

他们放弃了所有剩余的离心机和可用于开发核武器的浓缩材料。

They let the IAEA in in order to supervise this.

他们让国际原子能机构介入以监督此事。

They actually commit to not rebuilding this nuclear program.

他们实际上承诺不重建这个核计划。

We commit, as we’ve done with 23 other countries, to helping them provide civilian nuclear energy.

正如我们对其他 23 个国家所做的那样,我们承诺帮助他们提供民用核能。

Because it seems to me a little fanciful that Khamenei would build a civilian nuclear program under 80 meters of concrete surrounded by rock and take all the risks he’s taken.

因为在我看来,哈梅内伊会在 80 米高、周围有岩石的混凝土下建造一个民用核计划,并承担他所承担的所有风险,这似乎有点异想天开。

By the way, he faces a risk to his regime, spent a half a trillion dollars to do this when it makes no commercial sense.

顺便说一句,他的政权面临着风险,在没有商业意义的情况下花费了五万亿美元来做这件事。

Lex Fridman1:44:56

What can Trump do to help make that happen?

特朗普可以做些什么来帮助实现这一目标?

Mark Dubowitz1:44:59

I think what he can do is he can say to the Iranians, “Look, I made you that offer last time.

我认为他能做的就是对伊朗人说:“听着,我上次向你们提出了这个提议。

1:44:59 You rejected it.

你拒绝了。

Now that offer’s no longer on the table because that offer gave you enrichment.

现在这个提议不再摆在桌面上,因为这个提议让你充实了。

Now temporarily, but I now see the game that you would’ve played when I left office, to turn that enrichment capability into nuclear weapons.

现在是暂时的,但我现在看到了我卸任时你们会玩的游戏,将浓缩能力转化为核武器。

That deal’s off the table, but here’s the deal that’s on the table.

该交易尚未讨论,但这是正在讨论中的交易。

It’s a one-page deal.

这是一页纸的交易。

You give up your nuclear capabilities, we help you build civilian nuclear energy.” I think that’s best case.

你放弃核能力,我们帮助你建设民用核能。”我认为这是最好的情况。

Lex Fridman1:47:41

Can I just even dig in further on the worst case?

我可以进一步研究最坏的情况吗?

1:47:41 Do you think it’s possible to have where US gets pulled into a feet on the ground full-on war with Iran?

您认为美国有可能陷入与伊朗的全面战争吗?

Mark Dubowitz1:47:54

I think one must never dismiss possibilities because as I said, you’ve got to plan against worst case options, and I think-

我认为人们绝不能忽视可能性,因为正如我所说,你必须针对最坏情况的选择做好计划,而且我认为——

Scott Horton1:48:00

That’s what the Israel lobby has in store for you guys.

这就是以色列游说团体为你们准备的。

1:48:00 American lives mean nothing to the Israel-firsters.

对于以色列优先者来说,美国人的生命毫无意义。

They don’t care that Israel motivated September 11th and killed 3,000 of our guys.

他们不在乎以色列在 9 月 11 日煽动并杀害了我们的 3,000 人。

I was at the airport yesterday, had a big American flag with all the red and white stripes made out of the names of the dead of September 11th who were killed by people motivated by Israel’s crimes in Palestine and in Lebanon and enforcing Bill Clinton’s dual containment policy from Saudi Arabia.

昨天我在机场,看到一面巨大的美国国旗,上面的所有红白条纹都是由 9 月 11 日死者的名字制成的,这些死者是被以色列在巴勒斯坦和黎巴嫩犯下的罪行以及在沙特阿拉伯执行比尔·克林顿的双重遏制政策驱使的人杀害的。

They don’t care about that.

他们不在乎这个。

They don’t care about the 4,500 Americans who died in Iraq War Two or the million something people who died in Iraq War Two, the half a million in Syria as long as the Shiite Crescent is somehow is limited.

他们不在乎在第二次世界大战中丧生的 4,500 名美国人,在第二次世界大战中丧生的 100 万人,在叙利亚的 50 万人,只要什叶派新月区在某种程度上是有限的。

They’ll even celebrate openly.

他们甚至会公开庆祝。

Mark Dubowitz1:49:44

I wish you’d listened and not put words in my mouth.

我希望你能听我说,而不是把话塞到我嘴里。

Lex Fridman1:49:47

I heard what he said.

我听到了他说的话。

1:49:47 I forced him kind of to say what the worst case possibility of a full-on invasion as a thought experiment, and you can let him finish that as opposed to making the accusations.

作为一个思想实验,我强迫他说出全面入侵的最坏情况的可能性是什么,你可以让他完成这个任务,而不是提出指控。

Let’s just minimize both ways accusations, please.

请让我们尽量减少双向指责。

Just talk about the ideas.

简单谈谈想法吧。

That’s the most charitable interpretation of those ideas.

这是对这些想法最仁慈的解释。

Scott Horton1:50:06

I’m from the United States of America, unlike him, and I care about the future of this country, unlike him, who’s here to serve a foreign power and make their case at our expense.

与他不同,我来自美利坚合众国,我关心这个国家的未来,与他不同,他来这里是为了服务外国势力,并以牺牲我们的利益为代价来争取他们的利益。

Lex Fridman1:50:16

Scott, and next you’re going to say that I’m un-American.

斯科特,接下来你会说我不是美国人。

Mark Dubowitz1:50:21

Because an immigrant too.

因为也是移民。

Scott Horton1:50:21

You’re just hosting the show.

你只是主持节目。

1:50:21 I don’t know.

我不知道。

It seems like you’re trying to be fair.

看起来你正在努力做到公平。

Lex Fridman1:50:25

No, it’s not about fair.

不,这与公平无关。

Scott Horton1:50:27

He has an agenda.

他有一个议程。

Lex Fridman1:50:28

Stop.

停止。

1:50:28 Stop.

停止。

Scott Horton1:50:28

He’s from the FDD.

他来自FDD。

Lex Fridman1:50:29

Stop.

停止。

1:50:29 It’s not about being fair.

这与公平无关。

The implication here is somebody who’s un-American because where they’re from.

这里的含义是,有些人因为来自哪里而不是美国人。

Scott Horton1:50:36

I didn’t say anyone who’s not from here.

我没有说任何不是这里人的人。

1:50:36 I’m talking about him.

我正在谈论他。

Lex Fridman1:50:41

I think that’s a really deeply disrespectful accusation.

我认为这是一个非常不尊重的指控。

Scott Horton1:50:45

Can I ask you, does it bother you that when Naftali Bennett bombed a UN shelter full of 106 women and children in Qana, Lebanon in 1996, that that’s what motivated Mohamed Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh to join Al-Qaeda and attack our towers?

我能否问您,当纳夫塔利·贝内特 (Naftali Bennett) 1996 年在黎巴嫩卡纳 (Qana) 轰炸了一个载有 106 名妇女和儿童的联合国避难所时,穆罕默德·阿塔 (Mohamed Atta) 和拉姆齐·本·希卜 (Ramzi bin al-Shibh) 加入基地组织并袭击了我们的塔楼,您是否对此感到困扰?

Mark Dubowitz1:51:00

Scott, you know what bothers me?

斯科特,你知道什么让我烦恼吗?

1:51:00 I came to this country 22 years ago.

我22年前来到这个国家。

I became a proud US citizen 10 years ago.

十年前,我成为一名自豪的美国公民。

I’m proud to be an American and accusing me or Lex or any immigrants to this country of not being un-American is deeply offensive.

我为自己是一名美国人而感到自豪,指责我或莱克斯或这个国家的任何移民不是非美国人是非常无礼的。

Let me answer Lex’s question.

让我回答莱克斯的问题。

Lex, let’s get back to your question because I think it’s an important question.

Lex,让我们回到你的问题,因为我认为这是一个重要的问题。

What are the chain of events that could lead 500,000 mechanized US troops to have to invade Iran, which would be a disaster?

哪些连环事件可能导致50万美军机械化部队不得不入侵伊朗,这将是一场灾难?

That’s something we never want to see again.

这是我们永远不想再看到的事情。

That’s one of the lessons of Iraq.

这是伊拉克的教训之一。

Scott Horton1:52:14

Can’t the IDF handle it?

以色列国防军应付不了吗?

Mark Dubowitz1:52:16

Can I just finish just who can handle it, who cannot handle it?

我可以只说谁能处理,谁不能处理吗?

1:52:16 I think that it’s a potential scenario, which is why I don’t think anybody should be advocating for a US decapitation of the regime in Iran.

我认为这是一种潜在的情况,这就是为什么我认为任何人都不应该主张美国斩首伊朗政权。

I have long been on record of supporting the Iranian people, providing support to the Iranian people, to at one point take back their country and take back their flag.

我长期以来一直支持伊朗人民,为伊朗人民提供支持,以在某一时刻夺回他们的国家并夺回他们的旗帜。

It’s very much sort of Reagan’s strategy that Reagan ran in the Cold War of maximum pressure on the regime, maximum support for anti-Soviet dissidents.

这很像里根在冷战时期所采取的策略,即对政权施加最大压力,为反苏持不同政见者提供最大支持。

While by the way, he was negotiating arms control agreements for the Soviet Union in order to try to reduce the number of nuclear tipped ICBMs that both countries had pointed at each other.

顺便说一句,他正在为苏联谈判军备控制协议,以试图减少两国相互指责的核弹头洲际弹道导弹的数量。

I think the Reagan strategy of providing support to the people is a far better strategy for trying to get transition, leadership transition, government transition inside Iran.

我认为里根为人民提供支持的战略对于试图在伊朗内部实现过渡、领导层过渡和政府过渡来说是一个更好的战略。

But I think the scenario of decapitation strikes, killing Khamenei, taking out the entire government could potentially lead to that scenario.

但我认为斩首袭击、杀死哈梅内伊、推翻整个政府的情况可能会导致这种情况。

I think we have to be conscious of that.

我认为我们必须意识到这一点。

We have to guard against that.

我们必须警惕这种情况。

I think that’s important.

我认为这很重要。

Lex Fridman1:54:17

Scott, what do you think is the best case and the worst case here?

斯科特,你认为最好的情况和最坏的情况是什么?

Scott Horton1:54:20

Well, the best case scenario is that we quit right now and that Trump figures out a way to reorder some paragraphs and get back in something like the JCPOA, which was also signed with the rest of the UN security council power.

好吧,最好的情况是我们现在就退出,特朗普想出一种方法来重新排列某些段落,并重新加入《联合全面行动计划》之类的内容,该协议也是与联合国安理会其他权力机构签署的。

Lex Fridman1:54:34

Can I ask you like JCPOA is a pretty good approximation of what would be a good deal?

我能问一下,联合全面行动计划(JCPOA)是一个很好的近似协议吗?

Scott Horton1:54:39

Pretty good.

不错。

1:54:39 It could have been better, as I said at the beginning.

正如我一开始所说,它本来可以更好。

Trump could have gone in there and tried to negotiate a better result with the sunset provisions on some of those things.

特朗普本可以介入并尝试就其中一些问题与日落条款进行谈判以获得更好的结果。

But the concept that America is just going to insist on zero enrichment, zero nuclear program whatsoever when they have the unalienable “in the nonproliferation treaty to civilian nuclear material and a civilian program”, it’s a poison pill.

但是,当美国拥有不可剥夺的“民用核材料和民用核不扩散条约”时,美国就会坚持零浓缩、零核计划,这是一颗毒丸。

It’s meant to fail just like it was a poison pill meant to destroy the tox here, good enough to start a war.

它注定会失败,就像它是一颗毒丸,旨在摧毁这里的毒素,足以引发一场战争。

Again, as I quoted from earlier, he said on TV last week, “Well, America has to take out Fordo now because now they’re more likely to break out towards a nuke.” I think that’s exactly right.

正如我早些时候引用的那样,他上周在电视上说,“好吧,美国现在必须消灭福尔多,因为现在他们更有可能冲向核武器。”我认为这是完全正确的。

There still is, or there’s strong reason to be skeptical, including Israeli and American officials told the New York Times that they thought that the damage was quite incomplete.

仍然存在,或者有充分的理由持怀疑态度,包括以色列和美国官员告诉《纽约时报》,他们认为损害相当不完整。

Mark Dubowitz1:55:34

The IAEA just came out recently just point of fact, sort of interesting.

国际原子能机构最近刚刚发布了事实,有点有趣。

1:55:34 We’ll see on the battle damage assessment, but they actually think the facility was destroyed and that the sensitive centrifuges were destroyed.

我们将看到战斗损失评估,但他们实际上认为设施被摧毁,敏感的离心机被摧毁。

Just interesting for the viewers.

只是对观众来说很有趣。

It may be premature.

这可能还为时过早。

Scott Horton1:55:50

All the uranium mines, and all the aluminum smelters so that they can’t make any more centrifuges.

所有的铀矿和所有的铝冶炼厂都不能再制造离心机了。

Mark Dubowitz1:55:55

Interesting assessment.

有趣的评估。

Scott Horton1:55:57

They know how to make centrifuges.

他们知道如何制造离心机。

1:55:57 At this point, this is why government doesn’t work.

在这一点上,这就是政府不起作用的原因。

They make matters worse and create more work for themselves and make things worse and worse and worse.

他们让事情变得更糟,为自己创造更多的工作,让事情变得越来越糟。

We can make the same criticism about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine making matters worse for themselves and causing them to have to escalate even further.

我们可以对俄罗斯入侵乌克兰提出同样的批评,这会让事情变得更糟,并导致他们不得不进一步升级。

Lex Fridman1:57:05

Can you go into the analysis of best case and worst case?

您能分析一下最好情况和最坏情况吗?

1:57:05 You laid out the best case.

你列出了最好的情况。

What’s the worst case would be feet on the ground?

最糟糕的情况是什么?

Scott Horton1:57:06

Worst case is this.

最坏的情况是这样的。

Mark Dubowitz1:57:12

What was the best case?

最好的情况是什么?

1:57:12 I missed it.

我错过了。

The best case is a deal?

最好的情况是达成协议吗?

Scott Horton1:57:15

Yeah, that we quit now.

是的,我们现在就退出。

Mark Dubowitz1:57:16

The deal.

这笔交易。

Lex Fridman1:57:17

Basically, you guys agree on the best case.

基本上,你们都同意最好的情况。

Scott Horton1:57:19

We respect their right to a civilian nuclear program and try to negotiate, as I said, back into something like the JCPOA, which again had them exporting their entire stockpile of uranium out of the country.

正如我所说,我们尊重他们开展民用核计划的权利,并尝试通过谈判回到《联合全面行动计划》之类的协议,该协议再次要求他们将全部铀库存出口到国外。

Lex Fridman1:57:31

[inaudible 01:57:31].

[听不清 01:57:31]。

Scott Horton1:57:31

He wants no nuclear program whatsoever.

他不希望有任何核计划。

Mark Dubowitz1:57:33

No, no, that’s not what I said.

不,不,我不是这么说的。

1:57:33 That’s not what I said.

那不是我说的。

Be careful what I said.

小心我说的话。

Scott Horton1:57:36

Well, no enrichment capabilities [inaudible 01:57:38].

好吧,没有丰富能力 [听不清 01:57:38]。

Mark Dubowitz1:57:38

[inaudible 01:57:38].

[听不清 01:57:38]。

Scott Horton1:57:38

[inaudible 01:57:38] entire dependence on other countries to supply their fuel needs.

[听不清 01:57:38] 完全依赖其他国家来满足其燃料需求。

Lex Fridman1:57:41

Can you teach me the difference when we [inaudible 01:57:43]?

你能教我我们之间的区别吗 [听不清 01:57:43]?

Mark Dubowitz1:57:42

Let me just step back from this because we agree on some and we disagree on a major issue.

让我退后一步,因为我们在一些问题上意见一致,但在一个重大问题上存在分歧。

1:57:42 Then if we both agree Iran deserves a civilian nuclear program-

那么如果我们都同意伊朗值得拥有民用核计划-

Scott Horton1:57:52

The point is the Ayatollah is never going to give in on enrichment.

关键是阿亚图拉永远不会在致富问题上让步。

Mark Dubowitz1:57:55

Can I just-

我可以-

Scott Horton1:57:55

We know that.

我们知道这一点。

1:57:55 That’s a premise for our whole discussion here.

这是我们整个讨论的前提。

Therefore, what he’s saying is we’re going to have to keep escalating the war until the mission is accomplished.

因此,他的意思是我们必须不断升级战争,直到任务完成。

Mark Dubowitz1:58:03

Not sure I said that.

不确定我是否这么说过。

1:58:03 Scott, I think it’s, again, important that the distinction here.

斯科特,我认为这里的区别很重要。

We both agree that Iran deserves a civilian nuclear program.

我们都同意伊朗应该有民用核计划。

23 countries have civilian nuclear programs and they don’t have enrichment and they don’t have reprocessing.

23 个国家有民用核计划,但没有浓缩,也没有后处理。

Where we differ is, I don’t think Iran should have the Iran standard.

我们的不同之处在于,我认为伊朗不应该有伊朗标准。

I think that Iran should agree to the gold standard that 23 US allies have agreed to.

我认为伊朗应该同意美国23个盟友已经同意的金本位制。

Have civilian nuclear program, but you don’t get to keep the key enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that you need to develop nuclear weapons.

拥有民用核计划,但无法保留开发核武器所需的关键浓缩和后处理能力。

Scott Horton1:58:34

Do you think that Bill Clinton should have just let the Chinese sell them the light water reactor that they wanted to back in the ’90s?

你认为比尔·克林顿应该让中国人把他们在 90 年代想要的轻水反应堆卖给他们吗?

Mark Dubowitz1:58:40

America, of course, allowed Russia to sell them a heavy water reactor for the same purpose.

当然,美国允许俄罗斯出于同样的目的向他们出售一座重水反应堆。

1:58:40 But I agree with Scott that I think one of the ways out of this is, yes, whether it’s the Chinese or preferably as an American, I prefer the Americans actually sell reactors to the Iranians, a great nuclear industry in this country.

但我同意斯科特的观点,我认为解决这个问题的方法之一是,是的,无论是中国人还是最好是美国人,我更喜欢美国人实际上向伊朗人出售反应堆,这是这个国家一个伟大的核工业。

Let’s do that.

让我们这样做吧。

But if they can’t, the South Koreans can, the Russians can, the Chinese can.

但如果他们不能,韩国人可以,俄罗斯人可以,中国人可以。

I wouldn’t want to have significant Russian and Chinese influence in Iran, so better that it’d be a western country that does it.

我不希望俄罗斯和中国对伊朗产生重大影响,最好是西方国家这样做。

Nevertheless, provide those reactors.

尽管如此,还是提供那些反应堆。

They’re proliferation proof.

它们是扩散证明。

There’s no enrichment and no reprocessing.

没有浓缩,也没有再加工。

You buy your fuel rods from abroad, you put them in the reactors, you power the Iranian electrical grid, which is in terrible shape because the Ayatollah has spent a half a trillion dollars trying to build nuclear weapons.

你从国外购买燃料棒,将它们放入反应堆,为伊朗电网供电,而伊朗电网的状况很糟糕,因为阿亚图拉花费了五万亿美元试图制造核武器。

They’re not trying to provide electricity for these people.

他们并不是想为这些人提供电力。

Scott Horton2:00:23

Can I ask you, you were saying you supported the JCPOA, you were opposed to it.

请问一下,你说你支持全面协议,你说你反对。

Mark Dubowitz2:00:23

No, no, I was opposed to JCPOA.

不,不,我反对联合全面行动计划。

Scott Horton2:00:28

That’s right.

这是正确的。

2:00:28 You were opposed to withdrawing from it?

你反对退出吗?

Mark Dubowitz2:00:30

Yeah.

是的。

Scott Horton2:00:30

Don’t you think that Trump could have gone over there and negotiate to make it better?

你不认为特朗普可以去那里进行谈判以使情况变得更好吗?

2:00:30 Would you agree that it was a huge mistake to withdraw that because they were, as we agreed, shipping out all of their enriched uranium to only be brought back in a form that they could not use to make nukes.

你是否同意,撤回是一个巨大的错误,因为正如我们所同意的,他们将所有浓缩铀运出,只是以他们无法用来制造核武器的形式带回来。

The scientists had decided that if they kicked all the inspectors out and beat their chests and started making a nuke, it would take them a full year to have enough weapons grade uranium for a single gun type nuke under the JCPOA.

科学家们决定,如果他们把所有检查员赶出去,捶胸顿足,开始制造核武器,那么他们将需要一整年的时间才能在联合全面行动计划下获得足够的武器级铀来制造单枪型核武器。

Mark Dubowitz2:00:58

Let me ask you a question.

让我问你一个问题。

Scott Horton2:00:59

Yeah.

是的。

Mark Dubowitz2:00:59

Because you’re right.

因为你是对的。

2:00:59 I mean, I’m glad you’ve pointed out because I tried to take a nuanced position during the JCPOA debate, and I got hammered by the left and I got hammered by the right.

我的意思是,我很高兴你指出了这一点,因为我在联合全面行动计划辩论中试图采取微妙的立场,但我遭到了左翼的打击,也遭到了右翼的打击。

The left hammered me because I criticized the JCPOA because it’s fundamental flaw was twofold.

左派猛烈抨击我,因为我批评了《联合全面行动计划》,因为它有双重根本缺陷。

One, it gave Iran enrichment capability that would expand over time as the restrictions sunset it.

第一,它赋予伊朗浓缩能力,随着限制的解除,这种能力将随着时间的推移而扩大。

Number two, the sunsets were going to kick in and Iran would emerge with this industrial size program, which we would not be able to stop.

第二,日落即将到来,伊朗将出现这个工业规模的计划,我们将无法阻止它。

Now, the nuanced position, which I got hammered on by the right, was I said, “Go negotiate with the Europeans.

现在,我受到右翼猛烈抨击的微妙立场是,“去与欧洲人谈判。

Agree on a common transatlantic position to approach the Iranians and say, ‘Look, that deal that we did back in 2015, we think it’s flawed.

就跨大西洋的共同立场达成一致,与伊朗人接触并说,‘看,我们 2015 年达成的协议,我们认为它是有缺陷的。

We want to extend that deal.

我们希望延长该协议。

We want to get rid of the sunsets and we are going to negotiate a deal.'” Now, does that mean we have to give you more sanctions relief?

我们想要摆脱日落,我们将通过谈判达成协议。”现在,这是否意味着我们必须给予你们更多的制裁减免?

Yeah, probably.

是的,可能是。

The Iranians are not going to just agree without sanctions relief.

如果不解除制裁,伊朗人不会轻易同意。

Scott Horton2:02:20

But what I’m asking you is if say you were the national security advisor under the JCPOA where they’re still shipping all their enriched uranium out of the country and all that, which you would be advising him to not leave, in the negotiations to improve the deal, would you have been willing to accept some level of enrichment then as long as we have the restriction part where they’re shipping it all out of the country, or to you, enrichment at all is always a red line, essentially equivalent to them being 99% of the way to a nuclear weapon?

但我要问你的是,如果说你是《联合全面行动计划》下的国家安全顾问,他们仍在将所有浓缩铀运出该国以及所有这些,你会建议他在改善协议的谈判中不要离开,那么只要我们有限制部分,他们将所有浓缩铀全部运出该国,或者对你而言,浓缩始终是一条红线,本质上相当于他们99%的路都通往核武器?

Mark Dubowitz2:02:53

Look, enrichment capability is a red line.

看,浓缩能力是一条红线。

2:02:53 It has to be a red line.

应该是一条红线。

Scott Horton2:02:58

Even though you know it’s protected by the NPT, the right to peace nuclear technology?

即使你知道和平核技术的权利受到《不扩散核武器条约》的保护?

2:02:58 They call it a loophole, but they have the right to enrich uranium.

他们称之为漏洞,但他们有权浓缩铀。

Mark Dubowitz2:03:05

There’s different interpretations of everything, including agreements.

对一切事物都有不同的解释,包括协议。

2:03:05 There is a raging debate about whether the NPT actually gives you a right to enrich.

关于《不扩散核武器条约》是否真正赋予你致富的权利,存在着激烈的争论。

In fact, the Obama administration, even with the JCPOA, was not willing to recognize Iran’s right to enrich, but they were willing to recognize its de facto reality that they were enriching.

事实上,奥巴马政府即使有了联合全面行动计划,也不愿意承认伊朗的浓缩权,但他们愿意承认伊朗正在浓缩的事实。

Lex Fridman2:03:26

Can you explain NPT?

你能解释一下《NPT》吗?

Mark Dubowitz2:03:27

It’s the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

这是《不扩散条约》。

2:03:27 Iran is a member of it.

伊朗是其中的成员。

It’s supposed to promote peaceful civilian nuclear energy, and it’s supposed to prevent countries from developing nuclear weapons.

它应该促进和平民用核能,并且应该防止各国发展核武器。

I think that’s a basic summary of it.

我认为这就是它的基本总结。

Scott Horton2:03:41

It mandates that non-nuclear weapons states have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and full of additional protocols and whatever, where they have the right to inspect.

它要求无核武器国家与国际原子能机构签订保障协议以及完整的附加议定书等,并有权进行检查。

Mark Dubowitz2:03:42

Which Iran refused to sign, by the way.

顺便说一句,伊朗拒绝签署。

Scott Horton2:03:52

Well, no, they had an additional protocol that they were abiding, not even enriching at all while they were negotiating with the E-III.

好吧,不,他们在与 E-III 谈判时有一个他们遵守的附加协议,甚至根本没有丰富。

2:03:52 Then what the JCPOA really did was add a bunch of additional protocols and subsidiary arrangements and agreements.

那么联合全面行动计划真正做的就是增加了一堆附加协议和附属安排和协议。

Mark Dubowitz2:03:52

Iran refused …

伊朗拒绝...

Scott Horton2:04:00

Had a bunch of additional protocols and subsidiary arrangements and agreements [inaudible 02:04:04].

有一堆附加协议和附属安排和协议 [听不清 02:04:04]。

Mark Dubowitz2:04:04

Ironically refused to ratify the additional protocol.

具有讽刺意味的是拒绝批准附加议定书。

2:04:04 I just wanted just be clear on the facts.

我只是想澄清事实。

I mean, it’s really important.

我的意思是,这真的很重要。

Scott Horton2:04:07

Well, at which point in time did they refuse to ratify?

那么,他们在什么时候拒绝批准呢?

2:04:07 Because they did ratify the JCPOA, which was full of additional protocols and subsidiary arrangements and agreements they’re called.

因为他们确实批准了《联合全面行动计划》,其中充满了附加协议、附属安排和协议。

Mark Dubowitz2:04:17

There’s an important additional protocol that Iran refused.

伊朗拒绝了一项重要的附加议定书。

Scott Horton2:04:19

Which one was that?

那是哪一个?

2:04:19 The one where they promised not to enrich at all, which they actually did abide by while they were negotiating with the E3 in the W.

他们承诺完全不致富,而他们在西部与 E3 谈判时确实遵守了这一承诺。

Bush years before they even started spinning centric engines in response.

布什甚至在他们开始旋转中心发动机作为回应之前几年。

Mark Dubowitz2:04:30

The important point is that you asked me what I would advise the National Security Advisor of the United States, or if I was the National Security Advisor of the United States, which I guess I can’t be because I’m a foreigner, but the fact of the matter is-

重要的一点是,你问我会给美国国家安全顾问什么建议,或者如果我是美国国家安全顾问,我想我不可能,因为我是外国人,但事实是——

Scott Horton2:04:39

I think you could still be National Security Advisor.

我认为你仍然可以担任国家安全顾问。

2:04:39 Zbigniew Brzezinski sure was.

兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基确实是。

Lex Fridman2:04:43

I think he was taking a shot back at the fact that you took a shot.

我认为他是在反击你开枪的事实。

Scott Horton2:04:46

You know what, Lex?

你知道吗,莱克斯?

2:04:46 I think that you probably would recognize that there are many people who lobby for Israel’s interests in the United States who clearly don’t care that much about what happens to the United States of America in it as a consequence because they care about Israel, which is a different country than America, right?

我想你可能会认识到,有很多人在美国游说以色列的利益,但他们显然不太关心美利坚合众国的后果,因为他们关心以色列,因为以色列是一个与美国不同的国家,对吗?

It’s not part of the 50 states.

它不属于 50 个州。

Lex Fridman2:05:05

I think an American citizen cares primarily about America.

我认为美国公民首先关心的是美国。

2:05:05 That is a fundamental belief for me.

这是我的基本信念。

To make an accusation that they don’t requires a very large amount of proof for each individual.

要指控他们不这样做,不需要每个人提供大量证据。

I don’t care.

我不在乎。

Scott Horton2:05:19

Pretend that American and Israel’s interests are the same, requires a tremendous amount of cognitive dissonance by those who support Israel’s interests.

假装美国和以色列的利益是相同的,需要那些支持以色列利益的人产生巨大的认知失调。

Mark Dubowitz2:05:28

He’s right.

他是对的。

2:05:28 They’re not all the same.

它们并不完全相同。

Scott Horton2:05:29

State sponsor of terror as though Iran has anything to do with anti-American terrorists.

恐怖主义的国家支持者,好像伊朗与反美恐怖分子有任何关系。

Lex Fridman2:05:35

I don’t know who is the they that we’re talking about, but I believe American citizens care about America first.

我不知道我们正在谈论的他们是谁,但我相信美国公民首先关心美国。

2:05:35 They may discuss how their nations and the interests in the Middle East or in Europe and those interests might align with their own worldview, whatever.

他们可能会讨论他们的国家和中东或欧洲的利益以及这些利益如何与他们自己的世界观保持一致。

But when it comes, at the end of the day, if everybody starts a war with everybody else, they’re America first.

但当它到来时,归根结底,如果每个人都与其他人发动战争,那么他们就是美国优先。

I am America first.

我首先是美国。

If there’s a war that breaks out and we have to pick up guns, I’m fighting for America.

如果爆发战争,我们必须拿起枪,我会为美国而战。

Scott Horton2:06:05

I’ll take them on a case by case basis.

我会根据具体情况来对待它们。

Lex Fridman2:06:07

Case is great.

案例很棒。

Scott Horton2:06:07

I know immigrants.

我了解移民。

2:06:07 I know immigrants who are absolutely super patriots who know American history and love and care about America more than their next door neighbors who are from here, but that ain’t universal.

我认识一些移民,他们绝对是超级爱国者,他们了解美国历史,比来自这里的隔壁邻居更热爱和关心美国,但这并不普遍。

Okay?

好的?

Lex Fridman2:06:19

Sure.

当然。

2:06:19 Let’s talk about case by case then.

那我们就具体情况来谈吧。

That’s fine.

没关系。

Mark Dubowitz2:06:21

Well, I think he’s clearly accusing me.

嗯,我认为他显然是在指责我。

Scott Horton2:06:24

I think a worse war with Iran.

我认为与伊朗的战争会更糟糕。

2:06:24 He was entertaining the possibility of putting ground troops in there, [inaudible 02:06:29] catastrophe for this country.

他正在考虑在那里部署地面部队的可能性,[听不清 02:06:29] 这对这个国家来说是一场灾难。

Lex Fridman2:06:29

Don’t take personal shots.

请勿拍摄个人照片。

2:06:29 Don’t take personal shots.

请勿拍摄个人照片。

Either of you.

你们中的任何一个。

You’ve taken personal shots.

您拍摄了个人照片。

Let’s not do it.

我们不要这样做。

You guys are just having fun and I’m having fun.

你们只是玩得很​​开心,我也很开心。

Scott Horton2:06:36

Just on the idea here.

只是这里的想法。

Mark Dubowitz2:06:37

Let me respond.

让我回应一下。

Scott Horton2:06:37

He said that there, there’s a threat from the missiles.

他说那里存在来自导弹的威胁。

2:06:37 There’s a threat from Iranian missiles to America’s bases in the Middle East.

伊朗导弹对美国在中东的基地构成威胁。

Yeah.

是的。

Because of Israel and because of this war, the first time Iran ever fired missiles at an American base over there was in response to Trump bombing them.

由于以色列和这场战争,伊朗第一次向那里的美国基地发射导弹是为了回应特朗普轰炸他们。

Mark Dubowitz2:06:53

Never Iran’s fault.

从来都不是伊朗的错。

2:06:53 It’s never Iran’s fault.

这从来都不是伊朗的错。

Scott Horton2:06:55

Is that what everybody thinks?

大家都是这么想的吗?

Mark Dubowitz2:06:56

Never his [inaudible 02:06:57] fault.

从来不是他的[听不清 02:06:57] 的错。

Scott Horton2:06:56

It was Iran who started this?

这是伊朗发起的?

Mark Dubowitz2:06:58

Never Iran’s fault.

从来都不是伊朗的错。

2:06:58 Let’s bring it back, Scott.

让我们把它带回来,斯科特。

What a joke.

真是个笑话。

Lex Fridman2:06:58

Hold on a second.

等一下。

Mark Dubowitz2:07:01

Scott.

斯科特.

2:07:01 It’s a remarkable management.

这是一个了不起的管理。

I want to reiterate this-

我想重申这一点——

Scott Horton2:07:03

Trump bombed Ordo and then Iran shot missiles at Qatar and Iraq.

特朗普轰炸了鄂尔多,然后伊朗向卡塔尔和伊拉克发射了导弹。

Mark Dubowitz2:07:08

Scott, you’re a patriotic American.

斯科特,你是一个爱国的美国人。

2:07:08 God bless you.

上帝保佑你。

God bless the United States.

上帝保佑美国。

Thank you for allowing me to come to this country and become an American.

感谢您让我来到这个国家并成为一名美国人。

It’s a great country and as a patriotic American, I assume that the United States government and the United States intelligence community and the United States military has America’s best interest at heart.

这是一个伟大的国家,作为一个爱国的美国人,我认为美国政府、美国情报界和美国军方都把美国的最大利益放在心上。

However, we have learned from the history, and Scott’s done a very good job of detailing this during the Iraq war, that the United States gets it wrong.

然而,我们从历史中吸取教训,而且斯科特在伊拉克战争期间很好地详细说明了这一点,美国的做法是错误的。

I don’t think the United States lied us into war, but the United States got it wrong.

我不认为美国撒谎让我们陷入战争,但美国错了。

So I think Scott’s right.

所以我认为斯科特是对的。

We must make sure that we learn the lessons of Iraq, but not overlearn the lessons of Iraq.

我们必须确保我们吸取伊拉克的教训,但不要过度吸取伊拉克的教训。

I would also say this.

我也想说这个。

There are many lobby organizations in the United States.

美国有很多游说组织。

There’s the China lobby, there’s the oil lobby, there’s the pharmaceutical lobby, there’s the Qatar lobby.

有中国游说团,有石油游说团,有制药游说团,还有卡塔尔游说团。

Scott Horton2:10:52

They don’t have any 90% enriched uranium.

他们没有任何 90% 的浓缩铀。

2:10:52 He just means hypothetically, if they did have some, to be clear.

他只是假设,如果他们确实有的话,需要澄清一下。

Mark Dubowitz2:10:58

You know the 60%, that’s 99% of the way to 90% enriched uranium.

你知道 60%,即 99%,就是 90% 浓缩铀的方法。

2:10:58 By the way, you can make a crude nuclear device with 60% enriched uranium.

顺便说一下,你可以用60%的浓缩铀制造一个粗制核装置。

I just want to put that on the record, but he lost that key conversion facility that turns 90% enriched uranium or even 60% enriched uranium into uranium metal.

我只是想把这一点记录下来,但他失去了将 90% 浓缩铀甚至 60% 浓缩铀转化为铀金属的关键转化设施。

You need uranium metal to fashion a crude nuclear device or a warhead.

您需要铀金属来制造原始核装置或弹头。

That’s been destroyed.

那已经被毁掉了。

And when I was coming in this morning, I just checked, I thought it was interesting and a whole lot of discussion about the fact that about 12 or 16 trucks showed up at Fordo in the days before the U.S strikes and moved something out of Fordo.

今天早上我来的时候,我刚刚查了一下,我认为这很有趣,并且有很多关于这样一个事实的讨论:在美国罢工之前的几天里,大约有 12 或 16 辆卡车出现在福尔多,并将一些东西运出了福尔多。

Well, according to reports, just this morning, we’ll see if they’re verified.

嗯,据报道,就在今天早上,我们将看看它们是否得到验证。

I don’t trust single sourcing.

我不相信单一来源。

I don’t trust what some reporter just says in their stories because reporters got it wrong over and over again, especially all the ones who accuse President Trump have been a Russian agent.

我不相信某些记者在报道中所说的话,因为记者们一次又一次地犯错,尤其是那些指责特朗普总统是俄罗斯特工的人。

Scott Horton2:14:14

Who thinks that if they break out and try to start making nukes now that any hawks supporting this war will take responsibility for driving them to it.

谁会想到,如果他们突然爆发并试图开始制造核武器,那么任何支持这场战争的鹰派都会承担驱使他们走向战争的责任。

Lex Fridman2:14:22

So the suggestion you’re making is we’re actually driving as opposed to doing the opposite, we’re actually driving them to develop nuclear weapons.

所以你提出的建议是,我们实际上是在推动而不是相反,我们实际上是在推动他们发展核武器。

Scott Horton2:14:31

Of course.

当然。

2:14:31 That’s right.

这是正确的。

Lex Fridman2:14:31

Can you make the case of that?

你能证明这一点吗?

Scott Horton2:14:32

Yeah.

是的。

2:14:32 Previously he said, “Let’s take the Ayatollah at his word that he only wants a civilian electricity program.” Well, let’s not take him at his word.

此前他曾表示,“让我们相信阿亚图拉的话,他只想要民用电力项目。”好吧,我们不要相信他的话。

Again, I never said in this conversation, “Trust the Ayatollah.” He did.

再说一次,我在这次谈话中从未说过“相信阿亚图拉”。他做到了。

Now he’s kind of-,

现在他有点-,

Mark Dubowitz2:14:47

Yeah, but you said that the Ayatollah doesn’t want nuclear a weapons programs.

是的,但你说过阿亚图拉不想要核武器计划。

2:14:47 Scott, you were very clear about that.

斯科特,你说得很清楚。

Scott Horton2:14:51

What I said-

我说的是——

Mark Dubowitz2:14:53

Ayatollah never wanted a nuclear weapons program.

阿亚图拉从来不想要核武器计划。

2:14:53 Are you going back on that now?

你现在要回去吗?

Scott Horton2:14:55

Jesus Christ.

耶稣基督。

2:14:55 What I was very clear about from my very first statement when we sat down was that the Ayatollah was building himself a latent nuclear deterrent, putting Iran as what they call a threshold nuclear weapons state just like Brazil and Germany and Japan, so that everyone knows they have mastered the fuel cycle, they could enrich uranium up to 90%, don’t make me do it.

当我们坐下来时,我的第一个发言中我就非常清楚地知道,阿亚图拉正在为自己建立一个潜在的核威慑力量,将伊朗视为他们所谓的核武器门槛国家,就像巴西、德国和日本一样,这样每个人都知道他们已经掌握了燃料循环,他们可以将铀浓缩到90%,别让我这么做。

That was his position.

这就是他的立场。

Mark Dubowitz2:14:55

None of those countries have a nuclear weapons program.

这些国家都没有核武器计划。

None of them.

没有一个。

Scott Horton2:15:18

Did you ever hear me say anything about believing the Ayatollah saying he only wanted an electricity program?

你有没有听过我说过相信阿亚图拉说他只想要一个电力项目?

2:15:18 This is why enrichment is a red line.

这就是为什么浓缩是一条红线。

It’s because if all the enrichment is done overseas somewhere, then it’s not a latent nuclear deterrent at all.

这是因为,如果所有浓缩活动都在海外某个地方进行,那么它根本就不是潜在的核威慑力量。

Mark Dubowitz2:15:37

So it’s a red line for you, as well as for me, we agree, Scott.

所以这对你和我来说都是一条红线,我们同意,斯科特。

Scott Horton2:15:40

I’m saying it’s a red line for the Ayatollah that he’s clearly not going to give in on, and it’s a poison pill by the Israelis in the west.

我是说,这是阿亚图拉的红线,他显然不会屈服,也是西方以色列人的毒丸。

2:15:40 They know he’s never going to give up enrichment a hundred percent because that’s the whole point of it.

他们知道他永远不会百分百放弃丰富,因为这就是重点。

So it’s just disingenuous to say, “Oh, let’s believe him that he wants an electricity program.” He’s not saying that.

因此,说“哦,让我们相信他想要一个电力项目”是不诚实的。他不是这么说的。

I don’t even think that’s his official position.

我什至不认为这是他的官方立场。

Or if it is, it’s with a strong implication as everyone understands that it’s a latent nuclear weapons capability and a potential actual nuclear weapons capability.

或者,如果是的话,那就具有强烈的含义,因为每个人都明白这是一种潜在的核武器能力和潜在的实际核武器能力。

Lex Fridman2:16:13

To you, a deal will have to include enrichment.

对你来说,交易必须包括致富。

Scott Horton2:16:15

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman2:16:16

That is a red line.

那是一条红线。

2:16:16 He will move off.

他会离开。

Scott Horton2:16:17

Yes.

是的。

2:16:17 And then the thing is too, just like I was saying before, if Trump had come in 2017 and said, “Screw this, I hate this deal.” And then got on a plane and flown straight to Tehran and said, or sent his guys and said, “Now listen here Ayatollah, I want to fix this deal up better.” I think that he really could have, and I already said, I don’t know the details, but I believe Mark when he says that the Europeans were being intransigent on that.

然后事情也是如此,就像我之前说的,如果特朗普在 2017 年上任并说:“管他的,我讨厌这笔交易。”然后坐上飞机,直飞德黑兰,说,或者派他的人说,“现在听着,阿亚图拉,我想更好地解决这笔交易。”我认为他确实可以这样做,我已经说过,我不知道细节,但我相信马克,当他说欧洲人对此毫不妥协时。

And again, I criticized the CIA and FBI for framing Trump for treason, for preventing him from being able to work with the Russians to see if maybe they could put pressure on the Ayatollah to deal with him.

我再次批评中央情报局和联邦调查局指责特朗普犯有叛国罪,阻止他与俄罗斯人合作,看看他们是否可以向阿亚图拉施加压力来对付他。

Mark Dubowitz2:17:39

Can I just say technically, just I think, again, important for your listeners trying understand, under the JCPOA, Iran is allowed to keep a stockpile of a maximum of 300 kilograms, as I remember, of 3.67% enriched material.

我可以从技术上说吗,我想,再次,对于试图理解的听众来说很重要,根据 JCPOA,伊朗被允许保留最多 300 公斤的库存,据我所知,是 3.67% 的浓缩材料。

2:17:39 They’re allowed to continue to enrich as long as if they go over the 300 kilogram, they have to continue to send that out to Russian, to Russia to blend down.

他们被允许继续浓缩,只要超过300公斤,他们就必须继续把它送到俄罗斯,送到俄罗斯进行混合。

And so they kept the enrichment capability, the ability to enrich.

所以他们保留了丰富的能力,丰富的能力。

They did keep a stockpile.

他们确实保留了库存。

Scott’s right.

斯科特是对的。

They’re not allowed in those early years to go under 3.67%.

早些年不允许他们的利率低于 3.67%。

They would be allowed to go to 20% and 60% and 90% as the restrictions sunsetted, but they were able to keep all of those key capabilities.

随着限制的取消,他们将被允许达到 20%、60% 和 90%,但他们能够保留所有这些关键能力。

So I just want to clarify just technically what the JCPOA actually said and what it didn’t say.

所以我只想从技术上澄清《联合全面行动计划》实际上说了些什么,没有说了什么。

Lex Fridman2:18:30

Yeah.

是的。

2:18:30 Can you comment on the so-called Operation Midnight Hammer?

您能否对所谓的“午夜之锤行动”发表评论?

Now that we can look back at it, what parts were successful, what parts were a mistake?

现在我们可以回顾一下,哪些部分是成功的,哪些部分是错误的?

Was the whole operation a mistake that accelerates the Iran nuclear program or the incentives for it?

整个行动是加速伊朗核计划的错误还是其诱因?

Or is there some components that actually is a disincentive for Iran to develop the program?

或者是否有一些因素实际上阻碍了伊朗开发该计划?

And then maybe you can comment on the same.

然后也许你可以对此发表评论。

It’d be nice just to get comments on each.

如果能得到对每个问题的评论就太好了。

Scott Horton2:18:56

Well, I think we really don’t know, right?

好吧,我想我们真的不知道,对吧?

2:18:56 There’s some initial battle assessments and arguments and all that about just how much was destroyed, and we don’t know exactly what their reaction is going to be.

有一些初步的战斗评估和争论以及所有关于到底有多少被摧毁的事情,我们不知道他们到底会做出什么反应。

There were reports of them saying, “Hey, we’re already starting up a new facility somewhere else.” There were reports where they said, “Hey, a lot of our centrifuges survived and we’re going to start spinning them up right now,” and this kind of thing.

有报道称,他们说:“嘿,我们已经在其他地方开设了一个新设施。”有报道称,“嘿,我们的很多离心机都幸存下来,我们现在就要开始旋转它们”,诸如此类的事情。

The potential is there.

潜力就在那里。

I don’t know what the Ayatollah is going to do.

我不知道阿亚图拉要做什么。

And I think this goes to the larger argument about the apocalyptic threat of the Ayatollah, which Mark has not made, but which Israel hawks often do that these guys just can’t wait to get into a war and all this.

我认为这涉及到关于阿亚图拉的世界末日威胁的更大争论,马克没有提出这一点,但以色列鹰派经常这样做,这些人迫不及待地想卷入战争和所有这一切。

In fact, if you look at Iran-

事实上,如果你看看伊朗——

Mark Dubowitz2:19:35

Well, they’re in a war, but the argument I make is they’re not going to use a nuclear weapon.

好吧,他们正在打仗,但我的论点是他们不会使用核武器。

Scott Horton2:19:39

Jesus, man, you stop me, you interrupt me every time I try to say anything.

天哪,伙计,你阻止了我,每次我想说些什么时你就打断我。

Mark Dubowitz2:19:41

But Scott, just You’re mischaracterizing what I’m saying.

但是斯科特,你只是误解了我所说的话。

2:19:41 I need to clarify when you mischaracterize.

当你错误描述时我需要澄清。

Lex Fridman2:19:45

He’s not interrupting every time, but sometimes interrupting.

他不是每次都打断,但有时会打断。

2:19:45 Yes.

是的。

So try not to interrupt as much.

所以尽量不要打扰太多。

Go ahead, Scott.

来吧,斯科特。

Don’t take it personally.

不要把它当成是针对你个人的。

Come on, let’s go.

来吧,我们走吧。

Scott Horton2:19:54

It seems like a deliberate attempt to obfuscate and prevent me-

这似乎是故意试图混淆视听并阻止我——

Lex Fridman2:19:58

It’s not.

事实并非如此。

Scott Horton2:19:58

From just being able to complete a point.

从仅仅能够完成一个点开始。

2:19:58 He does it virtually every time.

他几乎每次都会这样做。

Lex Fridman2:20:02

No, it’s not.

不,不是。

2:20:02 As a listener, I’m enjoying this.

作为一个听众,我很享受这个。

Scott Horton2:20:05

Well, look, on the face of it, they blew up a lot of stuff and they made them very angry.

好吧,看,从表面上看,他们炸毁了很多东西,这让他们非常生气。

2:20:05 So are they going to now give in or they’re now going to double down or they’re now going to hold still?

那么他们现在会屈服还是会加倍努力还是会按兵不动?

We don’t really know.

我们真的不知道。

As I was trying to explain, from the Ayatollah’s position that he’s in, what are you going to do with a problem like the United States of America, right?

正如我试图解释的那样,从阿亚图拉所处的位置来看,你将如何处理像美利坚合众国这样的问题,对吧?

They can chant great Satan, this and that all they want.

他们可以唱诵伟大的撒旦,随心所欲。

They have no ability to really threaten this country in any way.

他们没有能力以任何方式真正威胁这个国家。

And they know that America absolutely does have the ability to, in fact, even without nuclear weapons, essentially wipe their civilization off the face of the earth just with B52s if we wanted to carpet bomb their major cities.

他们知道,事实上,即使没有核武器,如果我们想对他们的主要城市进行地毯式轰炸,美国绝对有能力仅用 B52 轰炸机将他们的文明从地球上抹去。

So they know, the Ayatollah knows, he’s in a very difficult position.

所以他们知道,阿亚图拉也知道,他的处境非常困难。

Lex Fridman2:21:39

Zero casualties so far?

至今零伤亡?

Scott Horton2:21:40

Zero casualties so far.

截至目前零伤亡。

2:21:40 So what is going on there essentially is he’s got to do something.

所以本质上发生的事情是他必须做点什么。

He’s doing these symbolic strikes essentially to say like, “Hey, you can’t do that to me.” But then he’s also telegraphing that, “Hey, I can’t do anything about you and I don’t really want to fight.” And so in a way, he’s kind of backing down.

他做这些象征性的打击基本上是为了说,“嘿,你不能那样对我。”但随后他也表示,“嘿,我对你无能为力,我真的不想打架。”所以在某种程度上,他有点退缩了。

He’s doing, and then what did Donald Trump say?

他正在做,然后唐纳德·特朗普说了什么?

Donald Trump again, let him have the last word and in fact, bragged and mocked and said, “Hey, thanks Ayatollah for giving us a warning that you were about to shoot missiles at our base so we could be ready to shoot them all down,” and this kind of thing.

唐纳德·特朗普再次让他说了最后一句话,事实上,他吹嘘并嘲笑说,“嘿,感谢阿亚图拉向我们发出警告,你即将向我们的基地发射导弹,这样我们就可以准备好将它们全部击落”,诸如此类的事情。

And he said, “Now is the time for peace.” In other words, Trump again, letting the Ayatollah get the last word.

他说:“现在是和平的时候了。”换句话说,特朗普再次让阿亚图拉说了算。

Why?

为什么?

Because the Ayatollah, he might be a horrible leader if you live in Iran, but he is not perfectly, but essentially cautious in foreign policy because what’s he going to do?

因为阿亚图拉,如果你生活在伊朗,他可能是一个可怕的领导人,但他并不完美,但在外交政策上基本上是谨慎的,因为他要做什么?

Lex Fridman2:23:45

That is one of the fundamental disagreements in the room that you’re saying they really don’t have interest to develop a nuclear weapon.

这是房间里的根本分歧之一,你说他们确实没有兴趣发展核武器。

2:23:45 And they’re not quite-

而且他们并不完全是——

Scott Horton2:23:55

Well, not exactly.

嗯,不完全是。

2:23:55 I mean, what I said-

我的意思是,我说的是——

Lex Fridman2:23:57

More towards that direction, then Mark is saying-

更朝着这个方向,马克说——

Scott Horton2:23:59

More toward, but they’re saying, “Look at us.

更多的是,但他们说,“看看我们。

2:23:59 We’re a threshold state.

我们是一个阈值状态。

Don’t push your luck and force us to make the bad decision.” Now, that’s an implication.

不要碰运气,强迫我们做出错误的决定。”现在,这是一个暗示。

They have not said that outright, but clearly the implication is that if we force them, then they will go ahead and make a nuclear weapon.

他们没有直接这么说,但显然暗示如果我们强迫他们,那么他们就会继续制造核武器。

Lex Fridman2:24:16

What I mean is if left on their own devices, they would not develop.

我的意思是,如果留在他们自己的设备上,他们就不会发展。

2:24:16 That’s the case you’re making, the case-

这就是你正在做的案子,案子——

Scott Horton2:24:22

Well, not just on their own devices, but if we were to try to negotiate with them in good faith and try to have normal relations with them, that would disincentivize a nuclear weapon even further.

好吧,不仅仅是在他们自己的设备上,而且如果我们试图真诚地与他们谈判并尝试与他们建立正常关系,这将进一步抑制核武器的积极性。

Lex Fridman2:24:32

Okay.

好的。

2:24:32 Can you comment on the mission on operation and in general?

您能否对此次任务的运作和总体情况发表评论?

Mark Dubowitz2:24:34

Sure.

当然。

2:24:34 A couple of things I think were interesting, what Scott said, and I agree certainly with some of it.

斯科特所说的一些事情我认为很有趣,我当然同意其中的一些内容。

I mean, the first thing is I do believe President Trump has negotiated in good faith.

我的意思是,首先我确实相信特朗普总统已经真诚地进行了谈判。

I mean, he sent Steve Witkoff, he’s chief negotiator for five rounds of negotiations since he came in office.

我的意思是,他派了自上任以来担任首席谈判代表的史蒂夫·威特科夫(Steve Witkoff)进行了五轮谈判。

The second is, I mean, we can keep going around in circles, but the fact of the matter is I do believe that Iran and Iran-backed terrorist organizations have for since 1979 killed and tried to kill and maim Americans and taken them hostage.

我的意思是,第二个是,我们可以继续兜圈子,但事实是,我确实相信,自 1979 年以来,伊朗和伊朗支持的恐怖组织一直在杀害、试图杀害和残害美国人并将他们扣为人质。

I think it’s important for me again to put that on the record, but where I agree with with Scott is, and it’s interesting, and I don’t know if Khamenei has changed.

我认为再次将这一点记录下来对我来说很重要,但我同意斯科特的观点是,这很有趣,我不知道哈梅内伊是否已经改变。

He’s 86 years old.

他今年 86 岁了。

He’s been in power since 1989.

他自1989年以来一直掌权。

And there’s a little bit of history that I think is really interesting.

我认为有一些历史非常有趣。

Scott Horton2:28:55

Do you think that that might have anything to do with the fact that America attacked Iraq and Libya when they did not have weapons of mass destruction programs?

您认为这可能与美国在伊拉克和利比亚没有大规模杀伤性武器计划的情况下袭击它们有关吗?

Mark Dubowitz2:29:04

Can I tell you the Libya example?

我能告诉你利比亚的例子吗?

2:29:04 I think Scott is the most interesting one for me, right?

我认为斯科特对我来说是最有趣的,对吧?

Because the Libya example-

因为利比亚的例子——

Scott Horton2:29:09

When they lynched the guy?

他们什么时候用私刑处死那个人的?

Mark Dubowitz2:29:09

It was a big mistake.

这是一个很大的错误。

2:29:09 By the way, Ukraine is another good example of this.

顺便说一句,乌克兰是另一个很好的例子。

We went to the Libyans and we said, “You must fully dismantle your program.” And Gaddafi said, reluctantly under huge American pressure, “Okay, I’ll do it.” And the Brits and the Americans went in there and literally hauled out his entire nuclear-

我们去找利比亚人,我们说:“你们必须彻底废除你们的计划。”卡扎菲迫于美国的巨大压力,不情愿地说:“好吧,我就这么做。”英国人和美国人进入那里并把他的全部核-

Scott Horton2:29:26

It wasn’t really a program, it was just a bunch of AQ cons junk sitting in crates in a warehouse.

这并不是一个真正的程序,它只是仓库里的板条箱里的一堆 AQ 骗子的垃圾。

2:29:26 They did not have the capability to make a nuclear program at all in Libya.

他们根本没有能力在利比亚实施核计划。

They didn’t have the engineers, the scientists or anyone.

他们没有工程师、科学家或任何人。

So Gaddafi had bought that junk just to trade it away.

所以卡扎菲买了这些垃圾只是为了把它换掉。

Just to be clear, there never was a nuclear weapons program or a nuclear program of any kind in Libya, unlike what you just heard.

需要明确的是,利比亚从来没有核武器计划或任何类型的核计划,这与您刚才听到的不同。

Mark Dubowitz2:29:48

That wasn’t my point.

那不是我的意思。

2:29:48 Okay?

好的?

My point is you had a nuclear program-

我的观点是你有一个核计划-

Scott Horton2:29:51

Patents are important.

专利很重要。

Mark Dubowitz2:29:52

We can debate about, again, how we were debating about whether-

我们可以再次辩论我们如何辩论是否-

Scott Horton2:29:52

He had warehouses full of crates.

他的仓库里装满了板条箱。

Mark Dubowitz2:29:56

Again, it’s always Gaddafi and Khamenei and all these people, they don’t really want nuclear weapons.

再说一遍,总是卡扎菲和哈梅内伊以及所有这些人,他们并不真正想要核武器。

2:29:56 We just misunderstand them.

我们只是误解了他们。

But that’s not the point.

但这不是重点。

The point is, we did a deal with Gaddafi.

关键是,我们与卡扎菲达成了协议。

We pulled out his nuclear program and then I don’t know how many years later, but it wasn’t too many years late.

我们撤出了他的核计划,然后我不知道过了多少年,但也不算晚了太多年。

Scott Horton2:29:56

Seven.

七。

Mark Dubowitz2:30:10

Seven years later, thank you, Scott.

七年后,谢谢你,斯科特。

2:30:10 We actually took Gaddafi out and he didn’t have a nuclear program, so we took him out in the Libya operation.

我们实际上消灭了卡扎菲,而且他没有核计划,所以我们在利比亚行动中消灭了他。

Now, Ukraine is another great example.

现在,乌克兰是另一个很好的例子。

The Ukrainians after the fall of the Soviet Union, you know this, they had the Soviet nuclear arsenal or good parts of it on their soil.

苏联解体后的乌克兰人,你知道这一点,他们的土地上拥有苏联的核武库或其中的大部分。

So we went to them and we said, “All right, well here’s the deal for you.

所以我们去找他们说:“好吧,这是给你的交易。

Give up the nuclear arsenal off your territory, and we and the Russians and the French guarantee your territorial integrity and your sovereignty as a country.” So the Ukrainians said, “Fair deal to me,” gave up all the nuclear weapons, and then Putin has now invaded Ukraine twice.

放弃你们领土上的核武库,我们、俄罗斯人和法国人保证你们的领土完整和国家主权。”所以乌克兰人说,“对我来说公平交易”,放弃了所有核武器,然后普京现在两次入侵乌克兰。

Scott Horton2:30:49

That’s not what the Bucharest Declaration says, that we promised their security, we promised to respect it, and the Russians promised to, and both sides broke that promise.

这不是《布加勒斯特宣言》所说的,我们承诺他们的安全,我们承诺尊重它,俄罗斯人也承诺了,但双方都违背了这一承诺。

2:30:49 But there is nothing like a guarantee.

但没有什么比保证更好的了。

Mark Dubowitz2:30:59

That’s not my point.

这不是我的观点。

Scott Horton2:31:00

That America would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty.

美国将保护乌克兰的主权。

2:31:00 They gave up those nukes and they had no ability to use those nukes anyway, because they were Soviet nukes with Soviet codes and they belonged to the Soviet military, and the Ukrainians would’ve had no ability to use them or deliver.

他们放弃了这些核武器,无论如何他们都没有能力使用这些核武器,因为它们是带有苏联代码的苏联核武器,属于苏联军队,乌克兰人没有能力使用或交付它们。

They were married to missiles that were made to fly around the world, not to Russian next door.

他们与能够在世界各地飞行的导弹联姻,而不是与邻国俄罗斯联姻。

Mark Dubowitz2:31:18

But Scott, my point is, and I think you’ll agree with this, my point is if you’re Khamenei, and you’ve seen those two examples of Libya, you gave up your nuclear program, Gaddafi gets taken down.

但是斯科特,我的观点是,我想你会同意这一点,我的观点是,如果你是哈梅内伊,你已经看到了利比亚的这两个例子,你放弃了核计划,卡扎菲被打倒了。

2:31:18 You’re Ukraine, you gave up your nuclear weapons, and the Russians invaded twice.

你是乌克兰,你放弃了核武器,而俄罗斯人两次入侵。

If you’re Khamenei thinking to yourself, “The only thing that matters more to me than my nuclear weapons program is my regime survival.

如果你是哈梅内伊,你会想:“对我来说,唯一比我的核武器计划更重要的事情就是我政权的生存。

And in 12 days of war, the Israelis specifically, because we hit Fordo and Isfahan and the Khans, we the United States hit those sites.

在 12 天的战争中,特别是以色列人,因为我们袭击了福尔多、伊斯法罕和可汗,我们美国袭击了这些地点。

We the United States hit those sites.

我们美国访问了这些网站。

Lex Fridman2:31:53

The gleeful nation, Scott, stop.

快乐的国家,斯科特,停下来。

2:31:53 Take that out.

把那个拿出来。

There’s no place here in this room with me, the un-American bullshit, don’t do that.

这个房间里没有我的位置,非美国式的废话,别这样做。

The implication here, man, is that I, me, am un-American.

这里的含义是,我,我,不是美国人。

I’ve been attacked just like the Russian hoax for being a Putin shill.

就像俄罗斯骗局一样,我被攻击为普京的托儿。

I’m an American.

我是美国人。

Scott Horton2:32:14

Well, when you talk about Ukraine’s war with Russia, do you say we or do you say they?

好吧,当你谈论乌克兰与俄罗斯的战争时,你说我们还是他们?

Mark Dubowitz2:32:19

I said we the United States, we actually-

我说我们美国,我们实际上——

Scott Horton2:32:21

Well, you added the United States, but you just described Israel’s strikes.

嗯,你补充了美国,但你刚刚描述了以色列的袭击。

Mark Dubowitz2:32:24

Israel didn’t strike Fordo, Scott.

斯科特,以色列没有袭击福尔多。

Lex Fridman2:32:25

He talked about the US attack.

他谈到了美国的袭击。

2:32:25 You’re speaking to this other people that you’ve heard that somehow.

你正在对其他人说你已经以某种方式听到了这一点。

They do say we, and they talk about, I would say ridiculously as if, I’ve even heard some people basically put Israel above US, and they’re American citizens.

他们确实说我们,他们谈论,我会荒谬地说,好像,我什至听说有些人基本上把以色列置于美国之上,而他们是美国公民。

Yeah, that’s fucking ridiculous.

是的,这太荒谬了。

But none of those people are in this room.

但这些人都不在这个房间里。

There are demons under the bed.

床下有鬼。

I’m sure those people exist.

我确信那些人存在。

There’s ridiculous people on the internet.

互联网上有一些可笑的人。

There’s ridiculous people in Congress who can criticize them, make fun of them, say they’re fucking crazy.

国会里有一些可笑的人可以批评他们,取笑他们,说他们他妈的疯了。

Scott Horton2:33:02

The foundation for a defense of democracy has been the vanguard of the war party in this country for 25 years.

25 年来,捍卫民主基金会一直是这个国家战党的先锋队。

Lex Fridman2:33:07

Well, that’s a different criticism, but I was-

嗯,这是一个不同的批评,但我是-

Scott Horton2:33:09

It’s an important one.

这是一个重要的事情。

Lex Fridman2:33:10

Yes, that, but no, you just switched.

是的,但是不,你刚刚换了。

2:33:10 You just switched.

你刚刚换了。

No, no, no.

不,不,不。

You just switched from the un-American discussion to criticizing policies that that particular institute, fine, criticize the policies, do that.

你刚刚从非美国讨论转向批评特定机构的政策,好吧,批评政策,这样做。

What is the un-American bullshit?

什么是非美国废话?

Not here.

不在这里。

Scott Horton2:33:27

Lex, the neoconservative movement is the vanguard of the Israel lobby.

莱克斯,新保守主义运动是以色列游说团体的先锋。

2:33:27 That’s who they are.

他们就是这样的人。

That’s what Neoconservatism is about.

这就是新保守主义的意义所在。

Mark Dubowitz2:33:34

Lex, I’m not a NeoCon.

莱克斯,我不是新保守派。

Scott Horton2:33:34

That’s who the war-

战争就是这样——

Mark Dubowitz2:33:35

I’m not a neoconservative, so I don’t know who he’s talking about, but I’m not a neoconservative.

我不是新保守主义者,所以我不知道他在说谁,但我不是新保守主义者。

Lex Fridman2:33:39

Let’s not mix stuff up.

我们不要把事情搞混了。

Scott Horton2:33:40

There is a massive Israel lobby in America, in Washington that is inseparable from the American War party.

在美国、华盛顿有一个庞大的以色列游说团体,它与美国战争党密不可分。

Lex Fridman2:33:47

Yeah, yeah.

是啊,是啊。

2:33:47 I’ve talked to John Mersham.

我和约翰·默沙姆谈过。

I respect him deeply.

我深深地尊敬他。

He’s one of the most brilliant people speaking on that topic.

他是谈论这个话题的最杰出的人之一。

Great, great.

太棒了,太棒了。

Let’s just talk about today and the nuclear proliferation.

我们今天就来说说核扩散吧。

You guys have been brilliant on this.

你们在这方面表现得很出色。

I’m learning a lot.

我学到了很多。

Let’s continue [inaudible 02:34:01].

让我们继续 [听不清 02:34:01]。

Mark Dubowitz2:34:01

Yeah.

是的。

2:34:01 Sorry.

抱歉。

Let’s go back to where Khamenei may be.

让我们回到哈梅内伊可能在的地方。

I mean, in a bunker, 86 years old thinking he’s going to drink the poison chalice and agree to a deal with Donald Trump and Oman, or is he going to do all of the things that Scott and I are concerned about?

我的意思是,在一个地堡里,86 岁的老人认为他会喝下毒酒并同意与唐纳德·特朗普和阿曼达成协议,或者他会做斯科特和我担心的所有事情吗?

And one of those, and Scott has pointed this out rightly so, is he may decide now to break out for the nuke or creep out for the nuke.

其中之一,斯科特正确地指出了这一点,就是他现在可能决定是为了核武器而突围,还是为了核武器而潜行。

He may decide not to do it now, he may decide to do it in three and a half years when President Trump is gone.

他现在可能决定不这样做,也可能在特朗普总统下台后的三年半后决定这样做。

And I think that the important thing is he’s seen, we, the United States, we took out Fordo and Natanz and Isfahan in one operation with B-II bombers and 12 30,000 pound massive orange penatrators and Tomahawk missile.

我认为重要的是他看到了,我们,美国,我们在一次行动中用 B-II 轰炸机和 12 枚 30,000 磅的大型橙色攻击机和战斧导弹摧毁了福尔多、纳坦兹和伊斯法罕。

So if he didn’t think if that the United States had serious military power before, he now knows we do.

因此,如果他以前不认为美国是否拥有强大的军事实力,那么他现在知道我们拥有。

Lex Fridman2:34:56

So to you, that operation was geopolitically a success.

所以对你来说,这次行动在地缘政治上是成功的。

2:34:56 It sends a message of strength that if you try to build, you’re going to be punished.

它传递出一种力量的信息,如果你试图建立力量,你就会受到惩罚。

2:35:00 It sends a message of strength that if you try to build, you’re going to be punished for it.

它传递出一种力量的信息,如果你试图建立力量,你就会因此受到惩罚。

Mark Dubowitz2:35:04

So I’ve said online in the past 12 days, and even before that, “Curb your enthusiasm.

所以过去12天,甚至在此之前,我都在网上说过,“抑制住你的热情。

2:35:04 Curb your enthusiasm.” So all the people-

抑制住你的热情。”所以所有的人——

Lex Fridman2:35:12

Related to which topic?

与哪个主题相关?

Mark Dubowitz2:35:13

…

……

2:35:13 Yeah, just this idea that this has been this unbelievable success and everything’s great.

是的,只是这个想法,这是令人难以置信的成功,一切都很棒。

And everything’s going to be amazing.

一切都会变得令人惊奇。

And we stopped the nuclear weapons program and this has been a resounding success.

我们停止了核武器计划,这是一个巨大的成功。

Scott Horton2:35:37

You demanded unconditional surrender on Twitter again last night, right?

昨晚你又在推特上要求无条件投降是吗?

2:35:37 After Trump said there’s a ceasefire?

特朗普说停火后?

Mark Dubowitz2:35:42

Yes.

是的。

Lex Fridman2:35:42

What does unconditional surrender mean?

无条件投降是什么意思?

Mark Dubowitz2:35:44

It means no enrichment, full dismantlement.

意味着不充实,全面拆解。

Lex Fridman2:35:45

Okay.

好的。

Mark Dubowitz2:35:46

Yes, exactly right.

是的,完全正确。

2:35:46 It’s exactly what President Trump …

这正是特朗普总统所做的……

Well, I can’t-

好吧,我不能-

Scott Horton2:35:49

Not a regime change?

不是政权更迭吗?

2:35:49 Unconditional surrender in World War II meant the end of the Nazi regime and the imperialist Japanese regime entirely.

第二次世界大战的无条件投降意味着纳粹政权和日本帝国主义政权的彻底终结。

Right?

对吗?

Lex Fridman2:35:55

Does President Trump know what that means?

特朗普总统知道这意味着什么吗?

Mark Dubowitz2:35:56

He made it very clear.

他说得很清楚了。

2:35:56 President Trump made it very clear.

特朗普总统说得很清楚。

Lex Fridman2:35:58

Unconditional?

无条件?

Mark Dubowitz2:35:58

He made it clear, ” I don’t support regime change.”

他明确表示,“我不支持政权更迭”。

Lex Fridman2:36:01

Well, except for that one post.

好吧,除了那一篇文章。

Scott Horton2:36:04

A few hours earlier?

提前几个小时?

2:36:04 Right.

对。

Mark Dubowitz2:36:06

Actually, I’ll explain that one because I thought it was really interesting.

事实上,我会解释一下这个,因为我认为这真的很有趣。

Lex Fridman2:36:10

He’s re-analyzing it like it’s Shakespeare.

他像莎士比亚一样重新分析它。

2:36:10 What does that?

那有什么作用?

Mark Dubowitz2:36:11

Yeah, yeah.

是啊,是啊。

Lex Fridman2:36:11

And what did he also mean?

他又是什么意思呢?

2:36:11 We have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the fuck they’re doing.

我们两个国家已经打了这么长时间、这么激烈,以至于他们不知道自己在做什么。

What’s that about?

那是关于什么的?

Scott Horton2:36:18

He was angry that Israel was still attacking after he promised they weren’t.

他对以色列在他承诺不会攻击后仍然发动攻击感到愤怒。

2:36:18 He demanded they turn their planes around.

他要求他们调转飞机。

He felt that they were doing it in defiance of their agreement.

他觉得他们这样做是违反协议的。

Lex Fridman2:36:27

But he didn’t say Israel.

但他没有说以色列。

2:36:27 He says that both countries [inaudible 02:36:30].

他说这两个国家都是如此 [听不清 02:36:30]。

Scott Horton2:36:29

Different quote.

不同的报价。

2:36:29 He did say, I believe it was a tweet from Truth Social, “I demand that Israel turn those planes around right now.” Was how upset he was about it.

他确实说过,我相信这是来自 Truth Social 的一条推文,“我要求以色列立即调转这些飞机。”他对此感到多么沮丧。

Mark Dubowitz2:36:39

Well, I guess Donald Trump doesn’t listen to Bibi all the time, does he?

嗯,我猜唐纳德·特朗普并不总是听比比的话,是吗?

Scott Horton2:36:41

Yeah, I guess he’s finding out they respect him about as much as they respect the Palestinian.

是的,我猜他发现他们尊重他就像尊重巴勒斯坦人一样。

2:36:41 He’s just the help.

他只是帮助者。

Lex Fridman2:36:47

Well, that’s how world leaders ….

嗯,世界领导人就是这样……

2:36:47 World leaders are interested in their own nation.

世界领导人对自己的国家感兴趣。

Mark Dubowitz2:36:49

That’s right.

没错。

Lex Fridman2:36:50

They fuck you over.

他们操你。

Scott Horton2:36:51

Good important lesson there everyone.

大家都学到了重要的一课。

2:36:51 What does Israel care about?

以色列关心什么?

Israel.

以色列。

Mark Dubowitz2:36:55

Every country then defends its national interests.

每个国家都会捍卫自己的国家利益。

2:36:55 That’s not unusual for Israel or any other country.

这对于以色列或任何其他国家来说并不罕见。

But I think to understand-

但我想明白了——

Scott Horton2:37:02

We’re supposed to pretend that, “Hey, whatever Israel needs, we’re here to serve their interests.”

我们应该假装:“嘿,无论以色列需要什么,我们都会为他们的利益服务。”

Lex Fridman2:37:06

If those people exist, they aren’t American.

如果这些人存在,他们就不是美国人。

2:37:06 If people put Israel’s interest first-

如果人们把以色列的利益放在第一位——

Scott Horton2:37:15

He just said we fight terrorism together.

他只是说我们一起打击恐怖主义。

Mark Dubowitz2:37:15

…

……

2:37:15 Well, we do.

嗯,我们愿意。

Scott Horton2:37:15

Well, we generate terrorism together.

好吧,我们一起制造恐怖主义。

What are you talking about?

你在说什么?

Lex Fridman2:37:15

But that doesn’t mean you put Israel’s interest above America’s.

但这并不意味着你将以色列的利益置于美国之上。

If you do, you’re unAmerican.

如果你这样做,你就不是美国人。

Mark Dubowitz2:37:20

You know how many American lives-

你知道有多少美国人的生命——

Scott Horton2:37:21

That’s all I’m saying.

这就是我要说的。

Mark Dubowitz2:37:22

…

……

2:37:22 Israeli intelligence community has saved?

以色列情报界有救吗?

And ask people in the FBI and CIA who work counter-terrorism, how many American lives the Israelis have saved because of their intelligence capabilities.

问问联邦调查局和中央情报局的反恐人员,以色列人因其情报能力拯救了多少美国人的生命。

Scott Horton2:37:34

How about when Naftali Bennett, again, bombed that shelter full of women and children and caused the September 11th attack.

纳夫塔利·贝内特再次轰炸了那个挤满妇女和儿童的避难所并引发了 9 月 11 日的袭击,情况又如何呢?

2:37:34 That’s what happened.

这就是发生的事情。

In fact, I don’t know if you know the story, but you could Google this.

事实上,我不知道你是否知道这个故事,但你可以谷歌一下。

You like Googling things.

你喜欢用谷歌搜索东西。

It’s on Google Books.

它在 Google 图书上。

Mark Dubowitz2:38:46

Of course, that’s ignores the history of Al-Qaeda-

当然,这忽略了基地组织的历史——

Scott Horton2:38:48

Which for years before that was for the United States, Britain, and Saudi Arabia.

在此之前的几年里,这是美国、英国和沙特阿拉伯的事。

Mark Dubowitz2:38:52

…

……

2:38:52 operations against the United States, but executing them.

针对美国的行动,但执行这些行动。

Lex Fridman2:38:55

You guys love pulling each other into history.

你们喜欢把彼此拉进历史。

Scott Horton2:38:57

No, no, no.

不,不,不。

2:38:57 History is, America’s problem with Al-Qaeda-

历史是,美国与基地组织的问题——

Mark Dubowitz2:39:01

Just one second.

只需一秒钟。

2:39:01 America’s problems with Al-Qaeda is Israel.

美国与基地组织的问题在于以色列。

America and Israel are terrorist states.

美国和以色列都是恐怖主义国家。

Scott-

斯科特-

Scott Horton2:39:06

They were America’s mercenaries that we used in Afghanistan, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Chechnya.

他们是我们在阿富汗、波斯尼亚、科索沃、车臣使用的美国雇佣军。

Mark Dubowitz2:39:11

It’s all us.

都是我们。

2:39:11 It’s all us.

都是我们。

Scott Horton2:39:11

But they turned against us.

但他们却转而反对我们。

Mark Dubowitz2:39:12

And when I mean us, Scott?

当我指的是我们时,斯科特?

2:39:12 I mean, America.

我的意思是,美国。

Scott Horton2:39:14

They turned against us.

他们转而反对我们。

Mark Dubowitz2:39:14

It’s all us, Scott.

都是我们,斯科特。

2:39:14 It’s all us.

都是我们。

Scott Horton2:39:15

Anyone can read Michael Shearer’s book, the former chief of the CIA’s Bin Laden where he wrote his great book.

任何人都可以读迈克尔·希勒的书,他是中央情报局前局长本·拉登,并在那里写下了他的伟大著作。

Mark Dubowitz2:39:21

We’re responsible for our enemies attacking us.

我们要对攻击我们的敌人负责。

Scott Horton2:39:23

It’s called Imperial Hubris.

这就是所谓的帝国傲慢。

Mark Dubowitz2:39:38

That’s the most articulate justification I’ve ever heard for Al-Qaeda in my life.

这是我一生中听过的为基地组织辩护的最明确的理由。

2:39:38 But let’s-

但是让我们-

Scott Horton2:39:42

It’s not a justification.

这不是一个理由。

2:39:42 I’m not saying that makes what they did right?

我不是说他们做的事情就是对的吗?

I’m saying that was how Bin Laden recruited his foot soldiers to attack this country was by citing American foreign policies that were directly to the detriment of the people of the Middle East.

我是说,本拉登就是这样招募他的步兵来攻击这个国家的,他引用了直接损害中东人民利益的美国外交政策。

And specifically, our support for Israel.

具体来说,我们对以色列的支持。

Mark Dubowitz2:41:27

I think Al-Qaeda hates America, Scott.

我认为基地组织讨厌美国,斯科特。

Scott Horton2:41:28

Why?

为什么?

2:41:28 You know what?

你知道吗?

I’ll tell you what, Ali Soufan …

我告诉你什么,阿里·苏凡……

You know, Ali Soufan, the former FBI agent, counter-terrorism agent?

你知道前联邦调查局特工、反恐特工阿里·苏凡吗?

He wrote in his book, The Black Banners, that the Bin Ladenites said to Bin Laden, “We don’t understand why you’re so angry at America.

他在《黑旗》一书中写道,本拉登分子对本拉登说:“我们不明白你为什么对美国如此愤怒。

They’ve been so good to us in Afghanistan, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and now here in Chechnya.

他们在阿富汗、波斯尼亚、科索沃以及现在的车臣对我们非常好。

Why do you want to attack them?”

你为什么要攻击他们?”

Mark Dubowitz2:41:50

And Bin Laden attacked America.

本拉登袭击了美国。

Scott Horton2:41:50

Bin Laden said, “I have a larger agenda that you don’t understand.”

本拉登说:“我有一个更大的议程,但你不明白。”

Lex Fridman2:41:54

The disagreement between you is clear.

你们之间的分歧很明显。

2:41:54 I’ve talked to Noam Chomsky twice.

我和诺姆·乔姆斯基谈过两次。

Scott, you focus on the criticism.

斯科特,你专注于批评。

Scott Horton2:41:59

You should interview Michael Scheuer.

你应该采访迈克尔·舒尔。

2:41:59 Well, although he’s gone pretty crazy lately.

好吧,虽然他最近变得很疯狂。

I don’t know.

我不知道。

Maybe not.

也许不是。

Lex Fridman2:42:04

Anyway, we’re going into history.

无论如何,我们即将走进历史。

2:42:04 We’re learning a lot.

我们学到了很多。

The perspectives differ strongly.

观点差异很大。

Can we look into the, maybe a ridiculous question, but a nuclear proliferation?

我们能否研究一下核扩散这个可能很荒谬的问题?

You already started to speak to, both of you.

你们已经开始和你们俩说话了。

Mark Dubowitz2:42:41

So look, I think it’s a great question.

所以看,我认为这是一个很好的问题。

2:42:41 Will there be more nuclear weapons powers in the future or less as a result of this decision by President Trump?

由于特朗普总统的这一决定,未来核武器国家的数量会增加还是减少?

Lex Fridman2:45:07

What if they don’t?

如果他们不这样做怎么办?

2:45:07 What if they’re prevented?

如果他们被阻止怎么办?

Doesn’t that still send the same message to everybody that they should build?

这是否仍然向每个人发出了他们应该建造的相同信息?

Mark Dubowitz2:45:15

Oh, I think it sends the opposite message, Lex.

哦,我认为它传达了相反的信息,莱克斯。

2:45:15 I think if they see what has happened and that it’s successful, and it stopped Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

我认为,如果他们看到所发生的事情并且它是成功的,并且它阻止了伊朗发展核武器。

And in addition, if Trump is able to negotiate an agreement for zero enrichment and full dismantlement, then the message to all these other countries is, number one, you don’t need it.

此外,如果特朗普能够通过谈判达成一项零浓缩和全面拆除的协议,那么向所有其他国家传达的信息是,第一,你不需要它。

And number two, if you try to get it, then the United States is going to use American power.

第二,如果你试图得到它,那么美国将使用美国的力量。

Lex Fridman2:47:42

My favorite thing is when you guys point out, when you agree with the other person.

我最喜欢的事情是当你们指出、同意对方的观点时。

2:47:42 Anyway, Scott, what do you think?

无论如何,斯科特,你觉得怎么样?

Everything that’s just happened over the past two weeks does to nuclear proliferation over the next 5, 10, 20 years?

过去两周发生的一切会对未来 5 年、10 年、20 年的核扩散产生影响吗?

Scott Horton2:47:56

I really don’t know for sure.

我真的不确定。

2:47:56 But I would think that there’s a very great danger that it’s going to reinforce the lessons of North Korea, Iraq, and Libya, which is, “You better get a nuke to keep America out.

但我认为存在一个非常大的危险,那就是它会强化朝鲜、伊拉克和利比亚的教训,即“你最好拥有核武器来将美国拒之门外。

And you better hurry before it’s too late.”

你最好快点,以免为时已晚。”

Lex Fridman2:49:33

And good translator.

还有好的翻译。

Scott Horton2:49:34

And Peele goes off like an angry Black guy kind of character.

皮尔就像一个愤怒的黑人角色一样。

2:49:34 Right?

正确的?

Lex Fridman2:49:37

He’s been going nuts on Twitter.

他在推特上疯了。

Scott Horton2:49:38

Yeah, he goes way out, above and beyond, but I think he’s probably acting on instructions to talk that way.

是的,他走得太远了,超越了,但我认为他可能是按照指示这样做的。

2:49:38 And it is a real risk that the NPT could just fall apart when it’s treated so callously by the United States who invented it.

当《不扩散核武器条约》受到发明者美国如此无情的对待时,它可能会崩溃,这是一个真正的风险。

And insisted that the rest of the world adopt the thing to such a great degree.

并坚持要求世界其他地方在很大程度上采用这种东西。

Lex Fridman2:49:59

Trump did say, ” Don’t use the N word.” He talked down to Medvedev.

特朗普确实说过,“不要使用 N 这个词。”他居高临下地对梅德韦杰夫说话。

Scott Horton2:50:02

That’s right.

这是正确的。

2:50:02 Yeah, he did.

是的,他做到了。

Lex Fridman2:50:04

Don’t throw around the nuclear word.

不要乱用“核”这个词。

Scott Horton2:50:05

Yeah.

是的。

2:50:05 Well, and I appreciate that.

嗯,我很欣赏这一点。

Lex Fridman2:50:07

That’s good.

那挺好的。

2:50:07 He’s right.

他是对的。

He’s right in that.

他是对的。

It’s a serious thing.

这是一件严肃的事情。

Scott Horton2:50:12

And look, Pakistanis could give a nuke to Iran who are their friends, I think not the tightest of allies.

看,巴基斯坦人可以向伊朗提供核武器,伊朗是他们的朋友,我认为不是最亲密的盟友。

2:50:12 I’m not saying I predict that, but there’s a danger of that.

我并不是说我预测到了这一点,但这是存在危险的。

Lex Fridman2:52:53

Is that your Bill Clinton impression?

这是你对比尔·克林顿的印象吗?

Scott Horton2:52:54

No.

不。

2:52:54 I’ll spare you.

我会饶过你的。

Lex Fridman2:52:55

Okay.

好的。

Scott Horton2:52:55

That was pretty good.

那是相当不错了。

2:52:55 After the show, when we’re not recording much.

演出结束后,当我们录制不多的时候。

Mark Dubowitz2:53:00

Can I respond to a couple of things here?

我可以在这里回应一些事情吗?

2:53:00 Just really quickly.

真的很快。

I’ll try to do it quickly.

我会尽力尽快完成。

Scott Horton2:54:21

I didn’t say that.

我没这么说。

Mark Dubowitz2:54:21

…

……

2:54:21 Well, you said, quote unquote, “Iran is not attacking Israel.” So I mean, it’s just not true.

好吧,你说过,“伊朗没有攻击以色列。”所以我的意思是,这不是真的。

Scott Horton2:54:25

Yeah, they were not in a state of war until Israel launched a state of war.

是的,在以色列发动战争状态之前,他们并没有处于战争状态。

2:54:25 That’s the fact.

这就是事实。

Mark Dubowitz2:54:29

Yeah, they were at war.

是的,他们正处于战争状态。

Scott Horton2:54:30

Oh, well, they backed a group that did a thing.

哦,好吧,他们支持了一个做了某件事的团体。

2:54:30 Yeah, okay.

是啊,好吧。

Mark Dubowitz2:54:33

They killed thousands of Israelis, maimed thousands of Israelis.

他们杀害了数以千计的以色列人,致残了数以千计的以色列人。

Scott Horton2:54:36

But that attack was not-

但那次袭击并不是——

Mark Dubowitz2:54:37

Suicide bomb ordered in Tehran.

德黑兰下令实施自杀式炸弹袭击。

Scott Horton2:54:39

The Wall Street Journal says that US intelligence does not believe that Tehran ordered that attack.

《华尔街日报》称,美国情报部门并不认为德黑兰下令发动这次袭击。

2:54:39 But they found out about-

但他们发现——

Mark Dubowitz2:54:43

What the Wall Street Journal says and what the US intelligence says, and we can dispute whether they directed it on October 7th.

《华尔街日报》的说法和美国情报部门的说法,我们可以质疑他们是否在 10 月 7 日指示了这一点。

2:54:43 Everybody knows indisputably, that Iran financed Hamas, provided Hamas with weapons.

无可争议,每个人都知道,伊朗资助了哈马斯,为哈马斯提供了武器。

Scott Horton2:54:44

So did Israel.

以色列也是如此。

Mark Dubowitz2:54:58

Well, just a second, provided Hamas with weapons.

好吧,就一秒钟,为哈马斯提供了武器。

2:54:58 That the IRGC and the Quds force were training Hamas.

伊斯兰革命卫队和圣城军正在训练哈马斯。

Hezbollah backed by Iran was training Hamas.

伊朗支持的真主党正在训练哈马斯。

There were three meetings before October 7th, one in Beirut, one in Damascus, and one in Tehran where the IRGC, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were together.

10月7日之前举行了三场会议,一场在贝鲁特,一场在大马士革,一场在德黑兰,伊朗革命卫队、真主党、哈马斯和巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织都在德黑兰举行会议。

There was a meeting in Tehran that was attended by Khamenei the Supreme leader.

最高领袖哈梅内伊出席了在德黑兰举行的一次会议。

Lex Fridman2:55:43

Critics of Israel will say that Benjamin Netanyahu has also been indirectly financing Hamas by allowing the funds going into-

以色列的批评者会说,本杰明·内塔尼亚胡还通过允许资金进入-来间接资助哈马斯。

Scott Horton2:55:51

I’ll say that America backs Israel, so anything Israel does is America’s responsibility too under that same logic, right?

我会说美国支持以色列,所以按照同样的逻辑,以色列所做的任何事情也是美国的责任,对吗?

Lex Fridman2:55:58

…

……

2:55:58 I think you started to make a point disagreeing with Scott about that they’re not a good member of the NPT.

我认为你开始提出不同意斯科特的观点,即他们不是《不扩散核武器条约》的好成员。

Scott Horton2:56:04

That’s all tiny technical violations.

这些都是微小的技术违规。

2:56:04 None of that has anything to do with weaponization.

这些都与武器化无关。

It’s always so, “Yeah, how do you explain this isotope?” And they go, “Well, it must’ve came with the Pakistani junk that we bought from [inaudible 02:56:14].”

总是这样,“是的,你如何解释这种同位素?”他们说,“好吧,它一定是和我们从[听不清的 02:56:14] 那里购买的巴基斯坦垃圾一起带来的。”

Mark Dubowitz2:56:21

Yeah, that’s just not the case.

是的,事实并非如此。

Scott Horton2:56:22

That’s the entire history of the IAEA’s objections to Iran.

这就是国际原子能机构反对伊朗的整个历史。

Mark Dubowitz2:56:27

So your listeners, I know they’re not going to do it, because it’s a lot of technical reading.

所以你的听众,我知道他们不会这样做,因为这是大量的技术阅读。

Scott Horton2:56:31

Nothing to do with weaponization.

与武器化无关。

2:56:31 A diversion of nuclear material.

核材料的转移。

Mark Dubowitz2:56:31

But just go out, go out and read IAEA reports dating back at least 20 years.

但只要出去,出去阅读至少 20 年前的 IAEA 报告。

And you’ll see the IAEA meticulously, methodically, dispassionately outlining all of the violations that Iran has embarked on of the NPT.

你会看到国际原子能机构一丝不苟、有条不紊、冷静地概述了伊朗违反《不扩散核武器条约》的所有行为。

Scott Horton2:56:50

Virtually all those are resolved later.

事实上,所有这些问题都会在以后解决。

2:56:50 They won’t answer this, and then later they do.

他们不会回答这个问题,但后来他们就会回答。

Well, they won’t answer that, and then later they do.

好吧,他们不会回答这个问题,然后他们就会回答。

Mark Dubowitz2:56:56

And many open files are still there.

并且许多打开的文件仍然存在。

2:56:56 Again, I just want your viewers to walk away from this conversation thinking, “Okay, that’s interesting.

再说一次,我只是希望观众在结束这场对话时思考:“好吧,这很有趣。

I didn’t know that.” And that, “I’m going to go fact check Mark and fact check Scott, and just see what this is all about.” Right?

我不知道。”然后,“我要去事实核查马克和斯科特,看看这到底是怎么回事。”正确的?

Because otherwise, it’s just he says, she says, or he says, he says.

因为否则的话,就只是他说,她说,或者他说,他说。

Scott Horton2:57:34

They abided by the additional protocol without having ratified it.

他们未经批准就遵守了附加议定书。

2:57:34 They abided by it for three years and did not proceed with any enrichment at all as long as they were dealing in good faith with the EU until W.

他们遵守了三年,只要他们真诚地与欧盟打交道,就根本没有进行任何浓缩活动,直到W.

Bush ruined those negotiations and closed them down.

布什破坏了这些谈判并结束了它们。

Only then did they begin to install the centrifuges at Natanz.

直到那时,他们才开始在纳坦兹安装离心机。

Mark Dubowitz2:57:51

It’s always the Americans who screw things up.

搞砸事情的总是美国人。

Scott Horton2:57:52

You complain they didn’t ratify the thing, but they abided by it for years.

你抱怨他们没有批准这件事,但他们多年来一直遵守它。

Mark Dubowitz2:57:56

So that’s an interesting-

所以这是一个有趣的——

Lex Fridman2:57:57

They were in violation of it.

他们违反了它。

2:57:57 But I think a more pragmatic and important disagreement that we already spoke to is how do we decrease the incentive for Iran to build nuclear programs?

但我认为我们已经讨论过的一个更务实和重要的分歧是我们如何减少伊朗建立核计划的动力?

Not just the next couple of years, but the next 10, 20 years.

不仅仅是未来几年,而是未来10年、20年。

Scott Horton2:57:57

Attack it more.

多攻击一下吧

Lex Fridman2:58:12

You’re mocking that.

你在嘲笑那个。

2:58:12 There’s a lot of people that will …

有很多人会……

There’s neocons that say basically, “Invade everything.

新保守派基本上会说:“入侵一切。

Let’s make money off of war.”

让我们从战争中赚钱吧。”

Scott Horton2:58:33

If we’re really lucky.

如果我们真的很幸运的话。

Lex Fridman2:58:35

So it’s a big risk is your case.

所以你的情况风险很大。

Mark Dubowitz2:58:36

So here’s some practical recommendations that I think the United States should follow.

因此,我认为美国应该遵循以下一些实用建议。

2:58:36 I think the first is get the Iranians back to Oman, negotiate with them and do a deal.

我认为首先是让伊朗人返回阿曼,与他们谈判并达成协议。

Lex Fridman3:03:02

So Scott, as many people know, here in Austin, Texas, you’re the director of the Libertarian Institute.

斯科特,正如很多人所知,在德克萨斯州奥斯汀,你是自由主义研究所的所长。

3:03:02 Let’s zoom out a bit.

让我们缩小一点。

What are the key pillars of libertarianism and how that informs how you see the world?

自由主义的关键支柱是什么?它如何影响你如何看待世界?

Scott Horton3:03:17

Well, the very basis of libertarianism is the non-aggression principle, which essentially is the same thing as our social rules for dealing with each other in private life.

嗯,自由主义的基础是互不侵犯原则,这本质上与我们在私人生活中相互交往的社会规则是一样的。

3:03:17 No force, no theft, no fraud, and keep your hands to yourself.

不强迫、不盗窃、不欺诈,管好自己的手。

And we apply that same moral law to government.

我们将同样的道德法则应用于政府。

3:06:00 For the United States of America, what we want is independence, non-interventionism and peace.

对于美利坚合众国来说,我们想要的是独立、不干涉主义与和平。

Lex Fridman3:06:05

So to you, isolationism is a kind of dirty word-

所以对你来说,孤立主义是一个肮脏的词——

Scott Horton3:06:08

That’s right.

没错。

3:06:08 It’s a smear term-

这是一个诽谤性的术语——

Lex Fridman3:06:08

It’s a smear term.

这是一个诽谤性的术语。

Scott Horton3:06:10

Invented by interventionists and internationalists to attack anyone who didn’t want to go along with their agenda.

由干涉主义者和国际主义者发明,旨在攻击任何不想遵循他们议程的人。

3:06:10 The term itself is used essentially as a smear against anyone who doesn’t want to go to war.

这个词本身本质上是用来抹黑任何不想参战的人的。

Lex Fridman3:06:22

So can you actually just deeper describe what non-interventionism means?

那么,您能更深入地描述一下不干预主义的含义吗?

3:06:22 So how much display of military strength should be there, do you think?

那么您认为应该展示多少军事实力呢?

Scott Horton3:06:32

Dr. Paul said, we could defend this country with a couple of good submarines, which by the way, for people who don’t know, one American Trident sub could essentially kill every city and military base in Russia, just one.

保罗博士​​说,我们可以用几艘优秀的潜艇来保卫这个国家,顺便说一句,对于那些不知道的人来说,一艘美国三叉戟潜艇基本上可以杀死俄罗斯的每一个城市和军事基地,仅仅一个。

3:06:32 So he’s absolutely right about that.

所以他的说法绝对正确。

A couple of good submarines are enough to defend our coast and deter anyone from messing with the United States of America.

几艘优秀的潜艇就足以保卫我们的海岸并阻止任何人扰乱美利坚合众国。

And then I admit, I’m a little bit idealistic about this, that I think of that old William Jennings Bryan speech, ” Behold the Republic,” where unlike the empires of Europe burdened under the weight of militarism.

然后我承认,我对此有点理想化,我想起了威廉·詹宁斯·布莱恩的旧演讲“看共和国”,与欧洲帝国不同,欧洲帝国背负着军国主义的重担。

Here we have a free country and where you know what we could do?

我们这里有一个自由的国家,你知道我们能做什么?

We could be the host of peace conferences everywhere.

我们可以成为世界各地和平会议的东道主。

There are frozen conflicts in the Donbass, in Kaliningrad, in Transnistria, in Taiwan, in Korea, virtually all the borders of Africa and Eurasia were drawn by European powers to either divide and conquer their enemies or artificially group their enemies together in order to keep them internally divided and conquered in those ways.

顿巴斯、加里宁格勒、德涅斯特河沿岸、台湾、朝鲜,几乎所有非洲和欧亚大陆的边界都是由欧洲列强划定的,目的是分裂和征服他们的敌人,或者人为地将他们的敌人聚集在一起,以便以这种方式在内部分裂和征服他们。

Lex Fridman3:08:54

Yeah, I’ve criticized Trump a lot, but I think maybe he’s just rhetoric, but I think he talks about peace a lot.

是的,我批评了特朗普很多次,但我认为也许他只是说说而已,但我认为他经常谈论和平。

3:08:54 Even just recently, the number of times the word peace is mentioned and with seriousness, not you get a genuine desire for peace from him.

即使就在最近,“和平”这个词被多次严肃地提及,但你并没有从他那里得到真正的和平渴望。

And that’s just beautiful to see for the leader of this country.

对于这个国家的领导人来说,这是一件很美好的事情。

Scott Horton3:09:15

And look, man, there used to be a time when a third of the planet was dominated by the communists, right?

你看,伙计,曾经有一段时间,地球上三分之一的地区都被共产党统治了,对吗?

3:09:15 So I’m not going to sit here and argue the first Cold War with you.

所以我不会坐在这里与你们争论第一次冷战。

My book’s about the second one, and I’m not as good on the first.

我的书是关于第二个的,而我对第一个的了解没那么好。

But since the end of the first Cold War, we have let the neoconservative policy of the defense planning guidance of ’92 and rebuilding America’s defenses and the rest of this American dominance-centered policy control our entire direction in the world.

但自第一次冷战结束以来,我们让92年国防规划指导和重建美国国防的新保守主义政策以及其他以美国主导地位为中心的政策控制了我们在世界上的整个方向。

It’s led to the war on terrorism in the Middle East, seven countries we’ve attacked.

它导致了中东的反恐战争,我们攻击了七个国家。

It’s led to the disaster in Eastern Europe, and it’s leading toward disaster in Eastern Asia when there’s just no reason in the world that it has to be this way with the commies dead and gone.

它导致了东欧的灾难,也导致了东亚的灾难,而世界上没有理由让共产党死而复生。

Lex Fridman3:10:22

Just one more thing.

还有一件事。

3:10:22 You mentioned the two submarines.

你提到了两艘潜艇。

What’s the role of nuclear weapons?

核武器的作用是什么?

Scott Horton3:10:28

Well, I would like for America to have an extremely minimal nuclear deterrent and work toward a world free of nuclear weapons.

嗯,我希望美国拥有极低限度的核威慑力量,并努力实现一个无核武器的世界。

3:10:28 And I know that that sounds utopian.

我知道这听起来很乌托邦。

However, I would remind your audience that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev came within a hair of achieving a deal just like that at Reykjavik Iceland in 1986, and they were both of them dead serious about it, complete and total nuclear disarmament.

然而,我想提醒各位听众,罗纳德·里根和米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫差一点就达成了一项协议,就像 1986 年在冰岛雷克雅未克达成的协议一样,他们都非常认真地对待它,即彻底彻底的核裁军。

Then Reagan was essentially bullied by Richard Pearl and others on his staff saying, “You promised the American people that you would build them a defensive anti-missile system, the Star Wars system,” which was total pie in the sky, technological fantasy of the 1980s.

然后,里根基本上被理查德·珀尔和他的幕僚中的其他人欺负,他们说,“你向美国人民承诺,你将为他们建立一个防御性反导弹系统,即星球大战系统”,这完全是天上掉馅饼,是 20 世纪 80 年代的技术幻想。

And if you’re getting rid of all the ICBMs, then why the hell do you need a missile shield anyway?

如果你要摆脱所有洲际弹道导弹,那你到底为什么还需要导弹防护罩呢?

Is the world’s probably greatest tragedy that ever took place that Ronald Reagan walked away from those negotiations.

罗纳德·里根退出这些谈判可能是世界上最大的悲剧。

Lex Fridman3:12:40

We should also just say one more thing, not to be ageist, but most of the major leaders with nukes and those with power in the world are in their 70s and 80s.

我们还应该再说一件事,不要歧视年龄,但世界上大多数拥有核武器的主要领导人和拥有权力的人都是70多岁和80多岁。

3:12:40 I don’t know if that contributes to it, but they kind of are grounded in a different time.

我不知道这是否有所贡献,但它们有点扎根于不同的时间。

I have a hope for the fresher, younger leaders to have a more optimistic view towards peace and to be able to reach towards peace.

我希望更年轻、更年轻的领导人能够对和平抱有更加乐观的态度,并能够实现和平。

Scott Horton3:13:06

And underlying so much of what we’re talking about here is all this enmity, but if America could just work, remember when China cut that pseudo sort of peace deal between Saudi and Iran a couple of years ago or last year was it?

我们在这里谈论的很多事情的背后都是这种敌意,但如果美国能够正常工作,还记得几年前或去年中国在沙特和伊朗之间达成那种伪和平协议的时候吗?

3:13:06 We could try to double up on that.

我们可以尝试加倍努力。

We could try to come up with ways for Saudi and Iran to exchange as much as possible.

我们可以尝试想出办法让沙特和伊朗尽可能多地进行交流。

I know you don’t like all the going back too far in history, but it’s important.

我知道你不喜欢追溯太久远的历史,但这很重要。

It’s in my book that in 1993, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who the revolution had happened on his watch Operation Eagle Claw, the disaster of the rescue mission in ’79 after the hostage crisis and everything, all that egg was on ZB’s face.

在我的书中,1993年,兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基(Zbigniew Brzezinski)在他的鹰爪行动中发生了革命,79年人质危机之后的救援任务发生了灾难,所有这些鸡蛋都在ZB的脸上。

But in ’93 he said, “We should normalize relations.

但在 93 年,他说:“我们应该实现关系正常化。

We should build an oil pipeline across Iran so they can make money.

我们应该修建一条横跨伊朗的石油管道,这样他们就可以赚钱。

We can make money and we can start to normalize.”

我们可以赚钱,我们可以开始正常化。”

Mark Dubowitz3:15:46

But to just have Scott and I fighting-

但让斯科特和我战斗——

Lex Fridman3:15:47

That’s a fund kind of fight.

这是一场基金之争。

Mark Dubowitz3:15:50

Fun and peaceful.

有趣又平静。

Lex Fridman3:15:51

Mark, you’re the CEO of FDD, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, it’s a DC-based organization that focuses on national security and foreign policy.

马克,你是保卫民主基金会(FDD)的首席执行官,这是一个总部位于华盛顿的组织,专注于国家安全和外交政策。

3:15:51 What has been your approach to solving some of these problems of the world?

您解决世界上的一些问题的方法是什么?

Mark Dubowitz3:16:09

So look, I love the vision that Scott painted, and I agree with some of the libertarian instincts that he has, but my view is that America is the indispensable power.

所以看,我喜欢斯科特描绘的愿景,我同意他的一些自由主义本能,但我的观点是美国是不可或缺的力量。

3:16:09 Scott mentioned earlier in the conversation about the rules-based order that is so important and the NPT and all these rules-based agreements that are important to maintain.

斯科特早些时候在谈话中提到了非常重要的基于规则的秩序,以及《不扩散核武器条约》和所有这些对于维护非常重要的基于规则的协议。

Well, the rules-based order has been maintained by the United States since World War II.

那么,二战以来,基于规则的秩序是美国一直维持的。

There is no American prosperity to the degree that we have.

美国没有达到我们这样的繁荣程度。

There’s no recovery of Europe, there’s no recovery of Asia after the devastation of World War II without American power and the rules-based order that America has led and back stopped.

如果没有美国的力量以及美国主导和支持的基于规则的秩序的停止,欧洲和亚洲在经历了二战的破坏之后就不可能复苏。

Scott Horton3:21:04

Have I been pronouncing it wrong this whole time?

难道我一直都念错了吗?

Mark Dubowitz3:21:06

Reza Pahlavi?

礼萨·巴列维?

Scott Horton3:21:06

You know the guy?

你认识那个人吗?

Mark Dubowitz3:21:08

I met him, yeah.

我遇见了他,是的。

Scott Horton3:21:09

Pahlavi.

巴列维。

Mark Dubowitz3:21:10

Pahlavi.

巴列维。

Lex Fridman3:21:10

What were you saying?

你说什么?

Scott Horton3:21:11

I thought it was Pahlavi.

我还以为是巴列维呢

Lex Fridman3:21:13

Oh wow.

哦哇。

Mark Dubowitz3:21:14

No, it’s okay.

不,没关系。

3:21:14 It’s okay.

没关系。

Lex Fridman3:21:14

Heartbreaking.

令人心碎。

Scott Horton3:21:14

Seriously, who knew?

说真的,谁知道呢?

Mark Dubowitz3:21:18

The only thing you’ve ever gotten wrong for pronouncing [inaudible 03:21:21] that’s not bad.

你唯一犯过的错误是 [听不清 03:21:21] 的发音,这还不错。

3:21:18 That’s

那是

Lex Fridman3:21:22

Pronouncing so many things correctly, I think people will give you a pass.

如果你能正确发音这么多东西,我想人们会给你通过的。

Scott Horton3:21:25

Can I ask you though?

我可以问你吗?

3:21:25 I mean all this militarization has led to a state of permanent war.

我的意思是,所有这些军事化导致了永久战争状态。

We’ve been bombing Iraq for 34 years.

我们轰炸伊拉克已经34年了。

We put a war against the Taliban who didn’t attack us instead of Al-Qaeda who did fought for 20 years, and the Taliban won anyway.

我们对没有攻击我们的塔利班而不是对战了20年的基地组织发动了战争,但塔利班无论如何都赢了。

We overthrew or launched an aggressive war against Saddam Hussein put the Ayatollah’s best friends in power, launched an aggressive war against Libya on this ridiculous hoax that Gaddafi was about to murder every last man, woman, and child in Benghazi.

我们推翻或发动了针对萨达姆·侯赛因的侵略战争,让阿亚图拉最好的朋友掌权,针对卡扎菲即将谋杀班加西每一个男人、女人和儿童的荒谬骗局,对利比亚发动了侵略战争。

Imagine Charlotte, North Carolina being wiped off the map, Barack Obama lied in order to start that war and completely destroyed Libya.

想象一下北卡罗来纳州夏洛特从地图上消失,巴拉克·奥巴马为了发动战争并彻底摧毁利比亚而撒谎。

It’s now three pieces in a state of semi-permanent civil war including, and this wasn’t just back then, this is to this day the re-legalization and re-institutionalization of chattel slavery of sub-Saharan Black Africans in Libya to this day, as a result.

现在,三部分处于半永久性内战状态,包括,这不仅仅是在当时,直到今天,利比亚撒哈拉以南非洲黑人动产奴隶制的重新合法化和重新制度化,结果也是如此。

Lex Fridman3:22:42

Point well made.

观点讲得好。

3:22:42 He’s speaking to the double-edged sword of a strong military that what you mentioned that Trump did, seems like a very difficult thing to do, which is keep it hit hard and keep it short.

他对着强大军队的双刃剑说,你提到的特朗普所做的事情似乎是一件非常困难的事情,那就是保持重击并保持简短。

Scott Horton3:22:57

We don’t know how this ended yet.

我们还不知道这一切是如何结束的。

Lex Fridman3:22:59

But even the beginning part is not trivial to do.

但即使是开始的部分也不是微不足道的。

3:22:59 Just hitting one mission and vocalizing except for one post, no regime change, really pushing peace, make a deal, ceasefire like that’s an uncommon way to operate.

只是完成一项任务并发出除了一个职位之外的声音,没有政权更迭,真正推动和平,达成协议,停火,这样的运作方式是不常见的。

So I guess you said that we should resist the military industrial complex.

所以我猜你说我们应该抵制军工联合体。

That’s not easy to do.

这并不容易做到。

That’s the double-edged sword of a strong military.

这是强大军队的双刃剑。

Scott Horton3:23:29

Oh, I forgot Yemen.

哦,我忘了也门。

3:23:29 Let me say real quick, and I promise…

让我快点说,我保证……

Look, I’m going to say one thing then and then I’ll stop.

听着,我要说一件事,然后我就停下来。

Mark Dubowitz3:23:32

You’ve made your point.

你已经表达了你的观点。

Scott Horton3:23:33

I just want to add that this is a really important point, okay.

我只是想补充一点,这是非常重要的一点,好吧。

3:23:33 Is grassroots efforts.

就是基层的努力。

There is no Houthi lobby in America.

美国没有胡塞武装游说团体。

It was grassroots efforts by libertarians, Quakers, and leftists to get War Powers resolutions introduced in Trump’s first term to stop war in Yemen, which was launched not for Israel, for Saudi Arabia and UAE by Barack Obama in 2015.

这是自由主义者、贵格会和左翼人士的草根努力,目的是让特朗普在第一个任期内提出战争权力决议,以制止也门战争,该决议不是为以色列、而是由巴拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)于2015年为沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋发起的。

Mark Dubowitz3:23:33

Well, that’s a first.

嗯,这是第一次。

Scott Horton3:23:56

It’s not a first.

这不是第一次。

3:23:56 The Afghan war wasn’t about Israel either.

阿富汗战争也与以色列无关。

Okay, but this Yemen war was-

好吧,但是这场也门战争是——

Mark Dubowitz3:24:01

I thought 9/11 was about Israel.

我以为 9/11 是关于以色列的。

Scott Horton3:24:03

Well, it was in great part, but the decision to sack Cobble and do a regime change and all that had nothing to do with the Likud whatsoever other than, well, we got to keep the war going long enough to go to Baghdad.

好吧,这在很大程度上是,但是解雇科布尔并进行政权更迭的决定以及所有这些都与利库德集团无关,除了,好吧,我们必须让战争持续足够长的时间才能到达巴格达。

Mark Dubowitz3:24:16

Oh, okay.

哦好的。

3:24:16 So it was Israel’s fault.

所以这是以色列的错。

Scott Horton3:24:17

I was in the middle of saying about the war in Yemen that we got the war powers resolution through twice, and Trump vetoed it twice.

我正在谈论也门战争,我们两次通过了战争权力决议,但特朗普两次否决了它。

3:24:17 And his man, Pete Navarro, explained to the New York Times that this was just welfare for American industry.

他的手下皮特·纳瓦罗向《纽约时报》解释说,这只是美国工业的福利。

A lot of industrialists were angry about the tariffs disrupting trade with China, and somehow they substituted Raytheon for all American industry somehow and said, industry will be happy if we funnel a lot of money to Raytheon.

许多实业家对关税扰乱与中国的贸易感到愤怒,他们以某种方式用雷神公司取代了所有美国工业,并表示,如果我们向雷神公司输送大量资金,工业界会很高兴。

That’s Pete Navarro talking to the New York Times about why they continued the war in Yemen throughout Trump’s entire first term.

这是皮特·纳瓦罗向《纽约时报》讲述为什​​么他们在特朗普的整个第一个任期内继续在也门进行战争。

He had no interest in it at all.

他对此完全没有兴趣。

The whole thing was it was Obama’s fault.

整件事都是奥巴马的错。

The whole thing was essentially on autopilot.

整个事情基本上是自动驾驶的。

And what was he doing?

他在做什么?

He’s flying Al-Qaeda’s Air Force against the Houthis, who originally, if you go back to January of 2015, America was passing intelligence to the Houthis to use to kill Al-Qaeda.

他驾驶基地组织的空军对抗胡塞武装,如果你回到 2015 年 1 月,美国最初正在向胡塞武装传递情报,以用来消灭基地组织。

You know AQAP, the guys that tried to blow up the plane over Detroit with the underpants bomb on Christmas Day 2009 that did all those horrific massacres in Europe, real As Bin Ladinist terrorists.

你知道 AQAP,他们在 2009 年圣诞节那天试图用内裤炸弹炸毁底特律上空的飞机,他们在欧洲制造了所有这些可怕的屠杀,他们是真正的本·拉登主义恐怖分子。

Lex Fridman3:25:38

Right, military, industrial complex.

对了,军事、工业综合体。

3:25:38 The point was made.

重点已经明确了。

Mark Dubowitz3:25:40

Yeah, maybe I could respond to that, because I mean, again, it’s always America’s fault according Scott.

是的,也许我可以对此做出回应,因为我的意思是,根据斯科特的说法,这始终是美国的错。

Lex Fridman3:25:46

Just take jab at each other.

就互相刺拳吧。

Mark Dubowitz3:25:46

No, no but it’s just-

不,不,但这只是——

Scott Horton3:25:46

Saudi and UAE asked Barack Obama for permission to start that war and for American help in prosecuting it, and he said yes, and helped them do it.

沙特和阿联酋请求巴拉克·奥巴马允许发动那场战争,并请求美国帮助发动这场战争,他答应了,并帮助他们这么做了。

Mark Dubowitz3:25:53

I’m going to segue into an answer, because I think it deserves an answer.

我将继续回答,因为我认为它值得一个答案。

3:25:53 Military industrial complex is a serious concern because I think you’re right.

军工综合体是一个严重的问题,因为我认为你是对的。

The bigger it gets, and the more weapons you have, you think the more the greater the temptation to use it, right?

它越大,你拥有的武器越多,你想使用它的诱惑就越大吧?

I think that’s sort of the argument.

我认为这就是一个论点。

And then there’s also self enrichment and how much money can be made, and all of that I think is of serious concern to people.

然后还有自我充实和能赚多少钱,所有这些我认为都是人们非常关心的。

Look, I think Trump is somebody who, it’s hard pressed to say that Donald Trump is a great advocate of the military industrial complex, or that he is in their pocket the same way that he’s in the pocket of the Israelis and in the pocket of the Saudis and in the pocket of everybody.

听着,我认为特朗普是这样一个人,很难说唐纳德·特朗普是军事工业联合体的伟大倡导者,或者说他在他们的口袋里,就像他在以色列人的口袋里、沙特人的口袋里以及每个人的口袋里一样。

I mean, I think the one thing with Trump is that Trump, he has learned the lessons of American engagement over the past few decades, and I think Scott’s done a good job of laying out the mistakes that have been made, even though we can discuss about causal connections and who’s responsible.

我的意思是,我认为特朗普的一件事是,特朗普已经吸取了过去几十年美国接触的教训,而且我认为斯科特很好地列出了所犯的错误,尽管我们可以讨论因果关系和责任人。

And I lean on-

我靠着——

Scott Horton3:26:52

Can we?

我们可以吗?

3:26:52 I want to.

我想要。

Mark Dubowitz3:26:53

Well, Scott, can I finish?

好吧,斯科特,我可以说完吗?

3:26:53 Because your causal connection is always, it’s America aggressing, Israel aggressing, and all these poor people responding to us.

因为因果关系总是美国侵略、以色列侵略,以及所有这些可怜的人对我们的回应。

But nonetheless, I think Trump has, he’s learned the lessons, but he hasn’t over-learned the lessons.

但尽管如此,我认为特朗普已经吸取了教训,但他并没有过度吸取教训。

He’s not paralyzed by Iraq or Afghanistan or the mistakes made by his predecessors.

他并没有因伊拉克、阿富汗或他的前任所犯的错误而瘫痪。

He understands that at the end of the day, we need serious American power.

他明白,归根结底,我们需要强大的美国力量。

We need lethal power.

我们需要致命的力量。

We need four deterrence.

我们需要四种威慑。

And he’s been very careful and very selective about how he uses American power.

他对于如何使用美国力量非常谨慎、非常有选择性。

I mean, we’ve talked about it throughout this whole conversation.

我的意思是,我们在整个谈话中都谈到了这个问题。

Trump used American power to kill Qasem Soleimani, one of the world’s most dangerous terrorists.

特朗普利用美国的力量杀死了世界上最危险的恐怖分子之一卡西姆·苏莱马尼。

He killed Baghdadi, the head of ISIS, one of the world’s most dangerous terrorists.

他杀死了世界上最危险的恐怖分子之一“伊斯兰国”的头目巴格达迪。

Scott Horton3:27:57

That’s not true.

那不是真的。

3:27:57 Those are North Korean missiles completely debunked by Janes’ Defense Weekly.

这些是《简氏防务周刊》彻底揭穿的朝鲜导弹。

Nice try.

不错的尝试。

Mark Dubowitz3:28:02

Yeah, nice try.

是的,不错的尝试。

3:28:02 Anyway, everybody knows that the Iranians have been financing the Houthis.

无论如何,每个人都知道伊朗人一直在资助胡塞武装。

Hezbollah has been training the Houthis, and Iran has given capabilities to the Houthis to develop their own indigenous missile capability.

真主党一直在训练胡塞武装,伊朗也向胡塞武装提供了发展自己本土导弹能力的能力。

The fact of the matter is he did in a way go after the Houthis much more intensively than Biden did in order to prevent them from continuing to shut down Red Sea shipping on which both America and our allies depend as a trade route.

事实是,他在某种程度上比拜登更深入地追击胡塞武装,以防止他们继续关闭美国和我们的盟友所依赖的红海航运作为贸易路线。

He actually did it quite successfully because after a few days of pretty intensive bombing, the Houthis got the message and they cut a deal with Donald Trump, they’re not going to interfere with our ships anymore.

他实际上做得相当成功,因为经过几天相当密集的轰炸后,胡塞武装得到了消息,他们与唐纳德·特朗普达成协议,他们不会再干扰我们的船只。

Scott Horton3:28:41

He got a deal with them.

他和他们达成了协议。

3:28:41 They kept bombing Israel, which is what got him involved in the first place.

他们不断轰炸以色列,这就是他最初参与其中的原因。

He completely backed out.

他彻底退缩了。

Sounds to me like they won, and he backed down.

在我看来,他们赢了,但他让步了。

Mark Dubowitz3:28:48

Well, it sounds like in terms of promoting American national security interests, it sounds like he did a pretty good job of sending a message to the Houthis and the Iranians don’t mess with the United States, and that gets us to the contemporary reality.

嗯,听起来在促进美国国家安全利益方面,听起来他在向胡塞武装传递信息方面做得很好,伊朗人不要惹恼美国,这让我们了解了当代的现实。

3:28:48 He took a decision one day on one day to send our B2s and our subs in order to severe damage to three nuclear facilities.

他日复一日地做出决定,派出我们的 B2 和潜艇,以严重破坏三个核设施。

It was a one day campaign.

这是为期一天的活动。

It was selective.

这是有选择性的。

It was narrow, it was overwhelming.

它很窄,很压倒性的。

And I think it sends a message to Khamenei.

我认为这向哈梅内伊传达了一个信息。

I think it sends a message to regimes around the world, anti-American regimes around the world, that Donald Trump has not over-learned the lessons of the past 20 years, but that in fact, he is not going to dismantle the U.S military and dismantle our nuclear program and fly around through all these cities and call peace conferences and hope that these dictators will just sit down with America and say, “You know what?

我认为这向世界各地的政权、世界各地的反美政权传达了一个信息,即唐纳德·特朗普并没有过度吸取过去20年的教训,但事实上,他不会解散美国军队,废除我们的核计划,不会飞遍所有这些城市,召开和平会议,并希望这些独裁者能与美国坐下来说:“你知道吗?

All is forgiven the United States of America.

美利坚合众国一切都被原谅了。

It’s all your fault.

都是你的错。

You did this all.

这一切都是你做的。

We admit our responsibility,” and then we have peace and paradise on earth.

我们承认我们的责任”,然后我们就会在地球上拥有和平和天堂。

Lex Fridman3:31:26

So you made a case for, if it’s okay, you made a case for strength here.

所以你提出了一个理由,如果可以的话,你在这里提出了一个力量的理由。

3:31:26 Just practically speaking, why do you think Trump has talked about peace a lot, why do you think he hasn’t been able to get to a ceasefire with Ukraine and Russia, for example?

实际上,你认为为什么特朗普经常谈论和平,为什么你认为他无法与乌克兰和俄罗斯达成停火?

If we just move away from Iran without getting into the history of the whole thing, why he’s been talking peace, peace, peace, peace, peace.

如果我们只是离开伊朗而不了解整个事情的历史,为什么他一直在谈论和平,和平,和平,和平,和平。

He’s been pushing it and pushing it.

他一直在推动它。

What can we learn about that so far failure, that’s also instructed for Iran?

从迄今为止的失败中我们可以了解到什么,这也是针对伊朗的?

Mark Dubowitz3:31:57

Look, I’m not a Russia expert.

听着,我不是俄罗斯专家。

3:31:57 I’m not a Ukraine expert.

我不是乌克兰问题专家。

I’m sitting in front of two people who know a lot more about that conflict than I do.

我坐在两个人面前,他们比我更了解这场冲突。

Lex Fridman3:32:03

You are, we should say, banned by Putin.

我们应该说,你被普京禁止了。

Mark Dubowitz3:32:06

I am.

我是。

3:32:06 I have been sanctioned by Russia and by Iran.

我受到了俄罗斯和伊朗的制裁。

Lex Fridman3:32:10

Sanctioned.

受到制裁。

3:32:10 Yes.

是的。

Mark Dubowitz3:32:11

Yes.

是的。

3:32:11 Banned, sanctioned, threatened.

禁止、制裁、威胁。

Lex Fridman3:32:14

Congratulations.

恭喜。

Mark Dubowitz3:32:15

Thank you.

谢谢。

3:32:15 Thank you.

谢谢。

Well, it causes some difficulties.

嗯,这会带来一些困难。

But anyway, I think the answer to that is that for Putin, he needs to understand that like Khamenei, he has two options here.

但无论如何,我认为答案是,对于普京来说,他需要明白,像哈梅内伊一样,他在这里有两个选择。

Option one, which President Trump has signaled over and over and over again is come sit down and negotiate a ceasefire with the Ukrainians.

特朗普总统一再表示的选项一是坐下来与乌克兰人谈判停火。

I don’t want to get into the details and the back and forth about who’s responsible for the fact there’s no ceasefire, Putin or Zelensky.

我不想详细讨论谁应该为没有停火这一事实负责,是普京还是泽连斯基。

I mean, that’s a whole other debate, and I’m sure you guys have a lot of opinions on that.

我的意思是,这完全是另一场辩论,我相信你们对此有很多看法。

But path one is sit down and let’s negotiate a ceasefire.

但第一条路是坐下来谈判停火。

Path two is the United States will use American power in order to build our leverage so that Vladimir Putin understands that he has to do a ceasefire.

第二条路径是美国将利用美国的力量来建立我们的影响力,以便弗拉基米尔·普京明白他必须停火。

Now, I’m not suggesting US troops, absolutely not.

现在,我并不是建议美军,绝对不是。

What I am suggesting is, there’s a package right now of sanctions that have ADA co-sponsors in the Senate across party lines.

我的建议是,目前有一个制裁方案,参议院中有跨党派的 ADA 共同发起人。

Lex Fridman3:35:10

Increasing military aid to Ukraine, in the case that you described, also has to be coupled with extreme pressure to make peace.

在你所描述的情况下,增加对乌克兰的军事援助还必须伴随着巨大的和平压力。

Mark Dubowitz3:35:17

Correct.

正确的。

3:35:17 Extreme pressure to make peace,

缔造和平的巨大压力,

Lex Fridman3:35:19

Which Trump hopefully appears to be doing now in Iran.

希望特朗普现在正在伊朗做这件事。

Mark Dubowitz3:35:23

I think Trump is early…

我认为特朗普早...

3:35:23 I mean, it’s interesting you said that because he’s early indicators.

我的意思是,你这么说很有趣,因为他是早期指标。

Again, who knows where the ceasefire goes.

再说一遍,谁知道停火会走向何方。

But I think it was important he slapped Khamenei, but he also said to Bibi, “Enough, enough.” And it’s like, okay, now we’re going back to Oman.

但我认为他打了哈梅内伊一巴掌很重要,但他也对比比说,“够了,够了。”就好像,好吧,现在我们要回阿曼了。

There’s going to be a temporary ceasefire.

将会有暂时停火。

Now let’s negotiate.

现在我们来谈判吧。

And I think that’s important.

我认为这很重要。

And I think it shows that Donald Trump is leading, not following.

我认为这表明唐纳德·特朗普正在引领,而不是跟随。

It shows that Donald Trump is his own man, not on the payroll of the Russians or the Iranians or the Israelis or all these other crazy accusations that have been made about this guy for many, many years.

这表明唐纳德·特朗普是他自己的人,而不是在俄罗斯人、伊朗人、以色列人或多年来对这个人提出的所有其他疯狂指控的工资单上。

And he’s going to give, as they say, peace a chance, and he’s going to give a ceasefire a chance.

正如他们所说,他将给和平一个机会,他将给停火一个机会。

He’s going to give negotiations a chance.

他将给谈判机会。

But I’ll think he’s sending the message to the Iranians and he needs to send it to Putin is, if you don’t take me up on my offer, I’ve already demonstrated that I am serious and I will use American power carefully and selectively in the way that I’ve done in the past.

但我认为他正在向伊朗人发送信息,他需要向普京发送信息,如果你不接受我的提议,我已经表明我是认真的,我将像过去那样谨慎而有选择地使用美国的力量。

Lex Fridman3:36:23

At the risk of doing the thing I shouldn’t do.

冒着做不该做的事的风险。

3:36:23 But just to test the ideas of libertarianism and the things we’ve been talking about.

但这只是为了测试自由主义的思想和我们一直在谈论的事情。

Can we, for a brief time unrelated to everything we’ve been talking about, talk about World War II, what was the right thing to do in 1938, 1939?

我们能否在与我们一直在谈论的一切无关的短暂时间里谈论第二次世界大战,1938 年、1939 年该做什么是正确的?

What would you do?

你会怎么办?

Okay.

好的。

To be clear, World War II has nothing to do with current events.

需要明确的是,第二次世界大战与时事无关。

In fact, many of the horrible policies of the United States, in my opinion, have to do with projecting World War II onto every single conflict in the world.

事实上,在我看来,美国的许多可怕政策都与将第二次世界大战投射到世界上的每一场冲突有关。

Okay.

好的。

Scott Horton3:37:00

Agree.

同意。

Lex Fridman3:37:01

But-

但是——

Mark Dubowitz3:37:01

Overlearning.

过度学习。

3:37:01 Overlearning.

过度学习。

Scott Horton3:37:00

Agree.

同意。

Mark Dubowitz3:37:01

But overlearning.

但过度学习。

Lex Fridman3:37:02

Overlearning.

过度学习。

3:37:02 But it is an interesting extreme case.

但这是一个有趣的极端案例。

Just to clarify, I’m just philosophically talking about at which point do you hit, do you do military intervention, and that’s a nice case.

澄清一下,我只是从哲学上讨论你在什么时候进行军事干预,这是一个很好的例子。

Maybe you have a better case study, but that’s such an extreme one that it’s interesting.

也许你有一个更好的案例研究,但这是一个非常极端的案例,所以很有趣。

Scott Horton3:37:22

We’re talking about Germany or Japan?

我们在谈论德国还是日本?

Lex Fridman3:37:23

Germany side.

德国这边。

3:37:23 Yeah.

是的。

Scott Horton3:37:24

So Japan attacked us and Germany declared war on us.

于是日本进攻了我们,德国向我们宣战。

3:37:24 Tough for them.

对他们来说很难。

And that’s what happens when you declare war on the United States, you get hit.

这就是当你向美国宣战时会发生的情况,你会受到打击。

Lex Fridman3:37:33

That was idiotic on the part of Hitler to declare war on the United States.

希特勒向美国宣战是愚蠢的。

Scott Horton3:37:36

I never understood why he ever did that.

我一直不明白他为什么要这么做。

3:37:36 They always said it was just because he was crazy.

他们总是说这只是因为他疯了。

But what it was is he was trying to get the Japanese to invade the Soviet Union from the East and in order to divide Stalin’s forces, which failed and it didn’t work.

但实际上,他试图让日本从东方入侵苏联,以分割斯大林的军队,但失败了,也没有奏效。

And it was a huge blunder from his point of view, I guess.

我想,从他的角度来看,这是一个巨大的错误。

Lex Fridman3:37:50

Philosophically from an interventionism perspective, you’re saying United States should have stayed out from that war as long as possible, until they’re attacked?

从哲学上来说,从干涉主义的角度来看,你是说美国应该尽可能长时间地远离这场战争,直到他们受到攻击?

Scott Horton3:37:59

Yes.

是的。

3:37:59 I mean, look at how powerful they ended up being and the amount of damage that they were able to inflict on the Soviets, better them than us.

我的意思是,看看他们最终变得多么强大,以及他们能够对苏联造成多大的伤害,他们比我们更好。

Lex Fridman3:38:07

What do you think?

你怎么认为?

Mark Dubowitz3:38:08

So, look-

所以,看——

Lex Fridman3:38:09

Is this a useful discussion?

这是一个有用的讨论吗?

Mark Dubowitz3:38:10

It’s interesting.

这很有趣。

3:38:10 I mean, I think it’s interesting-

我的意思是,我觉得这很有趣——

Lex Fridman3:38:12

Philosophically.

从哲学上来说。

Mark Dubowitz3:38:13

…

……

3:38:13 of sort of libertarianism or isolationism in practice.

实践中的某种自由主义或孤立主义。

I mean, I think the ’30s are more interesting to me than what happened between ’39 and ’45.

我的意思是,我认为 30 年代对我来说比 39 到 45 年间发生的事情更有趣。

I think the debate in America was very interesting in the ’30s where there was really a strong isolationist movement with Charles Lindbergh and Henry Ford and Father Coughlin and many.

我认为三十年代美国的辩论非常有趣,当时查尔斯·林德伯格(Charles Lindbergh)、亨利·福特(Henry Ford)和考夫林神父(Father Coughlin)等人发起了一场强大的孤立主义运动。

Lex Fridman3:38:34

And Joe Kennedy.

还有乔·肯尼迪。

Mark Dubowitz3:38:35

Yeah, and Joe Kennedy.

是的,还有乔·肯尼迪。

3:38:35 I mean they defined themselves as sort of America-firsters, but it was very much an isolationist strain.

我的意思是,他们将自己定义为美国优先主义者,但这在很大程度上是一种孤立主义倾向。

And I think we can talk about that history and-

我认为我们可以谈论这段历史并且-

Lex Fridman3:38:44

Coughlin was a New-Dealer, not a right-winger.

考夫林是一位新政人士,而不是右翼分子。

Mark Dubowitz3:38:46

Anyway, very much an isolationist talking about America having to stay out of these entangling alliances.

不管怎样,他在谈论美国必须远离这些纠缠不清的联盟时,很大程度上是一个孤立主义者。

3:38:46 This is not our war.

这不是我们的战争。

Emotionally understandable.

感情上可以理解。

Right?

正确的?

Because you can also overlearn the lessons of World War I.

因为你也可以过度学习第一次世界大战的教训。

and I think they over-learned the lessons of World War I, which was a brutal war and a devastating war mostly for Europe, but obviously for the United States.

我认为他们过度吸取了第一次世界大战的教训,这是一场残酷的战争,也是一场毁灭性的战争,主要对欧洲而言,但显然对美国而言也是如此。

We lost thousands of American men and women.

我们失去了数千名美国男女。

So the ’30s was this big debate between those who saw the gathering storm of what was happening with Nazi Germany and those who wanted to keep America out.

因此,20世纪30年代是一场激烈的辩论,双方之间的争论是那些目睹了纳粹德国所发生的风暴不断聚集的人与那些想要将美国排除在外的人之间的争论。

Lex Fridman3:41:14

To make clear, you mentioned there’s a parallel, but mostly there’s no parallel.

为了澄清这一点,你提到有一个相似之处,但大多数情况下没有相似之处。

3:41:14 It’s a fundamentally different…

这是一个根本不同的……

Mark Dubowitz3:41:20

Absolutely.

绝对的。

Lex Fridman3:41:20

There will never be a war like that.

永远不会有这样的战争。

Scott Horton3:41:22

It’s a real problem, too, because they always say everybody’s Hitler, all enemies are Hitler.

这也是一个真正的问题,因为他们总是说每个人都是希特勒,所有的敌人都是希特勒。

3:41:22 And to compromise with them at all is to appease Hitler and you can never do that.

与他们妥协就是为了安抚希特勒,而你永远做不到这一点。

Mark Dubowitz3:41:30

Agreed.

同意。

Scott Horton3:41:31

And they do that to Manuel Noriega, to David Koresh, to Saddam Hussein, to whoever they feel like demonizing and saying is-

他们对曼努埃尔·诺列加、大卫·科雷什、萨达姆·侯赛因,以及任何他们想要妖魔化的人,并说是——

Mark Dubowitz3:41:37

Hitler was unique evil.

希特勒是独一无二的邪恶。

Scott Horton3:41:38

…

……

3:41:38 too crazy to negotiate with, when let’s get real, and I think we’re agreed about this probably, that in 2002, W.

太疯狂了,无法与之谈判,当我们面对现实时,我认为我们可能就这一点达成了一致,即 2002 年,W.

Bush could have just sent Colin Powell, the four-star general former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State, to read the Riot Act to Saddam Hussein and tell him, “Look, man, you help keep Al-Qaeda down and we’ll let you live.” And everything would’ve been fine.

布什本可以派四星上将、前参谋长联席会议主席、国务卿科林·鲍威尔向萨达姆·侯赛因宣读《防暴法案》,并告诉他:“看,伙计,你帮助镇压基地组织,我们就会让你活下去。”一切都会好起来的。

And in fact, just like Saddam Hussein, there’s a great article by James Risen-

事实上,就像萨达姆·侯赛因一样,詹姆斯·里森写了一篇很棒的文章——

Mark Dubowitz3:42:05

For the record, I don’t agree.

根据记录,我不同意。

Scott Horton3:42:06

Hang on, hang on now.

坚持住,坚持住。

3:42:06 There’s an article by James-

詹姆斯有一篇文章——

Mark Dubowitz3:42:07

Not surprisingly.

不足为奇。

Scott Horton3:42:08

There’s an article by James Risen in the New York Times, and there’s another one by Seymour Hirsch as well about how Saddam Hussein offered to give in on everything.

《纽约时报》上有一篇詹姆斯·里森(James Risen)的文章,还有西摩·赫希(Seymour Hirsch)的另一篇文章,讲述了萨达姆·侯赛因如何主动屈服于一切。

3:42:08 He said, “You want to search for weapons of mass destruction, you can send your Army and FBI everywhere you want.

他说:“如果你想寻找大规模杀伤性武器,你可以派你的陆军和联邦调查局去任何你想去的地方。

You want us to switch sides in the Israel-Palestine conflict, we’ll stop backing Hamas.

你希望我们在巴以冲突中倒戈,我们就停止支持哈马斯。

You want us to hold elections, we’ll hold elections.

你希望我们举行选举,我们就会举行选举。

Just give us a couple years.

只要给我们几年时间。

If this is about the oil, we’ll sign over mineral rights.” This is James Risen, New York Times.

如果这是关于石油的,我们将签署采矿权。”我是《纽约时报》的詹姆斯·瑞森。

Mark Dubowitz3:43:54

And they were giving refuge to Al-Qaeda.

他们还为基地组织提供庇护。

3:43:54 And the CIA said, “This is a key facilitation pipeline between Iran and Al-Qaeda.” Quote unquote.

中央情报局表示,“这是伊朗和基地组织之间的一条重要的便利管道。”引用取消引用。

Scott Horton3:44:01

They were willing to negotiate a trade-

他们愿意就一项贸易进行谈判——

Mark Dubowitz3:44:03

Key facilitation pipeline.

关键便利管道。

Scott Horton3:44:04

…

……

3:44:04 between these dangerous Bin Ladenites and the MEK and America refused to negotiate that.

这些危险的本·拉登分子和 MEK 之间的关系以及美国拒绝就此进行谈判。

And it was years later when the Bin Ladenites abducted some Iranian diplomats in Pakistan that they then traded them away to get their diplomats back.

几年后,本·拉登分子在巴基斯坦绑架了一些伊朗外交官,然后他们将他们卖掉,以换回他们的外交官。

And Atef, I think Bin Laden’s son ended up being killed not long after that, Hamza, and Atef too.

还有阿特夫,我认为本拉登的儿子不久之后就被杀了,哈姆扎和阿特夫也是如此。

But both of those dangerous terrorists were released and were involved in terrorism between then and the time that they were later killed, I think within a couple of years of that.

但这两名危险的恐怖分子都被释放,并在他们后来被杀期间参与了恐怖主义,我认为在这之后的几年内。

So the hawks always like to say, “Oh yeah, Iran gives such aid and comfort to Al-Qaeda,” and all that.

所以鹰派总是喜欢说,“哦,是的,伊朗向基地组织提供了如此多的援助和安慰”,等等。

There’s a great document at the Counterterrorism Center at West Point where they debunk all of that.

西点军校反恐中心有一份很棒的文件,他们揭穿了所有这些。

Mark Dubowitz3:44:44

Yeah, there’s a 9/11 report by the 9/11 Commission.

是的,9/11 委员会有一份 9/11 报告。

3:44:44 There’s a 9/11 commission report, people can Google it, which talks about the cooperation between Iran and Al-Qaeda.

有一份9/11委员会的报告,人们可以谷歌一下,里面谈到了伊朗和基地组织之间的合作。

Scott Horton3:44:53

Only in Bosnia when they were doing a favor for Bill Clinton.

只有在波斯尼亚,当他们为比尔·克林顿提供帮助时。

Mark Dubowitz3:44:56

Beyond that, and the CIA released thousands of pages of classified material that they declassified showing the relationship between Iran and Al-Qaeda.

除此之外,中央情报局还公布了他们解密的数千页机密材料,显示了伊朗与基地组织之间的关系。

3:44:56 The US Treasury Department under Obama and under Trump actually designated a number of Iranian individuals for facilitating Al-Qaeda.

奥巴马和特朗普领导下的美国财政部实际上指定了一些为基地组织提供便利的伊朗个人。

So anyway, I mean, these are important facts, but I actually want to-

所以无论如何,我的意思是,这些都是重要的事实,但我实际上想-

Scott Horton3:45:19

You mentioned Baghdadi and Soleimani in the same breath a minute ago, and they’re deadly enemies.

一分钟前你同时提到巴格达迪和苏莱马尼,他们是死敌。

3:45:19 And it was Soleimani’s Shiite forces in a Iraq war three that helped destroy [inaudible 03:45:27]-

正是苏莱马尼的什叶派军队在伊拉克第三次战争中帮助摧毁了[听不清 03:45:27]-

Mark Dubowitz3:45:27

The enemy of my enemy is my friend.

我敌人的敌人就是我的朋友。

Scott Horton3:45:28

…

……

3:45:28 with America flying air power for them.

美国为他们提供空中力量。

Mark Dubowitz3:45:30

The greatest error that we’ve made in the Middle East is this notion, not the greatest, but one of the greatest, is this sort of conceptual error that somehow Sunnis and Shiites don’t work together and Iran doesn’t work with Al-Qaeda-

我们在中东犯下的最大错误是这样的观念,不是最大的错误,而是最大的错误之一,就是这种概念错误,不知何故逊尼派和什叶派不合作,伊朗不与基地组织合作——

Scott Horton3:45:30

Well, I didn’t say that.

好吧,我没那么说。

Mark Dubowitz3:45:43

I’m not saying you say that, but many people think that, and of course they do work, they hate each other, but of course they work together because they hate us more.

我不是说你这么说,但很多人认为,他们当然工作,他们互相憎恨,但他们当然一起工作,因为他们更恨我们。

3:45:43 But can I just say something, Lex, because I actually think just stepping back from all of this detail-

但我能说点什么吗,莱克斯,因为我实际上想从所有这些细节中退一步——

Lex Fridman3:45:54

The more we start to zoom out now, the better.

我们现在开始缩小得越多越好。

Mark Dubowitz3:45:56

Yeah.

是的。

3:45:56 I’d like to zoom out a little bit.

我想缩小一点。

Look, I think the lessons for me over 22 years on working on these issues is one must learn about the mistakes that we’ve made in Iraq and in Afghanistan, in Libya.

听着,我认为 22 年来我在这些问题上的工作经验给我带来的教训是,我们必须了解我们在伊拉克、阿富汗和利比亚所犯的错误。

One must learn about the mistakes that we made in Vietnam, mistakes that we made in World War II-

人们必须了解我们在越南犯下的错误,我们在第二次世界大战中犯下的错误——

Scott Horton3:46:13

So we can make them all over again in Iran this time.

所以这次我们可以在伊朗重新开始。

Mark Dubowitz3:46:15

Can I finish?

我可以完成吗?

3:46:15 Or…

或者……

Scott Horton3:46:16

Go ahead.

继续吧。

Mark Dubowitz3:46:16

Are you good?

你好吗?

Scott Horton3:46:17

Yeah, I’m ready.

是的,我准备好了。

Mark Dubowitz3:46:18

All right.

好的。

3:46:18 So I think that what President Trump is trying to do is learn but not overlearn.

所以我认为特朗普总统想做的是学习,但不要学得过度。

I think he understands the mistakes that have been made.

我认为他理解所犯的错误。

I think he’s trying to rectify those mistakes and he also understands that American power is important.

我认为他正在努力纠正这些错误,而且他也明白美国力量的重要性。

It is a force for good in the world, even though we have made major mistakes.

尽管我们犯了重大错误,但它是世界上一股向善的力量。

I think there is a great danger amongst certain people to believe that no power should ever be exercised, that all American power is a bad thing and a destructive thing.

我认为某些人认为不应该行使任何权力,认为美国的所有权力都是坏事和破坏性的事情,这是一个巨大的危险。

And sometimes to confuse major tactical decisions that have been made, whether it’s been made by the Brits in World War II or the Americans or us or whoever it is in whatever war, with the fact that there is a strategic reality that we always have to be conscious about and that we have enemies.

有时会混淆已经做出的重大战术决策,无论是二战中的英国人、美国人、我们还是任何战争中的任何人做出的,与我们始终必须意识到的战略现实以及我们有敌人的事实相混淆。

This is not the Garden of Eden, yet.

这还不是伊甸园。

Scott Horton3:48:12

They don’t have a nuclear weapons program.

他们没有核武器计划。

Mark Dubowitz3:48:16

Again, we’ve had a four-hour debate on this, so I’m sure if you want to rewind, you can listen to all our arguments once again.

我们再次就这个问题进行了四个小时的辩论,所以我确信如果你想倒带,你可以再次听听我们所有的论点。

3:48:16 But the fact of the matter is that our unwillingness to use power, if we’re never going to use power, all that’s going to do is send a signal to our enemies that they can do whatever they want.

但事实是,我们不愿意使用权力,如果我们永远不会使用权力,那么我们所能做的就是向我们的敌人发出一个信号,表明他们可以为所欲为。

They can violate whatever agreements they want, they can use aggression against anyone they want.

他们可以违反任何他们想要的协议,他们可以对他们想要的任何人进行侵略。

And I think that puts American lives in danger.

我认为这会让美国人的生命处于危险之中。

Lex Fridman3:49:23

On that topic, question for both of you, Scott.

关于这个话题,请向你们俩提问,斯科特。

3:49:23 If human civilization destroys itself in the next 75 years, it probably most likely will be a World War III type of scenario, maybe a nuclear war.

如果人类文明在未来75年内自我毁灭,很可能会出现第三次世界大战,甚至可能是核战争。

How do we avoid that?

我们如何避免这种情况?

We’ve been talking about Iran, but there’ll be new conflicts.

我们一直在谈论伊朗,但还会有新的冲突。

There’s Ukraine, China…

有乌克兰、中国……

Scott Horton3:49:41

Kashmir.

克什米尔。

Lex Fridman3:49:42

Kashmir.

克什米尔。

Mark Dubowitz3:49:44

North Korea.

北朝鲜。

Lex Fridman3:49:46

Yeah.

是的。

Mark Dubowitz3:49:47

Don’t forget North Korea.

别忘了朝鲜。

Lex Fridman3:49:48

Yeah, I mean, there was time when North Korea was the biggest threat to human civilization, according to…

是的,我的意思是,根据……的说法,曾经有一段时间朝鲜是人类文明的最大威胁。

Scott Horton3:49:53

We could have had a deal except John Bolton ruined it.

我们原本可以达成协议,但约翰·博尔顿却毁了它。

Lex Fridman3:49:56

So that’s the bigger question, not so much in the specifics.

所以这是一个更大的问题,而不是具体的问题。

Scott Horton3:50:00

Oh, I mean the second time.

哦,我是说第二次。

3:50:00 He ruined the Clinton deal of ’94, then he ruined the Trump deal of 2018.

他毁掉了 94 年的克林顿协议,然后又毁掉了 2018 年的特朗普协议。

Mark Dubowitz3:50:06

Or maybe the North Korean dictator ruined it.

或者也许是朝鲜独裁者毁了它。

3:50:06 But again, one doesn’t want to blame our enemies for their mistakes.

但同样,人们不想因为敌人的错误而责怪他们。

Scott Horton3:50:12

Well, at the second meeting, Trump sent John Bolton to Outer Mongolia so that he couldn’t sit at the table and ruin the deal.

那么第二次会面的时候,特朗普派博尔顿去外蒙古,这样他就不能坐在谈判桌旁毁掉这笔交易。

3:50:12 But what happened then?

但后来发生了什么?

The Democrats had his lawyer testify against him while he was at the meeting and they had this huge propaganda campaign that Kim Jong Un is going to walk all over Trump and take such advantage of him, and they made it virtually impossible for him to walk away claiming a victory.

当他出席会议时,民主党让他的律师对他作证,他们进行了一场大规模的宣传活动,称金正恩将在特朗普身上走来走去并利用他,他们让他几乎不可能声称胜利而离开。

Mark Dubowitz3:50:33

Scott, do you ever blame the enemy ever?

斯科特,你曾经责怪过敌人吗?

3:50:33 Do you ever blame the enemy?

你有没有责怪敌人?

Scott Horton3:50:37

North Korea is not my enemy.

朝鲜不是我的敌人。

Mark Dubowitz3:50:38

North Korea is not your enemy?

朝鲜不是你的敌人吗?

Scott Horton3:50:40

No.

不。

Mark Dubowitz3:50:40

Really?

真的吗?

3:50:40 They build nuclear weapons, ICBMs that targeted America.

他们制造核武器、针对美国的洲际弹道导弹。

Scott Horton3:50:45

That’s George Bush and John Bolton’s fault.

这是乔治·布什和约翰·博尔顿的错。

3:50:45 I already said that.

我已经说过了。

Mark Dubowitz3:50:47

Well, whatever fault it is, the fact of the matter is do you ever, ever blame an American adversary or is it always our fault?

好吧,无论它是什么,事实是你是否曾经责怪过美国对手,或者这总是我们的错?

Scott Horton3:50:55

In fact, what happened was-

事实上,发生的事情是——

Mark Dubowitz3:50:57

Is it always our fault?

这总是我们的错吗?

Scott Horton3:50:58

See, all you can do is characterize, but you don’t want to talk about the details.

你看,你所能做的就是描述特征,但你不想谈论细节。

3:50:58 The details are that Stephen Biegun, who worked for Donald Trump gave a speech and said, “you know what?

细节是,为唐纳德·特朗普工作的史蒂芬·比根发表演讲说:“你知道吗?

We can put normalization first and denuclearization later.”

我们可以先实现正常化,然后再实现无核化。”

Mark Dubowitz3:51:11

I know him very well.

我很了解他。

Scott Horton3:51:12

And then Donald Trump brought John Bolton to the meeting and he prevented that from being the message of the meeting and ruined the deal.

然后唐纳德·特朗普带着约翰·博尔顿参加了会议,他阻止了这一点成为会议的信息并破坏了协议。

Mark Dubowitz3:51:24

So it’s always John Bolton’s fault.

所以这总是约翰·博尔顿的错。

3:51:24 Always the neocon’s fault.

总是新保守派的错。

Scott Horton3:51:25

Yes.

是的。

3:51:25 That’s right.

这是正确的。

It’s all John Bolton’s fault, because how reasonable does this sound to you, Lex-

这都是约翰·博尔顿的错,因为这对你来说听起来多么合理,莱克斯——

Mark Dubowitz3:51:26

It’s lobby fault.

这是大厅的错。

Scott Horton3:51:29

Give up all your nuclear weapons first, then we’ll talk about every other issue.

先放弃所有核武器,然后我们再讨论其他问题。

3:51:29 Does that sound like a poison pill or that sounds like a reasonable negotiation?

这听起来像是毒丸还是听起来像是合理的谈判?

Give me a break.

让我休息一下。

Mark Dubowitz3:51:37

Sounds like a beginning of a negotiation.

听起来像是谈判的开始。

Scott Horton3:51:39

Yeah.

是的。

3:51:39 Well, they got nowhere because Trump brought John Bolton with him and helped to ruin it.

好吧,他们一事无成,因为特朗普带来了约翰·博尔顿并帮助毁掉了它。

Mark Dubowitz3:51:44

And maybe they went nowhere because the North Korean dictator at the end of the day, is a dictator who wants threaten the United States with ICBMs and nuclear.

也许他们无处可去,因为朝鲜独裁者最终是一个想要用洲际弹道导弹和核武器威胁美国的独裁者。

3:51:44 Listen, you’re criticizing the sequential decisions made in a negotiation.

听着,你正在批评谈判中做出的一系列决定。

Scott Horton3:51:59

I am.

我是。

Mark Dubowitz3:51:59

I’m just asking you a serious question out of hours of talking.

我只是在几个小时的谈话中问你一个严肃的问题。

Scott Horton3:52:02

Okay.

好的。

Mark Dubowitz3:52:03

Which I must say I’ve really enjoyed.

我必须说我真的很喜欢。

3:52:03 I’ve learned a lot.

我学到了很多。

Lex Fridman3:52:06

I enjoyed it.

我很享受。

Mark Dubowitz3:52:07

I think there’s been areas of agreement, obviously real disagreement.

我认为存在一些共识,但显然存在真正的分歧。

3:52:07 But here’s the question to you, really.

但这是给你的问题,真的。

I mean, do you ever, ever hold our adversaries responsible or do you just don’t think we have any adversaries?

我的意思是,你是否曾经让我们的对手承担责任,或者你只是认为我们没有对手?

Scott Horton3:52:19

This is ridiculous.

这太荒谬了。

3:52:19 The topic has been-

主题是——

Mark Dubowitz3:52:23

Tell me.

告诉我。

Scott Horton3:52:23

…

……

3:52:23 from your point of view, it’s all the adversaries and all American and Israel are trying to do is survive and fix the situation the best they can.

从你的角度来看,所有的对手、美国和以色列都在努力做的就是生存并尽力解决局势。

Mark Dubowitz3:52:31

I think I’ve acknowledged America’s has made mistakes the whole time.

我想我已经承认美国一直在犯错误。

Scott Horton3:52:33

I’m refuting that by bringing up all the things that America and Israel have done to make matters worse.

我通过提出美国和以色列所做的所有使事情变得更糟的事情来反驳这一点。

3:52:33 I didn’t ever say that the Ayatollah’s some great guy or that Kim Jong Un is some hero or any kind of-

我从来没有说过阿亚图拉是个伟人,或者金正恩是个英雄,或者任何一种——

Mark Dubowitz3:52:42

But do you think they’re threats to America?

但你认为他们对美国构成威胁吗?

Scott Horton3:52:42

…

……

3:52:42 thing to spin for their side.

为他们一方旋转的东西。

Mark Dubowitz3:52:44

Are there a threat to America?

对美国有威胁吗?

Scott Horton3:52:45

No, of course not.

不,当然不是。

3:52:45 As Zbigniew Brozinsky said in 1993-

正如兹比格涅夫·布罗津斯基 (Zbigniew Brozinsky) 1993 年所说——

Mark Dubowitz3:52:48

They’re not a threat to America?

他们对美国没有威胁吗?

3:52:48 Wow.

哇。

Scott Horton3:52:50

…

……

3:52:50 we could have perfectly normalized relations then.

那时我们的关系就可以完全正常化。

You talk about Iranian support for Al-Qaeda, Iran supported Al-Qaeda in Bosnia-

你谈论伊朗对基地组织的支持,伊朗支持波斯尼亚的基地组织-

Mark Dubowitz3:52:57

That’s the bottom line.

这是底线。

Scott Horton3:52:57

…

……

3:52:57 in 1995 as a favor to Bill Clinton because they were trying to suck up to the United States-

1995 年,作为对比尔·克林顿的恩惠,因为他们试图拍美国的马屁——

Mark Dubowitz3:53:02

I understand.

我明白了。

Scott Horton3:53:02

…

……

3:53:02 is why they supported Al-Qaeda in Bosnia.

这就是他们支持波斯尼亚基地组织的原因。

Mark Dubowitz3:53:04

I understand it, your position, your position-

我明白了,你的立场,你的立场——

Scott Horton3:53:05

Yes.

是的。

3:53:05 My position is whatever you say it is, not what I say.

我的立场是你所说的,而不是我所说的。

Mark Dubowitz3:53:08

No, no.

不,不。

3:53:08 I’m just, I’m trying to summarize.

我只是,我正在尝试总结。

Scott Horton3:53:10

You know who’s the last person who told me I need to be ware about over-learning the lessons of Iraq?

你知道最后一个告诉我需要警惕过度学习伊拉克教训的人是谁吗?

3:53:10 It was Charlie Savage from the New York Times when on the subject was his absolute ridiculous hoax, that Russia was paying the Taliban to murder American soldiers in Afghanistan in 2020, which ruined Trump’s potential, which he was floating trial balloons about withdrawing in the summer of 2020, which would’ve absolutely prevented-

这是《纽约时报》的查理·萨维奇(Charlie Savage),他在这个话题上讲的是他绝对荒谬的骗局,即俄罗斯付钱给塔利班,让他们在 2020 年谋杀阿富汗的美国士兵,这毁了特朗普的潜力,他正在试探要在 2020 年夏天撤军,这绝对会阻止——

Mark Dubowitz3:53:34

Scott, you said it.

斯科特,你说过。

Scott Horton3:53:34

…

……

3:53:34 the Joe Biden era catastrophe.

乔·拜登时代的灾难。

Mark Dubowitz3:53:36

You said it.

你说过了。

Scott Horton3:53:36

And Charlie Savage who published these ridiculous lies-

还有查理·萨维奇,他发表了这些荒谬的谎言——

Mark Dubowitz3:53:40

Scott.

斯科特.

Scott Horton3:53:41

…

……

3:53:41 that were later refuted by the general in charge of the Afghan war, the head of CENTCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the director of Intelligence-

这些后来被负责阿富汗战争的将军、中央司令部司令、参谋长联席会议主席和情报总监驳斥了——

Mark Dubowitz3:53:47

You flood the zone with as much detail as possible.

您用尽可能多的细节淹没该区域。

Scott Horton3:53:48

He told me, “You know what your problem is, Horton, is you have over-learned the lessons of Iraq War II.” But it turned out those lessons were perfectly apt for Charlie Savage’s hoax.

他告诉我,“霍顿,你知道你的问题是什么,你已经过度吸取了第二次世界大战的教训。”但事实证明,这些教训完全适合查理·萨维奇的骗局。

3:53:48 It wasn’t true what Charlie Savage said, you know what he resorted to?

查理·萨维奇说的不是真的,你知道他采取了什么手段吗?

He said, “Well, it’s true that there was a rumor I was reporting on.”

他说:“嗯,我确实报道过一个谣言。”

Mark Dubowitz3:54:05

Scott.

斯科特.

3:54:05 You made it very clear, America has no adversaries.

你说得很清楚,美国没有对手。

Scott Horton3:54:08

That’s called learning the lessons of Iraq, not over-learning them.

这就是吸取伊拉克的教训,而不是过度学习。

Lex Fridman3:54:12

All right, so I guess the answer to the question I asked about avoiding World War III is the two of you becoming friends.

好吧,所以我想我提出的关于避免第三次世界大战的问题的答案是你们两个成为朋友。

3:54:12 That’s my goal.

这就是我的目标。

If we can try to find the light at the end of the tunnel.

如果我们能尝试在隧道尽头找到光明。

One last question.

最后一个问题。

What gives you hope to the degree of hope about the future?

是什么让你对未来充满希望?

What gives you hope about this great country of ours and humanity too?

是什么让您对我们这个伟大的国家和人类充满希望?

Scott Horton3:54:33

Yeah, I mean, look, there are a million wonderful things about this country.

是的,我的意思是,看,这个国家有一百万件美妙的事情。

3:54:33 The land, the people, our culture and our resources and everything, and the kind of society that we could build in, not with a controlled system, but with just a pure free market capitalist system in this country where people are allowed to own their property, improve its value, and exchange it on the market and build this country up.

土地、人民、我们的文化、我们的资源和一切,以及我们可以建立的社会,不是用受控的制度,而是在这个国家建立一个纯粹的自由市场资本主义制度,允许人们拥有自己的财产,提高其价值,并在市场上进行交换,并建设这个国家。

We would be living in, comparatively, a paradise compared to what we have now.

与现在相比,我们将生活在一个天堂里。

And if you look at the opportunity costs just since the end of the Cold War on all that has been wasted on militarism in the Middle East especially, but also in Eastern Europe and in East Asia, all of that wealth put here could have gone much more to something like perfecting our society.

如果你看看冷战结束以来浪费在军国主义上的机会成本,特别是在中东,还有东欧和东亚,所有这些财富本来可以更多地用于完善我们的社会。

Lex Fridman3:56:14

What gives you hope?

是什么给了你希望?

Mark Dubowitz3:56:15

What gives me hope?

是什么给了我希望?

3:56:15 I think first of all, I have a lot of hope and confidence in the wisdom of the American people.

我认为首先,我对美国人民的智慧充满希望和信心。

I think Americans understand at the end of the day that they need leaders who are about making America great again.

我认为美国人最终明白,他们需要能够让美国再次伟大的领导人。

I think they elected Donald Trump who is flawed in many, many ways.

我认为他们选出了唐纳德·特朗普,他在很多方面都有缺陷。

But I think Trump is wrestling with some of the questions that we have been wrestling with for the past five hours.

但我认为特朗普正在努力解决我们过去五个小时一直在努力解决的一些问题。

I think most Americans know that we have adversaries and it’s just overwhelming numbers of Americans understand that.

我认为大多数美国人都知道我们有对手,而且绝大多数美国人都明白这一点。

They may disagree on exactly who is an adversary and how you rank them, but they know we have adversaries.

他们可能不同意到底谁是对手以及如何对他们进行排名,但他们知道我们有对手。

I think the third thing is Americans greatly admire the men and women in uniform.

我认为第三件事是美国人非常钦佩穿制服的男女。

I mean, I think the institution with the greatest popularity in America still remains the US military.

我的意思是,我认为在美国最受欢迎的机构仍然是美军。

Scott Horton3:58:39

The Iranians.

伊朗人。

Mark Dubowitz3:58:41

Well, and we start focusing on our adversaries, which are not the Iranians, because the 80% of Iranians despise this regime.

好吧,我们开始关注我们的对手,他们不是伊朗人,因为 80% 的伊朗人鄙视这个政权。

3:58:41 And Lex, I feel really bad that in five hours we actually haven’t even talked about that in any detail.

Lex,我感觉很糟糕,因为在五个小时内我们实际上甚至没有详细讨论过这个问题。

Lex Fridman3:58:52

Many of my friends are Iranian.

我的很多朋友都是伊朗人。

3:58:52 They’re beautiful people.

他们是美丽的人。

And it’s one of the great cultures on earth, yeah.

是的,它是地球上最伟大的文化之一。

Mark Dubowitz3:58:57

And you know the only place they don’t succeed in the world is inside the Islamic Republic.

你知道,他们在世界上唯一无法成功的地方就是伊斯兰共和国境内。

3:58:57 When they come to America and Canada and Europe, they’re incredibly successful people.

当他们来到美国、加拿大和欧洲时,他们都是非常成功的人。

And 80% of Iranians despise this regime and they long for a free and prosperous Iran.

而80%的伊朗人鄙视这个政权,他们渴望一个自由、繁荣的伊朗。

And so it’s a big question that they’re ever going to get there.

因此,他们能否到达那里是一个大问题。

And who knows the right way to get them there.

谁知道让他们到达那里的正确方法。

But at the end of the day, I am convinced that the vast majority of Iranians are our friends.

但归根结底,我相信绝大多数伊朗人都是我们的朋友。

But there is a regime that has been trying to build nuclear weapons, has been engaged in terrorism for decades, has killed and maimed thousands of Americans and our allies.

但有一个政权一直试图制造核武器,数十年来一直从事恐怖主义活动,杀害和残害了数千名美国人和我们的盟友。

And it’s a regime that has to be stopped.

这是一个必须停止的政权。

Lex Fridman4:00:36

I am deeply grateful that you guys will come here.

我非常感谢你们来到这里。

4:00:36 This is really mind-blowing, also that you have, it’s silly maybe to say, but the courage to sit down and talk through this, through the tension.

这确实令人兴奋,而且你也有勇气坐下来讨论这个问题,克服紧张,也许这么说很愚蠢。

I’ve learned a lot.

我学到了很多。

I think a lot of people are going to learn a lot.

我认为很多人都会学到很多东西。

I’m a fan of both of your work and it means a lot that you’ll come here today and talk to a silly kid like me.

我是你们两部作品的粉丝,你们今天来到这里与我这样的傻孩子交谈意义重大。

So Scott, thank you so much, brother.

斯科特,非常感谢你,兄弟。

Scott Horton4:01:04

Thank you.

谢谢。

Lex Fridman4:01:04

Thank you, Mark.

谢谢你,马克。

Mark Dubowitz4:01:05

Thanks Lex, appreciate it.

谢谢莱克斯,很感激。

Lex Fridman4:01:06

Bam.

嘭。

Mark Dubowitz4:01:06

Thanks Scott.

谢谢斯科特。

Lex Fridman4:01:09

Thanks for listening to this debate between Scott Horton and Mark Dubowitz.

感谢您收听斯科特·霍顿和马克·杜博维茨之间的辩论。

4:01:09 To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description and consider subscribing to this channel.

为了支持这个播客,请在描述中查看我们的赞助商并考虑订阅这个频道。

And now let me leave you with some sobering words on the cost of war from Dwight D.

现在,让我向你们说几句关于战争代价的发人深省的话:德怀特·D·布什 (Dwight D.

Eisenhower.

艾森豪威尔。

For some context, Eisenhower was the 34th President of the United States.

就某些背景而言,艾森豪威尔是美国第 34 任总统。

But before that, during World War II, he was the supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, orchestrating some of the most significant military operations at the war with leadership marked by strategic and tactical brilliance.

但在此之前,在第二次世界大战期间,他是盟军远征军的最高指挥官,以战略和战术才华为标志,精心策划了战争中一些最重要的军事行动。

It is in this context that the following words carry even more power and wisdom, spoken in 1953.

正是在这种背景下,下面这句话,1953年说的,更具力量和智慧。

文稿来自 Lex Fridman 官网公开发布的官方 Transcript(含说话人与时间戳)。
Mark Dubowitz (00:00:00): We want to avoid wars, we have to have serious deterrence because our enemies need to understand, we will use selective, focused, overwhelming military power when we are facing threats like an Iranian nuclear weapon. Scott Horton (00:00:12): I’m not seeing the peace through strength. I’m seeing permanent militarism and permanent war through strength. Mark Dubowitz (00:00:16): Do you ever hold our adversaries responsible or do you just don’t think we have any adversaries? Scott Horton (00:00:22): The easiest kind of nuke to make out of uranium is a simple gun type nuke. Mark Dubowitz (00:00:26): Are you saying that Mossad fabricated it? Scott Horton (00:00:29): Yeah. Mark Dubowitz (00:00:30): That’s what you’re claiming. Here’s the offer, take it to leave it. Zero enrichment full dismantlement. Scott Horton (00:00:34): Through the Iranians, told the IAEA, you can inspect any five out 10 facilities here, carte blanche, go ahead and they did and found nothing. Mark Dubowitz (00:00:41): Experts in Iran’s nuclear program, including David Albright, who actually saw the archive, went in there, wrote a whole book on it, and there’s a lot of detail about how Iran had an active nuclear weapons program called AMAD to build five nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (00:00:55): I have to refute virtually everything he just said, which is completely false. Mark Dubowitz (00:00:58): I mean really everything? There was not one thing I said that was true? Just one thing. Scott Horton (00:01:02): I mean Iran is a nation over there somewhere. You got that part right. Mark Dubowitz (00:01:05): 22 years of working on Iran and I got that right. Lex Fridman (00:01:07): But do you know the population of Iran? Mark Dubowitz (00:01:09): 92 million. Lex Fridman (00:01:10): Okay. Scott Horton (00:01:11): Give me a pound, dude. Lex Fridman (00:01:12): There we go, agreement. Lex Fridman (00:01:16): The following is a debate between Scott Horton and Mark Dubowitz on the topic of Iran and Israel. Scott Horton is author and editorial director of Ntwar.com, host of the Scott Horton Show and for the past three decades, a staunch critic of US foreign policy and military interventionism. Mark Dubowitz is a chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, host of the Iran Breakdown Podcast, and he has been a leading expert on Iran and its nuclear program for over 20 years. This is the Lex Fridman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description and consider subscribing to this channel. If you do, I promise to work extremely hard to always bring you nuanced, long-form conversations with a very wide range of interesting people from all walks of life, and now, dear friends, here’s Scott Horton and Mark Dubowitz. Lex Fridman (00:02:18): Gentlemen. All right, it’s great to have you here. Let’s try to have a nuanced discussion/debate and maybe even steal man-opposing perspectives as much as possible. All right, as a stands now, there’s a barely stable ceasefire between Iran and Israel. Let’s maybe rewind a little bit. Can we first lay out the context for this Iran-Israel war and try to describe the key events that happened over the past two weeks, maybe even a bit of the deep roots of the conflict? Mark Dubowitz (00:02:50): Sure. First of all, thanks so much for having me on. Great to be on with Scott. I know he and I don’t agree on a lot, but I certainly admire the passion and the dedication to stopping wars. So that’s something we want to talk about. So let’s talk about how we got to this war. So President Trump comes into office and immediately lays out that his Iran strategy is maximum pressure on the regime and he will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon, and he makes that clear. Consistently, I think made it very clear during his first term, made a clear throughout his career and thus begins this process with the Iranians, which has kind of multiple tracks, but the one that Trump sees most interested in at the time is the diplomatic track, and he makes it very clear from the beginning and a sort of Oval Office remark. Scott Horton (00:06:21): Sure. Well, he started with January, right? Trump’s second term here and the maximum pressure campaign essentially as should be clear to everyone. Now, all these negotiations were just a pretext for war. Trump and his entire cabinet must have known that the Ayatollah is not going to give up all enrichment. That is their latent nuclear deterrent. Their posture has been heavily implied, “Don’t attack us and we won’t make a nuke.” While America’s position was if you make a nuke, if you start to we’ll attack you. So it was the perfect standoff, but what happened was, and you might remember a few weeks ago, there was some talk about, “Well, maybe we could find a way to compromise on some enrichment. Maybe they could do a consortium with the Saudis.” And then nope, the pressure came down. No enrichment, zero enrichment, but that’s a red line. Lex Fridman (00:11:00): Maybe a good question to ask here is what is the goal for the United States in Iran in relation to Iran’s nuclear program? What is the red line here? Does Iran have this need for latent nuclear deterrent and what is the thing that’s acceptable to the United States and to the rest of the world? What should be acceptable? Mark Dubowitz (00:11:24): Yeah, so there was a lot to unpack there. So let’s sort of just back up a little bit. Let’s talk about first of all, the regime itself. Islamic Republic of Iran came into power in 1979. It has been declared a leading state sponsor of terrorism by multiple administrations dating back to the Clinton administration, by Obama, by Biden, by Trump and it is a regime that has killed and maimed thousands of Americans, not to mention obviously hundreds of thousands of Middle Easterners. It is a regime that has lied about its nuclear program and never actually disclosed its nuclear sites. All these sites were discovered by Iranian opposition groups, by western intelligence agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is the UN agency responsible for preventing proliferation has come out again and again over many years in very detailed reports describing Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Lex Fridman (00:18:35): Yeah, that is one of the fascinating questions, whether this Operation Midnight Hammer increase or decreased the chance that the Iran will develop a nuclear weapon. Scott Horton (00:18:44): Before you ask any more questions, I have to refute virtually everything he just said, which is completely false. Mark Dubowitz (00:18:49): I mean really everything, there was not one thing I said that was true. Just one thing. Scott Horton (00:18:52): I mean Iran is a nation over there somewhere. You got that part right. Mark Dubowitz (00:18:56): All right, 22 years of working on Iran and I got that right. Lex Fridman (00:18:59): But do you know the population of Iran? Mark Dubowitz (00:19:00): 92 million. Lex Fridman (00:19:01): Okay. Scott Horton (00:19:02): So first of all, they were trying to buy a light water reactor from the Europeans or the Chinese in the 1990s, and Bill Clinton wouldn’t let them and put tremendous pressure on China to prevent them from selling them a light water reactor, a turnkey reactor that produces waste that’s so polluted with impurities that you can’t make nuclear weapons fuel out of it. By the way, they never have to this day had a reprocessing facility for reprocessing plutonium. Even their current plutonium waste from their heavy water reactor at Boucher to make weapons fuel out of that. They have no plutonium route to the bomb under the JCPOA. Mark Dubowitz (00:19:37): At Iraq, not Boucher. There’s a difference. Scott Horton (00:19:40): Iraq is where they pour concrete into the reactor and shut it down. Mark Dubowitz (00:19:45): And the reason they pour concrete- Scott Horton (00:19:47): Under the JCPOA. Mark Dubowitz (00:19:48): Not they, but the Obama administration, he’s right, under the JCPOA poured concrete into the Kalindria in order to prevent them from using that reactor to reprocess plutonium. So there’s a distinction between Iraq and Boucher. Scott’s exactly right. Boucher is a heavy water reactor provided by the Russians as I described for the generation of electricity. Its proliferation proof. Iraq is the opposite. It’s a heavy water reactor that was built for a plutonium pathway to nuclear weapons, which is exactly why under the JCPOA, they literally had to pour concrete into the middle of it to prevent it from reprocessing plutonium. Scott Horton (00:20:25): I think we’re going to need a scientist to come in here and split the difference or maybe we need to go and look up some IAEA documents because I don’t believe that Iraq ever had a reprocessing facility for their plutonium waste and the deal under the JCPOA, the Russians would come and get all their plutonium waste, which the waste comes out all polluted and not useful. You need the reprocessing facility to get all of the impurities out. Mark Dubowitz (00:20:51): Just to clarify- Scott Horton (00:20:52): It could be that I’m wrong about that, but I don’t believe that they ever had a reprocessing facility at Iraq that they could use to remove all those impurities and then have weapons-grade plutonium fuel as the North Koreans do. Mark Dubowitz (00:21:05): So the Obama administration was very clear under the JCPOA, we are going to pour concrete into the Iraq facility as Scott acknowledged because we are concerned that Iraq can be used for reprocessing plutonium, for plutonium pathway to a nuclear weapon. Lex Fridman (00:21:21): Can be used, but we don’t know if it was used. Scott Horton (00:21:24): Oh, we know it never was. There never was any reprocessing of weapons fuel there. Lex Fridman (00:21:28): But there was concrete poured. Scott Horton (00:21:30): There’s no indication Mark Dubowitz (00:21:31): For your viewers who are interested and not to plug my own podcast, Lex so I apologize. Lex Fridman (00:21:35): It is a very good podcast. Mark Dubowitz (00:21:36): I just recently had David Albright on my podcast who is actually a physicist and a weapons inspector and goes into a lot of detail about the Iranian nuclear program. Please listen to the podcast. Lex Fridman (00:21:47): Iran Breakdown by the way is the name of the podcast. Mark Dubowitz (00:21:50): And David’s the president of the Institute for Science International Security and by the way, spent decades on this and to his credit, he was one of the deep skeptics of the Bush administration’s rush to war with Iraq. Scott Horton (00:22:00): That’s not true. He vouched for claims that there were chemical weapons in Iraq and later said he was sorry for it. Mark Dubowitz (00:22:06): Again, I mentioned the Bush administration’s rush to war based on their claims that Saddam was building nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (00:22:11): He did debunk the aluminum tubes though. Mark Dubowitz (00:22:14): He debunked it and it was a deep skeptic again of the rush to war in Iraq. The argument today, Lex, which I think is the more interesting argument, because there are very few people left today who don’t believe that the Iranians were building the nuclear weapons capability that gave them the option to build nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (00:22:33): I already said that. Mark Dubowitz (00:22:35): We can debate whether they had decided to, and I’m interested to hear Scott’s opinion on this, but the recent intelligence that has come out that the Iranian nuclear weapons scientists have begun preliminary work on building a warhead. Scott Horton (00:22:49): Came out from where? This intelligence that came out, who put that? Israeli claims. Not verified by the US and the Wall Street Journal anywhere, right? Let’s talk about all of my list of refutations of all your false claims from 10 years ago. Mark Dubowitz (00:23:04): The Wall Street Journal did verify. Scott Horton (00:23:06): That’s a lot of [inaudible 00:23:08] to refute. Lex Fridman (00:23:08): One at a time. Mark Dubowitz (00:23:09): Lawrence Norman actually wrote a piece and this was during the Biden administration because the Biden DNI had actually come out and for the first time in their annual threat assessment had removed a line that said Iran is not currently working on developing any capabilities that would put it in a position to actually deliver a nuclear warhead, and what became the Norman piece in the Wall Street Journal was that there actually was initial work done on metallurgy and on computer modeling, and so those actually were defined terms in Section T of the 2015 JCPOA, which defined weaponization in that section, and metallurgy and computer modeling were some of the initial steps so that the DNI was very concerned under Biden that these initial steps meant that either Khamenei had given the green lights or nuclear weapons scientists in order to get ahead of the boss so they could be in a position if he decided to move forward on this, were in a position and their timelines were therefore expedited. Scott Horton (00:24:29): Who’s the dog that didn’t bark there? The current director of National Intelligence who issued her threat assessment, Trump’s director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard who issued her threat assessment in February that repeated the exact same language that from the National Intelligence estimate of 2007, and that the CIA and the NIE, the National Intelligence Council have reaffirmed repeatedly ever since then, which is that supreme leader has not decided to pursue nuclear weapons. He has not made the political decision to pursue nuclear weapons. She testified in fact under oath in front of the senate in March and then according to CNN and the New York Times, there was a brand new assessment that was put together the week before the attack was launched reaffirming the same thing and at least in history, if you read it in Haaretz, Massad agreed with the CIA. Mark Dubowitz (00:25:19): I’d like to just sort of quote CIA director John Radcliffe because Scott brought up the CIA and the intelligence committee. I think Radcliffe had a good way of looking at this and that he said is when you’re in the 99 yard line as a football team, you have the intention of score a goal, and what he was actually pointing to is let’s not talk about this debate about whether Khamenei had given the order or not given the order, because Khamenei knows that if he gives an order, the US and Israeli intelligence community will pick up on that order and that will be the trigger for strikes. What Radcliffe is saying is that Khamenei had built the nuclear weapons capability. He’s at the 99 yard line, and both the CIA and European leaders, the European Intelligence Committee has said for yours that if Iran has that capability and they’re on the 99 yard line, at that point, it’s going to be too late to stop them. Once that decision is made to assemble the final warhead, which by the way is the final piece of what you need for a deliverable nuclear weapon. Scott Horton (00:26:18): That’s not true at all, right? They have to resort to a crude analogy about football yard lines because they can’t say the truth, which is that they had zero weapons grade uranium, they were not producing it. They were trying to get the United States back in the deal that they are still officially within the JCPOA with the rest of the UN Security Council wherein they shipped all of their enriched uranium stockpile out of the country to France to be transferred to fuel rods. Their insistence was on their continued ability to enrich uranium, and so this goes to one of the things that he at least sort of brought up that deserves addressing. When Trump came into power in 2017, he decided on this Israeli influence maximum pressure campaign, and he said the JCPOA was the worst deal in the history of any time any two men ever shook hands and all these kinds of things in his hyperbolic way, which of course made it very difficult for him to figure out a way to stay in the thing or to compromise along its lines. Scott Horton (00:31:00): Claims credit he was first and said this is a facility. However, they were not in violation of their safeguards agreement with the IAEA. They were still six months away from introducing any nuclear material to that facility. When it was revealed, they weren’t in violation of anything. And then on com we had a huge fight about this at the time. The party line came down from all the government officials in the media that they had just exposed the facility there. Com is Fordo. Same thing. When in fact that wasn’t true. The Iranians had announced to the IAEA that we had built a new facility here, and we are going to introduce nuclear material into it within six months. Here’s your official notification. And then a few days later, they just pretended to expose it, when it was the Iranians themselves who had admitted to it in going along with their obligations under their safeguards agreement. Lex Fridman (00:36:39): Enough Already. Scott Horton (00:36:40): Thank you. I have a solid dozen sources including Michael Gordon’s own colleague, Alissa Rubin at the New York Times, and many others where they found these bomb factories in Shiite Iraq. They were being made by Shiite Arab Iraqis. When David Petraeus was going to have a big press conference, and they laid out all the components, all the reporters gathered around, and they started noticing that the components said “Made in UAE. Made in Haditha.” That is Iraq. In other words, there was no evidence whatsoever that these came from Iran. And then they called off the press conference. And Stephen Hadley, George Bush’s second national security advisor, admitted that we didn’t have the evidence that we needed to present that. And I also quote two, one Marine and one high-level Army intelligence officer in there, who were deeply involved in Iraq war reconfirming that there was never any evidence that these bombs were coming across from Iran or especially that then, even if they were, that that was at the direction of the Quds Force or the Ayatollah. Lex Fridman (00:39:21): First, let me say on the cover of Enough Already, “Devastating,” Daniel Ellsberg, “Outstanding,” Daniel L. Davis, “Essential,” Ron Paul. You are respected by a very large number of people. You have decades of experience. And the same thing with Mark. Extremely respected by a very large number of people. Experts. There’s a lot of disagreements here, and we’re going to unfortunately leave a lot of the disagreements on the table for the aforementioned nuclear scientist to deconstruct later. Let’s not try to … Every single claim does not have to be perfectly refuted. Let’s just leave it on the table, the statements as they stand, and let’s try to also find things we kind of agree on and try … I know this might be difficult, but to steelman the other side. That’s the thing I would love to ask you. Scott Horton (00:40:20): I think that, in my opening statement, quite frankly, I don’t carry any brief for the Ayatollah. I’m a Texan. I don’t give a damn about what some Shiite theocrat says about nothing, right? My interest is the people of this country and its future and what’s true. And so I don’t mind telling you. Even though the Iranians never said, “We’re building a latent nuclear weapons capability,” that’s clearly what they’re doing is showing that they can make a nuke, so don’t make me make a nuke. That has been their position. Their position has not been, “I’m making a nuke so I can wipe Israel off the map.” Their position has been, “Look, if you guys don’t attack us, we could just keep this civilian program the way it is.” And again, there’s always the implication that they’re just building up this uranium stockpile, but no, they’re not. Lex Fridman (00:41:52): Point made. Let’s try, if possible, to keep it to a minute and two of back and forth- Scott Horton (00:41:58): I said the problem is we’re talking about nuclear stuff, which is all very complicated, and most people don’t know much about it, which is what the war party is relying on, that people just hear nuclear, afraid, and mushroom cloud and give the benefit of the doubt to the hawks. And so we got to get into the details of this stuff. Lex Fridman (00:42:13): Details 100%, but I like the tension between two people with different perspectives exploring those details. And the more we can go back and forth, the better. And there’s a lot of disagreement on the table. I personally enjoy learning from the disagreement, I think, a lot- Scott Horton (00:42:28): That was a very long list of claims that he made, though, where I felt I had to go down the list as much as I could because there was a lot- Lex Fridman (00:42:34): I think you addressed maybe one or two claims, and it took 15 minutes. That’s why I’m just commenting on- Scott Horton (00:42:40): That’s fair. Lex Fridman (00:42:40): … let’s do one at a time. I like the tension of the debate of back and forth. That’s all. Mark, do you want to comment on stuff a little bit here? Pick whichever topic you want to go with here. Mark Dubowitz (00:42:51): There’s a lot there. Just couple of things, I think, that are worth your viewers knowing. Because Scott’s right. I mean, the nuclear physics is complicated, and it’s also important. The Iranians have assembled about … They say about 15 to 17 bombs worth of 60% enriched uranium. And I think it’s always important for your listeners to understand, what does this all mean? Enriched to 3.67%, to 20%, to 60%, and then to 90% weapons-grade uranium. What does this actual process mean? Lex Fridman (00:43:35): That’s fascinating. Yes. Mark Dubowitz (00:43:37): I think it’s, again, important just to understand the sort of basics before we jump into the allegations and claims and counterclaims. If you’re going to enrich to 3.67% enriched uranium, that’s for civilian nuclear power. But when you do that, you’re basically 70% of what you need to get to weapons grade. You’ve done all the steps, 70% of the steps, in order to get to weapons-grade uranium. Scott Horton (00:44:15): Medical isotopes. Mark Dubowitz (00:44:16): Correct. Iran has a Tehran research reactor for medical isotopes. By the way, you can buy those isotopes from abroad, or you can produce them at home. If you’re going to enrich to 60%, then you’ve done 99% of what you need to get to weapons-grade uranium. And then 90% is quote weapons-grade uranium. By the way, you can use 60% to actually deliver a crude nuclear device. That has been done in the past, but you want to get to quote 90%. That’s weapons-grade uranium, as Scott’s defining it. But just again, to clarify, these huge stockpiles of 60% that Iran has accumulated, this 16, 17 bombs worth of 60%, is 99% of what they need for weapons-grade. I just wanted to explain that. Scott Horton (00:45:03): But when you say … You’re saying if you include the mining, the refining of the ore into yellow cake, the transformation of that into uranium hexafluoride gas, the driving of it in a truck over to the centrifuge, and then spinning it, this is where we get this 90% number from, right? In place of 90% enriched uranium or 80% enriched uranium. It’s 90% of the way on some chart that includes picking up a shovel and beginning to mine. Right? Mark Dubowitz (00:45:34): Again, just to clarify, I just think it’s important to understand the definition of terms. Once you have 60% enriched uranium, you’ve done 99% of all the steps, including some of the steps that Scott’s talking about. You’ve done 99% of what you need to have weapons-grade- Scott Horton (00:45:48): That’s just meaningless. Lex Fridman (00:45:49): Why is that meaningless? Scott Horton (00:45:51): Well, as I’ve already established numerous times here, under the JCPOA, they shipped out every bit of their enriched uranium stockpile. The French turned it into fuel rods and then shipped it back. That’s the deal they’re trying to get the US back into and were obviously clearly willing to do. And again, the only reason they were enriching up to 60% was to put the pressure on the Americans to go ahead and get back into the deal. And bad bet. It gave them an excuse to bomb based on the idea that people are going to listen to him, pretend that somehow that’s 99% of the way to the bomb, when you’re including driving to the mine and mining it and converting it to yellow cake and all these other things. Mark Dubowitz (00:46:28): You’re going to have a deliverable nuclear weapon, so you need the weapons-grade uranium. And just to repeat, they have multiple bombs worth of the 60% enriched uranium, which, again, is 99% of the steps you need to take for weapons grade. They’re very close to weapons grade. It’s 1% more that they need to do to enrich to weapons grade. Scott Horton (00:48:35): If I can jump in here on this point, too, and I’ll turn it back over to you, but I actually have a bit of a correction to make. For anyone who’s seen me on Piers Morgan or a Saagar and Krystal, I actually oversimplified and made a mistake. I’ve been off of the Iran nuclear beat for a little while doing other things, and so I’d like to take this opportunity to clarify, and I’m going to try to clarify with them on their shows, too, was I have … An old friend of mine used to make nuclear bombs, Gordon Prather, and I only just found out that he died two years ago, unfortunately. He used to write for us at antiwar.com. He’s a brilliant nuclear physicist and H-bomb developer, and he had really taught me all about this stuff. Lex Fridman (00:50:11): They could drop it as a bomb? Scott Horton (00:50:13): They could test it in the desert and beat their chest, but essentially that’s all they could do. Mark Dubowitz (00:50:16): Or you could drop it from a plane like we did, as Scott said, in with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Scott Horton (00:50:22): Well, very slim chance of Iranian heavy bombers getting through Israeli airspace, but anyway. Mark Dubowitz (00:50:49): The blueprints were given. Just to clarify, it’s just interesting just in the terms of the history of proliferation. Iran’s initial nuclear program, which is built on centrifuges, as Scott and I have been talking about … That was actually given to … The designs of that were given to them by AQ Khan who was really the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, and he actually stole those designs from the Dutch and handed it to the Iranians. He also handed it to the North Koreans and the Libyans and others. They were able to illicitly acquire this technology, or at least the blueprints for this technology, from the father of the Pakistani bomb. I think that’s an interesting point, but if you don’t mind- Scott Horton (00:51:31): As I said earlier, because Bill Clinton clamped down on the Chinese and wouldn’t let them sell or anyone else wouldn’t let them sell them light water reactors, so then they went to AQ Khan and bought the stuff on the black market. Mark Dubowitz (00:51:41): And they obviously bought heavy water reactors from the Russians, which they’ve been using for electricity. I want to just get to the second thing. I think it’s just important for listeners to know, and then I want to get to JCPOA- Scott Horton (00:51:52): I was in the middle of saying, though, when you’re trying to make a uranium implosion bomb or a plutonium implosion bomb, it’s a much more difficult task than putting together a gun-type nuke. Takes an extraordinary amount of testing. And that’s why he repeated, probably unknowingly, some false propaganda about Iran having this advanced testing facility. I think he was implying … Correct me if I’m wrong. I’m pretty sure you’re implying at Parchin that they were testing these implosion systems, but that’s completely debunked. It’s completely false. Mark Dubowitz (00:54:05): First of all, I’m glad Scott knows about what’s going on at Parchin because the IAEA doesn’t, and they’ve been asking the Iranians- Scott Horton (00:54:10): That’s not true. That’s not true. The Iranians told the IAEA, “You can inspect any five out of 10 facilities here carte blanche. Go ahead.” And they did and found nothing. Then they made up the lies about the implosion chamber later. And the IAEA … Again, Robert Kelly is the American IAEA guy. Debunked that in the Christian Science Monitor. Mark Dubowitz (00:54:27): All right. I want to just, again, just put it out there for your listeners. They should just Google AMAD, A-M-A-D, program, and they should learn about the AMAD program because it’s detailed in US government documents, experts in Iran’s nuclear program, including David Albright who actually saw the archive, went in there, wrote a whole book on it, and there’s a lot of detail about how Iran had an active nuclear weapons program called AMAD to build five nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (00:59:23): Somebody give me a screenshot of this. Give me a pound, dude. Mark Dubowitz (00:59:26): There we go. Lex Fridman (00:59:27): Agreement. Mark Dubowitz (00:59:28): There we go. Scott Horton (00:59:28): That’s fine. Lex Fridman (00:59:29): That makes my heart feel- Scott Horton (00:59:30): And I think the Ayatollah would’ve gone for it too. Mark Dubowitz (00:59:32): Well, I’m not sure if he would’ve, but let’s … Just a little bit of history. I think it’s just useful for the viewers to know, again, the context, especially when Scott and I agree. A process was begun- Lex Fridman (00:59:43): I’m loving this so much. Mark Dubowitz (00:59:44): … by the Trump administration. Trump appointed Brian Hook, or Secretary Pompeo actually appointed Brian Hook, who was the lead Iran envoy, and he began a process of talking to the Europeans. Now, the Europeans actually rejected this idea. And so at some point Trump said, “Look, if the Europeans aren’t prepared to get onside, then I’m out of the deal. I’m out of the deal.” And if you’re interested, I can talk about why I thought we should have stayed in the deal. Because I thought it gave us some important restrictions in the short term, certain leverage, but Trump decides to withdraw from that agreement because he recognizes that the fatal flaw of the agreement, the fatal flaws of the agreement are, one, giving them any enrichment capability, especially at an industrial size, within 15 years. Scott Horton (01:00:39): I’d like to go ahead and quickly accuse the FBI and the CIA of framing Trump for treason with Russia and pushing the Russiagate hoax. I’m trying to agree with my friend here. Because what it is is that that completely ruined Donald Trump’s ability to engage in real diplomacy with Russia for his entire first term. Certainly, for the first three years of it, he was completely handcuffed. It was terrible, as I’m sure you’re well aware, for the future, now our past, and current history of Ukraine, as well as for this deal too. Mark Dubowitz (01:01:39): Actually, can I just say one thing interesting? And again, I think it’s going to be a later topic, and so it’s going to be a provocative statement, but I think let’s put it on the table. I absolutely agree with Scott. I think it was a travesty of the accusations against Donald Trump as a Russian agent. I mean, completely debunked, but it did … I think it paralyzed. Mark Dubowitz (01:02:00): I mean, completely debunked. But it did, I think it paralyzed his presidency for two, two and a half years. I agree with Scott. The idea that you would accuse the President of the United States of being a foreign agent for Vladimir Putin, I think is unfounded. And I thought at the time, disgraceful, and I thought it was really important. I think Scott did really good work in debunking that. Scott Horton (01:02:54): Now, I was making a point. That’s hyperbole, making a point. But he did. In fact, could you Google this for me? Because I always forget exactly how many hundreds of millions of dollars that he took from Sheldon Adelson and Miriam Adelson. Mark Dubowitz (01:03:04): Who are Americans by the way. Scott Horton (01:03:06): Who are Americans. Who, Sheldon Adelson said his only regret in life is that he served in the American Army instead of the IDF, and said America should nuke Iran in order to get them to give up their nuclear weapons. He said, “I have one issue, one. Israel. And they gave Trump hundreds of millions of dollars over three campaigns.” That’s not just a, “Geez, I really hope you’ll think of me in the future.” Lex Fridman (01:03:27): Scott, first of all, a couple of things. So one, there’s a lot of people that are friends with Trump and try to gain influence. I believe that Trump, as an American, is making his own decisions. Let’s, for the purpose of this conversation, just focus on that and see what are the right decisions and what are the wrong decisions, and maybe- Scott Horton (01:03:45): I wonder what decisions I could get you to make if I gave you hundreds of millions of dollars. Lex Fridman (01:03:49): Well, me personally, you couldn’t give me… It doesn’t matter. Scott Horton (01:03:52): I couldn’t get you to drop in on a vert ramp or nothing for a hundred million bucks. Lex Fridman (01:03:56): Nothing. You cannot control my decisions with money. Scott Horton (01:03:59): It’s the American system, Lex. That’s how it works. It’s money. Lex Fridman (01:04:02): I appreciate that, yeah. Scott Horton (01:04:03): Right. Lex Fridman (01:04:03): We can go down that route. Scott Horton (01:04:04): It’s the same if we were talking about Archer Daniels Midland company throwing hundreds of millions of dollars around. They get policies based on their hundreds of millions of dollars. The squeaky wheel gets the grease, right? All that. Mark Dubowitz (01:04:14): So Lex, I think you’re right. I mean, I think Elon Musk spent what, $400 million helping Trump get elected. And obviously, there are a number of philanthropists. I think, clearly his son, Don Jr’s had a lot of influence in who gets selected in these positions in the Pentagon, NSC, and Tucker Carlson has had a lot of influence. So I think as you say, he surrounds himself with people who have certain ideas, ideologies, policies. The President makes his own decisions. Scott Horton (01:05:10): It’s a Mossad officer’s accusation. Mark Dubowitz (01:05:12): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:05:13): Victor Ostrovsky, is his name. Mark Dubowitz (01:05:15): Yeah. I know exactly who he is, and he has been widely discredited and having an ax to grind with Mossad. But anyway, not only ’83, but all through the 90s, the 2000s, 2010s, 2020s, there have been hundreds of attacks, of assassinations, of hostage taking. There are thousands Americans who have been killed and maimed by the regime. Scott Horton (01:05:41): Can you be specific what you’re talking about here? Mark Dubowitz (01:05:43): Yeah, I mean, I can give you a whole list. Scott Horton (01:05:44): Sure. Mark Dubowitz (01:05:45): Literally, I’m happy to pull it up. Lex, I shared it with you. It’s a long list of attacks all through the 80s and 90s. Lex Fridman (01:05:46): Yeah, yeah. You sent me a link. Mark Dubowitz (01:05:52): I mean, everything from the Khobar Towers. Scott Horton (01:05:57): The Khobar Towers was Al-Qaeda. Mark Dubowitz (01:05:57): Well, can I- Scott Horton (01:05:59): That was Osama bin Laden and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Lex Fridman (01:06:01): Let him lay it out, please. Scott Horton (01:06:02): All right. Let’s hear them. Mark Dubowitz (01:06:03): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:06:04): I got my pen in my hand. Go ahead. Mark Dubowitz (01:06:05): Yeah, and again, according to US intelligence findings, it was actually Hezbollah that worked with Al-Qaeda, trained Al-Qaeda in that attack in the Khobar Towers. They were kidnapping our diplomats in Beirut. They launched attacks against our soldiers while in Iraq. The notion that somehow- Scott Horton (01:06:27): I already debunked that. Mark Dubowitz (01:06:27): No, I don’t think, well, you say you debunked it, you just made your claim. But those were Iran-backed militias, backed by Qasem Soleimani, who Scott referred to, who was the commander of the IRGC Quds Force, who supplied them with those IEDs or those EFPs, actually, those explosives. Scott Horton (01:06:49): [inaudible 01:06:49]. Mark Dubowitz (01:06:48): Well, again, this has been all confirmed. Scott Horton (01:06:52): Why don’t you search Alyssa Rubin, New York Times EFP factory? Or you can look in the Christian Science Monitor for Operation Eagle Claw where- Mark Dubowitz (01:06:52): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:06:59): … they found these things. Mark Dubowitz (01:07:01): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:07:02): It’s easy to find in my book. You can flip right to Soda Straws and EFPs. And you see where I have all my citations for the solid dozen American newspaper reporters who were embedded with American soldiers who found these factories in Iraqi Shiaistan with Iraqi Arabs working the machines, not Iran. Mark Dubowitz (01:07:23): So I’d like your viewers to Google not just a couple of sources, but actually Google the US government reports that did a whole after-action report on the Iraq War. All the mistakes were made in the Iraq war, and there were legion of mistakes made. But it was very clear that Iran had actually provided the technology, the training, the funding for these Iran-backed militias to kill Americans. I mean, I could see, Scott- Scott Horton (01:07:48): In fact they learned a method from Lebanese, Hezbollah that got it from the IRA. Mark Dubowitz (01:07:52): Well- Scott Horton (01:07:52): They didn’t even get the technique from the Iranians at all. Mark Dubowitz (01:07:55): Yeah. So Lebanese, Hezbollah, as I’m sure all your listeners know, has been trained, financed- Scott Horton (01:08:00): It’s true- Mark Dubowitz (01:08:01): … and supported by- Scott Horton (01:08:01): … but they got it from the IRA. Mark Dubowitz (01:08:01): … Iran for many years. Scott Horton (01:08:02): The copper core bombs- Mark Dubowitz (01:08:02): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:08:03): … and that design did not come from Persia. Mark Dubowitz (01:08:05): Yeah. So again, I think we all admit, Scott admits as well that Hezbollah was trained, financed, and supported by Iran. Hezbollah’s been responsible for many of these terrorist attacks. Scott Horton (01:08:15): Where does Hezbollah come from? It’s a reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon where they went after the PLO and horribly mistreated the poor local Iraqi Shiites until they rose up and created these militias to fight in self-defense. Mark Dubowitz (01:08:26): Again- Scott Horton (01:08:26): That’s where Hezbollah comes from. Mark Dubowitz (01:08:27): Hezbollah was actually created by the IROGC before the Israeli invasion. Why- Scott Horton (01:08:30): This was the CIA’s Bin Laden unit. Mike Scheuer says it was Osama bin Laden and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed that did the Khobar Towers attack. And who did they kill? They killed 19 American airmen who were stationed there to bomb Iraq from bases in Saudi Arabia under the Israeli insisted upon Dual Containment Policy- Mark Dubowitz (01:08:49): What’s amazing- Scott Horton (01:08:49): … of Bill Clinton. Mark Dubowitz (01:08:49): What’s amazing, Scott- Scott Horton (01:08:50): That came from Yitzhak Shamir who had sent his man Martin Indyk to work for Bill Clinton and push the Dual Containment Policy, is where that comes from in the first place. The main reason Al-Qaeda turned against the United States, and the Khobar Towers attack was Bin Laden, and he bragged about it himself to Abdel Bari Atwan, the reporter from Al-Quds, Al-Arabi in London, and spent days with him and bragged all about it and blessed the martyrs and the rest of that and has widely discredited the claim that it was Iranian-backed Shiite Hezbollah that did the Khobar Towers attack. Mark Dubowitz (01:09:51): So what we know now from Scott, because he’s given certainly a lot of context to how he actually sees things, is here’s who lies to you and here’s who doesn’t. US government lies to you. Israeli government lies to you. The Israelis clearly lie to you. Mendacious bunch. Saudis lie to you. But you know who doesn’t lie to you, actually? Hezbollah doesn’t lie to you. AL-Qaeda doesn’t lie to you. Scott Horton (01:10:16): I didn’t cite Al-Qaeda or- Mark Dubowitz (01:10:17): The Ayatollah- Scott Horton (01:10:17): … or Hezbollah. I cited Osama himself. Mark Dubowitz (01:10:18): And the Ayatollah of Iran won’t lie to you. Scott Horton (01:10:20): I cited Michael Scheuer, the chief of the CIA’s bin Laden unit. Right? Mark Dubowitz (01:10:24): So make it clear here. The Iranians- Scott Horton (01:10:25): [inaudible 01:10:25] Hezbollah- Mark Dubowitz (01:10:27): The Iranians- Scott Horton (01:10:28): Did you get that? Lex Fridman (01:10:28): Scott, straight up, I hear you, but you’re interrupting and please, just honestly, it’s not about the content, but honestly. Scott Horton (01:10:34): How come you’re not saying to him, isn’t that weird that you just said he trusts Hezbollah even though he didn’t say anything about trusting Hezbollah? Lex Fridman (01:10:39): I’m not calling out the content. I’m calling out the interruptions. He hasn’t interrupted you. It’s great. I’m loving the back and forth. Scott Horton (01:10:45): Yeah. Lex Fridman (01:10:46): It is great. But just a little less talking over each other. That’s all. Mark Dubowitz (01:10:49): Yeah. So I mean, again, the sort of view of the regime in Iran, and I think Scott wisely said at the beginning of this discussion, what did you say? “I don’t have any love for the Ayatollah. I’m a Texan. I don’t have any love for the Ayatollah in Iran.” And yet, despite the fact, Scott, doesn’t have love for the Ayatollah, I agree with him and I think he’s being sincere, in every discussion that we’ve had on every topic, it’s always about everyone’s lying except the Ayatollah in Iran. He’s not lying about having a nuclear weapons program. Lex Fridman (01:14:59): Actually, that’s a good cue. Mark Dubowitz (01:15:01): Take a bathroom break. Lex Fridman (01:15:01): Let’s take a bath and break. Mark Dubowitz (01:15:02): All right. Lex Fridman (01:15:04): Okay. We took a quick break and now, Scott. Scott Horton (01:15:07): Yeah. Okay. So a few things there. First of all, on Ahmad, the pre-2003 nuclear weapons research, the CIA estimate in 2007 concluded that all research had stopped in 2003, and Seymour Hersh reported that the reasoning behind that was mainly that America had gotten rid of Saddam Hussein for them. Now, in Gareth Porter’s book Manufactured Crisis, he shows that the major conclusion that the DIA had made, that the Iranians were researching nuclear weapons, was based on some invoices that they had intercepted for some dual use materials, some specialty magnets and things that they thought, “Boy, this looks like this could be part of a weaponization program, a secret program here.” Mark Dubowitz (01:17:24): Scott, can I ask you a question? Not a comment by me, but a question. Scott Horton (01:17:24): Sure. Mark Dubowitz (01:17:25): Just your perspective. So just so I understand this, so the nuclear archive, this massive archive that the Israelis were able to take out of Tehran, bring to the United States, bring to the IAEA, which is very detailed blueprints. Scott Horton (01:17:39): It’s just the alleged studies documents again, it’s the same stuff from the smoking laptop. Mark Dubowitz (01:17:43): Yeah. So let me just ask you, because it’s huge, and it’s very detailed, and it shows clearly that Iran had an active nuclear weapons program, certainly until 2003. And then we can have a discussion about what happened after that. Are you suggesting that that’s all been forged by Israel? Scott Horton (01:18:01): Yes. Nothing in this smoking laptop held up. Mark Dubowitz (01:18:03): All four? Not the laptop, but this entire archive that they pulled out with the stats- Scott Horton (01:18:08): You’re thinking of- Mark Dubowitz (01:18:09): … and blueprints? Scott Horton (01:18:09): … the big photo op with all the folders of documents- Mark Dubowitz (01:18:12): No, no- Scott Horton (01:18:13): … behind them and all. Mark Dubowitz (01:18:13): … I’ve seen it. I’ve seen it. I’ve seen many- Scott Horton (01:18:15): How many pages were? Mark Dubowitz (01:18:15): … many of the documents. There’s thousands of pages. I’m asking, this is not what I’m claiming. Is that all forged by Israel? Scott Horton (01:18:21): Is that not all about the uranium tetra fluoride and the warhead that David Albright debunked and all the same claims that were in the smoking laptop from the Bush years? Mark Dubowitz (01:18:31): David Albright actually wrote an entire book. It’s a very detailed book your listeners should Google. It’s David Albright in the archive where he goes in, he went in detail and he confirms the information in that archive that Iran had an active program under something called Ahmad to develop five atomic weapons. So again, you and I can debate this all day. Scott Horton (01:18:53): Now, this would’ve been before Natanz was even dug and before a single centrifuge was spinning right? Mark Dubowitz (01:18:53): And again, forget all that. Scott Horton (01:18:58): I’m just making sure everybody understands, assuming that was true, we were talking about a piece of paper? Mark Dubowitz (01:19:01): It’s not a piece of paper. It’s a massive archive. I’m just asking the question. You believe Mossad fabricated all of this as a lie to deceive the United States, the IAEA, and the international community? That’s just my question. Scott Horton (01:19:13): My understanding is that there’s nothing significant in the 2018 archive that was not already in the debunked claims from the laptop. Mark Dubowitz (01:19:22): But my question is not that it’s debunked because we can argue about whether it’s debunked or not, but are you saying that Mossad fabricated it? That’s what you’re claiming? Scott Horton (01:19:32): Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, because the CIA admitted that there was no laptop and Oli Heinonen admitted- Mark Dubowitz (01:19:33): Not the laptop. Scott Horton (01:19:37): … that he got it from the MEK. Mark Dubowitz (01:19:37): I’m not asking about laptop. I’m not asking for- Scott Horton (01:19:37): He got it from the MEK. Where did the MEK get it? The MEK got it from the Israelis. Mark Dubowitz (01:19:43): Scott, I’m not asking about the laptop. I’m asking about this huge archive that was sitting in a warehouse in Tehran full of- Scott Horton (01:19:49): I don’t know the truth behind those documents. I don’t believe Israeli claims of what they were and where they came from without, for example, reading Albright’s book and seeing what he has to say about all of that. I don’t take Netanyahu’s claims. Okay, so what’s so significant in there? You say that there’s a document that has a plan to make five bombs, but isn’t the rest of the proof the same green salt experiments and the warhead for the missile that David Albright showed was obviously fake, because the warhead was purportedly being designed for a missile that was now going to have an entirely different nose cone on it? Mark Dubowitz (01:20:26): No. So David Albright, again, we should bring David Albright here. Lex Fridman (01:20:29): David Albright is a prominent physicist nuclear proliferation expert known for his detailed research and publication on nuclear weapons. Mark Dubowitz (01:20:35): Yeah. Lex Fridman (01:20:35): He has a bunch of books Peddling Peril, Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996 and so on. Mark Dubowitz (01:20:43): Yeah, so folks should read the book on the archive because David had full access to the archive, all the detailed documents and blueprints, and he writes a book that, again, the conclusion of which is Iran had an active nuclear weapons program. Scott Horton (01:21:00): No, no, no. The conclusion of which was they were researching it right before 2003. They had no nuclear material to introduce into a single machine, right? Mark Dubowitz (01:21:08): Well, they actually- Scott Horton (01:21:09): Active program, meaning they had- a piece of- Mark Dubowitz (01:21:10): No, they had already built a covert enrichment facility, which was only- Scott Horton (01:21:13): No they hadn’t. Mark Dubowitz (01:21:13): It was closed. Scott Horton (01:21:14): Natanz was empty until the end of 2006, right? They didn’t even start spinning centrifuges in there until ’06. Mark Dubowitz (01:21:21): They had gotten centrifuges for AQ-Khan. They’d built a deeply buried underground facility at Natanz. They were putting in place the component parts for a nuclear weapons capability. And Ahmad showed, conclusively, unless you believe Mossad fabricated all- Scott Horton (01:21:21): We’ll see. Mark Dubowitz (01:21:39): … that they actually had the plan to build nuclear warheads. Scott Horton (01:21:42): Again, Seymour Hersh says that it was when- Mark Dubowitz (01:21:43): Well, Seymour Hersh is not a nuclear weapons expert. David Albright has, he saw the archive. Scott Horton (01:21:48): Hersh’s sources said- Mark Dubowitz (01:21:50): You’re claiming that America fabricated- Scott Horton (01:21:51): … that when America invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein for them, that was when they gave up, even considering the need for it. Remember, the Iranians held a million-man vigil for the Americans on September 11th. The Iranians hated the Taliban. In fact, the Americans thought Iran might invade Afghanistan earlier in 2001, and they hated Saddam Hussein. Mark Dubowitz (01:22:10): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:22:10): So they had every reason in the world to want to work with the United States- Mark Dubowitz (01:22:13): No, that’s a distraction. Scott Horton (01:22:14): … after September 11th. And the American- Mark Dubowitz (01:22:15): My questions to you. It’s a distraction. My question- Scott Horton (01:22:17): It is- Mark Dubowitz (01:22:18): … let’s not go to al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 9/11 and the Iranians, and the Million People Vigil. Let’s just stay on the topic. Scott Horton (01:22:23): You’re asking me what I already answered. Mark Dubowitz (01:22:25): Do you believe Mossad fabricated that entire- Scott Horton (01:22:28): I already told you- Mark Dubowitz (01:22:28): … archive? Scott Horton (01:22:29): … I don’t take their word for anything. And as far as I understand, the accusations in there are the same ones from the laptop that are already discredited. And I haven’t read David Albright’s book. You’re distracting from me refuting this giant list of false claims that you made previously that I haven’t got a chance- Mark Dubowitz (01:22:44): Okay. Let’s all agree. Let’s all agree, you’re going to read the book? Maybe Lex, you’re going to read the book. Viewers, you should read the book. I think David Albright has done a meticulous job. By the way, just warning, it’s a big book, very detailed, hundreds of pages. And he goes through it in meticulous detail in analyzing this archive, and showed again that Iran had an active nuclear weapons program designed to build five atomic warheads. Now we can talk about what happened after 2003, and did they make the decision to totally stop it? Scott Horton (01:23:10): Yeah, God changed his mind after the Neoconservatives lied America into war with Iraq for Ariel Sharon. Lex Fridman (01:23:16): So just to clarify, you, Mark, and David Albright believed that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon. And you, Scott are saying they were not before 2003? Scott Horton (01:23:28): I’m saying- Lex Fridman (01:23:28): That’s just to summarize what we were just talking about. Scott Horton (01:23:31): Well, I could tell you that, so Gareth’s book came out in 2014, which is before this archive was supposedly revealed in Tehran. But in Gareth’s book, he shows that the CIA and National Intelligence estimate of 2007 that said that there was a program before 2003, and was halted after America invaded Iraq was based on one, the DIA’s mistaken, but sincere interpretation of these invoices for these dual use technologies. And then the smoking laptop, which was completely fake and funneled into the stream by the Mujahideen e-cult, communist terrorist cult. The same people who’ve come off with 10 major hoaxes. The NCRI, the National Council for Resistance in Iran, that’s the MEK. They just put out a fake story, what, three, four weeks ago about a big secret nuclear weapons site in Iran. Don’t you remember? And then nothing happened with that because it was another lie by the MEK. It happens all the time. Mark Dubowitz (01:24:28): So Lex, maybe we should talk about what happened after 2003. What about this 2007 NIE? What does it mean? Did it mean Iran had now abandoned its nuclear weapons program or did something else happen? Scott Horton (01:24:38): They never had a nuclear weapons program. Mark Dubowitz (01:24:40): All right, but let’s talk about that. They had- Scott Horton (01:24:42): [inaudible 01:24:42]- Mark Dubowitz (01:24:42): … interesting history. Scott Horton (01:24:43): According to NIE, They had a nuclear weapons research program that never made anything at all. So you can try to conflate that if you want. Mark Dubowitz (01:24:51): No. That’s not- Scott Horton (01:24:51): But I think everybody can see what you’re doing there. Mark Dubowitz (01:24:53): … what the 2007 NIE says. But the 2007 NIE says is that, and you are correct, according to the 2007 NIE is Iran made the decision after the invasion of Iraq not to pursue an active nuclear weapons program anymore. Scott Horton (01:25:09): Because we were putting their best friends in power in Baghdad for them. Mark Dubowitz (01:25:13): Well, because the United States had gone in- Scott Horton (01:25:14): So they didn’t need to worry no more. Mark Dubowitz (01:25:15): And in a matter of 100 days, had taken down the Iraqi army. Scott Horton (01:25:19): And put in Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s faction- Mark Dubowitz (01:25:21): That’s fine. Scott Horton (01:25:22): … the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq who’d been living in Iran for 20 years. Mark Dubowitz (01:25:26): That’s why you and I did not publicly support the Iraq War, did we? Scott Horton (01:25:30): I publicly opposed it. Mark Dubowitz (01:25:31): Good for you. Scott Horton (01:25:31): As far as I possibly could. Thank you. Mark Dubowitz (01:25:32): I should have publicly opposed it rather than just working on Iran in 2003. But you’re right, it redounded to the benefit of Iran, that invasion. But that’s not actually what I’m talking about. What I’m talking about is 100 days the Iranian Sea that the US military has taken down the Iraqi army, that they had fought an eight-year war with where almost a million people, Scott, as you know, had been killed. So they were afraid that the United States was going to march from Baghdad to Tehran. So they make a decision to end their active Ahmad program. They make a decision to build up the key capabilities they need to retain an Iranian nuclear weapons option, specifically the enrichment capabilities at Natanz, and then Fordow, and at Iraq given them the plutonium route. And then what they do is they take the members of the Ahmad program, the nuclear weapons scientists that have worked on this, and they disperse them. So they’re now no longer in a formal weapons program. They’re put in a number of different research centers and universities. Scott Horton (01:27:57): But- Mark Dubowitz (01:27:58): But, sorry, just to finish. So just understand the brilliance of Iranian nuclear deception, right? I think it’s really interesting to get in the minds of the Ayatollah and understand this, because he doesn’t want to provoke the United States. He doesn’t want to see another Iraq-style invasion, this time of his country. He’s building this capability on the enrichment side and on the reprocessing side. He is framing this as I’m only building a civilian nuclear program. He’s taken the weapons scientists who are building part of an active nuclear weapons program, and he’s dispersing them, putting them under the guidance and direction of Fakhrizadeh and starting to build out these capabilities. Lex Fridman (01:29:45): Two things. One, can you go and respond to certain things that you heard? And two, can we generally move in the direction of the modern day and trying to see what is the right thing now, our analysis of the situation now, we’ve been kind of staying in the context of history, which is really important, but sort of moving it forward? But yeah, go ahead please. Scott Horton (01:30:08): I’m not sure how much time we have. I kind of hoped- Lex Fridman (01:30:10): unlimited. Scott Horton (01:30:11): … you’d let me talk about Israel’s role in Iraq War, too, and for that matter in Barack Obama’s dirty war in Syria that led to the rise of the bin Ladenites there. It’s all part of America’s Israel policy. So I don’t want to, I’d rather go back before we go forward. But I also do, I need to go back over so many claims that he’s made here that I’d like to address. Lex Fridman (01:30:31): So I strongly prefer we go, because there’s so much history, we’re going to lose ourselves in it. There’s not enough hours. We should take certain moments in history that instruct the modern day, but let’s not get lost there if it’s okay. Scott Horton (01:30:45): Sure. Lex Fridman (01:30:45): This is such a fascinating conversation, Iraqi- Scott Horton (01:30:47): We talked about the JCPOA and the time between then and now quite a bit already too. Lex Fridman (01:30:52): Yes. Scott Horton (01:30:52): So we’ll be going back over some of that. Lex Fridman (01:30:54): Well, no, I mean modern day, I don’t mean- Scott Horton (01:30:56): You’re talking about this week. Lex Fridman (01:30:57): … I mean this week. Scott Horton (01:30:58): Okay. Lex Fridman (01:30:58): A lot of stuff happened this week and a lot of stuff will happen tomorrow and the next week. And everyone wants to know what is going to happen. What is the worst case, what is the best case? Should we be freaking out? What do we need to understand about today? That’s all. Scott Horton (01:31:13): All right, so there’s a lot of things to address here. So first of all, something that me and Mr. Dubowitz agree about. Mark Dubowitz (01:31:19): Please call me Mark. Scott Horton (01:31:19): Mark. Something that Mark and I agree about is that there actually is not a threat of an aggressive first strike by Iran. I’m a little surprised to hear him say that, but I’m grateful to hear him say that. It is honest. I would advise you, you may be unfamiliar with this, but I can tell you anyone in America who drives for a living and listens to AM radio have heard claims that Iran was making nuclear weapons probably 50,000 times in the last 25 years. Over and over and over again, we hear this propaganda. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:02): No, they never said that. Scott Horton (01:33:03): He didn’t say- Scott Horton (01:33:00): … out for a nuke. I’ll nuke them if I have to. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:02): No, they never said that. Scott Horton (01:33:03): He didn’t say that, but the implication was- Mark Dubowitz (01:33:05): By the way, no US president ever said they’re going to obliterate Iran. US president said- Scott Horton (01:33:08): Hillary Clinton did. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:09): … all options are on the table. Scott Horton (01:33:11): Anyone can Google her word. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:12): She was never our president. Scott Horton (01:33:13): No, I said she was running for president. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:15): But she was never our president. But no US president ever said they’re to obliterate Iran. Nobody ever said they could drop a nuke on Iran. Scott Horton (01:33:20): The implication was clear under W. Bush, Barack Obama, Trump, Biden, and Trump again- Mark Dubowitz (01:33:25): That they would strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Scott Horton (01:33:27): If they broke out toward a nuclear weapon, America would do whatever it took to prevent that from happening. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:34): Strike their nuclear facilities. Scott Horton (01:33:36): That was always the case there. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:38): But please clarify, just to be accurate, I was talking about nuking Iran. Scott Horton (01:33:38): I’m almost certain no one’s- Mark Dubowitz (01:33:42): No one’s talking about bombing Iran to smithereens or obliterating or any of that. Scott Horton (01:33:46): That’s really not true. I mean. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:46): US presidents- Scott Horton (01:33:48): Barack Obama changed America’s nuclear posture to say, because it used to say we reserve the right to use a nuclear first strike against any country. He changed that to say, “No, we promise not to use a nuclear first strike against any non-nuclear weapon state except maybe Iran.” That’s true. In fact, that was the threat. Mark Dubowitz (01:34:48): I think it’s really important. I agree with that. Scott Horton (01:34:49): I’m just agreeing with you so you don’t have to stop me. Mark Dubowitz (01:34:51): But I’m agreeing with you. Scott Horton (01:34:52): I know, but I’m agreeing with you so it’s all right. Netanyahu told Jeffrey Goldberg that he was not concerned about a first strike, that his only concern was that talented young Israelis would move to Miami, that there would be a brain drain. That was his words, a brain drain from Israel. That also then Hezbollah, as this is what he put it, and I agree with this, that conventional forces would have a bit more freedom of action in the region if Iran was sitting on an A-bomb. Neither of them said that there was a threat of an offensive first strike against Israel. I would point out, and I’m skipping ahead to Trump, but I’m skipping back here again in a second because I got more things to refute. But Trump just said the other day when he announced American airstrikes there that this has neutralized a threat to Israel. He did not even pretend that it was a threat to the United States that he had ended in doing so. Mark Dubowitz (01:35:43): Actually, he said exactly that. Scott Horton (01:35:44): Well, actually you can Google the state [inaudible 01:35:47]. Mark Dubowitz (01:35:47): He actually said, president Trump has said that an Iranian nuclear weapon is a threat to the United States. [inaudible 01:35:53]. He said that over and over again. Scott Horton (01:35:53): Not in the state [inaudible 01:35:53]. He announced his great victory in bombing, which is what I just said, right? Mark Dubowitz (01:35:57): President Trump sends out 20 Truth posts a day. Let’s look at the many, many, many things that he said. Scott Horton (01:36:03): Then we have this whole thing about how I always believe Hezbollah, and I always believe the Ayatollah, when in fact, I did not quote the Ayatollah and I did not quote Hezbollah on anything. I did quote Osama bin Laden taking responsibility for the Khobar Towers attack, which he shared that with Abdul Bari Atwan. Anyone can read it. He agrees with Michael Scheuer, the former chief of the CIA’s Bin Laden unit, who also said that it was a hoax, that it was Iranian-backed Saudi Hezbollah that did that attack. Again, who did they attack? They killed 19 American airmen, which was the number one complaint of al-Qaeda against the United States that we had air forces and Army stationed in Saudi Arabia in order to bomb and blockade Iraq, which again, and this was the thing that you had asked about before, was part of the dual containment policy in the 1990s. Mark Dubowitz (01:36:54): Scott, you’re saying- Scott Horton (01:36:54): Goddamn, man. Lex Fridman (01:36:55): No, wait a second. Mark Dubowitz (01:36:56): All right. Lex Fridman (01:36:56): Let Scott talk. Scott Horton (01:36:57): The fact is you’re sitting here saying that I trust them all so much. Well, what do you think, Lex, what do you think Ronald Reagan meant by trust but verify? He meant don’t trust but be polite. That’s what he meant. Verify means we know with sensors and cameras and inspections what’s going on. No one can find a quote that I said here about how we can trust the Ayatollah because he promised this or that or the other thing. I didn’t say that. What I’m talking about is the process. They sign agreements and then we have inspectors to verify their claims. As anyone can search at IAEA.org, they have continued to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material in Iran to any military or other special purpose. Mark Dubowitz (01:37:39): The IAEA has now said that they actually can no longer do this before this war started. Scott Horton (01:37:43): Because America withdrew from the- Mark Dubowitz (01:37:46): I mean, at the end of the day, let’s just be factually accurate. The fact of the matter is anybody who knows anything about nuclear weapons program knows that we do not have 100% certainty on anything. I mean, Scott is making claims here that Mossad is fabricating the CIA is fabricating, everybody’s fabricating, but he’s also assuming that we have 100% certainty about what Iran is doing inside a country more than two and a half times the size of Texas. Scott Horton (01:38:23): [inaudible 01:38:23] refuted that an hour ago. You can rewind it. Mark Dubowitz (01:38:24): Anyone can refute it, but the fact of matter is they did it. It’s there. Scott Horton (01:38:26): We know the facilities are there. By the way, you keep saying that I just say lies, lies, lies. But I have explained exactly what I meant. I’ve cited my sources and I haven’t just sat here and said, “Uh huh, that’s a lie,” because I don’t like it. I sat here and explained to you exactly how I know who was building those EFP bombs in Iraq, exactly how I know what the IAEA said about the state of inspections here, or what Robert Kelly told the Christian Science Monitor about Parchin and the rest and on and on and on. I don’t sit here like I’m just saying, “Well, that’s not true because I like it,” when in fact I’m explaining exactly why your claims are not true, which they’re not. Just like saying that I said I trust Hezbollah when anyone can rewind that and break their finger trying to find the part where I said that because I never did. Mark Dubowitz (01:40:57): But Scott, this is the constant theme in your analysis. Again, want to look at it, maybe steel man it, maybe challenge it, but the constant theme is the United States and Israel and the West, we constantly aggress against North Korea, against Iran, against Russia, against these countries, and they respond to us. They respond to us in ways that they build nuclear weapons programs that are peaceful, but we force them to develop nuclear weapons. They don’t actually mean to kill us. Scott Horton (01:41:34): Look, it’s not right that I’m saying everything anyone does- Mark Dubowitz (01:41:34): Can I finish? Scott Horton (01:41:34): No. Mark Dubowitz (01:41:38): [inaudible 01:41:38]. Scott Horton (01:41:38): You’re saying that everything I say is that everyone anyone else does is the reaction, but that’s not true. The subject here is what has America done to make things worse rather than better? Mark Dubowitz (01:41:48): That’s not the topic here. Scott Horton (01:41:49): I’m citing provocations. That doesn’t mean I’m saying that everything that happens in the world is only an equal and opposite reaction to an American provocation, and you can’t find me saying that. You can only somehow try to paraphrase me claiming that somehow or something like that. But that’s what’s at issue is as I said, for example, there’s the Reuters story that says that after Israel did the sabotage, which they bragged about at Natanz in April of ’21, that was when they started enriching up to 60%. now I’m saying that, and I’m just denying the agency of the Iranians or anything except that, no, I’m not. I’m just citing the Reuters news agency saying that this proactive action by Israel caused a negative reaction by your own lights, a very negative reaction in their beginning to again enrich up to 60% uranium. Mark Dubowitz (01:42:56): He did try. Scott Horton (01:42:57): The US government has made numerous mistakes in many of these countries. Mark Dubowitz (01:43:01): If this podcast was all about the American government and the mistakes that’s made, then we’d spend four hours on it. Scott Horton (01:43:06): It’s a huge [inaudible 01:43:06]. Lex Fridman (01:43:06): Can we please- Mark Dubowitz (01:43:08): Get to today. Lex Fridman (01:43:10): … use everything we just talked about and talk about today, what is maybe Mark, can you lay out what is the best case and the worst case in Scotland? Lay out the best case and the worst case that can happen now. Mark Dubowitz (01:43:22): Lex, I think the best case, and something I’ve advocated for, I’ve been working on this for 22 years, is that the Iranians return to negotiations at Oman, sit down with the United States and conclude an agreement that peacefully and permanently and fully dismantles their nuclear program. They agree to that, which means they shut down any remaining facilities. They give up all the remaining centrifuges and enriched material that they could use to develop nuclear weapons. They let the IAEA in in order to supervise this. They actually commit to not rebuilding this nuclear program. We commit, as we’ve done with 23 other countries, to helping them provide civilian nuclear energy. Because it seems to me a little fanciful that Khamenei would build a civilian nuclear program under 80 meters of concrete surrounded by rock and take all the risks he’s taken. By the way, he faces a risk to his regime, spent a half a trillion dollars to do this when it makes no commercial sense. Lex Fridman (01:44:56): What can Trump do to help make that happen? Mark Dubowitz (01:44:59): I think what he can do is he can say to the Iranians, “Look, I made you that offer last time. You rejected it. Now that offer’s no longer on the table because that offer gave you enrichment. Now temporarily, but I now see the game that you would’ve played when I left office, to turn that enrichment capability into nuclear weapons. That deal’s off the table, but here’s the deal that’s on the table. It’s a one-page deal. You give up your nuclear capabilities, we help you build civilian nuclear energy.” I think that’s best case. Lex Fridman (01:47:41): Can I just even dig in further on the worst case? Do you think it’s possible to have where US gets pulled into a feet on the ground full-on war with Iran? Mark Dubowitz (01:47:54): I think one must never dismiss possibilities because as I said, you’ve got to plan against worst case options, and I think- Scott Horton (01:48:00): That’s what the Israel lobby has in store for you guys. American lives mean nothing to the Israel-firsters. They don’t care that Israel motivated September 11th and killed 3,000 of our guys. I was at the airport yesterday, had a big American flag with all the red and white stripes made out of the names of the dead of September 11th who were killed by people motivated by Israel’s crimes in Palestine and in Lebanon and enforcing Bill Clinton’s dual containment policy from Saudi Arabia. They don’t care about that. They don’t care about the 4,500 Americans who died in Iraq War Two or the million something people who died in Iraq War Two, the half a million in Syria as long as the Shiite Crescent is somehow is limited. They’ll even celebrate openly. Mark Dubowitz (01:49:44): I wish you’d listened and not put words in my mouth. Lex Fridman (01:49:47): I heard what he said. I forced him kind of to say what the worst case possibility of a full-on invasion as a thought experiment, and you can let him finish that as opposed to making the accusations. Let’s just minimize both ways accusations, please. Just talk about the ideas. That’s the most charitable interpretation of those ideas. Scott Horton (01:50:06): I’m from the United States of America, unlike him, and I care about the future of this country, unlike him, who’s here to serve a foreign power and make their case at our expense. Lex Fridman (01:50:16): Scott, and next you’re going to say that I’m un-American. Mark Dubowitz (01:50:21): Because an immigrant too. Scott Horton (01:50:21): You’re just hosting the show. I don’t know. It seems like you’re trying to be fair. Lex Fridman (01:50:25): No, it’s not about fair. Scott Horton (01:50:27): He has an agenda. Lex Fridman (01:50:28): Stop. Stop. Scott Horton (01:50:28): He’s from the FDD. Lex Fridman (01:50:29): Stop. It’s not about being fair. The implication here is somebody who’s un-American because where they’re from. Scott Horton (01:50:36): I didn’t say anyone who’s not from here. I’m talking about him. Lex Fridman (01:50:41): I think that’s a really deeply disrespectful accusation. Scott Horton (01:50:45): Can I ask you, does it bother you that when Naftali Bennett bombed a UN shelter full of 106 women and children in Qana, Lebanon in 1996, that that’s what motivated Mohamed Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh to join Al-Qaeda and attack our towers? Mark Dubowitz (01:51:00): Scott, you know what bothers me? I came to this country 22 years ago. I became a proud US citizen 10 years ago. I’m proud to be an American and accusing me or Lex or any immigrants to this country of not being un-American is deeply offensive. Let me answer Lex’s question. Lex, let’s get back to your question because I think it’s an important question. What are the chain of events that could lead 500,000 mechanized US troops to have to invade Iran, which would be a disaster? That’s something we never want to see again. That’s one of the lessons of Iraq. Scott Horton (01:52:14): Can’t the IDF handle it? Mark Dubowitz (01:52:16): Can I just finish just who can handle it, who cannot handle it? I think that it’s a potential scenario, which is why I don’t think anybody should be advocating for a US decapitation of the regime in Iran. I have long been on record of supporting the Iranian people, providing support to the Iranian people, to at one point take back their country and take back their flag. It’s very much sort of Reagan’s strategy that Reagan ran in the Cold War of maximum pressure on the regime, maximum support for anti-Soviet dissidents. While by the way, he was negotiating arms control agreements for the Soviet Union in order to try to reduce the number of nuclear tipped ICBMs that both countries had pointed at each other. I think the Reagan strategy of providing support to the people is a far better strategy for trying to get transition, leadership transition, government transition inside Iran. But I think the scenario of decapitation strikes, killing Khamenei, taking out the entire government could potentially lead to that scenario. I think we have to be conscious of that. We have to guard against that. I think that’s important. Lex Fridman (01:54:17): Scott, what do you think is the best case and the worst case here? Scott Horton (01:54:20): Well, the best case scenario is that we quit right now and that Trump figures out a way to reorder some paragraphs and get back in something like the JCPOA, which was also signed with the rest of the UN security council power. Lex Fridman (01:54:34): Can I ask you like JCPOA is a pretty good approximation of what would be a good deal? Scott Horton (01:54:39): Pretty good. It could have been better, as I said at the beginning. Trump could have gone in there and tried to negotiate a better result with the sunset provisions on some of those things. But the concept that America is just going to insist on zero enrichment, zero nuclear program whatsoever when they have the unalienable “in the nonproliferation treaty to civilian nuclear material and a civilian program”, it’s a poison pill. It’s meant to fail just like it was a poison pill meant to destroy the tox here, good enough to start a war. Again, as I quoted from earlier, he said on TV last week, “Well, America has to take out Fordo now because now they’re more likely to break out towards a nuke.” I think that’s exactly right. There still is, or there’s strong reason to be skeptical, including Israeli and American officials told the New York Times that they thought that the damage was quite incomplete. Mark Dubowitz (01:55:34): The IAEA just came out recently just point of fact, sort of interesting. We’ll see on the battle damage assessment, but they actually think the facility was destroyed and that the sensitive centrifuges were destroyed. Just interesting for the viewers. It may be premature. Scott Horton (01:55:50): All the uranium mines, and all the aluminum smelters so that they can’t make any more centrifuges. Mark Dubowitz (01:55:55): Interesting assessment. Scott Horton (01:55:57): They know how to make centrifuges. At this point, this is why government doesn’t work. They make matters worse and create more work for themselves and make things worse and worse and worse. We can make the same criticism about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine making matters worse for themselves and causing them to have to escalate even further. Lex Fridman (01:57:05): Can you go into the analysis of best case and worst case? You laid out the best case. What’s the worst case would be feet on the ground? Scott Horton (01:57:06): Worst case is this. Mark Dubowitz (01:57:12): What was the best case? I missed it. The best case is a deal? Scott Horton (01:57:15): Yeah, that we quit now. Mark Dubowitz (01:57:16): The deal. Lex Fridman (01:57:17): Basically, you guys agree on the best case. Scott Horton (01:57:19): We respect their right to a civilian nuclear program and try to negotiate, as I said, back into something like the JCPOA, which again had them exporting their entire stockpile of uranium out of the country. Lex Fridman (01:57:31): [inaudible 01:57:31]. Scott Horton (01:57:31): He wants no nuclear program whatsoever. Mark Dubowitz (01:57:33): No, no, that’s not what I said. That’s not what I said. Be careful what I said. Scott Horton (01:57:36): Well, no enrichment capabilities [inaudible 01:57:38]. Mark Dubowitz (01:57:38): [inaudible 01:57:38]. Scott Horton (01:57:38): [inaudible 01:57:38] entire dependence on other countries to supply their fuel needs. Lex Fridman (01:57:41): Can you teach me the difference when we [inaudible 01:57:43]? Mark Dubowitz (01:57:42): Let me just step back from this because we agree on some and we disagree on a major issue. Then if we both agree Iran deserves a civilian nuclear program- Scott Horton (01:57:52): The point is the Ayatollah is never going to give in on enrichment. Mark Dubowitz (01:57:55): Can I just- Scott Horton (01:57:55): We know that. That’s a premise for our whole discussion here. Therefore, what he’s saying is we’re going to have to keep escalating the war until the mission is accomplished. Mark Dubowitz (01:58:03): Not sure I said that. Scott, I think it’s, again, important that the distinction here. We both agree that Iran deserves a civilian nuclear program. 23 countries have civilian nuclear programs and they don’t have enrichment and they don’t have reprocessing. Where we differ is, I don’t think Iran should have the Iran standard. I think that Iran should agree to the gold standard that 23 US allies have agreed to. Have civilian nuclear program, but you don’t get to keep the key enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that you need to develop nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (01:58:34): Do you think that Bill Clinton should have just let the Chinese sell them the light water reactor that they wanted to back in the ’90s? Mark Dubowitz (01:58:40): America, of course, allowed Russia to sell them a heavy water reactor for the same purpose. But I agree with Scott that I think one of the ways out of this is, yes, whether it’s the Chinese or preferably as an American, I prefer the Americans actually sell reactors to the Iranians, a great nuclear industry in this country. Let’s do that. But if they can’t, the South Koreans can, the Russians can, the Chinese can. I wouldn’t want to have significant Russian and Chinese influence in Iran, so better that it’d be a western country that does it. Nevertheless, provide those reactors. They’re proliferation proof. There’s no enrichment and no reprocessing. You buy your fuel rods from abroad, you put them in the reactors, you power the Iranian electrical grid, which is in terrible shape because the Ayatollah has spent a half a trillion dollars trying to build nuclear weapons. They’re not trying to provide electricity for these people. Scott Horton (02:00:23): Can I ask you, you were saying you supported the JCPOA, you were opposed to it. Mark Dubowitz (02:00:23): No, no, I was opposed to JCPOA. Scott Horton (02:00:28): That’s right. You were opposed to withdrawing from it? Mark Dubowitz (02:00:30): Yeah. Scott Horton (02:00:30): Don’t you think that Trump could have gone over there and negotiate to make it better? Would you agree that it was a huge mistake to withdraw that because they were, as we agreed, shipping out all of their enriched uranium to only be brought back in a form that they could not use to make nukes. The scientists had decided that if they kicked all the inspectors out and beat their chests and started making a nuke, it would take them a full year to have enough weapons grade uranium for a single gun type nuke under the JCPOA. Mark Dubowitz (02:00:58): Let me ask you a question. Scott Horton (02:00:59): Yeah. Mark Dubowitz (02:00:59): Because you’re right. I mean, I’m glad you’ve pointed out because I tried to take a nuanced position during the JCPOA debate, and I got hammered by the left and I got hammered by the right. The left hammered me because I criticized the JCPOA because it’s fundamental flaw was twofold. One, it gave Iran enrichment capability that would expand over time as the restrictions sunset it. Number two, the sunsets were going to kick in and Iran would emerge with this industrial size program, which we would not be able to stop. Now, the nuanced position, which I got hammered on by the right, was I said, “Go negotiate with the Europeans. Agree on a common transatlantic position to approach the Iranians and say, ‘Look, that deal that we did back in 2015, we think it’s flawed. We want to extend that deal. We want to get rid of the sunsets and we are going to negotiate a deal.'” Now, does that mean we have to give you more sanctions relief? Yeah, probably. The Iranians are not going to just agree without sanctions relief. Scott Horton (02:02:20): But what I’m asking you is if say you were the national security advisor under the JCPOA where they’re still shipping all their enriched uranium out of the country and all that, which you would be advising him to not leave, in the negotiations to improve the deal, would you have been willing to accept some level of enrichment then as long as we have the restriction part where they’re shipping it all out of the country, or to you, enrichment at all is always a red line, essentially equivalent to them being 99% of the way to a nuclear weapon? Mark Dubowitz (02:02:53): Look, enrichment capability is a red line. It has to be a red line. Scott Horton (02:02:58): Even though you know it’s protected by the NPT, the right to peace nuclear technology? They call it a loophole, but they have the right to enrich uranium. Mark Dubowitz (02:03:05): There’s different interpretations of everything, including agreements. There is a raging debate about whether the NPT actually gives you a right to enrich. In fact, the Obama administration, even with the JCPOA, was not willing to recognize Iran’s right to enrich, but they were willing to recognize its de facto reality that they were enriching. Lex Fridman (02:03:26): Can you explain NPT? Mark Dubowitz (02:03:27): It’s the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran is a member of it. It’s supposed to promote peaceful civilian nuclear energy, and it’s supposed to prevent countries from developing nuclear weapons. I think that’s a basic summary of it. Scott Horton (02:03:41): It mandates that non-nuclear weapons states have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and full of additional protocols and whatever, where they have the right to inspect. Mark Dubowitz (02:03:42): Which Iran refused to sign, by the way. Scott Horton (02:03:52): Well, no, they had an additional protocol that they were abiding, not even enriching at all while they were negotiating with the E-III. Then what the JCPOA really did was add a bunch of additional protocols and subsidiary arrangements and agreements. Mark Dubowitz (02:03:52): Iran refused … Scott Horton (02:04:00): Had a bunch of additional protocols and subsidiary arrangements and agreements [inaudible 02:04:04]. Mark Dubowitz (02:04:04): Ironically refused to ratify the additional protocol. I just wanted just be clear on the facts. I mean, it’s really important. Scott Horton (02:04:07): Well, at which point in time did they refuse to ratify? Because they did ratify the JCPOA, which was full of additional protocols and subsidiary arrangements and agreements they’re called. Mark Dubowitz (02:04:17): There’s an important additional protocol that Iran refused. Scott Horton (02:04:19): Which one was that? The one where they promised not to enrich at all, which they actually did abide by while they were negotiating with the E3 in the W. Bush years before they even started spinning centric engines in response. Mark Dubowitz (02:04:30): The important point is that you asked me what I would advise the National Security Advisor of the United States, or if I was the National Security Advisor of the United States, which I guess I can’t be because I’m a foreigner, but the fact of the matter is- Scott Horton (02:04:39): I think you could still be National Security Advisor. Zbigniew Brzezinski sure was. Lex Fridman (02:04:43): I think he was taking a shot back at the fact that you took a shot. Scott Horton (02:04:46): You know what, Lex? I think that you probably would recognize that there are many people who lobby for Israel’s interests in the United States who clearly don’t care that much about what happens to the United States of America in it as a consequence because they care about Israel, which is a different country than America, right? It’s not part of the 50 states. Lex Fridman (02:05:05): I think an American citizen cares primarily about America. That is a fundamental belief for me. To make an accusation that they don’t requires a very large amount of proof for each individual. I don’t care. Scott Horton (02:05:19): Pretend that American and Israel’s interests are the same, requires a tremendous amount of cognitive dissonance by those who support Israel’s interests. Mark Dubowitz (02:05:28): He’s right. They’re not all the same. Scott Horton (02:05:29): State sponsor of terror as though Iran has anything to do with anti-American terrorists. Lex Fridman (02:05:35): I don’t know who is the they that we’re talking about, but I believe American citizens care about America first. They may discuss how their nations and the interests in the Middle East or in Europe and those interests might align with their own worldview, whatever. But when it comes, at the end of the day, if everybody starts a war with everybody else, they’re America first. I am America first. If there’s a war that breaks out and we have to pick up guns, I’m fighting for America. Scott Horton (02:06:05): I’ll take them on a case by case basis. Lex Fridman (02:06:07): Case is great. Scott Horton (02:06:07): I know immigrants. I know immigrants who are absolutely super patriots who know American history and love and care about America more than their next door neighbors who are from here, but that ain’t universal. Okay? Lex Fridman (02:06:19): Sure. Let’s talk about case by case then. That’s fine. Mark Dubowitz (02:06:21): Well, I think he’s clearly accusing me. Scott Horton (02:06:24): I think a worse war with Iran. He was entertaining the possibility of putting ground troops in there, [inaudible 02:06:29] catastrophe for this country. Lex Fridman (02:06:29): Don’t take personal shots. Don’t take personal shots. Either of you. You’ve taken personal shots. Let’s not do it. You guys are just having fun and I’m having fun. Scott Horton (02:06:36): Just on the idea here. Mark Dubowitz (02:06:37): Let me respond. Scott Horton (02:06:37): He said that there, there’s a threat from the missiles. There’s a threat from Iranian missiles to America’s bases in the Middle East. Yeah. Because of Israel and because of this war, the first time Iran ever fired missiles at an American base over there was in response to Trump bombing them. Mark Dubowitz (02:06:53): Never Iran’s fault. It’s never Iran’s fault. Scott Horton (02:06:55): Is that what everybody thinks? Mark Dubowitz (02:06:56): Never his [inaudible 02:06:57] fault. Scott Horton (02:06:56): It was Iran who started this? Mark Dubowitz (02:06:58): Never Iran’s fault. Let’s bring it back, Scott. What a joke. Lex Fridman (02:06:58): Hold on a second. Mark Dubowitz (02:07:01): Scott. It’s a remarkable management. I want to reiterate this- Scott Horton (02:07:03): Trump bombed Ordo and then Iran shot missiles at Qatar and Iraq. Mark Dubowitz (02:07:08): Scott, you’re a patriotic American. God bless you. God bless the United States. Thank you for allowing me to come to this country and become an American. It’s a great country and as a patriotic American, I assume that the United States government and the United States intelligence community and the United States military has America’s best interest at heart. However, we have learned from the history, and Scott’s done a very good job of detailing this during the Iraq war, that the United States gets it wrong. I don’t think the United States lied us into war, but the United States got it wrong. So I think Scott’s right. We must make sure that we learn the lessons of Iraq, but not overlearn the lessons of Iraq. I would also say this. There are many lobby organizations in the United States. There’s the China lobby, there’s the oil lobby, there’s the pharmaceutical lobby, there’s the Qatar lobby. Scott Horton (02:10:52): They don’t have any 90% enriched uranium. He just means hypothetically, if they did have some, to be clear. Mark Dubowitz (02:10:58): You know the 60%, that’s 99% of the way to 90% enriched uranium. By the way, you can make a crude nuclear device with 60% enriched uranium. I just want to put that on the record, but he lost that key conversion facility that turns 90% enriched uranium or even 60% enriched uranium into uranium metal. You need uranium metal to fashion a crude nuclear device or a warhead. That’s been destroyed. And when I was coming in this morning, I just checked, I thought it was interesting and a whole lot of discussion about the fact that about 12 or 16 trucks showed up at Fordo in the days before the U.S strikes and moved something out of Fordo. Well, according to reports, just this morning, we’ll see if they’re verified. I don’t trust single sourcing. I don’t trust what some reporter just says in their stories because reporters got it wrong over and over again, especially all the ones who accuse President Trump have been a Russian agent. Scott Horton (02:14:14): Who thinks that if they break out and try to start making nukes now that any hawks supporting this war will take responsibility for driving them to it. Lex Fridman (02:14:22): So the suggestion you’re making is we’re actually driving as opposed to doing the opposite, we’re actually driving them to develop nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (02:14:31): Of course. That’s right. Lex Fridman (02:14:31): Can you make the case of that? Scott Horton (02:14:32): Yeah. Previously he said, “Let’s take the Ayatollah at his word that he only wants a civilian electricity program.” Well, let’s not take him at his word. Again, I never said in this conversation, “Trust the Ayatollah.” He did. Now he’s kind of-, Mark Dubowitz (02:14:47): Yeah, but you said that the Ayatollah doesn’t want nuclear a weapons programs. Scott, you were very clear about that. Scott Horton (02:14:51): What I said- Mark Dubowitz (02:14:53): Ayatollah never wanted a nuclear weapons program. Are you going back on that now? Scott Horton (02:14:55): Jesus Christ. What I was very clear about from my very first statement when we sat down was that the Ayatollah was building himself a latent nuclear deterrent, putting Iran as what they call a threshold nuclear weapons state just like Brazil and Germany and Japan, so that everyone knows they have mastered the fuel cycle, they could enrich uranium up to 90%, don’t make me do it. That was his position. Mark Dubowitz (02:14:55): None of those countries have a nuclear weapons program. None of them. Scott Horton (02:15:18): Did you ever hear me say anything about believing the Ayatollah saying he only wanted an electricity program? This is why enrichment is a red line. It’s because if all the enrichment is done overseas somewhere, then it’s not a latent nuclear deterrent at all. Mark Dubowitz (02:15:37): So it’s a red line for you, as well as for me, we agree, Scott. Scott Horton (02:15:40): I’m saying it’s a red line for the Ayatollah that he’s clearly not going to give in on, and it’s a poison pill by the Israelis in the west. They know he’s never going to give up enrichment a hundred percent because that’s the whole point of it. So it’s just disingenuous to say, “Oh, let’s believe him that he wants an electricity program.” He’s not saying that. I don’t even think that’s his official position. Or if it is, it’s with a strong implication as everyone understands that it’s a latent nuclear weapons capability and a potential actual nuclear weapons capability. Lex Fridman (02:16:13): To you, a deal will have to include enrichment. Scott Horton (02:16:15): Yes. Lex Fridman (02:16:16): That is a red line. He will move off. Scott Horton (02:16:17): Yes. And then the thing is too, just like I was saying before, if Trump had come in 2017 and said, “Screw this, I hate this deal.” And then got on a plane and flown straight to Tehran and said, or sent his guys and said, “Now listen here Ayatollah, I want to fix this deal up better.” I think that he really could have, and I already said, I don’t know the details, but I believe Mark when he says that the Europeans were being intransigent on that. And again, I criticized the CIA and FBI for framing Trump for treason, for preventing him from being able to work with the Russians to see if maybe they could put pressure on the Ayatollah to deal with him. Mark Dubowitz (02:17:39): Can I just say technically, just I think, again, important for your listeners trying understand, under the JCPOA, Iran is allowed to keep a stockpile of a maximum of 300 kilograms, as I remember, of 3.67% enriched material. They’re allowed to continue to enrich as long as if they go over the 300 kilogram, they have to continue to send that out to Russian, to Russia to blend down. And so they kept the enrichment capability, the ability to enrich. They did keep a stockpile. Scott’s right. They’re not allowed in those early years to go under 3.67%. They would be allowed to go to 20% and 60% and 90% as the restrictions sunsetted, but they were able to keep all of those key capabilities. So I just want to clarify just technically what the JCPOA actually said and what it didn’t say. Lex Fridman (02:18:30): Yeah. Can you comment on the so-called Operation Midnight Hammer? Now that we can look back at it, what parts were successful, what parts were a mistake? Was the whole operation a mistake that accelerates the Iran nuclear program or the incentives for it? Or is there some components that actually is a disincentive for Iran to develop the program? And then maybe you can comment on the same. It’d be nice just to get comments on each. Scott Horton (02:18:56): Well, I think we really don’t know, right? There’s some initial battle assessments and arguments and all that about just how much was destroyed, and we don’t know exactly what their reaction is going to be. There were reports of them saying, “Hey, we’re already starting up a new facility somewhere else.” There were reports where they said, “Hey, a lot of our centrifuges survived and we’re going to start spinning them up right now,” and this kind of thing. The potential is there. I don’t know what the Ayatollah is going to do. And I think this goes to the larger argument about the apocalyptic threat of the Ayatollah, which Mark has not made, but which Israel hawks often do that these guys just can’t wait to get into a war and all this. In fact, if you look at Iran- Mark Dubowitz (02:19:35): Well, they’re in a war, but the argument I make is they’re not going to use a nuclear weapon. Scott Horton (02:19:39): Jesus, man, you stop me, you interrupt me every time I try to say anything. Mark Dubowitz (02:19:41): But Scott, just You’re mischaracterizing what I’m saying. I need to clarify when you mischaracterize. Lex Fridman (02:19:45): He’s not interrupting every time, but sometimes interrupting. Yes. So try not to interrupt as much. Go ahead, Scott. Don’t take it personally. Come on, let’s go. Scott Horton (02:19:54): It seems like a deliberate attempt to obfuscate and prevent me- Lex Fridman (02:19:58): It’s not. Scott Horton (02:19:58): From just being able to complete a point. He does it virtually every time. Lex Fridman (02:20:02): No, it’s not. As a listener, I’m enjoying this. Scott Horton (02:20:05): Well, look, on the face of it, they blew up a lot of stuff and they made them very angry. So are they going to now give in or they’re now going to double down or they’re now going to hold still? We don’t really know. As I was trying to explain, from the Ayatollah’s position that he’s in, what are you going to do with a problem like the United States of America, right? They can chant great Satan, this and that all they want. They have no ability to really threaten this country in any way. And they know that America absolutely does have the ability to, in fact, even without nuclear weapons, essentially wipe their civilization off the face of the earth just with B52s if we wanted to carpet bomb their major cities. So they know, the Ayatollah knows, he’s in a very difficult position. Lex Fridman (02:21:39): Zero casualties so far? Scott Horton (02:21:40): Zero casualties so far. So what is going on there essentially is he’s got to do something. He’s doing these symbolic strikes essentially to say like, “Hey, you can’t do that to me.” But then he’s also telegraphing that, “Hey, I can’t do anything about you and I don’t really want to fight.” And so in a way, he’s kind of backing down. He’s doing, and then what did Donald Trump say? Donald Trump again, let him have the last word and in fact, bragged and mocked and said, “Hey, thanks Ayatollah for giving us a warning that you were about to shoot missiles at our base so we could be ready to shoot them all down,” and this kind of thing. And he said, “Now is the time for peace.” In other words, Trump again, letting the Ayatollah get the last word. Why? Because the Ayatollah, he might be a horrible leader if you live in Iran, but he is not perfectly, but essentially cautious in foreign policy because what’s he going to do? Lex Fridman (02:23:45): That is one of the fundamental disagreements in the room that you’re saying they really don’t have interest to develop a nuclear weapon. And they’re not quite- Scott Horton (02:23:55): Well, not exactly. I mean, what I said- Lex Fridman (02:23:57): More towards that direction, then Mark is saying- Scott Horton (02:23:59): More toward, but they’re saying, “Look at us. We’re a threshold state. Don’t push your luck and force us to make the bad decision.” Now, that’s an implication. They have not said that outright, but clearly the implication is that if we force them, then they will go ahead and make a nuclear weapon. Lex Fridman (02:24:16): What I mean is if left on their own devices, they would not develop. That’s the case you’re making, the case- Scott Horton (02:24:22): Well, not just on their own devices, but if we were to try to negotiate with them in good faith and try to have normal relations with them, that would disincentivize a nuclear weapon even further. Lex Fridman (02:24:32): Okay. Can you comment on the mission on operation and in general? Mark Dubowitz (02:24:34): Sure. A couple of things I think were interesting, what Scott said, and I agree certainly with some of it. I mean, the first thing is I do believe President Trump has negotiated in good faith. I mean, he sent Steve Witkoff, he’s chief negotiator for five rounds of negotiations since he came in office. The second is, I mean, we can keep going around in circles, but the fact of the matter is I do believe that Iran and Iran-backed terrorist organizations have for since 1979 killed and tried to kill and maim Americans and taken them hostage. I think it’s important for me again to put that on the record, but where I agree with with Scott is, and it’s interesting, and I don’t know if Khamenei has changed. He’s 86 years old. He’s been in power since 1989. And there’s a little bit of history that I think is really interesting. Scott Horton (02:28:55): Do you think that that might have anything to do with the fact that America attacked Iraq and Libya when they did not have weapons of mass destruction programs? Mark Dubowitz (02:29:04): Can I tell you the Libya example? I think Scott is the most interesting one for me, right? Because the Libya example- Scott Horton (02:29:09): When they lynched the guy? Mark Dubowitz (02:29:09): It was a big mistake. By the way, Ukraine is another good example of this. We went to the Libyans and we said, “You must fully dismantle your program.” And Gaddafi said, reluctantly under huge American pressure, “Okay, I’ll do it.” And the Brits and the Americans went in there and literally hauled out his entire nuclear- Scott Horton (02:29:26): It wasn’t really a program, it was just a bunch of AQ cons junk sitting in crates in a warehouse. They did not have the capability to make a nuclear program at all in Libya. They didn’t have the engineers, the scientists or anyone. So Gaddafi had bought that junk just to trade it away. Just to be clear, there never was a nuclear weapons program or a nuclear program of any kind in Libya, unlike what you just heard. Mark Dubowitz (02:29:48): That wasn’t my point. Okay? My point is you had a nuclear program- Scott Horton (02:29:51): Patents are important. Mark Dubowitz (02:29:52): We can debate about, again, how we were debating about whether- Scott Horton (02:29:52): He had warehouses full of crates. Mark Dubowitz (02:29:56): Again, it’s always Gaddafi and Khamenei and all these people, they don’t really want nuclear weapons. We just misunderstand them. But that’s not the point. The point is, we did a deal with Gaddafi. We pulled out his nuclear program and then I don’t know how many years later, but it wasn’t too many years late. Scott Horton (02:29:56): Seven. Mark Dubowitz (02:30:10): Seven years later, thank you, Scott. We actually took Gaddafi out and he didn’t have a nuclear program, so we took him out in the Libya operation. Now, Ukraine is another great example. The Ukrainians after the fall of the Soviet Union, you know this, they had the Soviet nuclear arsenal or good parts of it on their soil. So we went to them and we said, “All right, well here’s the deal for you. Give up the nuclear arsenal off your territory, and we and the Russians and the French guarantee your territorial integrity and your sovereignty as a country.” So the Ukrainians said, “Fair deal to me,” gave up all the nuclear weapons, and then Putin has now invaded Ukraine twice. Scott Horton (02:30:49): That’s not what the Bucharest Declaration says, that we promised their security, we promised to respect it, and the Russians promised to, and both sides broke that promise. But there is nothing like a guarantee. Mark Dubowitz (02:30:59): That’s not my point. Scott Horton (02:31:00): That America would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty. They gave up those nukes and they had no ability to use those nukes anyway, because they were Soviet nukes with Soviet codes and they belonged to the Soviet military, and the Ukrainians would’ve had no ability to use them or deliver. They were married to missiles that were made to fly around the world, not to Russian next door. Mark Dubowitz (02:31:18): But Scott, my point is, and I think you’ll agree with this, my point is if you’re Khamenei, and you’ve seen those two examples of Libya, you gave up your nuclear program, Gaddafi gets taken down. You’re Ukraine, you gave up your nuclear weapons, and the Russians invaded twice. If you’re Khamenei thinking to yourself, “The only thing that matters more to me than my nuclear weapons program is my regime survival. And in 12 days of war, the Israelis specifically, because we hit Fordo and Isfahan and the Khans, we the United States hit those sites. We the United States hit those sites. Lex Fridman (02:31:53): The gleeful nation, Scott, stop. Take that out. There’s no place here in this room with me, the un-American bullshit, don’t do that. The implication here, man, is that I, me, am un-American. I’ve been attacked just like the Russian hoax for being a Putin shill. I’m an American. Scott Horton (02:32:14): Well, when you talk about Ukraine’s war with Russia, do you say we or do you say they? Mark Dubowitz (02:32:19): I said we the United States, we actually- Scott Horton (02:32:21): Well, you added the United States, but you just described Israel’s strikes. Mark Dubowitz (02:32:24): Israel didn’t strike Fordo, Scott. Lex Fridman (02:32:25): He talked about the US attack. You’re speaking to this other people that you’ve heard that somehow. They do say we, and they talk about, I would say ridiculously as if, I’ve even heard some people basically put Israel above US, and they’re American citizens. Yeah, that’s fucking ridiculous. But none of those people are in this room. There are demons under the bed. I’m sure those people exist. There’s ridiculous people on the internet. There’s ridiculous people in Congress who can criticize them, make fun of them, say they’re fucking crazy. Scott Horton (02:33:02): The foundation for a defense of democracy has been the vanguard of the war party in this country for 25 years. Lex Fridman (02:33:07): Well, that’s a different criticism, but I was- Scott Horton (02:33:09): It’s an important one. Lex Fridman (02:33:10): Yes, that, but no, you just switched. You just switched. No, no, no. You just switched from the un-American discussion to criticizing policies that that particular institute, fine, criticize the policies, do that. What is the un-American bullshit? Not here. Scott Horton (02:33:27): Lex, the neoconservative movement is the vanguard of the Israel lobby. That’s who they are. That’s what Neoconservatism is about. Mark Dubowitz (02:33:34): Lex, I’m not a NeoCon. Scott Horton (02:33:34): That’s who the war- Mark Dubowitz (02:33:35): I’m not a neoconservative, so I don’t know who he’s talking about, but I’m not a neoconservative. Lex Fridman (02:33:39): Let’s not mix stuff up. Scott Horton (02:33:40): There is a massive Israel lobby in America, in Washington that is inseparable from the American War party. Lex Fridman (02:33:47): Yeah, yeah. I’ve talked to John Mersham. I respect him deeply. He’s one of the most brilliant people speaking on that topic. Great, great. Let’s just talk about today and the nuclear proliferation. You guys have been brilliant on this. I’m learning a lot. Let’s continue [inaudible 02:34:01]. Mark Dubowitz (02:34:01): Yeah. Sorry. Let’s go back to where Khamenei may be. I mean, in a bunker, 86 years old thinking he’s going to drink the poison chalice and agree to a deal with Donald Trump and Oman, or is he going to do all of the things that Scott and I are concerned about? And one of those, and Scott has pointed this out rightly so, is he may decide now to break out for the nuke or creep out for the nuke. He may decide not to do it now, he may decide to do it in three and a half years when President Trump is gone. And I think that the important thing is he’s seen, we, the United States, we took out Fordo and Natanz and Isfahan in one operation with B-II bombers and 12 30,000 pound massive orange penatrators and Tomahawk missile. So if he didn’t think if that the United States had serious military power before, he now knows we do. Lex Fridman (02:34:56): So to you, that operation was geopolitically a success. It sends a message of strength that if you try to build, you’re going to be punished. Lex Fridman (02:35:00): It sends a message of strength that if you try to build, you’re going to be punished for it. Mark Dubowitz (02:35:04): So I’ve said online in the past 12 days, and even before that, “Curb your enthusiasm. Curb your enthusiasm.” So all the people- Lex Fridman (02:35:12): Related to which topic? Mark Dubowitz (02:35:13): … Yeah, just this idea that this has been this unbelievable success and everything’s great. And everything’s going to be amazing. And we stopped the nuclear weapons program and this has been a resounding success. Scott Horton (02:35:37): You demanded unconditional surrender on Twitter again last night, right? After Trump said there’s a ceasefire? Mark Dubowitz (02:35:42): Yes. Lex Fridman (02:35:42): What does unconditional surrender mean? Mark Dubowitz (02:35:44): It means no enrichment, full dismantlement. Lex Fridman (02:35:45): Okay. Mark Dubowitz (02:35:46): Yes, exactly right. It’s exactly what President Trump … Well, I can’t- Scott Horton (02:35:49): Not a regime change? Unconditional surrender in World War II meant the end of the Nazi regime and the imperialist Japanese regime entirely. Right? Lex Fridman (02:35:55): Does President Trump know what that means? Mark Dubowitz (02:35:56): He made it very clear. President Trump made it very clear. Lex Fridman (02:35:58): Unconditional? Mark Dubowitz (02:35:58): He made it clear, ” I don’t support regime change.” Lex Fridman (02:36:01): Well, except for that one post. Scott Horton (02:36:04): A few hours earlier? Right. Mark Dubowitz (02:36:06): Actually, I’ll explain that one because I thought it was really interesting. Lex Fridman (02:36:10): He’s re-analyzing it like it’s Shakespeare. What does that? Mark Dubowitz (02:36:11): Yeah, yeah. Lex Fridman (02:36:11): And what did he also mean? We have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the fuck they’re doing. What’s that about? Scott Horton (02:36:18): He was angry that Israel was still attacking after he promised they weren’t. He demanded they turn their planes around. He felt that they were doing it in defiance of their agreement. Lex Fridman (02:36:27): But he didn’t say Israel. He says that both countries [inaudible 02:36:30]. Scott Horton (02:36:29): Different quote. He did say, I believe it was a tweet from Truth Social, “I demand that Israel turn those planes around right now.” Was how upset he was about it. Mark Dubowitz (02:36:39): Well, I guess Donald Trump doesn’t listen to Bibi all the time, does he? Scott Horton (02:36:41): Yeah, I guess he’s finding out they respect him about as much as they respect the Palestinian. He’s just the help. Lex Fridman (02:36:47): Well, that’s how world leaders …. World leaders are interested in their own nation. Mark Dubowitz (02:36:49): That’s right. Lex Fridman (02:36:50): They fuck you over. Scott Horton (02:36:51): Good important lesson there everyone. What does Israel care about? Israel. Mark Dubowitz (02:36:55): Every country then defends its national interests. That’s not unusual for Israel or any other country. But I think to understand- Scott Horton (02:37:02): We’re supposed to pretend that, “Hey, whatever Israel needs, we’re here to serve their interests.” Lex Fridman (02:37:06): If those people exist, they aren’t American. If people put Israel’s interest first- Scott Horton (02:37:15): He just said we fight terrorism together. Mark Dubowitz (02:37:15): … Well, we do. Scott Horton (02:37:15): Well, we generate terrorism together. What are you talking about? Lex Fridman (02:37:15): But that doesn’t mean you put Israel’s interest above America’s. If you do, you’re unAmerican. Mark Dubowitz (02:37:20): You know how many American lives- Scott Horton (02:37:21): That’s all I’m saying. Mark Dubowitz (02:37:22): … Israeli intelligence community has saved? And ask people in the FBI and CIA who work counter-terrorism, how many American lives the Israelis have saved because of their intelligence capabilities. Scott Horton (02:37:34): How about when Naftali Bennett, again, bombed that shelter full of women and children and caused the September 11th attack. That’s what happened. In fact, I don’t know if you know the story, but you could Google this. You like Googling things. It’s on Google Books. Mark Dubowitz (02:38:46): Of course, that’s ignores the history of Al-Qaeda- Scott Horton (02:38:48): Which for years before that was for the United States, Britain, and Saudi Arabia. Mark Dubowitz (02:38:52): … operations against the United States, but executing them. Lex Fridman (02:38:55): You guys love pulling each other into history. Scott Horton (02:38:57): No, no, no. History is, America’s problem with Al-Qaeda- Mark Dubowitz (02:39:01): Just one second. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:01): America’s problems with Al-Qaeda is Israel. America and Israel are terrorist states. Scott- Scott Horton (02:39:06): They were America’s mercenaries that we used in Afghanistan, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Chechnya. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:11): It’s all us. It’s all us. Scott Horton (02:39:11): But they turned against us. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:12): And when I mean us, Scott? I mean, America. Scott Horton (02:39:14): They turned against us. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:14): It’s all us, Scott. It’s all us. Scott Horton (02:39:15): Anyone can read Michael Shearer’s book, the former chief of the CIA’s Bin Laden where he wrote his great book. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:21): We’re responsible for our enemies attacking us. Scott Horton (02:39:23): It’s called Imperial Hubris. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:38): That’s the most articulate justification I’ve ever heard for Al-Qaeda in my life. But let’s- Scott Horton (02:39:42): It’s not a justification. I’m not saying that makes what they did right? I’m saying that was how Bin Laden recruited his foot soldiers to attack this country was by citing American foreign policies that were directly to the detriment of the people of the Middle East. And specifically, our support for Israel. Mark Dubowitz (02:41:27): I think Al-Qaeda hates America, Scott. Scott Horton (02:41:28): Why? You know what? I’ll tell you what, Ali Soufan … You know, Ali Soufan, the former FBI agent, counter-terrorism agent? He wrote in his book, The Black Banners, that the Bin Ladenites said to Bin Laden, “We don’t understand why you’re so angry at America. They’ve been so good to us in Afghanistan, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and now here in Chechnya. Why do you want to attack them?” Mark Dubowitz (02:41:50): And Bin Laden attacked America. Scott Horton (02:41:50): Bin Laden said, “I have a larger agenda that you don’t understand.” Lex Fridman (02:41:54): The disagreement between you is clear. I’ve talked to Noam Chomsky twice. Scott, you focus on the criticism. Scott Horton (02:41:59): You should interview Michael Scheuer. Well, although he’s gone pretty crazy lately. I don’t know. Maybe not. Lex Fridman (02:42:04): Anyway, we’re going into history. We’re learning a lot. The perspectives differ strongly. Can we look into the, maybe a ridiculous question, but a nuclear proliferation? You already started to speak to, both of you. Mark Dubowitz (02:42:41): So look, I think it’s a great question. Will there be more nuclear weapons powers in the future or less as a result of this decision by President Trump? Lex Fridman (02:45:07): What if they don’t? What if they’re prevented? Doesn’t that still send the same message to everybody that they should build? Mark Dubowitz (02:45:15): Oh, I think it sends the opposite message, Lex. I think if they see what has happened and that it’s successful, and it stopped Iran from developing nuclear weapons. And in addition, if Trump is able to negotiate an agreement for zero enrichment and full dismantlement, then the message to all these other countries is, number one, you don’t need it. And number two, if you try to get it, then the United States is going to use American power. Lex Fridman (02:47:42): My favorite thing is when you guys point out, when you agree with the other person. Anyway, Scott, what do you think? Everything that’s just happened over the past two weeks does to nuclear proliferation over the next 5, 10, 20 years? Scott Horton (02:47:56): I really don’t know for sure. But I would think that there’s a very great danger that it’s going to reinforce the lessons of North Korea, Iraq, and Libya, which is, “You better get a nuke to keep America out. And you better hurry before it’s too late.” Lex Fridman (02:49:33): And good translator. Scott Horton (02:49:34): And Peele goes off like an angry Black guy kind of character. Right? Lex Fridman (02:49:37): He’s been going nuts on Twitter. Scott Horton (02:49:38): Yeah, he goes way out, above and beyond, but I think he’s probably acting on instructions to talk that way. And it is a real risk that the NPT could just fall apart when it’s treated so callously by the United States who invented it. And insisted that the rest of the world adopt the thing to such a great degree. Lex Fridman (02:49:59): Trump did say, ” Don’t use the N word.” He talked down to Medvedev. Scott Horton (02:50:02): That’s right. Yeah, he did. Lex Fridman (02:50:04): Don’t throw around the nuclear word. Scott Horton (02:50:05): Yeah. Well, and I appreciate that. Lex Fridman (02:50:07): That’s good. He’s right. He’s right in that. It’s a serious thing. Scott Horton (02:50:12): And look, Pakistanis could give a nuke to Iran who are their friends, I think not the tightest of allies. I’m not saying I predict that, but there’s a danger of that. Lex Fridman (02:52:53): Is that your Bill Clinton impression? Scott Horton (02:52:54): No. I’ll spare you. Lex Fridman (02:52:55): Okay. Scott Horton (02:52:55): That was pretty good. After the show, when we’re not recording much. Mark Dubowitz (02:53:00): Can I respond to a couple of things here? Just really quickly. I’ll try to do it quickly. Scott Horton (02:54:21): I didn’t say that. Mark Dubowitz (02:54:21): … Well, you said, quote unquote, “Iran is not attacking Israel.” So I mean, it’s just not true. Scott Horton (02:54:25): Yeah, they were not in a state of war until Israel launched a state of war. That’s the fact. Mark Dubowitz (02:54:29): Yeah, they were at war. Scott Horton (02:54:30): Oh, well, they backed a group that did a thing. Yeah, okay. Mark Dubowitz (02:54:33): They killed thousands of Israelis, maimed thousands of Israelis. Scott Horton (02:54:36): But that attack was not- Mark Dubowitz (02:54:37): Suicide bomb ordered in Tehran. Scott Horton (02:54:39): The Wall Street Journal says that US intelligence does not believe that Tehran ordered that attack. But they found out about- Mark Dubowitz (02:54:43): What the Wall Street Journal says and what the US intelligence says, and we can dispute whether they directed it on October 7th. Everybody knows indisputably, that Iran financed Hamas, provided Hamas with weapons. Scott Horton (02:54:44): So did Israel. Mark Dubowitz (02:54:58): Well, just a second, provided Hamas with weapons. That the IRGC and the Quds force were training Hamas. Hezbollah backed by Iran was training Hamas. There were three meetings before October 7th, one in Beirut, one in Damascus, and one in Tehran where the IRGC, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were together. There was a meeting in Tehran that was attended by Khamenei the Supreme leader. Lex Fridman (02:55:43): Critics of Israel will say that Benjamin Netanyahu has also been indirectly financing Hamas by allowing the funds going into- Scott Horton (02:55:51): I’ll say that America backs Israel, so anything Israel does is America’s responsibility too under that same logic, right? Lex Fridman (02:55:58): … I think you started to make a point disagreeing with Scott about that they’re not a good member of the NPT. Scott Horton (02:56:04): That’s all tiny technical violations. None of that has anything to do with weaponization. It’s always so, “Yeah, how do you explain this isotope?” And they go, “Well, it must’ve came with the Pakistani junk that we bought from [inaudible 02:56:14].” Mark Dubowitz (02:56:21): Yeah, that’s just not the case. Scott Horton (02:56:22): That’s the entire history of the IAEA’s objections to Iran. Mark Dubowitz (02:56:27): So your listeners, I know they’re not going to do it, because it’s a lot of technical reading. Scott Horton (02:56:31): Nothing to do with weaponization. A diversion of nuclear material. Mark Dubowitz (02:56:31): But just go out, go out and read IAEA reports dating back at least 20 years. And you’ll see the IAEA meticulously, methodically, dispassionately outlining all of the violations that Iran has embarked on of the NPT. Scott Horton (02:56:50): Virtually all those are resolved later. They won’t answer this, and then later they do. Well, they won’t answer that, and then later they do. Mark Dubowitz (02:56:56): And many open files are still there. Again, I just want your viewers to walk away from this conversation thinking, “Okay, that’s interesting. I didn’t know that.” And that, “I’m going to go fact check Mark and fact check Scott, and just see what this is all about.” Right? Because otherwise, it’s just he says, she says, or he says, he says. Scott Horton (02:57:34): They abided by the additional protocol without having ratified it. They abided by it for three years and did not proceed with any enrichment at all as long as they were dealing in good faith with the EU until W. Bush ruined those negotiations and closed them down. Only then did they begin to install the centrifuges at Natanz. Mark Dubowitz (02:57:51): It’s always the Americans who screw things up. Scott Horton (02:57:52): You complain they didn’t ratify the thing, but they abided by it for years. Mark Dubowitz (02:57:56): So that’s an interesting- Lex Fridman (02:57:57): They were in violation of it. But I think a more pragmatic and important disagreement that we already spoke to is how do we decrease the incentive for Iran to build nuclear programs? Not just the next couple of years, but the next 10, 20 years. Scott Horton (02:57:57): Attack it more. Lex Fridman (02:58:12): You’re mocking that. There’s a lot of people that will … There’s neocons that say basically, “Invade everything. Let’s make money off of war.” Scott Horton (02:58:33): If we’re really lucky. Lex Fridman (02:58:35): So it’s a big risk is your case. Mark Dubowitz (02:58:36): So here’s some practical recommendations that I think the United States should follow. I think the first is get the Iranians back to Oman, negotiate with them and do a deal. Lex Fridman (03:03:02): So Scott, as many people know, here in Austin, Texas, you’re the director of the Libertarian Institute. Let’s zoom out a bit. What are the key pillars of libertarianism and how that informs how you see the world? Scott Horton (03:03:17): Well, the very basis of libertarianism is the non-aggression principle, which essentially is the same thing as our social rules for dealing with each other in private life. No force, no theft, no fraud, and keep your hands to yourself. And we apply that same moral law to government. Scott Horton (03:06:00): For the United States of America, what we want is independence, non-interventionism and peace. Lex Fridman (03:06:05): So to you, isolationism is a kind of dirty word- Scott Horton (03:06:08): That’s right. It’s a smear term- Lex Fridman (03:06:08): It’s a smear term. Scott Horton (03:06:10): Invented by interventionists and internationalists to attack anyone who didn’t want to go along with their agenda. The term itself is used essentially as a smear against anyone who doesn’t want to go to war. Lex Fridman (03:06:22): So can you actually just deeper describe what non-interventionism means? So how much display of military strength should be there, do you think? Scott Horton (03:06:32): Dr. Paul said, we could defend this country with a couple of good submarines, which by the way, for people who don’t know, one American Trident sub could essentially kill every city and military base in Russia, just one. So he’s absolutely right about that. A couple of good submarines are enough to defend our coast and deter anyone from messing with the United States of America. And then I admit, I’m a little bit idealistic about this, that I think of that old William Jennings Bryan speech, ” Behold the Republic,” where unlike the empires of Europe burdened under the weight of militarism. Here we have a free country and where you know what we could do? We could be the host of peace conferences everywhere. There are frozen conflicts in the Donbass, in Kaliningrad, in Transnistria, in Taiwan, in Korea, virtually all the borders of Africa and Eurasia were drawn by European powers to either divide and conquer their enemies or artificially group their enemies together in order to keep them internally divided and conquered in those ways. Lex Fridman (03:08:54): Yeah, I’ve criticized Trump a lot, but I think maybe he’s just rhetoric, but I think he talks about peace a lot. Even just recently, the number of times the word peace is mentioned and with seriousness, not you get a genuine desire for peace from him. And that’s just beautiful to see for the leader of this country. Scott Horton (03:09:15): And look, man, there used to be a time when a third of the planet was dominated by the communists, right? So I’m not going to sit here and argue the first Cold War with you. My book’s about the second one, and I’m not as good on the first. But since the end of the first Cold War, we have let the neoconservative policy of the defense planning guidance of ’92 and rebuilding America’s defenses and the rest of this American dominance-centered policy control our entire direction in the world. It’s led to the war on terrorism in the Middle East, seven countries we’ve attacked. It’s led to the disaster in Eastern Europe, and it’s leading toward disaster in Eastern Asia when there’s just no reason in the world that it has to be this way with the commies dead and gone. Lex Fridman (03:10:22): Just one more thing. You mentioned the two submarines. What’s the role of nuclear weapons? Scott Horton (03:10:28): Well, I would like for America to have an extremely minimal nuclear deterrent and work toward a world free of nuclear weapons. And I know that that sounds utopian. However, I would remind your audience that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev came within a hair of achieving a deal just like that at Reykjavik Iceland in 1986, and they were both of them dead serious about it, complete and total nuclear disarmament. Then Reagan was essentially bullied by Richard Pearl and others on his staff saying, “You promised the American people that you would build them a defensive anti-missile system, the Star Wars system,” which was total pie in the sky, technological fantasy of the 1980s. And if you’re getting rid of all the ICBMs, then why the hell do you need a missile shield anyway? Is the world’s probably greatest tragedy that ever took place that Ronald Reagan walked away from those negotiations. Lex Fridman (03:12:40): We should also just say one more thing, not to be ageist, but most of the major leaders with nukes and those with power in the world are in their 70s and 80s. I don’t know if that contributes to it, but they kind of are grounded in a different time. I have a hope for the fresher, younger leaders to have a more optimistic view towards peace and to be able to reach towards peace. Scott Horton (03:13:06): And underlying so much of what we’re talking about here is all this enmity, but if America could just work, remember when China cut that pseudo sort of peace deal between Saudi and Iran a couple of years ago or last year was it? We could try to double up on that. We could try to come up with ways for Saudi and Iran to exchange as much as possible. I know you don’t like all the going back too far in history, but it’s important. It’s in my book that in 1993, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who the revolution had happened on his watch Operation Eagle Claw, the disaster of the rescue mission in ’79 after the hostage crisis and everything, all that egg was on ZB’s face. But in ’93 he said, “We should normalize relations. We should build an oil pipeline across Iran so they can make money. We can make money and we can start to normalize.” Mark Dubowitz (03:15:46): But to just have Scott and I fighting- Lex Fridman (03:15:47): That’s a fund kind of fight. Mark Dubowitz (03:15:50): Fun and peaceful. Lex Fridman (03:15:51): Mark, you’re the CEO of FDD, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, it’s a DC-based organization that focuses on national security and foreign policy. What has been your approach to solving some of these problems of the world? Mark Dubowitz (03:16:09): So look, I love the vision that Scott painted, and I agree with some of the libertarian instincts that he has, but my view is that America is the indispensable power. Scott mentioned earlier in the conversation about the rules-based order that is so important and the NPT and all these rules-based agreements that are important to maintain. Well, the rules-based order has been maintained by the United States since World War II. There is no American prosperity to the degree that we have. There’s no recovery of Europe, there’s no recovery of Asia after the devastation of World War II without American power and the rules-based order that America has led and back stopped. Scott Horton (03:21:04): Have I been pronouncing it wrong this whole time? Mark Dubowitz (03:21:06): Reza Pahlavi? Scott Horton (03:21:06): You know the guy? Mark Dubowitz (03:21:08): I met him, yeah. Scott Horton (03:21:09): Pahlavi. Mark Dubowitz (03:21:10): Pahlavi. Lex Fridman (03:21:10): What were you saying? Scott Horton (03:21:11): I thought it was Pahlavi. Lex Fridman (03:21:13): Oh wow. Mark Dubowitz (03:21:14): No, it’s okay. It’s okay. Lex Fridman (03:21:14): Heartbreaking. Scott Horton (03:21:14): Seriously, who knew? Mark Dubowitz (03:21:18): The only thing you’ve ever gotten wrong for pronouncing [inaudible 03:21:21] that’s not bad. That’s Lex Fridman (03:21:22): Pronouncing so many things correctly, I think people will give you a pass. Scott Horton (03:21:25): Can I ask you though? I mean all this militarization has led to a state of permanent war. We’ve been bombing Iraq for 34 years. We put a war against the Taliban who didn’t attack us instead of Al-Qaeda who did fought for 20 years, and the Taliban won anyway. We overthrew or launched an aggressive war against Saddam Hussein put the Ayatollah’s best friends in power, launched an aggressive war against Libya on this ridiculous hoax that Gaddafi was about to murder every last man, woman, and child in Benghazi. Imagine Charlotte, North Carolina being wiped off the map, Barack Obama lied in order to start that war and completely destroyed Libya. It’s now three pieces in a state of semi-permanent civil war including, and this wasn’t just back then, this is to this day the re-legalization and re-institutionalization of chattel slavery of sub-Saharan Black Africans in Libya to this day, as a result. Lex Fridman (03:22:42): Point well made. He’s speaking to the double-edged sword of a strong military that what you mentioned that Trump did, seems like a very difficult thing to do, which is keep it hit hard and keep it short. Scott Horton (03:22:57): We don’t know how this ended yet. Lex Fridman (03:22:59): But even the beginning part is not trivial to do. Just hitting one mission and vocalizing except for one post, no regime change, really pushing peace, make a deal, ceasefire like that’s an uncommon way to operate. So I guess you said that we should resist the military industrial complex. That’s not easy to do. That’s the double-edged sword of a strong military. Scott Horton (03:23:29): Oh, I forgot Yemen. Let me say real quick, and I promise… Look, I’m going to say one thing then and then I’ll stop. Mark Dubowitz (03:23:32): You’ve made your point. Scott Horton (03:23:33): I just want to add that this is a really important point, okay. Is grassroots efforts. There is no Houthi lobby in America. It was grassroots efforts by libertarians, Quakers, and leftists to get War Powers resolutions introduced in Trump’s first term to stop war in Yemen, which was launched not for Israel, for Saudi Arabia and UAE by Barack Obama in 2015. Mark Dubowitz (03:23:33): Well, that’s a first. Scott Horton (03:23:56): It’s not a first. The Afghan war wasn’t about Israel either. Okay, but this Yemen war was- Mark Dubowitz (03:24:01): I thought 9/11 was about Israel. Scott Horton (03:24:03): Well, it was in great part, but the decision to sack Cobble and do a regime change and all that had nothing to do with the Likud whatsoever other than, well, we got to keep the war going long enough to go to Baghdad. Mark Dubowitz (03:24:16): Oh, okay. So it was Israel’s fault. Scott Horton (03:24:17): I was in the middle of saying about the war in Yemen that we got the war powers resolution through twice, and Trump vetoed it twice. And his man, Pete Navarro, explained to the New York Times that this was just welfare for American industry. A lot of industrialists were angry about the tariffs disrupting trade with China, and somehow they substituted Raytheon for all American industry somehow and said, industry will be happy if we funnel a lot of money to Raytheon. That’s Pete Navarro talking to the New York Times about why they continued the war in Yemen throughout Trump’s entire first term. He had no interest in it at all. The whole thing was it was Obama’s fault. The whole thing was essentially on autopilot. And what was he doing? He’s flying Al-Qaeda’s Air Force against the Houthis, who originally, if you go back to January of 2015, America was passing intelligence to the Houthis to use to kill Al-Qaeda. You know AQAP, the guys that tried to blow up the plane over Detroit with the underpants bomb on Christmas Day 2009 that did all those horrific massacres in Europe, real As Bin Ladinist terrorists. Lex Fridman (03:25:38): Right, military, industrial complex. The point was made. Mark Dubowitz (03:25:40): Yeah, maybe I could respond to that, because I mean, again, it’s always America’s fault according Scott. Lex Fridman (03:25:46): Just take jab at each other. Mark Dubowitz (03:25:46): No, no but it’s just- Scott Horton (03:25:46): Saudi and UAE asked Barack Obama for permission to start that war and for American help in prosecuting it, and he said yes, and helped them do it. Mark Dubowitz (03:25:53): I’m going to segue into an answer, because I think it deserves an answer. Military industrial complex is a serious concern because I think you’re right. The bigger it gets, and the more weapons you have, you think the more the greater the temptation to use it, right? I think that’s sort of the argument. And then there’s also self enrichment and how much money can be made, and all of that I think is of serious concern to people. Look, I think Trump is somebody who, it’s hard pressed to say that Donald Trump is a great advocate of the military industrial complex, or that he is in their pocket the same way that he’s in the pocket of the Israelis and in the pocket of the Saudis and in the pocket of everybody. I mean, I think the one thing with Trump is that Trump, he has learned the lessons of American engagement over the past few decades, and I think Scott’s done a good job of laying out the mistakes that have been made, even though we can discuss about causal connections and who’s responsible. And I lean on- Scott Horton (03:26:52): Can we? I want to. Mark Dubowitz (03:26:53): Well, Scott, can I finish? Because your causal connection is always, it’s America aggressing, Israel aggressing, and all these poor people responding to us. But nonetheless, I think Trump has, he’s learned the lessons, but he hasn’t over-learned the lessons. He’s not paralyzed by Iraq or Afghanistan or the mistakes made by his predecessors. He understands that at the end of the day, we need serious American power. We need lethal power. We need four deterrence. And he’s been very careful and very selective about how he uses American power. I mean, we’ve talked about it throughout this whole conversation. Trump used American power to kill Qasem Soleimani, one of the world’s most dangerous terrorists. He killed Baghdadi, the head of ISIS, one of the world’s most dangerous terrorists. Scott Horton (03:27:57): That’s not true. Those are North Korean missiles completely debunked by Janes’ Defense Weekly. Nice try. Mark Dubowitz (03:28:02): Yeah, nice try. Anyway, everybody knows that the Iranians have been financing the Houthis. Hezbollah has been training the Houthis, and Iran has given capabilities to the Houthis to develop their own indigenous missile capability. The fact of the matter is he did in a way go after the Houthis much more intensively than Biden did in order to prevent them from continuing to shut down Red Sea shipping on which both America and our allies depend as a trade route. He actually did it quite successfully because after a few days of pretty intensive bombing, the Houthis got the message and they cut a deal with Donald Trump, they’re not going to interfere with our ships anymore. Scott Horton (03:28:41): He got a deal with them. They kept bombing Israel, which is what got him involved in the first place. He completely backed out. Sounds to me like they won, and he backed down. Mark Dubowitz (03:28:48): Well, it sounds like in terms of promoting American national security interests, it sounds like he did a pretty good job of sending a message to the Houthis and the Iranians don’t mess with the United States, and that gets us to the contemporary reality. He took a decision one day on one day to send our B2s and our subs in order to severe damage to three nuclear facilities. It was a one day campaign. It was selective. It was narrow, it was overwhelming. And I think it sends a message to Khamenei. I think it sends a message to regimes around the world, anti-American regimes around the world, that Donald Trump has not over-learned the lessons of the past 20 years, but that in fact, he is not going to dismantle the U.S military and dismantle our nuclear program and fly around through all these cities and call peace conferences and hope that these dictators will just sit down with America and say, “You know what? All is forgiven the United States of America. It’s all your fault. You did this all. We admit our responsibility,” and then we have peace and paradise on earth. Lex Fridman (03:31:26): So you made a case for, if it’s okay, you made a case for strength here. Just practically speaking, why do you think Trump has talked about peace a lot, why do you think he hasn’t been able to get to a ceasefire with Ukraine and Russia, for example? If we just move away from Iran without getting into the history of the whole thing, why he’s been talking peace, peace, peace, peace, peace. He’s been pushing it and pushing it. What can we learn about that so far failure, that’s also instructed for Iran? Mark Dubowitz (03:31:57): Look, I’m not a Russia expert. I’m not a Ukraine expert. I’m sitting in front of two people who know a lot more about that conflict than I do. Lex Fridman (03:32:03): You are, we should say, banned by Putin. Mark Dubowitz (03:32:06): I am. I have been sanctioned by Russia and by Iran. Lex Fridman (03:32:10): Sanctioned. Yes. Mark Dubowitz (03:32:11): Yes. Banned, sanctioned, threatened. Lex Fridman (03:32:14): Congratulations. Mark Dubowitz (03:32:15): Thank you. Thank you. Well, it causes some difficulties. But anyway, I think the answer to that is that for Putin, he needs to understand that like Khamenei, he has two options here. Option one, which President Trump has signaled over and over and over again is come sit down and negotiate a ceasefire with the Ukrainians. I don’t want to get into the details and the back and forth about who’s responsible for the fact there’s no ceasefire, Putin or Zelensky. I mean, that’s a whole other debate, and I’m sure you guys have a lot of opinions on that. But path one is sit down and let’s negotiate a ceasefire. Path two is the United States will use American power in order to build our leverage so that Vladimir Putin understands that he has to do a ceasefire. Now, I’m not suggesting US troops, absolutely not. What I am suggesting is, there’s a package right now of sanctions that have ADA co-sponsors in the Senate across party lines. Lex Fridman (03:35:10): Increasing military aid to Ukraine, in the case that you described, also has to be coupled with extreme pressure to make peace. Mark Dubowitz (03:35:17): Correct. Extreme pressure to make peace, Lex Fridman (03:35:19): Which Trump hopefully appears to be doing now in Iran. Mark Dubowitz (03:35:23): I think Trump is early… I mean, it’s interesting you said that because he’s early indicators. Again, who knows where the ceasefire goes. But I think it was important he slapped Khamenei, but he also said to Bibi, “Enough, enough.” And it’s like, okay, now we’re going back to Oman. There’s going to be a temporary ceasefire. Now let’s negotiate. And I think that’s important. And I think it shows that Donald Trump is leading, not following. It shows that Donald Trump is his own man, not on the payroll of the Russians or the Iranians or the Israelis or all these other crazy accusations that have been made about this guy for many, many years. And he’s going to give, as they say, peace a chance, and he’s going to give a ceasefire a chance. He’s going to give negotiations a chance. But I’ll think he’s sending the message to the Iranians and he needs to send it to Putin is, if you don’t take me up on my offer, I’ve already demonstrated that I am serious and I will use American power carefully and selectively in the way that I’ve done in the past. Lex Fridman (03:36:23): At the risk of doing the thing I shouldn’t do. But just to test the ideas of libertarianism and the things we’ve been talking about. Can we, for a brief time unrelated to everything we’ve been talking about, talk about World War II, what was the right thing to do in 1938, 1939? What would you do? Okay. To be clear, World War II has nothing to do with current events. In fact, many of the horrible policies of the United States, in my opinion, have to do with projecting World War II onto every single conflict in the world. Okay. Scott Horton (03:37:00): Agree. Lex Fridman (03:37:01): But- Mark Dubowitz (03:37:01): Overlearning. Overlearning. Scott Horton (03:37:00): Agree. Mark Dubowitz (03:37:01): But overlearning. Lex Fridman (03:37:02): Overlearning. But it is an interesting extreme case. Just to clarify, I’m just philosophically talking about at which point do you hit, do you do military intervention, and that’s a nice case. Maybe you have a better case study, but that’s such an extreme one that it’s interesting. Scott Horton (03:37:22): We’re talking about Germany or Japan? Lex Fridman (03:37:23): Germany side. Yeah. Scott Horton (03:37:24): So Japan attacked us and Germany declared war on us. Tough for them. And that’s what happens when you declare war on the United States, you get hit. Lex Fridman (03:37:33): That was idiotic on the part of Hitler to declare war on the United States. Scott Horton (03:37:36): I never understood why he ever did that. They always said it was just because he was crazy. But what it was is he was trying to get the Japanese to invade the Soviet Union from the East and in order to divide Stalin’s forces, which failed and it didn’t work. And it was a huge blunder from his point of view, I guess. Lex Fridman (03:37:50): Philosophically from an interventionism perspective, you’re saying United States should have stayed out from that war as long as possible, until they’re attacked? Scott Horton (03:37:59): Yes. I mean, look at how powerful they ended up being and the amount of damage that they were able to inflict on the Soviets, better them than us. Lex Fridman (03:38:07): What do you think? Mark Dubowitz (03:38:08): So, look- Lex Fridman (03:38:09): Is this a useful discussion? Mark Dubowitz (03:38:10): It’s interesting. I mean, I think it’s interesting- Lex Fridman (03:38:12): Philosophically. Mark Dubowitz (03:38:13): … of sort of libertarianism or isolationism in practice. I mean, I think the ’30s are more interesting to me than what happened between ’39 and ’45. I think the debate in America was very interesting in the ’30s where there was really a strong isolationist movement with Charles Lindbergh and Henry Ford and Father Coughlin and many. Lex Fridman (03:38:34): And Joe Kennedy. Mark Dubowitz (03:38:35): Yeah, and Joe Kennedy. I mean they defined themselves as sort of America-firsters, but it was very much an isolationist strain. And I think we can talk about that history and- Lex Fridman (03:38:44): Coughlin was a New-Dealer, not a right-winger. Mark Dubowitz (03:38:46): Anyway, very much an isolationist talking about America having to stay out of these entangling alliances. This is not our war. Emotionally understandable. Right? Because you can also overlearn the lessons of World War I. and I think they over-learned the lessons of World War I, which was a brutal war and a devastating war mostly for Europe, but obviously for the United States. We lost thousands of American men and women. So the ’30s was this big debate between those who saw the gathering storm of what was happening with Nazi Germany and those who wanted to keep America out. Lex Fridman (03:41:14): To make clear, you mentioned there’s a parallel, but mostly there’s no parallel. It’s a fundamentally different… Mark Dubowitz (03:41:20): Absolutely. Lex Fridman (03:41:20): There will never be a war like that. Scott Horton (03:41:22): It’s a real problem, too, because they always say everybody’s Hitler, all enemies are Hitler. And to compromise with them at all is to appease Hitler and you can never do that. Mark Dubowitz (03:41:30): Agreed. Scott Horton (03:41:31): And they do that to Manuel Noriega, to David Koresh, to Saddam Hussein, to whoever they feel like demonizing and saying is- Mark Dubowitz (03:41:37): Hitler was unique evil. Scott Horton (03:41:38): … too crazy to negotiate with, when let’s get real, and I think we’re agreed about this probably, that in 2002, W. Bush could have just sent Colin Powell, the four-star general former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State, to read the Riot Act to Saddam Hussein and tell him, “Look, man, you help keep Al-Qaeda down and we’ll let you live.” And everything would’ve been fine. And in fact, just like Saddam Hussein, there’s a great article by James Risen- Mark Dubowitz (03:42:05): For the record, I don’t agree. Scott Horton (03:42:06): Hang on, hang on now. There’s an article by James- Mark Dubowitz (03:42:07): Not surprisingly. Scott Horton (03:42:08): There’s an article by James Risen in the New York Times, and there’s another one by Seymour Hirsch as well about how Saddam Hussein offered to give in on everything. He said, “You want to search for weapons of mass destruction, you can send your Army and FBI everywhere you want. You want us to switch sides in the Israel-Palestine conflict, we’ll stop backing Hamas. You want us to hold elections, we’ll hold elections. Just give us a couple years. If this is about the oil, we’ll sign over mineral rights.” This is James Risen, New York Times. Mark Dubowitz (03:43:54): And they were giving refuge to Al-Qaeda. And the CIA said, “This is a key facilitation pipeline between Iran and Al-Qaeda.” Quote unquote. Scott Horton (03:44:01): They were willing to negotiate a trade- Mark Dubowitz (03:44:03): Key facilitation pipeline. Scott Horton (03:44:04): … between these dangerous Bin Ladenites and the MEK and America refused to negotiate that. And it was years later when the Bin Ladenites abducted some Iranian diplomats in Pakistan that they then traded them away to get their diplomats back. And Atef, I think Bin Laden’s son ended up being killed not long after that, Hamza, and Atef too. But both of those dangerous terrorists were released and were involved in terrorism between then and the time that they were later killed, I think within a couple of years of that. So the hawks always like to say, “Oh yeah, Iran gives such aid and comfort to Al-Qaeda,” and all that. There’s a great document at the Counterterrorism Center at West Point where they debunk all of that. Mark Dubowitz (03:44:44): Yeah, there’s a 9/11 report by the 9/11 Commission. There’s a 9/11 commission report, people can Google it, which talks about the cooperation between Iran and Al-Qaeda. Scott Horton (03:44:53): Only in Bosnia when they were doing a favor for Bill Clinton. Mark Dubowitz (03:44:56): Beyond that, and the CIA released thousands of pages of classified material that they declassified showing the relationship between Iran and Al-Qaeda. The US Treasury Department under Obama and under Trump actually designated a number of Iranian individuals for facilitating Al-Qaeda. So anyway, I mean, these are important facts, but I actually want to- Scott Horton (03:45:19): You mentioned Baghdadi and Soleimani in the same breath a minute ago, and they’re deadly enemies. And it was Soleimani’s Shiite forces in a Iraq war three that helped destroy [inaudible 03:45:27]- Mark Dubowitz (03:45:27): The enemy of my enemy is my friend. Scott Horton (03:45:28): … with America flying air power for them. Mark Dubowitz (03:45:30): The greatest error that we’ve made in the Middle East is this notion, not the greatest, but one of the greatest, is this sort of conceptual error that somehow Sunnis and Shiites don’t work together and Iran doesn’t work with Al-Qaeda- Scott Horton (03:45:30): Well, I didn’t say that. Mark Dubowitz (03:45:43): I’m not saying you say that, but many people think that, and of course they do work, they hate each other, but of course they work together because they hate us more. But can I just say something, Lex, because I actually think just stepping back from all of this detail- Lex Fridman (03:45:54): The more we start to zoom out now, the better. Mark Dubowitz (03:45:56): Yeah. I’d like to zoom out a little bit. Look, I think the lessons for me over 22 years on working on these issues is one must learn about the mistakes that we’ve made in Iraq and in Afghanistan, in Libya. One must learn about the mistakes that we made in Vietnam, mistakes that we made in World War II- Scott Horton (03:46:13): So we can make them all over again in Iran this time. Mark Dubowitz (03:46:15): Can I finish? Or… Scott Horton (03:46:16): Go ahead. Mark Dubowitz (03:46:16): Are you good? Scott Horton (03:46:17): Yeah, I’m ready. Mark Dubowitz (03:46:18): All right. So I think that what President Trump is trying to do is learn but not overlearn. I think he understands the mistakes that have been made. I think he’s trying to rectify those mistakes and he also understands that American power is important. It is a force for good in the world, even though we have made major mistakes. I think there is a great danger amongst certain people to believe that no power should ever be exercised, that all American power is a bad thing and a destructive thing. And sometimes to confuse major tactical decisions that have been made, whether it’s been made by the Brits in World War II or the Americans or us or whoever it is in whatever war, with the fact that there is a strategic reality that we always have to be conscious about and that we have enemies. This is not the Garden of Eden, yet. Scott Horton (03:48:12): They don’t have a nuclear weapons program. Mark Dubowitz (03:48:16): Again, we’ve had a four-hour debate on this, so I’m sure if you want to rewind, you can listen to all our arguments once again. But the fact of the matter is that our unwillingness to use power, if we’re never going to use power, all that’s going to do is send a signal to our enemies that they can do whatever they want. They can violate whatever agreements they want, they can use aggression against anyone they want. And I think that puts American lives in danger. Lex Fridman (03:49:23): On that topic, question for both of you, Scott. If human civilization destroys itself in the next 75 years, it probably most likely will be a World War III type of scenario, maybe a nuclear war. How do we avoid that? We’ve been talking about Iran, but there’ll be new conflicts. There’s Ukraine, China… Scott Horton (03:49:41): Kashmir. Lex Fridman (03:49:42): Kashmir. Mark Dubowitz (03:49:44): North Korea. Lex Fridman (03:49:46): Yeah. Mark Dubowitz (03:49:47): Don’t forget North Korea. Lex Fridman (03:49:48): Yeah, I mean, there was time when North Korea was the biggest threat to human civilization, according to… Scott Horton (03:49:53): We could have had a deal except John Bolton ruined it. Lex Fridman (03:49:56): So that’s the bigger question, not so much in the specifics. Scott Horton (03:50:00): Oh, I mean the second time. He ruined the Clinton deal of ’94, then he ruined the Trump deal of 2018. Mark Dubowitz (03:50:06): Or maybe the North Korean dictator ruined it. But again, one doesn’t want to blame our enemies for their mistakes. Scott Horton (03:50:12): Well, at the second meeting, Trump sent John Bolton to Outer Mongolia so that he couldn’t sit at the table and ruin the deal. But what happened then? The Democrats had his lawyer testify against him while he was at the meeting and they had this huge propaganda campaign that Kim Jong Un is going to walk all over Trump and take such advantage of him, and they made it virtually impossible for him to walk away claiming a victory. Mark Dubowitz (03:50:33): Scott, do you ever blame the enemy ever? Do you ever blame the enemy? Scott Horton (03:50:37): North Korea is not my enemy. Mark Dubowitz (03:50:38): North Korea is not your enemy? Scott Horton (03:50:40): No. Mark Dubowitz (03:50:40): Really? They build nuclear weapons, ICBMs that targeted America. Scott Horton (03:50:45): That’s George Bush and John Bolton’s fault. I already said that. Mark Dubowitz (03:50:47): Well, whatever fault it is, the fact of the matter is do you ever, ever blame an American adversary or is it always our fault? Scott Horton (03:50:55): In fact, what happened was- Mark Dubowitz (03:50:57): Is it always our fault? Scott Horton (03:50:58): See, all you can do is characterize, but you don’t want to talk about the details. The details are that Stephen Biegun, who worked for Donald Trump gave a speech and said, “you know what? We can put normalization first and denuclearization later.” Mark Dubowitz (03:51:11): I know him very well. Scott Horton (03:51:12): And then Donald Trump brought John Bolton to the meeting and he prevented that from being the message of the meeting and ruined the deal. Mark Dubowitz (03:51:24): So it’s always John Bolton’s fault. Always the neocon’s fault. Scott Horton (03:51:25): Yes. That’s right. It’s all John Bolton’s fault, because how reasonable does this sound to you, Lex- Mark Dubowitz (03:51:26): It’s lobby fault. Scott Horton (03:51:29): Give up all your nuclear weapons first, then we’ll talk about every other issue. Does that sound like a poison pill or that sounds like a reasonable negotiation? Give me a break. Mark Dubowitz (03:51:37): Sounds like a beginning of a negotiation. Scott Horton (03:51:39): Yeah. Well, they got nowhere because Trump brought John Bolton with him and helped to ruin it. Mark Dubowitz (03:51:44): And maybe they went nowhere because the North Korean dictator at the end of the day, is a dictator who wants threaten the United States with ICBMs and nuclear. Listen, you’re criticizing the sequential decisions made in a negotiation. Scott Horton (03:51:59): I am. Mark Dubowitz (03:51:59): I’m just asking you a serious question out of hours of talking. Scott Horton (03:52:02): Okay. Mark Dubowitz (03:52:03): Which I must say I’ve really enjoyed. I’ve learned a lot. Lex Fridman (03:52:06): I enjoyed it. Mark Dubowitz (03:52:07): I think there’s been areas of agreement, obviously real disagreement. But here’s the question to you, really. I mean, do you ever, ever hold our adversaries responsible or do you just don’t think we have any adversaries? Scott Horton (03:52:19): This is ridiculous. The topic has been- Mark Dubowitz (03:52:23): Tell me. Scott Horton (03:52:23): … from your point of view, it’s all the adversaries and all American and Israel are trying to do is survive and fix the situation the best they can. Mark Dubowitz (03:52:31): I think I’ve acknowledged America’s has made mistakes the whole time. Scott Horton (03:52:33): I’m refuting that by bringing up all the things that America and Israel have done to make matters worse. I didn’t ever say that the Ayatollah’s some great guy or that Kim Jong Un is some hero or any kind of- Mark Dubowitz (03:52:42): But do you think they’re threats to America? Scott Horton (03:52:42): … thing to spin for their side. Mark Dubowitz (03:52:44): Are there a threat to America? Scott Horton (03:52:45): No, of course not. As Zbigniew Brozinsky said in 1993- Mark Dubowitz (03:52:48): They’re not a threat to America? Wow. Scott Horton (03:52:50): … we could have perfectly normalized relations then. You talk about Iranian support for Al-Qaeda, Iran supported Al-Qaeda in Bosnia- Mark Dubowitz (03:52:57): That’s the bottom line. Scott Horton (03:52:57): … in 1995 as a favor to Bill Clinton because they were trying to suck up to the United States- Mark Dubowitz (03:53:02): I understand. Scott Horton (03:53:02): … is why they supported Al-Qaeda in Bosnia. Mark Dubowitz (03:53:04): I understand it, your position, your position- Scott Horton (03:53:05): Yes. My position is whatever you say it is, not what I say. Mark Dubowitz (03:53:08): No, no. I’m just, I’m trying to summarize. Scott Horton (03:53:10): You know who’s the last person who told me I need to be ware about over-learning the lessons of Iraq? It was Charlie Savage from the New York Times when on the subject was his absolute ridiculous hoax, that Russia was paying the Taliban to murder American soldiers in Afghanistan in 2020, which ruined Trump’s potential, which he was floating trial balloons about withdrawing in the summer of 2020, which would’ve absolutely prevented- Mark Dubowitz (03:53:34): Scott, you said it. Scott Horton (03:53:34): … the Joe Biden era catastrophe. Mark Dubowitz (03:53:36): You said it. Scott Horton (03:53:36): And Charlie Savage who published these ridiculous lies- Mark Dubowitz (03:53:40): Scott. Scott Horton (03:53:41): … that were later refuted by the general in charge of the Afghan war, the head of CENTCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the director of Intelligence- Mark Dubowitz (03:53:47): You flood the zone with as much detail as possible. Scott Horton (03:53:48): He told me, “You know what your problem is, Horton, is you have over-learned the lessons of Iraq War II.” But it turned out those lessons were perfectly apt for Charlie Savage’s hoax. It wasn’t true what Charlie Savage said, you know what he resorted to? He said, “Well, it’s true that there was a rumor I was reporting on.” Mark Dubowitz (03:54:05): Scott. You made it very clear, America has no adversaries. Scott Horton (03:54:08): That’s called learning the lessons of Iraq, not over-learning them. Lex Fridman (03:54:12): All right, so I guess the answer to the question I asked about avoiding World War III is the two of you becoming friends. That’s my goal. If we can try to find the light at the end of the tunnel. One last question. What gives you hope to the degree of hope about the future? What gives you hope about this great country of ours and humanity too? Scott Horton (03:54:33): Yeah, I mean, look, there are a million wonderful things about this country. The land, the people, our culture and our resources and everything, and the kind of society that we could build in, not with a controlled system, but with just a pure free market capitalist system in this country where people are allowed to own their property, improve its value, and exchange it on the market and build this country up. We would be living in, comparatively, a paradise compared to what we have now. And if you look at the opportunity costs just since the end of the Cold War on all that has been wasted on militarism in the Middle East especially, but also in Eastern Europe and in East Asia, all of that wealth put here could have gone much more to something like perfecting our society. Lex Fridman (03:56:14): What gives you hope? Mark Dubowitz (03:56:15): What gives me hope? I think first of all, I have a lot of hope and confidence in the wisdom of the American people. I think Americans understand at the end of the day that they need leaders who are about making America great again. I think they elected Donald Trump who is flawed in many, many ways. But I think Trump is wrestling with some of the questions that we have been wrestling with for the past five hours. I think most Americans know that we have adversaries and it’s just overwhelming numbers of Americans understand that. They may disagree on exactly who is an adversary and how you rank them, but they know we have adversaries. I think the third thing is Americans greatly admire the men and women in uniform. I mean, I think the institution with the greatest popularity in America still remains the US military. Scott Horton (03:58:39): The Iranians. Mark Dubowitz (03:58:41): Well, and we start focusing on our adversaries, which are not the Iranians, because the 80% of Iranians despise this regime. And Lex, I feel really bad that in five hours we actually haven’t even talked about that in any detail. Lex Fridman (03:58:52): Many of my friends are Iranian. They’re beautiful people. And it’s one of the great cultures on earth, yeah. Mark Dubowitz (03:58:57): And you know the only place they don’t succeed in the world is inside the Islamic Republic. When they come to America and Canada and Europe, they’re incredibly successful people. And 80% of Iranians despise this regime and they long for a free and prosperous Iran. And so it’s a big question that they’re ever going to get there. And who knows the right way to get them there. But at the end of the day, I am convinced that the vast majority of Iranians are our friends. But there is a regime that has been trying to build nuclear weapons, has been engaged in terrorism for decades, has killed and maimed thousands of Americans and our allies. And it’s a regime that has to be stopped. Lex Fridman (04:00:36): I am deeply grateful that you guys will come here. This is really mind-blowing, also that you have, it’s silly maybe to say, but the courage to sit down and talk through this, through the tension. I’ve learned a lot. I think a lot of people are going to learn a lot. I’m a fan of both of your work and it means a lot that you’ll come here today and talk to a silly kid like me. So Scott, thank you so much, brother. Scott Horton (04:01:04): Thank you. Lex Fridman (04:01:04): Thank you, Mark. Mark Dubowitz (04:01:05): Thanks Lex, appreciate it. Lex Fridman (04:01:06): Bam. Mark Dubowitz (04:01:06): Thanks Scott. Lex Fridman (04:01:09): Thanks for listening to this debate between Scott Horton and Mark Dubowitz. To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description and consider subscribing to this channel. And now let me leave you with some sobering words on the cost of war from Dwight D. Eisenhower. For some context, Eisenhower was the 34th President of the United States. But before that, during World War II, he was the supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, orchestrating some of the most significant military operations at the war with leadership marked by strategic and tactical brilliance. It is in this context that the following words carry even more power and wisdom, spoken in 1953.

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