Velina Tchakarova on China, Russia, and the Future of Geopolitics (Ep. 214)

This transcript sponsorship is “in honor of Emily Carlson Allred, 1933–2023, who had 9 children, 53 grandchildren, and currently has 93 great-grandchildren: Pronatalist before it was a thing.”

这项成绩单赞助是“为了纪念艾米丽·卡尔森·奥尔雷德（Emily Carlson Allred，1933 年至 2023 年），她有 9 个孩子、53 个孙子，目前有 93 个曾孙：在它出现之前，她就是生育主义者。”

It matters also in terms of sentiments and in terms of, if you like, moods.

就情感和情绪（如果你愿意的话）而言，它也很重要。

Take a look at the political landscape in most of, let’s say, the Balkan countries.

看看大多数巴尔干国家的政治格局。

We still call our region the Balkan region, even though outsiders describe it as southeast Europe, mostly.

我们仍然称我们的地区为巴尔干地区，尽管外界大多将其描述为东南欧。

You will find all of these sentiments being reflected in various political groups and parties.

您会发现所有这些情绪都反映在各个政治团体和政党中。

We have nationalists in most of these countries, who are getting stronger by the day and are running for elections and are using, actually, agendas and narratives that have been known for the last 200 years.

这些国家中的大多数都有民族主义者，他们日益强大，正在竞选选举，实际上正在使用过去 200 年来众所周知的议程和叙述。

Yes, it’s unfortunately quite relevant.

是的，不幸的是，它非常相关。

Let me use another example.

让我再举一个例子。

The incident, the helicopter crash from yesterday, where the Iranian president and the foreign minister passed away, was used as an example by some analysts already.

昨天发生的伊朗总统和外交部长去世的直升机坠毁事件已经被一些分析人士拿来作为例子。

I would just use the reference here, that it could be the next Sarajevo moment.

我只想在这里引用，这可能是下一个萨拉热窝时刻。

Now, again, we had Balkan Wars, and then we had also, as you know, the big moment, the biggest black swan, as described by Professor Nassim Taleb, about the Sarajevo moment from 1914.

现在，我们再次经历了巴尔干战争，然后，如你所知，我们也经历了一个重要时刻，最大的黑天鹅，正如纳西姆·塔勒布教授所描述的，关于 1914 年萨拉热窝时刻。

That was an unanticipated event, which eventually resulted in the First World War.

这是一个意想不到的事件，最终导致了第一次世界大战。

Even now, this reference is being used, as you know.

如您所知，即使现在，该参考文献仍在使用。

A Sarajevo moment is something that is defined as a black swan and that could lead to a major military conflict if not, let’s say, another world war.

萨拉热窝时刻被定义为黑天鹅事件，如果不是另一场世界大战，也可能导致重大军事冲突。

All in all, these kinds of things are still relevant, even though they are not having the same influence or scale as used to be the case 200 years ago.

总而言之，这些事情仍然具有现实意义，尽管它们的影响力或规模已不如200年前。

Coming to the first part of your question, these sentiments will be politicized and instrumentalized, but they will not find a common denominator among the population in Bulgaria.

谈到你问题的第一部分，这些情绪将被政治化和工具化，但它们不会在保加利亚民众中找到共同点。

The dream of, let’s say, San Stefano Bulgaria or, if you like, big Bulgaria including parts of other countries, neighbors, is over.

比方说，圣斯特凡诺保加利亚，或者如果你愿意的话，包括其他国家和邻国部分地区的大保加利亚的梦想已经结束。

This is not going to come back, specifically in the case of Bulgaria and, I would argue actually, in the case of the other neighbors as well, unless we see a major process that right now I don’t see happening in the short term of, let’s say, dissolvement of the European Union.

这种情况不会再出现，特别是在保加利亚的情况下，而且我实际上认为，在其他邻国的情况下也是如此，除非我们看到一个目前我认为短期内不会发生的重大进程，比如说欧盟的解体。

Because so long as these countries are part of the European Union or are candidates for the European Union, this kind of conflict will always find a solution mechanism within the institutions.

因为只要这些国家是欧盟成员国或者是欧盟候选国，这种冲突总会在机构内部找到解决机制。

There will be enough incentives for the broader part of the parties and actors to find a common denominator.

对于更广泛的政党和行为者来说，将有足够的激励来找到共同点。

Yes, even countries like North Macedonia — and we saw that there was immediately a verbal conflict between North Macedonia and Greece because the newly elected president of North Macedonia didn’t use the full name but used only the name of Macedonia.

是的，即使是像北马其顿这样的国家 ——我们看到北马其顿和希腊之间立即发生了言语冲突，因为新当选的北马其顿总统没有使用全名，而只使用了马其顿的名字。

These kinds of sensitivities will remain, but again, they do not find a common denominator, even in these countries.

这些敏感性仍然存在，但即使在这些国家，它们也没有找到共同点。

Now, going back to the demographics, I think this is a bigger issue because right now — and probably the most famous person right now who is making the strong case of shrinking demographics all over the world — with a few exceptions, of course, because Africa and Southeast Asia will still see, at macro level, positive demographics.

现在，回到人口统计，我认为这是一个更大的问题，因为现在 ——可能是目前最著名的人，他在全世界范围内提出了人口统计萎缩的有力论据——当然，除了少数例外，因为非洲和东南亚在宏观层面上仍将看到积极的人口统计数据。

But in general, Bulgaria is probably one of the fastest demographically shrinking countries in the world, not just in Europe.

但总的来说，保加利亚可能是世界上人口萎缩最快的国家之一，而不仅仅是欧洲。

Here we have a very, very serious issue that is a systematic and structural issue that goes back to 30 years of political mismanagement, corruption, and, I would say, precarious socioeconomic indicators.

我们面临一个非常非常严重的问题，这是一个系统性和结构性问题，可以追溯到 30 年来的政治管理不善、腐败以及不稳定的社会经济指标。

It’s not just about the missing birth rates.

这不仅仅是出生率缺失的问题。

It’s also about the skyrocketing death rates in this country and more or less 3 million, 3.5 million people who have sought their happiness and try to find their luck outside of the country, which is quite telling.

它还涉及到这个国家不断飙升的死亡率，以及大约有300万、350万的人在国外寻求幸福并试图寻找运气，这很能说明问题。

That’s always been the case, by the way.

顺便说一句，情况一直如此。

If you would like to go back to the Balkan Wars, if you would like to go back to previous periods of the Balkan region, you would find out that once again, it was a competition of several empires, and each of these empires was trying to get a chunk of this region for itself.

如果你想回到巴尔干战争，如果你想回到巴尔干地区以前的时期，你会发现，这又是几个帝国的竞争，每个帝国都想在这个地区为自己分一杯羹。

Practically, through this balancing act, these small states were trying to capitalize on their own interests.

实际上，通过这种平衡行为，这些小国试图利用自己的利益。

This is a geopolitical continuum that is still very much in play in this region.

这是一个地缘政治连续体，在该地区仍然发挥着重要作用。

Practically, I use this golden rule of the closer, the better.

实际上，我使用这条越接近越好的黄金法则。

In terms of influence and in terms of penetration and subversion, the closer to the core, the bigger the influence.

从影响力来说，从渗透颠覆来说，越接近核心，影响力就越大。

We saw this clearly also during the Cold War, with Bulgaria being probably the most affected and highly influenced satellite with almost no say in whatever topics.

我们在冷战期间也清楚地看到了这一点，保加利亚可能是受影响最大和影响最大的卫星国，在任何话题上几乎没有发言权。

At the same time, if you look at the policies and actions of Soviet bloc satellites such as Poland or Czechoslovakia at the time, you will see that they had much more space to act, and they were prone to more internal turmoil.

与此同时，如果你看看波兰、捷克斯洛伐克等苏联集团卫星国当时的政策和行动，你会发现他们有更大的行动空间，而且更容易发生内部动乱。

Even Hungary — if you consider they had their moments of turning against the Soviet Union.

即使是匈牙利——如果你考虑到他们也曾有过反对苏联的时刻。

No, this hasn’t been the case with Bulgaria.

不，保加利亚的情况并非如此。

In the case of Serbia — because again, you cannot use a common denominator.

以塞尔维亚为例——因为同样，你不能使用共同点。

You cannot just say that these two, because they were geographically closer and still are geographically closer, they would be more influenced by Russia.

你不能仅仅说这两个国家，因为他们在地理上更接近，并且仍然更接近，他们会更多地受到俄罗斯的影响。

Because in the case of Serbia, being still in a very, very specific situation following the collapse of Yugoslavia, trying to find external partners that support the leadership, at the same time facing new realities with the buildup of the other states: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and so on and so forth.

因为就塞尔维亚而言，南斯拉夫解体后仍处于非常非常特殊的情况，试图寻找支持领导层的外部合作伙伴，同时面临着其他国家的发展的新现实：斯洛文尼亚、克罗地亚、波斯尼亚、黑山等等。

Of course, Serbia was in dire need to have a very strong supporter, and it has found this supporter in the face of Russia.

当然，塞尔维亚急需一个非常强大的支持者，而它在面对俄罗斯的时候找到了这个支持者。

In the Bulgarian case, this is more historic.

就保加利亚而言，这更具历史意义。

It has the sentiment in the Bulgarian population — even up until today — that has to do with emancipation of the Bulgarian state, the third Bulgarian state following the Russian-Turkish War from 1878, and then practically, because of the Russian Empire, Bulgaria could regain its statehood.

它在保加利亚人民中存在着这样的情绪——“甚至直到今天”——这与保加利亚国家的解放有关，保加利亚是1878年俄土战争后的第三个保加利亚国家，然后实际上，由于俄罗斯帝国，保加利亚可以重新获得国家地位。

The first tsar of Bulgaria was also practically from the Russian Empire with Alexander Battenberg.

保加利亚的第一位沙皇实际上也来自俄罗斯帝国，与亚历山大·巴滕伯格一起。

We had a very different mode of, let’s say, development and, in the same time, influence.

我们有一种非常不同的发展模式，同时也有影响力。

Today, we have, for instance, political parties in Bulgaria that are still very much rooted in the same mindset that one needs an internal friendship with Russia, that this is the only way forward.

例如，今天，我们保加利亚的政党仍然根植于同样的心态，即人们需要与俄罗斯建立内部友谊，这是唯一的出路。

Even on behalf of the Social Democrats, you will find this kind of voices.

即使代表社会民主党，你也会发现这种声音。

We have a Bulgarian president who is very much pro-Russian, even though he will deny it.

我们有一位非常亲俄罗斯的保加利亚总统，尽管他会否认这一点。

You see that this kind of layers of influence and penetration, to some extent, are manifold.

你看这种影响力和渗透力，从某种程度上来说，是多方面的。

You will have some that are taking place on a free base out of political convention or out of individual convention, but you will have also some instrumentalized influences.

有些活动会在政治大会或个人大会之外的自由基础上进行，但您也会产生一些工具化的影响。

I wouldn’t use any generalization for the region except, as I said, this golden rule that could be applicable: that, of course, the geographic approximation is certainly an indicator that will tell you a lot about how an external and powerful player would behave towards smaller neighbors and would try to, of course, increase its leverage via different mechanisms and actions.

我不会对该地区进行任何概括，除非，正如我所说，这条可能适用的黄金法则：当然，地理近似肯定是一个指标，它会告诉你很多关于外部强大参与者将如何对待较小邻国的信息，当然，也会尝试通过不同的机制和行动增加其影响力。

This goes through cultural ties to personal, business ties, but also political and economic projects.

这不仅涉及文化联系、个人联系、商业联系，还涉及政治和经济项目。

It goes also via instrumentalization of dependencies, raw materials, and all of these kinds of things.

它还通过依赖性、原材料和所有这些东西的工具化来实现。

Let me give you another example just to end up this topic.

让我再举一个例子来结束这个话题。

If you go to Serbia nowadays and just conduct a poll in the Serbian population and ask who is one of the biggest investors in Serbia, a lot of people will tell you that this is Russia, which is actually not the case.

如果你现在去塞尔维亚，对塞尔维亚人口进行一项民意调查，问谁是塞尔维亚最大的投资者之一，很多人会告诉你这是俄罗斯，但事实并非如此。

It’s not factual because still, the European Union is, in fact, the biggest institutional investor in the country.

这不是事实，因为事实上欧盟仍然是该国最大的机构投资者。

But it tells you a lot about perception, how Russia is being perceived in terms of its strong role in the country.

但它告诉了你很多关于看法的信息，以及人们如何看待俄罗斯在该国的强大作用。

I do not share this assessment.

我不同意这个评价。

I just don’t see why China will have to take such a big risk in achieving something that it can achieve in a much smarter and more efficient way.

我只是不明白为什么中国必须冒这么大的风险来实现它可以以更聪明、更有效的方式实现的目标。

What do I mean by that?

我这么说是什么意思？

I call this approach “death by a thousand cuts.” That would mean that China could spend a little bit longer in a slow but steady political, social, economic, and societal penetration of Taiwan.

我把这种方法称为“千刀万剐”。这意味着中国可能会花费更长的时间缓慢但稳定地对台湾进行政治、社会、经济和社会渗透。

We could argue it’s the old Soviet playbook.

我们可以说这是苏联的旧剧本。

It could be done in a more subtle way, using plausible deniability.

这可以通过一种更微妙的方式来完成，使用貌似合理的推诿。

Taiwan is still the most successful democracy in the Indo-Pacific.

台湾仍然是印太地区最成功的民主国家。

That means, also, it is vulnerable to this kind of penetration, where you can practically use agents provocateurs on the ground.

这也意味着它很容易受到这种渗透，实际上你可以在地面上使用挑衅者。

You can buy up a lot of institutional or individual players.

你可以收购很多机构或个人球员。

You can start doing all this subversion process in a longer timeframe, but it could bring about bigger success than actually risking military intervention, which is not giving you, I would say, even a 50–50 chance of success.

你可以在更长的时间内开始进行所有这些颠覆过程，但它可能会比实际冒着军事干预的风险带来更大的成功，我想说，军事干预甚至不会给你 50-50 的成功机会。

The terrain of Taiwan, if we compare it with the most sophisticated war that’s going on right now, is much more difficult.

如果我们将台湾的地形与目前正在发生的最复杂的战争进行比较，那就要困难得多。

You have a very, very limited window to attack.

你的攻击窗口非常非常有限。

In the case of Taiwan, this window of opportunity is probably limited only to two periods in the whole year, which, of course, is also known by everyone in the region.

就台湾而言，这个机会之窗大概只限于一年中的两个时期，这当然也是区内人尽皆知的。

That particularly means the defense of Taiwan.

这尤其意味着保卫台湾。

You have a window of opportunity in April and then in October, so you cannot attack at any time in the year.

你在四月和十月有一个机会窗口，所以你不能在一年中的任何时间进攻。

It is a sophisticated military attack that cannot be conducted on the whole of the island.

这是一次复杂的军事攻击，无法对整个岛屿进行。

Even though China is catching up militarily right now, I think that the mindset of this Chinese leadership — the way the Chinese leadership is actually conducting strategy — does contradict such risky endeavor, again because time is on China’s side.

尽管中国现在在军事上正在迎头赶上，但我认为中国领导层的心态——“中国领导层实际上执行战略的方式”——确实与这种冒险的努力相矛盾，因为时间站在中国一边。

China only needs to really prepare this sum of minor actions in a longer period of time.

中国只需要在较长一段时间内真正做好这一笔小动作的准备即可。

At least, this is what I would actually do as a strategist, which would promise a much better percentage of success than, like I said, an adventurous military attack.

至少，这就是我作为一名战略家实际上会做的事情，这比我所说的冒险的军事攻击更有可能取得成功。

Now, we may argue that under unanticipated circumstances for the political leadership — think of a situation where the political stability in China is shaken, where the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, is somehow put into a corner to take a very, let’s say, ad hoc decision on the matter because of certain circles of the hawks, of the military hawks.

现在，我们可以说，在政治领导层意想不到的情况下——想象一下中国的政治稳定受到动摇的情况，中国领导人习近平不知何故因为某些鹰派、军事鹰派圈子而被迫在这个问题上做出非常临时的决定。

Of course, we have this possibility as well.

当然，我们也有这种可能。

It could be a black swan event, something that has happened in China, and this makes him take this decision in order to draw the attention away from internal problems.

这可能是黑天鹅事件，发生在中国的事情，这让他做出这个决定，是为了转移人们对内部问题的注意力。

Foreign policy adventures are always gathering public support.

外交政策的冒险总是能获得公众的支持。

It’s not 100 percent to be excluded, but in my scenario, I would actually point to, as I explained, this death-by-a-thousand-cuts approach rather than a military attack on Taiwan.

并不是百分百排除，但在我的设想中，正如我所解释的，我实际上会指出这种千刀万剐的做法，而不是对台湾的军事攻击。

Right now, in this gray area of an interministic international system, the old international system is crumbling down, and the new international system is trying to be born.

当前，在跨部门国际体系的灰色地带，旧的国际体系正在崩溃，新的国际体系正在酝酿之中。

We are in, let’s say, a stadium of an emergence of a new global system in which each and every single field, including the international law — we see it also with international organizations such as the United Nations.

可以说，我们正处在一个新的全球体系出现的舞台上，在这个体系中，包括国际法在内的每一个领域——我们在联合国等国际组织中也看到了这一点。

The United Nations Security Council is a perfect example for it, where we have clear bipolarization, bifurcation of the club between China and Russia on the one hand, and the United States, France, and UK on the other.

联合国安理会就是一个完美的例子，那里有明显的两极分化，一方面是中国和俄罗斯，另一方面是美国、法国和英国。

The same goes for all these international bodies.

所有这些国际机构也是如此。

That is to say that they are, of course, being used on both sides, and at the same time, they’re being misused, unfortunately.

也就是说，它们当然被双方使用，但不幸的是，同时它们也被滥用。

That is the reality we are in right now.

这就是我们现在所处的现实。

We are in this period of international relations where the number of international military conflicts and wars hasn’t been that high since the end of the Cold War.

我们正处于冷战结束以来国际关系中国际军事冲突和战争数量从未如此之多的时期。

It’s the highest number of military conflicts and wars.

这是军事冲突和战争数量最多的一次。

We have a lot of, as you said, casualties.

正如你所说，我们有很多伤亡。

I argue we are going to have even more tensions and more military conflicts in the next years to come, with this year, 2024, being extremely volatile.

我认为，未来几年我们将面临更多的紧张局势和更多的军事冲突，而今年，即 2024 年，将极其不稳定。

In a sense, I’m not surprised that we are in this situation where both sides are trying to instrumentalize legal norms, rules, standards, but to no avail because in the end, until we do not have a new winner or new emerging blocks with their reading of international law, with their understanding of organizational principles, with their structures, we will be in this gray zone of interpretation and misinterpretation.

从某种意义上说，我并不感到惊讶，我们处于双方都试图将法律规范、规则、标准工具化的情况，但无济于事，因为最终，直到我们没有新的赢家或新的新兴群体对国际法的解读、对组织原则及其结构的理解，我们将处于解释和误解的灰色地带。

And practically, there is almost no common ground in between.

实际上，两者之间几乎没有共同点。

We do see that there is no more global police power that can decide over the end of military conflicts or wars.

我们确实看到，全球警察力量不再能够决定军事冲突或战争的结束。

At the same time, we see that, more or less, the narratives that are coming from both sides are equally being instrumentalized.

与此同时，我们看到，双方的叙述或多或少都被同样地工具化了。

Right now, you mentioned the case of the Middle East.

你刚才提到了中东的情况。

In fact, I argue that the war between Israel and Hamas probably will find its way by the end of this year, as compared to some other tensions that will still be ongoing, like the war in Ukraine, which will still be ongoing in the next several years.

事实上，我认为以色列和哈马斯之间的战争可能会在今年年底前找到解决办法，而其他一些紧张局势仍将持续，例如乌克兰战争，该战争将在未来几年内持续进行。

But here, we have a clear case where you see that the West — United States, European Union powers — are supporting Israel, and countries like China and Russia are actually supporting the Palestinian question.

但在这里，我们有一个明显的例子，你可以看到西方——美国、欧盟大国——正在支持以色列，而中国和俄罗斯等国家实际上正在支持巴勒斯坦问题。

I argue that in the end, probably, this balancing act will be the positive influence on finding a two-state solution for this conflict, with devastating humanitarian consequences for the Palestinian people without a doubt.

我认为，最终，这种平衡行为可能会对寻找解决这场冲突的两国解决方案产生积极影响，毫无疑问会给巴勒斯坦人民带来毁灭性的人道主义后果。

You had a series of military actions followed by ceasefire, followed by some kind of negotiations, then followed by military actions and rinse-and-repeat tactics.

采取了一系列军事行动，然后是停火，然后是某种谈判，然后是军事行动和反复战术。

This was the case for almost 10 years.

这种情况持续了近10年。

Due to this kind of strategy, Russia was able to militarily control eastern Ukraine, and then it could seize the opportunity to make a move.

正是由于这样的战略，俄罗斯才能够在军事上控制乌克兰东部，进而可以趁机出手。

Of course, I have to say that in my assessment from December 2021, I was pointing to a scenario in which I was absolutely sure that there will be a war, but I actually called this war a limited military operation.

当然，我不得不说，在我对2021年12月的评估中，我指的是一种我绝对肯定会发生战争的情景，但我实际上将这场战争称为有限的军事行动。

I thought that this was my mistake, that the war will start in the east and south of Ukraine.

我认为这是我的错误，战争将在乌克兰东部和南部爆发。

I did not think that Putin would make an all-in move in 2022.

我没想到普京会在2022年全力以赴。

This, I must say, was a mistake on my side because, as I said, I was seeing this as a 10- to 15-year plan, how to slowly subjugate the country.

我必须说，这对我来说是一个错误，因为正如我所说，我将其视为一个 10 到 15 年的计划，如何慢慢征服这个国家。

Why did he make an all-in move and practically launch the full-scale war from five directions?

他为何要全力出击，几乎从五个方向发动全面战争？

Well, I think it’s so early to make all these assessments, but certainly, I would argue the regional environment and situation prior to 2022 and also the global environment — think of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

嗯，我认为现在做出所有这些评估还为时过早，但当然，我会争论 2022 年之前的地区环境和局势以及全球环境 ——想想美国从阿富汗撤军。

Then think of elections in key European countries.

然后想想欧洲主要国家的选举。

In 2021, there was a political vacuum until new governments were built.

2021 年，在新政府组建之前存在政治真空。

We had a key election in Germany.

我们在德国举行了一次重要的选举。

This is, as you know, the key provider of support for Ukraine.

如您所知，这是为乌克兰提供支持的主要提供者。

We had the worst energy crisis in 2021 already looming in Europe.

2021 年最严重的能源危机已经在欧洲迫在眉睫。

We had the worst, actually, indicator for food prices.

实际上，我们的食品价格指标是最差的。

This is the FAO index that was already reaching levels of 2011 in December.

这是粮农组织的指数，12 月份就已经达到 2011 年的水平。

All of these were regional and global environment indicators that probably led also to this decision.

所有这些区域和全球环境指标可能也导致了这一决定。

More importantly, what Putin got was also this assurance of full-scale, comprehensive support coming from China.

更重要的是，普京得到的也是来自中国的全面、全面支持的保证。

He has been building up these models with Xi Jinping since 2013 when Xi Jinping came to power.

自2013年习近平上台以来，他一直在与习近平一起建立这些模型。

He knew that by launching a full-scale war — and this is my personal assessment, of course — he would not just trigger the systemic competition between the United States and China.

他知道，发动全面战争——当然，这是我个人的评估——他不仅仅会引发美国和中国之间的系统性竞争。

China at that time was not ready for that kind of fast-speed competition, which meanwhile, as we know, has accelerated to the point of the introduction of tariffs and the decoupling has really, really been triggered.

当时的中国还没有准备好进行这种快速的竞争，而我们知道，这种竞争已经加速到了关税的引入，脱钩真的已经被触发了。

But also, in a sense, Putin correctly bet on China, that China, even if not agreeing with the whole decision, actually would support Moscow in this endeavor as it turned out.

但从某种意义上说，普京对中国的押注是正确的，即中国即使不同意整个决定，实际上也会支持莫斯科的这一努力。

Going back now to your question — I just wanted to make this clarification — what would be the next steps?

现在回到你的问题 —— 我只是想澄清一下 —— 接下来的步骤是什么？

What would be next on his agenda?

他的下一步议程是什么？

Now, again, what is on his agenda is that he will not give up on attacking Kyiv and attacking Odessa and trying to get as much as possible from Ukraine.

现在，他的议程再次是，他不会放弃攻击基辅和敖德萨，并试图从乌克兰获得尽可能多的利益。

If he’s not able, for whatever reasons, we cannot debate now about technical issues, the technicalities of the war.

如果他不能，无论出于何种原因，我们现在就不能就技术问题、战争的技术细节进行辩论。

Russia has been adapting, but Russia has also made a lot of mistakes.

俄罗斯一直在适应，但俄罗斯也犯了很多错误。

Ukraine has been adapting in the war, but in reality, right now, they are attacking the second largest city, Kharkiv.

乌克兰一直在战争中适应，但实际上，现在他们正在攻击第二大城市哈尔科夫。

Obviously, they’re also attacking Odessa.

显然，他们也在攻击敖德萨。

Like I said, my expectation is that they will be attacking Kyiv again.

就像我说的，我的预期是他们将再次攻击基辅。

Let’s assume Putin succeeds in getting a large part of Ukraine, and then we have some sort of negotiations, some sort of ceasefire, and then negotiations.

让我们假设普京成功获得了乌克兰的大部分地区，然后我们进行某种谈判，某种停火，然后进行谈判。

Like I said, this is the best-case scenario from Russia’s point of view because every time there were ceasefire agreements and any kind of negotiations in this case, this will also legitimize the Russian territorial gains.

就像我说的，从俄罗斯的角度来看，这是最好的情况，因为每次达成停火协议和任何形式的谈判，这也将使俄罗斯的领土收益合法化。

This ceasefire has always been violated.

这项停火协议一直遭到违反。

In a sense, this actually plays into the cards of Russia.

从某种意义上说，这实际上是俄罗斯的牌。

This is the main question — will Russia actually attack other countries in Europe, right?

这是主要问题——俄罗斯真的会攻击欧洲其他国家吗？

Am I understanding correctly your question?

我正确理解你的问题吗？

In fact, we have to split it in two parts, the one part being neighboring countries like Moldova and Georgia.

事实上，我们必须把它分成两部分，一部分是摩尔多瓦和格鲁吉亚等邻国。

There, I would also go for territories because I have already the military presence.

在那里，我也会去争取领土，因为我已经有军事存在。

From Russia’s point of view, territories like Transnistria, which is neighboring Odessa and practically will enable cordon sanitaire with the European Union.

从俄罗斯的角度来看，像德涅斯特河左岸这样毗邻敖德萨的地区实际上将能够与欧盟建立警戒线。

Also, in Georgia, with the sweeping borders in South Ossetia, for instance, and Abkhazia, I would just go for these territories because this is about status and about great power exercise.

此外，在格鲁吉亚，例如南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹的边界广阔，我只会选择这些领土，因为这关系到地位和大国的行使。

In the next step, I would actually consider doing something like this: an attack on the Balticum because there will be a certain regional environment that will allow it.

下一步，我实际上会考虑做这样的事情：攻击波罗的海，因为会有一定的区域环境允许。

What do I mean by that?

我这么说是什么意思？

If, let’s say, the members of NATO and the European Union are somehow in conflictual blocs because of the future of these organizations .

比如说，如果北约和欧盟的成员国因为这些组织的未来而处于相互冲突的阵营中。

.

。

.

。

We do not talk about 2024, obviously, but in the next years, the European Union, as a bloc, will undergo major shifts and a lot of troubles.

显然，我们不谈论 2024 年，但在接下来的几年里，欧盟作为一个集团将经历重大转变和很多麻烦。

The member states will probably not be so coherent in their positions all the time.

成员国的立场可能不会一直如此一致。

The same goes for NATO, especially if we have a very, very different US leadership.

北约也是如此，特别是如果我们有一个非常非常不同的美国领导层的话。

Under these circumstances, provocation like this would mean to test the article 5, to use the opportunity to show that article 5 of NATO is not really going to be activated.

在这种情况下，这样的挑衅就等于试探第五条，借机表明北约第五条不会真正启动。

This is a possibility.

这是一种可能性。

I would say right now, from today’s point of view, it’s absolutely possible, and to some extent probable, but not plausible.

我现在想说，从今天的角度来看，这是绝对有可能的，而且在某种程度上是可能的，但不太合理。

But in the next few years, depending on the success of Russia in Ukraine — and I mean the time frame of 2025, 2026 — I would not exclude, as I said, such a possible and probable act by Russia, for instance, on the Balticum.

但在接下来的几年里，取决于俄罗斯在乌克兰的成功——我指的是2025年、2026年的时间框架——正如我所说，我不会排除俄罗斯可能采取的行动，例如在波罗的海问题上。

Not so much on Poland.

波兰就没有那么多了。

I do not take this really seriously as some analysts are pointing to an attack on Poland.

我并没有认真对待此事，因为一些分析人士指出这是对波兰的袭击。

I would also think that Poland may actually seek to get nuclear weapons.

我还认为波兰可能实际上寻求获得核武器。

If Poland decides to go nuclear, this question will be automatically answered as to whether Russia would be eager to attack Poland.

如果波兰决定拥核，那么俄罗斯是否会急于进攻波兰这个问题就会自动得到回答。

Okay, second point: Russia has a lot of conventional weapons systems that it is obviously already using against Ukraine.

好吧，第二点：俄罗斯拥有大量常规武器系统，显然已经在针对乌克兰使用这些系统。

It doesn’t need, actually, the tactical nuclear weapon against Ukraine.

实际上，它不需要针对乌克兰的战术核武器。

If you outline all these scenarios, I just do not anticipate the United States using the nuclear weapon.

如果你概述所有这些情景，我只是不认为美国会使用核武器。

Think of all the military defeats that the United States had experienced over the decades, and they still did not use the nuclear weapon, be it Vietnam or Afghanistan or whatever kind of military endeavors they had.

想想美国几十年来经历的所有军事失败，他们仍然没有使用核武器，无论是越南还是阿富汗，或者他们进行的任何类型的军事努力。

North Korea — I think that North Korea would not go for the nuclear weapon because the moment when they decide this, they will be annihilated not by one, but by two critically important players because the whole lifeline for North Korea is coming from China and, by extension, from Russia.

朝鲜 ——我认为朝鲜不会追求核武器，因为当他们做出这一决定的那一刻，他们将不是被一个人消灭，而是被两个至关重要的参与者消灭，因为朝鲜的整个生命线来自中国，进而来自俄罗斯。

Neither China nor Russia will actually allow a small player in international relations to use the nuclear weapon because there is a scalability in the international relations.

中国和俄罗斯实际上都不会允许国际关系中的小角色使用核武器，因为国际关系具有可扩展性。

You are allowed, as a smaller player, to do some steps to create some havoc in the regional environment if it’s in the interest of some of your supporters, as is the case right now in North Korea.

作为一个较小的参与者，如果符合你的一些支持者的利益，你可以采取一些措施在地区环境中造成一些破坏，就像现在在朝鲜的情况一样。

Why is North Korea receiving all this technological transfer and the whole political and diplomatic support from countries like China and Russia?

为什么朝鲜会得到中国和俄罗斯等国家的所有技术转让以及全部政治和外交支持？

Well, it’s obvious, activating the North Korean card plays into the cards of Beijing and Moscow because North Korea creates tensions in the Indo-Pacific and overstretches the attention of the US leadership.

很明显，激活朝鲜牌对北京和莫斯科来说是有利的，因为朝鲜制造了印太地区的紧张局势，并过度分散了美国领导层的注意力。

It also complicates the situation with South Korea.

这也使与韩国的局势变得复杂。

South Korea, together with Japan, are the most important Indo-Pacific allies of the United States.

韩国与日本都是美国在印太地区最重要的盟友。

So long as North Korea plays its card smartly and in its allowed, let’s say, scope of activities, things will be fine, but I just don’t see why North Korea would actually be eager to use a nuclear weapon.

只要朝鲜巧妙地打牌，并在其允许的活动范围内，事情就会好起来，但我只是不明白为什么朝鲜会真正渴望使用核武器。

Maybe, just because we are at the level of speculation, right?

也许，只是因为我们还处于猜测的水平，对吗？

If we are at the level of speculation, one region that would probably see nuclearization, will witness more nuclearization, is actually the Middle East because Iran has never been closer to getting the nuclear weapon.

如果我们处于猜测的层面，一个可能会出现核化、会见证更多核化的地区实际上是中东，因为伊朗从未如此接近获得核武器。

Given the most recent escalatory part between Israel and Iran — Israel has the nuclear weapon, Iran still doesn’t have the nuclear weapon — we may argue that this could be one such scenario.

鉴于以色列和伊朗之间最近的升级——“以色列拥有核武器，而伊朗仍然没有核武器”——我们可能会认为这可能是这样一种情况。

Again, I don’t consider it to be probable, but because you want me to speculate, I will do this with big pleasure just for the sake of intellectual exercise, to outline a scenario in which Israel would consider using the nuclear weapon for the sake of not allowing Iran to do so.

再说一次，我认为这不太可能，但因为你想让我推测，我会非常高兴地这样做，只是为了智力练习，概述以色列为了不允许伊朗使用核武器而考虑使用核武器的情景。

My clients usually ask exactly these kinds of questions as you’re doing right now.

我的客户通常会问你现在正在做的这类问题。

In the example you gave, will there be an escalation between Israel and Iran?

你举的例子中，以色列和伊朗之间的局势会升级吗？

Will there be political turmoil in Iran following this helicopter crash?

直升机失事后伊朗会出现政治动荡吗？

Will there be a next military episode between Israel and Iran?

以色列和伊朗之间会发生下一次军事冲突吗？

What will be the cascading effects beyond the region?

该地区以外将会产生什么连锁效应？

Or the question that you asked about the military conflict and the possible military attack on Taiwan.

或者你问的有关军事冲突和可能对台湾进行军事袭击的问题。

These are questions that come out almost every day.

这些是几乎每天都会出现的问题。

Practically, what I post on Twitter is linked to information I read.

实际上，我在 Twitter 上发布的内容与我阅读的信息相关联。

These are open-source analyses and mostly assessments by other colleagues or articles being published.

这些是开源分析，大部分是其他同事的评估或正在发表的文章。

I just go through these sources, and I post and comment.

我只是浏览这些来源，然后发布和评论。

That’s not the same as when you have to give an answer to a client, for instance, who has certain exposure in a particular region or has an investment portfolio and this investment portfolio is, for instance, affected by certain military conflicts, and so on and so forth.

这与您必须向客户提供答案不同，例如，客户在特定地区有一定的风险敞口或拥有投资组合，而该投资组合例如受到某些军事冲突的影响，等等。

So it’s a very different way of consulting.

所以这是一种非常不同的咨询方式。

Twitter, which is now X, is just for fun.

Twitter，现在是X，只是为了好玩。

This is my rescue from the day because the whole day I just read and read and read a lot of sources, a lot of information.

这是我这一天的拯救，因为一整天我都在阅读、阅读、阅读大量的资料、大量的信息。

I have a lot of chat rooms on various telecommunication platforms.

我在各种电信平台上有很多聊天室。

Of course, with time, I can easily identify whether the source is credible or not.

当然，随着时间的推移，我可以很容易地识别消息来源是否可信。

I use five different languages.

我使用五种不同的语言。

It’s a very, very diverse way of getting information.

这是一种非常非常多样化的获取信息的方式。

I know, for instance, when it comes to a certain conflict or a certain region, which sources to use and which platforms are credible.

例如，当涉及到某个冲突或某个地区时，我知道该使用哪些来源以及哪些平台是可信的。

That is a very, very different kind of approach if, for instance, a common user on Twitter will just check on Twitter and start reading through the sources.

例如，如果 Twitter 上的普通用户只需查看 Twitter 并开始阅读源代码，那么这是一种非常非常不同的方法。

Thanks to this kind of long-term experience, it’s very easy for me to track and understand what is credible, what is not.

得益于这种长期的经验，我很容易追踪和理解什么是可信的，什么是不可信的。

This is only one of several pillars of my activities at FACE.

这只是我在 FACE 活动的几个支柱之一。

Yes, I have private clients within FACE, but these are individuals from different backgrounds, different professions, who are mostly interested in this world of geopolitics and do not have the same amount of time to read and to go through all these sources.

是的，我在 FACE 内部有私人客户，但这些人来自不同的背景、不同的职业，他们对地缘政治的世界最感兴趣，但没有相同的时间来阅读和浏览所有这些来源。

They just rely on my assessment for specific topics.

他们只是依赖我对特定主题的评估。

Now, I must also highlight that the daily business of politics is not my main field.

现在，我还必须强调，日常政治事务不是我的主要领域。

My main field is actually the long-term, 10- to 15-year macro perspective.

我的主要领域实际上是长期的，10年到15年的宏观视角。

I actually draw scenarios for the future of international relations and for the future of the relations between great powers — for instance, China-United States, or Russia-China, or India-China, and so on and so forth — for the next 10 to 15 years, thanks to trends and risk analysis.

实际上，我通过趋势和风险分析，为未来 10 到 15 年的国际关系和大国之间的关系（例如中美、俄罗斯与中国、印度与中国等等）描绘了未来的情景。

This is something that is derived from the daily business of politics but in fact is a different methodology.

这是从政治日常事务中衍生出来的东西，但实际上是一种不同的方法论。

This different methodology is not helpful for, let’s say, tactical developments.

这种不同的方法对于战术发展没有帮助。

It is helpful if you, for instance, consider long-term-oriented investment based or derived from this macroanalysis.

例如，如果您考虑基于或源自此宏观分析的长期投资，这将很有帮助。

What do I mean?

我是什么意思？

Let me give you one example.

让我举一个例子。

Now people are talking about semiconductors, and an investment in semiconductors would be a very smart investment.

现在人们都在谈论半导体，投资半导体将是一项非常明智的投资。

I invested in semiconductors six, seven years ago, knowing that there will be actually a bifurcation of the global system, and one of the critical areas of it will be semiconductors.

我六七年前投资了半导体，知道全球体系实际上将会出现分歧，而其中的关键领域之一将是半导体。

Having the long-term trend projections in mind helps you to get the big picture in the long run if you are, of course, patient and if you really want to play this game, the long game.

当然，如果您有耐心并且真的想玩这个游戏，那么，考虑到长期趋势预测可以帮助您了解长期的全局。

This is where I’m located mostly, not at the tactical level.

这就是我主要所处的位置，而不是战术层面。

What do I mean by global system?

全球系统是什么意思？

I’m really focused on the macro perspective.

我真的很关注宏观角度。

The global system — this is my own concept that I’ve been working with since 2014.

全球体系 ——这是我自 2014 年以来一直在研究的自己的概念。

And that is that practically all the relevant socioeconomic networks — you take a global finance system, you take a global energy system, you take the global finance, trade, economy, agriculture — so these most relevant socioeconomic systems that have emerged specifically because of the last globalization wave following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

也就是说，几乎所有相关的社会经济网络——“全球金融体系、全球能源体系、全球金融、贸易、经济、农业”——因此，这些最相关的社会经济体系是由于苏联解体后的最后一次全球化浪潮而出现的。

Introduction of most of the countries into a global capitalist system, so they are now more or less intertwined.

大多数国家都被纳入全球资本主义体系，因此它们现在或多或少地交织在一起。

Looking at the interactions between these networks and looking at the way these systems are undergoing transformation gives me some answers as to the direction in which it goes.

观察这些网络之间的相互作用以及这些系统正在经历转变的方式，可以为我提供一些关于其发展方向的答案。

Let me give you an example.

让我举个例子。

Most of the analysts, you would agree, have been pointing, at least for the last 20 years, towards multipolarity.

你可能会同意，大多数分析师至少在过去 20 年里一直指出多极化的方向。

The biggest cliche that we’ve been hearing is that we are sliding into a multipolarity order.

我们听到的最大的陈词滥调是，我们正在滑向多极化秩序。

We have several big centers of power, several great powers, and so on and so forth.

我们有几个大的权力中心，几个大国，等等。

I’ve never bought into this.

我从来不相信这个。

Since 2014, when I started looking at this macro perspective based on this global system concept I’ve developed, I saw that, practically, we have only two centers of power.

自2014年以来，当我开始基于我提出的全球体系概念来审视这一宏观视角时，我发现实际上我们只有两个权力中心。

Everything in between is in this gray zone that is oscillating between United States on the one hand, and China on the other.

介于两者之间的一切都处于这个灰色地带，一方面是美国，另一方面是中国。

Now, Russia has taken sides already in 2014.

现在，俄罗斯早在 2014 年就已表明立场。

In fact, Russia has been saved by China following the first intervention in Ukraine and following the first launch of Western sanctions, when Russia, facing a serious, almost precarious economic situation, was saved by China.

事实上，在首次干预乌克兰、在西方首次实施制裁之后，俄罗斯就被中国救了，当时俄罗斯面临严重的、几乎岌岌可危的经济形势，是中国救了俄罗斯。

Meanwhile, most of these middle powers are still avoiding taking sides.

与此同时，大多数中等强国仍在避免选边站队。

They want to capitalize from both worlds.

他们想从两个世界中获利。

A classic example right now is the case of India.

印度就是一个典型的例子。

India is acting as a geopolitical bridge between the two antagonists, trying to take the best of both worlds.

印度正在充当这两个对手之间的地缘政治桥梁，试图两全其美。

But it is very, very difficult to bring this long-term picture that is to play out in the next 5 or 10 or 15 years to the daily business of politics.

但将未来 5 年、10 年或 15 年的长期前景纳入日常政治事务中是非常非常困难的。

Why?

为什么？

Because people are just not following.

因为人们只是不跟随。

They just don’t have the time to follow all these trends, and then don’t have the time to go into all these specific systemic processes.

他们只是没有时间跟随所有这些趋势，然后没有时间进入所有这些特定的系统流程。

When I was talking about bipolarity in 2015, or when I was talking about the Dragonbear since 2014 — the Dragonbear being this modus vivendi of China and Russia, as modus operandi to coordinate without the necessity to enter any strategic alliance — people were not interested because it did not really affect the daily life of politics.

当我在2015年谈论两极格局时，或者当我从2014年开始谈论龙熊时——“龙熊是中国和俄罗斯的临时做法，作为协调的做法，而不需要加入任何战略联盟”——人们不感兴趣，因为它并没有真正影响政治的日常生活。

But now you would agree that China-Russia axis, or whatever kind of articles, are almost coming out on a daily basis, and we are already talking about decoupling, and we are already discussing this kind of bipolarity.

但现在你会同意，中俄轴心，或者什么类型的文章，几乎每天都在出现，我们已经在谈论脱钩，我们已经在讨论这种两极格局。

This is the point.

这就是重点。

We have a 10-year time span that I have been investing in every day to try to get the trend projections correctly, but it is absolutely not possible to convince anybody else of the correctness of this assessment so long as the reality doesn’t kick in and prove you right.

我们有一个 10 年的时间跨度，我每天都在投资，试图正确地预测趋势，但只要现实没有出现并证明你是对的，就绝对不可能让其他人相信这个评估的正确性。

This is what was happening, at least with most of my assessments.

这就是正在发生的事情，至少在我的大部分评估中是这样。

This is how I am right now not stuck in 2024.

这就是我现在不被困在2024年的方式。

I’m already in 2030, 2040, and so on and so forth.

我已经是 2030 年、2040 年了，等等。

Most of my assessment is actually helping clients to prepare for the long-term perspective.

我的大部分评估实际上是帮助客户为长期前景做好准备。

I’m not a consultancy like most of these consultancies, providing these daily briefs and analysis, telling you about the dynamics in a specific country, explaining to you the constellations between the political actors and whatever, which is equally important.

我不像大多数咨询公司那样提供每日简报和分析，告诉你特定国家的动态，向你解释政治参与者之间的关系等等，这同样重要。

I’m not denying the importance, on the opposite.

我并不是否认其重要性，恰恰相反。

It’s just that what I do is so rare.

只是我做的事太少见了。

Right now, I’m observing that a lot of consultancies, like the big consultancy Goldman Sachs, are trying to enter this business of geopolitical foresight with big teams and trying to foresee the future.

目前，我观察到很多咨询公司，比如大型咨询公司高盛，正在尝试与大型团队一起进入地缘政治预见领域，并试图预见未来。

But in the end, I would argue it’s a methodology that is not so easily conducted.

但最终，我认为这是一种不太容易实施的方法。

Especially, it’s not easily conducted because you have to free yourself from any kind of personal biases, and you have to have a model.

尤其是，这并不容易进行，因为你必须摆脱任何个人偏见，并且你必须有一个模型。

Now, we may argue some have developed indexes like the geopolitical risk index that is now being published by the Federal Reserve.

现在，我们可能会说有些人已经开发了指数，例如美联储目前正在发布的地缘政治风险指数。

They try to track back different headlines in various newspapers and magazines.

他们试图追踪各种报纸和杂志上的不同标题。

Then, based on the number empirically, they just point to the severity of a geopolitical risk, like it happened with Russia’s war against Ukraine.

然后，根据经验数字，他们只是指出地缘政治风险的严重性，就像俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争所发生的那样。

We have a different kind of metrics, an algorithmic and empirical one.

我们有一种不同类型的指标，一种算法和经验的指标。

My approach is a very qualitative one, and it’s really derived from what I just explained to you.

我的方法是一种非常定性的方法，它实际上源自我刚才向您解释的内容。