Thomas Piketty on the Politics of Equality (Ep. 148)
Hello, everyone.
大家好。
Welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
欢迎回到与泰勒对话。
Today, I’m here with Thomas Piketty, and he has a new book out, A Brief History of Equality, which, in my opinion, is the very best introduction to his overall views.
今天，我和托马斯·皮凯蒂在一起，他出版了一本新书《平等简史》，在我看来，这是对他总体观点的最好介绍。
Thomas, welcome.
托马斯，欢迎。
Thank you for your invitation.
感谢您的邀请。
Let me start with some questions about France.
让我先问一些关于法国的问题。
Now, as you’ve pointed out yourself, France adopted a progressive income tax relatively late in its history.
现在，正如您自己所指出的，法国在其历史上相对较晚的时期采用了累进所得税。
Just how egalitarian, as a country, do you think France actually is?
您认为法国作为一个国家到底有多平等？
Well, as I stress in my new book, A Brief History of Equality, there’s been a long-run movement toward more equality in history, together with a movement toward more economic prosperity, and I argue that the two movements really came together.
嗯，正如我在我的新书《平等简史》中强调的那样，历史上存在着一场走向更加平等的长期运动，以及一场走向更加经济繁荣的运动，我认为这两个运动确实走到了一起。
France is part of this movement.
法国是这一运动的一部分。
Each country has its own limitations and its own hypocrisies with equality and inequality.
每个国家都有自己的局限性和平等与不平等的虚伪性。
France has lots of limitations, lots of hypocrisy in the way to deal with very unequal access to funds and different funding in higher education, or a lot of discrimination that is not well addressed.
法国有很多限制，在处理高等教育中获得资金的机会非常不平等和不同的资助方面存在很多虚伪，或者很多没有得到很好解决的歧视。
But by and large, if I take a big picture and look in the long run, there’s been a movement toward more equality of income, more equality of wealth, more equality in access to political power, more equality in access to education and health over the long run.
但总的来说，如果我放眼长远，就会发现，从长远来看，收入、财富、政治权力、教育和健康方面的平等正在朝着更加平等的方向发展。
Now, this has not been a steady process.
现在，这并不是一个稳定的过程。
This is a revolution toward more equality that has taken place through political mobilization, social struggles.
这是一场通过政治动员和社会斗争实现更加平等的革命。
The story I’m telling is really a story where the movement toward more equality starts at the end of the 18th century, typically — in the case of France, with the French Revolution, the abolition of aristocratic privileges, also the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue.
我讲的故事实际上是一个关于更加平等的运动始于18世纪末的故事，典型的是——就法国而言，随着法国大革命、贵族特权的废除以及圣多明各的奴隶起义。
These two events — the abolition of aristocratic privileges and the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue — are the beginning of the end of aristocratic society, societies based on privileges, and slave and colonial societies on the other hand.
这两个事件——“贵族特权的废除和圣多明各的奴隶起义”——是贵族社会、特权社会以及奴隶社会和殖民社会终结的开始。
But you can see very well how these two movements, these two evolutions toward more equality, are not over.
但你可以很清楚地看到，这两次运动、这两次朝着更加平等的方向发展还没有结束。
They continue during the 19th century, 20th century, with the end of slavery, the end of colonialism, the rise of social security, the rise of progressive taxation.
它们在19世纪、20世纪持续存在，随着奴隶制的结束、殖民主义的结束、社会保障的兴起、累进税的兴起。
But in France, just like in the US, there is still a lot of discrimination today.
但在法国，就像在美国一样，今天仍然存在很多歧视。
There is still a lot of gender inequality today.
今天仍然存在很多性别不平等。
There is still a lot of political inequality in access to voice, access to participation, political power.
在获得发言权、参与权和政治权力方面仍然存在很多政治不平等。
There’s still enormous concentration of wealth.
财富仍然高度集中。
To some extent, it has increased, especially in the US in recent decades, less so in France or in Europe.
在某种程度上，这一数字有所增加，尤其是近几十年来在美国，而在法国或欧洲则较少。
In the long run, there’s a movement toward more equality, but I’m not saying this to conclude that everything is great, and we should just stay like we are.
从长远来看，这是一场朝着更加平等的方向发展的运动，但我这么说并不是为了得出这样的结论：一切都很好，我们应该保持现状。
I’m saying this in order to suggest that this movement could and should continue.
我这么说是为了表明这场运动可以而且应该继续下去。
I think it will continue because in the end, this is a way to address some of the biggest challenges that we have to address.
我认为这种情况将会持续下去，因为最终，这是解决我们必须解决的一些最大挑战的一种方法。
Let me ask you just a very specific question.
让我问你一个非常具体的问题。
It’s a common American perception of France, and maybe Paris in particular, that there are relatively few dimensions of status competition.
美国人对法国（也许尤其是巴黎）的普遍看法是，地位竞争的维度相对较少。
One is supposed to dress a certain way or have particular habits of cultural consumption, and thus, along the dimension of cultural status, France and Paris are especially inegalitarian.
人们应该以某种方式着装或有特定的文化消费习惯，因此，在文化地位的维度上，法国和巴黎尤其不平等。
Now, as someone from France and nearby Paris, just what’s your impression of that portrait of your own country?
现在，作为来自法国和巴黎附近的人，您对自己国家的那幅肖像印象如何？
Is it misleading?
是否具有误导性？
Oh, you have to tell me that again.
哦，你得再告诉我一遍。
What exactly is the comparison you’re making between Paris and New York, for instance?
例如，您对巴黎和纽约进行的比较到底是什么？
If you compared Paris to New York, or even Paris to Berlin, an impression that many outsiders have is, there are relatively few dimensions of status competition.
如果将巴黎与纽约进行比较，甚至将巴黎与柏林进行比较，许多局外人的印象是，地位竞争的维度相对较少。
There’s the civil service, there’s a certain notion of doing well in business, the number of ways you could be expected to dress and be considered well dressed.
有公务员制度，有一定的在商业上表现出色的概念，你可以期望穿着并被认为穿着得体的方式有多种。
That seems fairly circumscribed in Paris, but somewhere like Berlin — there seem to be many more open dimensions of status competition, or in New York City.
这在巴黎似乎受到相当的限制，但在像柏林或纽约这样的地方，地位竞争似乎有更多开放的维度。
Do you think, in this particular way, Parisian life is especially inegalitarian?
您是否认为，在这种特殊的方式下，巴黎人的生活特别不平等？
I have never thought about this, but maybe you’re right.
我从来没有想过这个问题，但也许你是对的。
I have never heard of this before, but you’re saying the diversity of dress codes is less extensive in Paris than Berlin or New York.
我以前从未听说过这个，但你是说巴黎着装规范的多样性没有柏林或纽约那么广泛。
Not just dress.
不仅仅是穿着。
You could look at cuisine.
你可以看看美食。
You could look at the status, say, of tech nerds in Berlin or New York relative to France.
例如，你可以看看柏林或纽约的科技迷相对于法国的状况。
Maybe that’s right.
也许这是对的。
Maybe that’s wrong.
也许这是错误的。
I don’t know what’s the metric for this.
我不知道这个的衡量标准是什么。
I’m not sure.
我不知道。
Frankly, I have never thought of that before.
坦白说，我以前从未想过这一点。
Let me try another question.
让我尝试另一个问题。
For someone trying to place you in French intellectual history — let’s say they’re not an economist, and they want to know, which traditions from the French Left are you closest to?
对于那些试图将你置于法国思想史中的人来说——假设他们不是经济学家，但他们想知道你最接近法国左派的哪些传统？
Would it be utopian socialists, critical theorists, objective Marxists, 1968 crowd?
会是空想社会主义者、批判理论家、客观马克思主义者、1968 年的人群吗？
Where do you place yourself in your own country’s history?
您将自己置于自己国家历史的哪个位置？
Okay, this I can answer more precisely.
好吧，这个我可以更准确地回答。
I will say, first, none of the above.
我首先要说的是，以上都不是。
I would put myself more in the tradition of the Annales school.
我会让自己更多地遵循年鉴学派的传统。
I don’t know if this rings a bell for you or not.
我不知道这是否给你敲响了警钟。
Of course.
当然。
There’s a tradition of research in social and economic history that was particularly active in France, I would say, between the 1930s and 1980s, with people like Braudel or Labrousse.
我想说的是，在 20 世纪 30 年代到 80 年代之间，法国有一种社会和经济史研究传统，其中包括像布罗代尔或拉布鲁斯这样的人。
These are people who started working on the history of the distribution of wages, for instance, during the 18th century, in the period going to the French Revolution.
这些人开始研究工资分配的历史，例如在 18 世纪法国大革命时期。
Is the French Revolution due to the fact that wages were lagging behind land rent?
法国大革命是因为工资落后于地租吗？
That was one of the big questions that these people were asking.
这是这些人提出的重大问题之一。
In a way, what I’ve been doing is to try to pursue this tradition in social and economic history, with also a strong influence from Anglo-Saxon research in this area: Kuznets, Atkinson.
在某种程度上，我一直在努力在社会和经济史中追寻这一传统，同时也受到盎格鲁-撒克逊在这一领域的研究的强烈影响：库兹涅茨、阿特金森。
There’s a long tradition also of British and US historians and economists and social scientists trying to collect this kind of income and history.
英国和美国的历史学家、经济学家和社会科学家也有尝试收集此类收入和历史的悠久传统。
That’s what I’ve been doing.
这就是我一直在做的事情。
I don’t feel very close to the philosophical or political sort of tradition you are referring to because my work has mostly consisted of trying to collect these historical data sources and then, of course, to propose some interpretation of these data sources.
我觉得与你所指的哲学或政治传统不太接近，因为我的工作主要包括尝试收集这些历史数据源，然后，当然，对这些数据源提出一些解释。
But I feel I’ve always been very close to my sources.
但我觉得我一直与我的消息来源非常接近。
This is what has kept me busy 95 percent of my time for the past 25 years or so.
在过去 25 年左右的时间里，这让我 95% 的时间都在忙碌。
When I read Braudel, it strikes me there’s something quite conservative about the argument.
当我读布罗代尔的作品时，我觉得这个论点相当保守。
I don’t mean politically conservative, but I mean literally conservative — the sense of long structures stretching through decades or even centuries.
我指的不是政治上的保守派，而是字面上的保守派——即绵延数十年甚至数百年的长结构的感觉。
Do you share that with him?
你和他分享这个吗？
Or do you think, in some way, you deviate that makes you more politically radical?
或者你认为，在某种程度上，你的偏离使你在政治上更加激进？
You’re right.
你说得对。
I don’t know if this makes me more politically radical.
我不知道这是否会让我在政治上更加激进。
You’re perfectly right that one big difference between the work I’ve been doing and the work people like Braudel or Labrousse were doing is that I had to deal a lot with the 20th century, whereas these people were working a lot on previous centuries — 18th century, 19th century, or even before in the case of Braudel.
你完全正确，我一直在做的工作和像布罗代尔或拉布鲁斯这样的人所做的工作之间的一个很大的区别是，我必须处理很多关于20世纪的事情，而这些人则在之前的几个世纪——18世纪、19世纪，甚至在布罗代尔的例子中更早地进行工作。
Working on 20th-century data and, in particular, the enormous reduction of income inequality during the 20th century led me to a different kind of perspective and a different kind of thinking and issue.
对 20 世纪数据的研究，特别是 20 世纪收入不平等的大幅减少，让我产生了不同的观点、不同的思考和问题。
To be very precise, the political dimension is so much more important and, in a way, unavoidable and impossible to escape when you study the 20th century.
准确地说，政治维度更为重要，在某种程度上，当你研究 20 世纪时，政治维度是不可避免的，也是无法回避的。
When you study the 18th century or 19th century, or maybe you can have this Marxist or economic perspective stressing the long-run evolution, these deterministic economic forces.
当你研究 18 世纪或 19 世纪时，或者也许你可以有这种马克思主义或经济观点，强调长期演变，这些确定性的经济力量。
When you study the 20th century, politics is everywhere: World War I and World War II, the Great Depression, the creation of social security systems, the development of progressive taxation, decolonization, end of apartheid.
当你研究 20 世纪时，你会发现政治无处不在：第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战、大萧条、社会保障体系的建立、累进税制的发展、非殖民化、种族隔离的结束。
Politics is everywhere if you want to understand the evolution of inequality.
如果你想了解不平等的演变，政治无处不在。
I would say it’s also, to some extent, the same for the 19th century and the end of the 18th century.
我想说，在某种程度上，19世纪和18世纪末也是如此。
I talk about the French Revolution and the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue.
我谈论法国大革命和圣多明各的奴隶起义。
I think the history of equality or inequality cannot just be an economic history.
我认为平等或不平等的历史不能只是一部经济史。
It has to be a political history because, if you want to account for what you see, if you want to explain what you see, it’s political processes — sometimes revolution, sometimes tax reform, sometimes political confrontation of all sorts — play a major role.
它必须是一部政治史，因为如果你想解释你所看到的，如果你想解释你所看到的，它的政治进程 —— 有时是革命，有时是税收改革，有时是各种政治对抗 —— 发挥着重要作用。
I had to develop this perspective, and indeed, this is a big difference with the Annales school.
我必须发展这种观点，事实上，这与年鉴学派有很大的不同。
You know, the Annales school, in a way, did not disappear before reaching the 20th century.
要知道，年鉴学派，在某种程度上，在进入20世纪之前并没有消失。
They were not confronted with the same kind of issues that I was confronted with just because I write later than them with data covering the more recent period, so I had to develop a different perspective and a different kind of interpretation.
他们没有遇到与我遇到的同样的问题，只是因为我比他们写得晚，数据涵盖了更近期的时期，所以我必须发展不同的视角和不同的解释。
Yes, tracing the role of politics and political institution, fiscal institution, social institution, and the like.
是的，追踪政治和政治制度、财政制度、社会制度等的作用。
As you know, there’s a competing longue durée tradition — if you look at the work of Greg Clark and Neil Cummins — on surnames.
如你所知，在姓氏方面存在着一种相互竞争的长期传统——如果你看看格雷格·克拉克和尼尔·康明斯的作品。
They take data from England, from Sweden.
他们从英格兰和瑞典获取数据。
There’s one paper where they have almost eight centuries of data, I think, and social status is more heritable than height.
我认为，有一篇论文拥有近八个世纪的数据，社会地位比身高更具有遗传性。
A given status relationship has persistence for 15 or 20 generations.
给定的地位关系可以持续 15 或 20 代。
What do you think of that work?
你觉得那项工作怎么样？
Do you think it’s a perspective that contrasts to yours and shows it’s really very hard to redistribute what really matters in society?
您是否认为这种观点与您的观点形成鲜明对比，并表明重新分配社会中真正重要的东西真的非常困难？
Well, this is very interesting.
嗯，这很有趣。
Every time there is a lot of historical data collection, I am very interested, and so, this is very interesting work.
每次有很多历史资料的收集，我就很感兴趣，所以，这是一个很有趣的工作。
Now, that being said, I find the perspective a bit too conservative in a way, maybe because it’s very long run.
话虽这么说，我发现这种观点在某种程度上有点过于保守，也许是因为它是非常长期的。
Again, if I look, my period of study is the period ranging from the end of the 18th century until today.
再看一下，我的研究时期是从18世纪末一直到今天。
This is 1780 to 2020, if you want.
如果你愿意的话，这是 1780 年到 2020 年。
Over these two centuries and a half, what I see is a movement to have more equality, both in terms of political rights but also in terms of social and economic equality.
在这两个半世纪里，我看到的是一场争取更多平等的运动，无论是在政治权利方面，还是在社会和经济平等方面。
What I argue is that this process is very much related to political development, political revolution, slave revolt, wars of independence, tax reform, changing balance of power between capital and labor, development of social security, development of a public school system, of public health system.
我认为这个过程与政治发展、政治革命、奴隶起义、独立战争、税收改革、资本和劳动力之间权力平衡的变化、社会保障的发展、公立学校系统和公共卫生系统的发展密切相关。
And over this period, this has led to a very strong movement to have more equality in all these dimensions, and also toward more economic prosperity, and I stress this.
在此期间，这引发了一场非常强烈的运动，要求在所有这些方面实现更多平等，并实现更加经济繁荣，我强调这一点。
Now, before this period, I’m aware that there are people like Greg Clark and others who stress the continuity across eight centuries of the perpetration of status inequality.
现在，在这个时期之前，我知道像格雷格·克拉克和其他人一样强调地位不平等在八个世纪的延续。
There are also historians like Scheidel, going back to the Neolithic period or to ancient history, who stress a relatively pessimistic perspective in the sense that they say, “Okay, without major destruction or war, you’d never have a reduction of inequality.”
还有像沙伊德尔这样的历史学家，他们可以追溯到新石器时代或古代历史，他们强调相对悲观的观点，他们说：“好吧，如果没有重大破坏或战争，不平等就永远不会减少。”
All this work is very interesting, but the perspective I stress is a bit different.
所有这些工作都很有趣，但我强调的观点有点不同。
I think it’s more optimistic in a way.
我认为这在某种程度上更加乐观。
I think, if you look at this shorter period, but which is still very long — two centuries and a half, 1780–2020 — you see this political movement towards more equality.
我认为，如果你看看这个较短的时期，但它仍然很长——“两个半世纪，1780-2020”——你会看到这场走向更加平等的政治运动。
To be honest, I must admit, I must confess that I am always a bit skeptical about some of the data sources before the late 18th century, partly because I know them less well, so I’m less confident with them.
说实话，我必须承认，我必须承认，我对18世纪末之前的一些数据来源总是有点怀疑，部分原因是我对它们不太了解，所以我对它们不太有信心。
Partly because, when I don’t have a census, when I don’t have a tax administration, when I don’t even know the population that is out there and how it is changing over time, I find it very, very difficult to say, okay, did the concentration of wealth increase in Europe between 1500 and 1750?
部分原因是，当我没有人口普查时，当我没有税务管理部门时，当我什至不知道那里的人口数量以及人口随时间的变化情况时，我发现很难说，好吧，1500年至1750年间欧洲的财富集中度是否有所增加？
Let alone the question of did it increase between the end of the Roman Empire and 1500?
更不用说罗马帝国末期至 1500 年间它是否有所增加的问题了？
I don’t know the answer to these questions.
我不知道这些问题的答案。
I would suspect concentration of forced inequality was always pretty large in this pre-18th-century period.
我怀疑，在 18 世纪之前的时期，强迫不平等的集中程度总是相当大。
But from what I read — and I try to read carefully — most of what is written on this topic, I’m not sure we have the data sources to really answer these questions, unfortunately.
但不幸的是，从我读到的 — 并且我尝试仔细阅读 — 有关该主题的大部分内容来看，我不确定我们是否拥有真正回答这些问题的数据源。
This is why I try to focus on the more recent period, which is still very long.
这就是为什么我尝试关注最近的时期，这个时期仍然很长。
If I look at France in the early 1960s, as you know, the rate of finishing or even starting higher education is extremely low, but France basically is doing fine.
如果我看看 20 世纪 60 年代初的法国，如你所知，完成甚至开始高等教育的比率极低，但法国基本上做得很好。
Do you view that as evidence for the view that it’s really the continuity of cultural capital that matters and not so much policy?
您是否认为这可以证明文化资本的连续性才是最重要的，而不是政策？
No, because there’s been a huge educational expansion since then.
不，因为从那时起教育就发生了巨大的扩张。
Between 1950 and 1990 and until today, educational expansion in France — and throughout Europe and in most of the world — has been considerable.
从 1950 年到 1990 年直至今天，法国乃至整个欧洲和世界大部分地区的教育扩张相当可观。
It is true, in the 1950s, France — but to a large extent, Western Europe — is lagging behind the US in terms of educational achievement.
确实，在20世纪50年代，法国——但在很大程度上是西欧——在教育成就方面落后于美国。
To me, it’s clear that the key reason why the US has been an economic leader at the world level for most of the 20th century is because it was an educational leader.
对我来说，很明显，美国在 20 世纪的大部分时间里一直是世界经济领先者的关键原因是它是教育领先者。
In the 1950s, as you know very well, you have 90 percent of a generation going to high school in the US, whereas in France or in Germany, it’s 20 percent to 30 percent of a generation.
众所周知，在 20 世纪 50 年代，美国这一代人中有 90% 的人上高中，而在法国或德国，这一比例只有 20% 到 30%。
You need to wait until the 1980s or ’90s to reach the same kind of 90 percent of growth going to high school and to have universal access to it.
你需要等到 20 世纪 80 年代或 90 年代才能达到同样 90% 的高中入学率增长并普及高中教育。
It was the same also in the 19th century.
19世纪也是如此。
The US reached 90 percent primary school attendance rate almost a century before Europe, or at least half a century or two-thirds of a century before Europe.
美国小学入学率达到90%，比欧洲早了近一个世纪，或者至少比欧洲早了半个世纪或三分之二世纪。
I think that was a key explanation why also economic productivity was so much higher in the United States.
我认为这是美国经济生产率如此高的一个关键解释。
I think policy may be a bit different.
我认为政策可能会有所不同。
Especially after World War II, there was an enormous educational push, not only in France and Germany but also, of course, in Japan.
特别是在第二次世界大战之后，不仅在法国和德国，而且在日本，都大力推动了教育。
Then other countries in Asia also followed this push, and this has completely transformed the economic geography and the geography of productivity.
随后亚洲其他国家也纷纷效仿，彻底改变了经济地理和生产力地理。
And the huge advantage the US had in the middle of the 20th century, to a large extent, has disappeared today.
美国在20世纪中叶所拥有的巨大优势在很大程度上已经消失。
I think policies, institutions played a major role in these dynamics with specific political and social history in the different countries.
我认为政策、制度在不同国家特定政治和社会历史的这些动态中发挥了重要作用。
Of course, politics is also the product of the belief system and the perceptions that families have about education, about the culture of education.
当然，政治也是信仰体系和家庭对教育、教育文化的看法的产物。
So all these different dimensions have to be studied together, obviously.
因此，显然，所有这些不同的维度都必须一起研究。
As you know, Matt Rognlie and a number of other researchers have argued the relevant increase in wealth inequality really is centered in real estate and housing wealth.
如您所知，马特·罗格利（Matt Rognlie）和其他一些研究人员认为，财富不平等的相关加剧实际上集中在房地产和住房财富上。
Do you agree?
你同意？
If so, isn’t it enough just to be a Georgist?
如果是这样，仅仅成为一名乔治学家还不够吗？
Can’t we just do the redistribution there?
我们不能在那里进行重新分配吗？
If you look at the top of the wealth distribution, I don’t see a lot of real estate.
如果你看看财富分布的顶部，我看不到很多房地产。
I don’t think Matt Rognlie or anyone is saying that the huge rise in billionaire wealth in the US has anything to do with real estate.
我认为马特·罗格利（Matt Rognlie）或任何人都没有说美国亿万富翁财富的大幅增长与房地产有任何关系。
As far as I know, nobody has ever tried to put this theory on the table.
据我所知，没有人试图把这个理论摆到桌面上。
I’m not saying real estate is not important.
我并不是说房地产不重要。
I think for middle-class assets and lower-middle-class and upper-middle-class assets — for the middle of the distribution — real estate is, of course, very important.
我认为对于中产阶级资产以及中下层和中上层资产 — 对于分布的中间 — 房地产当然非常重要。
The movement in real estate prices explains a lot of what’s going on, both in terms of aggregate value and distribution.
房地产价格的变动解释了很多正在发生的事情，无论是在总价值还是在分配方面。
I’m not saying it’s not important.
我并不是说这不重要。
It is very important.
这非常重要。
If you go back to our paper with Gabriel Zucman, which was published, now, almost 10 years ago in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 2014, called “Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries, 1700–2010,” you will see, we have complete decomposition about the role of real estate in aggregate wealth accumulation, and it’s absolutely central for many countries over many periods of time.
如果你回顾一下我们与加布里埃尔·祖克曼 (Gabriel Zucman) 合作的论文，这篇论文发表在大约 10 年前的《经济学季刊》2014 年，题为“资本回归：富裕国家的财富收入比率，1700-2010 年”，你会发现，我们对房地产在总财富积累中的作用有了完整的分解，而且它在许多时期对许多国家来说绝对是核心。
We cannot have any disagreement of that because this is our data.
我们对此不能有任何异议，因为这是我们的数据。
This is what we did almost 10 years ago.
这就是我们大约 10 年前所做的事情。
That’s not going to explain, for example, what happens at the top of the distribution because real estate is absolutely ineligible when you look at the billionaire wealth.
例如，这并不能解释分布顶部发生的情况，因为当你观察亿万富翁的财富时，房地产绝对不符合条件。
Here, you need other stories.
在这里，你需要其他故事。
Yes?
是的？
For the distribution overall, it seems there are a lot of papers, quite recent, like Odran Bonnet, Jordà, the Rognlie work, Knoll, Pfeffer and Waitkus.
就总体分布而言，似乎有很多最近发表的论文，例如 Odran Bonnet、Jordà、Rognlie 的工作、Knoll、Pfeffer 和 Waitkus。
They seem to think it’s primarily about real estate, if not 100 percent, predominantly real estate.
他们似乎认为这主要与房地产有关，即使不是 100%，也主要是房地产。
You don’t agree with their estimates?
您不同意他们的估计？
Or you just think you’re addressing a separate problem of billionaire inequality at the top?
或者你只是认为你正在解决亿万富翁顶层不平等的另一个问题？
No, I think, again, it depends whether you look at aggregate wealth or you look at the distribution of wealth.
不，我再次认为，这取决于你是看财富总量还是财富分配。
If you look at aggregate wealth, then real estate is a really big part of the increase in aggregate wealth-to-income ratio, especially in Europe, less so in the US.
如果你看一下总财富，那么房地产是总财富与收入比率增长的一个非常大的部分，尤其是在欧洲，而在美国则较少。
In the US, the aggregate wealth-to-income ratio increased much less than in Europe.
在美国，总财富与收入之比的增幅远低于欧洲。
For the aggregate wealth-to-income ratio, especially in Europe or Japan, real estate is the sum total explanation.
对于总财富与收入的比率，尤其是在欧洲或日本，房地产是总的解释。
There’s no doubt about this.
这是毫无疑问的。
Now, if you look at the distribution, it’s a very different story.
现在，如果你看看分布情况，就会发现这是一个非常不同的故事。
In fact, the increase of the relative price of real estate asset relative to, say, stock market prices or financial assets is actually relatively good overall for the middle class as compared to the very top because the middle class owns mostly real estate, whereas the top owns mostly financial and business assets.
事实上，与最顶层相比，房地产资产相对于股票市场价格或金融资产的相对价格的上涨实际上对中产阶级来说总体上是相对较好的，因为中产阶级主要拥有房地产，而顶层则主要拥有金融和商业资产。
If the only force at play was the big increase in real estate price, in fact, wealth inequality should have declined, or at least top wealth share should have declined relative to the middle, which obviously is not what we see and is a recent disagreement with many traders increase in top wealth shares.
如果唯一起作用的力量是房地产价格的大幅上涨，那么事实上，财富不平等应该有所下降，或者至少顶级财富份额相对于中等财富份额应该有所下降，这显然不是我们所看到的，也是最近许多交易者对顶级财富份额增加的分歧。
But nobody is saying that top wealth shares have been declining in recent decades in any country.
但没有人说近几十年来任何国家的顶级财富份额一直在下降。
By definition, the real estate argument is not going to explain what we see for the wealth distribution.
根据定义，房地产论点无法解释我们所看到的财富分配情况。
It depends what segment of the distribution you’re interested in.
这取决于您对发行版的哪个部分感兴趣。
If you’re interested in the top share, if you’re interested in the very top billionaire wealth — which is interesting in its own sake and is a non-negligible fraction of total wealth — I think, again, nobody’s saying that real estate is explaining this.
如果你对顶级份额感兴趣，如果你对最顶级的亿万富翁财富感兴趣 ——这本身就很有趣，并且占总财富不可忽视的一部分 ——我想，再一次，没有人说房地产可以解释这一点。
If you see a paper saying that, please send it to me.
如果您看到有这样的文章，请将其发送给我。
If I look at nominal income data for the US or, for that matter, Switzerland, those two countries measure as being wealthier than either France or Germany.
如果我看一下美国或瑞士的名义收入数据，就会发现这两个国家比法国或德国都富裕。
Do you think citizens in US and Switzerland are happier than the French and Germans?
您认为美国和瑞士的公民比法国和德国的公民更幸福吗？
If you’re interested in welfare, you need to look at productivity.
如果你对福利感兴趣，你需要关注生产力。
That’s the first thing.
这是第一件事。
You need to look at GDP per hours of work or income per hours of work.
您需要查看每工作小时的 GDP 或每工作小时的收入。
You probably know very well, if you look at OECD data or Bureau of Labor Statistics series in the US — which are almost similar for Eurostat series — everywhere you go to, you will see the GDP per hours of work is virtually the same in US, Germany, France.
你可能很清楚，如果你看看美国经合组织或劳工统计局的数据 ——与欧盟统计局的数据几乎相似—— 无论你走到哪里，你都会发现美国、德国、法国的每小时GDP几乎是相同的。
It’s a few percent different.
有几个百分点的不同。
I’m sure you know these things.
我相信你知道这些事情。
Sure.
当然。
Of course.
当然。
In terms of welfare, of course, as economists, you know what matters is productivity, not income per se because if you have a higher income just because you work longer hours, the effect on welfare is ambiguous.
当然，就福利而言，作为经济学家，你知道重要的是生产力，而不是收入本身，因为如果你仅仅因为工作时间更长而获得更高的收入，那么对福利的影响是模糊的。
It depends how you value leisure versus work, et cetera.
这取决于您如何评价休闲与工作等。
Presumably, European countries decided to have more vacation and a bigger reduction of working times than the US in the 20th century.
据推测，20世纪的欧洲国家决定比美国有更多的假期和更大幅度地减少工作时间。
It was not the case a century ago.
一个世纪前情况并非如此。
In the early 20th century, working hours were actually shorter in the US than Europe, partly because productivity was higher, so you can afford working less.
20世纪初，美国的工作时间实际上比欧洲短，部分原因是生产力更高，所以你可以承担更少的工作时间。
Anyway, today and in the past century, the decline in working hours has been bigger in Germany and France.
不管怎样，今天和上个世纪，德国和法国的工作时间下降幅度更大。
Presumably, this was a choice.
想必，这是一个选择。
This was a complicated political process, but nobody in Germany or France today is proposing to divide by two the number of weeks of vacation and go to the US federal law in that respect.
这是一个复杂的政治过程，但今天德国或法国没有人建议将假期周数除以二，并在这方面诉诸美国联邦法律。
In terms of welfare, my own view, as you can imagine, is that when you multiply your productivity by 10 over the past century, it actually makes sense to take some of this increase in productivity to have more vacation, to spend more time with your children and family, to spend more time traveling around the world.
在福利方面，正如你可以想象的那样，我自己的观点是，当你在过去的一个世纪里将你的生产力乘以 10 时，实际上，将生产力的提高中的一部分用来享受更多的假期、花更多的时间陪伴你的孩子和家人、花更多的时间环游世界实际上是有意义的。
For me, like for many Europeans, the idea of taking only two weeks’ vacation over the summer when you are so rich looks like one of the most stupid things you can do in life.
对我来说，就像对许多欧洲人一样，当你如此富有时，在夏天只休两周假期的想法似乎是你一生中能做的最愚蠢的事情之一。
But look, different people can make different choices, of course, about this.
但是看，不同的人当然可以对此做出不同的选择。
If the relationship between wealth and happiness is so diffuse, and I would agree it may be — so I’m happier than some billionaires I know — why worry so much about wealth inequality?
如果财富和幸福之间的关系如此分散，我同意这可能是“所以我比我认识的一些亿万富翁更幸福”为什么要如此担心财富不平等？
Why not focus on inequality of well-being, which could be something quite different?
为什么不关注福祉的不平等，这可能是完全不同的事情？
Oh, yes.
哦是的。
Ultimately, what I care about is access to fundamental goods like education, health, participation in the political life, participation in economic life.
最终，我关心的是获得基本福利的机会，例如教育、健康、参与政治生活、参与经济生活。
Ultimately, this is what I care about.
归根结底，这就是我关心的。
Income and wealth per se are just a mechanism and tools and ways to go in this direction.
收入和财富本身只是朝这个方向发展的机制、工具和方式。
But in the end, what’s really important for me is to have the highest possible opportunities and rights to access fundamental goods for everybody.
但最终，对我来说真正重要的是拥有尽可能多的机会和权利来为每个人获取基本商品。
This is all that matters.
这才是最重要的。
I see that in Paris, and I tend to think it’s cultural capital.
我在巴黎看到了这一点，我倾向于认为这是文化资本。
Rents are very high.
租金非常高。
There are people who are not huge earners.
有些人的收入并不高。
They live in Paris.
他们住在巴黎。
They enjoy Paris immensely, as they should.
他们非常喜欢巴黎，这是他们应该的。
They have incredible cultural capital, amenities, smart people they can talk to.
他们拥有令人难以置信的文化资本、便利设施以及可以与之交谈的聪明人。
They’re partaking in those goods, yet there’s very high wealth inequality in Paris.
他们正在分享这些商品，但巴黎的财富不平等却非常严重。
You teach in London — super-high wealth inequality in London.
你在伦敦教书——伦敦的财富不平等程度极高。
You can live there very well if you do it smartly.
如果你做得聪明的话，你可以在那里生活得很好。
Again, why not focus on cultural capital for individuals rather than the wealth?
同样，为什么不关注个人的文化资本而不是财富呢？
First, I only teach in Paris.
首先，我只在巴黎教书。
I was in London a long time ago as a student, but I’m not teaching there.
很久以前我在伦敦当学生，但我不在那里教书。
Cultural capital is part of what I am interested in.
文化资本是我感兴趣的一部分。
When I look at the inequalities in education and access to education, this is about cultural capital.
当我审视教育和受教育机会方面的不平等时，这与文化资本有关。
I try to understand the changing structure of political cleavages and who votes for whom and which party and coalition, which is a topic on which I’ve been working quite a bit in recent years.
我试图了解政治分歧结构的变化，以及谁投票给谁、哪个政党和联盟，这是我近年来一直在研究的一个话题。
Cultural inequality and different access to education, reversal of educational cleavage over time, certainly is very important.
文化不平等和受教育机会的不同，随着时间的推移扭转教育分裂，当然是非常重要的。
But maybe I don’t get exactly your question.
但也许我不太明白你的问题。
Maybe you should tell me again.
也许你应该再告诉我一次。
Well, if we want to make people better off, the world we live in — it has plenty of wealth, and we observe many people who are not rich who have very high standards of living because they, in the broad sense, are well educated, can enjoy amenities, can live in Paris or London on a limited income, take in what the city has to offer.
好吧，如果我们想让人们过得更好，我们生活的世界——它拥有大量的财富，我们观察到许多并不富有的人却拥有很高的生活水平，因为从广义上讲，他们受过良好的教育，可以享受便利设施，可以以有限的收入生活在巴黎或伦敦，享受城市所提供的一切。
Doesn’t that suggest that wealth inequality shouldn’t really be the focus?
这是否表明财富不平等不应该真正成为焦点？
It should be inequality of cultural capital.
应该是文化资本的不平等。
Yes.
是的。
I think all of this is important because if you only have high cultural capital, living in Paris or London is going be difficult, given the rent level.
我认为所有这些都很重要，因为如果你只有较高的文化资本，考虑到租金水平，在巴黎或伦敦生活将会很困难。
I think you want to care about both, and so I care a lot about making access to education more egalitarian.
我认为你想同时关心这两个问题，所以我非常关心让教育机会更加平等。
As I told you, in France, there’s a lot of inequality and a lot of hypocrisy everywhere in terms of access to education in France.
正如我告诉过你的，在法国，在接受教育方面，到处都存在着严重的不平等和虚伪。
In the US, you have all this work by Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez showing the relation between the parental income percentile and access to higher education, the level of hypocrisy about the claims that are being made about equal opportunity and blah, blah, blah.
在美国，拉吉·切蒂（Raj Chetty）和伊曼纽尔·赛斯（Emmanuel Saez）所做的所有这些工作都展示了父母收入百分位数与接受高等教育的机会之间的关系，以及关于机会均等的主张的虚伪程度，等等。
When you look at what you see in the data, we are very far from that, but there’s a lot of hypocrisy everywhere in terms of unequal access to education.
当你看看数据时，你会发现我们离这个目标还很远，但在教育机会不平等方面，到处都存在很多虚伪之处。
In my country, in France, we put three times more public resources in the elite schools, where more socially advantaged students go to, than in the normal university scheme, where more socially disadvantaged students tend to go to.
在我的国家法国，我们在精英学校（更多社会优势学生就读）投入的公共资源是普通大学计划（更多社会弱势学生倾向于就读）的公共资源的三倍。
Through public funding, sometimes you actually magnify initial inequalities of resources and reduce them.
通过公共资助，有时实际上会放大最初的资源不平等并减少它们。
There’s enormous hypocrisy everywhere.
到处都存在巨大的虚伪。
And to me, making more effective equality in access to education is absolutely central.
对我来说，在受教育机会方面实现更有效的平等绝对是核心。
That being said, I also want to redistribute wealth and inheritance and property because, if you only have high education but you have no wealth at all, it’s more complicated.
话虽这么说，我也想重新分配财富、遗产和财产，因为如果你只有高等教育，但你根本没有财富，那就更复杂了。
It’s more complicated to buy a home for your family, or it’s more complicated to start up a business.
为家人买房更复杂，或者创业更复杂。
In the long run, there’s been a movement to have more equality of labor income through educational expansion, through more labor rights.
从长远来看，存在着一场通过教育扩张和更多劳工权利来实现劳动收入更加平等的运动。
But if you look at the distribution of wealth, what’s very striking is that the top 10 percent wealth share has declined in the long run.
但如果你看看财富的分配，就会发现非常引人注目的是，从长远来看，前 10% 的人的财富份额有所下降。
It used to be 80 percent, 90 percent of the total in the 19th century in Europe.
19世纪欧洲曾经是80%、90%。
Today it’s more 50 percent, 60 percent in Europe.
如今，欧洲的这一比例已超过 50%、60%。
In the US, it would be more 60 percent, 70 percent.
在美国，这个比例会更高，60%、70%。
People can disagree about the details, but these are really details as compared to this order of magnitude.
人们可能对细节有不同意见，但与这个数量级相比，这些确实是细节。
Now, this decline in the very top 10 percent wealth share has been mostly to the benefit of the next 40 percent, which is already good.
现在，最顶层 10% 的财富份额的下降主要是让接下来的 40% 的人受益，这已经很好了。
But if you look at the bottom 50 percent of the distribution — they have 2 percent of total wealth in the US.
但如果你看看收入分配中最底层的 50% 人口，他们拥有美国总财富的 2%。
They have 4 percent in Europe or in a country like France.
他们在欧洲或法国等国家占 4%。
It’s a bit better than 2 percent, but basically, they have nothing.
比百分之二好一点，但基本上他们什么都没有。
So if you take, in particular, the bottom 50 percent children generation in France today or in the US today, they basically receive nothing at all in inheritance.
因此，如果你特别考虑当今法国或美国最底层 50% 的儿童一代，他们基本上没有继承到任何遗产。
Whereas, the top 10 percent children will receive 60 percent, 70 percent of the total.
而排名前 10% 的孩子将获得总数的 60%、70%。
We are very far, to say the least, from equality of opportunity.
至少可以说，我们离机会平等还很远。
This is the least you can say, which is interesting because equality of opportunity is a theoretical concept that people very often say they are in favor of.
这是你至少可以说的，这很有趣，因为机会平等是人们经常说他们赞成的一个理论概念。
But if you try to move in a concrete manner to have more equality of opportunity, for instance, by distributing inheritance, people get completely crazy and say, “Oh, how could you do that?”
但如果你试图采取具体的方式来获得更多的机会平等，例如，通过分配继承权，人们会完全疯狂并说：“哦，你怎么能这么做？”
I’m making a proposal about this in my recent book, saying, okay, maybe everybody at age 25 should receive a minimum inheritance.
我在我最近的书中提出了一个关于这个问题的建议，我说，好吧，也许每个 25 岁的人都应该获得最低限度的遗产。
Let’s say it could be 60 percent of average wealth.
假设这可能是平均财富的 60%。
In France today, that would be €120,000 if the average wealth is €200,000 euros per adult, so everybody, say, would receive €120,000 euros at age 25.
在今天的法国，如果每个成年人的平均财富为 200,000 欧元，那么这将是 120,000 欧元，所以每个人在 25 岁时都会收到 120,000 欧元。
People who today receive zero would receive €120,000 at age 25.
今天领取零的人将在 25 岁时领取 120,000 欧元。
People who today receive €1 million will still receive €600,000 after the progressive taxation of inheritance and wealth that’s paying for that, so we would still be very, very far from equality of opportunity.
今天领取 100 万欧元的人在缴纳遗产税和财富累进税后仍将获得 60 万欧元，因此我们距离机会平等仍然非常非常遥远。
If you want my opinion, I think we could and we should go beyond that.
如果你想听听我的意见，我认为我们可以而且应该超越这个范围。
But just doing that would increase the share of the bottom 50 percent children in total inheritance, which today is between 2 percent in the US and 4 percent in France.
但仅仅这样做就会增加底层 50% 的孩子在继承总额中所占的份额，目前这一比例在美国为 2%，在法国为 4%。
It would be 20 percent to 25 percent, which is still much less than 50 percent because after all, they are the poorest 50 percent children.
大概是 20% 到 25%，但仍然远低于 50%，因为毕竟他们是最贫困的 50% 儿童。
But I think it will make a big difference in terms of real opportunity to start a business.
但我认为这会对创业的真正机会产生很大的影响。
But also, more generally, wealth has a big impact on your bargaining power in life.
但更一般地说，财富对你生活中的议价能力有很大影响。
When you don’t own anything, when you just own zero or when you only have debt, you have to accept everything.
当你一无所有时，当你只拥有零或只有债务时，你必须接受一切。
You have to accept any working condition, any wage, any job because you need to pay your bills.
你必须接受任何工作条件、任何工资、任何工作，因为你需要支付账单。
You need to pay your rent.
您需要支付房租。
If you have a family, you need to do something, so you have to accept this.
如果你有家庭，你就需要做点什么，所以你必须接受这一点。
For people with millions or billions, maybe 100 is like zero.
对于拥有数百万或数十亿的人来说，也许100就像零一样。
They don’t make the difference.
它们没有什么区别。
But for people who are at zero, having 100, 200 puts you in a position in terms of bargaining power vis-à-vis the rest of society.
但对于那些收入为零的人来说，拥有 100、200 可以让你在与社会其他人的讨价还价能力方面处于有利地位。
It is very different.
这是非常不同的。
I think it’s very complementary to control capital and human capital because €100,000, €200,000 — okay, that’s not going to make you buy an apartment in Paris.
我认为控制资本和人力资本是非常互补的，因为 10 万欧元、20 万欧元 ——好吧，这不会让你在巴黎买一套公寓。
That’s not enough.
这还不够。
But there are many other cities which, for many people, are more enjoyable, where you can actually buy an apartment or house.
但对于许多人来说，还有许多其他城市更有趣，您实际上可以在那里购买公寓或房屋。
You can start a business.
你可以创业。
It makes a real difference for the bottom 50 percent people.
这对底层 50% 的人来说确实产生了影响。
If I visit every major country in Europe, what I observe is the highest living standard is arguably in Switzerland — Norway and Luxembourg aside.
如果我访问欧洲每个主要国家，我发现生活水平最高的无疑是瑞士——除了挪威和卢森堡。
Switzerland has one of the smallest governments, and they attempt relatively little redistribution.
瑞士是最小的政府之一，他们尝试的再分配相对较少。
What is your understanding of Switzerland?
您对瑞士的了解是怎样的？
What if someone said, “Well, Europe should try to be more like Switzerland.
如果有人说：“好吧，欧洲应该努力变得更像瑞士。
They’re doing great.” Why is that wrong?
他们做得很好。”为什么这是错误的？
Oh, Switzerland.
哦，瑞士。
It’s a very small country, so it’s about the size.
这是一个非常小的国家，所以它的大小。
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Actually, it’s smaller than Île-de-France, which is a Paris region.
实际上，它比巴黎地区的法兰西岛还要小。
Now, if you were to make a separate country out of Île-de-France, GDP per capita, I think, would actually be higher than Switzerland.
现在，如果你要从法兰西岛建立一个独立的国家，我认为人均国内生产总值实际上会高于瑞士。
Of course, you can take a wealthy region in your country and say, “Okay, I don’t want to share anything with the rest of the country.
当然，你可以选择你所在国家的一个富裕地区并说：“好吧，我不想与该国其他地区分享任何东西。
I’m going to keep my tax revenue for me.
我将保留我的税收收入。
I’m going to be a tax haven based on bank secrecy.” That’s going to make you 10 percent or 20 percent richer.
我将成为基于银行保密的避税天堂。”这会让你变得更富有 10% 或 20%。
I’m not saying —
我不是说 ——
It’s been a long time since Switzerland relied on bank secrecy, right?
瑞士已经很久没有依赖银行保密了，对吧？
Following 9/11, that Swiss advantage largely went away.
9/11 事件之后，瑞士的优势基本上消失了。
Oh, that’s wrong.
哦，那是错误的。
Oh, you’re wrong on this.
噢，你错了。
It’s the US that’s the secrecy haven.
美国是秘密天堂。
No, it still brings .
不，它仍然带来。
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No, no, I can tell you in terms of the banking sector and the status as a tax haven still brings an additional income of at least 10 percent or 20 percent to Switzerland.
不不，我可以告诉你，就银行业而言，避税天堂的地位仍然给瑞士带来了至少10%或20%的额外收入。
But I agree with you, Switzerland would still be rich even without this.
但我同意你的观点，即使没有这个，瑞士仍然会很富有。
But they would be a bit poorer, and they will certainly not be richer than if you compare to, say, the Paris region GDP per capita or the London region, if you take the wealthiest region.
但如果你拿巴黎地区的人均 GDP 或伦敦地区（如果你拿最富裕的地区来比较的话），他们会更穷一些，而且肯定不会更富裕。
It’s important to compare countries of comparable size, regions of comparable size.
比较同等规模的国家、同等规模的地区非常重要。
You mentioned Norway.
你提到了挪威。
Again, Norway without the oil would be more comparable to Sweden or Denmark in terms of GDP per capita.
同样，没有石油的挪威在人均国内生产总值方面与瑞典或丹麦更具可比性。
Now, the oil is making them richer, but I think this oil should actually remain in the ground.
现在，石油让他们变得更加富有，但我认为这些石油实际上应该留在地下。
I don’t know if you’ve seen this incredible TV series, Occupied, which today, with what’s happening in Ukraine .
我不知道你是否看过这部令人难以置信的电视剧《占领》，该剧讲述了今天在乌克兰发生的事情。
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This is a series where Russia invades Norway in order to restart the oil production in order to make the European Commission happy.
这是俄罗斯入侵挪威以重启石油生产以取悦欧盟委员会的系列剧。
And the European Commission looks as ugly as it can possibly look, which unfortunately is sometimes an accurate description where oil production is so important that you’re ready, in effect, to tolerate things that, in fact, you should not tolerate.
欧盟委员会看起来很丑陋，不幸的是，有时这准确地描述了石油生产如此重要，以至于你实际上已经准备好容忍实际上不应该容忍的事情。
This was just a side note about Norway, but anyway, all explaining an important role.
这只是关于挪威的旁注，但无论如何，都解释了一个重要的作用。
Luxembourg.
卢森堡。
Okay, look, Luxembourg benefits a lot from its —
好吧，看，卢森堡受益匪浅——
But Switzerland is a real country with a diversified economy.
但瑞士是一个真正的经济多元化的国家。
Yes, sure.
是的，当然。
Very little of it is poor.
其中很少有贫穷的。
The Paris region is a real region.
巴黎地区是一个真实的地区。
But that’s a clustering effect within France.
但这是法国内部的集群效应。
France is much poorer than Switzerland.
法国比瑞士穷得多。
Could not France bring Swiss prosperity to —
难道法国不能给瑞士带来繁荣吗？
This is not comparable in size.
这在大小上是没有可比性的。
I don’t think it makes sense.
我认为这没有道理。
Again, if you want to compare a region of about 5 million,10 million inhabitants — which is the size of Switzerland — you find many other regions with comparable GDP per capita all across Europe.
同样，如果你想比较一个拥有大约 500 万、1000 万居民的地区（相当于瑞士的面积），你会发现整个欧洲还有许多其他人均 GDP 相当的地区。
There are many good things with Switzerland, by the way.
顺便说一句，瑞士有很多好东西。
I think the local democratic system has lots of good aspects to it.
我认为地方民主制度有很多好的方面。
The education system has .
教育系统有。
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I think there’s a lot to learn from each of these experiments.
我认为从每个实验中都可以学到很多东西。
The US has a much smaller government than Sweden or Denmark or France, but I think there’s a lot to learn historically from the US, including in terms of equality.
美国的政府比瑞典、丹麦或法国小得多，但我认为历史上有很多值得向美国学习的地方，包括在平等方面。
And I think the enormous educational advance that was there in the US in the 19th century and the middle of the 20th century is key to understanding many of the issues I refer to.
我认为美国在 19 世纪和 20 世纪中叶取得的巨大教育进步是理解我提到的许多问题的关键。
The case of Norway shows that you can also have a very generous welfare state, and that certainly does not prevent you from being prosperous.
挪威的例子表明，你也可以拥有非常慷慨的福利国家，这当然不会妨碍你走向繁荣。
Look, at the level of Europe, we have 27 countries in the European Union.
看，在欧洲层面，我们欧盟有27个国家。
If you look in terms of tax-to-GDP ratio, the countries with the lowest tax-to-GDP ratio are Bulgaria and Romania.
如果从税收占GDP的比率来看，税收占GDP比率最低的国家是保加利亚和罗马尼亚。
The countries with the highest tax-to-GDP ratio are Denmark and Sweden.
税收占 GDP 比例最高的国家是丹麦和瑞典。
If it was enough, in order to become rich, to have a small government, Bulgaria and Romania would be richer than Denmark and Sweden.
如果为了致富，拥有一个小政府就足够了，那么保加利亚和罗马尼亚就会比丹麦和瑞典更富有。
We know that things are more complicated, and it depends on what you do with your tax revenue.
我们知道事情更加复杂，这取决于您如何处理税收收入。
If you use it well, then it’s of use from this evidence that this is complementary with high prosperity.
如果你运用得好，那么从这个证据来看，它是有用的，这与高度繁荣是互补的。
You’ve been awarded a Legion of Honor.
您已被授予荣誉军团勋章。
You turned that down, if I understand correctly, on the grounds that you don’t trust, or don’t want, government handing out status.
如果我理解正确的话，你拒绝了，理由是你不信任或不希望政府给予地位。
If you do not entirely trust governments to hand out status, why trust them so much to redistribute all this wealth?
如果你不完全相信政府会分配地位，那为什么要如此相信他们会重新分配所有这些财富呢？
What’s the political economy constraint on that wealth redistribution process where you say, “Look, this isn’t going to go the way I want it to go”?
当你说“看，这不会按照我想要的方式发展”时，财富再分配过程的政治经济约束是什么？
No, I believe in anonymous rules.
不，我相信匿名规则。
It’s not a belief; it’s not a religious belief or religious faith.
这不是一种信仰；而是一种信仰。这不是一种宗教信仰或宗教信仰。
I study history, and I see that governments, under certain conditions, have been able to develop a public education system, public health system, tax administration, following anonymous rules, which have been working pretty well and which we can improve — we should improve.
我研究历史，我发现政府在某些条件下能够按照匿名规则发展公共教育系统、公共卫生系统、税务管理，这些系统运行得很好，我们可以改进——我们应该改进。
Whereas deciding on an individual basis who is honorable, who is not honorable — it’s a very different business.
然而，根据个人的情况来决定谁是值得尊敬的、谁是不值得尊敬的——这是一件非常不同的事情。
And I think, indeed, that governments are not elected to do these kinds of things.
我确实认为，选举出来的政府并不是来做这些事情的。
This is not what —
这不是 ——
How do you keep the anonymous rules anonymous?
如何保持匿名规则匿名？
There’s slippage.
有滑点。
It’s not something you can easily write into a constitution.
这不是你可以轻易写进宪法的东西。
Yes, but again, if I look at the history of state construction and welfare state development in Sweden or France or Germany, I don’t see what episode you have in mind exactly.
是的，但是，如果我回顾一下瑞典、法国或德国的国家建设和福利国家发展的历史，我不明白你到底想到的是哪一集。
What would be the —
会是什么 —
In the United States, France — for that matter, most countries — there’s plenty of corruption.
在美国、法国——就这一点而言，大多数国家——都存在大量腐败现象。
There are people, companies that get privileges due to tariffs, due to policy, due to —
有些人、公司因为关税、政策、因为 ——而获得特权——
Oh yes, sure.
哦，是的，当然。
And it doesn’t stay anonymous.
而且它不会保持匿名。
Why trust the government so much to redistribute wealth?
为什么如此信任政府来重新分配财富？
The corruption you have in mind — is it in the government of Sweden or France or Germany?
你心目中的腐败 —— 是瑞典、法国还是德国政府的腐败？
Or is it in the private companies, or is it —
或者是在私人公司，还是 ——
I think it’s both.
我认为两者都是。
It’s maybe higher in France and America than in Sweden.
法国和美国的比例可能比瑞典更高。
It’s relatively high in Germany, actually.
事实上，德国的这一比例相对较高。
You have Schröder — he’s put on the board of Gazprom, but you can’t say Germany isn’t corrupt, right?
施罗德 ——他被任命为俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司董事会成员，但你不能说德国不腐败，对吧？
But this is when he joined the private sector.
但这是他加入私营部门的时候。
It was not when he was in government.
这不是他在政府任职时的情况。
Clearly, they were buying the services of people in German government, right?
显然，他们正在购买德国政府人员的服务，对吧？
Yes — actually, no. The example you mentioned is very important because it’s exactly the example where, in fact, I don’t think any of these people, when they were in government, took money.
是的 —— 实际上，不是。你提到的例子非常重要，因为事实上，我认为这些人在政府任职时没有拿过钱。
The problem is if you let them go in the private sector and join this completely insane level of remunerations that you observe in the private sector — this is the problem.
问题是，如果你让他们进入私营部门并加入你在私营部门观察到的完全疯狂的薪酬水平——这就是问题所在。
But I don’t think, in any of these countries .
但我认为，在这些国家中的任何一个国家都不会。
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Give me an example of a political leader who became a billionaire by taking money when he was in office.
举个例子，一个政治领袖在任时靠拿钱成为亿万富翁。
I don’t know —
我不知道 ——
I think they sell their votes much more cheaply than that.
我认为他们出售选票的价格比这便宜得多。
Most of US Congress is quite happy to pass special interest–favoring legislation.
美国国会的大多数议员都非常乐意通过有利于特殊利益的立法。
They don’t get a billion dollars for their vote.
他们的投票并没有获得十亿美元。
Maybe that’s an economic puzzle.
也许这就是一个经济难题。
I think here, the perversity and the bad incentives come from the private sectors in all these examples, not the public sector, where you have salary scale, which in some cases could be reduced further, but which are, in general, much more reasonable than in the private sector, as far as I can see.
我认为，在所有这些例子中，反常现象和不良激励都来自私营部门，而不是公共部门，公共部门的工资标准在某些情况下可能会进一步降低，但据我所知，总的来说，比私营部门合理得多。
You’ve argued France should pay reparations to Haiti.
你认为法国应该向海地支付赔偿。
As I understand it, Haiti does not now really have a well-functioning government.
据我了解，海地目前并没有真正运作良好的政府。
Should France still pay?
法国还应该付钱吗？
Should France wait?
法国应该等待吗？
What’s your view?
你的看法是什么？
Yes, I think France should pay.
是的，我认为法国应该付出代价。
Let me just summarize the story very quickly.
让我快速总结一下这个故事。
This is an example where, when Haiti became independent and when the French state recognized — finally, in 1825 — the independence of Haiti, the French state said, “We are going to recognize your independence only if you pay us a huge amount of money,” which was the equivalent of 300 percent of GDP of Haiti of 1825, “in order to compensate the French slave owners for their loss of property.”
这是一个例子，当海地独立时，当法国政府承认——最终在1825年——海地独立时，法国政府说，“只有你付给我们一大笔钱，我们才会承认你的独立”，这笔钱相当于1825年海地GDP的300%，“以补偿法国奴隶主的财产损失”。
This of course was impossible to repay in one year or in a few years, so French bankers came and refinanced the debt.
这当然不可能在一年或几年内偿还，因此法国银行家前来为债务进行再融资。
And in the end, the debt was repaid until the 1950s.
最终，直到20世纪50年代，债务才还清。
You have payment to the bank of France until 1957.
您在 1957 年之前都会向法国银行付款。
There were many renegotiations.
进行了多次重新谈判。
The US was involved in the process at some point.
美国在某个时候参与了这一过程。
Some of the debt was sold by the French bankers to a consortium of US bankers.
法国银行家将部分债务出售给美国银行家财团。
Anyway, to make a long story short, Haiti effectively repaid between 1825 and 1957 — almost a century and a half — and then almost public debt in order, in effect, to compensate the French slave owners for their loss of property.
不管怎样，长话短说，海地在 1825 年至 1957 年间（几乎一个半世纪）有效地偿还了债务，然后几乎偿还了公共债务，实际上是为了补偿法国奴隶主的财产损失。
I think it is impossible to say today, “This is too old, we don’t care,” because there are reparations that are being made today for expropriation and values, injustices that took place during World War II, or sometimes even during World War I.
我认为今天不可能说“这太旧了，我们不在乎”，因为今天正在对二战期间甚至有时甚至是一战期间发生的征用和价值观、不公正现象进行赔偿。
So, if you say, “For Haiti, this is too late, and for this other reparation or expropriation during World War II, we can still do reparation,” I think you have a problem because then, it makes it very difficult to develop a language of neutrality, of justice upon which we can build future institutional —
因此，如果你说，“对于海地来说，这已经太晚了，而对于二战期间的其他赔偿或征用，我们仍然可以进行赔偿”，我认为你有一个问题，因为那样的话，就很难发展一种中立、正义的语言，我们可以在此基础上建立未来的制度 ——
I wouldn’t say it’s too late, but won’t the money just go into private bank accounts, and it will increase wealth inequality in precisely the way you object to?
我不会说现在已经太晚了，但这些钱会不会直接进入私人银行账户，并且会以您所反对的方式加剧财富不平等？
Oh, that’s certainly not what I am proposing.
哦，这当然不是我的建议。
What I am proposing is, of course, that whenever there is a transfer for reparation or for development aid or whatever you want, we need to have a very strict monitoring of individuals who might get rich or get the money about this.
当然，我的建议是，每当有赔偿或发展援助或任何你想要的转移时，我们都需要对可能因此致富或获得金钱的个人进行非常严格的监控。
Whether they are in the public sector, in the private sector — wherever they are — we should be very strict about that.
无论他们是在公共部门、在私营部门——无论他们在哪里——我们都应该非常严格。
That’s for sure.
这是肯定的。
But isn’t that re-imposing a kind of colonialism on Haitian government?
但这不是把某种殖民主义重新强加给海地政府吗？
If the French are going to monitor where all the money flows within Haitian government, that would require establishing quite a bit of sovereignty over Haiti.
如果法国要监控海地政府内部所有资金的流向，就需要对海地建立相当多的主权。
I think Haiti should be part of that.
我认为海地应该成为其中的一部分。
I think there are lots of people in Haiti who would like to monitor how this money is being used.
我认为海地有很多人希望监督这笔钱的使用情况。
Look, I’m not saying this is simple, but reparations are never simple.
看，我并不是说这很简单，但赔偿从来都不是简单的。
I can tell you, in my country you had to wait until 1999–2000 — only 20 years ago — for an official commission to look seriously at post–World War II reparation and Jewish expropriation during World War II, so this process takes time.
我可以告诉你，在我的国家，你必须等到1999-2000年——“仅仅20年前”——才有一个正式的委员会来认真研究二战后的赔偿和二战期间犹太人的征用，所以这个过程需要时间。
If you look in the US, remember, you have to wait until 1988 to see a law adopted by US Congress to have reparation for the Japanese Americans which, as you know, were interred during World War II.
如果你看看美国，请记住，你必须等到 1988 年才能看到美国国会通过一项法律，为二战期间被埋葬的日裔美国人提供赔偿。
During many decades people were saying, “Oh that’s impossible.
几十年来，人们一直在说：“哦，这是不可能的。
That’s too complicated.
那太复杂了。
Where are we going to draw the line?
我们要在哪里划清界限？
Where are we going to stop?
我们要在哪里停下来？
How can you decide the amount?”
你如何决定金额？”
I understand these are complicated decisions to be made.
我知道这些都是需要做出的复杂决定。
Is this a reason to forget about it and say we don’t care anymore?
这是忘记它并说我们不再关心的理由吗？
I don’t think so.
我不这么认为。
I think this would be the worst answer.
我认为这将是最糟糕的答案。
I fully recognize the complexity of the task.
我充分认识到这项任务的复杂性。
I’m certainly not trying to say this is easy, et cetera, but I reiterate my claim that if you abandon any attempt for justice, then you are in a very difficult situation to prepare for the future.
我当然不是想说这很容易，等等，但我重申我的主张，如果你放弃任何伸张正义的尝试，那么你将处于非常困难的境地，无法为未来做好准备。
Because then, people will tell you, “You care about this kind of expropriation and injustices, but you don’t care about this other kind.”
因为那时，人们会告诉你，“你关心这种征用和不公正，但你不关心另一种。”
You have to try to develop some universal approach to justice in terms of objective criteria, including the distribution of income, the distribution of wealth, access to education.
你必须尝试根据客观标准制定一些普遍的正义方法，包括收入分配、财富分配、教育机会。
I don’t know any other approach.
我不知道还有什么其他方法。
I know you’re very much a European federalist.
我知道您是一位欧洲联邦主义者。
In at least one interview, you argued that the major countries in the current European Union should, in a sense, secede and set up their own arrangements, part of which would redistribute more wealth.
您至少在一次采访中认为，从某种意义上说，当前欧盟的主要国家应该脱离并建立自己的安排，其中一部分将重新分配更多的财富。
Would the net actual effect of that not be to greatly weaken the European Union we have now?
这样做的最终实际影响难道不会大大削弱我们现在拥有的欧盟吗？
You would have multiple tiers, or how is that going to work?
你会有多个层级，或者这是如何运作的？
First of all, I have been involved in writing this manifesto for the democratization of Europe.
首先，我参与撰写了这份欧洲民主化宣言。
We have made a very large group of scholars from all over Europe — lawyers, political scientists, economists.
我们培养了一大群来自欧洲各地的学者——律师、政治学家、经济学家。
We have been proposing concrete changes in the treaties that organize the European Union.
我们一直在提议对组织欧盟的条约进行具体修改。
We are making very concrete proposals on improving the working of the European Union.
我们正在就改善欧盟的工作提出非常具体的建议。
Indeed, I am a European federalist.
事实上，我是一名欧洲联邦主义者。
I am a European, what I call, social federalist in the sense that I want federalism to be able to deliver more social justice, to deliver more popular support to Europe, which today is not exactly the case.
我是一个欧洲人，我称之为社会联邦主义者，因为我希望联邦制能够实现更多的社会正义，为欧洲提供更多民众的支持，但今天的情况并非如此。
If you look at the Brexit vote, the lower-income groups voted to exit.
如果你看看英国脱欧公投，就会发现低收入群体投票决定退出。
Upper-income groups and upper-education groups voted to stay.
高收入群体和高等教育群体投票决定留下来。
I think there’s something wrong going on.
我认为出了什么问题。
I think we need a different kind of Europe which brings more social justice, fiscal justice.
我认为我们需要一个不同类型的欧洲，带来更多的社会正义和财政正义。
One of the solutions — certainly not the only one — is to be able to make a majority-rule decision-making over taxation.
解决方案之一（当然不是唯一的）是能够就税收问题做出多数决定决策。
The problem today is that, if Luxembourg wants to put their veto on taxation of multinationals or taxation of billionaires in Europe, then you cannot do anything together, in spite of the fact that Luxembourg, with 300,000 inhabitants, is less than 0.1 percent of the population of the European Union, which is 500 million.
今天的问题是，如果卢森堡想否决对欧洲跨国公司征税或对欧洲亿万富翁征税，那么你们就无法一起做任何事情，尽管拥有30万居民的卢森堡还不到欧盟5亿人口的0.1%。
It’s even less than the nobility in France in 1789, where the nobility was about 1 percent of the population, and they had veto power about taxation.
甚至比1789年法国的贵族还要少，当时贵族约占人口的1%，而且对税收有否决权。
I’m saying this cannot continue for very long.
我是说这种情况不会持续太久。
In the proposal we’ve been making, it’s not .
在我们提出的提案中，事实并非如此。
.
。
.
。
what I want to say regarding your question is that it’s not open only to large countries.
关于你的问题我想说的是，它不仅仅对大国开放。
It’s also open to every country in the European Union, or even outside the European Union which may want to join at some point.
它也向欧盟的每个国家开放，甚至向欧盟以外可能想在某个时候加入的国家开放。
I’m just saying that if you take Germany, France, Italy, Spain — these four countries make almost 80 percent of the population and GDP of the eurozone.
我只是说，如果以德国、法国、意大利、西班牙为例，这四个国家的人口和GDP几乎占欧元区的80%。
If these four countries are ready to go, I think they should go.
如果这四个国家准备好了，我认为他们就应该去。
They should try to convince as many other countries as possible.
他们应该尝试说服尽可能多的其他国家。
I think the current arrangement where, officially, we have the unanimity rule for all fiscal and budgetary matters .
我认为在目前的安排中，我们正式对所有财政和预算事务实行一致同意的规则。
.
。
.
。
Remember what happened last year with the post-COVID recovery plan.
请记住去年新冠疫情后恢复计划中发生的事情。
In effect, France and Germany put so much pressure on the Netherlands, Sweden, et cetera, that in the end there was unanimity to have common borrowing and a recovery plan.
实际上，法国和德国对荷兰、瑞典等国施加了巨大压力，以至于最终一致同意制定共同借款和复苏计划。
But in a way, this was a fake unanimity.
但在某种程度上，这是一种虚假的一致。
There’s a risk that in the end, you make everybody unhappy because people are forced to agree.
最终，你可能会让每个人都不高兴，因为人们被迫同意。
In effect, what happened is that France and Germany told Netherlands and Sweden, “If you don’t want to come in, we’re going to have a separate arrangement between us, and we will do it without you.” So they said, “Okay, we will do it with you.” I don’t think this is the right way to organize political decisions.
实际上，法国和德国告诉荷兰和瑞典，“如果你们不想进来，我们之间将有一个单独的安排，我们将在没有你们参与的情况下完成。”所以他们说：“好吧，我们会和你一起做。”我认为这不是组织政治决策的正确方式。
I think we should have majority-rule decision-making, and not based on country against country.
我认为我们应该采取多数决定的决策，而不是基于国家对国家的对抗。
That’s why the proposal we are making in the manifesto for the democratization of Europe is to have a European assembly, where members of national parliament will come and be in front of each other.
这就是为什么我们在欧洲民主化宣言中提出的建议是召开欧洲议会，各国议会成员将出席并面对面。
They will be there in proportion to the population of each country and in proportion to the size of each political group in each country, so that it’s not just country against country.
他们的存在将按照每个国家的人口比例以及每个国家每个政治团体的规模比例进行，因此这不仅仅是国家与国家之间的对抗。
When you have the head of state of Germany, the head of state of France, the head of state of Sweden, or the minister of finance of Germany, France, and Sweden — when you have only one individual to represent the supposed interest of 18 million Germans or 65 million French, it’s a machinery to make national interests against national interests.
当德国国家元首、法国国家元首、瑞典国家元首，或者德国、法国和瑞典的财政部长时——当你只有一个人代表1800万德国人或6500万法国人的所谓利益时，它就是一台使国家利益与国家利益对抗的机器。
Whereas, in fact, within Germany or within France or within the Netherlands, people disagree, obviously.
然而事实上，在德国、法国或荷兰，人们显然不同意。
They have different political leanings.
他们有不同的政治倾向。
I think the current European parliament is not enough because in the end, it’s really the national parliament — the German Bundestag, the French Assemblée nationale — who have the political legitimacy to make their taxpayer pay more or less tax and to take budgetary decisions.
我认为目前的欧洲议会还不够，因为归根结底，真正是国家议会——德国联邦议院、法国国民议会——拥有政治合法性来让纳税人缴纳更多或更少的税，并做出预算决定。
Today, we are in this strange situation where each national parliament has, in effect, a veto power on all budgetary and fiscal decisions.
今天，我们处于这种奇怪的境地，每个国家议会实际上对所有预算和财政决策都拥有否决权。
Indeed, I think, one way to go beyond that is to actually put these national parliament members together, maybe one week per month, in the European assembly, to vote over budgetary decisions.
事实上，我认为，超越这一点的一种方法是实际上将这些国家议会成员聚集在一起，也许每月一周，在欧洲议会中对预算决定进行投票。
What will come out of this, I don’t know, but I trust democracy.
我不知道这会产生什么结果，但我相信民主。
I think it could bring more social justice and fiscal justice.
我认为这可以带来更多的社会正义和财政正义。
If I just take one example, which is corporate taxation, remember that the US, until Trump, had a federal corporate tax rate of 35 percent in addition to the state corporate tax rate.
如果我只举一个例子，即企业税，请记住，在特朗普当选之前，美国除了州企业税率外，联邦企业税率为 35%。
Whereas in Europe, corporate tax competition had led corporate tax rate to grow to 20 , 10 , et cetera — which is very paradoxical in a way, the fact that Europe has led the movement towards more tax competition and corporate taxation, because Europe has a bigger welfare state to pay for than the US.
而在欧洲，公司税竞争导致公司税率增长到20%、10%等等——这在某种程度上非常矛盾，事实上，欧洲引领了更多税收竞争和公司税的运动，因为欧洲需要支付比美国更大的福利国家。
I think this shows that political institution — the fact that you have federal corporate tax and income tax in the US but not in Europe — makes a difference.
我认为这表明政治制度（即美国有联邦公司税和所得税，但欧洲没有）会产生影响。
Anyway, we could talk a lot more about this, but that’s basically my view.
无论如何，我们可以就此进行更多讨论，但这基本上是我的观点。
If we really want to limit wealth inequality, why shouldn’t the European Union let in — as immigrants — many, many more non-Europeans?
如果我们真的想限制财富不平等，为什么欧盟不应该让更多的非欧洲人进入————作为移民——？
Won’t that just limit wealth inequality almost overnight?
这难道不会几乎在一夜之间限制财富不平等吗？
Is that a good idea?
这是个好主意吗？
I don’t think you endorse it in your book, but that seems to me, by far, the easiest and most direct way to limit wealth inequality.
我不认为你在书中认可了这一点，但在我看来，这是迄今为止限制财富不平等最简单、最直接的方法。
Sorry, we should do what?
抱歉，我们应该做什么？
Take in more non-European immigrants on a very large scale.
大规模接纳更多非欧洲移民。
Why not do that?
为什么不这样做呢？
You mean to reduce wealth inequality at the world level?
您的意思是减少世界范围内的财富不平等？
Sure.
当然。
There’s poor people all over the world, including in former French colonies, and take many more into the EU.
世界各地都有穷人，包括前法国殖民地的穷人，并且将更多的人带入欧盟。
Yes, I am in favor of more migration and more open borders.
是的，我赞成更多的移民和更开放的边界。
Roughly speaking, I am in favor of more control of capital and capital flows and less control of labor flows — whereas today, we do the opposite.
粗略地说，我赞成加强对资本和资本流动的控制，减少对劳动力流动的控制 ——而今天，我们的做法恰恰相反。
We have completely free capital flows and no fiscal coordination about corporate taxation or capital taxation, and we have strong restriction of labor flows.
我们有完全自由的资本流动，没有关于公司税或资本税的财政协调，而且我们对劳动力流动有严格的限制。
I think it’s important to address the two issues together because, if you only open labor flows without changing the regulation of capital and wealth taxation, then you’re going to reduce inequality in the sense that many people from the south might benefit, but you’re going to increase inequality within the populations that today live in the north.
我认为同时解决这两个问题很重要，因为如果你只开放劳动力流动而不改变资本和财富税的监管，那么你就会减少不平等，因为许多来自南方的人可能会受益，但你会加剧今天生活在北方的人口内部的不平等。
And the big winners may be top people in the north, also top people in the south, but bottom people in the north will lose.
而大赢家可能是北方顶尖的人，也可能是南方顶尖的人，但北方底层的人会输。
I think if you want a fair solution, you need to do exactly what you say, but together with redistribution of wealth and income, not only in the north but also in the south.
我认为，如果你想要一个公平的解决方案，你需要完全按照你所说的去做，但同时还要重新分配财富和收入，不仅在北方，而且在南方。
It seems that’s perfectly complementary with what I am saying.
看来这与我所说的完全互补。
Last question: what do you think of Michel Houellebecq and his book Submission?
最后一个问题：您如何看待米歇尔·维勒贝克（Michel Houellebecq）和他的《提交》一书？
This is too nihilistic for me.
这对我来说太虚无主义了。
He has some talent.
他有一些天赋。
He makes me think a lot of Céline.
他让我想起了很多席琳。
I don’t know if you know Céline, but —
我不知道你是否认识 Céline，但是 ——
Of course.
当然。
— Céline is a novelist of the interwar period in France who wrote this incredible novel, Voyage au bout de la nuit, where, basically, he tells us his experience during World War I.
— 席琳是法国两次世界大战期间的小说家，他写了这部令人难以置信的小说《夜行》，基本上，他在书中向我们讲述了他在第一次世界大战期间的经历。
And then, after World War I, he goes to Africa.
第一次世界大战结束后，他去了非洲。
Then he goes to Detroit.
然后他去了底特律。
Basically, he’s completely desperate about the world.
基本上，他对这个世界完全绝望了。
He’s desperate about World War I, of course.
当然，他对第一次世界大战感到绝望。
He’s desperate about colonialism.
他对殖民主义感到绝望。
He’s desperate about capitalism in Detroit.
他对底特律的资本主义感到绝望。
He’s completely nihilistic, but he has a lot of talent.
他完全是虚无主义者，但他却很有才华。
I think Houellebecq is a nihilist.
我认为维勒贝克是一个虚无主义者。
He has a lot of talent.
他有很多才华。
I think he’s — but in terms of political views, to me, he’s just very nihilistic.
我认为他是——但就政治观点而言，对我来说，他非常虚无主义。
I had the opportunity to debate with him and have a public discussion with him.
我有机会与他辩论并与他进行公开讨论。
He’s too nihilistic for me.
他对我来说太虚无主义了。
I believe we can make the world better.
我相信我们可以让世界变得更美好。
The problem is with institutions, not with people.
问题出在机构，而不是人。
I think human beings are basically good, so to speak, and the institutions are not always at the level of the human beings — partly because it’s difficult, of course, to set up the right institution.
我认为，可以这么说，人类本质上是善良的，而制度并不总是处于人类的水平——部分原因当然是很难建立正确的制度。
But we can learn from history.
但我们可以从历史中吸取教训。
I’m trying, with my work, to contribute to this collective process of learning from history on how to build better institutions to have a better world.
我正在努力通过我的工作，为这个从历史中学习如何建立更好的机构以拥有更美好的世界的集体过程做出贡献。
Thomas, thank you very much.
托马斯，非常感谢你。
Again, everyone, the new book is A Brief History of Equality.
大家好，这本新书是《平等简史》。
Thanks a lot, Tyler.
非常感谢，泰勒。