Steve Teles and Brink Lindsey on <em>The Captured Economy</em> (BONUS)

Today on the podcast, we’re gonna have Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles.

今天的播客节目中，我们将邀请布林克·林赛 (Brink Lindsey) 和史蒂文·泰勒斯 (Steven Teles)。

And they have together co-authored a new book “The Captured Economy: How the Powerful Enrich Themselves, Slow Down Growth, and Increase Inequality.” What happens in this book is that you have a liberal and a libertarian come together.

他们还共同撰写了一本新书《被俘获的经济：强者如何丰富自己、减缓增长并加剧不平等》。这本书中发生的事情是，自由主义者和自由主义者走到了一起。

In fact, together they’ve helped produce something called liberaltarianism and try to show or set out a series of policy changes we could make that would both boost the rate of economic growth and give us a more equal society.

事实上，他们共同帮助产生了一种叫做自由主义的东西，并试图展示或制定一系列我们可以做出的政策改变，这些改变既能提高经济增长率，又能给我们一个更加平等的社会。

I think this is one of the most important books of the year, but the podcast today, we’re gonna do a little differently.

我认为这是今年最重要的书之一，但今天的播客，我们会做一些不同的事情。

Rather than talk to the two of them together, we’re going to do them sequentially.

我们不会同时与他们两个交谈，而是按顺序进行。

First, will be Steven Teles, second will be Brink Lindsey.

第一名是史蒂文·特莱斯（Steven Teles），第二名是布林克·林赛（Brink Lindsey）。

And I’m actually even gonna ask them some of the exact same questions, or at least parallel questions, so you can compare the different answers because again, part of the interesting feature of this book is that it is a co-authored product from people of two different points of view.

事实上，我什至会问他们一些完全相同的问题，或者至少是平行的问题，这样你就可以比较不同的答案，因为这本书的一个有趣的特点是，它是由两种不同观点的人共同创作的产品。

To introduce Steve, he is a professor at Johns Hopkins University in the Department of Political Science, and he is also a senior fellow at the Niskanen Center.

介绍一下史蒂夫，他是约翰·霍普金斯大学政治学系的教授，同时也是尼斯卡宁中心的高级研究员。

Welcome Steve.

欢迎史蒂夫。

Thank you very much.

非常感谢。

We just dive in with questions.

我们只是带着问题深入探讨。

First question, if we think about inequality in America today, how much of it is due to bad policy as opposed to people not having the right skills or there being some kind of cognitive or human capital gap?

第一个问题，如果我们考虑当今美国的不平等，其中有多少是由于糟糕的政策而不是人们没有合适的技能或存在某种认知或人力资本差距？

I hate to disappoint you but I don’t think there’s any way to measure that.

我不想让你失望，但我认为没有任何方法可以衡量这一点。

We dug around to try and figure out for good, aggregate ways to measure the extent of rent-seeking, and its interaction with skills, and the extent in the market, and we weren’t able to find them.

我们四处寻找，试图找出衡量寻租程度、其与技能的相互作用以及市场程度的良好综合方法，但我们未能找到它们。

In some sense also, measuring rent-seeking may be simply analytically impossible.

从某种意义上说，衡量寻租也可能在分析上根本不可能。

We certainly tried to figure out how you would do it.

我们当然试图弄清楚你会如何做。

Part of it is rent-seeking is to some degree a judgmental category, rather than one that’s easily measured by some neutral measure.

其中一部分是寻租在某种程度上是一种判断类别，而不是可以通过某种中立措施轻松衡量的类别。

I think the main thing you can say, is we have evidence in the book that it’s substantial.

我认为你能说的最重要的是，我们在书中有证据表明它是实质性的。

We sure have some evidence that the distribution of rent-seeking is changing but being able to come up with any good aggregate measure of how it compares to other causes of inequalities is impossible, which is not a very desirable or satisfactory answer.

我们确实有一些证据表明寻租的分布正在发生变化，但不可能提出任何好的总体衡量标准来衡量它与其他不平等原因的比较，这不是一个非常理想或令人满意的答案。

But that’s about the best answer you can give.

但这就是你能给出的最佳答案。

We have this thing in public choice economics, I’m sure you know it, it sometimes called the Tullock paradox.

我们在公共选择经济学中有这个东西，我相信你知道它，有时被称为塔洛克悖论。

Gordon Tullock, my former colleague, he set out to measure how much was spent on lobbying, relative to how much is handed out by government.

我的前同事戈登·塔洛克（Gordon Tullock）开始衡量游说方面的支出与政府发放的支出之间的关系。

And Tullock, at least, thought that the amount spent on lobbying is actually remarkably low.

至少塔洛克认为，用于游说的金额实际上非常低。

It may appear large if you’re sitting in Arlington, Virginia but relative to GDP, it’s pretty tiny, and the amount of resources controlled by government is pretty significant.

如果你坐在弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿，它可能看起来很大，但相对于国内生产总值来说，它相当小，而且政府控制的资源数量相当大。

How is it that you think about the Tullock paradox, at least on the surface, some kind of rent-seeking costs would seem to be low?

您如何看待塔洛克悖论，至少从表面上看，某种寻租成本似乎很低？

Right.

正确的。

As I understand the Tullock paradox, it’s that essentially the amount of lobbying should approach the overall amount of rent, right?

据我了解塔洛克悖论，游说的数量本质上应该接近租金总额，对吗？

That is the amount that everyone expends, trying to capture whatever rents there are, should go up to that level, and the paradox is, why doesn’t it?

这是每个人为了获取租金而花费的金额，应该达到这个水平，但矛盾的是，为什么不呢？

One is, that can be a institutionally established equilibrium, that is in the Tullock model, there’s no institutions.

一是，这可以是一种制度上建立的均衡，即在塔洛克模型中，没有制度。

Whereas, we have a very substantial separation of powers that tends to lock in the status quo and reduce therefore the incentives for investing in lobbying.

然而，我们的权力分立非常严重，这往往会锁定现状，从而减少投资游说的动力。

You also have severe limits on the political agenda which again means there’s only so many things that you cannot debate simultaneously.

你对政治议程也有严格的限制，这再次意味着你不能同时辩论的事情太多了。

That creates a very substantial protection for the status quo.

这为现状提供了非常实质性的保护。

In that sense, if you’re given that a huge amount of lobbying is designed simply to keep political actors from doing anything.

从这个意义上说，如果你知道大量的游说只是为了阻止政治参与者做任何事情。

From simply having them take a walk and not on challenge the existing status quo, both institutions and the institutional factor of limited agendas.

从简单地让他们散步而不是挑战现有的现状，无论是制度还是有限议程的制度因素。

A limited agenda space would suggest that they don’t need to invest all that energy and at least protecting their existing rents, it would all go into expanding the ones they don’t have.

有限的议程空间意味着他们不需要投入所有的精力，至少可以保护现有的租金，这一切都将用于扩大他们没有的租金。

Let me play devil’s advocate for a moment and try to defend crony capitalism.

让我暂时唱反调，尝试为裙带资本主义辩护。

You look at the last 50 years and you ask yourself, “What are the two greatest growth miracles that have been seen on planet Earth?” Maybe the two greatest ever.

回顾过去 50 年，你会问自己：“地球上最伟大的两个增长奇迹是什么？”也许是有史以来最伟大的两个。

It seems plausible candidates would be one, China and two, South Korea.

看起来合理的候选者之一是中国，第二个是韩国。

And they’re about the most crony capitalistic societies you could imagine.

它们是你能想象到的最任人唯亲的资本主义社会。

If someone says, “Well, there’s two kinds of crony capitalism.

如果有人说：“嗯，裙带资本主义有两种。

Under one kind, the incentives are for the cronies to invest in infrastructure and human capital and then it does just fine.

一种是激励亲信投资基础设施和人力资本，然后效果就很好。

And then there’s other kinds of crony capitalism that stifle investment in education and infrastructure, but maybe the key is education and infrastructure and we just need a better crony capitalism of the sort, that say, South Korea and to some extent China have had.” What’s your reaction?

还有其他类型的裙带资本主义会扼杀对教育和基础设施的投资，但也许关键是教育和基础设施，我们只需要一种更好的裙带资本主义，韩国和某种程度上中国都有这种资本主义。”你的反应是什么？

Well, so first of all, the politics of rent in the economics or in operations we think very differently whether you’re at the outer edge of growth like the United States or Germany or Britain, and very different if you’re in a developing country…

好吧，首先，无论你是在美国、德国还是英国这样的增长边缘，我们对经济或运营中的租金政治的看法都非常不同，如果你在发展中国家，我们的看法也非常不同……

That is developing countries, first of all, have a lot of catch up growth that they can do, and if they…

首先，发展中国家有很多可以实现的追赶性增长，如果他们……

They’re not since they have a potential for 10%, 11%, 12% growth.

但事实并非如此，因为它们有 10%、11%、12% 的增长潜力。

If some of that, substantial amount of that, gets filtered off into payoffs and lobbying or whatever, that’s not a big deal.

如果其中一些，大量的，被过滤成回报和游说或其他什么，那没什么大不了的。

They’ve got, in some sense, more room to do that.

从某种意义上说，他们有更多的空间来做到这一点。

Also there’s some political science that suggest, at least at that level of development, some level of cronyism might actually facilitate growth in a way that it wouldn’t necessarily in an advanced economy.

此外，还有一些政治学表明，至少在当前的发展水平上，某种程度的任人唯亲实际上可能会促进经济增长，而在发达经济体中则不一定如此。

I wouldn’t assume that you can look at the two sides as being parallel in that sense.

我不认为你可以从这个意义上将两条边视为平行。

If we look at the federal budget and the tax system that accompanies it, that’s relatively easy to measure.

如果我们看看联邦预算和与之相伴的税收制度，就会发现相对容易衡量。

Do you see the net impact of our tax and budgetary decisions as being progressive or regressive?

您认为我们的税收和预算决策的净影响是累进还是累退？

For one thing, so the book is all about the regulatory system.

一方面，这本书是关于监管体系的。

And I know that by saying that one argument we make, and this relates to an article I wrote called “Kludgeocracy,” which is that it’s really these other parts, other ways the government influences the economy other than directly through taxing and spending that are most likely to have these anti-growth, incumbent-protecting kind of qualities.

我知道，我们提出的一个论点与我写的一篇名为《克鲁权政治》的文章有关，即政府除了直接通过税收和支出之外影响经济的其他部分、其他方式最有可能具有这些反增长、保护现任者的品质。

That is the more salient, the more visible the policy instrument is, the more easy it is to capture for the purposes of upward redistribution.

也就是说，政策工具越显着、越明显，就越容易被用于向上再分配的目的。

Given that a substantial amount of our spending is entitlements and they…

鉴于我们的大部分支出都是福利，而且他们……

We have difference of opinion.

我们有不同意见。

I think those are basically progressive on net given the inflow and outflow in them.

我认为考虑到它们的流入和流出，这些在网上基本上是渐进的。

And that our tax system, if anything, may be too progressive.

我们的税收制度（如果有的话）可能过于累进。

That is, it’s too progressive to raise the amount of revenue that we need for the amount of state that we want.

也就是说，对于我们想要的国家数量而言，增加我们所需的收入数额太过进步了。

I think our tax and benefit system, which could be doing better or at least doing better than our regulatory and litigation systems.

我认为我们的税收和福利制度可能会做得更好，或者至少比我们的监管和诉讼制度做得更好。

What if there is a potential default hypothesis?

如果存在潜在的默认假设怎么办？

That policy just doesn’t change the distribution of wealth very much.

这项政策并没有太大改变财富的分配。

The tax and fiscal side, that makes things somewhat more progressive.

税收和财政方面，这使得事情变得更加进步。

The regulatory side, as you argue convincingly in the book, that’s regressive and inefficient.

正如您在书中令人信服地论证的那样，监管方面是倒退且低效的。

And in part, we let the regulatory side get away with that because on the fiscal side we adjust, and maybe policy as a whole just doesn’t change the overall broad features of the distribution of wealth, something a bit like Pareto’s old law.

在某种程度上，我们让监管方面摆脱了这一点，因为在财政方面我们进行了调整，也许整个政策并没有改变财富分配的总体广泛特征，这有点像帕累托的旧法则。

And maybe it’s just much harder to change the distribution of wealth than we think because rent-seeking is another activity and the forces that are good at other things.

也许改变财富分配比我们想象的要困难得多，因为寻租是另一种活动，也是擅长其他事情的力量。

And is government when it comes to distribution actually, ultimately, maybe awash?

政府在分配方面实际上最终可能会被淹没吗？

Yes or no?

是还是不是？

There’s two things wrong with that.

这有两件事是错误的。

One is the argument from Pareto you made doesn’t have a mechanism.

一是你提出的帕累托论证没有机制。

That is, it might accidentally be the case of the two sides would equilibrate.

也就是说，可能会意外地出现两侧达到平衡的情况。

That doesn’t mean that there’s…

这并不意味着有……

But your argument assumes there’s a mechanism connecting them somehow, although it is unspecified exactly what that mechanism is…

但你的论点假设有一种机制以某种方式连接它们，尽管没有具体说明该机制是什么......

But think of lobbying as another sector.

但可以将游说视为另一个部门。

If we add on like the ski wear sector to the economy, that won’t change the distribution of wealth much because people who are good at building software maybe are also, on average, good at building ski wear.

如果我们将滑雪服行业加入到经济中，这不会对财富分配产生太大影响，因为平均而言，擅长构建软件的人可能也擅长构建滑雪服。

So lobbying is just another sector and the mechanism is adding on more sectors, it won’t change distribution much.

所以游说只是另一个部门，该机制正在增加更多部门，它不会改变分配。

To go to the other side though, A, I do think that there are substantial evidence in the book that the policy regime has in fact redistributed upward, or it has created protection.

不过，从另一方面来说，A，我确实认为书中有大量证据表明政策制度实际上已经向上重新分配，或者已经创造了保护。

If you look at finance I do think…

如果你看看金融，我确实认为……

Even adjusting for the tax and fiscal side.

甚至对税收和财政方面进行调整。

Yes.

是的。

Well, ’cause A, I don’t think the tax and fiscal side…

嗯，因为 A，我不认为税收和财政方面……

I think the tax and fiscal side has been more or less neutral over the last 30 or 40 years.

我认为在过去 30 或 40 年里，税收和财政方面或多或少是中性的。

I think, especially if you include state and local taxes which tend to be much more regressive than federal taxes, that pushes even more in the other direction.

我认为，特别是如果你把州税和地方税也算进去，而州税和地方税往往比联邦税更具累退性，这会进一步推动另一个方向的发展。

But I think certainly there’s evidence in our book that both the finance and the IP regime have led to very substantial upward distribution and have in fact changed the distribution of income in the economy.

但我认为，我们的书中确实有证据表明，金融和知识产权制度都导致了非常大幅度的向上分配，并且实际上改变了经济中的收入分配。

So A, I would question your assumption that while everything’s basically have been awash over the last 50 years, I think even including both the tax and benefits system and the regulatory system, there’s pretty substantial evidence that the policy regime has re-distributed upward.

所以，我对你的假设提出质疑，即虽然在过去 50 年里一切基本上都被淹没了，但我认为即使包括税收和福利体系以及监管体系，也有相当多的证据表明政策制度已经向上重新分配。

As you probably know, Walter Scheidel has a fairly new book and it’s called “The Great Leveler.” And he argues another version of the default hypothesis that inequality tends to stick, and you have big egalitarian changes essentially only through war and widespread destruction.

您可能知道，沃尔特·沙伊德尔（Walter Scheidel）有一本相当新的书，名叫《伟大的矫平者》（The Great Leveler）。他提出了默认假设的另一种版本，即不平等往往会持续存在，而平等主义的巨大变化基本上只能通过战争和广泛的破坏来实现。

What’s your opinion?

你有什么看法？