Stanley McChrystal on the Military, Leadership, and Risk (Ep. 134)
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today, I’m here with Stan McChrystal.
今天，我和斯坦·麦克克里斯特尔在一起。
I sometimes call him General Stanley McChrystal.
我有时称他为斯坦利·麦克里斯特尔将军。
He has a new book out, co-authored with Anna Butrico.
他出版了一本与安娜·布特里科 (Anna Butrico) 合着的新书。
It is new and exciting.
这是新的、令人兴奋的。
It is called Risk: A User’s Guide.
它被称为风险：用户指南。
Stan, welcome.
斯坦，欢迎。
Thanks for having me, Tyler.
谢谢你邀请我，泰勒。
Let me start with some questions about risk.
让我从一些有关风险的问题开始。
Now, if we go to the postwar era after World War II, a lot of serious intellectuals thought the risk of a nuclear war was pretty high in the next few decades.
现在，如果我们回到二战后的战后时代，许多严肃的知识分子认为未来几十年发生核战争的风险相当高。
We built bomb shelters everywhere.
我们到处都建造了防空洞。
Were we then overreacting?
我们当时反应过度了吗？
Or are we, today, under-reacting?
还是我们今天反应不足？
When were we thinking badly about risk?
我们什么时候对风险考虑得不好？
It’s funny, my third-grade classmate, David Langely — his father was an Air Force major, and they actually built a shelter under their front yard, a bomb shelter, and that was the time in the early 1960s when that seemed to be very, very real.
有趣的是，我三年级的同学大卫·兰格利（David Langely）——他的父亲是一名空军少校，他们实际上在他们的前院下建造了一个避难所，一个防空洞，而那是在 20 世纪 60 年代初期，这似乎非常非常真实。
I don’t think they were overreacting.
我不认为他们反应过度。
I actually think that the likelihood of nuclear war was probably closer than we thought.
事实上，我认为核战争的可能性可能比我们想象的更接近。
Now we’ve lived near the precipice long enough where we take it for granted.
现在我们已经在悬崖边生活了足够长的时间，我们认为这是理所当然的。
Things like cybersecurity, I think, are a greater risk than we actually admit.
我认为，诸如网络安全之类的风险比我们实际承认的要大。
Do you think 1950s America was better at thinking about risk because it had just lived through World War II?
您认为 20 世纪 50 年代的美国是否因为刚刚经历过二战而更善于思考风险？
Or are we better at thinking about risk?
或者我们是否更善于思考风险？
I think the people who were thinking seriously about risk — you hate to generalize — were thinking better.
我认为那些认真思考风险的人——“你讨厌一概而论”——思考得更好。
If you think about all of the deep thought that went on nuclear strategy — while on the one hand, nuclear war was unthinkable, and we laugh now with the Dr. Strangelove idea, how could they even contemplate it?
如果你想一想关于核战略的所有深刻思考——一方面，核战争是不可想象的，我们现在嘲笑奇爱博士的想法，但他们怎么可能考虑它？
In reality, game theory and whatnot was actually some pretty careful thought on actual risk and then things like deterrence.
事实上，博弈论之类的东西实际上是对实际风险以及威慑等问题的一些非常仔细的思考。
When it comes to warfare, what do you think is, today, the most common probabilistic mistake made by US policymakers?
谈到战争，您认为当今美国决策者最常见的概率错误是什么？
I don’t mean this to be about naming names.
我的意思并不是要指名道姓。
Just in general, what’s our blind spot?
总的来说，我们的盲点是什么？
Yeah, I think we want to oversimplify it.
是的，我认为我们想把它过于简单化。
We want to look back at World War II and see it as simplistic.
我们想回顾第二次世界大战，并认为它过于简单化。
You go crush your enemy into rubble, and then in the aftermath, you rebuild.
你将敌人碾成废墟，然后重建。
Yet, from Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, we often don’t admit the complexities because you’re dealing with war among people and of people.
然而，在朝鲜、越南、阿富汗和伊拉克，我们常常不承认其中的复杂性，因为我们面对的是人与人之间、人与人之间的战争。
So, you’re dealing with societies, not straight weapon on weapon or an army on army.
所以，你面对的是社会，而不是直接的武器对武器或军队对军队。
I don’t think we do that as well as we should.
我认为我们没有做得很好。
If that’s the most common probabilistic mistake of policymakers, what would be the most common probabilistic mistake of military commanders in the US?
如果这是政策制定者最常见的概率错误，那么美国军事指挥官最常见的概率错误是什么？
I think it’s a subset of that.
我认为这是其中的一个子集。
Military commanders have been shaped to think that they have to win battlefield victories.
军事指挥官已经被塑造成认为他们必须赢得战场胜利。
It’s hard to argue with the importance of being able to do that, but in the modern era, that very rarely solves the problem.
很难否认能够做到这一点的重要性，但在现代，这很少能解决问题。
The problem is bigger and more complex than that.
问题比这更大、更复杂。
For example, the first Gulf War, which is held up as an example of a very clean victory — in reality, in the aftermath of that, Saddam Hussein used the chaos to brutalize part of his population and to cement his hold on power.
例如，第一次海湾战争，它被视为一次非常干净的胜利的例子——事实上，在战争结束后，萨达姆·侯赛因利用混乱残酷地残暴了他的部分人民，巩固了他对权力的控制。
We didn’t solve the problem.
我们没有解决问题。
We solved one problem — Kuwait — but we didn’t solve the bigger problem.
我们解决了一个问题 —— 科威特 —— 但我们没有解决更大的问题。
I think military would like to keep it neat and clean.
我认为军队希望保持整洁。
We would like to say, “Give me a very straightforward military problem, and I will solve that.” But very few problems in the world lend themselves to that.
我们想说，“给我一个非常简单的军事问题，我会解决它。”但世界上很少有问题适合这样做。
If we think about military combatants in the field, say a sergeant, involved with combat, what’s the most common probabilistic mistake they’re going to make?
如果我们考虑一下战场上的军事战斗人员，比如参与战斗的中士，他们最常犯的概率错误是什么？
There, it’s a further subset.
在那里，它是另一个子集。
You have taken an individual, trained him to be a warrior, and to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail, so they are spring-loaded to want to use that particular tactic.
你把一个人训练成一名战士，而对于一个拿着锤子的人来说，一切看起来都像钉子，所以他们很容易想要使用那种特定的战术。
That’s what they’ve been trained, and then they run into complex problems in villages and towns and cities, and they find it’s not simple.
这就是他们接受的训练，然后他们在乡村、城镇和城市遇到复杂的问题，他们发现事情并不简单。
It’s challenging for them.
这对他们来说很有挑战性。
If we think about today, say, the risk that China would make a more serious move against Taiwan, whether an outright attack or something extremely provocative, are we under- or overestimating that risk?
例如，如果我们今天考虑一下中国对台湾采取更严重行动的风险，无论是公然的攻击还是极具挑衅性的行动，我们是低估还是高估了这种风险？
And why are we making the kind of mistake we’re making?
为什么我们会犯这样的错误？
I think we’re probably underestimating that risk.
我认为我们可能低估了这种风险。
When you consider China, you have to consider the sweep of their history and where they think they are now, the Middle Kingdom.
当你考虑中国时，你必须考虑他们悠久的历史以及他们认为自己现在所处的位置，即中央王国。
And they are trying to avoid the idea that they’re being contained by any outside power, particularly the United States.
他们试图避免认为自己受到任何外部势力（尤其是美国）的遏制。
Then you look at Taiwan itself.
然后你看看台湾本身。
Taiwan, of course — Formosa in the minds of most Chinese — is a legitimate part of China.
当然，台湾——“大多数中国人心目中的福尔摩沙”——是中国的合法部分。
The idea that part of China is being occupied by former Chinese nationalists, becoming this somewhat independent entity, is like a rock in their shoe.
认为中国的一部分正在被前中国民族主义者占领，成为这个某种程度上独立的实体的想法就像他们鞋里的石头一样。
It can’t help but be frustrating.
这不禁令人沮丧。
If you look at it from their standpoint, one of their goals is to avoid containment.
如果你从他们的角度来看，他们的目标之一就是避免遏制。
Another is to build up their national identity, which means controlling all of your territory, and then the idea that they want to be a more international power.
另一个是建立他们的国家认同，这意味着控制你的所有领土，然后他们想成为一个更加国际化的强国。
I don’t necessarily mean that they are going to go into foreign wars, but they’re going to push back those who would stop them from being engaged in the world.
我并不一定意味着他们会卷入对外战争，但他们会击退那些阻止他们参与世界事务的人。
I think the idea that they might do something on Taiwan — because it hasn’t happened for so many years, we tend to think it will never happen.
我认为他们可能在台湾做某事的想法 ——因为它已经很多年没有发生了，我们倾向于认为它永远不会发生。
We tend to think in terms of linear.
我们倾向于用线性的方式思考。
If something hasn’t happened for a long time, it never will, and then we’re always shocked.
如果某件事很长时间没有发生，那么它永远不会发生，然后我们总是会感到震惊。
So, you think we extrapolate too much from the relatively recent past?
那么，您认为我们从最近的过去推断得太多了吗？
Yeah, if you think about most people — they think that national boundaries don’t change much, but that’s because after World War II, not a lot of national boundaries have changed.
是的，如果你想想大多数人 ——他们认为国界没有太大变化，但那是因为二战后，国界并没有发生太大变化。
Some have, but if you go before that, they actually change in history pretty routinely.
有些有，但如果你在那之前，它们实际上在历史上经常发生变化。
The idea that the globe and national boundaries and identities are what they are now and will be in the future would be counter to historical experience.
全球和国家边界和身份现在和未来的想法与历史经验相悖。
Let’s say you’re a thinker, a planner, a commander, and you want to train yourself out of this habit, this mistake that other people are making of extrapolating too much.
假设你是一名思考者、计划者、指挥官，你想训练自己改掉这种习惯，改掉其他人因过度推断而犯的错误。
What literally is it that you do to your brain, to your body, to your habits to get you out of that way of thinking?
从字面上看，你对你的大脑、你的身体、你的习惯做了什么，才能让你摆脱这种思维方式？
To be honest, Tyler, I wish I knew.
说实话，泰勒，我希望我知道。
But you must have done it if you see this mistake.
但如果你看到这个错误，你一定已经这么做了。
You have an outside vantage point, where you’re not making it.
你有一个外部的有利位置，但你却无法做到这一点。
The other people are making it.
其他人正在成功。
I think I’ve made it along with everyone else, and I try not to, but that I do.
我想我已经和其他人一起成功了，我尽量不这样做，但我做到了。
The reality is, you have to step back — almost an out-of-body experience — and look historically at things and say, “Okay, what has happened in the past?
现实是，你必须退后一步——“几乎是一种灵魂出窍的体验”——并回顾历史，然后说：“好吧，过去发生了什么？
And why wouldn’t that happen again, or some new permutation of that?” It’s a discipline.
为什么这种情况不再发生，或者出现新的变化呢？”这是一门学科。
The person I’ve seen most impressive with that is Dr. Henry Kissinger.
我见过的对此印象最深刻的人是亨利·基辛格博士。
I’ve been in the room with him a couple of times — sort of a fly on the wall — and someone will bring up an issue, and he will suddenly soar up to 30,000 feet, and he will describe it in a way that no one in the room has been doing at that point.
我和他一起在房间里呆过几次 ——“有点像墙上的苍蝇”——有人会提出一个问题，然后他会突然飙升到 30,000 英尺的高度，他会用当时房间里没有人做过的方式来描述它。
I think there’s a discipline of thought to do that, and it’s not very common.
我认为有一种思想纪律可以做到这一点，但这并不常见。
Do you think reading a great deal of history is useful for thinking about risk, or only modestly useful?
您认为阅读大量历史对于思考风险有帮助，还是只有有限的帮助？
I think it’s not only useful; it’s essential.
我认为它不仅有用，而且有用。这是必要的。
If you don’t know history, you constrain your mind almost into personal experience only.
如果你不了解历史，你的思想几乎只能局限于个人经历。
How useful are war games in thinking about risk?
兵棋推演对于思考风险有多大用处？
I mean the board games, the box games.
我指的是棋盘游戏、盒子游戏。
I don’t mean war-gaming as you do in the military.
我指的不是军队中的兵棋推演。
Just plain old war games, like Avalon Hill in the old days.
只是普通的老式战争游戏，就像过去的阿瓦隆山一样。
Anything that forces you to problem-solve is very good about thinking about risk because you’ve got an opponent who is trying to cause you problems, to create threats and put you at risk.
任何迫使你解决问题的事情都非常适合考虑风险，因为你的对手试图给你带来问题、制造威胁并使你面临风险。
Of course, you’re trying to do the same.
当然，你也在尝试做同样的事情。
Chess is, of course, another version of this, so I think that they’re really good at building that muscle memory in your mind.
当然，国际象棋是另一个版本，所以我认为它们非常擅长在你的大脑中建立肌肉记忆。
How well do you feel we understand the probabilistic reasoning of the Chinese, say?
你觉得我们对中国人的概率推理的理解程度如何？
Very different culture, quite different history.
非常不同的文化，非常不同的历史。
Are they a black box to us?
它们对我们来说是一个黑匣子吗？
Or do you feel, somehow, we grasp their calculations?
或者你是否觉得我们以某种方式掌握了他们的算计？
I don’t think we grasp their calculations.
我认为我们没有掌握他们的算计。
I don’t think they’re a black box if you read their writings and if you listen to what they say.
如果你读过他们的著作并听听他们所说的话，我不认为他们是一个黑匣子。
In fact, I think that they signal pretty carefully what their intentions, or at least their aspirations, are.
事实上，我认为他们非常谨慎地表达了他们的意图，或者至少是他们的愿望。
Their aspirations, of course, are to be much more a player in the world than we have seen them in our lifetimes because if I go back to most of my lifetime, at first, it was China in the 1950s, and then the Cultural Revolution, then a very poor country struggling to get ahead.
当然，他们的愿望是成为世界上比我们有生之年见过的更大的参与者，因为如果我回顾一下我一生的大部分时间，首先是20世纪50年代的中国，然后是文化大革命，然后是一个非常贫穷的国家在努力取得进步。
That’s not China now, and that’s not China in the future, and they don’t see themselves that way.
那不是现在的中国，也不是未来的中国，他们不这么看自己。
I think we tend to lag the reality by quite a lot.
我认为我们往往落后现实很多。
How well do we understand the probabilistic and risk thinking of the Russian leadership?
我们对俄罗斯领导层的概率和风险思维有多了解？
That’s actually easier to understand because, in that case, you can focus it almost in the mind of Vladimir Putin.
这实际上更容易理解，因为在这种情况下，你几乎可以将它集中在弗拉基米尔·普京的脑海中。
He doesn’t represent all Russians, but for the last 20 years, he’s been a pretty good proxy for where the Russian psyche has been since he captured their imagination, starting with Chechnya.
他并不代表所有俄罗斯人，但在过去 20 年里，自从他抓住了俄罗斯人的想象力（从车臣开始）以来，他一直是俄罗斯人心理的一个很好的代表。
If we think of Russia as having been prostrate at the end of the Cold War, and we viewed them as a beaten former superpower, they are trying to get back on the national stage.
如果我们认为俄罗斯在冷战结束时已经屈服，并且我们将他们视为一个被击败的前超级大国，那么他们正试图重返国家舞台。
Now, they have far worse cards to play than China for the future.
现在，他们的未来牌比中国要糟糕得多。
They’ve got a real demographic problem.
他们面临着真正的人口问题。
They’ve got other issues, but the reality is, in the short term, they’ve got some aspirations to be powerful in the Mideast, to be powerful .
他们还有其他问题，但现实是，在短期内，他们有一些在中东变得强大的愿望。
.
。
.
。
Look what they’re doing with natural gas this winter with Europe.
看看今年冬天他们在欧洲对天然气做了什么。
They’re going to play the cards they’ve got more aggressively than we might expect them to.
他们会比我们想象的更积极地打出手中的牌。
So, in your mental model of Putin, he’s not risk-averse.
所以，在你对普京的心理模型中，他并不厌恶风险。
He’s willing to suffer great personal loss if there’s some chance of creating chaos and furthering Russia’s place on the world stage.
如果有机会制造混乱并提升俄罗斯在世界舞台上的地位，他愿意承受巨大的个人损失。
I think that he is.
我认为他是。
When you use the term personal loss, I don’t think we’ve ever tested that because we really haven’t confronted Putin himself very much.
当你使用“个人损失”这个词时，我认为我们从未测试过这一点，因为我们确实没有太多面对普京本人。
But I think that Russia is willing to suffer a fair amount of pain to try to get back into a position that they think they should be in as a superpower.
但我认为俄罗斯愿意承受相当大的痛苦，试图回到他们认为自己作为超级大国应该处于的位置。
If we’re trying, as American citizens, to understand the risk calculations of, say, EU, German, French policymakers — how they think about these risks, what’s the main thing we don’t understand about them?
如果我们作为美国公民试图了解欧盟、德国、法国政策制定者的风险计算——他们如何看待这些风险，那么我们对这些风险最不了解的是什么？
I don’t think you can generalize too much, but if you look at the European nations, each of them has an interesting calculus.
我认为你不能一概而论，但如果你看看欧洲国家，他们每个人都有一个有趣的计算。
There was a period in the Cold War where their dependence on the United States was comforting, and it was irritating — the idea that they needed the United States to be the 800-pound gorilla in NATO.
在冷战时期，他们对美国的依赖令人欣慰，但同时又令人恼火——他们需要美国成为北约中 800 磅重的大猩猩。
They would like a measure of independence from that.
他们希望有一定程度的独立性。
At the same time, independence from that without enough national power or enough unity across the EU is pretty dangerous.
与此同时，如果没有足够的国家实力或整个欧盟足够的团结，独立于欧盟是相当危险的。
I think the idea that, although Russia does not come close to what the Soviet Union’s power was, Russia — if they are aggressive in places like the Baltics or Ukraine and others — can really put the other European powers in a difficult position.
我认为，尽管俄罗斯的实力还无法与苏联相提并论，但俄罗斯——“如果他们在波罗的海国家或乌克兰等地采取侵略性行动”——确实会让其他欧洲国家陷入困境。
Then economically — as I mentioned natural gas earlier — if the countries of the EU are put in a position where they are less powerful economically, and they don’t have political unity, then there’s that balkanization, where each individual country finds themselves not strong enough physically with material power, economic or military power, to feel they can stand up confidently, then it’s problematic for them.
然后在经济上——正如我之前提到的天然气——如果欧盟国家在经济上处于较弱的地位，并且没有政治团结，那么就会出现巴尔干化，每个国家发现自己的物质力量、经济或军事力量不够强大，无法自信地站起来，那么这对他们来说是有问题的。
It’s a common view on the American right that Germany is not sufficiently afraid of Russia right now.
美国右翼人士普遍认为，德国目前还不够害怕俄罗斯。
Do you agree with that?
你同意吗？
Who’s making the risk miscalculation?
谁在错误估计风险？
The Germans, the American conservatives, someone else?
德国人、美国保守派，还是其他人？
I think the Germans are sufficiently worried about Russia, but we forget that they are also in close proximity to Russia.
我认为德国人足够担心俄罗斯，但我们忘记了他们也离俄罗斯很近。
It’s one thing to say that Russia is a big problem, but Germany has a certain dependence on things like natural gas and other trade with Russia that the United States doesn’t have.
说俄罗斯是一个大问题是一回事，但德国对天然气和其他与俄罗斯的贸易有一定的依赖，而美国则没有。
Russia is a reality.
俄罗斯是现实。
The United States, from a long way away, can put a finger in the eye of Russia with relative impunity.
美国可以从很远的地方对俄罗斯指手画脚，而相对不受惩罚。
Germany’s a strong country but not as strong as the United States and not as far away.
德国是一个强大的国家，但不如美国强大，也没有美国那么远。
I think Germany is more likely to be in a position where they think a realistic approach with some accommodation makes more sense, whereas it doesn’t seem to be an imperative when you have the geographic position of the United States.
我认为德国更有可能认为采取一些妥协的现实做法更有意义，而当你拥有美国的地理位置时，这似乎并不是必须的。
Since 9/11, there have not been many major terror attacks on US soil done by foreign terrorists.
自9/11以来，外国恐怖分子在美国境内实施的重大恐怖袭击事件并不多。
Why is that?
这是为什么？
And should we take much comfort in that fact?
我们应该对此感到安慰吗？
That’s a great question, Tyler, I ask myself.
这是一个很好的问题，泰勒，我问自己。
I think that the improvement in American intelligence and, to a degree, counter-terrorist operations was part of that.
我认为美国情报的进步以及在某种程度上反恐行动的进步是其中的一部分。
It became far harder for an organization like al-Qaeda to pull off a 9/11-scale attack.
对于像基地组织这样的组织来说，发动 9/11 规模的袭击变得更加困难。
What I never have been able to understand is why they didn’t try to prosecute a number of much simpler attacks — bombs in shopping malls and whatnot — because it would’ve been very difficult to stop and would’ve been terrifying for Americans.
我一直无法理解的是，为什么他们不尝试起诉一些更简单的袭击事件——“购物中心炸弹之类的”——因为这很难阻止，而且对美国人来说会很可怕。
In my mind.
在我心里。
What’s your best model of why that hasn’t happened?
对于为什么这种情况没有发生，你最好的模型是什么？
They could have crossed the Mexican border, bought a few submachine guns, done something terrible.
他们本可以越过墨西哥边境，买几把冲锋枪，做一些可怕的事情。
I’m really not sure.
我真的不确定。
My sense is that al-Qaeda .
我的感觉是基地组织。
.
。
.
。
Someone hits a grand slam in the third inning of a game, and when they get up in the sixth inning, they’d like to hit another home run.
有人在比赛的第三局打出大满贯，当他们在第六局起床时，他们想再打一个本垒打。
My sense is part of that psyche involved to them — I just don’t think that they thought realistically enough about creating the effect that they could do.
我的感觉是他们心理的一部分 —— 我只是认为他们对于创造他们能做到的效果没有足够现实的思考。
They were looking for the big dramatic operation.
他们正在寻找戏剧性的大手术。
Now, that doesn’t mean other organizations will be as limited.
现在，这并不意味着其他组织也会受到同样的限制。
It’s very likely that another organization will take a different approach, most likely cyber, but they could have a significant effect with a number of smaller attacks.
另一个组织很可能会采取不同的方法，最有可能是网络攻击，但它们可能会通过一些较小的攻击产生重大影响。
If we had to shrink one capacity of the military, say, by 50 percent, and double the capacity of another, what would you pick to shrink and what to expand?
如果我们必须将一项军事能力缩减（例如 50%），并将另一项军事能力增加一倍，您会选择缩减什么、扩展什么？
This is always the tough one.
这始终是最艰难的一件事。
I tend to think that the maneuver warfare part that we have created for ground warfare in Europe or in the Mideast is probably somewhere where we have to accept some risk.
我倾向于认为，我们为欧洲或中东地面战创建的机动战部分可能是我们必须接受一些风险的地方。
We have to have fewer capabilities there.
我们必须减少那里的能力。
You could even argue maybe the number of aircraft carriers — big capital things.
你甚至可能会争论航空母舰的数量——“大资本”。
I think where we can’t afford — and therefore, I would invest — is in really good people.
我认为我们买不起的地方——因此，我会投资——真正优秀的人。
Now, that seems like a simplistic answer, but we are going to need very crafty people at things like cyber warfare.
现在，这似乎是一个简单的答案，但我们将需要非常狡猾的人来处理网络战等事情。
We’re going to need very innovative people.
我们需要非常有创新精神的人才。
We’re going to need people with cultural acuity, which means language skills, and that’s going to be more important.
我们需要具有文化敏锐度的人，这意味着语言技能，这将更加重要。
So if I was advocating, I’d be leaning toward resourcing harder in those areas.
因此，如果我提倡的话，我会倾向于在这些领域更加努力地提供资源。
Now, of course, your father was a general.
当然，现在你的父亲是一名将军。
You come from a military family.
你出身于军人家庭。
Why is it that military recruitment, right now, is so well predicted by having had a parent in the armed forces?
为什么现在有父母参军的人就可以如此准确地预测到征兵呢？
What’s driving that?
是什么推动了这一点？
And how can we take advantage of that to recruit additional people?
我们如何利用这一点来招募更多人员？
Well, we’ve taken advantage of it to the point where it may be counterproductive now.
好吧，我们已经利用了它，以至于现在可能会适得其反。
When I would travel the battlefields and go to small bases, invariably, the sergeant or lieutenant in charge was the son or daughter of a friend of mine.
当我走遍战场、前往小型基地时，负责的中士或中尉总是我朋友的儿子或女儿。
In one way, it’s comforting because you know people have entered the service with open eyes and clear expectations, and they make good soldiers, but you don’t want a soldier class in America.
在某种程度上，这是令人欣慰的，因为你知道人们是带着开放的眼光和明确的期望进入服役的，他们是优秀的士兵，但你不希望在美国有一个士兵阶层。
You want military service to be spread across the nation geographically and sociologically.
您希望兵役在地理上和社会上遍布全国。
I actually think that that aspect of the all-volunteer force has weakened us a bit.
事实上，我认为全志愿部队的这一方面削弱了我们的实力。
We have created a bit of a warrior caste, and it’s insular.
我们创造了一个战士阶层，而且它是孤立的。
You grow up in it.
你在其中成长。
My family was very much that way, and I think that it’s not healthy for the long-term good of the force.
我的家人就是这样，我认为这对于部队的长期利益来说是不健康的。
We need to look at another way of recruiting, and try to go out and get a broader cross-section of America, and keep bringing that in because when we talk about diversity, it’s not about race or gender.
我们需要寻找另一种招聘方式，并尝试走出去，获得更广泛的美国横截面，并继续将其引入，因为当我们谈论多样性时，它与种族或性别无关。
It’s about different perspectives and different experiences and different talents.
这是关于不同的观点、不同的经历和不同的才能。
The military has to avoid the idea that we recruit best from the Midwest or the South and a certain demographic because it single-threads us.
军方必须避免这样的想法，即我们最好从中西部或南部以及特定人群中招募人才，因为它使我们成为单一线程。
How much do you worry about what is sometimes called “the woke”?
您对有时被称为“觉醒者”的事情有多担心？
A sometimes extreme set of political views — do you think it turns some young people against the military or diverts their attention from the possibility of a career in the military?
有时极端的政治观点 ——你认为这是否会让一些年轻人反对军队，或者转移他们对从军的可能性的注意力？
There have been some recent military ads that seem to be trying to appeal to the woke people.
最近有一些军事广告似乎试图吸引觉醒的人们。
How does this picture fit together for you?
这张照片对你来说怎么样？
I’m going to start by defining —
我首先要定义 ——
You teach at Yale, just to be clear, so you come in contact with the woke, yes?
澄清一下，你在耶鲁大学任教，所以你会接触到觉醒者，是吗？
I do.
我愿意。
Let me say first that everybody defines woke differently.
首先我要说的是，每个人对“醒来”的定义都不同。
There’s a certain extremist level of that, where people have views that are far different than mine.
这有一定程度的极端主义，人们的观点与我的观点截然不同。
But I think the idea of understanding that race and other things have been thought of in a pretty limited way in the United States for a very long time, questioning how things have been done in many of our cultural habits, is necessary.
但我认为，有必要了解美国长期以来对种族和其他事物的思考方式相当有限，质疑我们的许多文化习惯是如何做事的。
From that standpoint, if somebody wanted to say, “Is Stan McChrystal woke?” I’d have to say “Probably I am.” Taking that, I think what we need to do is tell people that the common defense of America is every American’s responsibility.
从这个角度来看，如果有人想说“斯坦·麦克里斯特尔醒了吗？”我不得不说“也许我是”。考虑到这一点，我认为我们需要做的是告诉人们，共同保卫美国是每个美国人的责任。
It’s not the warrior class.
这不是战士阶级。
It’s not a limited group of people with big biceps and maybe small brains — in the minds of some people — who are willing to go out and fight foreign wars.
愿意出去打对外战争的人，并不是一小群二头肌大、脑子可能很小的人——在某些人的心目中——。
It’s got to be young people from every family that ought to reflect America.
每个家庭的年轻人都应该反映美国。
If you hold a mirror up to the face of the US military, you ought to see our nation.
如果你把镜子举到美军的脸上，你应该看到我们的国家。
If you don’t see our nation, then you have a problem long term.
如果你看不到我们的国家，那么从长远来看你就会遇到问题。
Teaching now at Yale, what have you learned from that teaching about how to improve military recruitment?
现在在耶鲁大学任教，您从关于如何改进征兵的教学中学到了什么？
Because those are a lot of students who won’t apply, right?
因为有很多学生不会申请，对吗？
Yeah.
是的。
It’s interesting, it’s education.
很有趣，这就是教育。
I got to Yale in 2010, and they were just making the decision to open ROTC up again after 40 years.
我于 2010 年来到耶鲁大学，当时他们刚刚决定在 40 年后再次开放后备军官训练队。
I would argue that Yale used Vietnam War, and then they used “don’t ask, don’t tell” as excuses not to have ROTC for way too long.
我认为耶鲁大学利用了越南战争，然后他们用“不问，不说”作为借口，不让后备军官训练队呆太久。
It limited Yale’s diversity, and it limited Yale’s open-minded perspective.
它限制了耶鲁的多样性，也限制了耶鲁的开放视野。
They started getting it back, and that’s been a good move.
他们开始收回它，这是一个很好的举动。
There’s increasingly a balance there.
那里越来越平衡。
Now, at the same time, most young people that are at Yale don’t have any real touch with the military.
与此同时，现在耶鲁大学的大多数年轻人与军队没有任何真正的接触。
Their brothers and sisters haven’t served.
他们的兄弟姐妹还没有服役。
Often, their parents haven’t served.
通常，他们的父母没有服役。
Maybe their grandparents haven’t served.
也许他们的祖父母还没有服役。
So, when they get interaction with people in the military — there are a number of active-duty officers and senior NCOs being sent to Yale now for graduate degrees — and I teach a number of them — they have a disproportionate effect on young people because it’s the first time any of these young people have been up close to anybody who’s a soldier.
因此，当他们与军队中的人进行互动时——“现在有许多现役军官和高级士官被派往耶鲁大学攻读研究生学位”——“我教其中的一些人”——他们对年轻人产生了不成比例的影响，因为这是这些年轻人第一次与士兵近距离接触。
It can be eye-opening for them because they have a view that’s often very narrow of what a soldier is.
这会让他们大开眼界，因为他们对士兵的看法往往非常狭隘。
They’ve seen some movies, and they’ve got a two-dimensional, stereotypical opinion of it.
他们看过一些电影，并对电影有二维的、刻板的看法。
It’s very opening.
非常开放。
That’s where we need to open it.
这就是我们需要打开它的地方。
I think more needs to be done.
我认为还需要做更多的事情。
Is the US Officer Corps too educated or not educated enough?
美国军官团是受教育程度过高还是受教育程度不够？
I don’t think it’s possible to be too educated.
我不认为受过太多教育是可能的。
But are we selecting too much for highly educated people at the expense of talent that may be just as good but not with an advanced degree?
但是，我们是否过多地选择受过高等教育的人，而牺牲了可能同样优秀但不具备高级学位的人才？
You’re right, talent doesn’t always reflect itself in a degree.
你是对的，天赋并不总是通过学位来体现。
Sometimes talent reflects itself in a combination of values and experiences and native intelligence.
有时，天赋体现在价值观、经验和天生智力的结合上。
You don’t want a bunch of dumba**es, but at the same time, everybody having a PhD isn’t necessary, either.
你不需要一群傻瓜，但同时，也没有必要每个人都拥有博士学位。
What you’re really looking for is people with the right core values and enough innate talent to be able to be developed into good leaders with good sound judgment.
您真正需要的是具有正确核心价值观和足够天赋的人才，以便能够发展成为具有良好判断力的优秀领导者。
If you’re considering recommending someone for a high promotion, what qualities in them are you looking for?
如果您正在考虑推荐某人升职，您希望他们具备哪些品质？
Other than just the obvious, like good values, work hard, smart, common sense — but what else?
除了显而易见的东西，比如良好的价值观、努力工作、聪明、常识 —— 还有什么？
What’s your magic ingredient, where something clicks, and you say, “That person can make it”?
你的神奇成分是什么，当某件事发生时，你会说“那个人能做到”？
There’s no single one, but the two that I would jump on is, first, self-discipline.
没有单一的，但我会跳的两个是，第一，自律。
You say, “Well, all soldiers are self-disciplined,” and I’d say that’s not true.
你说，“嗯，所有的士兵都是自律的”，我会说这不是真的。
Self-discipline, to me, is not whether you get up in the morning and make your bed, although those might be indicators.
对我来说，自律并不在于你是否早上起床并整理床铺，尽管这些可能是指标。
It’s really, do you treat people the way you know they should be treated?
事实上，你是否按照你知道应该对待别人的方式对待他们？
Do you do the hard things, even though they may be inconvenient or frightening?
你是否会做困难的事情，即使它们可能不方便或令人恐惧？
Not all military do that.
并非所有军队都这样做。
Not all leaders do that.
并非所有领导者都会这样做。
The second is the ability to make a decision with uncertainty.
第二是在不确定的情况下做出决定的能力。
I’ve struggled with years as to whether that is born or developed.
多年来我一直在纠结这种能力是天生的还是后天培养的。
I remember asking my father, “How do you tell who’s going to be good in combat?” I was just a brand-new lieutenant asking the old soldier’s wisdom.
我记得我问父亲：“你怎么知道谁会擅长战斗？”我只是一名新中尉，向老士兵请教。
He said, “Who can make decisions in combat?” I said, “Well, how do you know?” He says, “Until you’re in combat, you don’t know.”
他说：“谁能在战斗中做出决定？”我说：“嗯，你怎么知道？”他说：“直到你进入战斗，你才知道。”
You can tell, as he described, a person who’s trying to drive uncertainty to zero will keep asking for more information.
正如他所描述的，你可以看出，一个试图将不确定性降至零的人会不断要求提供更多信息。
They’ll try to get to mitigate all of the uncertainty out, and of course that’s impossible.
他们会试图减轻所有的不确定性，当然这是不可能的。
Some people just have the ability to live with not having perfect knowledge, and yet, they can accept that and still make decisions decisively.
有些人只是有能力忍受不完美的知识，但他们可以接受这一点并仍然果断地做出决定。
When do you think the United States will have women as truly senior commanders in its armed forces?
您认为美国什么时候才会让女性担任武装部队中真正的高级指挥官？
And how would you manage that transition?
您将如何管理这种转变？
What would you do?
你会怎么办？
We already have some, so it’s moved along pretty well.
我们已经有了一些，所以进展得很好。
But to understand why it hasn’t moved faster is, for many years early in my career, the jobs that were given to female officers, even though they may have been just as talented — you went to a military base, the protocol officer was always a female.
但要理解为什么它没有进展得更快的是，在我职业生涯的早期许多年里，这些工作都交给了女性军官，尽管她们可能同样有才华——“你去了一个军事基地，礼宾官总是女性。
So they would put them off in these jobs, and when we get time to select them for higher-level responsibility, their records of experience didn’t match their male counterparts.
因此，他们会推迟她们从事这些工作，当我们有时间选择她们担任更高级别的职务时，她们的经验记录与男性同行不符。
Now, it wasn’t their fault, but the reality is, when you made that decision, they actually didn’t compare.
现在，这不是他们的错，但现实是，当你做出这个决定时，他们实际上没有进行比较。
Really, you have to have a period of affirmative action.
确实，你必须有一段时期的平权行动。
You have to promote some senior women, and you need to accept risk in that because they will be less prepared than some of their peers.
你必须提拔一些高级女性，并且你需要接受风险，因为她们的准备程度会比一些同龄人低。
You say, “Well, that’s too risky for the nation.” I think it’s too risky not to.
你说：“好吧，这对国家来说太冒险了。”我认为不这样做太冒险了。
Now, you’re only going to have to do that for about a generation because you have to provide senior-level examples to younger female officers to help them get up there.
现在，你只需要在大约一代人的时间里这样做，因为你必须为年轻的女警官提供高级榜样，以帮助他们达到目标。
Without any, it’s really hard to continue the progress.
如果没有任何一个，就很难继续进步。
We’ve seen a lot, but it still has a long way to go.
我们已经看到了很多，但还有很长的路要走。
Do you think there’s too much of an up-or-out element to promotion in the military?
您是否认为在军队中晋升有太多“上进下出”的因素？
No, I don’t.
不，我不。
It’s important that people realize they’ve got to perform, and they’ve got to be good.
重要的是，人们要意识到他们必须表现出色，而且必须表现出色。
Now, having said that, I am going to say that there is too much of a one-strike-and-you’re-out problem.
现在，话虽如此，我要说的是，一击出局的问题太多了。
If we go back to the Second World War, a number of officers were given command of infantry divisions, for example, and they got relieved of command because they didn’t do very well.
例如，如果我们回到第二次世界大战，一些军官被授予步兵师的指挥权，但他们因为表现不佳而被解除指挥权。
Then they got put in command of another division, and in many cases, they did very well.
后来他们又被调到另一个师指挥，很多时候他们都表现得很好。
We have a no-blemish habit in the US Army, for example.
例如，我们在美国陆军就有无瑕疵的习惯。
Even as a young officer, if you get scuffed up a little in your record, instead of someone taking that as “Well, they had a bad experience, and they learned from it,” that’s almost guaranteed to prevent your promotion to high rank.
即使作为一名年轻军官，如果你的记录有一点磨损，而不是有人认为“好吧，他们有过一次糟糕的经历，他们从中吸取了教训”，这几乎肯定会阻止你晋升到高级职位。
As a consequence, what you tend to get higher level is people who’ve never had any blemishes, which means maybe they’ve not taken enough risks; maybe they’ve lived a little too conservatively.
因此，你往往会获得更高水平的是那些从未有过任何瑕疵的人，这意味着他们可能没有承担足够的风险；也许他们的生活有点过于保守了。
And that’s a real negative for producing a better officer corps.
这对于培养一支更好的军官队伍来说是一个真正的负面影响。
Let’s say I’m in the military, but I’m not, in the moment, in combat.
假设我在军队，但目前我不在战斗中。
I’m not on an aircraft carrier also.
我也不在航空母舰上。
What should be the restrictions on my smartphone?
我的智能手机应受到哪些限制？
Never thought about that one, Tyler, actually, because there are some real challenges there.
事实上，泰勒，从来没有想过这个问题，因为那里存在一些真正的挑战。
One of the problems with the smartphones is, people are able to call home every 20 minutes if they want to.
智能手机的问题之一是，如果人们愿意的话，他们可以每 20 分钟给家里打电话一次。
When a person’s deployed, they live all the problems at home, which it’s hard to do what you’re doing at the moment and do it at home.
当一个人被部署时，他们会在家里解决所有的问题，很难在家里做你现在正在做的事情。
There’s also the ability to track it.
还有跟踪它的能力。
Of course.
当然。
I’m really not sure, but we probably need to have a cell phone that they can use for work purposes, one that does the function because we need technology to leverage.
我真的不确定，但我们可能需要一部可以用于工作目的的手机，一部能够实现该功能的手机，因为我们需要利用技术。
But you probably have to put severe limits on things that would allow them to be leveraged by foreign intelligence.
但你可能必须对那些可能被外国情报利用的事情施加严格的限制。
Should I be able to download TikTok, which, of course, is Chinese, or WeChat, for that matter?
我是否可以下载 TikTok（当然是中文版）或微信？
In my opinion, no. You’ve really got to take a look upstream at all of these, and we’ve got to start cleaning that up.
我认为，不。你真的必须看看所有这些上游，我们必须开始清理它们。
We’ve got to get trusted, clean networks.
我们必须获得值得信赖、清洁的网络。
And the ability to improve what we’re doing — not just in cell phones, but in wider networks — is there, but we really haven’t done it today.
改进我们正在做的事情的能力 ——不仅在手机中，而且在更广泛的网络中—— 是存在的，但我们今天确实还没有做到。
What would you do to limit the risk of what you might call the seditious, violent right wing in the military becoming more influential?
你会采取什么措施来限制你所谓的军队中煽动性、暴力性的右翼势力变得更有影响力的风险？
What can we improve to check that problem?
我们可以改进什么来检查这个问题？
Yeah, I think it’s a serious problem.
是的，我认为这是一个严重的问题。
One is, we’ve got to communicate in the military and not be shy about it.
一是，我们必须在军队中进行沟通，并且不要害羞。
We’ve got to say that what the military stands for — support of the Constitution and whatnot — cannot be perverted or corrupted by people who want to take a very narrow or extreme view on either side, but you see it much more on the right, right now.
我们必须说，军队所代表的东西——“支持宪法之类的”——不能被那些想要对任何一方采取非常狭隘或极端观点的人歪曲或腐蚀，但现在你在右翼身上看到的更多。
Then, just like we did with gangs in the 1990s, we’ve got to go to ferret it out.
然后，就像我们在 20 世纪 90 年代对待帮派一样，我们必须去把它揪出来。
We’ve got to identify those people who are on social media or even face-to-face who are reflecting those kinds of views, and you’ve got to have the courage to get rid of them or take a UCMJ action against them because that’s a cancer that could grow inside the force.
我们必须找出那些在社交媒体上甚至面对面反映此类观点的人，并且你必须有勇气摆脱他们或对他们采取 UCMJ 行动，因为这是可能在部队内部生长的癌症。
People say, “Well, how bad can it be?” Well, a sergeant can take young privates and have an extraordinary effect on them, and a lieutenant can do the same with people.
人们会说：“好吧，情况能有多糟糕呢？”好吧，中士可以带年轻的列兵，并对他们产生非凡的影响，中尉也可以对人做同样的事情。
The ability to cascade down extreme views is extraordinarily dangerous.
极端观点的传播能力是极其危险的。
If it has reached a somewhat dangerous point, what should we infer about how we should change the culture of the military?
如果已经到了一个有点危险的地步，我们该如何推断军队文化应该如何改变呢？
Because it’s not an accident that it’s a problem, right?
因为这不是一个偶然的问题，对吗？
There’s something about how you train people that’s connected to what can go wrong.
培训人员的方式与可能出现的问题有关。
Yeah, and I’m humble about my ability to give you a really good answer on this one.
是的，我对自己有能力在这个问题上给你一个非常好的答案感到谦虚。
I think one of the things is our recruiting.
我认为其中一件事是我们的招聘。
Because it’s gotten fairly narrow, and it’s gotten self-reinforcing into certain areas of the country, in certain parts of American society, the danger is that the military becomes an echo chamber reflection of that.
因为它已经变得相当狭窄，并且它已经自我强化到该国的某些地区、美国社会的某些部分，所以危险在于军队成为了这种情况的回声室反映。
I would widen recruiting.
我会扩大招聘范围。
I personally think we ought to have a draft.
我个人认为我们应该有一个草案。
Everybody ought to be open to a draft.
每个人都应该对草案持开放态度。
Now, we don’t need everybody in the military.
现在，我们不需要军队中的每个人。
I’m not saying increase the size, but I’m saying have a draft and bring people in and use other people for other civilian national service requirements.
我并不是说增加规模，而是说起草一份草案，引进人员并利用其他人来满足其他民事兵役需求。
This would be women also in your vision?
这也是你想象中的女性吗？
Of course.
当然。
In fact, I would argue, even people with significant handicaps can serve now.
事实上，我认为，即使是有严重障碍的人现在也可以服务。
There are some that would disqualify you, but many of the jobs, the vast majority of the jobs in the military don’t take a strapping 6-foot-2 barrel-chested male.
有些工作会让你失去资格，但很多工作，绝大多数军队工作都不需要身高 6 英尺 2 英寸、桶状胸的魁梧男性。
They require somebody willing to do your job and a smart person, so I would open that up.
他们需要有人愿意做你的工作并且是一个聪明的人，所以我会开放这一点。
What if someone can’t read and write very well?
如果有人读写能力不好怎么办？
They’re not disabled.
他们并不是残疾人。
It’s just, they’re not highly literate.
只是，他们的文化水平不高。
What do you do with them?
你用它们做什么？
You’ve drafted them.
你已经起草了它们。
They show up.
他们出现了。
Maybe they even mean well.
也许他们的本意是好的。
In the 1970s and ’80s, of course, we had to deal with that.
当然，在 20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代，我们必须解决这个问题。
In my early years, we had something called BSEP, Basic Skills Education Program.
在我早年，我们有一个叫做 BSEP（基本技能教育计划）的项目。
Now, it was inconvenient to put people in Basic Skills Education, but it was important.
现在把人放在基础技能教育上虽然不方便，但是很重要。
It wasn’t a bad thing for society or for the military.
对于社会或军队来说，这并不是一件坏事。
I probably would look on a case-by-case basis.
我可能会根据具体情况进行考虑。
I would avoid McNamara’s 100,000, when he brought in people with very low scores, because you limit the force’s capability.
我会避免麦克纳马拉的 100,000 人，当他引进得分非常低的人时，因为你限制了部队的能力。
If somebody doesn’t have education, if they’re ignorant but not stupid, you can address that.
如果某人没有受过教育，如果他们无知但不愚蠢，你可以解决这个问题。
If someone doesn’t have the mental abilities to learn, then you’ve probably got to take another look.
如果某人没有学习的心智能力，那么你可能需要重新审视。
What would you do to improve our ability to train foreign armies, which is hard, right?
你会采取什么措施来提高我们训练外国军队的能力，这很困难，对吗？
Very different cultures, language problems, gender issues, religion.
非常不同的文化、语言问题、性别问题、宗教。
If you look at places in history where that’s worked well, it takes cultural acuity on the part of the trainers.
如果你看看历史上那些行之有效的地方，就会发现培训师需要具有文化敏锐度。
The idea of US special forces has always been to train teams in the language and the culture and put them in an area, have them very familiar.
美国特种部队的想法一直是对团队进行语言和文化方面的培训，并将他们安置在一个地区，让他们非常熟悉。
But we haven’t been able to stay the course very much.
但我们没能坚持到底。
We move people around so much.
我们经常让人们到处走动。
We really don’t have a cadre of people who’ve got real experience in parts of the world that we can use.
我们确实没有一支在世界各地拥有实际经验可供我们使用的骨干队伍。
That’s what you’ve got to develop.
这就是你必须发展的。
The British used a tremendously effective technique of just small numbers of people seeded, but they were sent for long periods of time.
英国人使用了一种非常有效的技术，只播种少量人员，但他们被派出很长一段时间。
In the northwest provinces of India — when it was British India, now Pakistan — they used to send officers.
在印度的西北省份——当时是英属印度，现在是巴基斯坦——他们过去常常派遣军官。
The East India Company would bring officers in, and their tour of duty — their first tour was 10 years.
东印度公司会引进军官，他们的任期——他们的第一次任期是十年。
After that 10-year tour, they would go home for a year, typically, and get married, and then come back.
十年巡演结束后，他们通常会回家一年，然后结婚，然后再回来。
By that time, they had become completely fluent in the language and fluent in the culture.
到那时，他们已经完全掌握了语言和文化。
I don’t think, if you don’t do that, you’re ever going to be very effective at doing it.
我认为，如果你不这样做，你就不会非常有效地做到这一点。
If recruiting is hard, and we want to recruit more people, and learning languages, developing cultural acuity is hard, how do we push all that together and make it work?
如果招聘很困难，而我们想招聘更多的人，而学习语言、培养文化敏锐度也很困难，那么我们如何将所有这些整合在一起并使其发挥作用？
What has to give?
必须给予什么？
You’ve got to be willing to train them.
你必须愿意训练他们。
You can go out and try to hire people who already have language skills or very high language potential to learn, but we have not taken the time to train people in languages.
你可以出去尝试雇用那些已经具备语言技能或非常高的语言学习潜力的人，但我们没有花时间来培训人们的语言。
We have to put the resources.
我们必须投入资源。
During World War II, in the first year or two, we trained something like 5,200 Americans to become fluent in Japanese, a very difficult language.
第二次世界大战期间，在头一两年里，我们培训了大约 5,200 名美国人，让他们能够流利地讲日语，这是一种非常困难的语言。
In the period in Afghanistan and Iraq, I don’t think we trained one-tenth that many, even though we were there much longer.
在阿富汗和伊拉克期间，我认为我们训练的人数还没有那么多，尽管我们在那里待的时间要长得多。
We were unwilling to make the commitment, and it wasn’t just money.
我们不愿意做出承诺，而且这不仅仅是金钱的问题。
The military services have been averse in the past to sending someone like Tyler Cowen to school for language, because they have fear that you’ll become focused just on that, and they will lose your skills for the wider service.
过去，军队一直不愿意送泰勒·考恩这样的人去学校学习语言，因为他们担心你会只专注于此，而他们会失去你在更广泛的服务中的技能。
We’ve always celebrated and promoted generalists.
我们一直赞扬和提拔通才。
In fact, when I was a young officer, I had Spanish language on my record.
事实上，当我还是一名年轻军官时，我的记录中就有西班牙语。
I wasn’t very good in Spanish, but I’d taken advanced Spanish at West Point.
我的西班牙语不是很好，但我在西点军校学过高级西班牙语。
But it was not a good thing to have on my record because every year or two, they’d come up with this idea.
但这记录在我的记录中并不是一件好事，因为每隔一两年，他们就会提出这个想法。
They’d send me off to some assignment I really didn’t want, which wasn’t going to be very good for my long-term career.
他们会让我去做一些我真的不想要的任务，这对我的长期职业生涯来说并不是很好。
I tried to jink and jog and avoid those.
我尝试着扭动和慢跑来避免这些。
You’ve got to change that a bit.
你必须稍微改变一下。
I think you’ve got to make being fluent in at least one language for officers a requirement, and for more junior soldiers, something that we will reward.
我认为，对于军官来说，至少要流利地讲一种语言是一项要求，对于更多的下级士兵来说，这是我们会奖励的一项要求。
When you went to West Point, what was, for you, the most interesting class?
当你去西点军校时，对你来说最有趣的课程是什么？
By far, revolutionary warfare.
至此，革命战争。
There was a class taught by recent veterans from Vietnam, but it covered revolutionary warfare through history: Yugoslavia, Indochina, Vietnam, and whatnot.
有一个课程是由刚从越南回来的退伍军人讲授的，但它涵盖了历史上的革命战争：南斯拉夫、印度支那、越南等等。
It was war among the people, whatever the popular term in the moment was, and we dug into the doctrine of it, the experience of it, the difficulty of it.
无论当时流行的术语是什么，这都是人民之间的战争，我们深入研究了它的学说、它的经验和它的困难。
And I found that was the one that, when I left the academy, I thought most about later.
我发现这是我离开学院后最想念的一个。
What made the professor so good?
是什么让教授如此出色？
The professor I had was good.
我的那个教授很好。
They had personal experience and a passion for it, but they also leveraged some very good literature on it, books like The Centurions and others.
他们拥有个人经验和对此的热情，但他们也利用了一些非常好的文献，例如《百夫长》等书籍。
We read some historical novels, but we also really studied the experiences.
我们读了一些历史小说，但我们也真正研究了经历。
I think because Vietnam was so recent, it felt very relevant to the instructors.
我认为因为越南是最近才出现的，所以对教练来说感觉非常相关。
It felt very important.
感觉非常重要。
They had to get that across to us, to make sure we understood what a challenge this was.
他们必须向我们传达这一点，以确保我们理解这是一个多么大的挑战。
If I’m looking to movies, which movies can people watch, do you think, ultimately, are the most accurate portrayals of the military?
如果我看电影，人们可以看哪些电影，你认为最终是对军队最准确的描绘吗？
Are there any good ones?
有没有好的？
It’s hard for me to judge portrayals of the military back from wars that I wasn’t in.
我很难判断对我没有参与过的战争中的军队的描绘。
Because I know the ones I like, but I can’t tell which are accurate.
因为我知道我喜欢的，但我不知道哪些是准确的。
If you watch the movie Black Hawk Down, the very high-energy pictures of the actual combat, I think, were a little overdone, and close friends of mine who were there will say, “Yeah, that was Hollywooded up.”
如果你看电影《黑鹰坠落》，我认为那些非常高能量的实战画面有点过头了，我在场的亲密朋友会说，“是的，那是好莱坞化的。”
But at the same time, I thought that the depiction of how the movie portrayed Delta Force operators, the JSOC commanders who I had known, General Garrison — and they depicted him in the movie — and then the Rangers, was remarkably accurate.
但与此同时，我认为这部电影对三角洲部队操作员、我认识的联合特种作战司令部指挥官、加里森将军——以及他们在电影中描绘的他——以及游骑兵的描述非常准确。
It felt as though they had captured the essence of how the people I had known for so much of my career acted.
感觉好像他们抓住了我在职业生涯中认识的人的行为本质。
I thought it was pretty realistic to the personas.
我认为这对于人物角色来说非常现实。
Is military fiction a genre in decline?
军事小说是一种正在衰落的类型吗？
Norman Mailer, The Naked and the Dead was a huge bestseller in its day.
诺曼·梅勒的《裸者与死者》在当时是一本畅销书。
Now people live in Brooklyn — they read Jonathan Franzen.
现在人们住在布鲁克林——他们读乔纳森·弗兰岑的作品。
Has that changed?
那改变了吗？
Or is military fiction still relevant?
或者军事小说仍然有意义吗？
I think it’s in temporary decline.
我认为这是暂时的下降。
One of the reasons it’s in temporary decline is you don’t have a broad experience in the population with military service.
它暂时下降的原因之一是你在服兵役的人群中没有广泛的经验。
Military fiction is more apt to be interesting to people who either served earlier in their lives or they are close to someone who served, and therefore, there’s a curiosity.
军事小说更容易让那些早年服役过的人或者与服役过的人关系密切的人感兴趣，因此，他们会产生好奇心。
Right now, we have some military fiction, some of which is way glamorized.
现在，我们有一些军事小说，其中一些被美化了。
If you’ve had no connection with the military at all, it’s hard to really appreciate whether someone’s captured things in a very compelling way.
如果你与军队完全没有联系，就很难真正理解某人是否以非常引人注目的方式捕获了东西。
Do you read science fiction for military ideas?
您阅读科幻小说是为了获取军事思想吗？
I don’t.
我不知道。
I read some when I was young, you know, Heinlein and whatnot, but I have not read much of it.
我年轻时读过一些，你知道，海因莱因之类的，但我读得不多。
If we just take the military living quarters you’ve experienced throughout your career and think of them as hotel rooms, what would you do to improve them?
如果我们把您在职业生涯中经历过的军事宿舍视为酒店房间，您会如何改进它们？
I was very happy with the quarters I got.
我对我得到的宿舍感到非常满意。
When I was young, we had very small quarters given to us when I was a captain and whatnot, but everybody had the same quarters.
当我年轻的时候，当我还是队长之类的时候，我们得到的宿舍很小，但每个人都有相同的宿舍。
We were all in these neighborhoods where you knew your peers.
我们都在这些你认识你的同龄人的社区。
Nobody had a bigger house than anybody else.
没有人比其他人拥有更大的房子。
Everybody made the same amount of money, and it was shared experience that made it special.
每个人赚的钱都是一样的，正是分享的经历才让它变得特别。
Then, as I got older, I was lucky enough to live on posts at older quarters built in the 1930s.
后来，随着年龄的增长，我很幸运地住在 20 世纪 30 年代建造的旧宿舍里。
They were these big, rambling, old brick houses that had basements and things that many modern houses don’t have now.
它们是那些又大又杂乱的旧砖房，有地下室和许多现代房屋现在没有的东西。
I loved them.
我爱他们。
They weren’t as modern as many other houses.
它们不像许多其他房子那么现代。
They didn’t have many of the convenience you would joke about.
他们没有很多你会开玩笑的便利。
The plumbing didn’t always work as well as you like.
管道并不总是如您所愿。
There were a hundred coats of paint on every wall, but they were a wonderful life to live in.
每面墙上都有一百层油漆，但它们的生活却很美好。
The reality is, the only thing I would do for military quarters is change where they are and how they’re used.
现实是，我对军事宿舍唯一要做的就是改变它们的位置和使用方式。
For example, if I built barracks, I would build rooms for sergeants who are not married to live in the barracks, and I’d give them apartments there.
比如说，如果我建军营，我会为未婚的军士们建造房间，让他们住在军营里，然后给他们提供公寓。
You want people of multiple generations in some close proximity.
你希望多代人之间的距离很近。
You don’t want to have all the young people boxed off here and the older people completely somewhere else.
你不希望所有的年轻人都被关在这里，而老年人则完全被关在其他地方。
As you may know, in the Netherlands, disabled individuals — under some circumstances, they’re given vouchers so that they actually have access to sex workers.
如您所知，在荷兰，残疾人 ——在某些情况下，他们会获得代金券，以便他们实际上可以接触性工作者。
Now, many people, men also, come out of the US military disabled.
现在，很多人，包括男性，都从美军中退役。
Should we do the same for them?
我们也应该为他们做同样的事情吗？
I’ve never thought about it.
我从来没有想过。
The problem with doing something like that is the argument that sex workers are often exploited very badly.
这样做的问题是性工作者经常受到非常严重的剥削。
To the degree, which I have not personally experienced the industry close enough to say it wouldn’t be, but I’d be really frightened that we would create a bunch of people who end up having to be sex workers because that’s the job they can get.
在某种程度上，我个人对这个行业的经历还不够接近，不能说不会，但我真的很害怕我们会创造出一群最终不得不成为性工作者的人，因为这是他们可以获得的工作。
You don’t want to force people into that kind of life.
你不想强迫人们进入那种生活。
What more should we do for the disabled leaving the military?
对于退伍的残疾人，我们还应该做些什么？
Let’s say they can’t serve anymore.
假设他们不能再服务了。
Clearly, you’ve got to give them an opportunity to get a job.
显然，你必须给他们一个找到工作的机会。
The great cure for so many problems in life is some kind of very functional way to work and contribute because that’s where most of us derive our satisfaction and, say, feeling of self-worth.
解决生活中许多问题的良方是某种非常实用的工作和贡献方式，因为这是我们大多数人获得满足感和自我价值感的地方。
That’s important.
这很重要。
We could do a better job than we do right now because, again, with technology, there are so many things even someone with a significant disability can do.
我们可以做得比现在更好，因为有了技术，即使是患有严重残疾的人也可以做很多事情。
We need to fight to decrease the barriers.
我们需要努力减少障碍。
Let’s say an enlisted man or woman who is quite young, possibly headed into combat — they come to you or someone you know, and they ask for advice on how to write their will, how they should think about this, or what they should do.
假设一个入伍的男人或女人很年轻，可能即将参加战斗，他们会来找你或你认识的人，询问如何写遗嘱、应该如何考虑这个问题或者应该做什么等建议。
You’re not going to tell them specifically how to allocate any resources they might own, but what do you say to them?
你不会具体告诉他们如何分配他们可能拥有的任何资源，但你会对他们说什么？
How do you think about that issue?
您如何看待这个问题？
I have been asked this before.
我以前曾被问过这个问题。
I say don’t be superficial about it.
我说不要对此肤浅。
Think about if you’re really gone, who could use whatever it is you can leave, whether it’s your insurance policy, if you have outside money and whatnot.
想想如果你真的走了，谁可以使用你留下的任何东西，无论是你的保险单，如果你有外部资金等等。
Don’t find your bunkmate in the barracks, and just because it’s funny, you sign each other’s wills to each other.
不要在军营里找到你的室友，仅仅因为这很有趣，你们就互相签署了彼此的遗嘱。
Think about someone in your family or someone because you want to make an impact.
想想你的家人或某人因为你想产生影响。
You’re going to be gone, obviously, if your will is being exercised, but you want to have an impact on somebody who will actually benefit from it.
显然，如果你的意志得到运用，你就会离开，但你想对真正从中受益的人产生影响。
It’s one of the first times in life many young people can think very realistically about the reality they’re not immortal and that what they do can have an impact on other people.
这是许多年轻人一生中第一次能够非常现实地思考自己并非永生的现实，以及他们所做的事情可以对其他人产生影响的现实。
What do you think, emotionally, has been the hardest part of the military jobs you’ve had?
从情感上来说，您认为您所从事的军事工作中最困难的部分是什么？
You’d say up front that it would be putting people in harm’s way, but it’s not because everybody enters the military with that expectation — the people who are making the decision to put people in harm’s way, or the people who are being sent in harm’s way.
你可能会预先说这会让人们受到伤害，但这并不是因为每个人都带着这种期望进入军队——那些做出让人们受到伤害的决定的人，或者那些被送去伤害的人。
I had the most difficulty with debilitating injuries that people got — a few in training, but more in combat — that ended their ability to be soldiers.
我最难受的是那些使人衰弱的伤病——“一些是在训练中，但更多是在战斗中”——这些伤病终止了他们成为士兵的能力。
It’s one thing if a person is killed.
一个人被杀是一回事。
It’s another to go to the hospital bed or see them when suddenly they are physically unable.
当他们突然身体不舒服时去医院病床或去看他们是另一回事。
They’ve lost a limb or something, and they can’t be in the club anymore.
他们失去了肢体或其他东西，他们不能再留在俱乐部了。
We all say we’ll be friends forever and stay connected, but the reality is the healthy ones go on to the next operation, and you leave the wounded and dead behind, and they try to band together.
我们都说我们将成为永远的朋友并保持联系，但现实是健康的人继续进行下一次手术，而你把伤员和死者留在后面，他们试图团结在一起。
I found it most difficult to make that separation from the wounded.
我发现与伤员分离是最困难的。
What gave you the greatest joy?
什么给了你最大的快乐？
Clearly, when you see young people grow up, as I’m sure somebody watched my generation grow up as well.
显然，当你看到年轻人成长时，我确信有人也见证了我们这一代人的成长。
A young person comes in the military.
一个年轻人参军了。
There is a private or a young officer, and then suddenly, one day, you see them operating with confidence, actually doing really good stuff, and talking to you like a fellow leader.
有一位二等兵或一位年轻军官，然后突然有一天，你看到他们充满信心地工作，实际上做了很好的事情，并且像一位领导者一样与你交谈。
It’s an extraordinarily special moment.
这是一个非常特别的时刻。
Then of course, when they get older and you get older — I had some sergeants major who had been privates when I was a young officer, and so we literally had paralleled our way up.
当然，当他们长大了，你也长大了 —— 我有一些军士长，他们在我还是一名年轻军官时曾是二等兵，所以我们实际上是平行晋升的。
That sense that both had become experienced professionals and there’s a mutual respect — that is a pretty neat feeling.
两人都成为了经验丰富的专业人士，并且相互尊重——这是一种非常美妙的感觉。
You’re not in the military now, obviously, so what is it you do to fill that gap?
显然，你现在不在军队了，那么你会做什么来填补这一空白呢？
The moment I left the military, there was this sense of loss because I was born in a military hospital.
当我离开军队的那一刻，我有一种失落感，因为我是在军队医院出生的。
I’d gone to West Point at 17.
我17岁就去了西点军校。
And in a moment, in an instant, I was no longer a soldier.
转眼间，转眼间，我就不再是一名士兵了。
I couldn’t identify myself as a soldier.
我无法确认自己是一名士兵。
I didn’t feel at home, suddenly, among soldiers.
突然间，在士兵中间，我感觉不自在。
So what I’ve done is, I’ve tried to replicate that.
所以我所做的是，我试图复制这一点。
We joke about it, but soon after I retired, we started a company, and it’s got 85 people now.
我们开玩笑说，但我退休后不久，我们就创办了一家公司，现在有 85 名员工。
Essentially, when people asked me why I did it, I said, “Because I want to be part of something.
本质上，当人们问我为什么这么做时，我说：“因为我想成为某件事的一部分。
I want to be part of a team.
我想成为团队的一员。
I wanted a place to go around people that I really liked and admired.” It’s got young people and middle people and some old people.
我想要一个和我真正喜欢和钦佩的人在一起的地方。”有年轻人、中年人和一些老年人。
I can do enough self-analysis to know that I was trying to recreate the comradeship part of my military experience.
我可以做足够的自我分析，知道我正在努力重建我的军事经历中的同志关系部分。
It’s largely been successful, so I’ve really enjoyed that.
它基本上是成功的，所以我真的很喜欢它。
I get many of the same satisfactions that I got in the military relationship.
我得到了许多与军事关系中相同的满足感。
It made me realize that what I loved about being a soldier was less about carrying a weapon and being a soldier than it was about being a part of a team.
这让我意识到，我对成为一名士兵的热爱与其说是携带武器和成为一名士兵，不如说是成为团队的一员。
If we think about the post–World War II era, and to some extent after the Korean War, Vietnam War, you have a significant percentage of American males having been through that camaraderie, but also a pretty high degree of traumatic stress.
如果我们考虑一下二战后时代，在某种程度上，朝鲜战争、越南战争之后，有很大比例的美国男性经历过这种友情，但也承受着相当高的创伤压力。
That’s not the case anymore.
现在情况已不再是这样了。
It’s a much smaller minority.
这是一个小得多的少数群体。
How do you think that changed our nation in the ’50s and ’60s that so many men had that background?
你认为这对我们的国家在 50 年代和 60 年代有什么改变，以至于这么多人都有这样的背景？
I think it was positive because one, so many people were veterans or have been involved heavily in war sacrifices that nobody felt they could pound their chest and say, “I served and therefore, I’m special.” Everybody thought, “That was a responsibility, and I met my responsibility.” I think it was very good.
我认为这是积极的，因为很多人都是退伍军人，或者曾大量参与战争牺牲，以至于没有人觉得他们可以拍着胸脯说：“我服役过，因此，我很特别。”每个人都认为，“这是一种责任，我履行了我的责任。”我认为这非常好。
Also, even though there was trauma involved, everybody went through some trauma through that period.
此外，尽管涉及到创伤，但每个人在那段时期都经历过一些创伤。
Instead of feeling or being viewed as victims, everybody viewed it as we, as a group, went through this.
每个人都没有感觉或被视为受害者，而是将其视为我们作为一个群体经历过的事情。
I think that was very positive.
我认为这是非常积极的。
Now that we’ve got a very small percentage of Americans, a couple of things happen.
现在，我们的美国人所占比例非常小，发生了一些事情。
One is, Americans who didn’t serve feel a bit guilty, and they look from the outside and they say, “Thank you for your service,” and they try to be nice.
一是，没有提供服务的美国人会感到有点内疚，他们从外面看，会说，“谢谢你们的服务”，并且他们会努力表现得友善。
But also, the danger is that people who did serve start to feel self-righteous.
但危险在于，那些真正参与服务的人开始感到自以为是。
“I served and therefore, I must be more patriotic.
“我服役过，因此，我必须更加爱国。
I must be something more than other people.” Neither of those things are really healthy.
我一定比其他人更优秀。”这些东西都不是真正健康的。
We all have a responsibility to society and each other.
我们所有人都对社会和彼此负有责任。
I think we’ve got to view it as common requirements as common.
我认为我们必须将其视为共同的要求。
I would argue that our failure against COVID-19 is a failure to view public health as in the common defense.
我认为，我们在应对 COVID-19 方面的失败是因为我们未能将公共卫生视为共同防御手段。
That’s one of the challenges that’s come out of this.
这是由此带来的挑战之一。
Maybe it’s hard to generalize, but if a young man, say, has been through extreme traumatic stress in combat — emotional, psychological stress — are you more in the direction of “Well, they need a lot of therapy.
也许这很难一概而论，但如果一个年轻人在战斗中经历了极度的创伤性压力——情绪、心理压力——你是否会更倾向于“嗯，他们需要大量治疗。
They need to talk it through”?
他们需要讨论一下”？
Or do you think just suppression is better?
或者你认为压制更好？
Because after World War II and the Korean War, it seems to me, we, as a nation, mostly practiced suppression.
因为在第二次世界大战和朝鲜战争之后，在我看来，我们作为一个国家，主要实行镇压。
What do you think about that issue?
对于这个问题你怎么看？
I don’t agree with suppression because there are some people who have real trauma.
我不同意压制，因为有些人遭受了真正的创伤。
But I will be honest with you, I also think if you go looking for trauma long enough, you’ll find it — meaning, whether it’s there or not, you can almost create it by looking for trauma and telling people, “You must be traumatized because you went through this.” Then after a while, they go, “Oh, I must be traumatized,” and it almost becomes self-fulfilling.
但我会诚实地告诉你，我也认为如果你寻找创伤足够长的时间，你会发现它 —— 意思是，无论它是否存在，你几乎可以通过寻找创伤并告诉人们“你一定受到过创伤，因为你经历过这件事”来创造它。过了一会儿，他们会说，“哦，我一定受到了创伤”，这几乎变成了自我实现。
Having said that, I think that a lot of people have gone through a lot.
话虽如此，我想很多人都经历过很多事情。
What they need to do is understand that anyone who goes to combat comes out differently.
他们需要做的是明白，任何参加战斗的人都会有不同的结果。
They don’t come out worse.
他们的结果并没有变得更糟。
Trauma doesn’t always produce weakness.
创伤并不总是会导致虚弱。
It doesn’t produce flaws.
它不会产生缺陷。
It may produce a little bit more resilience.
它可能会产生更多的弹性。
It may produce a little bit more maturity.
它可能会产生更多的成熟度。
There are competing things.
有竞争的东西。
I don’t like the idea of suppression because that’s unhealthy.
我不喜欢压制的想法，因为那是不健康的。
But at the same time, we don’t want to look at every veteran as a victim or a casualty.
但与此同时，我们不想将每一位退伍军人视为受害者或伤亡者。
If you think about the numerous Afghans who fought with the United States in Afghanistan, how is it you think they understood America?
如果你想想在阿富汗与美国并肩作战的无数阿富汗人，你认为他们如何理解美国？
What did they value in their picture of America?
他们所看重的美国形象是什么？
And how accurate was it?
它有多准确？
It was flawed, but it was genuine.
它有缺陷，但它是真实的。
What I would say is, in 2001, the Afghans had a view of America from having helped America fight our Cold War enemy in the ’80s.
我想说的是，2001年，阿富汗人对美国的看法是因为他们在80年代帮助美国对抗我们的冷战敌人。
They fought Russia.
他们与俄罗斯作战。
We never fought the Soviet Union, but the Afghans lost 1.2 million Afghans in that war, which we funded and whatnot.
我们从未与苏联作战，但阿富汗人在那场战争中失去了 120 万阿富汗人，我们资助了这场战争。
Then we turned away, and they had their internal problems with a civil war and then with the rise of the Taliban.
然后我们转身离开，他们遇到了内战和塔利班崛起的内部问题。
When we arrived in 2001, their expectations were huge.
当我们 2001 年到达时，他们的期望很高。
They expected that now this is a chance to lose the Taliban leadership, which they didn’t like, but also to make political and economic progress, because now the United States, the 800-pound gorilla in every way, was on their side and in their corner.
他们期望现在这是一个失去塔利班领导层的机会，虽然他们不喜欢塔利班领导层，但也是取得政治和经济进步的机会，因为现在美国这个重达800磅的大猩猩在各方面都站在他们一边，站在他们一边。
Now, some of those expectations were unrealistic.
现在，其中一些期望是不切实际的。
They hoped so many things would happen.
他们希望发生很多事情。
And they contributed to many of the failures — the inability to wrestle corruption out of the system and whatnot.
它们导致了许多失败——无法将腐败从系统中清除出去等等。
But over the years that I was involved, from 2002 to 2010, there was an increasing gap between what they were getting from the relationship with the United States, the experience, and what we were able to provide or did provide.
但在我参与的这些年里，从2002年到2010年，他们从与美国的关系中得到的、经验以及我们能够提供或确实提供的之间的差距越来越大。
Now, there’s a lot of blame to go around on that.
现在，人们对此有很多指责。
Actually, a tremendous amount of progress was made, but they got increasingly frustrated that all of this, they felt was possible, and yet couldn’t be achieved for a number of reasons.
事实上，已经取得了巨大的进步，但他们越来越沮丧，因为所有这些他们认为是可能的，但却由于多种原因而无法实现。
That almost created a sense of bitterness: “You know, we ought to be able to sort this out, but we’re not doing that.”
这几乎产生了一种苦涩感：“你知道，我们应该能够解决这个问题，但我们没有这样做。”
I still think — and there’s a differing body of knowledge — many Afghans didn’t like America or viewed our use of too much power as being negative.
我仍然认为“而且有不同的知识体系”许多阿富汗人不喜欢美国或认为我们使用过多的权力是消极的。
There’s certainly some validity in that.
这当然有一定的道理。
At the same time, if you’d asked most Afghans, would they rather have Americans there in a big way helping them or the Taliban in charge, I think they’d absolutely lean toward the Americans.
与此同时，如果你问大多数阿富汗人，他们愿意让美国人大力帮助他们还是让塔利班掌管，我认为他们绝对会倾向于美国人。
But they didn’t believe we were going to stay, so they didn’t feel like we were reliable.
但他们不相信我们会留下来，所以他们觉得我们不可靠。
That became another source of frustration.
这成为另一个令人沮丧的原因。
What was the main thing you learned from them?
你从他们身上学到的主要东西是什么？
The Afghan people could go through a tremendous amount.
阿富汗人民可能会经历巨大的苦难。
You would go to an Afghan village, and you’d fly over it early in the morning.
你会去一个阿富汗村庄，然后一大早飞过它。
It’d be freezing cold in the winter.
冬天会很冷。
There wouldn’t be a single bit of smoke coming out of a chimney.
烟囱里不会冒出一丁点烟。
There was no heat whatsoever.
没有任何热量。
And life was primitive beyond which most Americans can even conceive.
生活是原始的，大多数美国人甚至无法想象。
This is in the 21st century.
这是在21世纪。
First, they’ve got a stoic ability.
首先，他们有坚忍的能力。
Maybe it’s been forced upon them, but it’s amazing, their ability to tolerate things and their ability to take a long-term view.
也许这是被迫的，但令人惊奇的是，他们有容忍事情的能力，也有长远眼光的能力。
And they would have a tremendous sense of loyalty to people whom they built a relationship with, this idea that they would stay true to someone that they committed themselves to.
他们会对与之建立关系的人抱有极大的忠诚感，他们会忠于自己所承诺的人。
At the same time, like any other population, they suffered from misinformation and ignorance and belief in things that were completely wrong, or misperceptions which made it difficult for them.
与此同时，与其他人群一样，他们也遭受错误信息、无知和信仰完全错误的事物或误解的困扰，这给他们带来了困难。
Not right now, but how much medium-term optimism do you have for Afghanistan?
现在还不行，但您对阿富汗的中期乐观程度有多少？
It’s great you worded it that way, Tyler.
泰勒，你这么说真是太好了。
Medium-term, I think things are going to move forward.
从中期来看，我认为事情将会向前发展。
I don’t think Afghanistan is anything like it was in 2001.
我认为阿富汗已经不再像 2001 年那样了。
There’s been too much progress socially, too much education.
社会进步太多，教育太多。
I think the Taliban are going to find that they caught something they really aren’t prepared for.
我认为塔利班会发现他们发现了一些他们确实没有准备好的东西。
They’re going to try to reimplement what they had in the 1990s, and it’s going to be very uncomfortable.
他们将尝试重新实施 20 世纪 90 年代的做法，这会非常不舒服。
I expect in the near term, there will be a lot of friction, and then one of two things is going to happen.
我预计在短期内，将会出现很多摩擦，然后两件事之一将会发生。
The Taliban will just find they’ve got to mature and accommodate and evolve themselves into a different kind of government, or they won’t be able to maintain control.
塔利班只会发现他们必须成熟、适应并发展成为一种不同类型的政府，否则他们将无法保持控制。
I think that the former is more likely, that the Taliban are forced to change who they are, but I’m not sure which of those two options is going to play out.
我认为前者更有可能，塔利班被迫改变他们的身份，但我不确定这两个选择中的哪一个会发挥作用。
What did we learn from the Armenia-Azerbaijan war?
我们从亚美尼亚-阿塞拜疆战争中学到了什么？
Is it all just about drones now?
现在只剩下无人机了吗？
Or is that an outlier?
或者这是一个异常值？
No, it’s an awful lot about drones now.
不，现在关于无人机的话题太多了。
The idea that you can use technology — we really started seeing this in Ukraine when Russia started using a combination of drones and really quick intelligence-sharing to mass artillery and whatnot.
可以使用技术的想法——当俄罗斯开始结合使用无人机和快速情报共享来大规模火炮等时，我们在乌克兰才真正开始看到这一点。
I think in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, you’re finding that even relatively — I don’t say backward, but less advanced nations can put out really advanced technology.
我认为在亚美尼亚-阿塞拜疆冲突中，你会发现即使是相对 —— 我不是说落后，但不太先进的国家也可以推出真正先进的技术。
You’re not talking about that being limited to superpowers to have smart weapons and whatnot.
你并不是在谈论仅限于拥有智能武器之类的超级大国。
Everybody’s got them now.
现在每个人都得到了它们。
When will be the first drone assassination within the borders of the United States?
美国境内首次无人机暗杀何时发生？
And what should we do about that now?
那么我们现在应该做什么呢？
It is probably closer than we think.
它可能比我们想象的更接近。
I don’t think it’s hard to do.
我认为这并不难做到。
You can go and buy off-the-shelf technology at Best Buy or RadioShack or anything like that, and you can get enough to do it.
你可以去 Best Buy 或 RadioShack 或类似的地方购买现成的技术，而且你可以获得足够的东西来做到这一点。
It’s hard to stop.
很难停下来。
They’re developing techniques, but it’s really hard to stop.
他们正在开发技术，但真的很难停下来。
If it’s not just an assassination of an individual, what about somebody going after an aircraft as it’s taking off, things like that.
如果这不仅仅是针对个人的暗杀，那么有人在飞机起飞时追赶飞机之类的事情又如何呢？
Just the ability to do the mass thing — I am surprised we haven’t seen it.
只是做大规模事情的能力 —— 我很惊讶我们还没有看到它。
Every morning I get up, I wouldn’t be surprised to .
每天早上我起床，我都不会感到惊讶。
.
。
.
。
And it could easily come from domestic players.
而且很容易来自国内玩家。
Let’s say 20 years from now, 30 years from now, what does the equilibrium look like for controversial public figures?
假设20年后、30年后，有争议的公众人物的均衡是什么样的？
Will it be a world where you almost can’t go out in public?
这会是一个你几乎不能出门的世界吗？
If the trend continues where it is, I think you’ll have a tremendous number of people who won’t even consider becoming public figures.
如果这种趋势继续下去，我认为将会有大量的人甚至不会考虑成为公众人物。
They will just avoid it.
他们只会避免它。
Then you will have these people who I call Teflon celebrities, where their goal in life is to be a celebrity.
然后你就会看到这些我称之为特氟龙名人的人，他们的人生目标就是成为名人。
They just don’t mind that.
他们只是不介意这一点。
They will step into the limelight, as many have now, and they will live there.
他们将像现在许多人一样成为众人瞩目的焦点，并且他们将住在那里。
The danger is that our politicians come from that latter group — people who are willing to go into very public spaces like that, or actually the people who in previous times would’ve been superficial celebrities.
危险在于，我们的政客来自后一个群体——那些愿意进入这样的公共场所的人，或者实际上是那些在以前只是肤浅的名人的人。
I think that’s very, very dangerous, but we’re going to have to come to grips with it.
我认为这非常非常危险，但我们必须面对它。
The social media ability, the glare — if we can’t get some maturity in this and some new accommodation, then I think we’ll have a very difficult period 20 years from now.
社交媒体能力、眩光——如果我们不能在这方面变得成熟并采取一些新的适应措施，那么我认为 20 年后我们将经历一段非常困难的时期。
I can’t envision exactly what the solution is, but I know there’s going to have to be something.
我无法确切地想象解决方案是什么，但我知道一定有什么办法。
Is there any plausible scenario where defense beats offense, or at least holds it back?
是否有任何可能的情况是防守击败进攻，或者至少阻止进攻？
In one sense, yes.
从某种意义上说，是的。
You say, “Well, we’ve got this high technology available to terrorist groups, and homemade precision strikes and assassinations are going to be easier.”
你说：“好吧，我们已经为恐怖组织提供了这种高科技，自制的精确打击和暗杀将会变得更加容易。”
On the other side, and maybe equally negative, we’ve got a surveillance-based society now.
另一方面，也许同样消极的是，我们现在有一个基于监视的社会。
We actually can know everything about Tyler Cowen, and we can watch you almost every minute.
事实上，我们可以了解泰勒·考恩的一切，我们几乎每分钟都能看到你。
And as that expands more, the ability to be a nefarious player or something like that — it’s going to get really hard.
随着这种情况的扩大，成为邪恶玩家或类似的东西的能力将会变得非常困难。
I would argue that if you consider that as defense — knowing everything all the time — then that could easily get more powerful than the ability to attack.
我认为，如果你将其视为防御 ——“始终了解一切”——那么这很容易变得比攻击能力更强大。
So, more nations will go the Chinese route in some manner?
那么，更多国家会以某种方式走中国路线吗？
I absolutely think so.
我绝对这么认为。
In fact, it will probably go faster than we expect it to.
事实上，它可能会比我们预期的更快。
Now, if drones have become so much more important — we mentioned cyberattacks before — great risks, right?
现在，如果无人机变得如此重要 ——我们之前提到过网络攻击—— 风险很大，对吗？
What does this mean for who the military has to recruit?
这对于军队必须招募的人来说意味着什么？
It seems like a very different recruiting problem than what we used to have, and maybe a harder problem because people who can work with cyberattacks — they can earn a lot more money in the private sector than, say, a guy who’s 6 foot 3 with big muscles.
这似乎是一个与我们以前遇到的非常不同的招聘问题，而且可能是一个更困难的问题，因为能够应对网络攻击的人 ——他们在私营部门可以比那些身高 6 英尺 3 英寸、肌肉发达的人赚更多的钱。
How are we going to deal with this?
我们该如何处理这个问题？
Well, that’s a cultural shift that has to occur in the military, but it has to occur, and has to occur soon.
嗯，这是军队中必须发生的文化转变，但它必须发生，而且必须很快发生。
I think we’re going to have to start recruiting people with the talent for that or the ability to be taught that.
我认为我们必须开始招募有这方面天赋或有能力接受这方面教育的人。
They may not have the skills walking in.
他们可能不具备走进去的技能。
The military — as it did in the aerospace age — needs to become the training ground for people, to teach them high-tech skills.
军队——就像在航空航天时代所做的那样——需要成为人们的训练场，向他们传授高科技技能。
Right now, the commercial world is ahead of the military on things like cyber, in terms of training basic skills and digitization.
目前，在网络、基本技能培训和数字化等方面，商业界领先于军方。
The military’s relied on trying to bring people in who are pretty good already, and then focus them on certain tasks.
军队依靠的是试图引进已经很优秀的人，然后让他们专注于某些任务。
The military’s got to think about creating an education system for talented people so that becomes a recruiting tool.
军方必须考虑为人才建立一个教育体系，使其成为一种招募工具。
If you come in and work in the military, you get access to technology and training that is hard to get on the outside.
如果你进入军队工作，你就能获得在外面很难获得的技术和培训。
You get people for a number of years, and then they graduate on to whatever tech firm.
你招募了很多年的人，然后他们毕业到任何一家科技公司。
That means we’ve got to reverse.
这意味着我们必须逆转。
We got to get the engine on the train right now because it’s not there.
我们现在必须把引擎装到火车上，因为它不在那儿。
To close, two questions about you.
最后，问两个关于你的问题。
You’re famous for eating only one meal a day.
你以一天只吃一顿饭而闻名。
Do you still do that?
你现在还这样做吗？
I do.
我愿意。
Okay.
好的。
The question is, what’s the meal?
问题是，饭吃什么？
It’s dinner.
吃晚饭了。
What do you prefer to eat for the one meal, if you have your way?
如果可以的话，你一顿饭更喜欢吃什么？
I’m not a foodie; I’m basic.
我不是美食家；我很基础。
I like salad, but I like a very basic dinner.
我喜欢沙拉，但我喜欢非常简单的晚餐。
I like a lot of chicken.
我喜欢很多鸡肉。
If you take me to a fancy restaurant and you try to serve me fancy food, I’ll eat it because it’s my one meal a day, but the reality is, it’s completely lost on me.
如果你带我去一家高档餐厅，并尝试为我提供美味的食物，我会吃它，因为这是我一天的一顿饭，但现实是，我完全迷失了它。
I just don’t get any satisfaction.
我只是没有得到任何满足。
It’s very basic food in significant quantities at night.
这是晚上大量的基本食物。
Final question — what will you be doing next?
最后一个问题 — 你接下来要做什么？
Your new book is out — Risk: A User’s Guide, co-authored with Anna Butrico.
您的新书已出版 — 风险：用户指南，与 Anna Butrico 合着。
What next?
接下来怎么办？
I think I’m never going to write another book.
我想我永远不会再写一本书了。
It’s a lot of hard work.
这是很多艰苦的工作。
This is the fourth one.
这是第四个。
What we’ll be doing is, in McChrystal Group, we’ll be taking the ideas of risk, and we’ll continue to work with civilian companies.
我们要做的是，在麦克里斯特尔集团，我们将承担风险的想法，我们将继续与民用公司合作。
We’ve worked with a number of states and cities to try to let them find a path to become more resilient, more capable as entities because that’s where I think the future has to go in organizations.
我们与许多州和城市合作，试图让他们找到一条变得更有弹性、更有能力的实体之路，因为我认为这就是组织的未来发展方向。
Stan McChrystal, thank you very much.
斯坦·麦克克里斯特尔，非常感谢你。
My pleasure, Tyler.
我很荣幸，泰勒。
Thank you.
谢谢。
Thumbnail photo credit: Leading Authorities, Inc.
缩略图来源：Leading Authorities, Inc.