Simon Johnson on Banking, Technology, and Prosperity (Ep. 179)

Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.

大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。

Today, I am chatting with Simon Johnson.

今天，我正在与西蒙·约翰逊聊天。

He’s a British American economist and a professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management.

他是一位英裔美国经济学家，也是麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院的教授。

He served as chief economist of the IMF.

曾任国际货币基金组织首席经济学家。

He’s worked on Russian reforms, and he’s the author of numerous books, but most prominently, his new book, co-authored with Daron Acemoglu, called Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle over Technology and Prosperity.

他致力于俄罗斯的改革，也是多本书的作者，但最引人注目的是他与达龙·阿西莫格鲁合着的新书，名为《权力与进步：我们对技术和繁荣的千年斗争》。

Hi, Tyler.

嗨，泰勒。

Great to see you, and great to see you today.

很高兴见到你，也很高兴今天见到你。

These are good Tyler topics, I would say.

我想说，这些都是泰勒的好话题。

Yes, so a very simple question: At what size or level is a US bank small enough to fail?

是的，这是一个非常简单的问题：美国银行达到什么规模或水平才小到足以倒闭？

I think we’re in the process of exploring that, Tyler, because previously .

我认为我们正在探索这一点，泰勒，因为之前。

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I actually testified to the Senate in 2015.

事实上，我在 2015 年就曾向参议院作证。

There was a big argument over many years about this.

多年来，人们对此争论不休。

I said, “If you let banks go over $50 billion, you’re going to have to pay attention to them because there could be systemic knock-on effects.” I talked about Long-Term Capital Management, which wasn’t a bank, which was about $100 billion.

我说：“如果你让银行的资金超过 500 亿美元，你就必须关注它们，因为可能会产生系统性连锁反应。”我谈到了长期资本管理公司，它不是一家银行，大约有 1000 亿美元。

Many of us used to have this notion that if we only split up the banks, made them smaller, stopped them from becoming large, they would be in a position where they’re allowed to fail.

我们中的许多人过去都有这样的观念，即如果我们只是拆分银行，缩小规模，阻止它们变大，它们就会处于允许倒闭的境地。

It now seems there’s no size where we can let that happen.

现在看来，我们没有足够的规模可以让这种情况发生。

So, should we give up on the idea of splitting up the banks?

那么，我们是否应该放弃银行分拆的想法呢？

No, actually, I think Sheila Bair nailed this.

不，实际上，我认为希拉·贝尔（Sheila Bair）解决了这个问题。

She nailed it in the Silicon Valley Bank weekend, if you like.

如果你愿意的话，她在硅谷银行周末做到了这一点。

And she wrote about it last week in the Financial Times, which is, what you could have done was have the Silicon Valley Bank uninsured deposits take a haircut.

她上周在《金融时报》上写道，你本可以做的就是让硅谷银行的未保险存款被削减。

The assets of that bank were mostly high-quality, long-term government bonds that were underwater, but only because of the interest rate increase.

该银行的资产大部分是优质长期政府债券，但只是因为利率上升而陷入水下。

Insured above $250,000, you mean?

您的意思是保险金额超过 250,000 美元？

Exactly.

确切地。

Sorry.

对不起。

Actually, the Sheila Bair proposal was to insure all uninsured deposits.

事实上，希拉·贝尔的提议是为所有未投保的存款提供保险。

We could talk about that.

我们可以谈谈这个。

I think a very sensible version of that would insure business transaction accounts, or operational deposits, as FDIC calls them.

我认为一个非常明智的版本是为商业交易账户（FDIC 称之为运营存款）提供保险。

Basically, small-business working capital, payroll, the account from which they make payroll, and so on.

基本上，小企业的营运资金、工资、工资账户等等。

I think those are a real issue at the moment.

我认为这些是目前的一个真正的问题。

I think insuring all deposits is something you only do when you’re absolutely desperate.

我认为只有当你绝对绝望时才为所有存款提供保险。

Hopefully, we won’t get to that.

希望我们不会做到这一点。

It seems to be that’s the world moving forward.

似乎这就是世界前进的方向。

If we insure all deposits but SVB, then they’re all insured.

如果我们为除 SVB 之外的所有存款提供保险，那么它们都会受到保险。

Then those banks will take a lot more risk, and the problem gets bigger, and you raise deposit insurance premia.

那么这些银行将承担更多的风险，问题就会变得更大，你就会提高存款保险费。

More funds move outside the banking system to, say, money market funds, which are less regulated.

更多资金从银行系统转移到监管较少的货币市场基金等领域。

Doesn’t it just postpone the problem and make it bigger?

这不是只会推迟问题并使问题变得更大吗？

It may do.

可能会。

I don’t think we’re going to get a consensus to insure all deposits, Tyler, for exactly the reasons you’re flagging.

我认为我们不会就为所有存款提供保险达成共识，泰勒，正是出于您所举报的原因。

I do think that we might leave individual deposits at $250,000, where it is now.

我确实认为我们可能会将个人存款保留在现在的 25 万美元水平。

And we might have a sensible design of an insurance scheme for small-business transaction accounts, because I think if you have a nine-person startup, telling them to spend time on financial management when they’re trying to build a new hot sauce company — whatever it is — it’s a distraction and rather unfair.

我们可能会为小企业交易账户设计一个明智的保险计划，因为我认为，如果你有一个九人的初创公司，告诉他们在试图建立一家新的辣酱公司时要花时间进行财务管理 ——“无论它是什么”—— 这是一种干扰，而且相当不公平。

Let me tell you my worry and see what your response is: that once you start playing the credibility game, which ultimately you can’t avoid, that even letting a truly small bank — much smaller than SVB — fail, it sends a signal.

让我告诉你我的担忧，看看你的反应是什么：一旦你开始玩信誉游戏，这最终是你无法避免的，即使让一家真正的小银行 ——比SVB小得多——失败，也会发出一个信号。

And then, since about half of the deposits in US banks are not FDIC-insured, it doesn’t matter how small the bank is; the signal is, in a sense, infinitely large once it happens once.

然后，由于美国银行大约一半的存款没有 FDIC 的保险，因此无论银行规模有多大，都没有关系；从某种意义上说，信号一旦发生一次，就无限大。

Is that a problem?

这是一个问题吗？

If so, how do we get around it?

如果是这样，我们如何解决它？

It’s a very big problem, Tyler, honestly.

老实说，这是一个非常大的问题，泰勒。

Uninsured deposits were about $8 trillion at the end of last year; insured was about $10 trillion.

截至去年底，未保险存款约为 8 万亿美元；保险金额约为10万亿美元。

Like you say, 50–50, and it’s all about the signal because if you believe that uninsured deposits are in jeopardy, which was the case during that Silicon Valley Bank weekend, then you may be looking for other places to put your money.

就像你说的，50-50，这完全取决于信号，因为如果你认为未投保的存款处于危险之中，就像硅谷银行周末的情况一样，那么你可能会寻找其他地方来存放你的钱。

Let’s say you had been in charge with Credit Suisse.

假设您曾负责瑞士信贷银行。

What would you have done in advance to have eased the path of the mess we’re now in?

你会提前做些什么来缓解我们现在所处的混乱局面？

Because they’ve been poorly managed for a long time, right?

因为他们长期以来管理不善，对吗？

Yes, absolutely, and they’ve had many cautions from the regulators.

是的，绝对如此，而且他们已经收到了监管机构的多次警告。

I think that the losses that have been imposed on their convertible bonds, the so-called CoCos or AT1 — additional tier 1 — bonds .

我认为他们的可转换债券（即所谓的 CoCos 或 AT1 — 附加一级 — 债券）遭受了损失。

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we’re going to see what happens.

我们会看看会发生什么。

But I think if that works, and that sends a signal that these are actually going to be treated like equity — or more than equity, Tyler, because the equity holders got some compensation in the purchase.

但我认为，如果这有效，就会发出一个信号，即这些实际上将被视为股权，或者不仅仅是股权，泰勒，因为股权持有人在购买中获得了一些补偿。

They got $3 billion for a bank that was worth $8 billion on the Friday before this happened, but the AT1 bonds were taken to zero.

在此之前的周五，他们以 30 亿美元收购了一家价值 80 亿美元的银行，但 AT1 债券却为零。

That’s the current position.

这就是当前的位置。

Sure, but isn’t that a huge problem?

当然可以，但这不是一个大问题吗？

We’re signaling the CoCo bonds don’t make any sense, you ought to just buy the equity.

我们表示 CoCo 债券没有任何意义，你应该只购买股权。

Haven’t we abolished CoCo bonds as an institution moving forward, at least in that context?

作为一个向前发展的机构，我们不是已经废除了 CoCo 债券吗，至少在这种情况下？

I think there’s going to be a lot of repricing in that market for that reason.

我认为出于这个原因，该市场将会有很多重新定价的情况。

But I think the concern, Tyler, was that the convertibility would not happen, that those bonds would be protected precisely because of the kind of contagion fears that you mentioned a few moments ago.

但泰勒，我认为担心的是可兑换不会发生，这些债券将受到保护，正是因为您刚才提到的那种传染恐惧。

What’s the likelihood and time frame for a dollar central bank digitally managed currency?

美元央行数字化管理货币的可能性和时间框架是什么？

Is it ever going to happen?

它会发生吗？

I think it’s pretty far off, Tyler.

我认为这还很遥远，泰勒。

Look, you mentioned money market funds a moment ago.

看，您刚才提到了货币市场基金。

One thing that could happen, of course, is people might decide to take their uninsured deposits, which are a claim, a liability of a bank, and you may have different views about the sustainability or vulnerability of that bank, and you could buy short-term government debt through a money market fund, and then you could just sit there and wait to see what happens.

当然，可能发生的一件事是，人们可能决定提取未投保的存款，这是银行的一项债权、一项负债，你可能对该银行的可持续性或脆弱性有不同的看法，你可以通过货币市场基金购买短期政府债务，然后你就可以坐在那里等着看会发生什么。

So, we’re just going to live with privately issued stablecoins, and that will be what we use?

那么，我们将继续使用私人发行的稳定币，这就是我们所使用的？

Or do we somehow abolish all attempts to make money programmable?

或者我们是否以某种方式废除所有让金钱可编程的尝试？

That’s the right question, Tyler.

这是正确的问题，泰勒。

I think these privately issued stablecoins are pretty unstable, personally, and there’ve been a number of pressures there and a number of disappointments, as you know.

我个人认为这些私人发行的稳定币相当不稳定，正如你所知，存在很多压力和失望。

I think they’re not well regulated, and the Systemic Risk Council, of which I’m co-chair now with Erkki Liikanen from Finland — we’ve sent some letters really cautioning about that.

我认为它们没有得到很好的监管，而系统性风险委员会（我现在与来自芬兰的 Erkki Liikanen 共同担任该委员会的联合主席）我们已经发出了一些信函，对此提出了真正的警告。

That’s the main part of the crypto space that we think has systemic implications.

这是我们认为具有系统性影响的加密空间的主要部分。

Regulating who or what is a bank — should that be expanded?

监管谁是银行或什么是银行——是否应该扩大？

It’s already pretty strenuous, the regulation of that, and I think supervision —

监管已经相当繁重了，我认为监管 -

But who counts as a bank?

但谁算银行呢？

Money market funds don’t count as a bank in the same way.

货币市场基金不能以同样的方式算作银行。

Crypto exchanges don’t count as clearinghouses in the same way.

加密货币交易所不以同样的方式算作清算所。

Financial regulation — should we extend it to more entities?

金融监管 — 我们是否应该将其扩展到更多实体？

I think Gary Gensler — when it comes to crypto exchanges, I think he’s got the right view, which is, if it walks like an exchange and talks like an exchange, it’s an exchange.

我认为加里·根斯勒（Gary Gensler）——当谈到加密货币交易所时，我认为他有正确的观点，那就是，如果它像交易所一样行走、像交易所一样说话，那么它就是一个交易所。

Doesn’t matter what you call it.

你怎么称呼它并不重要。

I think there’s a pretty clear definition also of what’s a security, which Gary is following up on.

我认为什么是证券也有一个非常明确的定义，加里正在跟进这一点。

The American separation of banking and commerce — does it still make sense?

美国的银行与商业分离 ——它仍然有意义吗？

Why don’t we just abolish it?

我们为什么不直接废除它呢？

Plenty of countries don’t have it.

很多国家都没有。

Maybe their banks have been more stable than ours.

也许他们的银行比我们的更稳定。

Why have that form of the Glass-Steagall Act?

为什么要制定这种形式的《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》？

That’s a great question.

这是一个很好的问题。

I think, in America, one of the things we’re really good at is allowing people to get really big and powerful fast.

我认为，在美国，我们真正擅长的事情之一就是让人们快速变得强大。

If Amazon owned a bank, or if Microsoft owned a bank, or if Apple owned a bank, would the system be more stable or less stable?

如果亚马逊拥有一家银行，或者微软拥有一家银行，或者苹果拥有一家银行，系统会更稳定还是更不稳定？

Would it be more fair or less fair?

会更公平还是更不公平？

It’s a very good question.

这是一个非常好的问题。

I think we’re not going to do it politically.

我认为我们不会在政治上这样做。

I think that separation is something that’s sufficiently ingrained, and people are accustomed to it, but you’re right to push them, Tyler.

我认为分离是一种根深蒂固的东西，人们已经习惯了它，但你推动他们是对的，泰勒。

Absolutely.

绝对地。

Universal banking, as we’ve had in Japan, Germany — I remember the 1980s, parts of the ’90s.

全能银行，就像我们在日本、德国那样——我记得 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代的部分时间。

People said how great it is.

人们说这是多么伟大。

Were they wrong in overrating universal banking?

他们高估全能银行的做法是错误的吗？

Those nations have not done perfectly since then, right?

从那时起，这些国家的表现并不完美，对吗？

Yes, exactly.

是的，完全正确。

The Japanese banks ran into big trouble end of the ’80s and the ’90s, and subsequently have been pretty rough, and the European banks are also regarded as an imperfect model.

日本银行在上世纪80年代末和90年代遇到了大麻烦，随后日子也很坎坷，欧洲银行也被认为是一个不完美的典范。

Deutsche Bank, for example, is often held out as being very problematic, although it’s backed by the German state, so they can get away with a lot of things.

例如，德意志银行经常被认为存在很大问题，尽管它得到了德国政府的支持，因此他们可以逃脱很多惩罚。

These Swiss banks that were struggling this week had universal bank features at some points in their history.

本周陷入困境的这些瑞士银行在其历史上的某些时刻具有全能银行的特征。

I think banking is a difficult business and rife with problems for the rest of us, Tyler, however you organize it.

我认为银行业是一项困难的行业，对我们其他人来说充满了问题，泰勒，无论你如何组织它。

Should very small countries be allowed to have such large banks?

是否应该允许非常小的国家拥有如此大的银行？

If you look at Credit Suisse liabilities relative to Swiss GDP, I’m not sure what the number is now, but those two things are not so far apart, right?

如果你看看瑞士信贷相对于瑞士国内生产总值的负债，我不确定现在的数字是多少，但这两者相差并不远，对吧？

Yes.

是的。

So, it’s an issue: Can Switzerland even bail out its own very large banks credibly?

所以，这是一个问题：瑞士能否可靠地救助自己的大型银行？

Credit Suisse, when it was in serious trouble, had a balance sheet of around half a trillion dollars.

瑞士信贷陷入严重困境时，其资产负债表约为五万亿美元。

The Swiss National Bank has foreign exchange assets of over or around about a trillion dollars.

瑞士国家银行拥有超过或约一万亿美元的外汇资产。

Yes, size matters, Tyler, but size relative to the ability of the government to stand behind its banks, including in foreign currency when they’re operating not in the domestic currency.

是的，规模很重要，泰勒，但规模是相对于政府支持银行的能力而言的，包括当银行不以本币运营时以外币计价。

I think, on that score, the Swiss did have that capacity.

我认为，从这一点来看，瑞士人确实有这种能力。

Well, Switzerland now has one really big bank, bigger than it had been a week ago.

好吧，瑞士现在有了一家非常大的银行，比一周前还要大。

Should the Swiss be more worried?

瑞士人应该更加担心吗？

Should they split it up?

他们应该把它分开吗？

What’s the equilibrium here?

这里的平衡是什么？

It’s moved against the direction you want.

它的移动方向与你想要的方向相反。

Right, absolutely.

对，绝对是。

I think they should be very careful and supervise that bank extremely carefully.

我认为他们应该非常小心并非常仔细地监督该银行。

Of course, part of why UBS is so big — it has very large wealth management, and if wealth management is run properly, it’s basically a custodian with fees for rich people.

当然，瑞银之所以这么大，部分原因在于它拥有非常庞大的财富管理业务，如果财富管理业务运行得当，它基本上就是一个向富人收取费用的托管机构。

When you strip that out, I think their total balance sheet is a bit more than the reserves that the Swiss National Bank has, but they still have strong enough national balance sheet and a credible enough central bank.

当你剔除这一点时，我认为他们的总资产负债表比瑞士国家银行的储备多一点，但他们仍然拥有足够强大的国家资产负债表和足够可信的央行。

Sure, but if you believe in splitting up the big banks, isn’t that the first place you should look, and the Swiss, say, two months from now, should turn around and split up UBS into three, four, five different parts?

当然可以，但如果你相信拆分大银行，那么这不是你应该首先考虑的地方吗？比如说，两个月后，瑞士应该转身将瑞银拆分为三、四、五个不同的部分？

Or do we give up on the idea?

或者我们放弃这个想法？

What do you consider?

你怎么看？

What’s your view?

你的看法是什么？

Well, I’ve always said, Tyler, that a strength of the US system from its financial history is that we’ve had a multitude of banks, and we’re always very suspicious of big banks.

泰勒，我一直说，从金融历史来看，美国体系的优势在于我们拥有众多银行，而且我们总是对大银行非常怀疑。

The Europeans went for the big banking model, universal banking, a long time ago — late 19th century, actually.

欧洲人很久以前——实际上是 19 世纪末——就追求大型银行模式，即全能银行。

So, there was a divergence there.

所以，那里存在分歧。

The US economy, US innovation, US productivity was not built on big banks.

美国经济、美国创新、美国生产力并不是建立在大银行的基础上的。

It was not associated with big banks.

它与大银行无关。

Given what a comeback housing prices have made in many countries around the world, should we not think that 2006–2007 wasn’t really much of a housing bubble?

考虑到全球许多国家房价的回升，我们难道不应该认为 2006 年至 2007 年实际上并不是房地产泡沫吗？

Prices were a little bit ahead of their time, but the actual crash was a kind of negative bubble in the shadow banking market,, and home prices then were close to rational — right or wrong?

价格有点超前了，但真正的崩盘是影子银行市场的一种负泡沫，当时的房价接近理性——是对还是错？

I think there’s a lot of validity to that.

我认为这有很多道理。

It was obviously also a derivative — I don’t know if bubble is quite the right word — but there was a view — and I was at the IMF, as you know, Tyler, in 2007 — and we had a view that was completely wrong, that derivatives had spread the risk around the world.

它显然也是一种衍生品——“我不知道泡沫这个词是否正确”——“但有一种观点”——“正如你所知，泰勒，2007 年我在国际货币基金组织工作”——我们有一种完全错误的观点，即衍生品将风险分散到了全世界。

In fact, they concentrated the risk, and it was that concentration of risk in these very large financial institutions in the US and in Europe that caused a lot of the panic, a lot of the problems, and that generated downward pressure on house prices, the negative to which you’re referring.

事实上，他们集中了风险，而正是风险集中在美国和欧洲的这些大型金融机构中，导致了很多恐慌、很多问题，并对房价产生了下行压力，也就是你所指的负面影响。

Speaking of the IMF, today, how would you reform the IMF?

说到国际货币基金组织，今天您会如何改革国际货币基金组织？

I would remove the Russians from the board of directors.

我会把俄罗斯人从董事会中除名。

I think that having the Russians there in that role is inappropriate, problematic.

我认为让俄罗斯人担任这个角色是不合适的，也是有问题的。

I think the way that Russia has acted over the past year, and arguably longer, is outside what’s acceptable for nations.

我认为俄罗斯在过去一年甚至更长时间内的行为方式超出了各国的可接受范围。

I’m very sad that this has not happened.

我很遗憾这没有发生。

I’m fine with that, but how would you improve the positive program for what the fund does?

我对此表示同意，但是您将如何改进该基金的积极计划呢？

I think that the fund has long been primarily engaged with emerging markets and developing countries.

我认为该基金长期以来主要致力于新兴市场和发展中国家。

I understand there’s a rhetoric of evenhandedness.

我知道有一种不偏不倚的言辞。

There’s a rhetoric of the IMF should speak truth to authority in all countries.

有一种说法是，国际货币基金组织应该向所有国家的权威说真话。

I think they struggle with that, just given the power structure of the world.

我认为考虑到世界的权力结构，他们正在为此奋斗。

So, their ability to lend, when necessary, to help people who are genuinely in trouble, but not to get sucked into situations where deeper reforms are needed, and reforms perhaps the IMF can’t help deliver on.

因此，他们有能力在必要时提供贷款，帮助那些真正陷入困境的人，但又不会陷入需要更深层次改革的境地，而国际货币基金组织可能无法帮助实现这些改革。

We have Pakistan entering, what, its 23rd or 24th IMF program.

我们让巴基斯坦加入了它的第 23 个或第 24 个国际货币基金组织计划。

It surely seems something about the system is broken, right?

看来系统肯定有什么问题，对吧？

Should there be a way we can just kick countries out and say, “No more”?

我们是否应该有一种方法可以将一些国家踢出去并说“不再”？

Well, you can.

好吧，你可以。

Countries can be —

国家可以是 ——

But we don’t very much.

但我们不太了解。

Well, certain countries don’t get excluded, countries that have, let’s say, some geopolitical significance and a good enough relationship with the G7.

嗯，某些国家不会被排除在外，比如说具有一定地缘政治意义并且与七国集团关系足够好的国家。

Sure, maybe there should be a special recovery arm of something, but it’s very hard to create these new institutions.

当然，也许应该有一个特殊的复苏部门，但创建这些新机构非常困难。

We haven’t really done it or done it well since 1944.

自 1944 年以来，我们还没有真正做到这一点，也没有做得很好。

So, there isn’t that much other than the IMF.

所以，除了国际货币基金组织之外，没有什么其他的了。

I agree, Tyler, it’s extremely awkward and not clear that it’s good for the people of Pakistan to continue on this sort of trajectory.

我同意，泰勒，这非常尴尬，而且不清楚巴基斯坦人民继续走这种轨迹是否有好处。

Here’s a reader question, and I’m quoting: “Ask him if Indonesia’s money-financed fiscal program in which their central bank monetized national debt has worked.

这是一个读者的问题，我引用的是：“问他印度尼西亚的货币融资财政计划是否有效，在该计划中，央行将国债货币化。

The nation’s currency has modestly appreciated.

该国货币小幅升值。

The program seemed to get them through the pandemic without ill effects.” Opinion?

该计划似乎帮助他们度过了大流行，并且没有产生任何不良影响。”观点？

Well, I’m not an expert on Indonesia, but I do think they’ve come a long way in the past 20 years in terms of responsible macro management.

嗯，我不是印度尼西亚问题专家，但我确实认为过去 20 年他们在负责任的宏观管理方面取得了长足的进步。

Of course, if you have a good reputation for keeping your budget under control .

当然，如果您在控制预算方面享有良好声誉。

.

。

.

。

The joke of the IMF and elsewhere is that IMF stands for It’s Mostly Fiscal.

国际货币基金组织和其他地方的笑话是，国际货币基金组织代表“主要是财政”。

If you’re credible on the fiscal side, I think you do create space, Tyler, for extraordinary operations at a time of crisis.

泰勒，如果你在财政方面是可信的，我认为你确实为危机时期的非凡行动创造了空间。

COVID was a time of crisis, a pretty severe crisis in some places.

新冠疫情是一个危机时期，在某些地方是相当严重的危机。

Okay.

好的。

Now turning to your new book with Daron Acemoglu, Power and Progress.

现在转向达龙·阿西莫格鲁的新书《权力与进步》。

Could you please summarize that book for us as a high-quality GPT-4 program might?

您能否为我们总结一下这本书，就像高质量的 GPT-4 程序一样？

That’s my prompt.

这是我的提示。

Okay, I haven’t had a chance to ask GPT-4 that, but it’s a great question.

好吧，我还没有机会问 GPT-4，但这是一个很好的问题。

We are challenging, I think, some modern techno optimism view, which happens to be quite prevalent, Tyler, which is that technology just kind of happens.

我认为，我们正在挑战一些现代技术乐观主义观点，泰勒，这种观点恰好相当普遍，即技术只是自然而然地发生了。

It raises productivity.

它提高了生产力。

It improves how people live, including their health, and it provides them with more opportunity, and everyone benefits eventually.

它改善了人们的生活方式，包括他们的健康，并为他们提供了更多的机会，最终每个人都受益。

Well, when we look back over the past 1,000 — and in some ways, we can look back 10,000 years — we find it to be more complicated.

好吧，当我们回顾过去的 1000 年——在某些方面，我们可以回顾 10000 年——我们发现情况更加复杂。

Say we take the Industrial Revolution.

假设我们以工业革命为例。

There’s a new paper by Joel Mokyr in the Journal of Political Economy, and he argues in the areas where you had an Industrial Revolution, wages went up a fair amount pretty rapidly.

乔尔·莫基尔（Joel Mokyr）在《政治经济学杂志》上发表了一篇新论文，他认为在发生工业革命的地区，工资增长得相当快。

Performance in England, as a whole, was mixed, but it was the areas that didn’t have the IR where wage performance was poor.

英格兰的整体表现参差不齐，但正是在没有IR的地区，工资表现较差。

Doesn’t it typically happen pretty rapidly that if you have sustained advances in technology, most people are much better off?

如果技术持续进步，大多数人的生活会变得更好，这通常不是很快就会发生吗？

We did talk to Joel a lot about that in writing the book, and he was immensely helpful.

在写这本书的过程中，我们确实和乔尔讨论了很多关于这个问题，他给了我很大的帮助。

We used his work a lot.

我们经常使用他的作品。

I think the distinct difference we would make, just in terms of those facts, is that if you look at how people lived in cities — for example, in Manchester in the 1830s, which Engels wrote about — whether or not you like Marx and Engels, that was a really good, powerful description of working-class conditions.

我认为，仅就这些事实而言，我们会做出的明显改变是，如果你看看人们如何生活在城市中——例如恩格斯所写的 1830 年代的曼彻斯特——无论你是否喜欢马克思和恩格斯，这都是对工人阶级状况的一个非常好的、有力的描述。

As we know, until fairly recently, there have been significant increases in wealth inequality in many Western nations.

众所周知，直到最近，许多西方国家的财富不平等现象还显着加剧。

But don’t they coincide with a period of relatively low TFP, not relatively high?

但它们难道不是与全要素生产率相对较低而非相对较高的时期相一致吗？

Productivity growth is pretty slow since 1973.

自 1973 年以来，生产率增长相当缓慢。

Income inequality goes up.

收入不平等加剧。

But the story you’re trying to tell in the book is, “Oh, you have a lot of tech advances, and then income inequality goes up.” But we’ve been seeing almost the opposite of that.

但你在书中试图讲述的故事是，“哦，你有很多技术进步，然后收入不平等加剧。”但我们看到的情况几乎恰恰相反。

The problem is not enough tech advances, so wages are somewhat stagnant until lately.

问题在于技术进步不够，因此工资直到最近才有所停滞。

We would like more tech advances and more productivity growth, to be clear.

明确的是，我们希望更多的技术进步和更多的生产力增长。

We’re not anti-tech at all.

我们根本不反科技。

And you’re quite right about the coincidence of what’s happened since the 1970s.

关于 20 世纪 70 年代以来发生的事情的巧合，你说得很对。

What we say is that a lot of the digital technology, for example, Tyler, was quite disappointing in terms of productivity effects, but it was nevertheless deployed because management thought it would be helpful to displace workers.

我们想说的是，很多数字技术，例如泰勒，在生产力影响方面相当令人失望，但它仍然被部署，因为管理层认为这将有助于取代工人。

What do you think of the claims of your colleague, David Autor, that now we’re entering an era of wage compression, say, the last four or five years?

您的同事戴维·奥托尔（David Autor）声称我们现在正在进入一个工资压缩的时代，比如过去四五年，您对此有何看法？

I hope he’s right.

我希望他是对的。

David, Daron, and I run a little center at MIT for the study of the future of work, so we talk about this a lot.

大卫、达伦和我在麻省理工学院经营着一个研究未来工作的小中心，所以我们经常谈论这个问题。

David is always really sharp, on the money, and into the latest data.

大卫总是非常敏锐，对金钱和最新数据都很敏锐。

I think he would say — he does say — that this, after coming out of the pandemic — it’s not clear if this is a trend or a blip, but I think some wage compression would be very helpful at this point, Tyler.

我认为他会说“——他确实说过”——“在疫情结束后”——“目前还不清楚这是一种趋势还是昙花一现，但我认为在这一点上进行一些工资压缩会非常有帮助，泰勒。

If we look at wealth, if we look at the very wealthiest people in this country — Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg — it seems they’re much less wealthy than they were two or three years ago.

如果我们看看财富，如果我们看看这个国家最富有的人——埃隆·马斯克、马克·扎克伯格——他们似乎比两三年前要少得多。

More than cut in half.

还砍了一半多。

Maybe they’ve lost three-quarters of their wealth.

也许他们已经失去了四分之三的财富。

If market returns are a random walk, that’s more or less our best forecast for the future.

如果市场回报是随机游走的，那么这或多或少是我们对未来的最佳预测。

So, hasn’t this problem largely fixed itself in the last few years?

那么，这个问题在过去几年里不是已经基本解决了吗？

Top wealth has really been cut down a lot.

顶级财富确实被削减了很多。

I’ve never been bothered by the top wealth, Tyler.

我从来没有被顶级财富所困扰，泰勒。

It’s never been a major concern of mine.

这从来都不是我主要关心的问题。

What bothers me more is lack of good wages, rising wages for people who haven’t completed college, let’s say, or didn’t go to college.

更令我困扰的是缺乏良好的工资，那些没有完成大学学业或没有上过大学的人的工资不断上涨。

I think it’s the stagnation of that since the 1970s, which was quite different, of course, from what happened for the 30 or 40 years before that.

我认为这是自 20 世纪 70 年代以来的停滞，当然，这与之前 30 或 40 年发生的情况有很大不同。

I think that’s unnecessary and we can do better, but it’s a very hard process to reverse.

我认为这是不必要的，我们可以做得更好，但这是一个很难逆转的过程。

You’ve probably seen estimates that ChatGPT is the most rapidly adopted computer application in all of human history compared to any technology.

您可能已经看到过估计，与任何技术相比，ChatGPT 是人类历史上采用最快的计算机应用程序。

Now, if that’s the case, why is it that Open AI has only a market valuation of about $30 billion?

那么，如果真是这样，为什么Open AI的市值只有300亿美元左右呢？

Which is high, but it’s not close to Apple.

虽然很高，但与苹果相比还差得远。

In a way, it’s remarkably low.

在某种程度上，它的水平非常低。

Doesn’t that suggest most of the gains from AI will go to other parties and not to the people who own and design the algorithms?

这是否表明人工智能的大部分收益将流向其他各方，而不是拥有和设计算法的人？

Well, that’s a great question, Tyler.

嗯，这是一个很好的问题，泰勒。

I suppose we should go back and look at when exactly people started to think IBM was so valuable, Microsoft was so valuable, Google was so valuable.

我想我们应该回顾一下人们到底是什么时候开始认为 IBM 如此有价值、微软如此有价值、谷歌如此有价值的。

There is certainly a lot of discussion about the value chain of AI and whether the place to be is some more fundamental generative algorithm, or whether it’s going to be in the applications, the downstream part of AI.

关于人工智能的价值链，以及是否是一些更基本的生成算法，或者它是否会出现在人工智能的下游应用程序中，肯定有很多讨论。

Shares of Nvidia — they’re definitely up, but they’re not up by so much.

Nvidia 的股价——确实上涨了，但涨幅并没有那么大。

It’s not become one of the world’s largest companies.

它没有成为世界上最大的公司之一。

There seems to be more and more evidence that AI can be commodified.

似乎有越来越多的证据表明人工智能可以商品化。

You have a lot of competitors.

你有很多竞争对手。

There’s talk of training systems on a single GPU .

有人谈论在单个 GPU 上训练系统。

So, doesn’t AI mean we’ve entered this new age again, where the gains mostly don’t go to corporations?

那么，人工智能是否意味着我们再次进入了这个新时代，其中的收益大部分不会流向企业？

Well, possibly.

嗯，有可能。

That, I think, could be quite positive.

我认为，这可能是非常积极的。

Of course, we thought that about crypto, as well, at the beginning.

当然，我们一开始也考虑过加密货币。

And there were many discussions I recall — I’m sure you recall — around the beginning of the internet, where there were thoughts that, oh, this could become a more distributive model.

我记得，在互联网诞生之初，有很多讨论——“我相信你还记得”——有人认为，哦，这可能会成为一种更具分配性的模式。

Maybe power seeps away from large corporations.

也许权力会从大公司手中流失。

I think we tend to recombine things in this country in particular, Tyler.

我认为我们倾向于重新组合这个国家的事物，泰勒。

Again, we get big quickly, and we let people get powerful quickly.

再说一遍，我们的规模迅速扩大，我们也让人们迅速变得强大。

The people who said all along that social media are more competitive than they look — haven’t they been proven right?

那些一直说社交媒体比看上去更具竞争力的人——事实证明他们是对的吗？

TikTok and Facebook, Google competing with Bing, Amazon laying people off repeatedly.

TikTok 和 Facebook、谷歌与 Bing 竞争、亚马逊不断裁员。

Those companies have lost their luster.

这些公司已经失去了光彩。

They don’t look like unassailable giants anymore, to say the least.

至少可以说，他们看起来不再像无懈可击的巨人了。

Meta shares were down, what, three-quarters in value not too long ago?

不久前，Meta 股价下跌了四分之三？

Well, sure.

嗯，当然。

There’s definitely competition in that sector, and there’s definitely been overexpansion and overexuberance.

该行业肯定存在竞争，而且肯定存在过度扩张和过度繁荣。

I think the regret actually there, Tyler, is much more about the impact of social media on political, economic, and social discourse, the way that people talk to each other, the way — what has happened to civility.

泰勒，我认为真正的遗憾更多的是社交媒体对政治、经济和社会话语、人们相互交谈的方式以及文明发生的事情的影响。

Of course, there’s lots of concern, which is still concern — I’m not saying this has been completely established — about the impact of social media on young people, young people’s minds, young people’s mental wellness, and so on.

当然，还有很多担忧，而且仍然是担忧——“我并不是说这已经完全成立了”——关于社交媒体对年轻人、年轻人的思想、年轻人的心理健康等等的影响。

From my point of view, it seems that you and Daron overestimate how much market concentration matters.

在我看来，你和达伦似乎高估了市场集中度的重要性。

There’s one passage you have where you’re criticizing the soft drink market for being highly concentrated.

您在一篇文章中批评软饮料市场高度集中。

Coca-Cola dominates and so on.

可口可乐占主导地位等等。

But I used Google, I used GPT, and everything I could find tells me the price of soft drinks, in real terms, has been falling.

但我使用了谷歌，我使用了 GPT，我能找到的所有信息都告诉我，软饮料的实际价格一直在下降。

Oh, I think that was just an attempt to illustrate what market concentration means, Tyler.

哦，我认为这只是试图说明市场集中度意味着什么，泰勒。

Perhaps I’ll go back and look and see if we need to insert some errata on that.

也许我会回去看看我们是否需要对此插入一些勘误表。

What do you think is the main thing you changed your mind on over the course of writing this book?

您认为在撰写本书的过程中您改变想法的主要事情是什么？

The Middle Ages.

中世纪。

How did you change?

你是怎么改变的？

Well, I bought into this idea that you get from school books and so on about there was a dark age of very little innovation between the fall of Rome and the emergence of the Renaissance.

嗯，我相信你从教科书等中得到的这个想法，即从罗马衰落到文艺复兴兴起之间有一个几乎没有创新的黑暗时代。

Turns out, when you look more closely, there was a huge amount of innovation in agriculture, in commerce, even in early industry, but what didn’t happen — it didn’t filter down to regular people.

事实证明，当你更仔细地观察时，你会发现农业、商业、甚至早期工业中都有大量的创新，但没有发生的事情 ——它并没有渗透到普通人身上。

But wasn’t your original view correct for at least 400 years, say, centuries six through nine?

但你最初的观点至少在 400 年（比如六世纪到九世纪）内不是正确的吗？

And the revival you’re talking about — maybe that’s 10th century, and then for England, the Normans in 1066.

你所说的复兴 ——也许那是10世纪，然后是英格兰，1066年的诺曼人。

But if the view you held earlier is correct for 400 to 500 years, it’s not that bad a view, right?

但如果你之前持有的观点在四百年到五百年内都是正确的，那么这个观点也不算太糟糕，对吧？

Good point.

好点。

I think that it was certainly right for several hundred years.

我认为这在几百年里肯定是正确的。

Whether it started in 800 or 900 — I think you can debate that.

无论它是从 800 还是 900 开始 — 我认为你可以对此进行辩论。

The record’s not very good.

记录不太好。

The general idea that was put around by Renaissance scholars like Petrarch was that nothing good had happened from the fall of Rome for 900 years, and that turns out not to be true.

像彼特拉克这样的文艺复兴时期的学者提出的普遍观点是，罗马灭亡后的九百年里没有发生任何好事，但事实证明这不是真的。

If you think about how you read your own book, and how Daron reads the book — I’m not saying the two of you disagree — but if you had to explain the difference in emphasis, how each of you views the book, how would you present that to your potential readers?

如果你想想你如何读你自己的书，以及达伦如何读这本书 —— 我并不是说你们两个不同意 —— 但是如果你必须解释重点的差异，你们每个人如何看待这本书，你会如何向你的潜在读者展示？

Well, I think Daron spends a lot of time thinking about the future of AI.

嗯，我认为达龙花了很多时间思考人工智能的未来。

He’s very deeply in discussions with that community.

他正在与该社区进行深入的讨论。

He’s always looking down the road, and Daron is very good at seeing what’s on the horizon, analyzing it, and then putting a mental structure around it.

他总是向前看，而达伦非常善于看到地平线上的情况，分析它，然后围绕它建立一个心理结构。

Working with Daron — how would you describe what that’s like?

与达龙 一起工作—— 你会如何描述那是什么样的感觉？

Obviously, he’s super productive, as are you, but he might be renowned as the very most productive person in the entire profession.

显然，他和你一样非常高效，但他可能被誉为整个行业中最高效的人。

How does that manifest itself through daily interactions?

这如何通过日常互动体现出来？

It’s hard to keep up with Daron, to be totally honest.

老实说，很难跟上达伦的脚步。

We talked about writing this book, and we kicked ideas around for about five years.

我们讨论了写这本书的事情，并且我们花了大约五年的时间来思考这个想法。

And then all of a sudden — it was a pre-planned moment, but all of a sudden, pretty much January last year, Daron said, “Right, let’s start writing.” We’d got some pieces already, but we worked flat out for six months, and that was super intense.

然后突然间——这是一个预先计划好的时刻，但突然间，几乎是去年一月，达伦说，“好吧，让我们开始写作吧。”我们已经有了一些作品，但我们全力以赴地工作了六个月，那是非常紧张的。

Have you and he been surprised at how rapidly AI has evolved?

你和他是否对人工智能的发展速度感到惊讶？

Large language models in particular.

特别是大型语言模型。

I have been surprised.

我很惊讶。

Daron has not, again, because he spent a lot of time with that community and with computer scientists in general.

达伦再次没有这样做，因为他花了很多时间与该社区以及整个计算机科学家在一起。

I think he called this in our internal discussions pretty much right.

我认为他在我们内部讨论中所说的非常正确。

We were lucky that some people gave us a heads-up on not exactly what was coming with GPT, but we did have some, let’s say, orientation to that.

我们很幸运，有些人给了我们一个关于 GPT 不完全是什么的提示，但我们确实对此有一些方向。

So we were not taken by surprise by some of the things that surprised many people, let’s say, particularly in December of last year.

因此，我们对一些让很多人感到惊讶的事情并不感到惊讶，尤其是在去年 12 月。

We took that in stride.

我们泰然处之。

I think it would’ve been quite disorienting if we had not had that fairly clear in our minds already.

我认为，如果我们的头脑中还没有相当清楚这一点，那将会非常令人迷失方向。

How do you feel that the progress of AI will influence your future career as an economist?

您认为人工智能的进步将如何影响您未来作为经济学家的职业生涯？

I’m not sure.

我不知道。

I’m planning to have quite a long future career, by the way, Tyler.

顺便说一句，泰勒，我计划有一个很长的未来职业生涯。

I am —

我是 ——

But it should change what you do, right?

但它应该改变你所做的事情，对吧？

I’m not saying it puts you out of work, but you ought to want to work with it in some manner.

我并不是说这会让你失业，但你应该想以某种方式使用它。

If it has big impacts, as the book says, it should have an impact on you.

如果它有很大的影响，就像书上说的那样，它应该对你产生影响。

Maybe, or maybe it should have an impact on a lot of people, and there should be niches for some of us that are less impacted by AI.

也许，或者也许它应该对很多人产生影响，而且对于我们中的一些受人工智能影响较小的人来说，应该有一些利基市场。

I’m not sure, Tyler, it’s a very good question.

我不确定，泰勒，这是一个很好的问题。

We’ve had him on.

我们已经让他上了。

Well, if you think about countries that have really done well but not entirely broken free of being middle income — South Korea is one of my favorites because my wife’s parents were born in South Korea, and I spent a lot of time talking with them and thinking about the country and talking with Korean economists.

好吧，如果你想想那些确实做得很好但尚未完全摆脱中等收入的国家 —— 韩国是我最喜欢的国家之一，因为我妻子的父母出生在韩国，我花了很多时间与他们交谈，思考这个国家并与韩国经济学家交谈。

If institutions are the key to economic growth, as many people have argued — Daron and yourself to varying degrees — why, then, is prospective economic growth so hard to predict?

如果制度是经济增长的关键，正如许多人所说的那样——“达伦和你在不同程度上”——那么，为什么未来的经济增长如此难以预测呢？

Yes, I think of institutions as being part of the hysteresis effect, if you can get it in a positive way, that if you grow and you strengthen institutions, which South Korea has done, it makes it much harder to relapse.

是的，我认为制度是滞后效应的一部分，如果你能以积极的方式实现它，如果你成长并加强制度，就像韩国所做的那样，那么旧病复发的难度就更大。

There are plenty of countries that had spurts of growth without strong institutions and found it hard to sustain that.

许多国家在没有强有力的机构的情况下实现了快速增长，并发现很难维持这种增长。

I’d say three years ago, I thought, incorrectly, that Ethiopia and Ghana had reasonably promising futures because they were on good tracks.

我想说的是，三年前，我错误地认为埃塞俄比亚和加纳拥有相当有前途的未来，因为它们走在良好的轨道上。

They had racked up a number of years of high growth rates in a row.

他们连续多年保持高增长率。

Now, it seems both of my views were wrong.

现在看来，我的两种观点都是错误的。

What exactly is the predictive content of institution-based theories of economic growth?

基于制度的经济增长理论的预测内容到底是什么？

What’s the prediction we would make now?

What’s the prediction we would make now?

It’s a good question, Tyler.

这是一个很好的问题，泰勒。

I think that if institutions have some predictive value, it’s fairly long term.

我认为，如果机构有一定的预测价值，那是相当长期的。

This is something I worked on at the IMF.

This is something I worked on at the IMF.

Other people were interested in this as well.

其他人也对此感兴趣。

I don’t think it helps you that much.

我认为这对你没有多大帮助。

Think about one year, two years, even five years.

想想一年，两年，甚至五年。

Here’s a simple and easy question about growth: How do we fix northern England?

这是一个关于增长的简单问题：我们如何解决英格兰北部的问题？

I think that’s a fantastic topic.

我认为这是一个很棒的话题。

I love the idea of more investment and infrastructure, of connecting the people of northern England.

我喜欢更多投资和基础设施建设、连接英格兰北部人民的想法。

I’m from a town that’s on the border between the Midlands and North of England.

我来自英格兰中部和北部边境的一个小镇。

Connections to other, more prosperous places, reducing travel time, encouraging remote work, moving the high-value jobs of headquarters and so on to lower-cost real estate places — these are all great ideas.

与其他更繁荣的地方建立联系、减少出行时间、鼓励远程工作、将总部的高价值工作转移到成本更低的房地产场所等等，这些都是好主意。

We’ve had a lot of autonomous advances in work from a distance that have nothing to do with northern England per se.

我们在远程工作中取得了很多自主进展，而这些进展与英格兰北部本身无关。

Working over Zoom is one of many.

通过 Zoom 工作只是其中之一。

AI may prove to be another one.

人工智能可能会被证明是另一种。

Are you predicting a resurgence in northern England?

您预测英格兰北部会出现复苏吗？

Or is it just too much the case that the high-capital individuals want to leave for London in the South?

或者说，高资本人士想要前往南方伦敦的情况实在是太多了？

I would love to predict a boom for northern England.

我很乐意预测英格兰北部的繁荣。

It’s certainly doing much better now than it than it did in the 1980s, when I left the North of England.

现在的情况肯定比 20 世纪 80 年代（我离开英格兰北部时）要好得多。

To me, it seemed easier to break in and have success in the United States than in London, actually, at that time.

对我来说，实际上，当时在美国闯入并取得成功似乎比在伦敦更容易。

It is a struggle for talent, you’re absolutely right, Tyler.

这是一场人才争夺战，你说得对，泰勒。

Where do smart people want to live?

Where do smart people want to live?

Where do they want to settle down?

Where do they want to settle down?

Where do they want to have families?

Where do they want to have families?

If you compare, say, Britain to France or Germany, the number two city in France would be Lyon.

例如，如果将英国与法国或德国进行比较，法国排名第二的城市将是里昂。

Lyon is a very nice place.

里昂是一个非常好的地方。

It’s not as rich as Paris, but you wouldn’t say it has structural problems different from those of France as a whole.

它不像巴黎那么富裕，但你不会说它存在与整个法国不同的结构性问题。

Germany has plenty of cities that are doing fine.

德国有很多城市表现良好。

Why is England, in particular, so unbalanced in terms of its urban geography?

尤其是英国，为什么其城市地理如此不平衡？

Well, I probably blame the Norman Conquest for that one, Tyler.

好吧，我可能把这件事归咎于诺曼征服，泰勒。

Just kidding a little bit in terms of going back a thousand years.

只是开个玩笑，说要追溯到一千年前。

No, it’s fine as the answer, but tell us how.

No, it’s fine as the answer, but tell us how.

London has long been this amazing place, this very dynamic place, a very entrepreneurial place.

伦敦长期以来一直是一个令人惊叹的地方，一个非常有活力的地方，一个非常有创业精神的地方。

If you think about what started to go right in England before the Industrial Revolution, which obviously, the Industrial Revolution was a British Midlands phenomenon more than a southern phenomenon.

如果你想想工业革命之前英国开始发生的事情，很明显，工业革命是英国中部地区的现象，而不是南方的现象。

But the commerce of London, the power of London as a trading center, the openness of London to new ideas and new products — that was a very important part of what made Britain susceptible to and open to industrialization.

但伦敦的商业、伦敦作为贸易中心的力量、伦敦对新思想和新产品的开放态度——这是使英国容易接受工业化并对其开放的一个非常重要的部分。

Should the UK join NAFTA?

Should the UK join NAFTA?

Which would mean chlorinated chicken, right?

Which would mean chlorinated chicken, right?

Would it be worth it?

值得吗？

Look, the UK should join the European Union, but —

听着，英国应该加入欧盟，但是 ——

Let’s say that’s impossible, or maybe they won’t take you because you can’t pre-commit to staying, but NAFTA would take you.

假设这是不可能的，或者也许他们不会接受你，因为你不能预先承诺留下来，但北美自由贸易协定会接受你。

Maybe it would.

也许会的。

I think that the people in NAFTA should worry about the British turning their backs on that, too, honestly, Tyler.

老实说，我认为北美自由贸易协定的人们也应该担心英国人也会拒绝这一点，泰勒。

But we wouldn’t mind.

但我们不介意。

Our feelings wouldn’t be hurt.

Our feelings wouldn’t be hurt.

It’d be a much easier separation.

It’d be a much easier separation.

Oh, I see what you’re saying — it wouldn’t be an emotional breakup.

哦，我明白你在说什么 ——这不会是情感上的分手。

Yes, possibly.

是的，有可能。

That’s a very intriguing notion and probably should be considered.

这是一个非常有趣的概念，可能应该考虑一下。

I think NAFTA or USMCA, as it is now, has enough political baggage as it is in the US.

我认为北美自由贸易协定或美墨加协定，就像现在一样，有足够的政治包袱，就像在美国一样。

The US, Tyler — we haven’t talked about this at all, but I think trade and trade policy and the politics of trade remain immensely complex in the US, and that’s not getting easier.

美国，泰勒——我们根本没有讨论过这个问题，但我认为美国的贸易和贸易政策以及贸易政治仍然非常复杂，而且这并没有变得更容易。

I’m not sure that adding a significant additional piece to USMCA would be helpful or even feasible.

我不确定在 USMCA 中添加一个重要的附加部分是否会有帮助，甚至是否可行。

My whole life I’ve admired the British system of government, but lately, it just feels to me that it’s not working.

我一生都很钦佩英国的政府制度，但最近，我只是觉得它不起作用。

You have how many prime ministers in how many years?

多少年来，你出了多少位总理？

Is it four in seven years?

Is it four in seven years?

I’ve lost track.

我迷失了方向。

What, if anything, has gone wrong, and how would you fix it?

如果有什么问题的话，你会如何修复它？

Procedurally, at the so-called constitutional level — I know you don’t have a formal written constitution — but what would you change?

从程序上来说，在所谓宪法层面 ——“我知道你们没有正式的成文宪法”—— 但是你会改变什么呢？

And what’s gone wrong?

出了什么问题？

There is no constitution, exactly.

There is no constitution, exactly.

There’s just heuristics, and there’s just what happens, and then establishing traditions.

只有启发法，然后就会发生什么，然后建立传统。

Look, it’s not unusual in the British parliamentary system, certainly, for one party to gain control, to keep control for a long period of time.

瞧，在英国议会制度中，一党获得控制权并长期保持控制权的情况当然并不罕见。

That’s what the Labour Party did previously.

That’s what the Labour Party did previously.

Now the Conservatives have had this long run, and you run out of steam, I think, Tyler.

现在保守党已经经历了这么长时间，我想你已经失去了动力，泰勒。

You’ve run out of ideas.

You’ve run out of ideas.

I’m a big fan of your book, Jump-Starting America, about science and science policy.

我非常喜欢你的书《Jump-Starting America》，这本书是关于科学和科学政策的。

It’s with Jonathan Gruber.

It’s with Jonathan Gruber.

I have a few questions about science policy.

I have a few questions about science policy.

You argue for a place-based policy to jump-start different regions in America.

您主张采取基于地方的政策来推动美国不同地区的发展。

I suppose I’m worried in the same way that you’re worried about northern England, that we could do a lot of good things, which I would be in favor of, but most of the gains will go to the coasts.

我想我的担心就像你担心英格兰北部一样，我们可以做很多好事，我会赞成这些，但大部分收益将流向沿海地区。

No, actually, we’ve gone the other way.

不，实际上，我们走了另一条路。

We’re a bit more encouraged, Tyler.

我们更加受到鼓舞了，泰勒。

You’re right, of course, about those big breakthroughs, and we are all about the breakthroughs there.

当然，关于这些重大突破，你是对的，我们都关心那里的突破。

But one of the things that strikes me as being a strength of the US is the depth of the bench.

但令我印象深刻的是美国队的优势之一是替补席的深度。

All these other places where real estate prices are not so high — there are plenty of talented people who want to live there.

所有这些其他地方的房地产价格都没有那么高——有很多有才华的人想住在那里。

Of course, there are massive spillover effects from investing in basic science, which is the basis of our argument.

当然，投资基础科学会产生巨大的溢出效应，这是我们论点的基础。

Reading the book, much as I like many parts of it, I feel you’re underrating the benefits of sunshine.

读这本书时，尽管我很喜欢其中的很多部分，但我觉得你低估了阳光的好处。

When you list your most promising places for regeneration, the top three on the list are Rochester, Pittsburgh, and the Syracuse area.

当您列出最有希望重建的地区时，排名前三的地区是罗切斯特、匹兹堡和锡拉丘兹地区。

Now, Pittsburgh may be doing okay, but Rochester is still losing population.

现在，匹兹堡可能表现不错，但罗切斯特仍在失去人口。

Syracuse area not doing so well.

雪城地区表现不太好。

Well, what we were flagging there was potential, potential that could be tapped.

嗯，我们所标记的有潜力，可以挖掘的潜力。

On our website, jump-startingamerica.com, there’s an interactive map, and you can put in different criteria, so if you like the idea of ranking places, you can change the ranking or change the weight on different elements.

在我们的网站 Jump-startingamerica.com 上，有一个交互式地图，您可以输入不同的标准，因此如果您喜欢排名位置的想法，您可以更改排名或更改不同元素的权重。

We did not put hours of sunshine in there, Tyler.

我们没有在那里放几个小时的阳光，泰勒。

Maybe we should in the next version, and then you could put that in the index.

也许我们应该在下一个版本中，然后你可以将其放入索引中。

Totally valid point.

完全正确的观点。

Circa 2023, with some more years behind us — apart from wanting to spend more money, how would you improve US science policy for any given level of expenditure?

大约在 2023 年，我们已经过去了很多年 ——除了想要花更多的钱之外，对于任何给定的支出水平，你会如何改进美国的科学政策？

I think that looking for places where you can invest in the basics, and you can imagine that there will be commercial applications.

我认为寻找可以投资基础知识的地方，你可以想象会有商业应用。

The Human Genome Project is one of our favorites.

人类基因组计划是我们最喜欢的项目之一。

That was actually turned down by private venture capital in the 1980s because they said, “Yes, you can do this, map out the human genome, but we don’t know how you can monetize it.”

这实际上在 20 世纪 80 年代被私人风险投资拒绝了，因为他们说：“是的，你可以做到这一点，绘制人类基因组图，但我们不知道如何将其货币化。”

A few questions about the Simon Johnson production function.

关于西蒙约翰逊生产函数的几个问题。

What is your most unusual successful habit?

你最不寻常的成功习惯是什么？

I don’t know.

我不知道。

I play tennis.

我打网球。

I find playing tennis to be immensely mentally challenging.

我发现打网球对智力来说非常具有挑战性。

It just makes you clear your mind.

它只会让你理清思路。

If you have anything else in your mind at all, you miss the ball and embarrass yourself.

如果你脑子里还有别的事情，你就会错过球，让自己难堪。

I just find that to be completely refreshing.

我只是觉得这完全令人耳目一新。

What’s your favorite novel and why?

你最喜欢的小说是什么？为什么？

Oh, Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash.

哦，尼尔·史蒂芬森的《雪崩》。

First of all, because Paul Krugman said in 1992 or something that it was the best possible predictor of the future, and it turns out to be pretty much right.

首先，因为保罗·克鲁格曼 (Paul Krugman) 在 1992 年说过，这是对未来的最佳预测，事实证明它是非常正确的。

I think Stephenson predicted the metaverse.

我认为史蒂芬森预言了虚拟宇宙。

Stephenson predicted a bunch of things that happened at the political-social level.

斯蒂芬森预测了政治社会层面上发生的一系列事情。

It’s an exaggeration; it’s a fun novel.

这有点夸张了；这是一本有趣的小说。

I’m still looking for any science fiction of any kind that’s a better predictor of the future than that one.

我仍在寻找比这更能预测未来的任何类型的科幻小说。

We have an episode with him.

我们和他有一集。

Do you think our actual future will be as dystopian as his novelistic future?

你认为我们实际的未来会像他小说中的未来一样反乌托邦吗？

Well, he wrote the book 30 years ago, and I think we’ve had some dystopian moments along the way, Tyler.

好吧，他 30 年前写了这本书，我认为我们一路走来经历过一些反乌托邦的时刻，泰勒。

I think the key idea that he has is that our technology-powered future will lead to a fragmentation of society and to a collapse of the United States, a sort of political disunion.

我认为他的关键思想是，我们以技术为动力的未来将导致社会分裂和美国崩溃，这是一种政治分裂。

There’ve been plenty of pressures that were .

压力很大。

.

。

.

。

maybe even the pressure of today was unimaginable compared to when he wrote 30 years ago.

也许连今天的压力与三十年前写作时相比也是难以想象的。

I don’t think it ends up quite so bad.

我认为事情的结局并没有那么糟糕。

What’s your favorite movie, and why?

你最喜欢的电影是什么，为什么？

I did like Everything Everywhere All at Once.

我确实喜欢一切都同时发生。

I know that’s just the most recent movie I saw.

我知道那只是我最近看的电影。

Also, it did give me a headache.

而且，这确实让我很头疼。

I had to close my eyes at a certain point, but I did like the whole idea that we have multiple empowering personalities that we can draw on in different circumstances.

在某个时刻我不得不闭上眼睛，但我确实喜欢这个想法，即我们拥有多种赋权的个性，我们可以在不同的情况下利用它们。

I thought that was supremely wonderful, and I did really like the fact that the Asian actors won so many Oscars.

我觉得这太棒了，我真的很喜欢亚洲演员赢得了这么多奥斯卡奖。

I thought that was outstanding.

我认为这非常出色。

Now, I’m quite sure the position of MIT is secure in our future, but what’s the future of the MBA more generally, beneath, say, the top 10 or 20 schools?

现在，我非常确定麻省理工学院的地位在我们的未来是稳固的，但更广泛地说，在排名前 10 或 20 名的学校之下，MBA 的未来是什么？

Will we still have MBAs in 20 years?

20年后我们还会有MBA学位吗？

Will anyone go and pay all that money?

有人会去付所有的钱吗？

It’s a great question.

这是一个很好的问题。

I think a big part of what went right in the era of Henry Ford was the so-called engineer managers, the people who created the new tasks, the people who designed companies, the people who built these organizations.

我认为亨利·福特时代正确的很大一部分是所谓的工程师经理，创造新任务的人，设计公司的人，建立这些组织的人。

I think they got a little bit of a bad name later, Tyler.

我想他们后来的名声有点不好，泰勒。

It’s like middle management.

这就像中层管理人员。

Perhaps that was deserved.

也许这是应得的。

Perhaps things became too bureaucratic.

也许事情变得过于官僚化了。

My intuition is that I would rather hire people with technical training and no MBA than hire people with the MBA, maybe even now.

我的直觉是，我宁愿雇佣受过技术培训但没有 MBA 学位的人，也不愿雇佣有 MBA 学位的人，也许现在也是如此。

Again, not Harvard, not MIT, where a lot of it’s selection and networking.

再说一次，不是哈佛大学，不是麻省理工学院，那里的很多工作都是选择和网络。

But in terms of what you actually learn, it seems to me the other backgrounds are more valuable.

但就你实际学到的东西而言，在我看来，其他背景更有价值。

I think an engineering or a science undergraduate degree is a very strong preparation for the modern world.

我认为工程或科学本科学位是为现代世界做好充分准备的。

I also find that for the right people, where it’s a match, an MBA-type qualification — and they come in many shapes and sizes, as you know — I find that that can be really quite helpful to them.

我还发现，对于合适的人来说，只要是匹配的，MBA 类型的资格 ——正如你所知，他们有多种形状和规模——我发现这对他们真的很有帮助。

I know some remarkably talented people who fit exactly that description, so I’m sticking with the business model, Tyler.

我认识一些非常有才华的人，他们完全符合这种描述，所以我坚持这种商业模式，泰勒。

Last two questions.

最后两个问题。

First, when you’re evaluating students — not just who will make a lot of money, but someone you might want to work with or you think will change how the rest of the world thinks about ideas — what are the non-obvious qualities you look for in those students?

首先，当你评估学生时——“不仅仅是谁会赚很多钱，而是你可能想与之共事的人，或者你认为会改变世界其他地方对想法的看法的人”——“你在这些学生身上寻找哪些不明显的品质？

Sure, they should be smart, they should work hard, but what else?

当然，他们应该聪明，他们应该努力工作，但是还有什么呢？

Ability to communicate.

沟通能力。

Daron and I actually have a course based on the book we’re teaching to MIT undergraduates right now.

达伦和我实际上有一门课程是基于我们现在向麻省理工学院本科生教授的书。

It’s a communications elective, Tyler.

这是一门沟通选修课，泰勒。

We have a fantastic writing coach working with us, and some superb TAs.

我们有一位出色的写作教练和我们一起工作，还有一些出色的助教。

We’re trying to help the students learn how to write persuasively about technology.

我们正在努力帮助学生学习如何以有说服力的方式撰写有关技术的文章。

Technology policy, sure, but about technology more broadly.

当然是技术政策，但涉及更广泛的技术。

It’s a lot of fun, and, I think, a good complement to their other parts of education, which are obviously much more technical, much more mathematical.

这很有趣，而且我认为，这是对他们教育的其他部分的一个很好的补充，这些部分显然更加技术化，更加数学化。

Last question: What will you do next, other than promote the book?

最后一个问题：除了宣传这本书，接下来你会做什么？

Again, to repeat, everyone: Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle over Technology and Prosperity, Simon Johnson and Daron Acemoglu.

再次向大家重复一遍：《权力与进步：我们对技术与繁荣的千年斗争》，西蒙·约翰逊和达伦·阿西莫格鲁。

But what next?

但接下来呢？

Well, talking a bit about the book is a big part of what’s next, Tyler, because it’s immensely fun.

好吧，泰勒，谈论一下这本书是接下来的重要部分，因为它非常有趣。

You get to go around the country and some other countries and really get feedback and hear the sorts of questions and pushback that you’ve been giving me today.

你可以走遍全国和其他一些国家，真正得到反馈，听到你今天向我提出的各种问题和阻力。

That’s immense.

那是巨大的。

A pleasure to chat with you, Simon Johnson, and very good luck with the book.

很高兴与你聊天，西蒙·约翰逊，祝你这本书好运。

Thanks a lot.

多谢。