Samantha Power on Learning How to Make a Difference (Ep. 75)

Samantha Power, of course, later served in President Obama’s cabinet, and she was his ambassador to the United Nations.

当然，萨曼莎·鲍尔后来在奥巴马总统的内阁任职，她是他的驻联合国大使。

She is also the author of other books, but most notably, she has a memoir just out called The Education of an Idealist: A Memoir.

她还是其他书籍的作者，但最值得注意的是，她刚刚出版了一本回忆录，名为《理想主义者的教育：回忆录》。

Samantha, welcome.

萨曼莎，欢迎。

But they also are individuals who are sometimes very independent minded, and they’re fighting within their own systems.

但他们也是有时非常独立的个体，他们在自己的系统内战斗。

So often there’s a tendency to just see the instructions or the diktat that comes at you and think that that’s the sum total of what the individual in front of you represents or wants to advance.

人们常常倾向于只看到向你发出的指示或命令，并认为这就是你面前的人所代表或想要推进的总和。

But in fact, you have to pry a little bit and try to loosen the individual up to get some sense of where they fall within their universe.

但事实上，你必须稍微撬开一点，尝试让个体放松下来，才能了解他们在宇宙中的位置。

I only know that because it’s true of me as well, or anybody practicing diplomacy on behalf of the United State.

我只知道这一点，因为这对我或任何代表美国从事外交活动的人来说也是如此。

You have to listen really carefully to understand the situated self in many ways.

你必须非常仔细地倾听，才能从很多方面理解身处的自我。

But then — and I think this would also be true of a good diplomat — being able to bridge a distance between the readers or the viewers that you have in mind back in your home country and then these experiences that most of your viewers and readers hopefully will never have themselves.

但是，我认为对于一名优秀的外交官来说也是如此——能够在你心目中的祖国读者或观众之间架起一座桥梁，然后获得大多数观众和读者希望自己永远不会拥有的经历。

That requires keeping an eye on both and trying to see what is adaptive.

这需要密切关注两者并尝试找出适应性的内容。

What works for a reader — learn from that.

什么对读者有用——从中学习。

If you get a lot of responses to a story because they see themselves in the individuals that you have managed to describe, then chances are that’s something you should try again.

如果你从一个故事中得到很多回应，因为他们在你成功描述的人物身上看到了自己，那么你很可能应该再试一次。

So really listening and hearing both sides of the spectrum, I think, as a war correspondent.

因此，我认为，作为一名战地记者，要真正倾听并听取双方的意见。

I was very fortunate — but again, it’s not a common circumstance — to be both a diplomat representing the United States and a member of the president’s cabinet.

我非常幸运——但同样，这并不常见——既是代表美国的外交官，又是总统内阁的成员。

I was able to spend enough time with President Obama to have a sense not only of what my explicit instructions were, but where the gray areas were at the margins and how far to push.

我能够花足够的时间与奥巴马总统相处，不仅了解我的明确指示是什么，还了解边缘的灰色地带以及需要推动的程度。

Being in that privileged position of spending more time with him, I was more inclined, I’d say, to be risk taking than somebody who’s literally receiving a cable from their minister or from their head of state to go forth and do X or Y on behalf of their country.

我想说，由于我处于与他共度更多时间的特权地位，所以我比那些真正收到部长或国家元首发来的电报，代表他们的国家去做某事或某事的人更倾向于冒险。

I took a lot of risks in my public persona.

我在公众形象中冒了很多风险。

They don’t sound like risks, certainly not like the risks I took as a war correspondent, but I thought it was really important to try to break out of a stale lingua franca that exists around contemporary conflict.

它们听起来不像风险，当然也不像我作为战地记者所冒的风险，但我认为尝试打破当代冲突中存在的陈旧的通用语言非常重要。

The tendency is just to describe conflicts in very mechanical, very antiseptic ways, and what I would do when I was projecting publicly — let’s say at the UN Security Council or at a press stakeout — is to tell the stories of individuals that I had met who had suffered the consequences of conflict.

这种倾向只是以非常机械、非常防腐的方式描述冲突，而当我公开演讲时——比如说在联合国安理会或新闻界的监视中——我会做的就是讲述我遇到的那些遭受冲突后果的人的故事。

This is, again, back to having been a journalist, but recognizing the diplomats who I’m disagreeing with are human beings, and that they’re as unlikely to be moved by rote talking points as I am unlikely to be moved by rote talking points or changed internally, emotionally, or changed as a practical matter.

这又回到了记者的身份，但要认识到我不同意的外交官也是人，他们不太可能被死记硬背的谈话要点所感动，就像我不太可能被死记硬背的谈话要点所感动，或者在内部、情感上或在实际问题上发生改变一样。

This is, again, back to having been a journalist, but recognizing the diplomats who I’m disagreeing with are human beings, and that they’re as unlikely to be moved by rote talking points as I am unlikely to be moved by rote talking points or changed internally, emotionally, or changed as a practical matter.

这又回到了记者的身份，但要认识到我不同意的外交官也是人，他们不太可能被死记硬背的谈话要点所感动，就像我不太可能被死记硬背的谈话要点所感动，或者在内部、情感上或在实际问题上发生改变一样。

So my only hope of breaking them out of the rut that they are in — not maybe my only hope, but a main source of hope — is to remind them that this isn’t just some run-of-the-mill conflict, that this isn’t just a day job, that there are these individuals who might be the same age as your daughter or your sister or your mother who are suffering these consequences, and we have a responsibility to try to shake things up a little bit because what we’ve been doing hasn’t been working, or we wouldn’t be in a position of having this conversation.

因此，我让他们摆脱困境的唯一希望——也许不是我唯一的希望，但却是希望的主要来源——就是提醒他们，这不仅仅是一些普通的冲突，这不仅仅是一份日常工作，有些人可能与你的女儿、你的姐妹或你的母亲同龄，正在遭受这些后果，我们有责任尝试改变一些事情，因为我们一直在做的事情没有奏效，或者我们不会处于进行此对话的位置。

It’s storytelling, but it’s more about breaking people out of their comfort zone so they can hear afresh what is happening in the world.

这是讲故事，但更多的是让人们走出舒适区，以便他们能够重新听到世界上正在发生的事情。

I was very lucky to have been mentored by him.

我很幸运能够得到他的指导。

That’s a story I told in the edited Holbrooke volume that isn’t as salient, I think, in Packer’s account.

这是我在霍尔布鲁克编辑的书中讲述的一个故事，我认为在帕克的叙述中并不那么突出。

It’s very wonderful, but also quite unusual for an established diplomat, whether one who is self-involved and egotistical and/or one who is super talented and creative.

这非常美妙，但对于一位成熟的外交官来说也很不寻常，无论是一位自私自利的外交官和/还是一位才华横溢、富有创造力的外交官。

Holbrooke was both of those things.

霍尔布鲁克就是这两类人。

For anyone in those categories to spend the time that Holbrooke spent cultivating young diplomats, I think that speaks to a depth of character and a deep reverence for the United States, a kind of patriotism, because he saw it wasn’t like, “Let me have my refracted glory,” or “Let all of these minions go forth in the world and they’ll be mini Holbrookes going around.” I think he really thought it was incumbent on him to groom the next generation of diplomats to go forth on behalf of US interests.

对于那些花霍尔布鲁克花时间培养年轻外交官的人来说，我认为这体现了一种深度的性格和对美国深深的崇敬，一种爱国主义，因为他认为这不是“让我拥有我折射的荣耀”，或者“让所有这些奴才在世界上前进，他们将成为四处走动的迷你霍尔布鲁克”。我认为他确实认为他有责任培养下一代外交官代表美国利益。

So I think any black-and-white portrait of someone with that range of qualities would be flawed.

所以我认为任何具有这种品质的人的黑白肖像都是有缺陷的。

I think George does an excellent job capturing the yin and the yang.

我认为乔治在捕捉阴阳方面做得非常出色。

On migrating from Ireland

关于从爱尔兰移民

Then just the selection.

然后就是选择。

We had the old-school TV, which of course Americans did have many generations before, I guess, here in this country.

我们有老式电视，当然，我想，美国人在这个国家已经有很多代了。

But we had the three channels, the antenna where you try to get .

但我们有三个通道，即您试图获取的天线。

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One of the channels was only in Irish all the time, the Gaelic language.

其中一个频道一直只有爱尔兰语，即盖尔语。

Then suddenly you get to America, and at that time, I think there were 13 or 14 channels, but within a few years there’d be 60, and then God knows how many we have now.

然后突然你到了美国，当时我认为有 13 或 14 个频道，但几年之内就会有 60 个，然后天知道我们现在有多少个。

So just that sense of abundance, I think.

我想，这就是那种丰富的感觉。

But some things were similar, even if the form changed.

但有些东西是相似的，即使形式发生了变化。

Like sport was huge in Ireland, even for a small country — Irish football or soccer or hurling or whatever.

就像体育运动在爱尔兰很重要，即使对于一个小国家来说也是如此——爱尔兰足球、足球、曲棍球等等。

Then you come to America, and you look around.

然后你来到美国，环顾四周。

It’s just a different set of sports but that same kind of enthusiasm and energy.

这只是一套不同的运动，但同样的热情和能量。

There were categories that one could slot the new into that I brought with me, I guess.

我想，人们可以将我带来的新东西归入某些类别。

But I do think that it is incumbent on large countries and large powers and large personalities to see the individual worth and dignity of the people around them, whether the person who works for you or the small country in the United Nations that may only have a population of 10,000, but nonetheless, every one of those 10,000 people on one level counts on the United States, let’s say, to deal with climate change or something like that.

但我确实认为，大国、大国和名人有责任看到他们周围的人的个人价值和尊严，无论是为你工作的人，还是联合国中可能只有一万人口的小国，但尽管如此，这一万人中的每一个人都依赖美国，比如说，应对气候变化或类似的问题。

So the idea that some countries are intrinsically better than others, or any kind of superiority complex — I think I would have been innately suspicious of that, I suppose, even as I rejoiced in all that made America amazing to me, both as a kid and as a diplomat.

因此，有些国家本质上比其他国家更好，或者有任何一种优越感的想法——我想，我本能地对此表示怀疑，尽管我对所有让美国对我来说令人惊叹的事物感到高兴，无论是作为一个孩子还是作为一名外交官。

On China

关于中国

These are enduring questions that have been with us through history whenever there’s a rising power but also whenever there’s a falling power.

这些都是历史上长期存在的问题，无论是大国崛起还是衰落，都伴随着我们。

How do different countries deal with major changes in their status?

不同国家如何应对地位的重大变化？

And what level of entitlement do they bring to their practices?

他们为自己的实践带来了什么程度的权利？

What we did was work with others to challenge them in the court of public opinion, of course, but also at the International Court of Justice, invoking the rules of the road, invoking the rule of law, and then to continue to try to maintain freedom of navigation in these critical areas.

我们所做的是与其他人合作，在舆论法庭上挑战他们，当然，也在国际法院上，援引道路规则，援引法治，然后继续努力维护这些关键地区的航行自由。

It’s very challenging because it’s also the case that you don’t have an American public, or an American constituency, let’s say, that would be terribly enthusiastic about a military confrontation over questions of land grabs in the South China Sea.

这是非常具有挑战性的，因为也没有美国公众或美国选民对南海土地掠夺问题的军事对抗非常热衷。

So you’re balancing an invocation of the rule of law, a recognition that some of these claims are contested, and that it’s not for us to decide whether this belongs to Vietnam or to China but to, again, invest in a rules-based order where every country doesn’t just grab what it wants but is prepared to abide by these rulings.

因此，你要平衡援引法治，承认其中一些主张存在争议，并且我们不应该决定这是否属于越南或中国，而是要再次投资于基于规则的秩序，在这个秩序中，每个国家不仅要攫取它想要的东西，而且准备遵守这些裁决。

Unfortunately, what we’re seeing with China is, it just swats away those rulings, sort of as the United States has done in the past as well, I should note.

不幸的是，我应该指出，我们在中国看到的是，它只是推翻了这些裁决，就像美国过去所做的那样。

And there is a tendency, especially among strong powers, to cherry-pick those findings that they like.

而且有一种倾向，特别是在强国之间，会挑选他们喜欢的发现。

So I’m not sure going back — maybe more of an emphasis on the freedom-of-navigation dimension, which is something that all the countries of the world, including China, should be able to agree upon.

所以我不确定是否会回去——也许更强调航行自由的维度，这是包括中国在内的世界所有国家都应该能够达成的共识。

We did really pivot — to use the phrase that President Obama used at the time — to Asia and make very significant new investments, both in terms of trade and the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

We did really pivot — to use the phrase that President Obama used at the time — to Asia and make very significant new investments, both in terms of trade and the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Negotiating that, which I think would have been an enormous boon and also a real signal to China that all of these countries are going in a different direction, and that you can’t separate out the military land grab from the economic, and that there are communities of values also that can come together.

我认为，就这一问题进行谈判将是一个巨大的福音，也是向中国发出的一个真正的信号，表明所有这些国家都在朝着不同的方向前进，你不能将军事土地掠夺与经济分开，而且也存在可以聚集在一起的价值观社区。

But that of course has been walked away from by the Trump administration.

但特朗普政府当然已经放弃了这一点。

But we also made sizable military investments in the region, really deepening our presence in Asia.

但我们也在该地区进行了大量军事投资，真正加深了我们在亚洲的存在。

Beyond that, again, I think it’s a balancing act.

除此之外，我再次认为这是一种平衡行为。

Looking back, I’m not sure that China was going to be bucked if we did six more freedom-of-navigation exercises, and I’m not sure, again, that the military confrontation approach .

回想起来，我不确定如果我们再进行六次航行自由演习，中国是否会遭到抵制，我也不确定军事对抗的方式是否会发生。

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Some seem quite reckless in their prescriptions: “Well, why didn’t you answer?” How would that play itself out?

有些人的处方似乎很鲁莽：“好吧，你为什么不回答？”这会如何发挥作用呢？

You have to stand up for what’s right and stand up for the rule of law, but it’s not as if potential consequences have no bearing on that calculus.

你必须坚持正义，维护法治，但这并不是说潜在的后果与这种计算无关。

But to bracket that question of how we recover from a Trump presidency and the human rights practices and affections of this president, I think that the core of the questioner’s concern is more geopolitical.

But to bracket that question of how we recover from a Trump presidency and the human rights practices and affections of this president, I think that the core of the questioner’s concern is more geopolitical.

It’s more, well, any country now can forum shop, and if they don’t like what they’re hearing from us, they’ll just say, “Okay, well, I’ll go and do my Belt and Road Initiative with China.” So that’s an enduring question, irrespective of whether we can clean up our act in the wake of Trump.

更重要的是，现在任何国家都可以在论坛上购物，如果他们不喜欢我们从我们那里听到的内容，他们只会说，“好吧，好吧，我会去和中国一起实施我的一带一路倡议。”所以这是一个持久的问题，无论我们是否能在特朗普之后纠正我们的行为。

And what I’d say is, I actually look at it a little bit differently, which is that, in an age of China’s increasing aggression beyond its borders, its crackdown and increase in assertiveness in the near abroad — I’m not sure you can call Hong Kong the near abroad, but the fact that China actually goes to Thailand to round up a critic of China, of its incarceration of the Uighurs, or the fact that it is prepared to act beyond its borders in very aggressive ways, whether in the South China Sea or, again, in order to keep itself insulated from criticism.

And what I’d say is, I actually look at it a little bit differently, which is that, in an age of China’s increasing aggression beyond its borders, its crackdown and increase in assertiveness in the near abroad — I’m not sure you can call Hong Kong the near abroad, but the fact that China actually goes to Thailand to round up a critic of China, of its incarceration of the Uighurs, or the fact that it is prepared to act beyond its borders in very aggressive ways, whether in南海问题，或者再次是为了使自己免受批评。

China is now at the UN trying to alter the rules of the road and the core human rights principles that have undergirded the international system for more than 70 years.

中国现在在联合国试图改变70多年来支撑国际体系的交通规则和核心人权原则。

They’re trying to make the rules more pro-censorship, more about state consent and not about there being a set of higher principles against which states should be measured or judged.

他们试图让规则更加有利于审查，更多地关注国家的同意，而不是制定一套更高的原则来衡量或判断国家。

They’re out there being China, and they’re out there not yet in a full mode of “Let us export our domestic values internationally.” That is not their number-one game plan right now.

他们在那里是中国，而且他们还没有处于“让我们向国际出口我们的国内价值观”的完整模式。这不是他们目前的首要计划。

Their number-one game plan is internal stability above everything else, and of course sustained economic growth and economic sustenance and provision for their people.

他们的首要计划是内部稳定高于一切，当然还有持续的经济增长、经济维持和人民的供给。

But day by day, you’re seeing more and more of this exporting.

但日复一日，你会看到越来越多的出口。

So what the United States could do in deference to the logic of the question is to say, “Well, China’s out there doing its thing, and if we start whining about human rights, what good is that going to do?” Or to look at our values, our democracy, our traditions, our respect for the dignity of individuals as a comparative advantage in what is a bit of a scrum geopolitically, and there, I think, we would actually have a lot of friends.

So what the United States could do in deference to the logic of the question is to say, “Well, China’s out there doing its thing, and if we start whining about human rights, what good is that going to do?” Or to look at our values, our democracy, our traditions, our respect for the dignity of individuals as a comparative advantage in what is a bit of a scrum geopolitically, and there, I think, we would actually have a lot of friends.

What I hear most from European partners or democracies in Asia and Africa is, “We’re all alone.

我从欧洲伙伴或亚洲和非洲的民主国家那里听到最多的是，“我们都很孤独。

Now China is trying to change the rules of the road and we’re kind of scattered among ourselves.

现在中国正试图改变交通规则，而我们之间却有些分散。

We’re trying to learn how to build coalitions without you, United States.” That’s not just because of Trump’s human rights practices.

我们正在努力学习如何在没有你美国的情况下建立联盟。”这不仅仅是因为特朗普的人权做法。

That’s also because of his lack of engagement with international institutions.

这也是因为他缺乏与国际机构的接触。

And as democracies, if we believe in this model, if we believe everything we’ve been saying for a very long time about the links between democracy and prosperity and the links between democracy and stability over time, then it’s actually in our interest to see that model strengthened and not to go into retreat.

作为民主国家，如果我们相信这种模式，如果我们相信我们长期以来所说的关于民主与繁荣之间的联系以及民主与稳定之间的联系的一切，那么看到这种模式得到加强而不是倒退实际上符合我们的利益。

So I actually think that you’re going to see American politicians and leaders talk more, not less, about values in an age of China’s rise.

所以我实际上认为，你会看到美国政客和领导人更多而不是更少地谈论中国崛起时代的价值观。

Has the whole thing been soft-pedaled compared to, say, how Yugoslavia was talked about in the 1990s?

与 20 世纪 90 年代谈论南斯拉夫等问题相比，整个事情是否变得温和了？

We know Hollywood moviemakers won’t make a movie where a Chinese person is the villain, and they insert Asian-looking individuals as heroes, typically, to appeal to the Chinese market, which is now number two.

我们知道，好莱坞电影制片人不会制作一部以中国人为反派的电影，他们通常会插入亚洲人作为英雄，以吸引目前排名第二的中国市场。

Have we painted ourselves into a box of censoring ourselves?

我们是否把自己置于自我审查的盒子里？

So I agree with that premise, in part because of the gravity of the harm.

所以我同意这个前提，部分原因是伤害的严重性。

It’s hard to imagine what would be sufficient.

很难想象什么才足够。

I mean, that’s unbelievable.

我的意思是，这令人难以置信。

They can’t get out.

他们出不去。

They talk about reeducation and rehabilitation.

他们谈论再教育和康复。

It’s not like there’s some test where you say, “I love President Xi, and I wish he could be dictator, not only for life but for 100 lives,” and then you get out of jail.

It’s not like there’s some test where you say, “I love President Xi, and I wish he could be dictator, not only for life but for 100 lives,” and then you get out of jail.

This is mass incarceration with no shelf life, and no one can escape this if you are a Uighur and speak your language and practice your culture.

这是没有保质期的大规模监禁，如果你是维吾尔人，说你的语言，实践你的文化，没有人能逃脱这种监禁。

I mean, it’s sick.

我的意思是，它有病。

So woefully insufficient.

如此严重的不足。

In terms of the soft-pedaling, I guess I’d want to look at that as an empirical question.

就轻踩踏板而言，我想我想将其视为一个经验问题。

I think part of what’s going on is you don’t hear a lot of criticism coming from the United States government.

我认为部分原因是你没有听到来自美国政府的很多批评。

Every now and then, because of the religious freedom commitments of different individuals within the Trump administration, you’ll hear some discussion of the Uighurs more than you might, let’s say, in Saudi Arabia.

由于特朗普政府内部不同人士对宗教自由的承诺，你时不时会听到比在沙特阿拉伯更多的关于维吾尔人的讨论。

Because there’s a broader attack on China because of trade and other things, this sort of gets lumped in with that, and there seems more comfort criticizing them than countries with which we are aligned and seem totally unprepared to criticize — again, like Saudi Arabia.

因为贸易和其他事情对中国造成了更广泛的攻击，所以这种攻击与其他事情混为一谈，而且与我们结盟且似乎完全没有准备好批评的国家（例如沙特阿拉伯）相比，批评中国似乎更舒服。

But it’s not as if the Trump administration has a human rights policy as such.

但特朗普政府似乎并没有这样的人权政策。

It’s not as if they’re looking at the conditions inside particular countries.

他们并不是在关注特定国家内部的情况。

If they were, they’d probably be nervous about discussions of detention, given the amount of detention being done in the migrant and immigration context by the Trump administration — not that there’s any parallel, but nonetheless, it’s the kind of thing that would be thrown back at them.

如果是的话，他们可能会对拘留的讨论感到紧张，考虑到特朗普政府在移民和移民背景下拘留的数量——虽然没有任何相似之处，但尽管如此，这仍然是一种会被扔回给他们的事情。

So I think that there’s not enough noise.

所以我认为噪音还不够。

But it’s hard for me to know whether or not that latest Brookings piece isn’t going all in on that, or because of censorship or because of corporate influence — it’s plausible that that’s a factor — or because they actually feel that they don’t have a great recommendation as to what can be done.

但我很难知道布鲁金斯学会的最新文章是否没有全力以赴，或者是因为审查制度，还是因为企业影响力——这似乎是一个因素——或者因为他们实际上觉得自己对可以做什么没有很好的建议。

I find in advocacy, you see the most spirited advocacy in circumstances like Bosnia where policymakers are on the brink of doing one thing or another, and activists feel like, in making their recommendations or in taking over the op-ed pages, that they’re sort of one step away from really making a difference.

我发现在倡导方面，你会在像波斯尼亚这样的情况下看到最激烈的倡导，那里的政策制定者正处于做一件事或另一件事的边缘，而活动人士在提出建议或接管专栏版时感觉他们距离真正做出改变只有一步之遥。

On the Uighur policy, even if we were in office — the Obama administration or the next Democratic administration — it’s hard to speak with confidence that any particular tool that you employed would convince the Chinese government to think differently about this repulsive and brutal policy that it’s practicing.

关于维吾尔族政策，即使我们在任——奥巴马政府或下一届民主党政府——也很难有信心地说，你使用的任何特定工具都会说服中国政府对其正在实施的这种令人厌恶和残酷的政策有不同的看法。

And so I think that is another factor.

所以我认为这是另一个因素。

But I’m sure the money is a factor as well, and it is terrifying.

但我确信钱也是一个因素，而且这是可怕的。

I see even here the extent to which you see such a willful attempt on the part of the Chinese government to sort of insinuate themselves into American college campuses, to really shrivel up the safe spaces in which criticism of China can occur, even thousands and thousands of miles away from where any instability might take root and might actually threaten the regime.

我什至在这里看到了中国政府如此故意地试图渗透到美国大学校园，真正压缩对中国的批评可能发生的安全空间，甚至是在距离任何不稳定因素可能扎根并可能真正威胁政权的地方千里之外。

And again, with us more recessive on these questions — we, the United States, that is — I think you’re seeing an emboldened China using the money that it has, using the economic leverage that it has around the world, using the student exchanges that many of us really do think are a good idea as a general proposition, in part to increase connections among our peoples as our governments grow more estranged.

再说一次，由于我们在这些问题上更加隐性——我们，即美国——我认为你会看到一个大胆的中国利用它所拥有的资金，利用它在世界各地拥有的经济影响力，利用我们许多人确实认为是一个好主意的学生交流作为一个普遍主张，部分目的是在我们的政府变得更加疏远时增加我们人民之间的联系。

But they are all in on this strategy of sanitizing China’s reputation globally.

但他们都参与了这一削弱中国在全球声誉的战略。

And think tanks and independent institutions, educational institutions absolutely have to defy the intimidation and the really de facto bribery that China brings to bear in order to advance that agenda.

智库、独立机构、教育机构绝对必须反抗中国为推进这一议程而进行的恐吓和事实上的贿赂。

On democracy in the Middle East

论中东的民主

And even though Tunisia is experiencing terrorism, economic stagnation, the very levels of corruption arguably that gave rise to the Arab Spring in the first place, it’s a plucky democracy that has seen its leaders do something that other leaders in the Middle East haven’t done, which is to move away from the kind of winner-takes-all mindset.

尽管突尼斯正在经历恐怖主义、经济停滞，以及可以说是引发阿拉伯之春的腐败程度，但它是一个勇敢的民主国家，其领导人做了一些中东其他领导人没有做过的事情，那就是摆脱赢者通吃的思维模式。

And I think, why has democracy not taken hold in other countries?

我想，为什么民主没有在其他国家扎根呢？

You have families that almost wrote a how-to manual for how to inflict the most savage atrocities on their people — that in the case of Syria.

有些家庭几乎写了一本如何对他们的人民施加最野蛮暴行的指导手册——以叙利亚为例。

In the case of Egypt and el-Sisi, a different kind of manual — not the same extreme tactics of incendiary weapons and napalm and chemical weapons and mass torture and so forth, but nonetheless willing to pull out all the stops to keep power because self-preservation and a mindset where if you practice your religion or believe that religion has a different place in society, you are like a terrorist.

就埃及和塞西而言，这是一种不同的手册——不是燃烧武器、凝固汽油弹、化学武器和大规模酷刑等极端战术，但仍然愿意竭尽全力保持权力，因为自我保护和一种心态，如果你信奉你的宗教或相信宗教在社会中拥有不同的地位，你就像一个恐怖分子。

That’s the sort of Egyptian mindset.

这就是埃及人的心态。

Could it have gone another way in Egypt after Mubarak’s fall with a different outcome to their first democratic election?

穆巴拉克倒台后，埃及是否会走上另一条路，带来与第一次民主选举不同的结果？

Or, indeed, with the same outcome — which was probably inevitable, given popular will, all told — if the person elected to represent the Muslim Brotherhood had not had a winner-takes-all mindset?

或者，事实上，如果当选代表穆斯林兄弟会的人没有赢家通吃的心态，那么结果会是相同的——考虑到民众的意愿，这可能是不可避免的？

In Tunisia, you had the equivalent of a Muslim Brotherhood victory, but he recognized that the society is so divided that there had to be some kind of pacted transition.

在突尼斯，你取得了相当于穆斯林兄弟会的胜利，但他认识到社会如此分裂，必须有某种有协议的过渡。

And it’s a tragedy that in the case of Egypt, at a time when the society was clearly divided, again, along similar lines as in Tunisia, that the idea on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, Warsi, was, “I’m in power.

就埃及而言，这是一个悲剧，在社会明显分裂的时候，与突尼斯的情况类似，穆斯林兄弟会领导层瓦尔西的想法是，“我掌权了。

I may not have another election,” which was always the big fear.

我可能不会再参加选举了，”这一直是人们最大的恐惧。

Then Sisi comes in and he says, “Now I’m in power, and now this part of society that doesn’t represent my worldview, you are to be excluded from any hand in governance, and effectively I may never have another free election.”

然后塞西进来，他说：“现在我掌权了，现在这部分社会不代表我的世界观，你们将被排除在治理的任何人之外，实际上我可能永远不会再有自由选举了。”

Elections weren’t supposed to bring to office people who would have an election once in order to rubber-stamp their own power.

选举不应该让那些为了巩固自己的权力而参加一次选举的人上任。

It’s not only bad luck.

这不仅仅是运气不好。

There are no democratic institutions that have taken hold over time that have the kind of resilience and the rule of law behind them to have kicked in.

随着时间的推移，没有一个民主机构具有足够的韧性和法治来发挥作用。

But Egypt also suffered some bad luck, I think, in who the individuals were who were elevated.

但我认为，埃及也遭遇了一些厄运，这取决于那些被提拔的人。

And in a lot of these societies, you see some of the best leaders leaving, or staying and becoming entrepreneurs or civil society members and being so repulsed by what politics has represented that they wouldn’t dare to be part of public life or public office.

在许多这样的社会中，你会看到一些最优秀的领导人离开或留下来并成为企业家或公民社会成员，但他们对政治所代表的东西如此反感，以至于他们不敢参与公共生活或担任公职。

What no self-respecting historian would be able to say is that what the United States did was well prosecuted, was well thought through.

任何有自尊心的历史学家都不会说，美国的所作所为是经过深思熟虑的、经过深思熟虑的。

I think it’d be very hard to argue that you have to break eggs to make an omelet, and this was just what it had to look like.

我认为很难说你必须打破鸡蛋才能做煎蛋卷，而这正是它的样子。

You could imagine wildly different scenarios ultimately leading to the same kind of outcome but without a degree of bloodshed that is certainly unprecedented in that country’s history, even by the standards of having been governed by Saddam Hussein.

你可以想象完全不同的场景最终会导致相同的结果，但没有一定程度的流血，这在该国历史上肯定是前所未有的，即使按照萨达姆·侯赛因统治的标准来看也是如此。

So in the end, they might say, “Yes, we staggered our way out of this completely bungled US-led invasion, and we took matters into our own hands with the support of the United States ongoing” — including by the Trump administration but also by the Obama administration — “and once the lessons of everything — sort of ham-handed — that had been done, had been applied, we were able, again, to stagger ourselves into some kind of solvent political structure.

所以最后，他们可能会说，“是的，我们摇摇晃晃地摆脱了这场由美国领导的完全失败的入侵，在美国持续的支持下”——包括特朗普政府和奥巴马政府——“我们把事情掌握在自己手中”——包括特朗普政府和奥巴马政府——“一旦所有事情的教训——有点笨拙——已经完成、得到应用，我们就能再次摇摇晃晃地进入某种有偿付能力的政治结构。

And then, lo and behold, we were able to build our own democracy.”

然后，你瞧，我们能够建立我们自己的民主。”

It would be great if Iraq became another exhibit of how, over time, when you allow people to hold their leaders accountable, you will end up with leadership that advances the needs of the larger population.

如果伊拉克成为另一个展示，随着时间的推移，当你允许人们追究他们的领导人的责任时，你最终将获得能够满足更多人口需求的领导力，那就太好了。

That would be a great outcome.

那将是一个很好的结果。

And in some dimensions — as you say on the economic axis, the fact that state-owned enterprises and other things have been taken over and the Iraqi entrepreneurial spirit has been unleashed — on that axis, good things are happening.

在某些方面——正如你在经济轴上所说的那样，国有企业和其他东西已经被接管，伊拉克的企业家精神已经被释放——在这个轴上，好事正在发生。

But it’s a very difficult place for Iraqis to live.

但对于伊拉克人来说，这是一个非常难以居住的地方。

The intervention from outside was Australian led, so there was at least some regional expertise and not the kind of tortured history that, let’s say, Portugal or the Netherlands or whatever, some kind of colonial past.

来自外部的干预是由澳大利亚领导的，因此至少有一些区域专业知识，而不是葡萄牙或荷兰或其他国家那种令人痛苦的历史，某种殖民历史。

So it was maybe, you could argue, just enough regional heft.

所以，你可能会说，这也许只是足够的地区影响力。

There were a lot of issues between Australia and East Timor, but not quite the same baggage maybe, so a little more legitimacy in terms of culture and nationalism.

澳大利亚和东帝汶之间存在很多问题，但可能不是完全相同的包袱，因此在文化和民族主义方面更具合法性。

And it had the broad support of the UN Security Council.

它得到了联合国安理会的广泛支持。

You raised a number of issues.

你提出了很多问题。

What I would say is, what is the harm on the ground that you’re even contemplating a humanitarian intervention in response to?

我想说的是，你甚至考虑采取人道主义干预来应对，这会造成什么危害？

Many people argued in the United States, in the Bush administration, that what Saddam was doing to his people in 2002–2003 had crossed some threshold for humanitarian intervention.

在美国，在布什政府，许多人认为萨达姆在 2002 年至 2003 年对其人民所做的事情已经跨过了人道主义干预的门槛。

It was a huge country, not a million people.

这是一个幅员辽阔的国家，人口不到一百万。

It had a huge sectarian cleavage that the Bush administration, of course, completely underestimated.

当然，它存在巨大的宗派分歧，布什政府完全低估了这一点。

It had zero international legitimacy.

它的国际合法性为零。

It had a huge amount of attention from the president, initially great popular support because of the faux link mainly, I suppose, to 9/11 and to weapons of mass destruction.

它得到了总统的极大关注，最初得到了广泛的支持，因为我想主要是因为它与 9/11 和大规模杀伤性武器有虚假联系。

But I would argue that you don’t even get to that question of “Is it a humanitarian intervention?” because a dictatorship, even one as brutal as that one — there was no clear and present danger to huge numbers of lives or no imminent risk of genocide or something of that nature.

但我认为你甚至没有触及“这是人道主义干预吗？”的问题。因为一种独裁统治，即使是像那样残酷的独裁统治，也不会对大量生命构成明显而现实的危险，也不存在迫在眉睫的种族灭绝或类似性质的风险。

And in part, it kind of takes care of itself because when there isn’t that precipitating trigger, you have a very hard time securing international legitimacy, never mind international legal support through the Security Council, which is hard to get in the best of circumstances.

在某种程度上，它会自行解决，因为如果没有那种突然的触发因素，你就很难确保国际合法性，更不用说通过安理会获得国际法律支持了，而这在最好的情况下也很难获得。

So I’d say that — and indeed this was said at the time, I think — that your ability to build an international coalition, to use military force, the breadth and the pluralism of the coalition itself that might be brought to bear — usually that will have some relationship with the underlying harm and the sense that there’s a kind of trigger, either for a slaughter in a country or a trigger for an intervention.

所以我想说——我认为当时确实是这样说的——你建立国际联盟、使用军事力量的能力、联盟本身可能发挥作用的广度和多元化——通常这与潜在的伤害以及存在某种触发因素的感觉有关，要么是在一个国家进行屠杀，要么是干预的触发因素。

In Syria, which was the most vexing issue that I’ve dealt with in my career, where I think we should have leaned in and at least taken some steps militarily to see whether limited intervention might have kick-started our diplomacy, might have created some protection for some number of Syrians .

在叙利亚，这是我职业生涯中处理过的最棘手的问题，我认为我们应该有所帮助，至少采取一些军事措施，看看有限的干预是否可以启动我们的外交，是否可以为一些叙利亚人提供一些保护。

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I think if you’re looking at that from where the president was sitting — President Obama that is, and now President Trump — you see just the .

我认为，如果你从总统坐的地方看——即奥巴马总统，现在是特朗普总统——你会看到。

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similar to Iraq, but the underlying complexity among the factions on the ground, so the humanitarian trigger is higher than anything arguably since the Rwandan genocide.

与伊拉克类似，但当地各派之间的潜在复杂性，因此人道主义触发因素可以说比卢旺达种族灭绝以来的任何事件都要高。

But as you do your cost-benefit calculus, the complexity of what you are seeking to influence just shatters, really, any of the other examples that we’ve dealt with over the last three decades.

但当你进行成本效益计算时，你所寻求影响的复杂性实际上会粉碎我们在过去三十年中处理过的任何其他例子。

So again, to look at it to say that there’s one cabining factor, one great limiting factor — the fact now that there is very little American domestic constituency for using military force when our most vital national interests are not implicated — I think that’s a fact right now on the left and the right.

因此，再次审视这一点，说有一个限制因素，一个很大的限制因素——事实上，在我们最重要的国家利益没有受到牵连的情况下，美国国内几乎没有选民愿意使用武力——我认为这对于左翼和右翼来说都是一个事实。

There is a shrinking constituency for internationalism generally, and so, I think, one has to be all the more careful about getting too far in front of where the public is because already you’re seeing in very dangerous ways, I think, a backlash against the war fatigue in Iraq and Afghanistan and a kind of tendency to say, “This is what foreign policy buys you,” instead of, in the case of Iraq, “This is what a poorly planned, poorly executed military intervention buys you.”

一般来说，国际主义的支持者正在减少，因此，我认为，人们必须更加小心，不要在公众面前走得太远，因为我认为，你已经以非常危险的方式看到了对伊拉克和阿富汗战争疲劳的强烈抵制，以及一种倾向说，“这就是外交政策给你带来的东西”，而不是在伊拉克的情况下，“这就是计划不周、执行不善的军事干预给你带来的东西。”

There is a shrinking constituency for internationalism generally, and so, I think, one has to be all the more careful about getting too far in front of where the public is because already you’re seeing in very dangerous ways, I think, a backlash against the war fatigue in Iraq and Afghanistan and a kind of tendency to say, “This is what foreign policy buys you,” instead of, in the case of Iraq, “This is what a poorly planned, poorly executed military intervention buys you.”

一般来说，国际主义的支持者正在减少，因此，我认为，人们必须更加小心，不要在公众面前走得太远，因为我认为，你已经以非常危险的方式看到了对伊拉克和阿富汗战争疲劳的强烈抵制，以及一种倾向说，“这就是外交政策给你带来的东西”，而不是在伊拉克的情况下，“这就是计划不周、执行不善的军事干预给你带来的东西。”

We need to restore a constituency and a faith that we can have a productive foreign policy, and I think that part of what that will entail is putting diplomacy and burden sharing at the front of our messaging and of our packaging and of our actions.

我们需要恢复选民和信心，相信我们可以制定富有成效的外交政策，我认为这需要将外交和负担分担置于我们的信息传递、我们的包装和我们的行动的首位。

Right now, humanitarian intervention, if it happens — and it’s happening in different places around the world — but is much more likely to be done by regional organizations like the African Union than it is to be orchestrated by great powers.

目前，人道主义干预如果发生的话——而且它正在世界各地发生——但更有可能是由非洲联盟等区域组织实施，而不是由大国精心策划。

And given the lagging public opinion, until some successful actions are prosecuted — depending, again, on the circumstances — that may be a wise thing.

考虑到公众舆论的滞后，在一些成功的行动被起诉之前——再次取决于具体情况——这可能是明智之举。

But that doesn’t mean that the United States doesn’t have a role, for example, in training and equipping the troops that are going into a Central African Republic or into a Mali or into places where lives can be saved.

但这并不意味着美国没有发挥作用，例如，在训练和装备即将进入中非共和国、马里或可以拯救生命的地方的部队方面。

On baseball

关于棒球

But so far, the kinds of adjustments that have been contemplated, that are being, indeed, put in place this year, like holding your hand up and saying, “Here are your four balls for your .

但到目前为止，我们已经考虑过的调整今年确实已经实施，比如举起手说：“这是你的四个球。”

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Here’s your intentional walk.

这是你有意的行走。

I’m not going to go and do the four pitches.”

我不会去完成四个投球。”

I personally think that’s a loss, and maybe it just shows you what a purist I am, but I find the suspense and the fact that even if 1 out of 20 — or I don’t even know what the numbers are, probably more obscure than that — but just the 1 out of 50 balls that go awry on an intentional walk, that’s part of the drama.

我个人认为这是一种失败，也许这只是向你展示了我是一个多么纯粹的人，但我发现了悬念和事实，即使20个球中有1个——或者我什至不知道数字是什么，可能比这更晦涩——但只有50个球中有1个在故意保送时出错，这就是戏剧的一部分。

So much of what happens in baseball is about what has happened before that informs your experience of what is happening before your eyes, so to buy yourself four minutes here, seven minutes there .

棒球比赛中发生的很多事情都是关于之前发生的事情，这些事情告诉你眼前发生的事情，所以给自己买四分钟，那里七分钟。

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Susan Jacoby actually had a wonderful little book on this called Why Baseball Matters.

苏珊·雅各比实际上有一本关于这方面的精彩小书，名为“为什么棒球很重要”。

But the bigger issue is, we do have an aging constituency for the game, a youth potential constituency that can’t stay off its phones and that believes in instant gratification for just about everything, and so the one-click consumer wants drama, wants action.

但更大的问题是，我们确实有一个老龄化的游戏支持者，一个年轻的潜在支持者，他们无法远离手机，并且相信几乎所有事情都能立即得到满足，因此一键式消费者想要戏剧性，想要行动。

The slow buildup, the idea that how many pitches the pitcher has thrown by the fifth inning then is going to have bearing on which crappy middle reliever the Washington Nationals are going to bring in — those sort of joys that people who’ve been groomed on the game and who didn’t receive the game in the first instance as kids in this world of distraction — we do have to grapple with the fact that we’re not winning those new converts.

缓慢的积累，以及投手在第五局投出多少个球的想法将影响华盛顿国民队将引进哪个蹩脚的中投手——那些在比赛中接受训练的人以及在这个分散注意力的世界中第一次没有接受比赛的人的那种快乐——我们确实必须面对这样一个事实，即我们没有赢得那些新的皈依者。

Now, I think a lot more could be done by bringing baseball to the inner city and to communities that haven’t had the space or the resources to make it happen because the truth is, the greatest conversion for people, or the greatest attraction to the game, comes from people who’ve played the game and have had to work those mechanics and those philosophies and those strategies themselves.

现在，我认为通过将棒球带到内城区和那些没有空间或资源来实现它的社区可以做更多的事情，因为事实是，对人们最大的转变，或者对这项运动的最大吸引力，来自那些玩过这项运动并且必须亲自运用这些机制、这些哲学和这些策略的人。

So maybe less focus on length because, frankly, if a one-nothing nine-inning game is boring for somebody, a one-nothing six-inning game is going to be boring for somebody.

所以也许不要那么关注长度，因为坦率地说，如果一场一无所有的九局比赛对某人来说很无聊，那么一场一无所有的六局比赛也会对某人来说很无聊。

Robot umpires — I watch a lot of tennis as well as baseball, and I think it is very useful in tennis to have a machine that tells you what is true.

机器人裁判——我看了很多网球和棒球比赛，我认为在网球比赛中拥有一台可以告诉你什么是真实的机器非常有用。

My worry in baseball is that your two concerns compete with one another.

我对棒球的担忧是你的两个担忧会相互竞争。

I guess you’re imagining a robot umpire 24/7, not as a court of appeal.

我猜你想象的是一个 24/7 的机器人裁判，而不是上诉法庭。

But I think applying tags — we’re going to have to retain the human element there.

但我认为应用标签——我们必须保留人为因素。

And maybe there’s weirdly an appeal from a robot to a person in some of these subjective circumstances, but on a home run ball, there’s no reason you shouldn’t be able to ascertain on the question of whether a home run has gone over the line or is below the line.

也许在某些主观情况下，机器人对人有一种奇怪的吸引力，但在本垒打球上，你没有理由不能确定本垒打是越过线还是低于线的问题。

I don’t know how you would do the foul ball.

我不知道你会怎么做界外球。

You could probably have some magnetic field along the yellow foul pole where the people sitting in the stands have electromagnetic rays going into themselves.

你可能会沿着黄色犯规杆产生一些磁场，坐在看台上的人们会受到电磁射线的影响。

That would be very, very healthy for the game.

这对于游戏来说是非常非常健康的。

No.

不。

I don’t know.

我不知道。

I think it could get really carried away, but it is useful to have instant replay where at least there’s a court of appeal.

我认为它可能会让人忘乎所以，但在至少有上诉法院的情况下进行即时重播是有用的。

And I think on balls and strikes .

我想到的是球和击球。

.

。

.

。

I hadn’t really thought of it much before.

我之前并没有真正考虑过这个问题。

I’ve been a little preoccupied with the destruction of our democracy and other things.

我一直有点担心我们的民主制度和其他事情的破坏。

I’m recommending this not because I like tennis and not because I like sports or because I somehow was some big Agassi fan, but it’s about friendship and family and grit, and it’s just beautiful in every respect.

我推荐这个并不是因为我喜欢网球，也不是因为我喜欢运动，也不是因为我是阿加西的忠实粉丝，而是因为它关乎友谊、家庭和勇气，而且它在各个方面都很美丽。

I recommend it to everybody.

我向大家推荐它。

To not be presumptuous, to have what Cass would call the right implied author, to be a person that the reader — whether they’re interested in your story or not — that the voice that you’re projecting is the voice of a person they’d want to spend time with?

不自以为是，拥有卡斯所说的正确的隐含作者，成为读者（无论他们是否对你的故事感兴趣）认为你所投射的声音是他们愿意与之共度时光的人的声音？

I mean, it’s really presumptuous.

我的意思是，这确实很自以为是。

The Irish like to say that you shouldn’t even use the first person in therapy, and that’s how I felt writing.

爱尔兰人喜欢说，你甚至不应该在治疗中使用第一人称，这就是我写作时的感受。

I felt immensely self-conscious at the beginning.

一开始我感到非常不自在。

But I think, to the degree that I got mine to work — and I hope I did — it really requires a ruthlessness with your own story.

但我认为，就我的工作而言——我希望我做到了——这确实需要对你自己的故事进行无情的对待。

Just because something happened doesn’t mean it belongs in the book.

仅仅因为发生了某件事并不意味着它属于书中。

Just because it’s interesting to you doesn’t mean it’s interesting.

仅仅因为它对你来说有趣并不意味着它很有趣。

And because I was focusing specifically on learning how to make a difference in the world, I think subjecting the stories that I was including to remembering what my purpose was — which would be very different than other memoirs’ purposes — I had a very distinct purpose in writing the book.

因为我特别专注于学习如何改变世界，所以我认为我所写的故事要记住我的目的是什么——这与其他回忆录的目的非常不同——我写这本书有一个非常明确的目的。

People are turning away from public service.

人们正在远离公共服务。

They don’t believe they can make a difference in their communities.

他们不相信自己能够为社区带来改变。

They think the problems are too big.

他们认为问题太大了。

I wanted to write a book that opened up the world of service of different kinds, even of journalism and of teaching as well as of government, and to show that a kind of nobility in effort, if not always, God knows, in outcome, and to show the integrity of that at a time when some of these institutions are being ridiculed.

我想写一本书，打开不同类型的服务世界，甚至是新闻、教学和政府的世界，并展示一种努力的高贵，如果不是总是，上帝知道，结果，并在其中一些机构受到嘲笑的时候展示这种高贵的完整性。

So I knew my purpose.

所以我知道我的目的。

I think if you know why you’re writing a memoir, and it isn’t just to vent or to get back at somebody or to sell books.

我想如果你知道自己为什么要写回忆录，那么它不仅仅是为了发泄或报复某人或卖书。

If you have a purpose, then to subject what you’re writing to that constant kind of callback.

如果你有一个目的，那么就让你所写的内容受到那种持续的回调的影响。

Is it doing any work for my ultimate purpose?

它是否为我的最终目的做任何工作？

If I look at my Syria chapters, is that an inspiring case of “Here’s why you should go into public service”?

如果我看看我的叙利亚章节，这是一个鼓舞人心的案例“这就是为什么你应该进入公共服务”？

Five hundred thousand people died, and you thought you could prevent atrocities, and you go into government.

五十万人死亡，你认为你可以阻止暴行，然后你进入政府。

It turns out some conflicts are incredibly complex and maybe beyond your reach or beyond, certainly, the reach of outside actors and so forth.

事实证明，有些冲突非常复杂，可能超出您的能力范围，或者当然超出外部参与者的能力范围等等。

So why muddy up my happy message about the importance of trying to make a difference with something so complex?

那么，为什么要混淆我关于尝试改变如此复杂的事情的重要性的快乐信息呢？

Because that’s life.

因为这就是生活。

You’re not going to win them all, and you’re not going to be able to, certainly, affect the world in the way that you would like.

你不会赢得所有这些，当然，你也不可能以你想要的方式影响世界。

But the question is, can you make a positive difference enough of the time to make it worth your effort?

但问题是，你能在足够的时间里做出积极的改变，让你的努力值得吗？

Because I knew what I was trying to do with the memoir, to include those cases where I, as a citizen and as an actor in some of this history, where I was crushed and disappointed and flattened by the irrelevance of what I was doing — that proved to be a really important part of, in the end, being able to urge people to get in the fight.

因为我知道我想在回忆录中做什么，包括那些我作为公民和演员参与到这段历史中的案例，在这些案例中，我因自己所做的事情的无关紧要而感到沮丧、失望和沮丧——这被证明是最终能够敦促人们参与战斗的一个非常重要的部分。

I think the ones that flop or that lose you are ones that either didn’t know why they were doing what they were doing to begin with or lost sight of that someplace along the way.

我认为那些失败或失去你的人要么不知道自己为什么要做他们正在做的事情，要么在过程中的某个地方忘记了这一点。

I was somebody who had been a senior official, and I had my act together.

我是一个曾经担任过高级官员的人，我的行为是井然有序的。

Clearly, I must have had my act together, or how could I have been representing the United States at the United Nations?

显然，我一定是齐心协力，否则我怎么能在联合国代表美国呢？

Very much in the same way that I would have seen a Madeleine Albright or a Jeane Kirkpatrick when I was a kid — these iconic women who are out there, standing up to Russia.

就像我小时候看到的玛德琳·奥尔布赖特或珍妮·柯克帕特里克一样——这些标志性的女性勇敢地面对俄罗斯。

That can be very appealing, and some students will come up to me and say, “I want to be America’s ambassador to the UN.

这可能非常有吸引力，一些学生会来找我说：“我想成为美国驻联合国大使。

How do I go about doing it?” And I’ll say, “Well, not that way, probably.” Because if you focus on the title rather than what you want to do in the world, you’re probably not going to get very far.

我该怎么做呢？我会说，“嗯，可能不是那样。”因为如果你专注于头衔而不是你想在世界上做什么，你可能不会走得太远。

But some people are drawn to power, to the position or whatever.

但有些人被权力、职位或其他什么所吸引。

I get that, and I want to work with those students, too.

我明白了，我也想和那些学生一起工作。

But many just think, “I want to try to make a difference, but I don’t know that I could ever be that person.

但许多人只是想：“我想尝试做出改变，但我不知道我是否能成为那样的人。

I don’t have my act together to that extent.

我的行为还没有达到那种程度。

I don’t have that kind of conviction.”

我没有这样的信念。”

So the reason I include the personal, and especially the material about self-doubt and about what I call the bat cave, which is my head at times, where the bats are swirling around: “Can I do this?” and “Have I gone too far?” and “Did I go on too long in that meeting with President Obama?” This sort of self-recrimination.

所以我之所以把个人的，特别是关于自我怀疑和我所说的蝙蝠洞的材料包括在内，蝙蝠洞有时是我的头，蝙蝠在那里盘旋：“我能做到吗？”以及“我是不是做得太过分了？”以及“我与奥巴马总统的会面是否谈得太久了？”这种自责。

By opening that up, I want young people to know that whatever doubts they’re experiencing, whatever their romantic foibles, that’s what it looks like to grow up.

通过敞开心扉，我希望年轻人知道，无论他们遇到什么疑虑，无论他们在浪漫方面有什么缺点，这就是成长的样子。

Sometimes you grow up in the public eye.

有时你会在公众的视线中长大。

Sometimes you grow up in the confines of your own relationships and your own family and your own home.

有时，你是在自己的人际关系、自己的家庭和自己的家的限制中长大的。

And I did a bit of both.

我两者都做了一些。

The idea that my public persona would somehow cause young people to think that I was some other species of person — I did not want that to happen.

我的公众形象会以某种方式让年轻人认为我是其他物种的人——我不希望这种情况发生。

To the essence of your question about whether there’s more, there’s always more, Tyler.

对于你关于是否还有更多问题的本质，泰勒，总是有更多。

But yeah, there’s something that happens .

但是，是的，有些事情发生了。

.

。

.

。

Oh, this is actually interesting, and somebody pointed this out to me.

哦，这确实很有趣，有人向我指出了这一点。

I would not have picked this up on my own.

我不会自己捡起这个。

Lee Siegel, the writer, pointed this out to me.

作家李·西格尔向我指出了这一点。

When you’re writing a memoir, if you’re me anyway, you start pretty boxed up and anxious about using the first person and saying, “Who am I to write a memoir?

当你写回忆录时，如果你是我的话，你会开始变得非常拘谨，并担心使用第一人称并说：“我是谁来写回忆录？

I didn’t make Middle East peace.

我没有实现中东和平。

What the hell am I doing here?” Start with that disposition.

我到底在这里做什么？从这种性格开始。

Then you gradually kind of unfurl yourself, and you realize that you have to build the portrait of a character, and the readers have to get to know the writer.

然后你逐渐展开自己，你意识到你必须塑造一个人物的肖像，读者必须了解作者。

So it becomes almost a literary exercise, but you can’t make anything up because it’s a memoir.

所以它几乎变成了一种文学练习，但你不能编造任何东西，因为它是一本回忆录。

So you have to use the material of your life to build a kind of thick portrait that people will get to know and hopefully root for.

因此，你必须利用你生活中的素材来构建一幅厚重的肖像，让人们了解并支持。

I wanted people to root for me and the ideals that I had, and I want them to share those ideals, hopefully.

我希望人们支持我和我的理想，并且希望他们能够分享这些理想。

But Lee Siegel pointed out to me that as you unfurl, there comes a moment where you then think that you have to say everything, and you start to just TMI, too much information.

但李·西格尔向我指出，当你展开时，会有一个时刻，你会认为你必须说出一切，然后你开始只是TMI，太多的信息。

And you actually can lose your dignity because you’ve lost your sense .

事实上，你可能会因为失去理智而失去尊严。

.

。

.

。

You initially had an appropriate sense of what TMI is.

您最初对 TMI 是什么有一个适当的认识。

My past, pre-memoir self, I think, is the right balance of what you share and what you don’t share.

我认为，我的过去，即回忆录前的自己，是你分享的和你不分享的之间的正确平衡。

I share a lot as it is.

我分享了很多。

But then I decided, okay, I was really going to go out there.

但后来我决定，好吧，我真的要去那里。

And then you lose the sense of where the boundaries are, and so to go back over it and to say, “Okay, I want to give enough of a portrait where this is a distinctly human person that the reader gets to know, but also they don’t need to be in my .

然后你就失去了界限在哪里的感觉，所以回过头来说，“好吧，我想给出足够的肖像，这是一个读者可以了解的明显的人，但他们也不需要出现在我的……中。”

.

。

.”

”。

What work is every one of these scenes doing for the larger story?

这些场景中的每一个都为更大的故事做了什么工作？

And if it doesn’t meet that threshold, and if, let’s say, I’m making the same mistake with different men six times, they only need to hear about it happening once.

如果它没有达到这个阈值，如果，比方说，我对不同的人犯了六次同样的错误，他们只需要听到它发生一次。

If I did it five other times, the part can stand for the whole.

如果我再这样做五次，部分就可以代表整体。

On foreign policy

关于外交政策

But by upping the stakes, they arguably could be sending a signal like, “You want to get in this game?

但通过提高赌注，他们可能会发出这样的信号：“你想参加这个游戏吗？

It’s not as if we’re an island and you can just break the deal, penalize us gratuitously, penalize the people who are still trying to maintain the terms of the deal, and that there won’t be collateral consequences outside the nuclear space.”

这并不是说我们是一个岛屿，你可以破坏协议，无端惩罚我们，惩罚那些仍在努力维持协议条款的人，并且不会在核空间之外产生附带后果。”

Because the nuclear consequences, as they begin to enrich and violate the terms of the deal — having legitimately argued that we had violated the terms of the deal — the effects of those are not day-to-day effects in the news world.

因为核后果，当它们开始丰富并违反协议条款时——我们合理地辩称我们违反了协议条款——其影响并不是新闻界的日常影响。

It’s a bit abstract for the public and even for policymakers.

对于公众甚至政策制定者来说，这有点抽象。

It’s an incremental abrogation.

这是一种渐进式的废除。

But acts like this show that they have leverage, that they are active militarily in parts of the world where we have a vested interest in maintaining freedom of navigation.

但这样的行为表明他们有影响力，他们在世界上一些我们在维护航行自由方面有既得利益的地区积极开展军事活动。

So I think they’re showing that they can hit in domains outside the nuclear domain.

所以我认为他们正在表明他们可以打击核领域之外的领域。

I think that is probably what they’re doing.

我想这可能就是他们正在做的事情。

And the real problem — this isn’t just about defense spending, but there’s a big problem across Europe in that if we were in a world of referenda, I’m not sure many of these European countries would have defense budgets or would even have militaries in some cases.

真正的问题是——这不仅仅是国防支出，整个欧洲都存在一个大问题，如果我们处于一个全民公投的世界，我不确定这些欧洲国家中是否有许多国家会有国防预算，或者在某些情况下甚至会拥有军队。

So, if you ask, “Should they?” the answer is, “Unequivocally.” Is it an incredible deal for them?

所以，如果你问“应该吗？”答案是“毫无疑问”。这对他们来说是一笔不可思议的交易吗？

Yes.

是的。

Should they be alarmed by the fact that successive presidents, who are very different — George W.

他们是否应该对这样一个事实感到震惊：历任总统都非常不同——乔治·W·布什(George W.

Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump — have all harped on this issue, Trump of course the most vocally and tweet-ily and not, to this point, very effectively.

布什、巴拉克·奥巴马和唐纳德·特朗普——都在这个问题上喋喋不休，特朗普当然是声音最大、最喜欢发推文的人，但到目前为止，效率还不是很高。

But nonetheless, we all agree that there has to be burden sharing, and I mentioned earlier a kind of shriveled constituency in the United States that we have to win back.

但尽管如此，我们都同意必须分担负担，我之前提到过我们必须赢回美国的一种萎缩的选区。

The way we in the United States will build back the kind of foreign policy that our European allies want to see us having is when they find a way to step up and bring their constituents along.

我们美国将重建我们的欧洲盟友希望看到的外交政策，那就是他们找到办法挺身而出并带动他们的选民。

Maybe there’ll be an opening in a post-Trump world where we can, because on some level, we, as American leaders, have to speak directly to the constituents who then elect the parliamentarians who then pass the budgets.

也许在后特朗普时代，我们可以这样做，因为在某种程度上，我们作为美国领导人，必须直接与选民对话，然后选民选出议员，然后议员再通过预算。

It’s not a bunch of dictators who are like, “I’ve done a public opinion poll, and they don’t want to go the full 2 percent.” This is about the chancellor of Germany also has to get that budget through a parliament and a coalition government and so forth.

这不是一群独裁者，他们会说，“我做了一次民意调查，他们不想支持全部 2%。”这是关于德国总理还必须通过议会和联合政府等获得预算。

Again, I’m not an apologist for their politics, but I’m a believer that they need to work a lot harder to try to change their constituencies, just as we’re going to have to do the same on this end.

再说一次，我不是他们政治的辩护者，但我相信他们需要更加努力地努力改变他们的选民，就像我们为此必须做同样的事情一样。

No, there has to be a right sizing for the sake of the families who are the ones who bear this burden because that is not actually the face of America that is the most winning face.

不，为了承受这一负担的家庭，必须有一个合适的尺寸，因为这实际上并不是美国最成功的面孔。

Our soldiers, of course, are making an amazing contribution in some of those places, but having these large bases where locals don’t get to even interact that much with our soldiers — it perpetuates a perception of America as a militarized nation.

当然，我们的士兵在其中一些地方做出了惊人的贡献，但拥有这些大型基地，当地人甚至无法与我们的士兵进行太多互动，这让人们对美国作为一个军事化国家的看法永久化。

But also it speaks, I think, to the imbalance that I write about as one of my conclusions in the book.

但我认为，这也说明了我在书中所写的结论之一的不平衡。

How can it be that we have almost more people serving in military marching bands than serve as diplomats representing the United States when our military leaders are the first to say that they can’t do the conflict resolution, they can’t deal with the underlying socioeconomic or ethnic or other tensions, or the land grabs, or the climate change that shrinks the resources that people are fighting over?

当我们的军事领导人首先表示他们无法解决冲突、无法应对潜在的社会经济、种族或其他紧张局势、土地掠夺或导致人们争夺的资源减少的气候变化时，我们在军事乐队中服役的人数怎么可能比代表美国的外交官还要多呢？

They’re just a set of problems where we need the other tools in our arsenal, and other countries comparably need to expand their diplomatic and socioeconomic benches to be able to pool our resources to make more of a difference to deal with the causes of these conflicts rather than just setting up bases and playing whack-a-mole.

这些只是一系列问题，我们需要我们的武器库中的其他工具，而其他国家同样需要扩大其外交和社会经济基础，以便能够集中我们的资源，在解决这些冲突的根源方面发挥更大的作用，而不仅仅是建立基地和玩打地鼠游戏。

The one thing I will say is that I do think we’re moving into a period where we do need to make investments in state solvency elsewhere.

我要说的一件事是，我确实认为我们正在进入一个确实需要在其他地方对国家偿付能力进行投资的时期。

And by “we,” I don’t just mean the United States.

我所说的“我们”不仅仅指美国。

I mean the broader international community, such as it is, but with the United States probably, as always, playing a leading role.

我指的是更广泛的国际社会，但美国可能一如既往地发挥着主导作用。

One reason that we’re constantly asking about humanitarian intervention or why we have 100,000 peacekeepers in countries around the world is that the militaries in those countries are either preying on their people or are incapable of — take Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad — incapable of thwarting Boko Haram, which is preying on the people.

我们不断询问人道主义干预或为什么我们在世界各国部署10万名维和人员的原因之一是，这些国家的军队要么正在掠夺其人民，要么无力——以尼日利亚、喀麦隆、尼日尔、乍得为例——无法挫败正在掠夺人民的博科圣地。

Indeed, the militaries are so either corrupt or abusive themselves that they end up fueling or effectively aiding the Boko Haram recruitment process by committing such human rights abuses that people say, “There’s no difference between the Nigerian army and Boko Haram,” which can’t be the case.

事实上，军队本身要么腐败，要么滥用职权，最终通过侵犯人权的行为助长或有效地帮助了博科圣地的招募过程，以至于人们说，“尼日利亚军队和博科圣地之间没有区别”，但事实并非如此。

So, even though it can sound like militarization, we have some of the best trainers in the world.

因此，尽管这听起来像是军事化，但我们拥有一些世界上最好的培训师。

I think we should be more, not less, ambitious working with other countries’ militaries.

我认为我们应该更加雄心勃勃地与其他国家的军队合作，而不是更少。

And there’s a real gap in the international system around police.

国际警察体系确实存在差距。

There’s actually very, very scant police training capability.

事实上，警察的培训能力非常非常不足。

If you think about global goods and collective goods, training other cities’ or other countries’ police forces, depending on how the police are structured, is an incredibly important investment in the rule of law, or prodding them to train their own police, or for themselves to hold their own soldiers accountable.

如果你考虑全球商品和集体商品，培训其他城市或其他国家的警察部队（取决于警察的结构）是对法治的一项极其重要的投资，或者促使他们培训自己的警察，或者让自己的士兵承担责任。

I think that you could imagine some of the resources that are now expended in places where we’re in combat that the American people don’t even know about.

我认为你可以想象现在我们在战斗中消耗的一些资源，而美国人民甚至不知道。

But to actually invest alongside other countries in professionalizing some of these training apparatuses — I think that would be a worthwhile investment.

但实际上，与其他国家一起投资，使其中一些培训设备专业化，我认为这将是一项值得的投资。

We’re going on two decades since the 9/11 authorization under which most of our operations abroad are being waged.

自 9/11 授权以来，我们的大部分海外业务都是在该授权下开展的，现在已经过去了二十年。

It’s a failure to perform Congress’s duty as stipulated under the Constitution and, I think, under the War Powers Resolution as well, but it’s also such a disservice to our troops and their families.

这是未能履行宪法规定的国会职责，我认为也是《战争权力决议》规定的职责，但这对我们的军队及其家人来说也是一种伤害。

We say that we’re all for the troops and we’re giving the troops this and we’re giving the troops that.

我们说我们都是为了部队，我们给部队这个，我们给部队那个。

We fail them consistently on benefits, and we fail them in overseeing how their lives are being spent, and by “spent,” for the most part, I mean how their days are being spent, where they’re being deployed.

我们在福利方面一直让他们失望，在监督他们的生活如何度过方面我们让他们失望，而“度过”在很大程度上是指他们的日子是如何度过的，他们被部署在哪里。

That conversation has not happened domestically in too long.

这种对话在国内已经很久没有发生了。

So yes, if you did a referendum of the American people, or if that were played out as we saw in the Syria red-line episode, I think you would see great skepticism about the use of force.

所以，是的，如果你对美国人民进行全民公投，或者如果像我们在叙利亚红线事件中看到的那样进行公投，我认为你会看到对使用武力的极大怀疑。

I think there should be great skepticism in many, many cases when our vital national interests are not involved.

我认为，在很多很多情况下，当不涉及我们的重大国家利益时，人们应该抱有极大的怀疑。

But if you see a circumstance like the Ebola outbreak, where we used our military in such a constructive way, and where we did a congressional notification, but because that didn’t really rise to the level of war, we weren’t engaged in combat at all.

但如果你看到像埃博拉疫情这样的情况，我们以建设性的方式使用我们的军队，我们向国会发出了通知，但因为这并没有真正上升到战争的水平，所以我们根本没有参与战斗。

But it’s an example where, if Congress were playing in the larger space of the deployment of our military generally, we could have had a constructive and maybe, in some ideal world, eventually a bipartisan discussion of why problems that happen over there matter to us over here.

但这是一个例子，如果国会在我们军队普遍部署的更大空间中发挥作用，我们本来可以进行建设性的，也许在某些理想世界中，最终可以进行两党讨论，讨论为什么那里发生的问题对我们在这里很重要。

Instead, the Obama administration carried out the intervention in support of the local efforts on the ground, which were heroic and dauntingly complex.

相反，奥巴马政府进行了干预，以支持当地的实地努力，这是英勇且复杂的。

And because of our polarization problem, which we haven’t talked about, Republicans, by and large on party lines, basically sniped at, criticized, undermined, threatened to quarantine even those American heroes who went over to be part of the intervention.

由于我们还没有谈论过的两极分化问题，共和党人基本上按照党派路线，基本上是在狙击、批评、破坏、威胁要隔离那些参与干预的美国英雄。

And it’s funny.

这很有趣。

For all of the valorization of what our troops do, there’s a carveout for Ebola because it was Obama’s successful intervention to end a major public health calamity, and they decided that the politics of supporting that weren’t good or whatever.

对于我们军队所做的一切的评价，有一个针对埃博拉病毒的例外，因为这是奥巴马成功的干预措施，结束了一场重大的公共卫生灾难，而他们认为支持这一行动的政治不好或其他什么。

In general, we need more buy-in for our foreign policy.

总的来说，我们的外交政策需要更多的支持。

And given the large weight that the US military is carrying in shouldering the foreign policy burden, that oversight role is incredibly important.

鉴于美国军队在外交政策方面承担着巨大的责任，这种监督作用非常重要。

If we could somehow return to a time where Republicans didn’t snipe at what Democrats did .

如果我们能以某种方式回到共和党人不攻击民主党人所做的事情的时代就好了。

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。

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。

I hope we’re still in a world where Democrats, if Trump did something .

我希望我们仍然处于一个民主党人的世界，如果特朗普做了一些事情的话。

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。

I think you saw this with the Syria chemical weapons response, that some Democrats came out in favor of that because it’s something they had favored Obama doing, and they were consistent.

我想你在叙利亚化学武器反应中看到了这一点，一些民主党人站出来支持这一点，因为这是他们支持奥巴马做的事情，而且他们是一致的。

But probably the fact that it was Trump doing it overrode their cost-benefit of the action itself.

但特朗普这样做的事实可能超越了行动本身的成本效益。

It proved not to be a terribly effective action over time anyway.

无论如何，随着时间的推移，事实证明这并不是一个非常有效的行动。

But when our lives are at stake, the lives of our soldiers are at stake, but also when American lives are at stake — which is what is at stake in many foreign policy decisions — I just wish we could return to the Nunn-Lugar era of bipartisanship, where we could work on really hard problems together.

但是，当我们的生命受到威胁时，我们士兵的生命受到威胁，而且当美国人的生命受到威胁时——这也是许多外交政策决定中的关键时刻——我只是希望我们能够回到两党合作的纳恩-卢格时代，在那里我们可以共同解决真正棘手的问题。

If you had that kind of backdrop, then you could imagine more congressional oversight but also not the evisceration of our foreign policy generally.

如果你有这样的背景，那么你可以想象国会会有更多的监督，但也不会总体上削弱我们的外交政策。

So we are in a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation where polarization makes the prospect of securing congressional authorization for anything large harder to imagine.

因此，我们正处于一种先有鸡还是先有蛋的局面，两极分化使得任何大型项目获得国会授权的前景变得更加难以想象。

But that gets back to the first principle, where we have to deal with our polarization and start working together on issues of all stripes.

但这又回到了第一个原则，即我们必须解决两极分化问题，并开始就各种问题开展合作。