Raghuram Rajan on Understanding Community (Ep. 62)
Today, we’re here with Raghuram Rajan, who is professor at University of Chicago.
今天，我们邀请了芝加哥大学教授拉古拉姆·拉詹 (Raghuram Rajan)。
Raghu has a new book out: The Third Pillar: How Markets and the State Leave the Community Behind.
拉古出版了一本新书：《第三支柱：市场和国家如何让社区落后》。
Raghu, welcome.
拉古，欢迎。
Thank you for having me.
谢谢你有我。
First question: should we really be trying to empower local communities if we think NIMBY is a big problem and strong localism just means tighter zoning regulations?
第一个问题：如果我们认为邻避是一个大问题并且强烈的地方主义只是意味着更严格的分区法规，我们真的应该努力赋予当地社区权力吗？
Well, you need a new kind of structure going forward.
嗯，你需要一种新的结构来推进。
Certainly, you need more empowerment locally, but you have to make sure that that empowerment is not total, that it’s not about building walls around the community but making the community able to take advantage of a global economy as well as a large country.
当然，你需要在当地给予更多的赋权，但你必须确保这种赋权不是完全的，这不是在社区周围筑起围墙，而是让社区能够利用全球经济和大国的优势。
Walls prevent that.
墙壁可以防止这种情况发生。
So how do you get people to have a sense of agency, while at the same time there are flows across the borders of the community?
那么如何让人们有一种代理感，同时又可以跨越社区边界流动呢？
That’s really what I’m trying to do.
这确实是我想做的事情。
If we had stronger local communities, do you think we would have stronger restrictions on building in, say, Manhattan, San Francisco, the American suburbs?
如果我们有更强大的当地社区，你认为我们会对曼哈顿、旧金山等美国郊区的建筑有更严格的限制吗？
I think you have to worry about that.
我想你必须担心这一点。
We might, if the local communities’ abilities to enact sort of zoning laws were not tempered in some way by the other two pillars that I talk about in the book, the state and markets.
如果当地社区制定某种分区法的能力没有受到我在书中谈到的其他两个支柱（国家和市场）的某种程度的削弱，我们可能会这样做。
To some extent, we need to keep the borders of the community low and porous while giving the community greater decision-making power.
在某种程度上，我们需要保持社区边界的低度和渗透性，同时赋予社区更大的决策权。
The decision-making power is not about the borders per se, but about how it will encourage economic activity, in some sense attuned to the needs and the capabilities of the community.
决策权不在于边界本身，而在于如何鼓励经济活动，在某种意义上适应社区的需求和能力。
If I think, say, about China, which has done pretty well in terms of economic growth — didn’t they, in some sense, trash localism?
比如说，如果我想想中国，它在经济增长方面表现得相当不错——从某种意义上来说，他们不是在垃圾地方主义吗？
They said, “We’re going to do the state really well.
他们说：“我们会把国家做得很好。
We’re going to do the market somewhat well.
我们将把市场做好一些。
We’re not going to try for balance.” United States has a somewhat dysfunctional government, but we have great markets.
我们不会试图寻求平衡。”美国的政府有些功能失调，但我们有巨大的市场。
We’re not trying for balance.
我们并不是在努力寻求平衡。
Isn’t it better to have a cultural specialization in either state or market than to try to balance all three of the things?
在国家或市场中拥有文化专业化不是比试图平衡这三者更好吗？
Well, first, I would disagree a little about your characterization of China.
好吧，首先，我不太同意你对中国的描述。
I think one of the things they’ve done very well is have pretty strong, in fact impenetrable, business regulation around — that’s not a recommended path, but what they’ve done is empowered the local government officials to essentially work with those regulations and open them up for local businesses.
我认为他们做得很好的一件事是围绕着非常强大的、实际上难以理解的商业监管——这不是一条推荐的道路，但他们所做的是授权地方政府官员基本上遵守这些规定并向当地企业开放。
So in some sense, they’ve incentivized the local officials by giving them strong rewards for growth — they get promoted faster up the Communist Party — and allowed them, in a sense, to build the local community around their abilities.
因此，从某种意义上说，他们通过给予地方官员丰厚的成长奖励来激励他们——“他们在共产党内得到更快的晋升”——并在某种意义上允许他们围绕自己的能力建设当地社区。
So Chinese growth — a lot of it is not because China has the best business regulation in the world, but because it has empowered Communist Party officials who know how to break the rules selectively.
因此，中国的增长——很大程度上并不是因为中国拥有世界上最好的商业监管，而是因为它赋予了共产党官员权力，让他们知道如何有选择地违反规则。
Now, is that a recommended mode?
现在，这是推荐模式吗？
Certainly not, but it’s worked.
当然不是，但它确实有效。
If you were to cite a particular place in India that right now is doing community especially well, what would it be?
如果您要列举印度某个地方目前社区建设特别好，那会是哪里？
The villages, by and large, are self-governing, have been self-governing for many, many decades.
总的来说，这些村庄是自治的，已经自治了很多很多年了。
But I think what you really need is, over and above that, you need the funding that accumulates at the center, or the state level, to come down to the community level, so they can decide what kinds of irrigation projects, for example, that they need.
但我认为，除此之外，你真正需要的是，你需要在中央或州一级积累的资金，以落实到社区一级，这样他们就可以决定他们需要什么样的灌溉项目。
A lot of it is local.
其中很多都是本地的。
It’s not these mega, gigantic projects which create a whole lot of problems.
造成这么多问题的并不是这些大型项目。
It’s about local tanks, local wells.
这是关于当地的水箱、当地的水井。
And there are many areas where, once the local people take it up and have the funding associated with it, they actually do a great job of doing the right things as far as irrigation, as far as the environment, as far as everything local community needs.
在许多地区，一旦当地人接受并获得相关资金，他们实际上在灌溉、环境和当地社区所需的一切方面都做了正确的事情。
But if people are leaving villages in India or, for that matter, in America, isn’t that a sign they’re rejecting community in some sense?
但如果人们离开印度的村庄，或者就此而言，离开美国的村庄，这难道不是他们在某种意义上拒绝社区的迹象吗？
They find it too stifling?
他们觉得这太令人窒息了？
They prefer the anonymous, impersonal existence of the big city?
他们更喜欢大城市的匿名、非个人化的存在？
Well, there is some of that.
嗯，有一些。
There are some people who prefer the anonymous existence of the city.
有些人更喜欢城市的匿名存在。
And there are some people who come back from the city, back to the community because they like the sense of identity that it provides.
有些人从城市回到社区，因为他们喜欢它提供的认同感。
We are with people we’ve known for many years; they are who we are, in some sense.
我们和认识多年的人在一起；从某种意义上说，他们就是我们。
You’re defined by the people around you.
你是由你周围的人定义的。
I think there’s room for both.
我认为两者都有空间。
In fact, the book is about saying, “Look, let’s create the possibility for all kinds of communities to coexist within a country.”
事实上，这本书的意思是：“看，让我们为各种社区在一个国家内共存创造可能性。”
How much of the decline of community do you think is actually the decline of religion?
您认为社区的衰落有多少实际上是宗教的衰落？
Take this country, the United States.
以美国这个国家为例。
Some of it is, but you might argue that when community declines, people reach out to measures of identity that they can lock onto.
其中一些是，但你可能会说，当社区衰落时，人们会寻求他们可以锁定的身份衡量标准。
And sometimes, religion is something that they grasp at because that, at least, gives them some sense of who they are.
有时，宗教是他们所抓住的东西，因为这至少让他们了解自己是谁。
Because the local community’s collapsing, social dysfunctionality is setting in, families are breaking down, teenage pregnancies are up.
由于当地社区的崩溃，社会功能失调，家庭破裂，少女怀孕率上升。
When that doesn’t satisfy you, looking for other symbols — nationalism is one, religion is another.
当这不能满足你时，寻找其他象征 ——民族主义是一回事，宗教是另一回事。
It seems the secularization thesis is finally coming to this country.
看来世俗化的论点终于来到了这个国家。
That is, fewer people are going to church after a long period of stability.
也就是说，经过长期的稳定之后，去教堂的人越来越少。
Do you think the same is likely to happen in India as per capita income grows?
您认为随着人均收入的增长，印度也会出现同样的情况吗？
Because it’s happened in just about every other country, and now finally also the US.
因为这种情况几乎发生在所有其他国家，现在终于也发生在美国。
In the majority religion in India, Hinduism, you really don’t have a strong concept of church, that is, going to assemblies and so on.
在印度的主流宗教印度教中，你真的没有一个强烈的教堂概念，那就是去集会等等。
But there are festivals and deities.
但也有节日和神灵。
There are ways you participate.
您可以通过多种方式参与。
What you see is, again, that in reaction to modernity, there is sometimes an increasing emphasis on these older symbols.
你再次看到的是，为了应对现代性，有时人们越来越强调这些古老的符号。
For example, the Ganesh festival — festival of the elephant god — is celebrated with full gusto in Maharashtra, and a lot of young kids are participating in that.
例如，在马哈拉施特拉邦，人们热烈庆祝象神节——“象神的节日”，很多孩子都参与其中。
They like the symbolism.
他们喜欢象征意义。
They like the festivities.
他们喜欢庆祝活动。
They like being with other people.
他们喜欢和其他人在一起。
But they’ve converted it into something new.
但他们已经把它变成了新的东西。
They dance in the streets — a lot of Western dance as opposed to traditional Indian dance.
他们在街上跳舞——很多西方舞蹈，而不是传统的印度舞蹈。
They’ve adapted it to their needs.
他们已经根据自己的需要进行了调整。
What’s your favorite Indian festival?
你最喜欢的印度节日是什么？
Diwali is pretty up there.
排灯节在那里很漂亮。
It’s the most important Hindu festival.
这是最重要的印度教节日。
It’s, again, a time of coming together, of family, of recognizing your community.
这又是一个家人团聚、认识社区的时刻。
Do you think the European Union is a substitute for community?
您认为欧盟可以替代共同体吗？
Or an enabler of it, on net?
或者它的推动者，在网上？
I think that, at least in the way that it has grown, it has actually created more reaction than a greater sense of community.
我认为，至少在它发展的方式上，它实际上引起了更多的反应，而不是更大的社区意识。
And I’ll be very specific about that.
我会非常具体地说明这一点。
What it’s done is, it’s taken powers up into the Union which traditionally used to belong at the country level and, within the country level, at the regional level.
它所做的是，它将传统上属于国家层面以及国家层面和地区层面的权力转移到了欧盟。
And as those paths migrate up, people in the country feel disempowered.
随着这些道路向上迁移，该国人民感到被剥夺了权力。
“We can’t determine everything.
“我们无法决定一切。
Everything is determined by those bureaucrats in Brussels.”
一切都是由布鲁塞尔的那些官僚决定的。”
When that happens, there’s a reaction against the European Union.
当这种情况发生时，就会出现针对欧盟的反应。
To some extent, the local politicians play into that.
在某种程度上，当地政客也参与其中。
All the good stuff is because of them.
所有的美好都是因为他们。
All the bad stuff is because of those bureaucrats in the Union.
所有的坏事都是因为联盟里的那些官僚造成的。
There is no political consensus behind the Union itself, though if you ask, “What is the political consensus behind Europe?” — as a concept, I think it’s still pretty strong.
欧盟本身并没有达成政治共识，但如果你问“欧洲背后的政治共识是什么？” ——作为一个概念，我认为它还是相当强大的。
Should the existence of the internet make us super optimistic about community?
互联网的存在是否应该让我们对社区超级乐观？
Or super pessimistic?
还是超级悲观？
I think that it actually helps in many ways.
我认为它实际上在很多方面都有帮助。
Often, we worry about the internet — people spending so much time away — the traditional picture of a family of four eating, and each one on their cell phone, communicating with somebody outside.
我们常常担心互联网 ——“人们花太多时间在外面”——传统的画面是一家四口吃饭，每个人都用手机与外面的人交流。
But in fact, when you look at the evidence, it seems like it can also help bring together people.
但事实上，当你查看证据时，你会发现它似乎也有助于将人们聚集在一起。
My kids, for example — they are so much more in touch with their college friends — through Facebook and so on — in a way that we never were.
例如，我的孩子们 ——他们与大学朋友的联系更加频繁了—— 通过 Facebook 等等 —— 以一种我们从未有过的方式。
There’s an example in the book of this community, Netville, where they actually overlay internet on half a community.
书中有一个关于 Netville 社区的例子，他们实际上在半个社区上覆盖了互联网。
This is exactly what an economist wants: a randomized experiment, half the community linked, the other half not.
这正是经济学家想要的：随机实验，一半的社区有联系，另一半则没有。
Which segment does better in maintaining social ties?
哪个部分在维持社会关系方面做得更好？
It’s the one that’s linked.
这是链接的那个。
Because they can traverse locked doors, they can communicate with each other, they can do social events together, and it works a lot better.
因为他们可以穿过上锁的门，他们可以互相交流，他们可以一起进行社交活动，而且效果更好。
The internet offers a lot of possibilities, not all of them good.
互联网提供了很多可能性，但并非所有可能性都是好的。
Absolutely.
绝对地。
But it offers a way to stay together which we didn’t have in the past.
但它提供了一种我们过去没有的在一起的方式。
And now there’s new ways of getting together, again, which we didn’t have in the past.
现在又有了新的聚会方式，这是我们过去没有的。
Why doesn’t online education work better, then?
那么，为什么在线教育效果不佳呢？
What’s special about face to face?
面对面有什么特别之处？
I think you need both.
我认为你两者都需要。
Look, face to face in my class — when I look at a student and they’re not prepared, they feel a sense of embarrassment.
瞧，在我的课堂上面对面 ——当我看到学生没有做好准备时，他们会感到尴尬。
It’s hard to get that sense of embarrassment across the net, at least in full measure.
很难在网络上感受到这种尴尬感，至少很难完全感受到。
You can text them an insult.
你可以发短信侮辱他们。
RAJAN: You could text them an insult.
拉詹：你可以给他们发短信侮辱。
It’s not as powerful, I would think.
我认为它没有那么强大。
If you up the quality of the insult, it might be.
如果你提高侮辱的质量，可能是这样。
This goes to the point of online is less engagement.
这就导致了在线参与度较低。
It allows you to opt in and opt out, it allows you more choice, but the depth of engagement, I would argue, is much less than when you have a local, real community.
它允许你选择加入和选择退出，它允许你有更多选择，但我认为，参与的深度比你拥有本地真实社区时要少得多。
I’ve a few questions about India, and again, I remind our listeners this is the conversation I want to have with Raghu, not the conversation they want to have.
我有几个关于印度的问题，我再次提醒我们的听众，这是我想与拉古进行的对话，而不是他们想要进行的对话。
A lot of observers have suggested to me that the notion of a kind of Anglo-American liberalism as ascendant in India is now a dead idea, that ideologically, India has somehow shifted, and the main currents of thought, including on the so-called right, are just really not liberalism anymore.
许多观察家向我表示，那种英美自由主义在印度方兴未艾的想法现在已经是一个死胡同了，在意识形态上，印度已经发生了某种转变，主流思潮，包括所谓的右翼，实际上已经不再是自由主义了。
Do you have a take on that view?
您对这种观点有什么看法吗？
I’m not sure I would agree.
我不确定我会同意。
I would say that we’ve had a government over the last five years which has elements of the majoritarian, Hindu nationalist group in it.
我想说的是，过去五年我们的政府中有多数派、印度教民族主义团体的成分。
But I would argue the country, as a whole, is still firmly secular, liberal in the Nehruvian idea, which is that we need a country which is open to different religions, to different ethnicities, to different beliefs if we are to stay together.
但我认为，作为一个整体，这个国家仍然坚定地世俗化，遵循尼赫鲁维亚思想的自由主义，即如果我们要团结在一起，我们需要一个对不同宗教、不同种族、不同信仰开放的国家。
And democracy plays an important role here because it allows some of the pressures which build up in each community to essentially get expressed and therefore diffuses some of the pressure.
民主在这里发挥着重要作用，因为它允许每个社区中积累的一些压力从本质上得到表达，从而分散一些压力。
So I think India’s ideal is still a polyglot coming together in this country.
所以我认为印度的理想仍然是一个多语言的国家聚集在一起。
But someone like Ramachandra Guha — what he symbolizes intellectually — do you think that would be a growing part of India’s future?
但像拉马钱德拉·古哈这样的人——“他在知识上的象征”——你认为这会成为印度未来日益增长的一部分吗？
Or that will dwindle as colonial ties become smaller, the United States less important in global affairs?
或者，随着殖民关系的缩小、美国在全球事务中重要性的下降，这种关系会减弱吗？
I think that an open, liberal, tolerant country is really what we need for the next stage of growth.
我认为，一个开放、自由、宽容的国家才是我们下一阶段增长所需要的。
We are now reaching middle income.
我们现在已达到中等收入水平。
We could go a little faster.
我们可以走快一点。
We should go a little faster there.
我们应该走快一点。
Once we reach middle income, to grow further, I think we need an intellectual openness, which only the kind of democracy we have — the open dialogue, a respectful dialogue — will generate the kinds of innovative forces that will take us more to the frontier.
一旦我们达到中等收入，为了进一步增长，我认为我们需要知识上的开放，只有我们拥有的那种民主——“公开对话、尊重的对话”——才能产生创新力量，将我们带到更前沿。
So I keep saying, and I say this in the book, we’re very well positioned for the next stage of growth, from middle to high income.
所以我一直在说，而且我在书中也说过，我们已经为下一阶段的增长（从中等收入到高收入）做好了充分的准备。
But we first have to reach middle income.
但我们首先必须达到中等收入。
Do you worry much about premature industrialization for India?
您是否非常担心印度工业化过早？
The percentage of jobs and manufacturing has been declining for some while, but India’s not yet quite a middle-income country.
一段时间以来，就业和制造业的比例一直在下降，但印度还不是一个中等收入国家。
It is a concern, but I would argue that there’s enough room for growth in India, doing the old traditional things.
这是一个令人担忧的问题，但我认为印度有足够的增长空间，做古老的传统事情。
I wouldn’t worry about it right now.
我现在不会担心。
I think in the longer run, we have to worry.
我认为从长远来看，我们不得不担心。
We certainly have to upgrade the quality of education in India significantly.
我们当然必须大幅提高印度的教育质量。
More people have to be better prepared for the global economy; they’re not.
更多的人必须为全球经济做好更好的准备；他们不是。
We have many of the same problems that we talk about in industrial countries — too few people educated at the levels that the economy needs.
我们面临着许多与工业化国家相同的问题——受过经济所需水平教育的人太少。
But that said, I would say there are very low-hanging fruit in India, which if we pluck, we can generate 9, 10 percent growth for the next 10, 15 years that would get us firmly into middle income.
但话虽如此，我想说印度有一些非常容易实现的成果，如果我们采摘这些果实，我们可以在未来 10 年、15 年实现 9%、10% 的增长，从而使我们坚定地进入中等收入国家。
I don’t think we necessarily need to go the Chinese way of manufacturing-led growth.
我认为我们不一定需要走中国式的制造业主导型增长之路。
Maybe that option has already closed out.
也许这个选择已经结束了。
But just simply building out the infrastructure in India, connecting people, getting internal trade up — you don’t need to go the external manufacturing route to get strong growth for some time.
但只要简单地在印度建设基础设施、连接人们、促进内部贸易，你就不需要走外部制造路线来在一段时间内获得强劲增长。
Oil-producing countries aside, are there countries, or even regions, that have done 9 percent growth without a lot of manufacturing and exports?
除了石油生产国之外，还有哪些国家甚至地区在没有大量制造业和出口的情况下实现了 9% 的增长？
Isn’t there a kind of cost disease that so many of the service sectors — even in wealthier countries — they just don’t increase in productivity much?
难道不是存在一种成本病吗？以至于如此多的服务部门（即使在较富裕的国家）生产力却没有大幅提高？
Well, we have to think more cleverly about doing that.
好吧，我们必须更聪明地考虑这样做。
But it’s not primarily going to be the financial services, or consulting and so on.
但它主要不是金融服务或咨询等。
It’s actually construction.
其实就是建筑。
If India can construct what it needs in terms of housing, in terms of infrastructure, in terms of boats, railroads, et cetera, for the next 15 years, that’s where a lot of the jobs will be, not just around the roads we build, but the restaurants, the motels, the service sector which builds around those roads.
如果印度能够在未来 15 年建设其所需的住房、基础设施、船舶、铁路等，那么大量的就业机会将出现在这些地方，不仅是我们修建的道路周围，还有餐馆、汽车旅馆以及围绕这些道路建设的服务业。
And of course there will be some manufacturing.
当然也会有一些制造。
India still has very cheap labor, so manufacturing will increase.
印度仍然拥有非常廉价的劳动力，因此制造业将会增加。
What Vietnam is doing now, India will also do.
越南现在所做的，印度也会做。
But we need to build out that infrastructure.
但我们需要建立基础设施。
So I would say construction, then manufacturing, and around all this, a significant increase in services.
所以我想说的是建筑业，然后是制造业，围绕这一切，服务业显着增长。
One Belt, One Road emanating from China — is it even a real thing?
中国提出的“一带一路”——这是真的吗？
Is it just public relations?
这只是公共关系吗？
What’s your prediction?
你的预测是什么？
What’s your take?
你怎么看？
It is a real thing.
这是真实的事情。
But like any country doing something so gigantic, I think they’re learning that there are lots of unintended consequences.
但就像任何一个国家在做如此巨大的事情一样，我认为他们正在认识到这会带来很多意想不到的后果。
Some of the debt traps that countries have gotten into as they’ve built out some of the infrastructures associated with the One Belt, One Road — I don’t think that was necessarily intentional on the part of the Chinese.
一些国家在建设与“一带一路”相关的基础设施时陷入了一些债务陷阱——我认为这不一定是中国人故意的。
But they do realize that it creates a tremendous amount of resentment.
但他们确实意识到这会引起巨大的怨恨。
You think people are happy because you’ve essentially financed this infrastructure for them?
你认为人们很高兴是因为你基本上为他们提供了基础设施的资金？
But nobody’s using it, and the people on the other side say, “Look, why did we build this?
但没有人使用它，另一边的人说：“看，我们为什么要建造这个？
This is a white elephant.”
这是一头白象。”
So I think there are aspects of One Belt, One Road which are going that way.
所以我认为“一带一路”的某些方面正在朝着这个方向发展。
There are also successes.
也有成功的例子。
Longer run, I think, as an important thrust, an important international responsibility of the Chinese, this is an important step forward.
从长远来看，我认为，作为中国的重要推力、重要的国际责任，这是向前迈出的重要一步。
The Chinese have grown internally and now are saying “What do we do for the world?” We should look at what they’re doing and see how it can be pushed in the right direction.
中国人已经在内部成长，现在正在问“我们为世界做什么？”我们应该看看他们在做什么，看看如何将其推向正确的方向。
Why does China have such a bad record at cultivating allies?
为什么中国在培养盟友方面的记录如此糟糕？
Maybe Cambodia, maybe North Korea, Pakistan perhaps.
也许是柬埔寨，也许是朝鲜，也许是巴基斯坦。
But China has remarkably few allies relative to its GDP.
但相对于其国内生产总值而言，中国的盟友却少得可怜。
Some of that may have to do with the nature of the government, that it is a one-party system.
其中一些可能与政府的性质有关，即它是一党制。
There isn’t an enormous scope for internal dialogue and debate.
内部对话和辩论的范围并不大。
I would suspect that one of the reasons people felt more comfortable with the United States’ postwar hegemony was the internal debate in the United States.
我怀疑人们对美国战后霸权感到更加放心的原因之一是美国的内部辩论。
Not so much that everybody trusted the US government, but they realized that there were checks and balances internally, and that every once in a while — especially in the ’70s and the ’80s and the ’90s — the public would start pointing at some of the actions of the US government and restrain some of the worst actions.
并不是说每个人都信任美国政府，而是他们意识到内部存在制衡，每隔一段时间——尤其是在70年代、80年代和90年代——公众就会开始指责美国政府的一些行为，并抑制一些最恶劣的行为。
So I think there was greater confidence, I would say right from Jimmy Carter.
所以我认为吉米·卡特更有信心。
Carter’s not a popular president in the United States, but the kind of introspection that he did in public, I think, was useful for the rest of the world to know that the United States was actually morally on the right path.
卡特在美国并不是一位受欢迎的总统，但我认为，他在公开场合所做的反省对于世界其他国家来说是有用的，让他们知道美国在道德上实际上走在正确的道路上。
If we look at Spain today, many Catalonians wish to leave.
如果我们看看今天的西班牙，许多加泰罗尼亚人希望离开。
To outsiders, the difference between a Spaniard and a Catalonian appears relatively small compared to, say, the differences in India.
在外人看来，西班牙人和加泰罗尼亚人之间的差异与印度等国家的差异相比似乎相对较小。
I see no serious signs of India breaking up whatsoever.
我没有看到印度有任何分裂的严重迹象。
What is it that accounts for this extreme stability of India that maybe is not so visible to outsiders?
到底是什么原因导致了印度如此极端的稳定，而外人却不太明显？
I would say that to some extent, the structure we created has stood us well.
我想说，在某种程度上，我们创建的结构对我们很有帮助。
And this is where I go back to the democracy.
这就是我回到民主的地方。
Yes, people question how illiterate people can have a sensible vote.
是的，人们质疑文盲如何能够进行明智的投票。
But again and again, you see that our voters make what seem like sensible decisions.
但你一次又一次地看到我们的选民做出了看似明智的决定。
But Spain has democracy, Belgium has democracy.
但西班牙有民主，比利时有民主。
They might be splitting apart.
他们可能会分手。
I think there is a reasonable .
我认为有一个合理的。
.
。
.
。
We found a balance.
我们找到了平衡。
Every country has to find that balance between regional power and central power.
每个国家都必须在地区权力和中央权力之间找到平衡。
And it goes back and forth.
它来回。
Increasingly what we find is, in India, the states are demanding more power, and more is being decentralized to them.
我们越来越多地发现，在印度，各邦要求更多的权力，并且更多的权力被下放给他们。
This is something that every country has to work out.
这是每个国家都必须解决的问题。
How much do you allow a state like Catalonia the freedom to express itself within the larger nation?
您在多大程度上允许像加泰罗尼亚这样的国家在更大的国家内表达自己的自由？
And sometimes repression has the wrong consequences.
有时镇压会带来错误的后果。
We in India know that.
我们印度人知道这一点。
We have had a number of states where there has been repression, and there has been pushback.
我们有许多州存在镇压，也存在阻力。
Jeff Sachs wrote a famous review of Acemoglu and Robinson, and he pointed out that if you go back in time and try to predict which countries will do well on the basis of their institutions, it’s very hard to predict, using institutions, which countries will be the high-growth winners.
杰夫·萨克斯（Jeff Sachs）对阿西莫格鲁和罗宾逊写了一篇著名的评论，他指出，如果你回到过去并试图根据其制度来预测哪些国家会表现良好，那么很难利用制度来预测哪些国家将成为高增长的赢家。
To most economists that sounds counterintuitive.
对于大多数经济学家来说，这听起来违反直觉。
We feel in our bones institutions have to matter.
我们从骨子里觉得机构必须很重要。
Are we mismeasuring institutions?
我们是否错误地衡量了机构？
Are we not looking at the right ones?
难道我们没有在寻找正确的人吗？
How do you account for this paradox?
您如何解释这个悖论？
I think what happens is, more than institutions is the political environment in which these institutions are created that matters.
我认为所发生的情况是，比制度更重要的是创建这些制度的政治环境。
The political dispensation.
政治分配。
That’s a lot of what the book is trying to say — that you need the right political structures to emerge.
这就是这本书想要表达的很多内容——你需要正确的政治结构的出现。
Take, for example, the US Constitution, which Liberia adopted.
以利比里亚通过的美国宪法为例。
But you would not say that the checks and balances we have in the US, the distribution of power in the US transferred to Liberia.
但你不会说我们在美国的制衡、美国的权力分配转移到了利比里亚。
So the institution, that is, the constitution being imposed in Liberia didn’t necessarily mean that they inherited the same sort of structure.
因此，利比里亚实行的制度，即宪法，并不一定意味着他们继承了同样的结构。
And I would say that’s true of country after country.
我想说，每个国家都是如此。
The same institution can function very differently if the distribution of power is different, which is why in this book, I emphasize it’s that distribution in which markets play a very important role that we need to think about to have stable, functioning democracies.
如果权力分配不同，同一机构的运作可能会大不相同，这就是为什么在本书中，我强调市场在分配中发挥着非常重要的作用，我们需要考虑拥有稳定、运转良好的民主国家。
What do you think will prove enduring from Indian fiction?
您认为印度小说中的哪些元素能够经久不衰？
From Indian fiction?
来自印度小说？
Well, Arundhati Roy wrote a stellar book, The God of Small Things.
阿伦达蒂·罗伊 (Arundhati Roy) 写了一本出色的书，《小事物之神》(The God of Small Things)。
She hasn’t followed it up, unfortunately, thus far.
不幸的是，到目前为止她还没有跟进。
But every once in a while, we have a great author who comes out like that.
但每隔一段时间，我们就会有一位伟大的作家以这样的方式出现。
Is there anything that I particularly like nowadays?
现在有什么是我特别喜欢的吗？
Amitav Ghosh has written a nice trilogy on immigration, which I think is very sensible and very interesting.
阿米塔夫·戈什（Amitav Ghosh）写了一部很好的移民三部曲，我认为非常明智，也非常有趣。
One of the problems — this goes to your earlier question — is we don’t see much of the vernacular literature coming out in English.
问题之一——这就是你之前的问题——我们没有看到太多的白话文学以英语出版。
And there are depths there which are very, very interesting, and they deserve more airing.
其中有一些深度非常非常有趣，值得更多的传播。
Jhumpa Lahiri has argued that when you read her books about a kind of Indian American experience, does that relate to your personal life?
琼帕·拉希里 (Jhumpa Lahiri) 认为，当你读她关于印度裔美国人经历的书时，这与你的个人生活有关吗？
Do you feel at home in those books?
读这些书你有宾至如归的感觉吗？
Or do you feel your experience is so different from hers?
或者你觉得你的经历和她的有很大不同吗？
No, I think we all have some commonalities in that experience.
不，我认为我们在这段经历中都有一些共同点。
For example, she writes in her books about parents coming from India and wondering why this is an entirely different world — the temptation to hang your washing outside and the knowledge that that’s a no-no in some communities here.
例如，她在书中写道，来自印度的父母想知道为什么这是一个完全不同的世界——将洗好的衣服挂在外面的诱惑，以及知道这在某些社区是禁忌。
Some of those experiences translate very well to what each one of us experiences.
其中一些经历可以很好地转化为我们每个人的经历。
What’s something, say, from Indian culture — music or Bollywood — that maybe our listeners, who are mostly Western I think, wouldn’t know about, that they should appreciate better than they do?
比如说，印度文化中的什么东西——音乐或宝莱坞——也许我们的听众（我想他们大多是西方人）不知道，他们应该比他们更好地欣赏？
Hmm, that’s a tough one.
嗯，这很难。
What’s your favorite Bollywood movie?
你最喜欢的宝莱坞电影是什么？
If you want the standard Bollywood movie, Sholay is the all-time favorite, right?
如果您想要标准的宝莱坞电影，《Sholay》是您一直以来的最爱，对吧？
Mm-hmm.
嗯嗯。
It’s a story about dacoits and revenge, love, et cetera, et cetera.
这是一个关于强盗、复仇、爱情等等的故事。
It has the whole song and dance sequence, and it goes on forever.
它有完整的歌曲和舞蹈序列，并且永远持续下去。
It’s the Bollywood movie we all grew up with.
这是伴随我们长大的宝莱坞电影。
Let’s say I’m an educated person, I’ve been to maybe 20 countries, but I’ve never been to India, and I’m going for two weeks, and you’re designing a trip for me.
假设我是一个受过教育的人，我去过大约 20 个国家，但我从未去过印度，我要去印度两周，而你正在为我设计一次旅行。
Where should I go?
我应该去哪里？
I certainly think you should see some of the traditional sites that every tourist goes and sees: the palaces in Rajasthan, the Taj Mahal, et cetera.
我当然认为你应该看看每个游客都会去的一些传统景点：拉贾斯坦邦的宫殿、泰姬陵等等。
But there are lots of interesting parts of India which tourists don’t go to.
但印度有很多有趣的地方游客不会去。
The wildlife parks, the bird sanctuaries, a tremendous variety of animals and birds.
野生动物公园、鸟类保护区、种类繁多的动物和鸟类。
And there are really very interesting places in India that nobody really knows of or goes to.
印度确实有一些非常有趣的地方，但没有人真正知道或去过。
Certainly the temples in South India are very worth visiting.
当然，南印度的寺庙非常值得参观。
Some of the towns in Kerala are very quaint, very interesting.
喀拉拉邦的一些城镇非常古雅、非常有趣。
India is many countries in one.
印度是多个国家合而为一。
If you go to the south in one trip, you go to the north in another trip, you’re in a different country.
如果你在一次旅行中去了南方，在另一次旅行中去了北方，那么你就在不同的国家了。
Why does India have the best food in the world?
为什么印度有世界上最好的食物？
It’s not obvious that it should.
不明显应该这样做。
Far be it for me to say it has the best food, but I like Indian food.
我不能说它有最好的食物，但我喜欢印度菜。
But it’s much better in India than in the United States.
但印度的情况比美国好得多。
Is it the lower wage rate?
是不是工资率比较低？
Vegetables are so fresh, but so much food rots on the way to market.
蔬菜很新鲜，但很多食物在运往市场的途中腐烂了。
That to me seems counterintuitive, that the country with the freshest vegetables would have one of the highest rates of rotting on the highway.
对我来说，这似乎违反直觉，蔬菜最新鲜的国家将是高速公路上腐烂率最高的国家之一。
Well, there’s less use of fertilizer, and the highest rate of rotting is because we don’t have that infrastructure we talked about earlier.
好吧，化肥的使用较少，腐烂率最高是因为我们没有我们之前谈到的基础设施。
We need to build that infrastructure to take those vegetables to market because cities want those vegetables.
我们需要建设基础设施将这些蔬菜运往市场，因为城市需要这些蔬菜。
They’d fetch a much higher price — that’s development for you.
他们会卖出更高的价格 ——这就是你的发展。
Based on services.
以服务为基础。
And make the food worse.
并使食物变得更糟。
It would make the food better because it would get faster to the city where it’s not rotting on the way.
它会让食物变得更好，因为它会更快地到达城市，而不会在途中腐烂。
But you’d rely more on refrigeration, right?
但你会更依赖冷藏，对吗？
So it’s a double-edged sword.
所以这是一把双刃剑。
Some on refrigeration, absolutely.
绝对有一些是关于冷藏的。
So you wouldn’t grow your own food, but I’m sure, over time, you’d have these urban farmers setting up little farms outside the city to produce exactly what they produce here.
所以你不会自己种植食物，但我相信，随着时间的推移，你会让这些城市农民在城外建立小农场，生产他们在这里生产的东西。
I have a few questions on monetary economics, and again, feel free to pass on these.
我有一些关于货币经济学的问题，再次欢迎您提出来。
How is it even that money matters at all?
钱怎么那么重要呢？
And is that different in the United States versus India?
美国和印度的情况有什么不同吗？
Well, we have learned it does matter in India.
嗯，我们知道这在印度确实很重要。
Yes.
是的。
Because we just had a massive experiment where 87 and a half percent of the currency was taken out.
因为我们刚刚做了一个大规模的实验，87%半的货币被拿出来了。
And it turns out that actually, people use the money for transactions, and not everybody had a credit card.
事实证明，实际上，人们用这些钱进行交易，并不是每个人都有信用卡。
Not everybody could use a check.
不是每个人都可以使用支票。
So overnight you found activity in these areas dropping significantly, even though much of that activity, we don’t measure because it’s informal activity.
因此，一夜之间，您发现这些领域的活动显着下降，尽管其中大部分活动我们没有进行测量，因为它是非正式活动。
So people have used fancy ways of getting at that activity by looking at, for example, the intensity of lights in that area at night to see if activity went down, and they conclude that yes, money matters in India.
因此，人们使用奇特的方法来了解该活动，例如，观察该地区夜间的灯光强度，看看活动是否减少，他们得出的结论是，钱在印度很重要。
But will that show up in per capita income levels 10 years from now?
但这会体现在十年后的人均收入水平上吗？
So there’s a one-time shock.
所以有一次震惊。
It’s like an investment — you move to a higher technology, you adjust.
这就像一项投资——你转向更高的技术，然后进行调整。
There’s catch-up growth, and maybe 13 years from now, you’re glad you have the new technology.
追赶性增长可能会出现，也许 13 年后，您会很高兴拥有新技术。
Maybe.
或许。
I think there are less harsh ways of creating that new technology.
我认为创造这项新技术的方法并不那么严酷。
A number of people died standing in lines.
许多人在排队时死亡。
A number of people — their firms closed down, their livelihoods went away.
许多人——他们的公司倒闭了，他们的生计消失了。
I think we can find smoother ways of actually getting people to use new payment systems than just eliminating the money overnight.
我认为我们可以找到更顺畅的方法来真正让人们使用新的支付系统，而不是一夜之间消除资金。
But take, say, the US — money mattering.
但以美国为例——金钱很重要。
How much do you think is sticky nominal prices?
您认为名义价格的粘性是多少？
And how much is credit channel, or how much is something else?
信用渠道有多少，或者其他渠道有多少？
We’re going to be debating this thing for years to come, right?
我们将在未来几年内就此事进行辩论，对吗？
How much is each one of these?
这些每一件多少钱？
And of course, we have now new theories which say nothing matters.
当然，我们现在有了新的理论，认为一切都不重要。
You can print all the money you want.
你可以打印所有你想要的钱。
But we know those are wrong, right?
但我们知道这些都是错误的，对吧？
I hope they’re wrong!
我希望他们错了！
Because otherwise we have to throw all our knowledge out of the window.
因为否则我们就必须把所有的知识都扔到窗外。
Well, it would make life easier if they were right.
好吧，如果他们是对的，生活就会变得更轻松。
It would make life very easy, yes.
是的，这会让生活变得非常轻松。
Money is debt.
钱就是债。
Let’s print as much as we want, and nothing actually happens.
让我们想打印多少就打印多少，实际上什么也没有发生。
What’s the most underrated idea in monetary theory?
货币理论中最被低估的想法是什么？
Let me tell you what is the most difficult concept.
让我告诉你最难的概念是什么。
So, I’ll answer a different question.
所以，我会回答一个不同的问题。
It is how people’s expectations form.
人们的期望就是这样形成的。
See, modern textbooks are full of “you said this” and “people will think that” and “therefore we will have an effect.” But how many people actually think about inflation?
看，现代教科书充满了“你这么说”和“人们会这么认为”和“因此我们会产生效果”。但有多少人真正考虑过通货膨胀呢？
How many people actually know what inflation is out there?
有多少人真正知道通货膨胀是什么？
In India, we found that in our surveys, the median inflation rate that people said was going on was about 10 percentage points higher than the highest rate had been for the last 10 years.
在印度，我们的调查发现，人们所说的通货膨胀率中值比过去 10 年的最高通胀率高出约 10 个百分点。
So people don’t really have a good sense of what those numbers are.
所以人们并不太清楚这些数字到底是什么。
Yet we focus on them because, ultimately, we think changing those expectations matters.
然而我们关注它们是因为最终我们认为改变这些期望很重要。
And by the way, this is true even of industrial countries.
顺便说一句，即使对于工业化国家也是如此。
The expectation of inflation is typically higher than what it actually is measured to be.
通货膨胀预期通常高于实际测量的值。
So why is there this very strong link to expectations that we have in our theories, but in practice how they formed is really a mystery?
那么，为什么我们在理论中的期望与我们的期望有着如此密切的联系，但在实践中它们是如何形成的却是一个谜呢？
How do people on the street actually gauge inflation?
街上的人们实际上如何衡量通货膨胀？
Because they don’t read the financial papers.
因为他们不读财经报纸。
They don’t pay attention to the inflation numbers that appear on Bloomberg or whatever.
他们不关注彭博社或其他网站上出现的通胀数据。
How do they actually react?
他们实际上有何反应？
If people don’t know what inflation means, should we then move to NGDP targeting?
如果人们不知道通货膨胀意味着什么，那么我们是否应该转向 NGDP 目标？
Well, that’s precisely the point.
嗯，这正是重点。
We’re getting more and more esoteric in how we implement inflation targeting, now price-level targeting, nominal GDP targeting.
我们对于如何实施通胀目标制、现在的价格水平目标制、名义GDP目标制变得越来越深奥。
The poor guy on the street doesn’t even understand what inflation is.
街上的穷人甚至不明白什么是通货膨胀。
So why are we getting more and more esoteric here?
那么为什么我们在这里变得越来越深奥呢？
Let’s first figure out how we communicate what inflation is.
让我们首先弄清楚如何传达通货膨胀是什么。
We’re getting more and more esoteric in how we implement inflation targeting, now price-level targeting, nominal GDP targeting.
我们对于如何实施通胀目标制、现在的价格水平目标制、名义GDP目标制变得越来越深奥。
The poor guy on the street doesn’t even understand what inflation is.
街上的穷人甚至不明白什么是通货膨胀。
So why are we getting more and more esoteric here?
那么为什么我们在这里变得越来越深奥呢？
Let’s first figure out how we communicate what inflation is.
让我们首先弄清楚如何传达通货膨胀是什么。
But if we think sticky nominal wages are a problem, and we then want the flow of nominal payments to grow at some preordained rate each year so that stickiness doesn’t cause output losses, why isn’t nominal GDP targeting necessarily better than, say, inflation targeting?
但如果我们认为粘性名义工资是一个问题，然后我们希望名义支付流量每年以预定的速度增长，这样粘性就不会导致产出损失，那么为什么名义GDP目标不一定比通货膨胀目标更好呢？
No, I’m not saying that it’s better or worse.
不，我并不是说它更好或更糟。
I’m just saying that, for me, it’s a mystery how these concepts translate to the common person, whose expectations we care about, unless you think they don’t matter, and who we are communicating to are largely the union bosses, are largely the analysts on the street.
我只是说，对我来说，这些概念如何转化为普通人是一个谜，我们关心他们的期望，除非你认为它们不重要，而我们沟通的对象主要是工会老板，主要是街上的分析师。
These are the people who determine how the economy moves and shakes, not the ordinary person who’s making consumption decisions.
这些人决定经济如何运行和震动，而不是做出消费决策的普通人。
But some of our theories require that person to also internalize our model of whether it’s inflation targeting or nominal GDP targeting.
但我们的一些理论要求这个人也内化我们的模型，无论是通货膨胀目标还是名义 GDP 目标。
And my sense is, it would be very useful for us to know how that transmission takes place.
我的感觉是，了解这种传播是如何发生的对我们来说非常有用。
If citizens don’t understand what the rate of price inflation is, am I wrong to think that the American public has become much more inflation averse compared to, say, the 1980s?
如果公民不了解物价通胀率是多少，那么我认为美国公众与 20 世纪 80 年代相比变得更加厌恶通胀的想法是否错误？
In the Reagan recovery, you have rates of price inflation, 5 percent.
在里根复苏时期，物价通胀率为 5%。
I’m not sure people like it, but it’s not a big issue.
我不确定人们是否喜欢它，但这不是一个大问题。
Whereas today, you creep a bit over 2 percent, people flip out and go crazy.
而今天，你的涨幅略高于 2%，人们却变得疯狂起来。
Why has that change happened?
为什么会发生这种变化？
Let me throw that back to you.
让我把它还给你。
Who’s flipping out on 2 percent?
谁对 2% 感到愤怒？
I think this smaller crowd is flipping out, so people get very angry when the Fed says, “We’re going to run a little hot.” But I’m not sure it’s the common man who’s saying, “I hate 2.25 percent.” I don’t think they’re the guys who’re flipping out.
我认为这一小群人正在变得愤怒，所以当美联储说“我们会变得有点热”时，人们会非常生气。但我不确定是普通人在说“我讨厌 2.25%”。我不认为他们是那些发脾气的人。
And that also leads to the question of whether we’re getting a disconnect within the broader population and some of the ways policies are set.
这也引发了一个问题：我们是否在更广泛的人群中与某些政策制定方式脱节。
One of the bastions of elite policy making in any economy is a central bank.
在任何经济体中，精英决策的堡垒之一都是中央银行。
Increasingly, I think, the public is basically asking, “What on earth are you doing?
我认为，公众越来越多地问：“你到底在做什么？
And is what you’re doing in my benefit?”
而且你所做的事是为了我的利益吗？”
But say you have a lot of bureaucratically set wages, which is the case in most countries.
但是假设你有很多官僚设定的工资，大多数国家都是这种情况。
So there’s real stickiness in wages.
所以工资确实存在粘性。
When the rate of price inflation is higher, a lot of people are taking real wage cuts, and at least some of them notice.
当物价通胀率较高时，很多人都在采取实际工资削减措施，至少其中一些人注意到了这一点。
So my theory is Congress flips out — not that they think people understand what’s happening, but people will understand they have less to spend in some way, and they’ll take it out on Congress.
所以我的理论是国会发怒了——并不是说他们认为人们了解正在发生的事情，而是人们会明白他们在某些方面的支出减少了，他们会把它发泄在国会身上。
So Congress pressures the central bank, and we’re maybe today way too inflation averse, and we’d be better off if we could tolerate 4.63 inflation rates during a recovery.
因此国会向央行施压，而我们今天可能过于厌恶通胀，如果我们能够在复苏期间容忍 4.63 的通胀率，我们的境况会更好。
It may well be.
很可能是这样。
The difficulty, Tyler, as you know, is moving away from whatever the central bank has been saying — 2 percent is our target.
泰勒，正如你所知，困难在于偏离央行一直所说的——2% 是我们的目标。
Sure.
当然。
And if you hit 4 and a half percent, people start worrying that if you’re tolerating 4 and a half, well, why not 6 and a half?
如果你达到了 4% 半，人们就会开始担心，如果你能容忍 4% 半，那么为什么不能容忍 6% 半呢？
You become a prisoner of the target that you’ve set.
你成为你设定的目标的俘虏。
And so the flexibility that you have been moving away, or even moving the target, which Oliver Blanchard, as you know, has suggested, becomes much more difficult.
因此，正如你所知，奥利弗·布兰查德（Oliver Blanchard）所建议的那样，你已经离开的灵活性，甚至移动目标，变得更加困难。
On corporate America
论美国企业界
A lot of your early research is on business firms, corporations.
您的许多早期研究都是针对商业公司、企业的。
A few questions there.
有几个问题。
What’s the biggest crisis today in American corporate governance?
当今美国公司治理最大的危机是什么？
I would say that there are two big issues.
我想说有两个大问题。
One, of course, is the domination of industry after industry by a few firms.
当然，其中之一是少数企业对一个又一个行业的统治。
Many of these firms are well managed.
其中许多公司管理良好。
Many of these firms provide efficient services, provide a service that people want.
其中许多公司提供高效的服务，提供人们想要的服务。
But it does raise the question going forward, how are they maintaining their dominance?
但这确实提出了一个问题：他们如何保持主导地位？
And is it possible that they might chill innovation and competition going forward?
它们是否有可能抑制未来的创新和竞争？
That certainly is a concern.
这当然是一个问题。
I don’t think we know the answer, but it is a concern which America’s addressed time and again in the past.
我认为我们不知道答案，但这是美国过去一次又一次解决的一个问题。
What’s a sector where you have that worry?
您对哪个行业有这样的担忧？
Certainly right now, the focus is on big tech, so Facebook, Google, et cetera.
当然，现在的焦点是大型科技公司，例如 Facebook、谷歌等。
What do they know?
他们知道什么？
How do they know it?
他们怎么知道的？
And are they able to maintain a hold over their clientele because of that?
他们是否能够因此保持对客户的控制？
How do you make the area more competitive?
如何让该地区更具竞争力？
One of the worries is, we don’t fully understand the extent to which the possession of a network can keep out the competition and how long it can do that.
令人担忧的问题之一是，我们并不完全了解拥有网络可以在多大程度上排除竞争以及可以持续多久。
Our theories are, well, you will find this wonderful innovative company.
我们的理论是，你会发现这家出色的创新公司。
We should demolish the opposition by producing such a baited mouse trap that everybody will migrate to that.
我们应该通过制造一个这样的诱饵捕鼠器来摧毁反对派，让每个人都会迁移到那里。
But with the kinds of structures we have today, it’s theory still.
但就我们今天所拥有的各种结构而言，它仍然是理论。
We don’t know if that will work.
我们不知道这是否有效。
Yes, people say before Facebook, there was .
是的，人们说在 Facebook 之前就已经存在了。
.
。
.
。
What was that?
那是什么？
Make My Space?
腾出我的空间？
Myspace.
我的空间。
Myspace, and so on.
我的空间等等。
And Facebook came in.
Facebook 也进来了。
But yeah, Facebook came in, and it’s gobbled up everybody else who was anywhere near a threat.
但是，是的，Facebook 进来了，它吞噬了所有其他接近威胁的人。
So, will Facebook face the appropriate amount of competition?
那么，Facebook会面临适当程度的竞争吗？
Remains to be seen.
还有待观察。
But if there’s a lot of innovation, and there’s zero price, and obviously no coercion, I can network with people by texting.
但如果有很多创新，而且价格为零，而且显然没有强迫，我就可以通过短信与人们建立联系。
I can use email, I can use Twitter, I can use my blog.
我可以使用电子邮件，我可以使用 Twitter，我可以使用我的博客。
I can still use the telephone, believe it or not, though I don’t.
不管你信不信，我仍然可以使用电话，尽管我不这样做。
Why isn’t that actually a pretty contestable market?
为什么这实际上不是一个竞争激烈的市场？
It’s unclear.
目前还不清楚。
The question is whether the network itself — let’s take Facebook for the sake of discussion — whether that network itself is strong enough, and their ability to acquire anybody who poses anything of a threat is strong enough, to keep out competition.
问题在于网络本身是否 ——“为了讨论，我们以 Facebook 为例”—— 该网络本身是否足够强大，以及他们收购任何构成威胁的人的能力是否足够强大，以阻止竞争。
As you know, many venture capitalists now talk about a kill zone.
如您所知，许多风险投资家现在都在谈论“杀戮区”。
If we finance somebody within this zone, they will not grow to be full adults.
如果我们资助这个区域内的某人，他们将不会成长为完整的成年人。
They will be bought out early or forced out of business.
他们将被提前收购或被迫停业。
And that’s not going to make enough returns for us.
这不会为我们带来足够的回报。
Now, there’s stuff here which needs to be unpacked.
现在，这里有些东西需要拆包。
What I’m saying is, we need to watch this in a careful way because this is the future, and we have to be careful that it doesn’t become an uncompetitive future.
我想说的是，我们需要仔细观察这一点，因为这是未来，我们必须小心，不要让它成为一个没有竞争力的未来。
Are you worried that there are so few public corporations in America these days compared to the past?
您是否担心现在美国的上市公司比过去少了？
Well, so long as the private corporations are reasonably well governed and that there is .
好吧，只要私营公司受到相当良好的治理并且确实存在。
.
。
.
。
you know, many of these private corporations have public funds as investors, so that the returns for investment are also broadly distributed.
要知道，这些私营企业很多都有公共资金作为投资者，因此投资回报也分布广泛。
I don’t think whether it’s public or private is a big issue.
我认为无论是公共还是私人都不是一个大问题。
I’m more worried about excessive corporate market power.
我更担心企业市场力量过大。
Are CEOs paid too much?
CEO们的薪酬是否过高？
That’s the question of the ages, right?
这是千古难题，对吧？
I’d say there are examples of CEOs that are paid too much.
我想说的是，有一些首席执行官薪酬过高的例子。
Oh, of course, but on average?
哦，当然，但是平均而言呢？
Is it just that they’re managing larger firms with global reach, and the job is harder to do, and in essence, they deserve the money?
难道只是因为他们管理着具有全球影响力的大公司，而且这项工作更难做，而从本质上来说，他们应该得到这笔钱吗？
My colleague, Steve Kaplan, would say that.
我的同事史蒂夫·卡普兰会这么说。
I think he has some arguments in his favor.
我认为他有一些对他有利的论据。
At the same time, you can point to corporations in other countries where the disparity in income — the guy at the bottom and the guy at the top — is not so great.
与此同时，你可以指出其他国家的公司，收入差距 ——“底层的人和顶层的人”——并没有那么大。
Are they doing as well?
他们也这么做吗？
I think that’s what we have a big debate about — whether US corporations are, in fact, managed better than corporations in other countries.
我认为这就是我们争论的焦点——美国公司实际上是否比其他国家的公司管理得更好。
Many years ago, you wrote an article with your colleague, Luigi Zingales, on the concept of power in industrial organization.
许多年前，您与同事 Luigi Zingales 写了一篇关于产业组织中权力概念的文章。
Do you feel that piece explains anything worth seeing in the world today?
你觉得这篇文章解释了当今世界上有什么值得一看的事情吗？
Or what has come of that in your mind?
或者你心里想到了什么？
I do think that increasing the notion of corporations as being a variety of fixed-claim holders and the shareholders of the residual claimants, which is what led Friedman to propose shareholder value maximization as a principle — I think that’s being challenged.
我确实认为，增加公司作为各种固定索取权持有人和剩余索取权股东的概念，这导致弗里德曼提出股东价值最大化作为原则 - 我认为这正在受到挑战。
Increasingly, corporations, agglomerations of a variety of entities that essentially benefit from the corporation and share in the corporation’s rent, so to speak.
可以说，越来越多的公司、各种实体的聚集体本质上从公司中受益并分享公司的租金。
So essentially, the nature of the corporation is moving more towards partnerships rather than manager-worker.
因此，从本质上讲，公司的性质更多地转向合伙人关系，而不是经理-工人关系。
The nature of the corporation has to actually reflect that, and more and more corporations are doing that.
公司的性质必须实际反映这一点，越来越多的公司正在这样做。
What that means is that, increasingly, long-term workers are part of the stakeholders of the corporation.
这意味着，长期工人越来越多地成为公司利益相关者的一部分。
And seeing them as part of the value-maximization process, I think, is both politically reasonable, but also economically the right thing to do.
我认为，将它们视为价值最大化过程的一部分，在政治上是合理的，在经济上也是正确的做法。
The nature of the corporation is moving more towards partnerships rather than manager-worker.
公司的性质更多地转向伙伴关系而不是经理-工人关系。
The nature of the corporation has to actually reflect that, and more and more corporations are doing that.
公司的性质必须实际反映这一点，越来越多的公司正在这样做。
What that means is that, increasingly, long-term workers are part of the stakeholders of the corporation.
这意味着，长期工人越来越多地成为公司利益相关者的一部分。
And seeing them as part of the value-maximization process, I think, is both politically reasonable, but also economically the right thing to do.
我认为，将它们视为价值最大化过程的一部分，在政治上是合理的，在经济上也是正确的做法。
How fragile is a free society with respect to the behavior of its own corporations?
一个自由社会对其自身企业的行为有多脆弱？
Can crony capitalism bring the system down?
裙带资本主义能够摧毁这个体系吗？
Or is it just a deadweight loss we’d like to minimize, and as long as we have some economic growth, we can pay off the interest groups and get on with our business and live to fight another day?
或者这只是我们想尽量减少的无谓损失，只要我们有一定的经济增长，我们就可以还清利益集团，继续我们的生意，为日后的战斗而奋斗？
No, I believe very much that crony capitalism is really the danger for any economy because it not only constrains economic growth, but I also think it limits political freedom.
不，我非常相信裙带资本主义对任何经济体来说都是真正的危险，因为它不仅限制了经济增长，而且我认为它还限制了政治自由。
That, to some extent, a comparative independent private sector is extremely important to keep government in check.
在某种程度上，相对独立的私营部门对于控制政府极其重要。
That when the private sector gets compromised and depends on tariffs to protect itself or depends on cartels — government-sanctioned cartels as we had post-depression — I think that’s when we find that the private sector’s no longer independent.
当私营部门受到损害并依靠关税来保护自己或依赖卡特尔时——“像大萧条后那样的政府批准的卡特尔”——我认为那时我们就会发现私营部门不再独立。
When it is no longer independent, it becomes a pawn of the government, and that’s when we get authoritarianism.
当它不再独立时，它就成为政府的棋子，那就是威权主义。
So to some extent, Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom — I think essentially one way of looking at that in the current context is, it’s when the private sector is co-opted by the government that we get both political unfreedom as well as a noncompetitive economy.
因此，在某种程度上，哈耶克的《通往奴役之路》——我认为在当前背景下看待这一问题的一种基本方式是，当私营部门被政府收编时，我们就会同时获得政治上的不自由和非竞争性的经济。
On finances and budgets
关于财务和预算
If I look at the federal budget, don’t I see a problem being that too much of it is controlled by voters, not that too much is controlled by corporations?
如果我看看联邦预算，我难道没有看到一个问题是太多的预算是由选民控制的，而不是太多的预算是由公司控制的吗？
And tariffs — even under Trump, they’re still quite low.
而关税 ——即使在特朗普的领导下，关税仍然相当低。
When you say they’re controlled by voters, certainly the representatives of the people have an ability to opine on it.
当你说他们是由选民控制的时候，人民代表当然有能力发表意见。
And certainly, over time, certain kinds of spending have picked up.
当然，随着时间的推移，某些类型的支出有所增加。
Now, I’m not saying that, necessarily, what we need is more redistribution of spending.
现在，我并不是说我们必然需要更多的支出重新分配。
I think we have a constant interplay between the two.
我认为我们两者之间一直存在着相互作用。
But I would argue that it’s not so much how the budget is controlled, but how profits are allocated in the economy.
但我认为，问题不在于如何控制预算，而在于如何在经济中分配利润。
What kinds of special dispensations do you have?
你们有哪些特殊豁免？
What kinds of tariff protections do you have?
你们有哪些类型的关税保护？
Those are the kinds of things that limit the competitiveness of the economy.
这些都是限制经济竞争力的因素。
As you know, you’re quite well known for, among other things, having predicted the financial crisis that started in 2008.
如您所知，您因预测 2008 年爆发的金融危机而闻名。
We’ve all been updating our views ever since then, but if you were to say, just in the last three or four years, how have you even further revised your view of what happened during the financial crisis?
从那时起我们都在更新我们的看法，但是如果你说，就在过去的三四年里，你对金融危机期间发生的事情的看法是如何进一步修正的？
I would say that this 30-year process of technological change that we’ve been talking about — increasing automation, the disappearance of the middle-income jobs that you’ve talked about in your books — that stagnation, for at least certain groups inside these certain communities, we tried to remedy through making credit easy.
我想说的是，我们一直在谈论的这个 30 年的技术变革过程——自动化程度的提高，你在书中谈到的中等收入工作的消失——这种停滞，至少对于这些特定社区内的某些群体来说，我们试图通过让信贷变得容易来补救。
Didn’t work.
没用。
We ended up with a whole lot of people with underwater houses and even angrier because for a while they enjoyed home equity loans which allowed them to consume, but now they were deeply under water.
我们最终得到了很多人拥有水下房屋的结果，甚至更愤怒，因为他们有一段时间享受房屋净值贷款，这使他们能够消费，但现在他们已深深地淹没在水下。
I think that we’re getting into that trap once again, where easy money is the answer when, in fact, we need structural change in the economy.
我认为我们再次陷入了这个陷阱，即宽松的货币政策就是答案，而事实上我们需要经济的结构性变革。
We need to find ways for people to get the skills that they need for sustainable employment.
我们需要找到方法让人们获得可持续就业所需的技能。
If you look around, one of the problems during the run-up to the Great Recession was the enormous increase in construction jobs, which pulled people out of high school into a well-paying construction job, only for that job to disappear and to leave this person with a family and a kid but no real skills.
如果你环顾四周，就会发现大衰退前夕的问题之一是建筑工作的大量增加，这使得人们从高中毕业后从事高薪建筑工作，但这种工作却消失了，留下了一个有家庭和孩子的人，但没有真正的技能。
We are seeing some of that again in, for example, the enormous increase in Uber drivers — the great way to make a little bit of money, but in terms of sustainability, you have to ask yourself, how long is this going to be sustainable?
我们再次看到了其中的一些情况，例如，优步司机的大幅增加——这是赚一点钱的好方法，但就可持续性而言，你必须问自己，这种情况能持续多久？
And this all relates to your new book on community.
这一切都与您关于社区的新书有关。
Going back to some of your earliest research, what’s your opinion now?
回到您最早的一些研究，您现在有何看法？
How well does financial development predict economic growth rates?
金融发展对经济增长率的预测效果如何？
I think it’s sort of associated with it.
我认为这与它有关。
It’s one of those institutions you talked about.
这是你谈到的那些机构之一。
When everything is going well, a good financial market also helps.
当一切顺利时，良好的金融市场也会有所帮助。
It’s a lubricant to growth.
它是成长的润滑剂。
Is it the underpinning of growth?
这是增长的基础吗？
I don’t think so.
我不这么认为。
But some people argue that, past a certain level of per capita income, there’s no relationship between financial deepening and economic growth rates.
但一些人认为，人均收入超过一定水平后，金融深化与经济增长率之间就不存在关系了。
Do you agree?
你同意？
No, I think that beyond a certain level, once you have adequate access to finance and the ability to channel it into savings, the real problem is to prevent the other side, the adverse side of the financial sector, of it going haywire and taking your GDP down by 10, 20 percent, which really sets you back for a decade or two.
不，我认为超过一定水平后，一旦你有足够的融资渠道并有能力将其转化为储蓄，真正的问题是防止另一面，即金融部门的不利一面，陷入混乱，导致你的GDP下降10%、20%，这确实会让你倒退一两年。
So to my mind, beyond a certain level, it’s managing certain risks while ensuring that the financial sector allocates resources appropriately.
因此，在我看来，超出一定水平，它是在管理某些风险的同时确保金融部门适当地分配资源。
In a world with so much information technology, do you think there’s still a synergy between loan making and deposits?
在信息技术如此发达的世界里，您认为贷款和存款之间仍然存在协同作用吗？
Can you borrow from a bank more cheaply if you have an account there?
如果您在银行有账户，可以更便宜地从银行借款吗？
Well, banks have been resilient for the last, what, 3,000 years?
那么，银行在过去 3,000 年里一直保持着弹性？
But why?
但为什么？
What’s the nature of their informational advantage?
他们的信息优势的本质是什么？
How do we model it?
我们如何对其进行建模？
How do we think about it?
我们如何看待这个问题？
I think it’s not so much on the lending side.
我认为贷款方面的影响并不大。
They have some ability there.
他们在那里有一些能力。
But it’s just the fact on the depositors’ side that it doesn’t require a genius to keep testing the bank.
但这只是储户一方的事实，不需要天才来不断测试银行。
If you want your money, you go in and say, “I want it back today.” That is a disciplinary mechanism on the bank which has stood the test of time.
如果你想要钱，你就进去说：“我今天想要回来。”这是银行的纪律机制，经受住了时间的考验。
Is it still necessary today?
今天还有必要吗？
Even today, when you see what forces the bank into distress, it’s the run on the banks by the large depositors.
即使在今天，当你看到是什么迫使银行陷入困境时，你仍然会发现大储户对银行的挤兑。
That’s an enormous disciplinary device on the banks, keeps them from going off the straight and narrow.
这是银行的一个巨大的纪律机制，防止它们偏离正路。
We prevented the small depositors from earning through deposit insurance.
我们阻止小储户通过存款保险获得收益。
But even today, what closes a bank down is when the large guys say, “These guys are not good for our money.
但即使在今天，银行倒闭的原因还是大公司说：“这些人不利于我们的钱。
We’re going to take it out.” And that’s when it closes.
我们要把它拿出来。”那就是它关闭的时候。
I think that basically forces a bank to stay on the straight and narrow to the extent possible.
我认为这基本上迫使银行尽可能保持正直和狭窄。
Of course it creates the downside of financial-sector risk, but it is a fairly strong governance mechanism, much better than the equity holders in the bank who have no clue as to what it’s doing.
当然，它会带来金融部门风险的负面影响，但它是一个相当强大的治理机制，比不知道银行在做什么的银行股东要好得多。
But say if there’s deposit insurance, especially in the US, where resolution occurs quite quickly, why should that discipline be much of a force?
但如果有存款保险，尤其是在美国，解决问题的速度相当快，为什么这种纪律会产生很大的力量呢？
If I have a hundred thousand dollars in a bank and they screw up, I still have my money.
如果我在银行有十万美元，而他们搞砸了，我仍然有我的钱。
I don’t really have to wait.
我真的不需要等待。
Why should the bank have some kind of comparative advantage?
为什么银行应该拥有某种比较优势？
Well, you will not do anything because you’re insured, and deposit insurance has been very successful in putting the small depositor to rest, their anxieties to rest.
好吧，你不会做任何事情，因为你有保险，存款保险非常成功地让小储户安息，安息他们的焦虑。
What closes the bank is when the large guys — the guys who have 5, 10 million in the bank, who are monitoring the bank on a daily basis because they operate in the commercial paper markets, the hedge funds, the big mutual funds — they’re the guys who start taking the money out quickly, as soon as there is a whiff of trouble about the bank.
银行倒闭的原因是那些大人物——在银行里有五千万、一千万的人，他们每天都在监控银行，因为他们在商业票据市场、对冲基金、大型共同基金中运作——一旦银行出现一丝麻烦，他们就会迅速开始把钱取出来。
I think they perform an enormously important role, which is why, as you said, the bank gets shut down in a day or two, but that preserves the money.
我认为他们扮演着非常重要的角色，这就是为什么，正如你所说，银行在一两天内被关闭，但这保留了钱。
Lehman, when it shut down, was essentially — when you looked at the overall value — it was pretty close to the value owed to the depositors.
雷曼兄弟倒闭时，本质上是 —— 当你看总价值时 —— 它非常接近欠储户的价值。
It was shut down before it lost even that money.
它甚至在损失这笔钱之前就被关闭了。
On banking
关于银行业务
In the United States, are current financial and lending connections too relationship based?
在美国，当前的金融和借贷联系是否过于基于关系？
Again, going back to your earlier work.
再次回到你之前的工作。
My coauthor, Luigi Zingales, would say there’s a lot more connections that work today than is healthy.
我的合著者路易吉·津加莱斯 (Luigi Zingales) 会说，如今有效的联系比健康的联系要多得多。
I would say that modern business operates in a mix of both arm’s-length contracts, as well as relationships that fill the gaps in these contracts.
我想说，现代企业的运作既包括公平合同，也包括填补这些合同空白的关系。
I don’t think relationships are necessarily bad if they are a way of enforcing trust, of adhering to terms that are not precisely written in the contract.
我认为，如果关系是一种加强信任、遵守合同中未明确规定的条款的方式，那么它们不一定是坏事。
You do business with somebody else because, broadly, you think they will do the right thing.
你与其他人做生意是因为，总的来说，你认为他们会做正确的事。
They won’t haul you to court anytime there’s any sense of discrepancy.
任何时候只要有任何不符感觉，他们都不会把你拖上法庭。
I think that’s how business works.
我认为这就是商业运作的方式。
And that’s usually a good thing.
这通常是一件好事。
It’s when those relationships become the only way of actually functioning that you restrict access to a narrow circle of friends and relatives.
当这些关系成为实际运作的唯一方式时，你就限制了与朋友和亲戚的狭窄圈子的接触。
That’s when it becomes problematic.
这时候就出现问题了。
Can narrow banking proposals work?
缩小银行范围的建议能奏效吗？
Not really, for the reasons we just discussed.
事实并非如此，原因我们刚刚讨论过。
Narrow banking basically requires all the deposits to be invested essentially in safe treasuries, and no lending.
狭义银行业基本上要求所有存款都投资于安全的国债，而不是放贷。
But you’re lending to the government, and then other private capital can do the private lending.
但是你贷款给政府，然后其他私人资本可以做民间借贷。
Well, that’s the part, right?
嗯，这就是部分，对吧？
All the deposits first go to the government, and if the government has an excess of funding, it has to find a way of recycling it back to the private sector.
所有存款首先流向政府，如果政府资金过剩，就必须想办法将其回收回私营部门。
It’s that part that people don’t talk about.
这是人们不谈论的部分。
What is the way the government is going to recycle it back?
政府将通过什么方式将其回收呢？
Is it going to start buying corporate bonds?
是否要开始购买公司债券？
Which bonds is it going to buy?
将购买哪些债券？
What’s the kind of worry about cronyism that takes place at that point?
那时发生的任人唯亲的担忧是什么？
Those are the kinds of issues we don’t talk about in narrow banking, and I think they deserve to be opened up.
这些是我们在狭义银行业中不会谈论的问题，我认为它们值得公开。
The other point is, of course, is there virtue for banks to be financed with shorter-term debt while lending longer term?
当然，另一点是，银行用短期债务融资，同时发放长期贷款是否有好处？
And that’s part of what I’ve been trying to talk about.
这就是我一直试图谈论的内容的一部分。
Will current payments companies end up as competitors to banks or complements to the banking system?
当前的支付公司最终会成为银行的竞争对手还是银行系统的补充？
Or are they free riders on the banking system?
或者他们是银行系统的搭便车者吗？
I think they’re trying to figure out their space.
我认为他们正在试图找出自己的空间。
As of now, sometimes they’re substituting for .
到目前为止，有时他们正在替代。
.
。
.
。
Certainly, my daughter uses her payment system completely separate from her bank account.
当然，我女儿使用的支付系统与她的银行账户完全分开。
But longer term, we’ll find ways of meshing these in and reduce the costs of making payments.
但从长远来看，我们会找到将这些结合起来并降低支付成本的方法。
Those costs are really too high at this point, and reducing those costs makes a lot of sense.
目前这些成本确实太高了，降低这些成本非常有意义。
Will banks ever be truly excellent at doing software?
银行真的会在软件开发方面表现出色吗？
I think we will have a combination of the guys who are truly good at software — the fintech companies — merging with banks who know how to do the financial side.
我认为我们将把真正擅长软件的人——金融科技公司——与懂得如何做金融方面的银行合并起来。
They’ll bring each of their talents together.
他们会将各自的才能结合在一起。
I’ve seen a lot of fintech people who have no clue as to what finance is really about.
我见过很多金融科技人士，他们根本不知道金融到底是什么。
And I’ve seen a lot of banks who have no clue as to what tech is about.
我见过很多银行对科技是什么一无所知。
I think some merger will happen over time.
我认为随着时间的推移，一些合并将会发生。
How much has the US actually fixed its financial system?
美国实际上修复了多少金融体系？
Post 2008.
2008年后。
Some.
有一些。
I think the recapitalization of the banks and increasing the capital requirements was generally a good thing.
我认为银行资本重组和提高资本要求总体上是一件好事。
However, the banks have reduced the risks that they take.
然而，银行降低了所承担的风险。
A lot of the risks have migrated into what we call the shadow financial system.
许多风险已经转移到我们所说的影子金融体系中。
And the worry is, we don’t fully understand that.
令人担忧的是，我们并不完全理解这一点。
Are they managing their risks appropriately?
他们是否适当地管理风险？
We have the same questions we had before the global financial crisis when everybody said, “Don’t worry, these are the smartest guys in the universe.
我们有与全球金融危机之前相同的问题，当时每个人都说：“别担心，这些人是宇宙中最聪明的人。
They know how to manage their risks.” Well, there’s a lot of trust that the shadow financial system knows how to manage its risks, and I’m not sure we can be confident.
他们知道如何管理风险。”嗯，人们非常相信影子金融体系知道如何管理其风险，但我不确定我们是否有信心。
So what do we need to do to address that?
那么我们需要做什么来解决这个问题呢？
I think we need to keep exploring what’s really going on and trying to understand.
我认为我们需要继续探索到底发生了什么并试图理解。
For example, we’ve seen a big explosion in leveraged loans in recent years.
例如，近年来我们看到杠杆贷款出现大幅增长。
Are they being placed in the right places?
它们是否被放置在正确的位置？
When they dry up, will the entities that borrowed that way have enough liquidity?
当它们枯竭时，以这种方式借款的实体是否有足够的流动性？
Those are the kinds of questions we’ve got to keep asking.
这些都是我们必须不断问的问题。
Increasingly, liquidity becomes a source of both leverage and, eventually, credit risk.
流动性越来越成为杠杆的来源，并最终成为信用风险的来源。
And that’s, unfortunately, the problem.
不幸的是，这就是问题所在。
When liquidity dries up, a lot of people — both the lenders as well as borrowers — are left high and dry, which is why you get pressure on the central banks to come in to the rescue of the system: Infuse the system with liquidity.
当流动性枯竭时，很多人——包括贷方和借款人——都陷入困境，这就是为什么中央银行会面临压力，要求它们介入拯救体系：向体系注入流动性。
Start lending to anybody who needs it.
开始贷款给任何需要的人。
And that becomes a problem.
这成为一个问题。
You become too reliant on public liquidity.
你变得过于依赖公共流动性。
Say I’m just a naïve citizen, maybe even with a left-wing bent, and I say, “Look, why should banks even have off–balance-sheet risk to begin with?
假设我只是一个天真的公民，甚至可能有左翼倾向，我会说：“看，为什么银行一开始就应该有表外风险呢？
Why shouldn’t we force almost everything on the balance sheet?
为什么我们不应该把几乎所有的事情都写在资产负债表上呢？
There’s otherwise no way of handling this.
否则没有办法处理这个问题。
We’re completely on the wrong track in terms of bank regulations.” Do you agree or disagree?
就银行监管而言，我们完全走在了错误的轨道上。”你同意还是不同意？
I think you have to be a little careful.
我认为你必须小心一点。
Every time you stop something, it’ll show up somewhere else if there’s a need for it.
每次你停止某件事时，如果有需要，它就会出现在其他地方。
And is it better that it be in an entity that you regulate and you monitor reasonably closely?
它是在一个由您监管和密切监控的实体中更好吗？
Or in an entity that you don’t regulate?
或者在不受您监管的实体中？
To the extent the entity you don’t regulate can absorb those loses, that’s not a bad thing.
如果不受您监管的实体能够承担这些损失，这并不是一件坏事。
But to the extent that it cannot, and it all comes back into the system via these interconnected markets, you’re no better off.
但如果不能做到这一点，并且所有这些都通过这些相互关联的市场回到系统中，那么你的处境也并没有变得更好。
In fact, you’re worse off because you’re blindsided by the risks migrating to places you don’t look at.
事实上，你的处境会更糟，因为你对迁移到你不注意的地方的风险感到措手不及。
Given China’s own lending initiatives, and also fissures in the international order, is there now a coherent way of integrating China into the IMF and World Bank the way we used to talk about five years ago?
考虑到中国自己的贷款举措以及国际秩序中的裂痕，现在是否有一种连贯的方式让中国融入国际货币基金组织和世界银行，就像我们五年前谈论的那样？
I think we have to figure out not just how to integrate them, but how these organizations have to change for a multi-puller world.
我认为我们不仅要弄清楚如何整合它们，还要弄清楚这些组织必须如何改变以适应多拉力的世界。
When the US was determining the shots, which it still does, there was a sense that there was one entity, and it had pull position in many of these organizations.
当美国决定射击时（现在仍然这样做），有一种感觉，那就是有一个实体，并且它在许多此类组织中拥有主导地位。
Increasingly China is becoming bigger in certain markets than the United States, and probably, in the next five to ten years, will become bigger in terms of overall GDP.
中国在某些市场上的规模日益超过美国，而且在未来五到十年内，中国的GDP总量可能会变得更大。
Would the US still have that pull position?
美国还会有这样的牵引地位吗？
And if not, what kind of structure do we have in which there’s not one single sort of equity holder, but there are multiple equity holders, some of whom have very different incentives?
如果不是，我们有什么样的结构，其中不存在单一类型的股权持有人，而是有多个股权持有人，其中一些股权持有人有非常不同的激励措施？
The structure of the organization has to change to accommodate these different interests to make sure they work together.
组织的结构必须改变以适应这些不同的利益，以确保他们能够共同工作。
So I think this change — especially given that China doesn’t have that liberal market democracy structure that the US has — will be painful, but it’s something we need to do if we are to essentially get better multilateral institutions for this more integrated world.
因此，我认为这种变化——尤其是考虑到中国没有美国所拥有的自由市场民主结构——将是痛苦的，但如果我们想为这个更加一体化的世界建立更好的多边机构，这是我们需要做的事情。
Have we actually learned the proper lessons from the East Asian financial crisis of the late ’90s?
我们真的从90年代末东亚金融危机中吸取了正确的教训吗？
Or has that just fallen down a memory hole?
或者它只是掉进了记忆洞？
I think we learned some.
我想我们学到了一些。
We learned, for example, that the international merger fund — that it’s not primarily or always a fiscal problem.
例如，我们了解到，国际合并基金 ——它并不主要或始终是一个财政问题。
That sometimes the financial sector’s the problem, and mandating significant austerity at that point sometimes can backfire.
有时金融部门是问题所在，而此时强制实行大幅紧缩有时可能会适得其反。
I think that lesson has been used in the global financial crisis also.
我认为这一教训在全球金融危机中也得到了应用。
However, I do think there is a very real ongoing problem, which is how to deal with capital flows — abundant capital flows — because when they come in, it’s hard to say no to them, but they don’t stay that long, and they can leave on a whim.
但我确实认为有一个非常现实的持续存在的问题，就是如何处理资本流动 —— 大量的资本流动 ——因为当他们进来时，很难拒绝他们，但他们不会停留那么久，他们可以随心所欲地离开。
And again and again, countries like, now, Argentina, Turkey, get into trouble because they borrow in the good times and don’t know how to deal with the bad times.
现在，像阿根廷、土耳其这样的国家一次又一次陷入困境，因为它们在经济繁荣时借钱，却不知道如何应对经济萧条。
On the Raghuram Rajan production function
关于 Raghuram Rajan 生产函数
Our final section of this chat, of course, is about you.
当然，我们本次聊天的最后一部分是关于您的。
I call this the Raghu Rajan production function — just a few questions about your life.
我称之为 Raghu Rajan 生产函数——只是关于你生活的几个问题。
Your parents were diplomats.
你的父母是外交官。
You lived all over.
你到处都住过。
Is it good for kids to live abroad?
孩子在国外生活好吗？
And where did you go?
你去了哪里？
Well, yeah, we had a fantastic time.
嗯，是的，我们度过了一段美好的时光。
I grew up initially in Indonesia.
我最初是在印度尼西亚长大的。
In Jakarta?
在雅加达？
In Jakarta in the year of living dangerously — we were there.
在雅加达，那年的生活很危险——我们就在那里。
I remember — and my father corroborates this because I was really very young — gunfire in the streets as the Suharto coup was getting rid of the communist sympathizers of the previous government.
我记得——“我父亲证实了这一点，因为我真的很年轻”——当苏哈托政变推翻前政府的共产主义同情者时，街上枪声四起。
Two hundred fifty thousand people, at a low estimate, died in that.
据低估计，有二十五万人死于那次袭击。
I remember some of that.
我记得其中一些。
I don’t know if it’s a figment of my imagination.
我不知道这是否是我的想象。
We went to Sri Lanka when, again, they had an insurgency.
我们去斯里兰卡时，他们再次发生叛乱。
We had student terrorists who used to blow up government vehicles by embracing people, human bombs.
我们有学生恐怖分子，他们过去常常通过拥抱人、人体炸弹来炸毁政府车辆。
We had a year with no school.
我们有一年没有上学。
We loved it!
我们喜欢它！
My parents didn’t like it so much.
我的父母不太喜欢它。
We then went to Belgium, which was appropriately sober and boring.
然后我们去了比利时，那里的气氛相当清醒和无聊。
It was a fun place in the early ’70s.
七十年代初期，这是一个有趣的地方。
And then back to India, which was enormously interesting.
然后回到印度，这非常有趣。
India was still very poor.
印度仍然很穷。
And where in India?
那么在印度哪里呢？
Delhi.
德里。
New Delhi.
新德里。
And you had early training in engineering — is that correct?
而且您早期接受过工程学培训 —— 这是正确的吗？
I am an electrical engineer, certified.
我是一名获得认证的电气工程师。
How did you become an economist?
您是如何成为一名经济学家的？
At some point in my 30s, I had enough of fields and waves.
在我三十多岁的某个时刻，我已经受够了田野和波浪。
We do fields and waves in economics.
我们研究经济学中的场和波。
Yeah.
是的。
Well, I could touch and feel fields and waves, and I wanted to do something where I felt more connected.
嗯，我可以触摸并感受到田野和波浪，我想做一些让我感觉更有联系的事情。
And I’ve always been a fan of — believe it or not — John Maynard Keynes.
我一直是 ——“不管你信不信”—— 约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯。
Not in terms of .
不是就。
.
。
.
。
I didn’t know anything about his work, but I did know that he was such a renaissance figure.
我对他的作品一无所知，但我确实知道他是一位文艺复兴时期的人物。
And I said, “That’s the kind of guy who’s really impressive.” You need these sort of superstars in a profession to attract people in.
我说：“这才是真正令人印象深刻的人。”你需要某个职业中的此类超级明星来吸引人们。
Not that anybody in there ever has a chance of getting there, but it’s a way of bringing people into the profession.
并不是说那里的任何人都有机会到达那里，但这是将人们带入该行业的一种方式。
So I owe my economics to Keynes.
所以我的经济学要归功于凯恩斯。
In one interview, I think you mentioned Marx as one of your favorite economists, though of course you’re not a Marxist, but what aspect of Marx do you find important or interesting for today?
在一次采访中，我认为您提到马克思是您最喜欢的经济学家之一，尽管您当然不是马克思主义者，但您认为马克思的哪些方面对今天来说重要或有趣？
I think he was deeply sensitive of the importance of technology.
我认为他对技术的重要性非常敏感。
And I am more and more convinced that it’s these technological revolutions which create the impetus for society to change.
我越来越相信，正是这些技术革命为社会变革创造了动力。
And this book is really about how this technological revolution has created the disruption, but we still haven’t seen the societal change, and I think we will need to see that in order to adapt to it.
这本书实际上是关于这场技术革命如何造成破坏的，但我们仍然没有看到社会变化，我认为我们需要看到这一点才能适应它。
You and Luigi Zingales — you’ve written so many pieces together, dozens I think.
你和 Luigi Zingales — 你们一起写了很多作品，我想有几十篇。
Why has that particular partnership been so productive?
为什么这种特殊的伙伴关系如此富有成效？
How does that work?
这是如何运作的？
Luigi comes from Italy.
路易吉来自意大利。
I come from India.
我来自印度。
We both have maybe some cultural sympathy?
我们或许都有一些文化上的共鸣？
But we’re also to some extent .
但我们在某种程度上也是如此。
.
。
.
。
we started with a very healthy skepticism of how industrial countries function, I mean, him from his view from Italy, and I from India.
我们一开始对工业国家的运作方式抱有非常健康的怀疑态度，我的意思是，他来自意大利，我来自印度。
And I think, over time, our skepticism has been borne out, unfortunately, more than we would like it to be.
我认为，不幸的是，随着时间的推移，我们的怀疑已经得到证实，超出了我们的预期。
And to close, last question: what general message would you like to leave us with concerning your new book, The Third Pillar: How Markets and the State Leave the Community Behind?
最后一个问题是：关于您的新书《第三支柱：市场和国家如何让社区落后》，您想向我们传达什么一般性信息？
In many ways, this book is my view of why capitalism worked and why it’s not working as much anymore.
从很多方面来说，这本书都是我对资本主义为何有效以及为何不再有效的看法。
Central to this view is how important democracy is — democracy working through the community, the community pushing its ideas up.
这一观点的核心是民主的重要性——民主通过社区发挥作用，社区推动其思想的发展。
And to some extent, that we need to regain that ability for capitalism to work for all.
在某种程度上，我们需要重新获得资本主义为所有人服务的能力。
That’s the effective capitalism that took us in the West over the last 70 years to where we are.
这就是有效的资本主义在过去 70 年里带领西方取得今天的成就。
It’s where I think we could go in the East, but we need that spreading of capitalism’s benefits.
我认为这是我们在东方可以去的地方，但我们需要传播资本主义的好处。
And there I think democracy, in opening up capitalism and keeping it open, is extremely important.
我认为民主对于开放资本主义并保持开放是极其重要的。
That’s why I focus in this book on the community, because it seems to me that the community is a basic building block of democracy.
这就是为什么我在本书中重点关注社区，因为在我看来，社区是民主的基本组成部分。
It’s the guy at the bottom, who has no influence, who is essentially saying, “I want capitalism to work for me” — that’s when capitalism actually works.
那些处于底层、没有影响力的人本质上是在说：“我希望资本主义为我工作”——这才是资本主义真正发挥作用的时候。
It’s when everything is determined at the top that it stops working and we get the crony states.
当一切都由最高层决定时，它就不再起作用，我们就会得到裙带关系。
Whether they be socialist crony states, or fascist crony states, or even some versions of capitalist crony states.
无论它们是社会主义裙带国家，还是法西斯裙带国家，甚至某些版本的资本主义裙带国家。
Raghu, thank you very much.
拉古，非常感谢你。