Peter Singer on Utilitarianism, Influence, and Controversial Ideas (Ep. 181 - BONUS)
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today I’m here with Peter Singer of Princeton University.
今天我和普林斯顿大学的彼得·辛格在一起。
Peter is one of our most important and influential intellectuals.
彼得是我们最重要和最有影响力的知识分子之一。
For our purposes, there is a new and very much revised edition of Peter’s classic book, Animal Liberation.
为了我们的目的，彼得的经典著作《动物解放》有了一个新的、经过大量修订的版本。
It is now titled Animal Liberation Now: The Definitive Classic Renewed.
它现在的标题是《现在的动物解放：权威经典的更新》。
By my estimate, it’s about two-thirds to three-quarters new material.
据我估计，大约有三分之二到四分之三是新材料。
Peter, welcome.
彼得，欢迎。
Thanks very much, Tyler.
非常感谢，泰勒。
Good to be with you.
很高兴和你在一起。
When large language models make it possible for us to speak with dolphins, what will be the first question you ask?
当大型语言模型使我们能够与海豚交谈时，您问的第一个问题是什么？
What do you think of humans, maybe.
也许你对人类有什么看法？
COWEN: What do you think they will say?
COWEN：你认为他们会说什么？
Nothing very positive, that’s for sure, because a lot of dolphins have been caught in nets for catching tuna and impaled to stop them eating fish that people want in some parts of the world.
可以肯定的是，没有什么非常积极的事情，因为在世界某些地方，许多海豚被用来捕金枪鱼的网捕获，并被刺穿，以阻止它们吃人们想要的鱼。
I don’t think they’ll think too well of us.
我认为他们不会对我们有太好的看法。
What do you expect the dolphin to ask you?
你希望海豚问你什么？
We explain to the dolphin that you’re Peter Singer, right?
我们向海豚解释说你是彼得·辛格，对吧？
Right, okay.
对了，好吧。
What’s the question?
问题是什么？
Why have you failed?
你为什么失败了？
Why have you failed to stop humans treating animals so badly?
为什么你没能阻止人类如此虐待动物？
I’ll ask you the dolphin question.
我会问你海豚问题。
Why have you failed?
你为什么失败了？
It’s harder than I thought it might be.
这比我想象的要难。
That begins, I think, with the fact that humans eat animals, and it seems like we’re very conservative about what we eat.
我认为，这要从人类吃动物这一事实开始，而且我们似乎对吃的东西非常保守。
Relatively few people are prepared to really think ethically and openly about what they eat.
相对较少的人愿意真正从道德角度、公开地思考他们吃的东西。
They’re worried about having to change that, eat something different, maybe stand out from their friends and family by not eating meat and, therefore, implicitly criticizing those people when they do eat meat.
他们担心必须改变这一点，吃一些不同的东西，也许通过不吃肉来从朋友和家人中脱颖而出，因此，当他们吃肉时，他们会含蓄地批评那些人。
I think there are a whole lot of factors that just make it hard for people to make that fundamental change about what they eat.
我认为有很多因素导致人们很难对他们的饮食做出根本性的改变。
Without that, they’re not really going to fundamentally change what they think about animals.
如果没有这一点，他们就不会真正从根本上改变他们对动物的看法。
I have a general question about how totalizing ethics can be, or how totalizing utilitarianism can be.
我有一个普遍的问题，关于道德可以达到什么程度，或者功利主义可以达到什么程度。
If someone says to me, as you likely would, “Well, at the margin, we should treat animals better, much better,” I would agree.
如果有人对我说，就像你可能会说的那样，“好吧，在边际上，我们应该更好地对待动物，更好，”我会同意。
But if someone asks the question, say, “Do we wish that human beings had never settled the New World, and there would then be many more intelligent mammals alive in the New World today?” I simply think that question is intractable and that the limits of utilitarian reasoning are fairly tight around marginal changes, small events.
但如果有人问这个问题，你可以说：“我们是否希望人类从未在新大陆定居，这样今天的新大陆上就会有更多聪明的哺乳动物生存？”我只是认为这个问题很棘手，而且功利主义推理的局限性在边际变化和小事件方面相当严格。
So, I’ll ask you, do you wish that human beings had never settled the New World or New Zealand?
那么，我问你，你是否希望人类从未在新大陆或新西兰定居？
No, I don’t wish that.
不，我不希望这样。
I agree that the question is intractable.
我同意这个问题很棘手。
I’m not sure whether it’s intractable in a philosophical sense because we can’t sum up the values, or whether there’s just so much factual information that we don’t have, including how do we make comparisons between the well-being of the bison, let’s say, that were here more numerously, as compared with the well-being of the humans.
我不确定这是否在哲学意义上是棘手的，因为我们无法总结这些价值观，或者是否有太多我们没有的事实信息，包括我们如何对野牛的福祉进行比较，比方说，与人类的福祉相比，野牛的福祉数量更多。
If you think, say, about Earth’s current population — which is, what, about 8 billion human beings — can we conclude that it’s too many because it’s too much pressure on animals?
如果你想想地球目前的人口 ——也就是大约80亿人 ——我们是否可以得出这样的结论：人口太多是因为对动物造成了太大的压力？
Or is that also an intractable comparison in the same way?
或者说这也是一个同样棘手的比较？
I don’t think you can say it’s too many or it’s too few unless you make assumptions about the kind of technology that we have available to live in a sustainable way on the planet and to allow nonhuman animals to live as well.
我认为你不能说它太多或太少，除非你对我们拥有的技术做出假设，以可持续的方式在地球上生活并允许非人类动物也能生存。
But also in that question, of course, there’s the issue of, how do we compare the value of human lives — let’s assume that they’re human lives that are lived positively, that they’re rich and fulfilling human lives — with the lives of nonhuman animals?
当然，在这个问题中，还有一个问题是，我们如何将人类生命的价值——“让我们假设他们是积极生活的人类生命，他们是丰富且充实的人类生命”——与非人类动物的生命相比？
I totally agree that they’re different.
我完全同意他们是不同的。
I think it’s reasonable to argue that a rich and fulfilling human life contains more happiness than the life of, I don’t know, a cow or a sheep.
我认为，有理由认为，丰富而充实的人类生活比（我不知道）牛或羊的生活包含更多的幸福。
I’m not going to deny that.
我不会否认这一点。
I don’t think animals are equal in the sense that their lives contain equal value with that of humans.
我不认为动物是平等的，因为它们的生命与人类的生命具有同等的价值。
But you still think, in principle, we should be trying to do these total comparisons of one state of affairs against another?
但您仍然认为，原则上我们应该尝试将一种事态与另一种事态进行全面比较？
Or those are just big-picture questions that we need to set aside; we should be content with marginal comparisons?
或者这些只是我们需要搁置的大局问题；我们应该满足于边际比较吗？
Because you’re sounding like more of a marginalist than what I was expecting.
因为你听起来比我想象的更像一个边缘主义者。
I see.
我懂了。
Well, I’m certainly prepared to say that, clearly, the suffering we inflict on animals in factory farms is indefensible.
好吧，我当然准备说，显然，我们对工厂化农场的动物造成的痛苦是不可原谅的。
We cause far more suffering than any good we do for humans.
我们给人类带来的痛苦远远多于我们为人类带来的任何好处。
Arguably, actually, it’s a negative for humans as well.
事实上，可以说，这对人类也是不利的。
That’s what my focus is in Animal Liberation Now.
这就是我在《现在的动物解放》中关注的重点。
In fact, a lot of my work has been aimed at that.
事实上，我的很多工作都是为了这个目的。
It’s been aimed at what we should do about people in extreme poverty.
它的目的是我们应该为赤贫者做些什么。
It’s been aimed at things like, should we have the right to say we’ve had enough of life and we want to die if we’re terminally ill and in pain?
它的目标是这样的事情，如果我们身患绝症和痛苦，我们是否应该有权说我们已经受够了生活并且我们想死？
So, in a way, the big-picture questions that you’re asking — I find them interesting theoretical questions, and I can give you the answer that a utilitarian would give if you want that answer.
所以，在某种程度上，你提出的宏观问题 —— 我发现它们是有趣的理论问题，如果你想要这个答案，我可以给你一个功利主义者会给出的答案。
But in practice, I do think that I can’t really make a lot of headway with that.
但在实践中，我确实认为我无法真正取得很大进展。
How do you think about what is sometimes called the meat-eater problem?
您如何看待有时被称为肉食者问题的问题？
Most countries — probably all countries — as they become richer, they start eating more meat.
大多数国家——可能是所有国家——随着变得更加富裕，他们开始吃更多的肉。
At some point, they start treating the animals less well.
在某些时候，他们开始不再善待动物。
If not factory farms, there’s just more mass production of animal meat.
如果不是工厂化农场，动物肉类的大规模生产就会更多。
Do we need to calculate a tradeoff to wish for those countries to become wealthier, or do we just root for the wealth and figure we’ll sort it out later?
我们是否需要计算一个权衡以希望这些国家变得更富裕，或者我们只是支持财富并认为我们稍后会解决这个问题？
My view over the long term has generally been that countries will have to pass through this stage where they’ve got wealthier, they can purchase more meat, they raise animals in factory farms to do that.
从长远来看，我的观点总体上是，各国将必须经历这个阶段，他们变得更加富裕，他们可以购买更多的肉类，他们在工厂化农场饲养动物来做到这一点。
But then eventually, they’ll go on to become more humane and more civilized, and they’ll see that that’s the wrong thing to do, and they’ll treat animals much better.
但最终，他们会变得更加人道、更加文明，他们会发现这是错误的做法，他们会更好地对待动物。
The outcome will be better on the whole than it was before they became prosperous, when there were a lot of people in extreme poverty and they also weren’t treating animals well, although they didn’t have the power to raise so many of them.
总体来说，结果会比他们富裕之前更好，当时有很多人处于极端贫困状态，而且他们也没有善待动物，尽管他们没有能力饲养这么多动物。
But still, because they were using them for food and because if your own survival is at stake or that of your family, you need to eat more, that you’ll do anything to animals to do so, it was not a good situation.
但尽管如此，因为他们将它们用作食物，并且因为如果你自己或你家人的生存受到威胁，你需要吃更多，你会为此对动物做任何事情，这不是一个好情况。
In other words, what I’m saying is, I was prepared to swallow the short-term negatives for the long-term outcome.
换句话说，我想说的是，为了长期结果，我已经准备好接受短期的负面影响。
I have to admit that I’ve become less confident about the long-term outcome.
我必须承认，我对长期结果变得不那么有信心了。
I still hope that it’s there.
我仍然希望它在那里。
But the fact that there’s been relatively little progress in terms of treating animals better over the 48 years since the first version of Animal Liberation appeared does make me concerned that we’re not going to be going in that right direction, or not for a long time.
但自《动物解放》第一个版本问世以来的 48 年里，在更好地对待动物方面取得的进展相对较小，这一事实确实让我担心我们不会朝着正确的方向前进，或者在很长一段时间内不会。
Let’s say you could peer ahead another 70 years, 80 years, and things basically didn’t get better compared to now.
假设你再展望 70 年、80 年，情况与现在相比基本上没有改善。
Would you then think the meat eater’s problem is a real dilemma, a moral dilemma if it seems it’s not a stage?
那么你会认为肉食者的问题是一个真正的困境，一个道德困境，如果它看起来不是一个阶段的话？
People will just keep on eating meat through factory farms more or less forever.
人们或多或少会永远继续通过工厂化农场吃肉。
Then I would think, yes, there’s a real question as to whether it would’ve been better if people had not had the prosperity and the ability to raise animals in that way.
然后我会想，是的，存在一个真正的问题，如果人们没有以这种方式饲养动物的繁荣和能力，情况是否会更好。
You once wrote a book entitled A Darwinian Left.
您曾经写过一本名为《达尔文左派》的书。
Do you think you’re becoming more or less Darwinian over time?
你认为随着时间的推移，你变得越来越达尔文主义还是越来越不达尔文主义？
My Darwinian intuition is people won’t ever get much better because they evolve to eat animals, not to have factory farms, but to kill them in painful ways and simply not worry about it.
我的达尔文直觉是，人们永远不会变得更好，因为他们进化来吃动物，而不是拥有工厂化农场，而是以痛苦的方式杀死它们，并且根本不担心它。
What’s your current view on how Darwinian you are?
您目前对自己的达尔文主义看法如何？
I’m still 100 percent Darwinian.
我仍然是百分百达尔文主义者。
I don’t think there’s an alternative explanation of how we exist and of the biological elements of our nature.
我认为对于我们如何存在以及我们本性的生物元素没有其他解释。
But I also think it’s compatible with being a Darwinian to say we are a being who’s evolved the capacity to reason, and reason can lead us to conclusions which can influence our behavior.
但我也认为，作为一个达尔文主义者，我们是一个进化出了推理能力的生物，并且推理可以引导我们得出可以影响我们行为的结论，这与达尔文主义者是相容的。
I don’t see that as being anti-Darwinian or non-Darwinian.
我不认为这是反达尔文主义或非达尔文主义的。
I just see it as a realistic appreciation of the fact that we have evolved as rational beings and that that leads us to certain conclusions we wouldn’t have reached otherwise.
我只是将其视为对我们已经进化为理性生物这一事实的现实认识，这导致我们得出某些否则我们不会得出的结论。
But one might start seeing, in Darwinian fashion, that the evolution of rationality is just far more selective than what we might wish for.
但人们可能会开始看到，以达尔文的方式，理性的进化比我们所希望的更有选择性。
There are people who are very reasonable, and then, in another context, they’ll do terrible things.
有些人非常讲道理，但在另一种情况下，他们就会做出可怕的事情。
They could be a prison guard.
他们可能是一名狱警。
It could be animals.
它可能是动物。
You’ve written plenty about many, many other examples.
您已经写了很多很多其他例子。
Is there really this general faculty of reason that overrides those evolved intuitions?
真的存在这种超越进化直觉的一般理性能力吗？
I think there certainly can be, and I think there is for some people some of the time.
我认为肯定有可能，而且我认为在某些时候对某些人来说是有的。
The question would be, is everybody capable of that?
问题是，每个人都有能力做到这一点吗？
Or even if not everybody, are we capable of getting a dominant group who do follow reason in general, universal directions, who use it to develop a more universal ethic that applies to a wider group of beings than their own kin and family and those that they’re in cooperative relationships with?
或者，即使不是每个人，我们是否有能力找到一个在普遍、普遍的方向上遵循理性的主导群体，他们用它来发展一种更普遍的道德，这种道德适用于比他们自己的亲属和家庭以及与他们有合作关系的人更广泛的群体？
I think there’s evidence that that is possible, and we don’t yet know to what extent that can spread and start to dominate humans in future generations.
我认为有证据表明这是可能的，而且我们还不知道它可以在多大程度上传播并开始主宰未来几代的人类。
I wonder sometimes how much we can have an ethics that truly separates morality from partiality.
有时我想知道我们能在多大程度上拥有真正将道德与偏见区分开来的道德规范。
Here’s a question I gave to Sam Bankman-Fried.
这是我向 Sam Bankman-Fried 提出的问题。
I said, “As a utilitarian, let’s say a super being offered you a gamble where we would, in essence, double the population on Earth, create a dual Earth somewhere, equally happy, with 51 percent; and 49 percent, we wipe out the Earth we have now.
我说：“作为一个功利主义者，假设有一个超级存在向你提出了一场赌博，从本质上讲，我们将把地球上的人口增加一倍，在某个地方创造一个双重地球，同样快乐，51％；而49％，我们会消灭我们现在拥有的地球。
That would represent an increase in expected value.”
这将代表预期价值的增加。”
And furthermore, I asked Sam, “Would you keep on playing this game, double or nothing?” As Sam being Sam, he just said, “Yes.” Indeed, in his own life, he did continue playing the game, double or nothing.
此外，我问萨姆：“你会继续玩这个游戏，双倍还是什么都不玩？”由于山姆就是山姆，他只是说：“是的。”事实上，在他自己的生活中，他确实继续玩这个游戏，无论是加倍还是什么都没有。
And he ended up with nothing or worse than nothing.
而他最终却一无所获，或者比一无所有更糟糕。
Yes, but doesn’t a thought example like that mean we can’t really be utilitarians in the big picture of things?
是的，但是这样的思想例子难道不意味着我们不能在事物的大局中真正成为功利主义者吗？
We need to be more loyal to the Earth we have and not consider gambling, in a way, for these extra Earths.
我们需要更加忠诚于我们所拥有的地球，而不是考虑在某种程度上为这些额外的地球进行赌博。
I think it says more about gambling than it does about being utilitarian.
我认为这更多的是关于赌博而不是功利主义。
I agree, it’s a paradox.
我同意，这是一个悖论。
You could say it’s a paradox particularly for maximizing utilitarians who normally will talk about maximizing expected utility.
你可以说这是一个悖论，特别是对于最大化功利主义者来说，他们通常会谈论最大化预期效用。
And this seems to be a case where you don’t want to maximize expected utility.
这似乎是您不想最大化预期效用的情况。
Although, of course, there are arguments that would say, well, your expected utility is actually low, given that you can’t infinitely long keep doubling utility, I assume.
当然，尽管有一些论点会说，好吧，你的预期效用实际上很低，因为我认为你不能无限长时间地使效用加倍。
But you had a hypothesis where you have a twin Earth, and if you could just create a twin Earth, I guess you could.
但你有一个假设，你有一个孪生地球，如果你能创造一个孪生地球，我想你可以。
But for the real world, we can’t keep doubling utility, and so we shouldn’t do double or nothing.
但对于现实世界，我们不能一直将效用加倍，因此我们不应该加倍或什么也不做。
I’m not claiming to solve this paradox, by the way.
顺便说一句，我并不是说要解决这个悖论。
I think it is an interesting and somewhat baffling problem with maximizing expected utility.
我认为最大化预期效用是一个有趣且有点令人困惑的问题。
But does the question show not only that it’s some unusual paradox in a corner of the moral universe, but that in all our choices, that assessments of utility are within some framework that is pre-assuming a certain amount of partiality, and that there’s no escape from that partiality, no fully objective outside viewpoint?
但这个问题是否表明，这不仅是道德宇宙某个角落的某种不寻常的悖论，而且在我们所有的选择中，对效用的评估都在某种框架内，该框架预先假设了一定程度的偏见，并且无法摆脱这种偏见，没有完全客观的外部观点？
I don’t understand why you’re seeing this paradox as relating to partiality.
我不明白为什么你认为这个悖论与偏袒有关。
It’s just as true if we’re completely impartial about universal good.
如果我们对普遍利益完全不偏不倚，情况也是如此。
I don’t understand why you think that it shows that we, inevitably, are going to be partial.
我不明白为什么你认为这表明我们不可避免地会偏袒。
Well, take the Bernard Williams question, which I think you’ve written about.
好吧，就拿伯纳德·威廉姆斯的问题来说吧，我想你已经写过这个问题了。
Let’s say that aliens are coming to Earth, and they may do away with us, and we may have reason to believe they could be happier here on Earth than what we can do with Earth.
假设外星人来到地球，他们可能会消灭我们，我们可能有理由相信他们在地球上会比我们在地球上做的更幸福。
I don’t think I know any utilitarians who would sign up to fight with the aliens, no matter what their moral theory would be.
我认为我不知道有哪个功利主义者会报名与外星人作战，无论他们的道德理论是什么。
Okay, you’ve just met one.
好吧，你刚刚遇到了一个。
I’ve just met one.
我刚刚遇到一个。
So, you would sign up to fight with the aliens?
那么，你会报名参加与外星人的战斗吗？
If the hypothesis is like that, that the aliens are wiser than we are, they know how to make the world a better place for everyone, they’re giving full weight to human interests, but they say, “Even though we’re giving full weight to human interests, not discounting your interests because you’re not a member of our species, as you do with animals, but unfortunately, it just works out that to produce a better world, you have to go,” I’ll say, “Okay, if your calculations are right, if that’s all right, I’m on your side.”
如果假设是这样的，外星人比我们更聪明，他们知道如何让世界变得对每个人来说都更美好，他们充分重视人类的利益，但他们说，“尽管我们充分重视人类的利益，并没有因为你不是我们物种的一员而忽视你的利益，就像对待动物一样，但不幸的是，事实证明，为了创造一个更美好的世界，你必须离开，”我会说，“好吧，如果你的计算是正确的，如果可以的话，我是站在你这边的。”
You’re making them a little nicer.
你让他们变得更好一点。
You’re calling them wise.
你称他们为明智者。
They may or may not be wise.
他们可能聪明，也可能不聪明。
They’re just happier than we are.
他们只是比我们快乐而已。
They have less stress, less depression.
他们的压力较小，抑郁较少。
If they could rule over Earth, they would do a better go of it than we would.
如果他们能够统治地球，他们会比我们做得更好。
I would still side with the humans.
我仍然会站在人类一边。
I would not.
我不会。
What you’ve shown now is that their interest happens to coincide with the universal good.
你现在所展示的是，他们的兴趣恰好与普遍利益一致。
That’s the way to produce more happiness, full stop, not just more happiness for them.
这是创造更多幸福的方法，句号，而不仅仅是为他们带来更多幸福。
And if that’s the case, I’m on their side.
如果是这样的话，我就站在他们一边。
How do we know there is a universal good?
我们怎么知道存在普遍利益？
You’re selling out your fellow humans based on this belief in a universal good, which is quite abstract, right?
你基于这种对普遍利益的信念而出卖了你的人类同胞，这是相当抽象的，对吧？
The other smart humans you know mostly don’t agree with you, I think, I hope.
我想，我希望，你认识的其他聪明人大多不同意你的观点。
But you’re using the kind of language that Bernard Williams used when he says, “Whose side are you on?” You said, “You’re selling out your fellow humans,” as if I owe loyalty to members of my species above loyalty to good in general, that is, to maximizing happiness and well-being for all of those affected by it.
但你用的是伯纳德·威廉姆斯（Bernard Williams）说的那种语言，“你站在哪一边？”你说，“你正在出卖你的人类同胞”，就好像我对我的物种成员的忠诚高于对一般善的忠诚，也就是说，要最大限度地提高所有受其影响的人的幸福和福祉。
I don’t claim to have any particular loyalty for my species rather than the general good.
我并不声称对我的种族有任何特别的忠诚，而不是对整体利益的忠诚。
If there’s not this common metric between us and the aliens, but you just measure — you hook people up to a scale, you measure.
如果我们和外星人之间没有这个共同的衡量标准，但你只是测量——你把人们挂在一个秤上，你就可以测量。
They have more of it than we do.
他们拥有的比我们多。
Let them come in.
让他们进来吧。
If that doesn’t exist, what is the common good or universal good in this setting?
如果不存在，那么在这种情况下，共同利益或普遍利益是什么？
I don’t know if that doesn’t exist, but you said they’re happier than we are, which suggests that there is a common metric of happiness, and that was the basis on which I answered your question.
我不知道这是否不存在，但你说他们比我们幸福，这表明存在一个共同的幸福衡量标准，这就是我回答你问题的基础。
If there’s no common metric, I don’t really have an answer, or I would try to use the metric of overall happiness.
如果没有通用的衡量标准，我真的没有答案，或者我会尝试使用整体幸福感的衡量标准。
I’m not sure why I wouldn’t be able to use that, but if we assume that I couldn’t, then I would just not know what to do.
我不确定为什么我不能使用它，但如果我们假设我不能，那么我就会不知道该怎么办。
So you wouldn’t fight for our side.
所以你不会为我们而战。
Even then, you’d throw up your hands or just not be sure what to do.
即使那样，你也会举手或只是不知道该怎么做。
No, this is not about a football team.
不，这与一支足球队无关。
You can give your loyalty to a football team and support them, even though you don’t really think that they’re somehow more morally worthy of winning than their opponents.
你可以对一支足球队忠诚并支持他们，即使你并不真正认为他们在道德上比他们的对手更值得获胜。
But this is not a game like this.
但这不是这样的游戏。
There’s everything at stake.
一切都岌岌可危。
To what extent for you is utilitarianism not only a good theory of outcomes but also a theory of obligation?
在您看来，功利主义在多大程度上不仅是一种良好的结果理论，而且也是一种义务理论？
I’m sure you know the Donald Regan literature, this “Oh, you prefer the outcome with more utility,” but “What should I do?” can still be a complex question.
我相信你知道唐纳德·里根的文学作品，“哦，你更喜欢更实用的结果”，但是“我该怎么办？”仍然可能是一个复杂的问题。
Well, it can be a complex question in the sense that it may be that we don’t want to directly aim at utility because we’re likely to get things wrong.
嗯，这可能是一个复杂的问题，因为我们可能不想直接瞄准效用，因为我们可能会出错。
If we can’t be confident in our calculations that we are doing the right thing, then I think the obligations that we have are to maximize utility.
如果我们不能确信我们正在做正确的事情，那么我认为我们的义务就是最大化效用。
But it’s been argued that we’re more likely to make mistakes if we do that, and rather that our obligation should be to conform to certain principles or rules.
但有人认为，如果我们这样做，我们更有可能犯错误，而我们的义务应该是遵守某些原则或规则。
I think that depends on how confident you are in your ability.
我认为这取决于你对自己的能力有多大信心。
I certainly think we should follow rules of thumb sometimes, when we can’t be sure of what’s the right outcome, and we should do what generally is accepted.
我当然认为，当我们无法确定什么是正确的结果时，有时我们应该遵循经验法则，并且我们应该做普遍接受的事情。
You go back to Sam Bankman-Fried.
你回到萨姆·班克曼-弗里德。
Obviously, I think that was his mistake.
显然，我认为这是他的错误。
He was too confident that he could get things right and fix things and didn’t follow basic rules, or at least it’s alleged that he didn’t follow basic rules, like “Don’t steal your clients’ money.”
他过于自信，认为自己能够把事情做好并解决问题，并且没有遵守基本规则，或者至少据称他没有遵守基本规则，例如“不要偷客户的钱”。
Isn’t there a dilemma above and beyond the epistemic dilemma?
难道除了认知困境之外还存在一个困境吗？
Say, you, Peter Singer, you’re programming a driverless car and you’re in charge.
假设你，彼得·辛格，正在编程一辆无人驾驶汽车，并且由你负责。
Ideally, you would like to program the car to be a utilitarian and Benthamite car, that if it has to swerve, it would sooner kill one older person than two younger people, and so on.
理想情况下，您希望将汽车编程为实用主义和边沁主义的汽车，如果它必须转向，它会更快地杀死一个老年人而不是两个年轻人，等等。
Let’s say you also knew that if you programmed the driverless car to be Benthamite, basically, the law would shut it down, public opinion would rebel, you’d get in trouble, the automaker would get in trouble.
假设你也知道，如果你将无人驾驶汽车编程为边沁主义，基本上，法律会关闭它，公众舆论会反抗，你会遇到麻烦，汽车制造商也会遇到麻烦。
How then would you program the car?
那么你将如何对汽车进行编程呢？
Yes, I would program it to produce the best consequences that would not be prohibited by the government or the manufacturer.
是的，我会对它进行编程，以产生政府或制造商不会禁止的最佳结果。
I’m all in favor of making compromises if you have to, to produce the most good that you possibly can in the circumstances in which you are.
如果有必要的话，我完全赞成做出妥协，在你所处的环境下尽可能地做出最好的贡献。
Doesn’t that then mean individuals should hold onto some moral theory that may be quite far from utilitarianism?
这是否意味着个人应该坚持某种可能远离功利主义的道德理论？
It’s not just a compromise.
这不仅仅是一个妥协。
You need to be very intuition driven, nonutilitarian just to get people to trust you, to work with you, to cooperate.
你需要非常直觉驱动，不功利，只是为了让人们信任你，与你一起工作，合作。
In that sense, at the obligation level, you’re not so utilitarian at all.
从这个意义上说，在义务层面上，你根本就没有那么功利。
You may be.
你可能是。
That will depend on your own nature, as to whether you think you’re going to be led astray if you’re not intuition driven.
这取决于你自己的本性，如果你不被直觉驱动，你是否认为自己会误入歧途。
Or you may think that you can be self-aware about the risks that you’re going to go wrong.
或者您可能认为您可以自我意识到自己可能会出错的风险。
You’re not exactly intuition driven, but you’re driven by the thought that “I could be mistaken here, and it’s probably going to have more value if I don’t just directly think about how to produce the most utility.”
你并不完全是直觉驱动的，但你是被这样的想法所驱动的：“我可能会犯错，如果我不直接思考如何产生最大的效用，它可能会更有价值。”
Let me continue with a number of the easy questions.
让我继续回答一些简单的问题。
If you take current AI’s large language models, you would agree they’re not sentient, they’re not beings, right?
如果你采用当前人工智能的大型语言模型，你会同意它们没有感知能力，它们不是生命，对吗？
I would agree with that.
我同意这一点。
So they don’t count.
所以他们不算数。
I agree with that, too.
我也同意这一点。
There’s something about sentience that is essential for a being to count, but we actually know very little about consciousness.
感知力对于生物的计数至关重要，但我们实际上对意识知之甚少。
You can read philosophy of mind.
你可以阅读心灵哲学。
You can look at neuroscience.
你可以看看神经科学。
It seems to me one of the most mysterious and baffling areas in all of human knowledge.
在我看来，这是人类知识中最神秘、最令人困惑的领域之一。
We have introspection; I’m not sure how much to trust introspection.
我们有内省；我不确定该在多大程度上相信内省。
Does it worry you to be erecting a moral theory based on sentience, some notion of utility happiness, when all of our scientific inroads toward that concept seem to be, at least for the moment, very, very badly flawed?
当我们对这一概念的所有科学进展似乎（至少目前而言）存在非常非常严重的缺陷时，您是否会担心建立一种基于感知力的道德理论，即某种实用幸福的概念？
They’re incomplete, certainly.
当然，它们是不完整的。
Are they flawed in the sense that would lead us astray in terms of making those decisions based on sentience?
它们是否有缺陷，会导致我们在基于感知做出这些决定时误入歧途？
I’m not convinced of that.
我不相信这一点。
But say you’re trying to compare human animal welfare to nonhuman animal welfare.
但是假设您正在尝试将人类动物福利与非人类动物福利进行比较。
We have a sense many of these other animals are sentient.
我们感觉许多其他动物都是有感情的。
That’s pretty much certain.
这是非常确定的。
They feel pain, but we don’t know how to compare them to us.
他们感到痛苦，但我们不知道如何将他们与我们进行比较。
We don’t really know even where in science to look for such a unit of comparison.
我们甚至不知道在科学中去哪里寻找这样的比较单位。
How do we know they don’t just overwhelm our well-being Derek Parfit-like conclusions?
我们怎么知道它们不会压倒我们的福祉德里克·帕菲特式的结论？
Doesn’t one just become a radical agnostic if all of our judgments rely on this utility thing?
如果我们所有的判断都依赖于这个实用性的东西，那么我们不就变成了一个激进的不可知论者吗？
Which, to me, is somewhat mysterious.
这对我来说有点神秘。
I don’t think you have to be completely agnostic about all these issues.
我认为你不必对所有这些问题完全不可知。
I think there are some cases — and again, I would instance factory farming — where we can be very confident that what we’re doing is causing more pain and suffering than it’s doing good to us.
我认为在某些情况下，我们可以非常自信地认为，我们正在做的事情给我们带来的痛苦和磨难比给我们带来的好处更多。
That’s not to say that there aren’t a lot of other questions, including that question you asked about — is it good that humans colonized North America — where it’s harder to make those decisions because they are involving comparisons.
这并不是说没有很多其他问题，包括你问的那个问题——“人类殖民北美是件好事吗？”——在那里很难做出这些决定，因为它们涉及比较。
Some of these decisions are quite practical, too.
其中一些决定也非常实用。
For example, even within the animal movement, if you say, should we focus on trying to get people not to eat chicken?
例如，即使在动物运动中，如果你说，我们是否应该集中精力努力让人们不吃鸡肉？
Because chickens are so intensively farmed, and there’s so many of them, it takes less of a chicken to make a meal than it does of a cow.
由于鸡的养殖规模如此之大，而且数量如此之多，所以用鸡做一顿饭所需的时间比用牛少。
Should we do that?
我们应该这样做吗？
Then we’re trying to compare the suffering of more chickens with fewer cows or fewer pigs.
然后我们尝试比较更多的鸡与更少的牛或更少的猪所遭受的痛苦。
I agree those questions are still ones that we can’t really get a grip on, but it doesn’t mean that there’s nothing we can do that is based on sentience, happiness, suffering, and so on.
我同意这些问题仍然是我们无法真正掌握的问题，但这并不意味着我们基于感知、快乐、痛苦等无能为力。
If there are many intelligent and sentient space aliens, would that make the extinction of the human race less of a tragedy?
如果有很多有智慧、有感知力的外星人，人类的灭绝是否会少一些悲剧？
If the idea is that then these intelligent and sentient aliens might populate our planet or take —
如果这个想法是，那么这些聪明且有感知力的外星人可能会居住在我们的星球上，或者带走 -
No, they’re just out there.
不，他们只是在那里。
They’re just out there.
他们就在那里。
Speed of light is too fast.
光速太快了。
We’ll never catch them, vice versa.
我们永远抓不到他们，反之亦然。
Then the extinction of our species is still just the same loss.
那么我们物种的灭绝仍然是同样的损失。
It’s a loss of a certain amount of happiness, and the fact that it’s less of a proportion of the happiness or well-being or sentience in the universe doesn’t mean that it isn’t the same loss.
这是失去一定量的幸福，事实上，它在宇宙中的幸福、福祉或知觉中所占的比例较小，并不意味着它不是同样的损失。
So, it’s linear and separable.
因此，它是线性且可分离的。
Yes.
是的。
So, the notion of a universe empty of sentient and intelligent life — there’s nothing special about the zero point?
那么，宇宙中没有感知和智慧生命的概念 ——零点没有什么特别的吗？
No. As you say, assuming that the existence of some sentient life isn’t going to regenerate and repopulate the universe, that’s a reason why extinction is worse than the loss of most of our species.
不。正如你所说，假设某些有感知生命的存在不会在宇宙中再生和繁殖，这就是为什么灭绝比我们大多数物种的消失更糟糕的原因。
But otherwise, no.
但除此之外，没有。
What is the margin at which you wish to police nature?
您希望监管自然的限度是多少？
I’ve argued, for instance, we should not subsidize carnivores per se.
例如，我认为我们不应该补贴肉食动物本身。
There may be some other reason to do so, but the idea, “Oh, we’re going to introduce wolves back into this national park,” should not be an especially desirable prospect.
这样做可能还有其他原因，但“哦，我们要把狼重新引入这个国家公园”的想法不应该是一个特别理想的前景。
What’s your view on that, and where should we stop?
您对此有何看法？我们应该在哪里停止？
That was an interesting, pioneering article that you wrote, I think, “Policing Nature.” I tend to agree with it.
我认为您写的这篇文章很有趣，具有开创性，“监管自然”。我倾向于同意这一点。
I think it’s reasonable to raise a question about why we should reintroduce predators.
我认为提出一个关于为什么我们应该重新引入掠食者的问题是合理的。
As you said, there may be effects on other animals and plants in the area where we’re introducing them.
正如您所说，这可能会对我们引入的地区的其他动植物产生影响。
But to do so just for its own sake, just because they were once here and were once part of the ecology, is not, to my view, a sufficient reason for introducing them if we know that is going to increase the suffering of some prey animals.
但在我看来，仅仅因为它们本身的缘故，仅仅因为它们曾经在这里并且曾经是生态的一部分，并不能成为引入它们的充分理由，如果我们知道这会增加一些猎物动物的痛苦。
How much should we spend trying to thwart predators?
我们应该花多少钱来阻止掠夺者？
I think that’s difficult because, again, you would have to take into account the consequences of not having predators, and what are you going to do with a prey population?
我认为这很困难，因为你必须再次考虑没有捕食者的后果，以及你将如何处理猎物种群？
Are they going to overpopulate and maybe starve or destroy the environment for other sentient beings?
他们是否会人口过剩，甚至导致其他众生挨饿或破坏环境？
So, it’s hard to say how much we should spend trying to thwart them.
因此，很难说我们应该花多少钱来阻止它们。
I think there are questions about reducing the suffering of wild animals that are easier than that.
我认为减少野生动物痛苦的问题比这更容易。
That’s a question that maybe, at some stage, we’ll grapple with when we’ve reduced the amount of suffering we inflict on animals generally.
也许在某个阶段，当我们普遍减少对动物造成的痛苦时，我们就会解决这个问题。
It’s nowhere near the top of the list for how to reduce animal suffering.
对于如何减少动物痛苦来说，它远不是最重要的。
What do you think of the fairly common fear that if we mix the moralities of human beings and the moralities of nature, that the moralities of nature will win out?
您如何看待一种相当普遍的恐惧，即如果我们将人类的道德和自然的道德混合在一起，自然的道德将获胜？
Nature is so large and numerous and populous and fierce.
大自然如此广阔、众多、人口众多、凶猛。
Human beings are relatively small in number and fragile.
人类数量相对较少且脆弱。
If the prevailing ethic becomes the ethic of nature, that the blending is itself dangerous, that human beings end up thinking, “Well, predation is just fine; it’s the way of nature.” Therefore, they do terrible things to each other.
如果流行的伦理成为自然伦理，那么这种混合本身就是危险的，人类最终会想：“好吧，掠夺没什么问题；这是自然之道。”因此，他们互相做了可怕的事情。
Is that what you meant by the moralities of nature?
这就是你所说的自然道德吗？
I wasn’t sure what the phrase meant.
我不确定这句话的意思。
Do you mean the morality that we imply, that we attribute to nature?
你指的是我们所暗示的、我们赋予自然的道德吗？
“Red in tooth and claw.” If we think that’s a matter that is our business, do we not end up with that morality?
“牙齿和爪子都是红色的。”如果我们认为那是我们的事，我们最终不就会有这样的道德吗？
Trumping ours, we become subordinate to that morality.
我们超越了我们的道德，就变得服从于这种道德。
A lot of very nasty people in history have actually cited nature.
历史上有很多非常讨厌的人实际上引用了自然。
“Well, nature works this way.
“嗯，大自然就是这样运作的。
I’m just doing that.
我就是这么做的。
It’s a part of nature.
这是自然的一部分。
It’s more or less okay.” How do we avoid those series of moves?
或多或少都还好。”我们如何避免这一系列的举动呢？
Right.
正确的。
It’s a bad argument, and we try and explain why it’s a bad argument, that we don’t want to follow nature.
这是一个糟糕的论点，我们试图解释为什么这是一个糟糕的论点，我们不想遵循自然。
That the fact that nature does something is not something that we ought to imitate, but maybe, in fact, we ought to combat, and of course, we do combat nature in many ways.
事实上，自然做某事并不是我们应该模仿的事情，但事实上，也许我们应该与自然作斗争，当然，我们确实以多种方式与自然作斗争。
Maybe war between humans is part of nature, but nevertheless, we regret when wars break out.
也许人与人之间的战争是自然的一部分，但尽管如此，当战争爆发时，我们还是感到遗憾。
We try to have institutions to prevent wars breaking out.
我们试图建立机构来防止战争爆发。
I think a lot of our activities are combating nature’s way of doing things rather than regarding it as a model to follow.
我认为我们的许多活动都是在与自然的做事方式作斗争，而不是将其视为可遵循的模式。
But if humans are a part of nature flat out, and if our optimal policing of nature leaves 99.9999 percent of all predation in place — we just can’t stop most of it — is it then so irrational to conclude, “Well this predation must be okay.
但是，如果人类完全是自然的一部分，并且如果我们对自然的最佳监管让 99.9999% 的掠食行为保持原样——“我们只是无法阻止其中的大部分”——那么得出“这种掠食行为一定是没问题的”的结论是不是很不合理呢？
It’s the natural state of the world.
这是世界的自然状态。
Our optimal best outcome leaves 99.99999 percent of it in place.” How do we avoid that mindset?
我们的最佳结果保留了 99.99999% 的内容。”我们如何避免这种心态？
I think we can avoid that mindset because if we don’t have any option about leaving it in place, we just regret it.
我认为我们可以避免这种心态，因为如果我们没有任何选择保留它，我们只会后悔。
I do regret the way nature works.
我确实对大自然的运作方式感到遗憾。
I think it’s a very powerful argument against the idea that this world was created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent creator.
我认为这是一个非常有力的论据，反对这个世界是由全能、全知、全仁的创造者创造的观点。
That just seems to be impossible because of the way nature works, but that’s the world we live in.
由于自然的运作方式，这似乎是不可能的，但这就是我们生活的世界。
Given low fertility rates in virtually every wealthy nation, is there something self-defeating about secularism as a philosophy?
鉴于几乎每个富裕国家的生育率都很低，世俗主义作为一种哲学是否会弄巧成拙？
Is secularism responsible for the low fertility rates?
世俗主义是低生育率的原因吗？
I think Roman Catholic couples in some of these countries have birth rates that are as low as secular people or —
我认为其中一些国家的罗马天主教夫妇的出生率与世俗人一样低，或者 -
Well, these countries have all secularized.
嗯，这些国家都已经世俗化了。
Israel is somewhat an exception.
以色列在某种程度上是一个例外。
They’re above replacement.
他们超越了替代品。
I don’t know of any other wealthy countries.
我不知道还有其他富裕国家。
It’s not only secularism, but it’s secularism plus birth control, plus a number of other features of modernity.
这不仅是世俗主义，而且是世俗主义加上节育，加上现代性的许多其他特征。
Does that mean this whole enterprise is just self-defeating?
这是否意味着整个企业只是弄巧成拙？
I hope that it’s not self-defeating, and I hope that birth rates will drop in less secular countries as well, or that those countries will become more secular.
我希望这不会弄巧成拙，我希望不那么世俗化的国家的出生率也会下降，或者这些国家会变得更加世俗化。
I think the project of secularism is sound and right.
我认为世俗主义的计划是合理且正确的。
I certainly hope that we won’t see a world in which secular people have few children and religious people have more children, and therefore, secularism disappears.
我当然希望我们不会看到一个世俗人孩子少、宗教人孩子多的世界，世俗主义就消失了。
I accept that there’s a possibility that that could happen.
我承认这种情况有可能发生。
I think that would be a very bad outcome.
我认为这将是一个非常糟糕的结果。
Why be so loyal to a project that is so poor at producing utility?
为什么要如此忠诚于一个在产生效用方面如此糟糕的项目呢？
Babies being utility, happiness, well-being, something.
婴儿是有用的、幸福的、幸福的等等。
I think one reason for supporting secularism is that it seems to me to be true.
我认为支持世俗主义的原因之一是它在我看来是正确的。
I don’t think that there is a divine being.
我不认为有神灵存在。
I can’t simply say, “Let’s adopt the idea of a divine being and fool ourselves that there is one.” I would rather say, “Given that there isn’t, let’s find ways of having enough children to produce good long-term outcomes.”
我不能简单地说，“让我们接受神的存在的想法，并欺骗自己，相信有一个神存在。”我宁愿说，“既然没有，让我们想办法拥有足够的孩子来产生良好的长期成果。”
You do have this piece, I think it’s titled “Secrecy in Consequentialism,” where you say a true consequentialist should be willing to entertain or even advocate ideas just because they will help the world.
你确实有这篇文章，我想它的标题是“结果主义的秘密”，你说一个真正的结果主义者应该愿意接受甚至提倡想法，只是因为它们会帮助世界。
Why not move away from secularism, become a religious Straussian?
为什么不摆脱世俗主义，成为宗教施特劳斯主义者呢？
The Amish have more kids.
阿米什人有更多的孩子。
We all need to have more kids, and that would be one of the false ideas that you would, at least publicly, embrace.
我们都需要有更多的孩子，而这将是你至少在公开场合接受的错误想法之一。
Yes.
是的。
The article, “Secrecy in Consequentialism” — and I should acknowledge my co-author, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek — is more about acting in certain ways that you keep secret, like when it might be right to lie but bad if your lie became known publicly, than it’s about fostering general ideas like becoming religious.
《结果论中的秘密》一文——我应该感谢我的合著者卡塔齐娜·德·拉扎里-拉德克——更多的是关于以某种你保守秘密的方式行事，比如当撒谎可能是对的，但如果你的谎言被公开时就不好了，而不是培养像成为宗教人士这样的一般观念。
I would think that there would be sufficient negative consequences to that particular idea that we wouldn’t want to do it anyway.
我认为这个特定的想法会产生足够的负面后果，我们无论如何都不想这样做。
Should abortion be legal or illegal, say, in Western countries?
例如，在西方国家，堕胎应该合法还是非法？
I think abortion should be legal.
我认为堕胎应该是合法的。
From a utilitarian point of view, which I would not myself apply to abortion, but why isn’t it just better to have the babies?
从功利主义的角度来看，我自己不会将其应用于堕胎，但为什么生孩子不是更好呢？
The benefit to the baby-to-be seems to outweigh the costs to the family.
对准婴儿的好处似乎超过了对家庭的成本。
Well, for a start, not all abortions reduce the number of children who will be born.
嗯，首先，并非所有堕胎都会减少即将出生的孩子数量。
Often, abortions terminate a pregnancy that is poorly timed, but the couple have a plan to have x children, and they will have x children.
通常，堕胎会在不合时宜的情况下终止妊娠，但这对夫妇计划生 x 个孩子，而且他们将会生 x 个孩子。
But truly, on average, the number of babies will go down if abortion is legal?
但如果堕胎合法的话，平均婴儿数量真的会下降吗？
Oh, possibly it will on average, but those babies would be born to mothers who did not want to have them at that particular time.
哦，可能平均而言，但这些婴儿的母亲在那个特定时间不想生孩子。
Maybe their circumstances were ones that would’ve made it difficult for them to bring up the child well, and so the child might be a less happy child, and the mother or the parents might also be much more stressed because they had to rear a child at a time that wasn’t suitable for them.
也许他们的环境让他们很难抚养好孩子，所以孩子可能会成为一个不那么快乐的孩子，而母亲或父母也可能会因为在不适合他们的时间抚养孩子而感到更大的压力。
The fact that, yes, there’ll be an extra being in the world — and we can hope that being is going to have a positive life — still doesn’t mean that abortion actually is maximizing utility.
是的，世界上将会多出一个存在，而且我们可以希望这个存在能够过上积极的生活，这一事实仍然并不意味着堕胎实际上正在最大化效用。
That’s a lot of stress on the family to outweigh the value from a whole new life.
家庭承受的压力远远超过了全新生活的价值。
Then that baby will become an adult, in turn, have other children.
然后那个婴儿就会长大成人，进而生下其他孩子。
If the optimal discount rate is low or zero, it’s really a lot of future gain you’re forgoing, right?
如果最佳贴现率很低或为零，那么您实际上会放弃很多未来收益，对吧？
But you’re assuming that having more children in the world today is a net positive, which may be the case, but there are also negatives to it in terms of, that child and then adult will continue to use products that consume energy and produce more greenhouse gases and deprive wildlife of habitat.
但你假设当今世界上有更多的孩子是一个净积极的结果，这可能是事实，但也有消极的一面，即儿童和成人将继续使用消耗能源、产生更多温室气体并剥夺野生动物栖息地的产品。
So there’s a whole lot more involved than just simply saying, having another child is a plus.
因此，这不仅仅是简单地说“再生一个孩子是一个优点”，还有很多其他的事情要做。
Sure, but you don’t say, “Well, once population falls enough due to low total fertility rates, well, then the time will come to ban abortion.” I’ve never met a person who made that calculation.
当然，但你不会说，“好吧，一旦人口由于总生育率低而下降足够多，那么禁止堕胎的时候就会到来。”我从来没有见过一个人能做出这样的计算。
They’re either for or against abortion being legal.
他们要么支持，要么反对堕胎合法。
They don’t say, “Oh, at current population levels, but in 80 years, get back to me.
他们不会说：“哦，按照目前的人口水平，但 80 年后，再回复我。
I’ll change my mind,” which suggests to me it’s just not a utilitarian calculation.
我会改变主意”，这对我来说这表明这不是功利主义的计算。
I do think it would make a difference if the world were underpopulated.
我确实认为，如果世界人口稀少，情况将会有所不同。
One question is whether you would make it illegal.
一个问题是你是否会将其定为非法。
Another question is whether you would discourage it, or think that individual women who had abortions were doing something wrong.
另一个问题是你是否会阻止堕胎，或者认为个别堕胎的女性做错了什么。
I think they are relevant factors, but if what you want .
我认为它们是相关因素，但如果你想要的话。
.
。
.
。
if population falls and you want to have more people, then I think there would be better ways of doing that than prohibiting abortion.
如果人口下降而你想要更多的人，那么我认为有比禁止堕胎更好的方法。
You would give baby bonuses.
你会给宝宝奖金。
Oh, but do both.
哦，但是两者都做。
You don’t have to do one or the other.
您不必选择其中之一。
Well, but you’re probably going to get enough of a population increase by doing the ones that involve more conception rather than more pregnancy termination.
好吧，但是通过采取更多涉及受孕而不是更多终止妊娠的措施，您可能会获得足够的人口增长。
Now, you’re one of three co-editors of the Journal of Controversial Ideas, which I believe started in 2021.
现在，您是《争议思想杂志》的三位联合编辑之一，我认为该杂志于 2021 年创刊。
Is that correct?
这是正确的吗？
I think we produced our first issue then, yes.
我想我们当时就制作了第一期，是的。
What have you learned doing that?
这样做你学到了什么？
I’ve learned that there is a need for our journal, actually.
我了解到实际上我们的日记是有必要的。
I suppose I thought that when we began, but I wasn’t really sure.
我想当我们开始的时候我也是这么想的，但我不太确定。
But one of the interesting things is that we have published a number of interesting papers — I’m not necessarily saying I agree with them — but papers that have worthwhile ideas that should be out there, which would not have got published otherwise, which were being rejected.
但有趣的事情之一是，我们发表了许多有趣的论文 —— 我不一定说我同意它们 —— 但是那些应该发表的有价值的想法的论文，否则不会发表，但被拒绝了。
That happened in the most recent issue, which we just published at the end of April this year, with an article called “Merit in Science,” which actually had 29 co-authors.
我们今年四月底刚刚出版的最新一期就出现了这种情况，其中有一篇名为《科学的优点》的文章，实际上有 29 位共同作者。
I think two of them were Nobel laureates.
我认为其中有两位是诺贝尔奖获得者。
And it was objecting to the fact that, as the authors claimed, positions, research jobs, and also research grants were not simply going to those with the best qualifications or the greatest merit in scientific terms, but were going also on the criteria of maximizing diversity and inclusion.
它反对这样一个事实，即正如作者声称的那样，职位、研究工作和研究补助金不仅仅流向那些在科学方面具有最佳资格或最大优点的人，而且还遵循最大限度地提高多样性和包容性的标准。
The authors of that paper — as I say, a distinguished group of scientists — submitted it to the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences and were told that they wouldn’t publish it because it might be harmful to some people.
该论文的作者——正如我所说，是一群杰出的科学家——将其提交给《美国国家科学院院刊》，并被告知他们不会发表该论文，因为它可能对某些人有害。
I think they shopped it around to another couple of journals before somebody suggested they send it to us.
我认为在有人建议他们将其发送给我们之前，他们已经将其转给了另外几家期刊。
It was published in the Journal of Controversial Ideas.
它发表在《争议思想杂志》上。
It was written about in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times.
《华尔街日报》和《纽约时报》对此进行了报道。
We’ve had a hundred thousand views in the month since we published that issue, which for a peer-reviewed academic journal is pretty unusual.
自从我们出版该期以来，我们在一个月内就有了十万次浏览，这对于同行评审的学术期刊来说是很不寻常的。
It’s open access, right?
它是开放获取的，对吗？
It is free, open access, that’s right.
它是免费的、开放的，没错。
We are supported by donors.
我们得到捐助者的支持。
Anybody who would like to donate to us, please do so.
任何愿意向我们捐款的人，请这样做。
But yes, we’re managing.
但是，是的，我们正在管理。
If you look only at submissions and not acceptances, what’s the most common topic you see crossing the desk of the journal?
如果你只看投稿而不是接受，你在期刊上看到的最常见的主题是什么？
At the moment, I would say it’s transgender issues.
目前，我会说这是变性问题。
Because there are so few outlets where you can say your mind, or —
因为你可以表达自己想法的渠道太少了，或者 ——
There’s a lot of hostility about it.
对此有很多敌意。
So there are two things about a journal.
所以关于日记有两件事。
One is, as I say, that we are prepared to publish controversial ideas that other places are not prepared to publish.
一是，正如我所说，我们准备发表其他地方不准备发表的有争议的想法。
The other is, we’re prepared to publish under a pseudonym if the authors don’t wish to be identified with the article.
另一个是，如果作者不想透露文章的身份，我们准备以笔名发表。
Roughly, I’d say about a third of the articles in each issue, authors prefer to publish under a pseudonym.
粗略地说，每期大约有三分之一的文章，作者更喜欢以笔名发表。
In the area of transgender studies, that’s because many academics have been severely abused and harassed and their lives made quite difficult if they have published things that were seen as transphobic, although I think that term is used far too broadly.
在跨性别研究领域，这是因为许多学者受到了严重的虐待和骚扰，如果他们发表了被视为跨性别者的东西，他们的生活就会变得相当困难，尽管我认为这个词的使用过于广泛。
We could simply say they were not accepting the idea that a person’s identification as a gender is necessarily the last word as to what their gender is.
我们可以简单地说，他们不接受这样一种观点，即一个人的性别认同必然是其性别的最终决定。
Do you worry that with AI, everyone will just be identified?
您是否担心有了人工智能，每个人都会被识别？
“Oh, whose writing style is this?” And it will tell you?
“哦，这是谁的文笔？”它会告诉你吗？
That’s a possibility.
这是一种可能性。
Actually, I must admit that’s one I hadn’t thought of.
事实上，我必须承认这是我没有想到的。
It could be a worry.
这可能是一个担忧。
I don’t know whether maybe we’ll get an AI that will be able to mix people’s writing styles so that they’re harder to identify.
我不知道我们是否会得到一个人工智能，它能够混合人们的写作风格，使他们更难识别。
Do you ever reject good or potentially good pieces just because they’re not controversial enough?
你是否曾经因为好的或潜在的好作品没有足够的争议而拒绝它们？
Yes.
是的。
We say that in our call for papers, that articles must be controversial in some sense, and we tell our reviewers that.
我们在征集论文时说，文章在某种意义上必须具有争议性，并且我们告诉审稿人这一点。
Occasionally, they write back and say, “Yes, this is a reasonable article, but I don’t see why it couldn’t get published in any other journal.” We don’t publish it then.
有时，他们回信说：“是的，这是一篇合理的文章，但我不明白为什么它不能在任何其他期刊上发表。”那时我们不会发布它。
Organizationally, institutionally — put aside philosophy — what do you think of the current Effective Altruist movement?
从组织上、制度上 —— 抛开哲学 —— 你如何看待当前的有效利他主义运动？
I think it’s making progress.
我认为它正在取得进展。
I think it’s a good forum for ideas, and I think it’s had significant influence.
我认为这是一个很好的思想论坛，而且我认为它产生了重大影响。
So, on the whole, I view it positively, which is not to say that I view every aspect of it positively.
所以，总的来说，我对它的看法是积极的，但这并不是说我对它的每个方面都持积极的态度。
Let’s say you were called in to give advice, and probably you have been.
假设你被叫去提供建议，而且很可能你已经这么做了。
What do you tell them they should do different?
你告诉他们应该做什么不同的事情？
I’ve had concerns about the extent to which Effective Altruism has moved in the direction of very long-term thinking about the future, so thinking not just about the present or even the next century or two, but thinking about the next million years.
我一直担心有效利他主义在多大程度上朝着对未来进行长期思考的方向发展，因此不仅要考虑现在甚至下一两个世纪，还要考虑未来一百万年。
William MacAskill, I think, has talked about the next billion years.
我认为威廉·麦克阿斯基尔已经谈到了未来十亿年。
I understand why he’s doing that.
我明白他为什么这么做。
He’s talking about the possible loss that could exist if we become extinct and if, in fact, there is no other intelligent life in this corner of the universe, so we are not replaced by others.
他说的是，如果我们灭绝了，并且事实上，宇宙的这个角落里没有其他智慧生命，那么我们就不会被其他生命所取代，那么可能存在的损失。
I can understand why he wants to emphasize the importance of preventing extinction, but I think there are a number of concerns.
我可以理解他为什么要强调防止灭绝的重要性，但我认为有很多担忧。
One is uncertainty about whether we can actually make a positive difference in this direction and also whether, if you encourage people to ignore present suffering, you’re actually going have a long-term drawback in that people may become more callous, and that may actually contribute to making the world a worse place.
一个是不确定我们是否真的能在这个方向上做出积极的改变，而且如果你鼓励人们忽视当前的痛苦，你是否实际上会遇到一个长期的缺点，因为人们可能会变得更加冷酷无情，这实际上可能会让世界变得更糟。
My advice is not to forget about the present and to continue to have a really major focus on things like reducing extreme poverty, reducing animal suffering, protecting the environment from climate change right now.
我的建议是不要忘记现在，并继续把重点放在减少极端贫困、减少动物痛苦、保护环境免受气候变化影响等事情上。
I’d like to see Effective Altruism with more of a focus, not an exclusive focus, but more of a focus on those issues.
我希望看到有效利他主义有更多的关注，而不是排他性的关注，而是更多地关注这些问题。
Is there too much emphasis on existential risk from AGI in your opinion?
您认为 AGI 是否过于强调存在风险？
I’m not an expert on that risk, but yes, I think there is too much of an emphasis.
我不是这种风险的专家，但是，是的，我认为人们过分强调了这一点。
I think perhaps that has something to do with a lot of the people in AI are people who like these kinds of problems.
我认为这可能与人工智能领域的很多人都喜欢这类问题有关。
How are you going to align super-intelligent AGI with human values?
您将如何使超级智能 AGI 与人类价值观保持一致？
That’s a really interesting problem, and in some ways, it’s a more interesting problem than how are you going to reduce the suffering of animals in factory farms?
这是一个非常有趣的问题，从某些方面来说，这是一个比如何减少工厂化农场中动物的痛苦更有趣的问题？
Or even, how are you going to help people in extreme poverty?
或者甚至，你将如何帮助极端贫困的人？
I think that’s perhaps why there’s been more of a tendency to talk about that and focus on it than is really justified.
我认为这也许就是为什么人们更多地倾向于谈论这个问题并关注它，而不是真正合理的。
Not everyone knows you’ve written a book on Hegel.
并不是每个人都知道你写了一本关于黑格尔的书。
What have you learned from Hegel, who is not a utilitarian, right?
你从不是功利主义者的黑格尔那里学到了什么，对吗？
Not in a simple way.
不是以简单的方式。
Definitely not a utilitarian.
绝对不是功利主义者。
Let me just say, firstly, that book was written a long time ago, I think in the early 1980s.
我只想说，首先，那本书是很久以前写的，我想是在 20 世纪 80 年代初。
Secondly, it’s a very slim book.
其次，这是一本非常薄的书。
It’s a hundred-page book for what was then called the Past Masters series by Oxford University Press.
这是一本一百页的书，当时被牛津大学出版社称为过去的大师系列。
It’s now called A Very Short Introduction.
现在它被称为“非常简短的介绍”。
But it’s a good book.
但这是一本好书。
Let me just make a point of adding that.
让我补充一点。
Thank you.
谢谢。
Thank you.
谢谢。
I’m glad you think it’s a good book.
我很高兴你认为这是一本好书。
I think what I learned from Hegel was that the nature of society at a time, including its economic interests, does influence people’s ideas.
我想我从黑格尔那里学到的是，一个时代的社会本质，包括它的经济利益，确实会影响人们的思想。
Of course, that’s an idea that a lot of people will associate with Marx, but Marx really, I think, took that from Hegel.
当然，很多人都会把这个想法与马克思联系起来，但我认为马克思确实是从黑格尔那里继承了这个想法。
I’m going to say that that’s an insight that I learned from Hegel rather than from Marx.
我想说的是，这是我从黑格尔而不是马克思那里学到的见解。
If you, today, were to write a book about some other philosopher — you’re granted the free time to do it miraculously — who would that philosopher be?
如果你今天要写一本关于其他哲学家的书 ——“你有空闲时间奇迹般地完成它”—— 那个哲学家会是谁？
I did, again with Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, write a book about Sidgwick.
我确实再次与卡塔齐娜·德·拉扎里-拉德克（Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek）一起写了一本关于西奇威克的书。
And Marx, too.
还有马克思。
I have written a very short book about Marx as well, yes.
是的，我也写了一本关于马克思的非常短的书。
I’m interested in the English utilitarians, but I’m interested in the roots of utilitarianism as it goes back further.
我对英国功利主义感兴趣，但我对功利主义的根源感兴趣，因为它可以追溯到更远的地方。
So, I’m not sure.
所以，我不确定。
David Hume is certainly a favorite philosopher and, in some sense, an early utilitarian.
大卫·休谟无疑是一位受人喜爱的哲学家，从某种意义上说，他也是一位早期的功利主义者。
I suppose if I had free time to write, Hume would certainly be a candidate.
我想如果我有空闲时间写作，休谟肯定会是一个候选人。
Where did Parfit go wrong?
帕菲特错在哪里？
The final two-volume set — to me, it seems like a mess.
最后的两卷集 —— 对我来说，它看起来一团糟。
Intellectually, what happened there?
从理智上来说，那里发生了什么？
It’s a three-volume set now, right?
现在已经是三卷本了吧？
Three.
三。
Yes, yes.
是的，是的。
You think the whole three-volume set is a mess, or you think the third volume is a mess, or — ?
你觉得整套三卷很乱，或者你觉得第三卷很乱，或者 —— ？
It’s often interesting, but the whole thing, to me, seems a mess.
这通常很有趣，但对我来说，整件事似乎一团糟。
The project is too hard.
项目太难了。
He’s not thinking marginally enough, and to make all of consequentialism, and maybe Kantianism, compatible — I just don’t think it can be done.
他的思考不够边缘化，要使所有结果主义，也许还有康德主义，兼容 ——我只是认为这是不可能做到的。
I like the fact that you think the project is too hard and you started off by asking me about whether it was a good thing that humans settled North America.
我喜欢这样一个事实：你认为这个项目太难了，你一开始就问我人类定居北美是否是一件好事。
I see the project as making a case for the idea that there are objective values, that things matter objectively, and I think it makes a significant contribution to that project, so I don’t think of it as a failure.
我认为这个项目证明了存在客观价值、事物客观重要的理念，而且我认为它对该项目做出了重大贡献，所以我不认为它是失败的。
There are some parts of it that may be a failure, maybe the attempt to reconcile the three series — a form of consequentialism, a form of Kantianism, and a form of contractualism — maybe that’s a failure.
它的某些部分可能是失败的，也许是调和三个系列的尝试——结果主义的一种形式、康德主义的一种形式和契约主义的一种形式——也许那就是失败。
Certainly, the proponents of those other theories or nonconsequentialist theories don’t really approve of it.
当然，其他理论或非结果主义理论的支持者并不真正赞同它。
In fact, I don’t like the form of consequentialism that he ends up with as part of the triple theory, and I talked to him about that.
事实上，我不喜欢他最终将结果主义作为三重理论的一部分，我和他谈过这一点。
The third volume, to some extent, grapples with that.
第三卷在某种程度上解决了这个问题。
I edited this collection of papers called Does Anything Really Matter?
我编辑了这本论文集，名为《有什么真的重要吗？》
Originally, Parfit was going to reply to in the volume, but then his reply — characteristically for Parfit — grew so long that it had to be a third volume.
本来帕菲特要在卷中回复，但后来他的回复——“帕菲特的典型特征”——变得太长，以至于必须是第三卷。
That’s really why there’s a third volume.
这就是为什么有第三卷的原因。
I think that there are problems with what he says about consequentialism, and he doesn’t really address act consequentialism.
我认为他所说的结果主义有问题，而且他并没有真正解决行为结果主义。
It’s rule consequentialism that he’s reconciling with the others.
他与其他人达成和解的是规则结果论。
I don’t think he succeeds in producing reconciliation between the major ethical theories.
我认为他没有成功地在主要伦理理论之间达成和解。
I think that part of it is a failure.
我认为这部分是失败的。
Why did he fail?
他为什么失败了？
I would say he became so committed to the idea that he had to show that morality is objective — that otherwise nihilism is true, nothing matters, and his whole life would be a waste — that that influenced his acceptance of arguments that otherwise he would not have accepted.
我想说的是，他变得如此坚定，以至于他必须证明道德是客观的——否则虚无主义是真实的，一切都无关紧要，他的一生都将是浪费——这影响了他对那些否则他不会接受的论点的接受。
Who’s an underrated philosopher that we should be reading more, talking about more, thinking about more?
谁是一位被低估的哲学家，我们应该多读书、多讨论、多思考？
I used to say that Sidgwick is an underrated philosopher because he’s the best of the utilitarians, of the 19th-century utilitarians.
我曾经说过，西奇威克是一位被低估的哲学家，因为他是最好的功利主义者，19世纪功利主义者中最好的。
He certainly was neglected, and that’s why Katarzyna and I wrote The Point of View of the Universe, to try to show that he is a great philosopher and that his ethics is still relevant.
他当然被忽视了，这就是为什么卡塔齐娜和我写了《宇宙的观点》，试图表明他是一位伟大的哲学家，他的道德观仍然具有现实意义。
But other people, like Parfit, have also praised him.
但帕菲特等其他人也称赞了他。
I’m not sure to what extent he is still neglected.
我不确定他在多大程度上仍然被忽视。
Say someone active today, whose work you admire — maybe not even in your areas.
比如说今天活跃的某个人，你钦佩他的工作——甚至可能不在你的领域。
As a younger philosopher — and I must admit, he was one of my students — I greatly admire Richard Chappell.
作为一名年轻的哲学家——“我必须承认，他是我的学生之一——”我非常钦佩理查德·查佩尔。
He’s somebody who has a fairly popular Substack blog now and has a little book on Parfit, in fact, we’re talking about.
他现在拥有一个相当受欢迎的 Substack 博客，并且有一本关于 Parfit 的小书，事实上，我们正在谈论。
Does a lot of interesting work.
做了很多有趣的工作。
I’m a big fan of your book, Pushing Time Away: My Grandfather and the Tragedy of Jewish Vienna.
我是你的书《推开时间：我的祖父和犹太维也纳的悲剧》的忠实粉丝。
A few questions in that direction.
朝这个方向提出几个问题。
Should we respect the wishes of the dead?
我们应该尊重死者的意愿吗？
Yes, that’s a good question.
是的，这是一个好问题。
I had that feeling in writing this book.
我在写这本书时就有这种感觉。
For those who don’t know, this book is about my maternal grandfather, who was a victim of the Holocaust.
对于那些不知道的人来说，这本书是关于我的外祖父的，他是大屠杀的受害者。
I was born after the Second World War, so, of course, I never knew him.
我出生在第二次世界大战后，所以，当然，我从来不认识他。
He left a lot of papers, a lot of writings, and I wanted to read them.
他留下了很多论文、很多著作，我想读它们。
In a sense, I suppose I thought, in reading them, and then subsequently, when I decided to write about him, that I was bringing him back and undoing the terrible crime that the Nazis committed against him and so many others.
从某种意义上说，我想，在阅读这些文章时，以及随后当我决定写他时，我想我正在把他带回来，并消除纳粹对他和其他许多人犯下的可怕罪行。
But did I really think that I had an obligation to do that because he might have wished it?
但我真的认为我有义务这样做，因为他可能希望这样做吗？
I toyed with that idea, but I never fully convinced myself of it.
我曾考虑过这个想法，但我从未完全说服自己。
But never fully rejected it either, right?
但也从未完全拒绝过它，对吗？
Yes, perhaps that’s true.
是的，也许确实如此。
I’ve held different forms of utilitarianism throughout my career, and for quite a long time, I was a preference utilitarian.
在我的职业生涯中，我一直持有不同形式的功利主义，并且在相当长的一段时间里，我是一个偏好功利主义者。
A preference utilitarian thinks that the good you should maximize is the satisfaction of preferences.
偏好功利主义者认为，你应该最大化的好处是偏好的满足。
There’s a question, then, about whether the preferences of the dead count.
那么，就有一个问题是，死者的偏好是否算在内。
My supervisor at Oxford, R.M.
我在牛津的导师，R.M.
Hare, thought that they did.
野兔，认为他们做到了。
He thought, in fact, that if there was some ancient Roman and you stumbled across his tombstone, and he engraved on it, “I want an oil lamp to be burning on my gravestone forever,” that gave you a reason — not necessarily an overriding reason — to put an oil lamp on his gravestone and to watch that it kept burning.
事实上，他认为，如果有一个古罗马人，你偶然发现了他的墓碑，他在上面刻下了“我希望我的墓碑上永远燃烧着一盏油灯”，这给了你一个理由——“不一定是压倒一切的理由”——在他的墓碑上放一盏油灯，并看着它一直燃烧。
I wasn’t totally convinced of that.
我并不完全相信这一点。
I must admit that.
我必须承认这一点。
If population shrinks and the past accumulates, we’re going to be in big trouble, right?
如果人口减少，历史积累，我们就会遇到大麻烦，对吗？
Yes, that’s right because we’ll all have to be looking after the preferences of all of those in the past.
是的，这是正确的，因为我们都必须照顾过去所有人的偏好。
Anyway, I’m now a hedonistic utilitarian, so on that view, no. The only reason to pay attention to the wishes of the dead is that the living will have more confidence that their wishes will be respected.
不管怎样，我现在是一个享乐主义的功利主义者，所以从这个角度来看，不。关注死者意愿的唯一原因是生者会更有信心他们的意愿会得到尊重。
Referring especially to early 20th-century Vienna, during times of great cultural achievement, are most thinkers utilitarians?
特别是20世纪初的维也纳，在文化取得巨大成就的时期，大多数思想家都是功利主义者吗？
I would say no, but I want to hear your view.
我会说不，但我想听听你的看法。
I haven’t, in fact, thought about Vienna’s heyday.
事实上，我没有想过维也纳的鼎盛时期。
No, certainly, they were not utilitarians, but then, utilitarianism is a relatively new theory.
不，当然，他们不是功利主义者，但是，功利主义是一个相对较新的理论。
I say, in terms of spreading to non-English-speaking cultures, that’s happened much later, too.
我说，就传播到非英语文化而言，这也发生得很晚。
It’s not surprising that people were not utilitarians in late 19th-century, early 20th-century Vienna.
19 世纪末 20 世纪初维也纳的人们不是功利主义者，这并不奇怪。
But they knew enough.
但他们知道得足够多了。
They knew Bentham and Hume, and they knew consequentialism in some form.
他们了解边沁和休谟，也了解某种形式的结果主义。
They could have been.
他们本来可以的。
It wasn’t some mysterious idea they’d never heard of.
这不是什么他们从未听说过的神秘想法。
Isn’t this like the driverless car problem, where you actually want a society of nonutilitarians?
这不是就像无人驾驶汽车问题一样，你实际上想要一个非功利主义者的社会吗？
I don’t know, do you?
我不知道，你知道吗？
Again, yes, there were some wonderful works of culture and art produced, but the working class had a very rough life, and maybe they would’ve had a better life if there’d been more utilitarian thinking.
再说一次，是的，确实产生了一些精彩的文化艺术作品，但工人阶级的生活非常艰苦，如果有更多的功利主义思想，也许他们会过上更好的生活。
If I try to think, today, which government in the world is most utilitarian — not globally, not for animals, but just for its own citizens — I would tend to think that’s Singapore.
如果我试着思考，今天世界上哪个政府是最功利的 ——不是全球性的，不是为了动物，而是为了本国公民—— 我倾向于认为是新加坡。
Does that make sense to you?
这对你来说有意义吗？
It’s quite possible.
这是很有可能的。
I think the Australian governments are actually reasonably utilitarian, and I’m more familiar with them than I am with the governments of Singapore, but Singapore’s a strong candidate.
我认为澳大利亚政府实际上相当功利，我对他们比对新加坡政府更熟悉，但新加坡是一个强有力的候选人。
If I think of Singapore, it’s a big success.
如果我想到新加坡，那就是一个巨大的成功。
People are quite well off.
人们过得相当好。
They have more freedom than a lot of outsiders like to admit, but it seems not that happy to me, relative to per capita income.
他们比许多局外人愿意承认的拥有更多的自由，但相对于人均收入，我似乎并不那么高兴。
Australia, relative to income, seems really quite happy to me.
就收入而言，澳大利亚对我来说似乎真的很幸福。
Are those consistent with your impressions?
这些与你的印象相符吗？
Maybe there are things that utilitarianism has no control over, like a better climate.
也许有些事情是功利主义无法控制的，比如更好的气候。
It’s not hot and sticky and humid like it is in Singapore all the time.
这里并不像新加坡那样又热又粘又潮湿。
Australia has great beaches.
澳大利亚拥有美丽的海滩。
Natural assets will play a role in how happy the population is.
自然资产将影响人们的幸福程度。
On your book about your grandfather, your ancestors — at the very last page of the book, you say that justice was done to the Nazi leaders, and I fully agree.
在你关于你的祖父、你的祖先的书中——在书的最后一页，你说纳粹领导人得到了正义，我完全同意。
But for a pure utilitarian, what does that mean?
但对于一个纯粹的功利主义者来说，这意味着什么呢？
I think we want to punish people who do great evil as a way of indicating that it’s got an expressivist function, that this was a terrible thing that they did.
我认为我们想要惩罚那些犯下大恶的人，以此表明它具有表现主义功能，表明他们做了一件可怕的事情。
This is an ultimate condemnation that people should learn from, be educated from.
这是人们应该学习、教育的终极谴责。
And also a deterrent function if other people think that they’re going to get away with that.
如果其他人认为他们会侥幸逃脱惩罚，这也具有威慑作用。
In terms of just downright justice, flat-out right and wrong, I consider myself a two-thirds utilitarian, but not completely.
就彻头彻尾的正义、彻头彻尾的对与错而言，我认为自己是三分之二的功利主义者，但并非完全如此。
You’re more than two-thirds.
你已经超过三分之二了。
Can I pull you down to two-thirds and bring in justice for these extreme cases, where you can just point and say, “That was wrong”?
我可以把你的支持率降低到三分之二，并为这些极端案例伸张正义吗？你可以指着说：“那是错误的”？
I think we all have that intuition.
我想我们都有这样的直觉。
It’s not that I don’t have any retributive intuitions.
这并不是说我没有报应直觉。
I don’t want retribution.
我不想遭到报应。
I just want to be able to say it’s wrong without having to count up the utils.
我只是想能够说这是错误的，而不必计算实用程序。
Sorry, to say that what they did is wrong and that they should be punished for it?
抱歉，是说他们做错了，应该受到惩罚吗？
Sure.
当然。
It’s not that I want retribution per se.
并不是我想要报应本身。
As you noted, there are other reasons to punish them.
正如您所指出的，惩罚他们还有其他原因。
Yes.
是的。
I’m happy to say that what they did was wrong and they should be punished for it, and that at a level that is compatible with utilitarianism but also compatible with a lot of other views.
我很高兴地说，他们的所作所为是错误的，他们应该为此受到惩罚，而且惩罚的程度既与功利主义兼容，也与许多其他观点兼容。
Is that enough for you?
这对你来说够了吗？
But is there some nonutilitarian reason that you’re willing to call your own and let in the door?
但是否有一些非功利的理由让你愿意自称并让他们进来？
If so, how do you stop that reason from growing?
如果是这样，你如何阻止这个原因的增长？
At a theoretical philosophical level, I’m going to say no, it’s all explicable in terms of the utility.
在理论哲学层面上，我会说不，这一切都可以用效用来解释。
But as I said, that doesn’t mean that I don’t have nonutilitarian intuitions about it.
但正如我所说，这并不意味着我对此没有非功利主义的直觉。
What do you think of Freud as a philosopher?
您如何看待作为哲学家的弗洛伊德？
I don’t think Freud was a great philosopher.
我不认为弗洛伊德是一位伟大的哲学家。
I think that if he were a great philosopher, he would have been more open to different ideas.
我认为如果他是一位伟大的哲学家，他会对不同的想法更加开放。
Clearly, he was highly authoritarian in his thinking.
显然，他的思想是高度专制的。
He had a set of ideas and wasn’t really prepared to brook opposition to them.
他有一套想法，但并不真正准备好忍受反对。
That’s why my grandfather broke with him, along with Alfred Adler.
这就是我祖父与他决裂的原因，还有阿尔弗雷德·阿德勒。
When the split between Freud and Adler occurred, my grandfather — this is what my mother and aunt told me — my grandfather acknowledged that Freud was, in some sense, the greater genius, but just really didn’t like the way he behaved and how authoritarian he was, and therefore sided with Adler.
当弗洛伊德和阿德勒之间发生分歧时，我的祖父 ——这是我母亲和姨妈告诉我的—— 我的祖父承认弗洛伊德在某种意义上是更伟大的天才，但只是真的不喜欢他的行为方式和他的专制，因此站在阿德勒一边。
I think if Freud had been more open to ideas, he wouldn’t have treated dissent — whether Adlerian or other forms of dissent — in the way he did.
我认为，如果弗洛伊德对思想更加开放，他就不会像他那样对待异议——“无论是阿德勒的还是其他形式的异议”。
Why does so much of professional philosophy today seem so boring?
为什么今天这么多的专业哲学看起来如此无聊？
It’s my subjective opinion, but I meet many philosophers who, to me, don’t seem philosophical at all.
这是我的主观意见，但我遇到了很多哲学家，对我来说，他们似乎根本不哲学。
Not at all the case with you or the other guests we’ve had on the show, but what has gone wrong?
你或我们节目中的其他嘉宾的情况并非如此，但出了什么问题呢？
Or do you challenge my premise?
或者你挑战我的前提？
No, I don’t really challenge your premise, although I do think there’s a lot of good work being done in philosophy.
不，我并没有真正挑战你的前提，尽管我确实认为哲学领域正在做很多好的工作。
Sure.
当然。
I think there’s, obviously, immense competition for jobs, and particularly for tenured jobs.
我认为，显然，工作的竞争非常激烈，特别是终身职位的竞争。
You’re going to be reviewed.
你将接受审查。
Your case for appointment or for tenure is going to be reviewed by your peers, other philosophers.
你的任命或终身职位的申请将由你的同行、其他哲学家进行审查。
They are going to look for work that is the kind of work that gets published in highly rated journals, which is going to tend to be work that reviews, criticizes, builds on work that is already going on in those journals.
他们将寻找那些在高评价期刊上发表的作品，这些作品往往会评论、批评、建立在这些期刊上已经发表的作品的基础上。
I think it’s difficult for young people to break away and say, “Here’s a different area that I want to work in,” or “Here’s something that is broader and less narrow that I want to work in.”
我认为年轻人很难摆脱困境并说：“这是我想要工作的不同领域”，或者“这是我想要工作的更广泛、更不狭窄的领域”。
We tend to get articles which say, “Well, here’s a theory that some philosopher holds.
我们往往会收到这样的文章：“嗯，这是一些哲学家持有的理论。
I’ve got an objection to one part of this theory, and maybe I’ve got an alternative to that.” In a sense, instead of aiming for, really, the lifeblood of the subject, it’s aiming for the capillaries of the subject, in a way.
我对这个理论的一部分持反对意见，也许我有替代方案。”从某种意义上说，它并不是真正瞄准主题的命脉，而是在某种程度上瞄准了主题的毛细血管。
It’s the smaller things that you can get right and you can get articles published in good journals.
你可以把这些更小的事情做好，并且可以在好的期刊上发表文章。
How would you reform that?
你会如何改革呢？
I think you would really have to change the system of making appointments and tenuring people.
我认为你真的必须改变任命和终身任职的制度。
You would.
你会的。
What would you replace the status quo with?
你会用什么来取代现状？
The dean does it all, the students vote, there’s no tenure whatsoever — a lot of options.
院长负责这一切，学生投票，没有任何终身职位——有很多选择。
Do you —
你 ——
Yes, there are a lot of options.
是的，有很多选择。
I’m reluctant to get rid of tenure.
我不愿意摆脱终身教职。
It has been a protection for people to have different and controversial ideas.
它一直是对人们拥有不同和有争议的想法的一种保护。
But it’s not so much anymore, given that you started this journal, which I’m glad you did.
但考虑到你开始写这本日记，它已经不再那么重要了，我很高兴你这么做了。
Surely, you must think tenure is not enough now.
当然，你一定认为现在终身任职还不够。
Yes, it’s not enough, but I worry that people with controversial ideas would simply get fired by deans when people on Twitter start criticizing.
是的，这还不够，但我担心当推特上的人们开始批评时，那些有争议想法的人会被院长解雇。
I’ve really been disappointed in some of these recent controversies where people have been criticized for saying things.
我对最近的一些争议感到非常失望，人们因言论而受到批评。
The extent to which university administrations have not stood up to this Twitter storm and have instead suspended, or in some cases, people who were not on tenure, dismissed or not reappointed people for controversial ideas.
大学管理部门在多大程度上没有经受住这场推特风暴，反而对那些没有获得终身教职的人进行停职，或者在某些情况下，解雇或不再任命那些有争议想法的人。
I think tenure has provided protection for some people.
我认为终身教职为一些人提供了保护。
That’s why I’m still reluctant to get rid of tenure.
这就是为什么我仍然不愿意摆脱终身教职。
I’m not sure.
我不知道。
Maybe giving students more of a role in appointments would be a reasonable factor because they would be interested in things that the professional philosophers might not see as part of philosophy, but they would.
也许让学生在任命中发挥更多作用是一个合理的因素，因为他们会对专业哲学家可能不认为是哲学一部分但他们会的事情感兴趣。
For how many years have you taught at Princeton now?
您在普林斯顿大学任教多少年了？
Oh, 23, 24.
哦，23、24。
How have your students changed over that time?
这段时间你的学生发生了怎样的变化？
What do you notice?
你注意到什么？
It’s actually got harder to get them to do the reading, I think.
我认为，让他们阅读实际上变得更加困难。
When I first came to Princeton, I was very pleasantly surprised that you could set students reading, and you would find that when you talk to them about it, they nearly all had read it.
当我第一次来到普林斯顿时，我非常惊喜地发现你可以让学生阅读，你会发现当你和他们谈论这件事时，他们几乎都读过了。
I think they’re reading less now, and that’s disappointing.
我认为他们现在阅读量减少了，这令人失望。
That’s one difference.
这是一个区别。
Otherwise, I’ve always found there’s a reasonable level of idealism.
除此之外，我总是发现理想主义有一个合理的水平。
I think that fluctuates.
我认为这是波动的。
I find American students — again, this is particularly a Princeton experience — there are some of them who are just wanting to get through the course and get a decent grade and get on with the degree.
我发现美国学生 ——再次强调，这尤其是普林斯顿大学的经历 ——他们中的一些人只是想完成课程并获得不错的成绩并继续攻读学位。
But there are quite a few who come to philosophy courses, and particularly ethics courses like mine, really wanting to think about what they’re going to do with their lives.
但有相当多的人来参加哲学课程，特别是像我这样的伦理课程，真的想思考他们将如何度过自己的一生。
What are their ultimate values?
他们的最终价值是什么？
How are they going to live?
他们将如何生活？
I find that refreshing.
我觉得这令人耳目一新。
I don’t think that’s changed dramatically in any direction, either up or down, over the 24 years I’ve been at Princeton.
我认为，在我在普林斯顿大学工作的 24 年里，这种情况在任何方向上都没有发生巨大的变化，无论是向上还是向下。
Last three questions.
最后三个问题。
First, as a mental-state utilitarian, surely you’re concerned with happiness.
首先，作为一个精神状态功利主义者，你肯定关心幸福。
What advice might you give us today to enjoy our own lives better?
为了更好地享受自己的生活，您今天会给我们什么建议？
Oh, I am very concerned with happiness.
哦，我很关心幸福。
The advice I would give is to think about making your life fulfilling and meaningful.
我给出的建议是考虑让你的生活充实而有意义。
Not to think that it’s just about earning more money, buying more consumer goods, having a richer lifestyle, but contributing to making the world a better place.
不要以为这只是为了赚更多的钱、购买更多的消费品、拥有更丰富的生活方式，而是为让世界变得更美好做出贡献。
This is obviously the goal of Effective Altruism.
这显然是有效利他主义的目标。
But there’s a lot of psychology research showing that people who are generous and are thinking of values, and their lives are in harmony with values, do actually find their lives more rewarding and more satisfying.
但大量心理学研究表明，那些慷慨且考虑价值观的人，以及他们的生活与价值观和谐相处的人，实际上确实发现他们的生活更有意义、更令人满意。
In the spirit of your new book, Animal Liberation Now, what are three things we can do to help other sentient beings?
本着您的新书《现在的动物解放》的精神，我们可以做哪三件事来帮助其他众生？
Firstly, we can stop eating nonhuman animals, and particularly, I would say, stop eating animal products from factory farms.
首先，我们可以停止食用非人类动物，特别是，我想说，停止食用来自工厂化农场的动物产品。
That seems really important.
这看起来真的很重要。
Secondly, we can support the organizations that are trying to combat factory farming.
其次，我们可以支持那些试图打击工厂化农业的组织。
If you want to find the best ones, you can go to Animal Charity Evaluators, which is an effective altruism site for animal charities.
如果你想找到最好的，你可以去Animal Charity Evaluators，这是一个有效的动物慈善机构利他主义网站。
Thirdly, you can get political about this.
第三，你可以把这件事变得政治化。
You can tell your political representatives at all levels of government that animals matter and that you’re going to be more likely to vote for people who have strong policies on animal welfare.
您可以告诉各级政府的政治代表，动物很重要，并且您将更有可能投票给对动物福利制定强有力政策的人。
Final question: After your book tour is over, what will you do next?
最后一个问题：售书活动结束后，您下一步打算做什么？
I’m going to relax a little bit from what I’ve been doing.
我将从我一直在做的事情中放松一点。
I’m going to be teaching my final semester at Princeton because I’m retiring from Princeton at the end of the fall semester.
我将在普林斯顿大学教我的最后一个学期，因为我将于秋季学期结束时从普林斯顿大学退休。
I’ll want to put some time into doing that.
我想花一些时间来做这件事。
Then I’m going to stop and think, are there still other things that I’m really keen to write and do?
然后我会停下来想一想，还有其他我真正热衷于写和做的事情吗？
I’m sure I’m going to be speaking, doing short-form writing about the issues that are important to me.
我确信我会就对我来说很重要的问题发表演讲、撰写简短的文章。
Do I still have a major book in me at this stage?
现阶段我心里还有一本重要的书吗？
I must admit, I’m not sure what that would be.
我必须承认，我不确定那会是什么。
But I’ve been working hard on Animal Liberation Now and, more recently, been trying to promote it and publicize it.
但我一直在为“立即解放动物”而努力，最近，我一直在努力推广和宣传它。
So, I think I need to take a break and take stock and think.
所以，我觉得我需要休息一下，盘点一下，思考一下。
Peter Singer, thank you very much.
彼得·辛格，非常感谢你。
Thank you, Tyler.
谢谢你，泰勒。
It’s been terrific talking to you again.
再次与你交谈真是太棒了。
Photo credit: Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek
照片来源：Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek