Paul Krugman on Politics, Inequality, and Following Your Curiosity (Ep. 51)
Today I’m here with Paul Krugman, who needs no introduction.
今天我和保罗·克鲁格曼在一起，他不需要介绍。
Just to remind you all, this is the conversation with Paul I want to have, not the one you want me to have.
只是想提醒大家，这是我想要与保罗进行的对话，而不是你们希望我进行的对话。
To start with a very basic question: The major tech companies have become increasingly controversial.
从一个非常基本的问题开始：主要科技公司的争议性越来越大。
Do you think there’s a significant market failure there?
您认为那里存在严重的市场失灵吗？
And if so, what would it be?
如果是的话，会是什么？
It’s hard.
这很难。
I think that it’s hard even to start with the market failure.
我认为即使从市场失灵开始也很困难。
Everything about tech, certainly everything about networks, is a violation of the principles that say that a market should be efficient.
关于技术的一切，尤其是关于网络的一切，都违反了市场应该高效的原则。
The trouble is, it’s hard to sort out.
问题是，很难解决。
It’s not that there’s any one thing.
并不是说有任何一件事。
It’s got increasing returns, it’s got imperfect competition, it’s got spillovers.
它有递增的回报，有不完全竞争，有溢出效应。
So I’m not sure what I know is the particular market failure.
所以我不确定我所知道的是特定的市场失灵。
There’s no reason at all to think that Facebook or Twitter or Google are doing the optimal thing from a social point of view.
从社交角度来看，没有理由认为 Facebook、Twitter 或 Google 正在做最好的事情。
The trouble is, trying to figure out what to do as an alternative is not trivial.
问题是，试图找出替代方案并不是一件容易的事。
They have zero price.
他们的价格为零。
That’s very different from the monopolies of the past.
这与过去的垄断有很大不同。
They don’t restrict output.
他们不限制产出。
They try to build these platforms, and it seems increasingly clear, the plan is not to raise price someday, but just to make the platform as big as possible.
他们尝试建立这些平台，而且似乎越来越清楚，计划不是有一天提高价格，而只是让平台尽可能大。
Is that problematic?
这有问题吗？
Or is that just consumer paradise?
或者说这只是消费者的天堂？
What’s problematic is that they’re still — although they’re not charging us anything — they’re not in business for our health, they’re in business for their health.
问题在于，他们仍然 ——尽管他们没有向我们收取任何费用 ——他们不是为了我们的健康，而是为了他们的健康。
They’re in business to sell something else.
他们做生意是为了卖别的东西。
What Google is selling, really — it’s still ads.
事实上，谷歌销售的仍然是广告。
It’s selling advertiser access.
它正在出售广告商访问权。
At some level, that’s what Facebook is doing as well.
在某种程度上，这也是 Facebook 正在做的事情。
Since it’s indirect, in some ways, the reasons to think that it’s going to be non-optimal are even greater.
由于它在某些方面是间接的，因此更有理由认为它不是最佳的。
You can see a little bit.
你可以看到一点点。
I actually don’t use Facebook.
事实上我不使用Facebook。
I have an account, which is impossible to close, but I don’t use it.
我有一个帐户，无法关闭，但我不使用它。
I do use YouTube.
我确实使用 YouTube。
I use it only for music, but I gather there’s a lot of politics on it.
我只用它来听音乐，但我认为它涉及很多政治。
YouTube actually has algorithms that push you towards more extreme stuff.
YouTube 实际上有一些算法可以推动你走向更极端的事物。
That’s because that enhances their ability to market their position.
这是因为这增强了他们推销自己地位的能力。
It’s probably not what most people, if you ask, “Is this what you want?” would say they want.
如果你问“这是你想要的吗？”，这可能不是大多数人的想法。会说他们想要。
But YouTube isn’t interested in what you want — of course, it’s part of Google — but it’s interested in what it can use to make money.
但 YouTube 对你想要的东西不感兴趣——当然，它是 Google 的一部分——但它感兴趣的是它可以用来赚钱的东西。
This is nothing at all like an Econ 101 supply-and-demand market.
这与 Econ 101 的供需市场完全不同。
There’s no reason at all to think it gets it right.
完全没有理由认为它是正确的。
The New York Times recently referred to a new movement.
《纽约时报》最近提到了一项新运动。
They called it “hipster antitrust.” The notion, for instance, that maybe Amazon was bad for a more general commercial ecosystem of publishing and retail.
他们称之为“时髦反垄断”。例如，亚马逊可能不利于出版和零售等更普遍的商业生态系统。
Do you have an opinion on hipster antitrust?
您对时髦反垄断有何看法？
We need something.
我们需要一些东西。
I haven’t actually looked at the hipster antitrust.
我实际上还没有研究过时髦的反垄断法。
Two things, actually, I think are pretty clear.
事实上，我认为有两件事非常清楚。
One is, the old antitrust paradigm still has a lot of relevance.
一是，旧的反垄断范式仍然具有很大的现实意义。
Most of the economy is still not, in fact, novel tech, zero-marginal-cost stuff.
事实上，经济的大部分仍然不是新技术、零边际成本的东西。
Most of it is still traditional stuff, and the fact that we largely stopped enforcing good old-fashioned antitrust is actually a problem.
其中大部分仍然是传统的东西，我们基本上停止执行良好的老式反垄断实际上是一个问题。
It is part of the problem with our economy and part of the problem with rising inequality.
这是我们经济问题的一部分，也是不平等加剧问题的一部分。
How big a part is something?
某物有多大？
That’s hard to pin down, but it’s something.
这很难确定，但确实如此。
Good old-fashioned antitrust is far from irrelevant.
好的老式反垄断绝非无关紧要。
Second, there’s a whole bunch of issues.
其次，存在一大堆问题。
The role of this handful of tech platform providers in possibly distorting markets is a pretty big deal.
这少数技术平台提供商在可能扭曲市场的过程中所扮演的角色是相当重要的。
I have to admit, I haven’t put a lot of effort into trying to think about what the solutions are because it just seems like the political climate for actually doing anything is probably not there.
我必须承认，我并没有花太多精力去思考解决方案是什么，因为似乎实际做任何事情的政治氛围可能都不存在。
The chance of doing anything good is not high, but that may be a bad judgment on my part.
做任何好事的机会并不高，但这对我来说可能是一个错误的判断。
I’ve been more focused on other areas where the market failure is so pervasive that even a market failure framework is almost the wrong way to go about it, like healthcare.
我更关注市场失灵如此普遍的其他领域，即使市场失灵框架也几乎是错误的解决方法，比如医疗保健。
On current politics
关于当前政治
You’ve been tweeting a good deal about politics lately, and in particular the notion that malevolent intentions may be stronger than you had thought.
你最近在推特上发布了大量有关政治的内容，尤其是恶意意图可能比你想象的更强烈的观点。
If you had to explain to someone — not using any names or even party names — but just in terms of a model, what has gone wrong for the United States lately?
如果你必须向某人解释——“不使用任何名字，甚至政党名称”——而只是用一个模型来解释，美国最近出了什么问题？
How would you boil that down to its essence in terms of what you’ve called toy models?
您如何将其归结为您所谓的玩具模型的本质？
Put it this way: our political system is set up on the basis that we elect representatives who will not exactly reflect their voters but will, in fact, deliberate and exercise independent judgment.
可以这么说：我们的政治制度是建立在我们选举代表的基础上的，这些代表不会完全反映选民的情况，但实际上会深思熟虑并做出独立判断。
But we are in an extreme partisan environment in which, for all practical purposes, only the party matters.
但我们正处于一个极端党派之争的环境中，出于所有实际目的，只有政党才是重要的。
All that matters on most things is whether there’s an R or a D, which means that all of the .
对大多数事情来说，重要的是是否有 R 或 D，这意味着所有 .
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Not that long ago, people used to refer to the Senate as the world’s greatest deliberative body in a non-ironic fashion.
不久前，人们还以一种非讽刺的方式将参议院称为世界上最伟大的审议机构。
These days, it’s ridiculous.
如今，这很荒谬。
There is no deliberation that goes on.
没有继续进行深思熟虑。
It’s a completely partisan institution.
这是一个完全党派化的机构。
If the president is of one party, and the Senate majority leader is of another party, presidential appointments just don’t even get hearings.
如果总统属于某一党派，而参议院多数党领袖属于另一党派，那么总统任命甚至不会举行听证会。
What’s the structural reason why that’s become worse?
导致情况变得更糟的结构性原因是什么？
As you said, it was once much better.
正如你所说，它曾经好得多。
I think it’s two things.
我认为这是两件事。
One is simply, I do believe that, in the end, there’s a pretty strong correlation between income inequality and partisan polarization.
一是，我确实相信，最终，收入不平等和党派两极分化之间存在相当强的相关性。
Political scientists who measure polarization have found that’s a really strong correlation.
测量两极分化的政治科学家发现，这种相关性非常强。
It makes sense.
这是有道理的。
In effect, the increasing weight to the right tail of the income distribution has dragged one party off in its direction.
事实上，收入分配右尾权重的增加已经拖累了一方朝自己的方向发展。
That’s opened up a large gap so that the center really just did not hold.
这造成了很大的差距，因此中心实际上无法保持。
There used to be at least some overlap on economic issues between the parties, and there is none now.
过去，双方在经济问题上至少有一些重叠，而现在已经没有了。
The other, which is uglier .
另一个，更难看。
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One of the bases of some degree of bipartisan shift in our politics was, in fact, the overt racism.
事实上，我们政治中两党某种程度转变的基础之一是公开的种族主义。
We used to have two dimensions in American politics, one of which was race — this is what the political science modelers tell us — one of which was race, the other of which was essentially left/right on economics.
美国政治曾经有两个维度，其中一个是种族——“这是政治科学建模者告诉我们的”——“其中一个是种族，另一个本质上是经济学上的左/右”。
Those have collapsed into a single dimension now.
这些现在已经塌陷成一个维度了。
That means that you no longer have the populist Southern senator that used to provide part of what was, in bad ways, the political center.
这意味着你不再拥有民粹主义的南方参议员，他曾经以不好的方式提供了政治中心的一部分。
That’s another piece.
那是另一块。
I have to admit, when all is said and done, I find it a little bit mysterious.
我不得不承认，当一切都说了又做了之后，我发现它有点神秘。
It’s hard for me to quite understand.
我很难完全理解。
I can talk about it.
我可以谈谈。
I think that the role of money in politics has created .
我认为金钱在政治中的作用已经创造了。
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a lot of people in political life now have spent their entire lives within a partisan ecosystem, never really having to step outside.
现在政治生活中的许多人一生都在党派生态系统中度过，从未真正走出去。
Any independence in judgment, any demonstration of an independent conscience is actually career destroying.
任何独立的判断、任何独立良心的表现实际上都会毁掉你的职业生涯。
So the kind of people you get are people who are basically bad people, at the very least very cynical people.
所以你遇到的人基本上都是坏人，至少是非常愤世嫉俗的人。
I still find it hard to understand how people can be quite as cynical as they have become.
我仍然觉得很难理解人们怎么会变得如此愤世嫉俗。
Hayek wrote a famous essay, “Why the Worst Get to the Top in Politics.” At the time, he seemed to think it was a fairly universal tendency, which maybe in the 1940s was a reasonable thing to believe.
哈耶克写了一篇著名的文章，《为什么最糟糕的人能登上政治顶峰》。当时，他似乎认为这是一种相当普遍的趋势，这在 20 世纪 40 年代也许是合理的。
But there seems to be a lot of variation.
但似乎有很多变化。
What’s your underlying model for why the worst sometimes do or do not get to the top?
为什么最糟糕的人有时能够登上顶峰或未能登上顶峰，你的基本模型是什么？
I think there was a time — think about being a US senator — there was a time when, I think, voters cared about someone who wanted to be a US senator seeming senatorial, seeming to have some gravity, some strength of character.
我认为曾经有一段时间——“想想成为一名美国参议员”——我认为，曾经有一段时间，选民关心那些想成为美国参议员的人，他们看起来像参议员，看起来有一定的严肃性，有一定的性格力量。
Now, often that may have been an illusion, but there was still some sense that you wanted a person of high character to be representing you in that august body.
现在，通常这可能是一种幻觉，但仍然有某种感觉，你希望一个品格高尚的人在那个庄严的身体里代表你。
Over time, with increasing partisanship and tribalism, that matters less and less.
随着时间的推移，随着党派之争和部落主义的加剧，这一点变得越来越不重要。
The kinds of things that come out of the mouths of senators .
这类话是从参议员嘴里说出来的。
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I obviously don’t think the parties are the same.
我显然不认为双方是同一个人。
I think that you can find a lot more I-can’t-believe-he-said-that things from the Republicans than the Democrats.
我认为你可以从共和党那里找到更多我不敢相信他说的事情，而不是民主党。
The point is that, for the most part, voters don’t care because they’ve become so polarized that, really in a lot of places, as long as the guy is a Republican, it doesn’t matter what he says.
关键是，在大多数情况下，选民并不关心，因为他们已经变得如此两极分化，实际上在很多地方，只要这个人是共和党人，他说什么并不重要。
Are there potentially beneficial changes you think we should at least consider making to the US Constitution?
您认为我们至少应该考虑对美国宪法进行哪些潜在有益的改变？
I’m reading a lot about the Supreme Court discussion now, and I have to say, some people have been suggesting that, instead of lifetime appointments to the Supreme Court, we should do 18 years, which is probably enough to insulate from short-term political pressures but ends this .
我现在读了很多关于最高法院的讨论，我不得不说，有些人一直在建议，我们不应该对最高法院实行终身任命，而应该任命18年，这可能足以免受短期政治压力，但结束了这一切。
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at least reduces the extreme drama where, when somebody finally collapses, then all hell breaks loose and would basically give every president a chance to nominate two Supreme Court justices.
至少减少了极端的戏剧性，当有人最终崩溃时，一切都会崩溃，基本上会给每位总统一个提名两名最高法院法官的机会。
That sounds like something that would work.
这听起来像是有用的东西。
But in many ways, I think what we really need to do, if we can, is to recreate the kind of society that supported a more reasonable political process, which means reducing income inequality.
但从很多方面来说，我认为如果可以的话，我们真正需要做的是重建一个支持更合理政治进程的社会，这意味着减少收入不平等。
Let me throw out a number of ways we might do that, and tell me what you think.
让我列出一些我们可以做到这一点的方法，然后告诉我你的想法。
Universal basic income.
全民基本收入。
I’m still debating with myself over UBI.
我还在和自己争论 UBI。
The pro is that its automaticity is a big thing.
优点是它的自动化是一件大事。
It matters a lot that Social Security and Medicare are just there.
社会保障和医疗保险的存在非常重要。
No one asks, “Do you need it?
没有人问：“你需要吗？
Do you deserve it?” It’s just there, and UBI would have that character.
你值得吗？它就在那里，UBI 就会有这样的特征。
On the other hand, it’s expensive.
另一方面，它很昂贵。
If you make it generous enough so the people who really, really need help get it, then it’s a lot of money.
如果你足够慷慨，让真正需要帮助的人得到帮助，那么这就是一大笔钱。
If you try to keep the price down, then it’s not good enough.
如果你试图压低价格，那就不够好。
What we have now is a bunch of means-tested programs, which are a lot more generous to people at the bottom than a skinny UBI would be.
我们现在拥有的是一系列经过经济状况调查的计划，这些计划对底层人民来说比微薄的全民基本收入要慷慨得多。
So I’m actually unsure, but that’s a possibility.
所以我实际上不确定，但这是有可能的。
That would only really make a big difference at the bottom, and I think we need to do more further up the scale.
这只会在底层产生很大的影响，我认为我们需要在规模上做更多的事情。
Reparations for descendants of slaves.
对奴隶后代的赔偿。
It’s certainly just, but I find it hard to believe it’s going to happen.
这当然是公正的，但我发现很难相信它会发生。
But that’s not going to change the structure.
但这不会改变结构。
If we were really going to talk about justice, it would make sense.
如果我们真的要谈论正义，那就有意义了。
There will be a fair number of people who say, “Well, my grandparents or my great-grandparents came over in 1915.
会有相当多的人说：“嗯，我的祖父母或我的曾祖父母是 1915 年过来的。
Why should I be liable for this?”
为什么我要为此承担责任？”
But on the other hand, our country was built, in large part, on an incredible injustice.
但另一方面，我们的国家在很大程度上是建立在令人难以置信的不公正之上的。
But that’s not going to change the structure.
但这不会改变结构。
That would be a one-time thing.
那将是一次性的事情。
But symbolic actions can matter.
但象征性的行动可能很重要。
Some of the Supreme Court debate is about symbolism.
最高法院的一些辩论是关于象征意义的。
Look, I think that going after Confederate monuments is a .
听着，我认为追寻南方联盟纪念碑是一种……行为。
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You can say, “What difference does that make in people’s lives?” Well, it’s actually taking away some symbols that say that violent action on behalf of slavery was a good thing.
你可以说：“这对人们的生活有什么影响？”嗯，它实际上消除了一些象征，这些象征表明代表奴隶制的暴力行动是一件好事。
That’s why the monuments were put in there in the first place.
这就是为什么纪念碑首先被放置在那里的原因。
They weren’t actually put in in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War in memory to the heroes.
它们实际上并不是在内战结束后立即投入使用的，以纪念英雄。
They were put in during the Jim Crow era to remind people of the importance of keeping those people in their place.
它们是在吉姆·克劳时代设立的，目的是提醒人们让这些人留在自己的地方的重要性。
That’s the kind of symbolic action I certainly think makes sense.
我认为这种象征性行动当然是有意义的。
Ending the war on drugs and moving to either decriminalization or legalization.
结束毒品战争并走向非刑事化或合法化。
Would it help our cities or hurt them?
它会帮助我们的城市还是会伤害它们？
It probably would help, but I’ve put in no thought at all on drugs.
这可能会有帮助，但我根本没有考虑过毒品。
I’ve just done no homework.
我刚刚没做作业。
Immigration policy.
移民政策。
Maybe your views on this have changed over time.
也许您对此的看法随着时间的推移而改变。
If you could set an ideal immigration policy for 2018, what would it be?
如果你能为2018年制定一个理想的移民政策，你会选择什么？
How would it impact income inequality?
这将如何影响收入不平等？
First, this is one of those areas where my views have changed.
首先，这是我的观点发生变化的领域之一。
If you’d asked me about it 20 years ago, I basically went with a simple model of the labor force being workers with different levels of education.
如果你在 20 年前问我这个问题，我基本上会采用一个简单的劳动力模型，即具有不同教育水平的工人。
Immigration of low-education workers would widen income inequality.
低学历工人的移民将扩大收入不平等。
Then you could ask about some of the other effects and dilemmas and so on.
然后你可以询问一些其他的影响和困境等等。
But I’ve been mostly convinced by evidence that says that an immigrant with a high school degree or less equivalent is really not competing head to head with native-born workers who have similar educational credentials.
但我最相信的证据表明，具有高中或同等学历的移民实际上无法与具有相似教育背景的本土出生的工人正面竞争。
It doesn’t look like they’re filling the same jobs.
看起来他们从事的工作并不相同。
It doesn’t look like they’re competing in the same labor markets.
他们看起来并不像在同一个劳动力市场上竞争。
So I think the income distribution effects of immigration are actually much less than we thought.
所以我认为移民对收入分配的影响实际上比我们想象的要小得多。
The backlash effects that, if too many foreigners enter too rapidly, a lot of native-born Americans become Trump supporters.
如果太多外国人过快地进入，就会产生强烈的反弹效应，许多土生土长的美国人就会成为特朗普的支持者。
How much does that worry you?
这让你有多担心？
My view on immigration has always been that if you aren’t at least somewhat conflicted about it, there’s something wrong with you.
我对移民的看法一直是，如果你对此至少没有多少抵触，那么你就有问题了。
If you want to have a strong social safety net, which I do and most people do if actually pressed on it, then completely open borders is going to get in the way.
如果你想拥有一个强大的社会安全网，我和大多数人都这样做，如果确实施加压力的话，那么完全开放的边界就会成为障碍。
Whether or not it’s really going to bankrupt the system, the sense that lots of people are coming in to take your benefits is going to be a problem.
无论它是否真的会让系统破产，很多人进来拿走你的福利的感觉都会成为一个问题。
My view on immigration has always been that if you aren’t at least somewhat conflicted about it, there’s something wrong with you.
我对移民的看法一直是，如果你对此至少没有多少抵触，那么你就有问题了。
On the other hand, not allowing anybody in is, from a global welfare point of view, is a terrible thing because one of the best ways to improve people’s lives is to give them a chance to move to a place where they’re more productive.
另一方面，从全球福利的角度来看，不允许任何人进入是一件可怕的事情，因为改善人们生活的最佳方法之一就是给他们机会搬到生产力更高的地方。
And there are good reasons to think that just our own economic prospects are enhanced by immigration.
我们有充分的理由认为，移民只会增强我们自己的经济前景。
So some kind of inevitably awkward compromise is what you’re going to do.
因此，你要做的就是某种不可避免的尴尬妥协。
Then the question becomes, “How many million immigrants a year are we talking about?” That’s a hard question to answer.
那么问题就变成了：“我们谈论的每年有多少百万移民？”这是一个很难回答的问题。
Restricted immigration, but not slamming the door, has got to be the right place to be.
限制移民，但不关门，必须是正确的地方。
This is America.
这是美国。
Diversity has been our huge strength over the centuries.
几个世纪以来，多样性一直是我们的巨大优势。
It’s a real betrayal of our own history and of our prospects to turn it off.
关闭它是对我们自己的历史和我们的前景的真正背叛。
By the way, I’m sitting here at CUNY, which is the quintessential children-of-immigrants school system.
顺便说一句，我坐在纽约市立大学，这是典型的移民子女学校系统。
As is my school now, George Mason.
就像我现在的学校，乔治梅森大学一样。
And it continues to fill that role.
它继续扮演这个角色。
It did, of course, in previous generations .
当然，在前几代人中也是如此。
.
。
.
。
Janet Gornick — in the office next door, runs the Stone Center — and I are both CUNY babies.
珍妮特·戈尔尼克（Janet Gornick）——在隔壁的办公室里，经营着斯通中心（Stone Center）——而我都是纽约市立大学的婴儿。
Her father went to CCNY and mine went to Brooklyn College.
她的父亲去了 CCNY，我的父亲去了布鲁克林学院。
The story is the same but the ethnicity is different now.
故事是一样的，但现在种族不同了。
In 1996, for the New York Times, you wrote a very interesting essay called “White Collars Turn Blue.” I took this, on your part, to be a speculation, not an actual prediction.
1996 年，您为《纽约时报》写了一篇非常有趣的文章，名为《白领变蓝》。我认为这只是你的猜测，而不是实际的预测。
You mused about the possibility that maybe the returns to education would fall dramatically because of automation.
您思考过，由于自动化，教育回报可能会急剧下降。
Do you think this has in any way come about?
您认为这会以某种方式发生吗？
The Times actually assigned, told people to write things from the perspective of a century from now, looking back, and I was the only one who was willing to do it straight.
《泰晤士报》实际上指定了，告诉人们从一个世纪后的角度来写东西，回顾过去，而我是唯一一个愿意直接做的人。
You predicted ride sharing in that piece, by the way.
顺便说一下，你在那篇文章中预测了拼车。
I don’t know if you remember this.
我不知道你是否还记得这一点。
Yeah, it was fun.
是的，很有趣。
None of it was entirely serious, but yeah, there is this question.
这些都不是完全严肃的，但是，是的，有这个问题。
At the moment, college degrees still carry a significant wage premium.
目前，大学学位仍然具有显着的工资溢价。
But there is a question in many ways, in the longer run — I think I did say that — a lot of the things we think of as being high skill, requiring lots of education, are actually the kinds of things that computers can, in the end, do.
但从长远来看，在很多方面都存在一个问题——我想我确实说过了——很多我们认为需要高技能、需要大量教育的事情实际上都是计算机最终可以做的事情。
AI, or machine learning, whether that’s really AI or not, but it can do a whole lot of stuff that we thought of, not very long ago, as being the stuff that you have to go to school for years and years to achieve.
人工智能，或者机器学习，无论它是否真的是人工智能，但它可以做很多我们不久前想到的事情，这些事情是你必须去学校很多年才能实现的。
Whereas robot plumbers are still quite a ways off because the material world tends to be full of unpredictable, hard-to-model features.
然而，距离机器人水管工还有很长的路要走，因为物质世界往往充满了不可预测、难以建模的特征。
The idea that we’re always going to be spending huge resources or that it will always make sense to put a lot of effort into higher education is at least arguable.
我们总是会花费大量资源，或者在高等教育上投入大量精力总是有意义的想法至少是有争议的。
I think the idea that we could become a society where education goes back to being a status symbol for the elite is a live possibility.
我认为，我们可以成为一个教育重新成为精英地位象征的社会，这种想法是有可能实现的。
On US voters
关于美国选民
If I think a lot of your criticisms of the Republicans, of Donald Trump, as I read you, very often you’re saying that what’s wrong here is really quite obvious.
当我读到你的文章时，如果我认为你对共和党、唐纳德·特朗普的很多批评，你常常会说这里的问题真的很明显。
So, that it’s still happening, is your view that somehow shame has become too weak a force?
那么，这种情况仍然在发生，你是否认为羞耻感已经变得太弱了？
Or is it asymmetric information?
还是信息不对称？
Is there simply some kind of permanent lock that bad forces have over various processes?
是否存在某种邪恶势力对各种进程的永久锁定？
Kind of the micro foundations of how some very obvious wrongs could persist.
一些非常明显的错误如何持续存在的微观基础。
Oh, sure.
哦，当然。
We have to ask why.
我们必须问为什么。
The question is, for different people, why do certain wrongs persist?
问题是，对于不同的人来说，为什么某些错误会持续存在？
Of the question, why do people continue to claim that cutting top marginal tax rates has huge positive effects on growth?
问题在于，为什么人们继续声称削减最高边际税率对增长有巨大的积极影响？
A proposition for which there is zero evidence.
零证据的主张。
The answer is, who benefits from the perception that cutting top tax rates is good for growth?
答案是，谁会从降低最高税率有利于经济增长的观点中受益？
That’s almost a question that answers itself.
这几乎是一个可以自我回答的问题。
It doesn’t take a whole lot of money, relative to the amount of wealth in our society, to create a whole structure of institutions that reward people who will endorse supply-side economics.
相对于我们社会的财富总量来说，不需要花很多钱就能创建一个完整的制度结构来奖励那些支持供给侧经济学的人。
But at the voter level, most voters don’t know that debate.
但在选民层面，大多数选民并不了解这场辩论。
They see Republicans doing bad things.
他们看到共和党人在做坏事。
Republicans are still getting re-elected.
共和党人仍在争取连任。
We might have all Republican governors in New England, which to me is deeply strange.
新英格兰可能全都是共和党州长，这对我来说非常奇怪。
At the voter level, there’s two things.
在选民层面，有两件事。
The Republican governors in New England is a little weird because they often don’t behave like Republicans.
新英格兰的共和党州长有点奇怪，因为他们的行为常常不像共和党人。
I was in New Jersey.
我当时在新泽西。
I was in Massachusetts, both places that are deep blue, so much so that you end up with kind of routine machine politics, corruption among the Democrats, and people elect Republicans just to get a break from the machine.
我在马萨诸塞州，这两个地方都是深蓝色的，以至于你最终会陷入一种例行公事的机器政治，民主党腐败，人们选举共和党只是为了摆脱机器的束缚。
They don’t necessarily pursue policies that are anything like those of the national party.
他们不一定奉行与国家党类似的政策。
That’s an exceptional case.
这是一个特例。
Ordinary people, people with real lives, real jobs, people who aren’t paid to think about abstract policy issues are, understandably really, more poorly informed that those of us who push around words and symbols for a living can easily appreciate.
普通人，有现实生活、有实际工作的人，没有报酬去思考抽象政策问题的人，可以理解的是，他们的见识更贫乏，而我们这些以文字和符号为生的人很容易理解。
If you ask people, do they actually know what the policies are being propounded, if you ask them do they know what Republican healthcare policies actually are — maybe more so now than a year or two ago — but still mostly not.
如果你问人们，他们是否真的知道正在提出的政策是什么？如果你问他们，他们是否知道共和党的医疗保健政策实际上是什么——“现在可能比一两年前更了解”——但仍然大多不知道。
People are poorly informed.
人们信息匮乏。
Of course, sometimes they’re actively misinformed by Fox News or something.
当然，有时他们会被福克斯新闻之类的东西误导。
It’s instructive, being out there in public, writing for a newspaper, even writing for the New York Times, and then looking at the mail you get.
这是很有启发性的，在公共场合，为报纸撰稿，甚至为《纽约时报》撰稿，然后查看你收到的邮件。
Leaving aside the crazy and hate stuff, but just the sort of ordinary citizens — they’ve heard from somebody that there’s a plan to replace the US dollar with some global currency.
抛开疯狂和仇恨的东西不谈，就普通公民来说——他们从某人那里听说有计划用某种全球货币取代美元。
You know and I know that’s ridiculous.
你知道，我也知道这很荒谬。
But these aren’t necessarily stupid people.
但这些人并不一定是愚蠢的人。
They’re not devoting a lot of time to public affairs.
他们没有投入大量时间处理公共事务。
Of course, the news environment is — leave aside, again, the partisan media — tends to be very information scarce.
当然，新闻环境是 ——再次抛开党派媒体 ——信息往往非常稀缺。
Years back, during the 2004 campaign, I went through transcripts for network news over a three-month period on the issue of healthcare, to find out how much would somebody who got their news from watching the TV news programs have learned about Bush versus Kerry on healthcare.
几年前，在 2004 年竞选期间，我浏览了三个月内有关医疗保健问题的网络新闻记录，以了解通过观看电视新闻节目获得新闻的人对布什与克里在医疗保健问题上的了解有多少。
The answer was, not one thing.
答案是，不是一件事。
There were a couple of stories about how their healthcare strategies were playing politically, but there were none at all about the actual content of their healthcare programs.
有一些关于他们的医疗保健策略如何在政治上发挥作用的故事，但根本没有关于他们医疗保健计划的实际内容。
So why would we expect voters to necessarily recognize bad ideas?
那么，为什么我们期望选民一定会认可坏想法呢？
A lot of times you remind me of the earlier progressive historians: the notion special interests and self-interest is rife, that it’s quite obvious that someone needs to blow the whistle, that there’s a kind of ongoing moral struggle in America.
很多时候你让我想起早期的进步历史学家：特殊利益和自身利益的概念很普遍，很明显有人需要揭发，美国存在着一种持续的道德斗争。
A lot of it’s about economic self-interest.
其中很多都是关于经济自身利益的。
Is that an identification you either agree with or make self-consciously, or you just think it’s evolved that way because of historical constants?
这是你同意或自觉做出的一种认同，还是你只是认为它是由于历史常数而演变的？
No, I think it’s evolved that way.
不，我认为它就是这样进化的。
First of all, that’s always been somewhat true.
首先，这在某种程度上一直是正确的。
You’ll always need to be blowing the whistle on self-interested stuff that’s going on in the hope that the public won’t understand it.
你总是需要揭发正在发生的自私的事情，希望公众不会理解。
But it’s also true the progressive movement arose during a period of great income inequality and corporate dominance of a lot of politics.
但进步运动确实是在收入严重不平等和企业在许多政治领域占据主导地位的时期兴起的。
And here we are, in an era of great economic inequality and corporate dominance of politics.
我们现在正处于一个经济严重不平等、企业在政治上占据主导地位的时代。
So of course, we’re going to sound the same when critiquing a lot of the conventional wisdom.
所以，当然，当我们批评许多传统观点时，我们会发出同样的声音。
You’ve written a few times that you started with history before economics, but never explained that much besides mentioning Isaac Asimov’s Foundation Trilogy.
你曾多次写道，你先从历史开始，然后再从经济学开始，但除了提到艾萨克·阿西莫夫的《基础三部曲》之外，你从未解释过太多。
A funny kind of history, but still a historically oriented series of novels.
一段有趣的历史，但仍然是一部以历史为导向的系列小说。
What else did your early history background consist of?
您的早期历史背景还包括哪些内容？
And how has that shaped your thought?
这对你的想法有何影响？
I took lots of courses.
我选修了很多课程。
In my nonfiction reading, history is dominant.
在我的非小说类阅读中，历史占主导地位。
I just find that the story of the past, whether or not it actually translates into any direct parallels with the present, is a great way to have a sense of the world.
我只是发现过去的故事，无论它是否真的与现在有任何直接的相似之处，都是了解世界的好方法。
You have a paper with Venables from the mid ’90s in the QJE.
QJE 上有一篇 90 年代中期维纳布尔斯的论文。
I think it’s called “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations.” It’s really a paper about history.
我认为这就是“全球化与国家不平等”。这确实是一篇关于历史的论文。
For some reason, it’s become somewhat neglected.
由于某种原因，它有点被忽视了。
The notion that, as transportation costs fall very low, that nations on the periphery come back at the expense of the nations in center — do you think that’s what’s happening to the world today?
随着交通成本下降得非常低，边缘国家会以牺牲中心国家的利益为代价回归——你认为这就是当今世界正在发生的事情吗？
I think we don’t really know.
我想我们真的不知道。
Source
来源
Just around the corner, Branko Milanovic has his office, and Branko has the famous elephant curve that shows income growth around the world.
布兰科·米兰诺维奇 (Branko Milanovic) 的办公室就在拐角处，布兰科 (Branko Milanovic) 拥有著名的大象曲线，该曲线显示了世界各地的收入增长情况。
There’s a clear transition after the late 1980s as globalization really takes off.
20 世纪 80 年代末之后，随着全球化真正起飞，出现了明显的转变。
You start to see twin peaks: the global one percent pulling away from the rest, but also the global middle — the Chinese middle class, really — experiencing rapid growth, with a trough in between, which is the working class in advanced countries.
你开始看到双峰：全球百分之一的人与其他人拉开差距，而且全球中产阶级——中国的中产阶级，真正的——正在经历快速增长，中间有一个低谷，那就是发达国家的工人阶级。
Is that actually because of globalization?
这实际上是因为全球化吗？
Or are common factors driving both globalization?
或者推动全球化的共同因素是什么？
I don’t think we really know.
我认为我们真的不知道。
It’s certainly a nice story.
这当然是一个好故事。
Tony Venables and I were having some fun.
托尼·维纳布尔斯和我玩得很开心。
We were working on economic geography and realized that one way you could cast the model would be one that would give you this U-shaped behavior in which you start from a world of high transport costs with very little globalization.
我们当时正在研究经济地理学，并意识到构建模型的一种方法是提供一种 U 形行为，即从一个运输成本高且全球化很少的世界开始。
Reduce them some, and the world differentiates into an advanced region and a peripheral region.
减少一些，世界就会分化为先进地区和外围地区。
Then reduce them further, and the peripheral region, with its lower costs, makes a comeback.
然后进一步减少，周边地区成本更低，卷土重来。
That’s a nice story.
这是一个很好的故事。
It’s probably too simple to capture what really went on.
可能太简单了，无法捕捉到底发生了什么。
On infrastructure
关于基础设施
What’s your view on NIMBY versus YIMBY?
您对 NIMBY 与 YIMBY 有何看法？
Do we need to build more in America’s major cities?
我们需要在美国的主要城市建造更多的建筑吗？
Oh, yeah.
哦，是的。
I’m a total YIMBY on that.
我对此完全不认同。
There are reasons for certain kinds of zoning restrictions, but that has very little to do with most of the reasons we don’t build housing.
某些类型的分区限制是有原因的，但这与我们不建造住房的大多数原因关系不大。
If you like, it’s a place where at least a lot of liberals are wrong, and the de facto policies of a lot of conservative places are right.
如果你愿意的话，在这个地方，至少有很多自由主义者是错误的，而很多保守派地方的事实上的政策是正确的。
You want to allow more building.
你想要允许更多的建设。
New York is in many ways a thriving, successful example of what you can do.
从很多方面来说，纽约都是一个蓬勃发展、成功的典范。
We make it way too hard to build housing for people who want to come here, and the result is to price out a lot of people who really should be part of this experience.
我们为想要来这里的人建造住房变得太困难，结果是让很多真正应该参与这种体验的人付出了高昂的代价。
Henry George’s single land tax — would you consider it as a means of both encouraging building and reducing inequality?
亨利·乔治的单一土地税——你会认为它是鼓励建立和减少不平等的一种手段吗？
I just haven’t done my homework on that.
我只是还没有做这方面的功课。
If you think of the international supply chains that spread across many countries — Richard Baldwin has written on this.
如果你想到遍布许多国家的国际供应链 ——理查德·鲍德温（Richard Baldwin）对此有过论述。
You have yourself.
你有你自己。
Do you think we’re now in an era where those chains are, in essence, contracting or collapsing?
您是否认为我们现在正处于一个这些链条本质上正在收缩或崩溃的时代？
And what is now done in China may end up being done in Mexico or NAFTA?
现在在中国所做的事情最终可能会在墨西哥或北美自由贸易协定中做？
And that will unravel?
那会解开吗？
Was it all too utopian to begin with?
这一切一开始就太乌托邦了吗？
It wasn’t utopian.
这不是乌托邦。
It worked.
它起作用了。
It is true that global trade really soared from about 1990 to 2010 and then sort of leveled off.
确实，从 1990 年到 2010 年，全球贸易确实猛增，然后趋于平稳。
It does look as if it was a one-time thing, the combination of trade liberalization in emerging markets and reduced transportation and transaction costs — because it’s not just the shipping costs, but it’s the costs of getting things on and off the ships, and all that led to it.
这看起来确实像是一次性的事情，新兴市场的贸易自由化与运输和交易成本降低的结合——因为这不仅仅是运输成本，而且是装卸物品的成本以及所有导致这一成本的成本。
But it looks like it was a one-time surge in trade, this value-chain kind of trade.
但看起来这只是一次贸易激增，这种价值链贸易。
There’s some indication that there was a little bit of overreach, that businesses, in search of saving that last penny, built international logistics chains that were just too complex, too subject to delays, disruption, and that there wasn’t advantage in moving stuff back closer to home.
有迹象表明，存在一点过度行为，企业为了节省最后一分钱，建立了过于复杂、容易延误、中断的国际物流链，而且将货物运回离家较近的地方并没有优势。
So there probably would have been some retrenchment anyway.
所以无论如何，可能都会有一些裁员。
Now, you tell me what’s going to happen with our trade conflict.
现在，你告诉我我们的贸易冲突将会发生什么。
It’s perpetual.
这是永恒的。
Supply chains will contract and become more regional.
供应链将收缩并变得更加区域化。
But how big?
但有多大呢？
How severe?
有多严重？
First of all, even the regional stuff — I have to say that the trade policy guy in me is, in some ways, enjoying this.
首先，即使是区域性的事情 —— 我不得不说，在某种程度上，我内心的贸易政策专家也很享受这一点。
It’s been, historically, for a long time, a pretty boring subject.
从历史上看，很长一段时间以来，这一直是一个非常无聊的话题。
That’s right.
这是正确的。
World trade was almost free; nothing was happening.
世界贸易几乎是自由的；什么也没发生。
Now, all of a sudden, not only is stuff happening, but it’s happening in unpredictable directions.
现在，突然之间，事情不仅发生了，而且还朝着不可预测的方向发生。
Even after the 2016 election, if you had told me that we would be making nice with Mexico but in dire conflict with Canada .
即使在 2016 年大选之后，如果你告诉我，我们会与墨西哥和好，但与加拿大会发生严重冲突。
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I have no idea how far this goes.
我不知道这件事能走多远。
I suspect that .
我怀疑。
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Let’s put it this way.
这么说吧。
A good guess would be that the regional trading agreements are more robust in the end, just because business has so much of a stake in maintaining them.
一个不错的猜测是，区域贸易协定最终会更加稳健，因为企业在维护这些协定方面拥有很大的利害关系。
But who knows?
但谁知道呢？
Given the trends in economic geography we see, the trends and evolving technologies, do you think the two American coasts will become increasingly economically important?
鉴于我们看到的经济地理趋势、趋势和不断发展的技术，您认为美国的两个海岸在经济上会变得越来越重要吗？
Or will, at some point, that trend reverse itself?
或者，这种趋势会在某个时候逆转吗？
It really looks as if agglomeration economies have become more important.
看起来集聚经济确实变得更加重要了。
We really do see a migration of economic activity to the areas that are already rich, and that is a little interesting.
我们确实看到经济活动正在向已经富裕的地区迁移，这有点有趣。
There was a debate — it still goes on a bit — there was a debate 20 years ago: With the internet, distance shouldn’t matter.
有一场辩论 ——“现在还持续着一点”——20 年前有一场辩论：有了互联网，距离不再重要。
Why won’t people relocate to where land is cheap and there’s no traffic?
为什么人们不搬迁到土地便宜且没有交通的地方？
It doesn’t seem to happen.
这似乎并没有发生。
There seem to be other factors that make it more, not less, desirable to locate where the action is.
似乎还有其他因素使得定位行动所在的位置变得更加可取，而不是更少。
As far as we can tell, it’s still going in that direction.
据我们所知，它仍在朝这个方向发展。
I’m a little reluctant to be sure that it continues.
我有点不愿意确定它会继续下去。
Ex ante, it wasn’t at all clear which way it was going to go.
事前，根本不清楚事情会走向何方。
To the extent that we can model this at all, which is pretty limited, it seems to be there are countervailing factors.
就我们可以对此进行建模的程度而言，这是相当有限的，似乎存在一些抵消因素。
I don’t think anyone had enough insight to know that it was going to turn out that the big metropolitan areas were going to be winners rather than losers from this trend.
我认为没有人有足够的洞察力知道大都市地区将成为这一趋势的赢家而不是输家。
On macroeconomics
论宏观经济
A few macro questions.
几个宏观问题。
How much do you worry about slowing population growth as a factor for an ongoing slowing of aggregate demand?
您对人口增长放缓作为总需求持续放缓的一个因素有多担心？
Very much.
非常。
There’s a little story here.
这里有一个小故事。
Larry Summers became famous for advocating the idea that we’re facing secular stagnation.
拉里·萨默斯因倡导“我们正面临长期停滞”的观点而闻名。
I had written about the same time, or even a month or so earlier, along the same lines, except what I wrote was very poorly formulated and unreadable.
我大约在同一时间，甚至一个月左右之前写过同样的内容，只是我写的内容非常糟糕且难以阅读。
Larry came up with this crystal clear explanation of the issue.
拉里对这个问题做出了清晰的解释。
So he gets all the credit, and what’s even worse is he deserves it.
所以他得到了所有的荣誉，更糟糕的是他应得的。
So I get really pissed because I blew it on that one.
所以我真的很生气，因为我把它搞砸了。
I think that the secular stagnation–type stories, the stories that say that, with falling population growth, we have a hard time generating enough investment demand to use the desired savings, so that interest rates tend to be low even when times are good and tend to hit the zero-bound way too often, is a good story.
我认为，长期停滞型故事是一个好故事，这些故事说，随着人口增长下降，我们很难产生足够的投资需求来使用所需的储蓄，因此即使在经济好的时候，利率也往往很低，而且往往会经常触及零界限。
It’s not 100 percent certain that it’s right, but I think it’s a good story.
虽然不能百分百确定它是正确的，但我认为这是一个好故事。
The first dress rehearsal for the difficulties that we’ve all had since 2008 was Japan.
自 2008 年以来我们所经历的困难的第一次彩排是在日本。
Japan famously is the place where declining working-age population kicked in well before it happened in the rest of the advanced world.
众所周知，日本是一个早在其他发达国家就开始出现劳动年龄人口下降的国家。
I think it’s a big issue.
我认为这是一个大问题。
Political risk aside, which we’ve already discussed, what do you think is the number-one danger to the global economy right now?
除了我们已经讨论过的政治风险之外，您认为目前全球经济面临的头号危险是什么？
Is it corporate debt?
是企业债务吗？
Is it China?
是中国吗？
Is it Turkey plus Argentina?
是土耳其加阿根廷吗？
Something else?
还有别的事吗？
I’ve been arguing that the next recession will be a smorgasbord recession.
我一直认为下一次衰退将是一场自助式衰退。
It will be a mix of all of these.
它将是所有这些的混合体。
There’s no one huge thing that stands out, but there’s a bunch of things where it looks like the Minsky financial cycle.
没有一件大事引人注目，但有很多事情看起来像明斯基金融周期。
After a long period without shocks, people get complacent.
在长时间没有受到冲击之后，人们会变得自满。
They start extending themselves, taking risks, taking on leverage that creates new risks.
他们开始扩展自己，承担风险，利用杠杆创造新的风险。
That all tends to proliferate.
这一切都有扩散的趋势。
The thing that makes it dangerous is not so much that there’s this one huge weakness as the fact that, in a typical recession, the Fed cuts interest rates by something like 600 basis points.
其危险之处并不在于存在这一巨大弱点，而在于在典型的经济衰退中，美联储会降息约 600 个基点。
At the moment, the Fed only has 200 basis points to cut.
目前，美联储只需降息200个基点。
It ties in with the question about secular stagnation, is the fact that we’re starting from a position of really low interest rates, which means that monetary policy is not very effective.
与长期停滞问题相关的是，我们是从非常低的利率开始的，这意味着货币政策不是很有效。
We’re accumulating no one huge problem in the economy, but arguably a bunch of smaller ones.
我们没有积累经济中的一个大问题，但可以说是一堆较小的问题。
If several of them come to a head together, then we’re set up for a very difficult business cycle again.
如果其中几个问题同时发生，那么我们将再次面临一个非常困难的商业周期。
Janet Yellen mentioned yesterday, I read, that the Fed may need to raise interest rates again at this point.
我读到珍妮特·耶伦昨天提到，美联储此时可能需要再次加息。
If you view that matter different than she does, how would you trace that difference back to underlying frameworks?
如果您对此事的看法与她不同，您将如何将这种差异追溯到底层框架？
That’s an interesting question because as far as I can tell .
这是一个有趣的问题，因为据我所知。
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She’s very dovish.
她非常鸽派。
We all know, right?
我们都知道，对吧？
Yeah.
是的。
As far as I can tell, her framework is not very different from mine, and what my framework was telling me is, don’t raise rates because, actually, a somewhat higher inflation rate would be extremely useful.
据我所知，她的框架与我的框架没有太大不同，而我的框架告诉我的是，不要提高利率，因为实际上，稍微高一点的通货膨胀率将非常有用。
If you don’t raise rates now, you can get up to somewhat higher inflation, which means that you’ll have room to get real interest rates lower during the next slump, and that would be a good thing.
如果现在不加息，通胀可能会更高，这意味着在下一次经济衰退期间，你将有空间降低实际利率，这将是一件好事。
So why doesn’t Janet Yellen see it that way?
那么为什么珍妮特·耶伦不这么认为呢？
My answer is that, for reasons that are less intellectual and more almost social, anyone who’s been associated with central banking is really wedded to the 2 percent inflation target.
我的回答是，出于一些不那么理智、更接近社会的原因，任何与央行有联系的人都真正执着于 2% 的通胀目标。
If you accept that the 2 percent inflation target is sacrosanct, then yeah, there’s pretty reasonable grounds to think that, although inflation has been very low to come along, the chances that, if the Fed doesn’t raise rates further, inflation will start to creep noticeably above 2 percent are reasonable, reasonably high.
如果你承认 2% 的通胀目标是神圣不可侵犯的，那么是的，我们有相当合理的理由认为，尽管通胀一直非常低，但如果美联储不进一步加息，通胀将开始明显攀升至 2% 以上的可能性是合理的、相当高的。
If you take that as your constraint — inflation must not be allowed to substantially exceed 2 percent — then yeah, you need to raise rates, but I don’t accept the starting premise.
如果你以此为约束条件 ——通货膨胀不得大幅超过2%——那么，是的，你需要提高利率，但我不接受这个起始前提。
If we have a service-sector economy where contracts are not renegotiated all the time — workers’ bargaining power, at times, will be weak — would the American public put up with, say, a 4 percent inflation rate, knowing their real wages would be cut into, and they would have to struggle to get that back every time there’s a bargaining cycle?
如果我们的服务业经济不总是重新谈判合同——“工人的讨价还价能力有时会很弱”——美国公众是否会忍受，比如说，4%的通货膨胀率，因为他们知道他们的实际工资会被削减，而且每次有一个讨价还价周期时，他们都必须努力收回工资？
That’s a good question, although I’m not sure that the service economy aspect really makes a big difference to the extent that .
这是一个很好的问题，尽管我不确定服务经济方面是否真的会产生很大的影响。
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But there are fewer unions, right?
但工会较少，对吗？
There are fewer unions.
工会较少。
But on the other hand, fewer unions might mean that more wages could arguably become more flexible than not.
但另一方面，更少的工会可能意味着更多的工资可能会变得更加灵活。
What is true is we don’t have COLAs.
事实是我们没有可乐。
Actually, I’m showing my age by even knowing what a COLA is.
事实上，我什至知道可乐是什么，就暴露了我的年龄。
Cost-of-living adjustment.
生活费用调整。
At the moment, it’s not the public is saying 4 percent inflation or 3 percent inflation is unacceptable.
目前，公众并没有说 4% 或 3% 的通胀率是不可接受的。
It’s all the central bankers who are there.
所有的央行行长都在场。
I am actually old enough to remember a 4 percent inflation economy, which is the second half of the 1980s, and I don’t remember people complaining bitterly about inflation during those years.
事实上，我已经足够大了，还记得20世纪80年代后半叶的通货膨胀率为4%的经济，而且我不记得那些年里人们对通货膨胀有强烈的抱怨。
It felt OK.
感觉还可以。
We shouldn’t be inventing a public objection without clear evidence that it’s really there.
在没有明确证据证明确实存在的情况下，我们不应该发明公开反对意见。
Meanwhile, the economics that says that a 4 percent inflation rate makes a lot of sense, I think, is pretty strong.
与此同时，我认为 4% 的通胀率在经济学上是非常有道理的。
The economics that said the 2 percent was enough has all turned out to be wrong, given the experience of the last 10 years.
从过去十年的经验来看，认为 2% 就足够的经济学观点被证明是错误的。
In your view, how well run is New York City as an entity?
在您看来，纽约市作为一个实体的运行状况如何？
Not very.
不太。
Compared to what?
与什么相比？
Actually, I like de Blasio.
事实上，我喜欢白思豪。
I actually think he’s done some really good things.
我实际上认为他做了一些非常好的事情。
What he’s done on education, and even on affordable housing, is actually quite substantial.
他在教育，甚至经济适用房方面所做的工作实际上是相当可观的。
But the city is so big and the problems are so large that people may not get it.
但城市太大了，问题太大了，人们可能看不明白。
I will say, it is crazy that you have a city that is so dependent on public transportation, and yet the public transportation is not actually under the city’s control and has clearly been massively neglected.
我想说，这是一个疯狂的城市，如此依赖公共交通，但公共交通实际上并不在城市的控制之下，而且显然被严重忽视了。
I don’t suffer the full woes of the subway, but I suffer some of them, even myself.
我并没有经历地铁的全部痛苦，但我也经历了其中的一些痛苦，甚至是我自己。
The city could be run better than it is, but it’s certainly not among the worst-managed political entities in the United States, let alone in the world.
这座城市的管理本可以比现在更好，但它肯定不是美国管理最差的政治实体之一，更不用说在世界上了。
Purely local control of the subway to internalize those gains, you think would be a good idea?
纯粹由地方控制地铁来内部化这些收益，你认为是个好主意吗？
Probably it would be.
也许会是这样。
It would mean that the complaints would be felt sooner, that there would probably be less .
这意味着抱怨会更快地被感受到，而且可能会更少。
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The subway is desperately strapped for money but has spent a fair bit on things that seem to be more about prestige than actually improving the daily ride.
地铁资金极度短缺，但在看起来更多是为了声誉而不是实际改善日常乘坐的事情上花费了相当多的钱。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
I’m not sure what else is important.
我不确定还有什么重要的。
Someplace where de Blasio I think is in the wrong: We could really use a congestion tax.
我认为白思豪有一个错误的地方：我们真的可以征收拥堵税。
I guarantee you that outside the window just behind me, there is a standing traffic jam because there always is.
我向你保证，就在我身后的窗外，堵车一直存在，因为一直都是这样。
Sure.
当然。
I’m not sure exactly how the politics would .
我不确定政治会如何。
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what do I know about political institutions and their effect?
我对政治制度及其影响了解多少？
Only amateur, only what anybody who reads the newspaper does.
只是业余爱好者，只是读报纸的人所做的事情。
But there are things that could be done better.
但有些事情可以做得更好。
Bringing down infrastructure costs, in part to be able to build more.
降低基础设施成本，部分原因是为了能够建设更多基础设施。
What’s the trick there?
这里面有什么窍门呢？
It doesn’t seem to be mainly labor unions.
看来主要不是工会。
Why can’t we do it?
为什么我们做不到？
It seems to be there’s just a lot of cross-cutting interests.
似乎有很多交叉的兴趣。
It’s not mostly the labor unions.
这主要不是工会。
It does seem to be something about some combination of opposing bureaucracies.
这似乎确实是一些对立官僚机构的结合。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
It is a remarkable thing, though.
不过，这是一件了不起的事情。
Why everything is so expensive, I still haven’t figured it.
为什么东西都那么贵，我还没想明白。
That’s not a New York problem.
这不是纽约的问题。
That’s an everywhere problem.
这是一个无处不在的问题。
Sure.
当然。
But some areas — London seems to run much better than New York.
但有些地区——伦敦的运行情况似乎比纽约好得多。
That’s right.
这是正确的。
It’s a US problem.
这是美国的问题。
Cleanliness, certain kinds of public order .
清洁度、某些公共秩序。
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even though New York is safe now.
尽管纽约现在很安全。
But it doesn’t look like a well-run city in every way when you walk past garbage, say.
但比如说，当你走过垃圾时，它看起来并不像是一个管理良好的城市。
There’s some of that.
有一些这样的。
Although, actually, I would say that I remember New York 40 years ago.
不过，实际上，我会说我记得 40 年前的纽约。
So do I.
我也一样。
It’s inconceivable how much it’s gotten better.
难以想象它已经好转了多少。
By the way, this is not a recent thing.
顺便说一下，这并不是最近发生的事情。
I don’t think New York gets enough credit for the brilliant innovation, I don’t know how many decades ago, of the four-track subway system, with express and local trains.
我不认为纽约因不知多少年前的四轨地铁系统（包括快车和慢车）的辉煌创新而得到足够的赞誉。
It makes a huge difference in the livability of the city and the ability to commute within it.
它对城市的宜居性和城市内的通勤能力产生了巨大的影响。
There’s something in the US build .
美国有一些东西。
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how did we get there?
我们是怎么到达那里的？
We used to be a great country on infrastructure.
我们曾经是一个基础设施大国。
We used to be the great builders of the world.
我们曾经是世界的伟大建设者。
Incredible.
极好的。
The best, right?
最好的，对吧？
Now we can’t seem to .
现在我们似乎不能。
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a mile of anything costs at least a billion dollars, and I don’t know why.
任何东西一英里至少要花费十亿美元，我不知道为什么。
What do you think of the William Baumol cost disease hypothesis?
您如何看待威廉·鲍莫尔的成本疾病假说？
There are just some sectors where rising wages mean they cost more and more and become less effective.
只有某些行业的工资上涨意味着成本越来越高，效率也越来越低。
This is obviously true of some things, but it’s not clear that that applies to infrastructure.
对于某些事情来说显然是这样，但尚不清楚这是否适用于基础设施。
The old Baumol hypothesis was very much, service costs were always going to rise relative to goods production.
鲍莫尔的旧假设是，服务成本相对于商品生产总是会上升。
But that’s not at all clear more recently where, at least during the productivity spurt we had from ’95 to ’05, a lot of it was in the service sector.
但最近还不清楚，至少在 95 年到 05 年生产力突飞猛进的时期，其中很大一部分是在服务业。
So I think it varies.
所以我认为这会有所不同。
With changing technologies, the cost disease may be afflicting different sectors.
随着技术的不断变化，成本病可能会困扰不同的行业。
Machine learning already means that a lot of stuff that we used to think of as cost disease–afflicted service sectors has now actually gotten startlingly cheap.
机器学习已经意味着，我们过去认为受疾病困扰的服务行业的很多东西现在实际上变得便宜得惊人。
On things interstellar
关于星际事物
Will there ever be interstellar trade in intellectual property?
是否会有知识产权的星际贸易？
You send your technology to a planet far away.
你将你的技术发送到一个遥远的星球。
It arrives much later, of course.
当然，它到来的时间要晚得多。
Or you trade Beethoven to the aliens in return for a transporter beam?
或者你将贝多芬交易给外星人以换取传送光束？
Can this work?
这可以吗？
You’ve written a paper that seems to indicate it can work.
你写的一篇论文似乎表明它是可行的。
I wrote a paper on the theory of interstellar trade when I was an unhappy assistant professor.
当我还是一个不快乐的助理教授时，我写了一篇关于星际贸易理论的论文。
Are there any happy assistant professors?
有快乐的助理教授吗？
I was just blowing off steam.
我只是发泄一下而已。
But it’s an interesting question.
但这是一个有趣的问题。
It could become your most important paper, right?
它可能会成为你最重要的论文，对吗？
KRUGMAN: We could imagine that there would be some way.
克鲁格曼：我们可以想象会有某种办法。
We’d have to find somebody to trade with, although it’s the kind of thing — if you try to imagine interstellar trade for real in intellectual property — it’s probably the kind of thing that would be more like government-to-government exchanges.
我们必须找到可以进行交易的人，尽管这种事情 ——“如果你尝试想象真正的知识产权星际贸易”—— 这可能更像是政府与政府之间的交流。
It sounds like it would be really, really hard, although some science fiction writers are imagining that something like Bitcoin would make it possible to do these long-range .
听起来这真的非常非常困难，尽管一些科幻小说作家正在想象像比特币这样的东西可以让这些远程操作成为可能。
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I don’t think something like Bitcoin is even going to work here.
我认为像比特币这样的东西在这里根本行不通。
One might hope that in the 23rd century or something, that we’ve actually gotten to the point where we will give, we will share our knowledge with the aliens out of our goodness, and they will do the reverse.
人们可能希望在 23 世纪之类的时候，我们实际上已经达到了我们愿意给予的地步，我们会出于善意与外星人分享我们的知识，而他们会做相反的事情。
The Star Trek universe appears to be a postcapitalist society, so who knows?
《星际迷航》宇宙似乎是一个后资本主义社会，所以谁知道呢？
If you can send humans out into space at near light speeds and bring them back, does that mean real interest rates have to fall to zero?
如果你能以接近光速的速度将人类送入太空并将他们带回来，这是否意味着实际利率必须降至零？
Many years could pass, and you could save and come back a trillionaire.
许多年过去了，你可以储蓄并成为万亿富翁。
First of all, actually, it’s not clear that the returns are high enough to make that an attractive proposition.
首先，实际上，尚不清楚回报是否足够高以使其成为一个有吸引力的提议。
There was an old, old story about the guy who put a dollar in the bank and left it in a perpetual trust fund and eventually ends up owning the economy.
有一个非常非常古老的故事，讲的是一个人把一美元存入银行，然后存入永久信托基金，最终拥有了经济。
But in fact, R has been less than G on average, historically, so that doesn’t actually happen.
但事实上，从历史上看，R 的平均值一直小于 G，所以这种情况实际上并没有发生。
I think the same thing is true.
我认为同样的事情也是如此。
You don’t need interstellar trade for that, right?
你不需要星际贸易，对吧？
You could have cryonics.
你可以进行人体冷冻检查。
But the fact of the matter is, that would not have worked.
但事实是，那是行不通的。
If you had found yourself a way to do a Rip Van Winkle, with intent to reclaim your invested money from a century ago, I don’t think you would have done all that well.
如果你找到了一种像瑞普·范·温克尔那样的方法，意图收回一个世纪前投资的钱，我认为你不会做得那么好。
I don’t think that’s going to be the constraint.
我认为这不会成为限制。
Star Trek versus Star Wars.
星际迷航与星球大战。
Which do you find more interesting?
你觉得哪个更有趣？
Oh, boy.
哦，男孩。
Good thing about Star Trek is that there were lots of shows and not three absolutely horrible movies that I refuse to watch.
《星际迷航》的好处是有很多节目，而不是三部我拒绝观看的绝对可怕的电影。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
I’ve actually never been all that into either one.
事实上，我从来没有那么热衷于其中任何一个。
Purely nonintellectual stuff.
纯粹是非智力的东西。
I think the use of iconography, of just the way things look in Star Wars is a lot more interesting, but the social speculation in Star Trek is more interesting.
我认为《星球大战》中图像的使用、事物的外观更有趣，但《星际迷航》中的社会猜测更有趣。
So, both have their virtues, and the truth is, I’m not all that into either one.
所以，两者都有各自的优点，而事实是，我对其中任何一个都不感兴趣。
What would be a science fiction novel that maybe people don’t all know about that you would recommend that influenced how you think about the world?
您会推荐哪些可能人们都不知道的科幻小说，它会影响您对世界的看法？
We know the connection to Asimov, Iain Banks, the Culture series.
我们知道与阿西莫夫、伊恩·班克斯和文化系列的联系。
What else?
还有什么？
Charlie Stross — almost everything he writes.
查理·斯特罗斯（Charlie Stross）——几乎他写的所有东西。
Charlie Stross, if people don’t know, is an English writer but living in Edinburgh.
如果人们不知道的话，查理·斯特罗斯是一位住在爱丁堡的英国作家。
Incredibly prolific and writes these multiple linked series of books.
非常多产，撰写了这些多重链接的系列书籍。
And he blogs.
他还写博客。
And he blogs, which is also great fun.
他还写博客，这也很有趣。
The Merchant Princes novels involved world-walkers, people who can step in between alternative universes.
《商人王子》的小说涉及世界行走者，即能够穿行于不同宇宙之间的人。
They come from an alternative timeline in which North America is this backward medieval society.
他们来自另一个时间线，其中北美是一个落后的中世纪社会。
They can step back and forth to our timeline.
他们可以来回回顾我们的时间线。
You would think that they would bring back our technology and transform everything.
你可能会认为他们会带回我们的技术并改变一切。
In fact, they have some of our technology, but their society stays medieval and backward.
事实上，他们拥有我们的一些技术，但他们的社会仍然是中世纪和落后的。
They basically used their world-walking ability to be drug smugglers.
他们基本上是利用自己的行走世界的能力成为毒品走私者。
I’ve actually written about this.
我实际上写过这个。
This is a series that’s about development economics, about having access to advanced technology doesn’t make you an advanced society, and how hard it is actually to achieve social change.
这是一个关于发展经济学的系列，关于获得先进技术并不会让你成为一个先进的社会，以及实现社会变革实际上有多困难。
The dream of a generalized psychohistory is outlined in the Foundation Trilogy.
基础三部曲概述了广义心理史学的梦想。
Will it ever be possible?
这有可能吗？
Probably not.
可能不会。
It’s just a motivating dream?
这只是一个激励人心的梦想吗？
That’s what I always wanted.
这就是我一直想要的。
That’s why I went into economics, as I say.
正如我所说，这就是我进入经济学的原因。
I’ve wanted to be a psychohistorian.
我一直想成为一名心理史学家。
The reason we can get even as far as we do in economics is that economics is about the simplest, crudest aspects of human motivation and behavior — getting and spending, basically.
我们之所以能够在经济学中取得如此大的成就，是因为经济学是关于人类动机和行为的最简单、最原始的方面——基本上是获取和支出。
Even there we don’t do too great, but at least we have a pretty good idea of what it is people are trying to do.
即使在这方面我们做得也不是很好，但至少我们很清楚人们正在尝试做什么。
Get beyond that, and it gets way harder.
超越这个范围，事情就会变得更加困难。
Returning to nonfiction, is there an economically viable role for humans in space?
回到非小说类内容，人类在太空中是否能发挥经济上可行的作用？
That’s unclear.
这还不清楚。
At the moment, it doesn’t seem obvious that there is if you try to think about the things you can actually use space for.
目前，如果你尝试思考一下你实际上可以利用空间做些什么，那么这一点似乎并不明显。
Colonizing space doesn’t look like a great thing to do.
殖民太空看起来并不是一件好事。
There’s a lot of things you can imagine.
有很多事情你可以想象。
In fact, space is already extremely useful for communications and could become useful for some kinds of manufacturing.
事实上，太空对于通信已经非常有用，并且可能对某些类型的制造业有用。
But it’s hard to see that any of these things require that there be people up there.
但很难看出这些事情中的任何一个都需要有人在那里。
What about diversification?
那么多元化呢？
The earth is vulnerable, if only to asteroid strikes.
地球很容易受到小行星撞击。
There’s a case to be made for it, but is there an incentive to do it?
这是有理由的，但有动力这样做吗？
Who internalizes that gain?
谁将这种收益内在化？
Yeah, who internalizes?
是啊，谁内化了？
A lot of space, a lot of science fiction is built around the analogy between space and the frontier, but it’s not much like that.
很多太空、很多科幻小说都是围绕太空和边境之间的类比而建立的，但事实并非如此。
There’s not rich land waiting to be exploited.
没有肥沃的土地等待开发。
There’s an extremely hostile environment.
这里的环境极其恶劣。
I mean, we haven’t colonized Antarctica, either.
我的意思是，我们也没有殖民南极洲。
On the Paul Krugman production function
关于保罗·克鲁格曼生产函数
To finish up the discussion, a few questions about what I call the Paul Krugman production function.
为了结束讨论，我提出几个关于我所说的保罗·克鲁格曼生产函数的问题。
In the 1990s, you wrote a well-known paper.
在20世纪90年代，您写了一篇著名的论文。
It’s called “How I Work.” It was giving people tips, not quite advice for other people, but how it is that you get things done.
这就是“我的工作方式”。它给人们一些提示，而不是给其他人的建议，而是如何把事情做好。
A few decades have passed since then.
从那时起已经过去了几十年。
What do you think you’ve learned about getting things done that was not in your paper “How I Work”?
您认为您在完成“我的工作方式”论文中没有的事情方面学到了什么？
I put in a lot more effort.
我付出了更多的努力。
First of all, I still think that reads pretty well as a description of how I work.
首先，我仍然认为这对于我的工作方式的描述读起来很好。
At the time I wrote that, though, I was writing for academics.
不过，当我写这篇文章时，我正在为学者写作。
Now, I do a lot, obviously, of public intellectual stuff.
现在，显然我做了很多公共知识分子的事情。
So you would probably have to add some principles about thinking about how this reads to people who are intelligent but come at it with no background.
因此，你可能需要添加一些原则来思考如何让那些聪明但没有背景的人读懂它。
One of the principles I think about all the time with the Times is, nobody has to read your column, so you have to have a hook at the beginning, and you have to have a zinger at the end.
我一直在思考《泰晤士报》的原则之一是，没有人必须阅读你的专栏，所以你必须在开头有一个吸引人的地方，在结尾处也必须有一个亮点。
Style matters, as it should because people have scarce time, and you have to give them a reason to spend time with you.
风格很重要，因为人们的时间很少，所以你必须给他们一个与你共度时光的理由。
And of course, these days, with Twitter, which it turns out, I guess, if numbers are an indication, I do well at.
当然，现在有了 Twitter，我想，如果数字可以说明的话，我在 Twitter 上做得很好。
There, I think the most important thing is to just not think about how many people are reading it.
在那里，我认为最重要的是不要考虑有多少人正在阅读它。
Dance as if no one is watching, tweet as if no one is reading.
跳舞就好像没有人在看，发推就好像没有人在读书。
That just seems to be the way to make it work.
这似乎就是让它发挥作用的方法。
Dance as if no one is watching, tweet as if no one is reading.
跳舞就好像没有人在看，发推就好像没有人在读书。
You mentioned having had, around 1987, a kind of temporary dry spell in your career.
你提到，1987 年左右，你的职业生涯经历过一段短暂的干旱期。
How is it you pulled yourself out of that?
你是如何摆脱困境的？
No idea.
不知道。
It just happened.
它就这样发生了。
It just happened.
它就这样发生了。
I was thinking about lots of things, running around to conferences, and somehow that gelled into a series of good ideas.
我思考了很多事情，跑来跑去参加会议，不知何故，这些想法凝聚成了一系列好主意。
I guess, given the trajectory, the dry spell was the anomaly.
我猜，考虑到轨迹，干旱期是异常现象。
If you were given a free decade you could take off and then return to the life you had, what would you do with that decade?
如果给你十年自由的时间，你可以起飞然后回到原来的生活，你会用这十年做什么？
Oh, God.
哦，上帝。
That’s hard.
这很难。
I’m 65 years old.
我今年 65 岁了。
I’m pretty set in my ways.
我已经很确定自己的方式了。
It’s hard to think about.
很难想象。
You could read more books.
你可以多读点书。
You could travel around.
你可以到处旅游。
I’m sort of doing that already.
我已经在这么做了。
That’s the thing.
就是这样。
I’m not working as hard as I was.
我不再像以前那样努力工作了。
This past summer, I was trying to decide between two bike trips in Europe that both looked really appealing.
去年夏天，我试图在欧洲的两次自行车旅行之间做出决定，这两次旅行看起来都很有吸引力。
Then I said, “What the hell.” So I did both of them.
然后我说：“到底是什么？”所以我都做了。
I’m taking more time to see the world, do stuff.
我花更多的时间去看世界，做事。
The great luxury of being where I am now is the end of ambition.
我现在所处的位置是一种极大的奢侈，这就是野心的终结。
There are no more notches I need to put in my belt, no more rungs I need to climb on the ladder.
我不再需要在腰带上放任何凹口，不再需要在梯子上爬任何横档。
Aside from the fact that the world is going to hell otherwise, I’m just basically having a good time.
除了世界将会变得地狱这一事实之外，我基本上只是过得很开心。
The great luxury of being where I am now is the end of ambition.
我现在所处的位置是一种极大的奢侈，这就是野心的终结。
There are no more notches I need to put in my belt, no more rungs I need to climb on the ladder.
我不再需要在腰带上放任何凹口，不再需要在梯子上爬任何横档。
Aside from the fact that the world is going to hell otherwise, I’m just basically having a good time.
除了世界将会变得地狱这一事实之外，我基本上只是过得很开心。
Is that utopia or dystopia, however?
然而，这是乌托邦还是反乌托邦呢？
Because presumably to have arrived at your current point, you’re driven in some set of ways.
因为大概要到达当前的位置，您会受到某些方式的驱动。
Now, you’re not sure what the next step is.
现在，您不确定下一步是什么。
There was a period, I have to say — I think I’m over that hump, but we’ll see if I go crazy in the near future, but there’s a moment when you .
有一段时间，我不得不说 —— 我想我已经度过了那个难关，但我们会看看我是否会在不久的将来发疯，但有那么一刻，你……。
.
。
.
。
I suspect that quite a few people, after getting a Nobel Prize or something, actually experience a spell of depression because now what?
我怀疑相当多的人在获得诺贝尔奖或其他什么之后，实际上经历了一段抑郁症，因为现在怎么办？
I had a little bit of that, but that’s a point where you just find things that you’re interested in.
我有一点这样的想法，但那就是你只能找到你感兴趣的东西的地方。
You know that whole business about “Do what you love and the money will follow”?
你知道“做你喜欢做的事，钱就会随之而来”这句话吗？
That, of course, is garbage.
那当然是垃圾。
But if the money is already there, you’re being paid a nice salary, then you can do what you love.
但如果钱已经有了，你的薪水也不错，那么你就可以做你喜欢做的事情。
Let’s say a very smart 20-year-old came to you and said, “I want to be the next Paul Krugman,” and they meant as a public intellectual, not as a research economist.
假设一个非常聪明的 20 岁年轻人来找你说，“我想成为下一个保罗·克鲁格曼”，他们的意思是作为一名公共知识分子，而不是作为一名研究经济学家。
What advice would you give them?
你会给他们什么建议？
The truth is I have no idea.
事实是我不知道。
I would say, maybe, that it’s just be interested in a lot of things, but when you find something that really grabs your attention, work at it seriously.
我想说，也许，只是对很多事情感兴趣，但是当你发现真正吸引你注意力的东西时，认真地去做。
Figure stuff out.
把事情弄清楚。
Curiosity, as opposed to intellectual complacency, is the big thing.
与智力上的自满相反，好奇心是最重要的。
If you don’t feel that the explanations you’re being given of something — whether it’s international trade patterns or the Japanese slump or something — if you don’t feel that the explanations quite hold together, then worry at it.
如果你不觉得别人对某件事的解释 ——无论是国际贸易格局还是日本经济衰退还是其他什么—— 如果你觉得这些解释不太站得住脚，那就担心吧。
Try to find something.
尝试寻找一些东西。
Scratch that itch.
抓一下痒处。
Don’t let it go away.
不要让它消失。
Whether that will turn out to do what you want it to do, I don’t know.
我不知道这是否会达到你想要的效果。
For a budding research economist, would it, in fact, be the exact same advice?
对于一个崭露头角的研究经济学家来说，这实际上是完全相同的建议吗？
Oh yeah, except that what I would say is that at this point, don’t do what I did, which was very heavily theory-oriented, simple models, because there’s always a possibility of that, but now we are in this golden age of empirical work.
哦，是的，除了我要说的是，在这一点上，不要做我所做的事情，这是非常以理论为导向的简单模型，因为总是有这种可能性，但现在我们正处于实证工作的黄金时代。
The same advice that we used to give our grad students: Find facts and data that have not been heavily worked over, and look for anomalies or look for natural experiments that shed light on disputed issues.
我们曾经给研究生的同样的建议是：寻找尚未经过大量研究的事实和数据，寻找异常现象或寻找能够阐明有争议问题的自然实验。
Go out there and look at the world.
走出去看看世界。
I suspect that stepping beyond traditional economic methodology is going to be productive in the years ahead.
我怀疑，超越传统的经济方法论在未来几年将会富有成效。
We just had the Rainwater Lecture here.
我们刚刚在这里举办了雨水讲座。
We had a lecture from an ethnologist, who goes and talks to working-class fathers.
我们听了一位民族学家的讲座，他去和工人阶级的父亲们交谈。
I was blown away by .
我被震撼了。
.
。
.
。
It’s a totally different research method from anything we do in economics, normally.
这是一种与我们通常在经济学中所做的任何研究方法完全不同的研究方法。
It’s totally different and, of course, requires a degree of personal interaction with the subject you’re studying that I would find terrifying.
这是完全不同的，当然，需要与你正在学习的学科进行一定程度的个人互动，而我会觉得这很可怕。
But that made me think, “I wonder how many insights might we get by doing things in a way that’s very different from anything that’s now part of the standard economics research paradigm?”
但这让我想到，“我想知道，通过采用与现在标准经济学研究范式截然不同的方式做事，我们可以获得多少见解？”
Paul Krugman, thank you very much.
保罗·克鲁格曼，非常感谢你。
Thank you.
谢谢。