Noel Johnson and Mark Koyama on <em>Persecution and Toleration</em> (Ep. 59)

By the time you get to the Renaissance, there is more tension that’s emerging in Europe, in part because of states growing more powerful, rising state capacity.

到了文艺复兴时期，欧洲出现了更多的紧张局势，部分原因是国家变得更加强大，国家能力不断增强。

States are expanding their territory.

各国正在扩大领土。

States are attempting to impose themselves more in different parts of life, and this is starting to generate certain tensions.

各国正试图将自己更多地强加于生活的不同领域，这开始产生一定的紧张局势。

This is sometimes called the rise of the persecuting state.

这有时被称为迫害国家的崛起。

But when you view it as a time series, it seems that you get more capitalism or more advanced state structures, and then more anti-Semitism.

但当你将其视为一个时间序列时，你似乎会看到更多的资本主义或更先进的国家结构，然后是更多的反犹太主义。

How do I square those two tendencies?

我如何平衡这两种倾向？

Or am I wrong?

还是我错了？

But in Europe, you have an initial phase where individuals are being categorized according to identity rules.

但在欧洲，在初始阶段，个人根据身份规则进行分类。

They’re being placed into legal categories and social categories, that it’s based on things like their religious identity.

他们被分为法律类别和社会类别，这是基于他们的宗教身份等因素。

Jewish communities are one of the easiest groups to identify this with.

犹太社区是最容易认同这一点的群体之一。

They’re forced to live in the same place.

他们被迫住在同一个地方。

They’re forced to wear different kinds of clothes.

他们被迫穿不同种类的衣服。

They can do different sorts of occupations.

他们可以从事不同种类的职业。

This is an equilibrium, at first.

首先，这是一种平衡。

And during this time, you observe relatively little persecution of these groups.

在此期间，您观察到对这些群体的迫害相对较少。

One reason is because they’re in their place, so there’s not the same tension that’s being generated there.

原因之一是因为他们在自己的位置上，所以那里不会产生同样的紧张气氛。

Also, they’re serving a purpose.

而且，它们也是有目的的。

And it’s often, for Jews, for example, in the sense that they are raising money for non-Jews.

例如，对于犹太人来说，这通常是指他们为非犹太人筹集资金。

For towns, they might grant Jews the monopoly right to lend money.

对于城镇来说，他们可能会授予犹太人放贷的垄断权。

Then, of course, Jews make monopoly profit from lending out at higher interest rates.

当然，犹太人通过以更高的利率放贷来赚取垄断利润。

But of course, the Jews don’t get to keep this money.

但当然，犹太人无法保留这笔钱。

It’s taken by, say, the town burghers.

比如说，它被镇上的市民拿走了。

And then they’re taxed.

然后他们就被征税了。

This is actually a rather pernicious equilibrium because you also get a cultural byproduct, which is that Jews are perceived as Shylocks lending at excessive interest rates.

这实际上是一种相当有害的平衡，因为你还会得到一个文化副产品，那就是犹太人被视为以过高的利率放贷的夏洛克。

And this generates anti-Semitism, which in turn makes it easier for them to be taxed by the secular authority or by the Christian authorities.

这会产生反犹太主义，进而使他们更容易被世俗当局或基督教当局征税。

So that equilibrium — you don’t necessarily see a tremendous amount of persecution yet.

因此，这种平衡 ——你不一定会看到大量的迫害。

However, every now and then, that breaks down, and you do.

然而，时不时地，这种情况就会崩溃，而你就会崩溃。

But then what starts to happen as you get into the Renaissance, and especially as you get more towards the Reformation, you have states expanding.

但当你进入文艺复兴时期，特别是当你更多地走向宗教改革时，就会发生什么，你的国家正在扩张。

This is the next phase, where you’re moving out of these identity rules, where, importantly, you don’t have to have strong states in that world.

这是下一阶段，你将摆脱这些身份规则，重要的是，你不必在那个世界上拥有强大的国家。

You can rely on — you mentioned capital.

你可以信赖——你提到了资本。

You can rely on market mechanisms, often, in order to run your state.

你通常可以依靠市场机制来管理你的国家。

Tax farming, or subcontracting to Jews to raise money for you — these sorts of things.

包税，或者分包给犹太人来为你筹集资金——诸如此类的事情。

This puts them in a precarious position, but there’s not a tremendous amount of persecution that comes out of it.

这使他们处于危险的境地，但并没有因此而产生巨大的迫害。

As you have the states expanding their role, these sorts of institutional arrangements start to break down at the same time.

随着国家扩大其作用，此类制度安排同时开始崩溃。

And this is often when you see the largest amounts of persecution that are taking place.

这通常是你看到最大规模的迫害正在发生的时候。

But over time, you have — for example, the state may want to .

但随着时间的推移，你会发现——例如，国家可能想要这样做。

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They might bring in more people, like, conquer more territory.

他们可能会带来更多的人，比如，征服更多的领土。

The French might do this, say, in the 16th century or 15th century.

法国人可能会在 16 世纪或 15 世纪这样做。

And as they’re doing this, they are also realizing that they have a lot more difference, a lot more identities in their midst than they knew before.

当他们这样做时，他们也意识到他们之间有比他们以前知道的更多的差异和更多的身份。

And this can generate more persecution.

这可能会引发更多迫害。

An example that Mark Koyama and I have written about in this case would be the Albigensian Crusades, to take a non-Jewish example.

马克·小山和我在这种情况下写过的一个例子是阿尔比派十字军东征，举一个非犹太人的例子。

This is something that’s building at the end of the 12th century, at the end of the 1100s.

这是 12 世纪末 1100 年代末建造的东西。

Then by the beginning of the 13th century, you have the French state expanding its power into the south.

然后到了 13 世纪初，法国将其权力扩展到南部。

As they do this, they run into a different religious group, which becomes known as Cathars, which were not necessarily really that different.

当他们这样做时，他们遇到了一个不同的宗教团体，该团体被称为卡特里派，它们并不一定有那么不同。

But they were different enough that they could use this as an excuse to conquer the territory and take them over.

但他们的不同之处足以让他们以此为借口来征服领土并接管他们。

This is a case where the rules kind of run into this heterogeneity, so you get persecution.

在这种情况下，规则会遇到这种异质性，因此你会受到迫害。

And that’s the state’s building power that’s generating some persecution that’s coming out of that.

这就是国家的权力建设，从而产生了一些迫害。

We don’t know exactly why this occurs.

我们不知道为什么会发生这种情况。

But there’s a lot going on in the 13th century between nobles in England and the crown.

但 13 世纪的英格兰贵族和王室之间发生了很多事情。

You have Magna Carta at the beginning.

一开始就有大宪章。

You have the First Barons’ War, you have the Second Barons’ War, that are taking place at the beginning of the 13th century.

第一次男爵战争和第二次男爵战争都发生在 13 世纪初。

And what a lot of these wars, these civil disturbances are about are, you have nobles who are having taxes extracted from them.

很多这些战争、内乱都是关于贵族从他们身上榨取税收的。

They’re having revenue extracted from them by the king, and these individuals also know that Jews are involved in the exchequer.

国王从他们身上收取收入，这些人也知道犹太人参与了财政。

They want to exploit the Jews and take over both the revenue streams that the Jews have, and also get rid of some of their debts.

他们想要剥削犹太人，接管犹太人的收入来源，并摆脱他们的一些债务。

So you asked .

所以你问了。

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we don’t know for sure, but one reasonable explanation that’s almost certainly playing a part in the eventual expulsion of Jews in 1290 is that this is a credible way for the king to give something to the nobles, so that they —

我们不确定，但一个合理的解释几乎肯定在 1290 年最终驱逐犹太人的过程中发挥了作用，那就是，这是国王向贵族提供一些东西的一种可靠方式，这样他们——

Mark and I have done a lot of work on building datasets of Jewish persecution and Jewish expulsions at the city level and the country level in Europe over a very long period of time.

马克和我在很长一段时间内做了大量工作，建立了欧洲城市和国家层面的犹太人迫害和犹太人驱逐的数据集。

And a question that I, for one, don’t fully understand is, you don’t need to actually kill all the Jews or expel them in order to extract resources from them.

我不完全理解的一个问题是，你不需要真正杀死所有犹太人或驱逐他们来从他们身上获取资源。

In fact, in some way, this is off the equilibrium path.

事实上，在某种程度上，这偏离了均衡路径。

You’re no longer in some optimal equilibrium for both the ruler and for the Jewish community.

对于统治者和犹太社区来说，你不再处于某种最佳平衡状态。

Oftentimes, these Jewish communities would be expelled from a city, they would be invited to come back, and they would come back — in 5, 10, 15 years, sometimes even shorter.

通常，这些犹太社区会被驱逐出城市，他们会被邀请回来，然后他们会在 5 年、10 年、15 年甚至更短的时间内回来。

But that’s a little bit easier to understand.

但这更容易理解一些。

In the case I gave you in England in 1290s, I think I understand a little bit about why it might have happened that way.

以我在 1290 年代的英国为例，我想我有点理解为什么会发生这种情况。

I think it was signaling credibility in some political compact between the king and the nobles, but I’m not sure.

我认为这标志着国王和贵族之间某种政治契约的可信度，但我不确定。

But that’s an example of top down.

但这是自上而下的一个例子。

Other times, clearly, people are .

其他时候，显然，人们是这样的。

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You have, say, guilds moving against these Jewish communities.

比如说，有行会反对这些犹太社区。

An example of this would be in 1614, when the most well-known Jewish persecution was in Frankfurt am Main.

1614 年就是一个例子，当时最著名的犹太人迫害发生在美因河畔法兰克福。

It was called the Fettmilch Massacre.

这被称为费特米尔希大屠杀。

Fettmilch was a baker.

费特米尔奇是一名面包师。

He was in guild, and he was upset about the terms of the political deal between the city rulers — the city council — and what the guilds were getting.

他加入了行会，他对城市统治者——市议会——之间政治协议的条款以及行会得到的东西感到不安。

One of the things that the guilds wanted were the Jews to be expelled.

行会想要的事情之一就是驱逐犹太人。

This was competition in some sense.

从某种意义上来说，这就是竞争。

Poland has often claimed to be a state without stakes, in the sense that it’s not a persecuting society in the way that other European areas were.

波兰经常声称自己是一个没有利害关系的国家，因为它不像其他欧洲地区那样是一个迫害社会。

The story that Mark and I tell about Poland is that they actually had very weak state authority in Poland.

马克和我讲述的关于波兰的故事是，他们在波兰的国家权威实际上非常薄弱。

They experienced something called the second serfdom.

他们经历了所谓的第二次农奴制。

So after the Black Death —

所以在黑死病之后——

However, what economists often don’t take into account is, one response to this might be for people in power to double down on keeping peasants under their thumb.

然而，经济学家常常没有考虑到的是，对此的一种反应可能是当权者加倍努力让农民受其控制。

The second serfdom in Eastern Europe — Poland I’m thinking, in particular — this is that instead of getting better deals, the peasants were put under even greater submission after the Black Death because they were not able to get the market wage.

东欧的第二个农奴制 ——我想特别是波兰—— 这就是黑死病之后，农民不但没有得到更好的待遇，反而受到更大的屈从，因为他们无法获得市场工资。

Power played a role there with the nobility.

权力在那里与贵族一起发挥作用。

And the nobility would often take advantage of Jews’ skills in, say, monitoring labor, keeping books — these sorts of things — to help them run this situation.

贵族们经常会利用犹太人的技能，比如监督劳动、记账——诸如此类的事情——来帮助他们应对这种情况。

So you have sorts of court Jews, Jews who were integrated into that power structure in that area.

所以你有各种各样的宫廷犹太人，他们融入了该地区的权力结构。

Not all of them, by any means.

无论如何，不​​是全部。

And the story changes dramatically as you move into the 19th and 20th centuries.

当你进入 19 世纪和 20 世纪时，故事发生了巨大的变化。

But Poland never really goes through these transformations of developing state capacity.

但波兰从未真正经历过这些发展国家能力的转变。

And Jews remain in this identity equilibrium in Poland, which insulates them from the persecution that we observe at the time, say 14th century, 1500s, up to 1800 or so, that we see in the other parts of Europe.

在波兰，犹太人保持着这种身份平衡，这使他们免受我们在欧洲其他地区看到的当时（例如 14 世纪、1500 年代、直到 1800 年代）所观察到的迫害。

But of course, you don’t get the emergence of a true form of tolerance.

但当然，你不会出现真正的宽容形式。

And this comes back doubly bad, much, much worse in the 19th and into the 20th century.

在 19 世纪和 20 世纪，这种情况变得更加糟糕，非常非常糟糕。

This is going to change the bargaining power, the relative bargaining power of workers compared to nobles or people who are running states and cities and these sorts of things.

这将改变议价能力，即工人与贵族或管理国家和城市的人相比的相对议价能力。

And so you’re going to see more power for these individuals.

所以你会看到这些人拥有更多的权力。

One of the biggest changes that’s going to happen is you’re going to see the emergence of more trading cities in the north relative to the south.

即将发生的最大变化之一是，相对于南方，你将看到北方出现更多的贸易城市。

And this is going to play a big role in generating the economic equilibrium that comes about from the next couple hundred years.

这将在未来几百年实现经济平衡方面发挥重要作用。

But the main thing that’s going on with institutional change is going to be this shift in the bargaining power that’s letting peasants have more power relative to nobles.

但制度变革中发生的主要事情将是议价能力的转变，让农民相对于贵族拥有更多的权力。

I don’t think we really have examples in the modern period of immigration on that level.

我认为在现代移民时期我们还没有真正达到这种水平的例子。

And I know from the literature on immigration — which I’m not an expert in — but typically, these movements are not so large that we see them radically affecting wages in the way that I’m talking about.

我从有关移民的文献中了解到——“我不是这方面的专家”——但通常情况下，这些变动不会那么大，以至于我们认为它们会像我所说的那样从根本上影响工资。

Initially, when the Black Death hits, the world is ending.

最初，当黑死病袭来时，世界即将终结。

Wages don’t go up.

工资上不去。

Production just breaks down.

生产刚刚崩溃。

Every second person or so is dead.

大约有两个人死亡。

There’s disintermediation — to use a modern word — in a massive way.

存在大规模的去中介化——用现代词来说。

One thing that you can look at if you want to tell whether or not increasing returns are one of the main reasons why you have cities in the place they are — that is, are people in cities where they are because that’s where all the people are?

如果你想判断收益递增是否是城市在其所在位置的主要原因之一，你可以看一下一件事——也就是说，人们之所以在城市中，是因为那里是所有人都在的地方吗？

— you can take the people away, and then see if they move to a different location that might have something tied to geography or tied to space which is better.

— 你可以把人们带走，然后看看他们是否搬到了另一个可能与地理或空间相关的地方，哪个更好。

For example, what I just mentioned is that there is a general shift towards northern trading networks.

例如，我刚才提到的是，贸易网络普遍转向北方。

We know — because of what we’ve been looking at — that the Hanseatic cities, which are the trading network that exists on the Baltic in the north of Europe — those cities recovered much more quickly than cities in the south, cities tied to the old Roman road network that centered on the Mediterranean, for example.

我们知道————因为我们一直在关注————汉萨城市，即欧洲北部波罗的海沿岸的贸易网络​​————这些城市的恢复速度比南部城市快得多，例如与以地中海为中心的古罗马公路网相连的城市。

And this makes sense if you think that trade has been shifting with wool trade, for example, over time, since the collapse of Rome.

如果你认为贸易随着羊毛贸易的变化而变化，例如，自罗马崩溃以来，随着时间的推移，这是有道理的。

But then, if you have increasing returns, you’re not going to immediately see this shift in the urban network.

但是，如果你的回报递增，你不会立即看到城市网络的这种转变。

But if you take away, on average, 40 percent of the population of the cities, then this allows you to let people reshuffle.

但是如果你平均拿走城市40%的人口，那么这就可以让人们重新洗牌。

And in effect, this did happen to a certain extent.

事实上，这在一定程度上确实发生了。

But the Church land, they take.

但教会的土地，他们却拿走了。

And there’s a tremendous amount of land owned by the Church in France.

法国教会拥有大量土地。

I think it approaches up to 70 percent or so of the land that’s there.

我认为它覆盖了那里 70% 左右的土地。

Then they issued this paper money initially backed on this.

然后他们发行了最初以此为支持的纸币。

Then — this is the initial thing they do, and then they have an auction to distribute this land.

然后 —— 这是他们最初做的事情，然后他们进行拍卖来分配这块土地。

So I get in trouble because sometimes people hear me say that the auctions of this land was good.

所以我遇到了麻烦，因为有时人们听到我说这块土地的拍卖很好。

And they say, “Well, he’s just a GMU economist.

他们说：“好吧，他只是 GMU 的一名经济学家。

And markets are always good, and that’s good.

市场总是好的，这很好。

But you have to remember, they also confiscated all the land.” So those are two things going on here.

但你要记住，他们还没收了所有的土地。”这是这里发生的两件事。

So they distribute this land by auction.

所以他们通过拍卖来分配这块土地。

Auctions are pretty good mechanisms to put an asset into the hands of somebody who values it most.

拍卖是将资产交到最有价值的人手中的非常好的机制。

And there’s an active secondary market that goes on for this land.

这片土地有一个活跃的二级市场。

The way that my coauthors on this paper, who are Theresa Finley and Raphael Franck — the way we think about this process is that you have a set of feudal institutions and property that exists up to about 1790 or something like this — the French Revolution, early phases.

我这篇论文的合著者特蕾莎·芬利 (Theresa Finley) 和拉斐尔·弗兰克 (Raphael Franck)  ——我们思考这个过程的方式是，有一套封建制度和财产，一直存在到 1790 年左右或类似的时间 ——法国大革命的早期阶段。

And in that feudal system, you have lots of overlapping property rights.

在那个封建制度中，你有很多重叠的产权。

For example, if I wanted to build an irrigation canal or make some improvement to my land, I might have to negotiate with multiple parties to do this because they all have some stake in what I’m doing to my land.

例如，如果我想修建一条灌溉渠或对我的土地进行一些改进，我可能需要与多方谈判才能做到这一点，因为他们都对我对我的土地所做的事情有利害关系。

So everybody is having these institutions wiped out, in effect, when the revolution comes.

因此，当革命到来时，实际上每个人都在消灭这些机构。

However, it’s only a subset of the properties that are immediately put on the market and then auctioned off to individuals and falling into the hands of the people who value them most.

然而，这只是立即投放市场然后拍卖给个人并落入最看重它们的人手中的一小部分财产。

What we find is that those people ultimately started to consolidate the land, and they also started making investments in things like irrigation and drainage and having better crop rotation systems and so forth.

我们发现，这些人最终开始整合土地，他们也开始在灌溉和排水以及更好的轮作系统等方面进行投资。

So what that really is — it’s a story about what economists are familiar with, the Coase theorem.

那么这到底是什么——这是一个关于经济学家所熟悉的科斯定理的故事。

The Coase theorem, stated simply, says that if there are low enough transaction cost, low enough costs of trading, then it doesn’t actually matter who owns an asset initially.

简单地说，科斯定理说，如果交易成本足够低，交易成本足够低，那么最初谁拥有一项资产实际上并不重要。

People will trade it, and you’ll end up with the best possible arrangement.

人们会进行交易，而你最终会得到最好的安排。

And you see that the productivity of agriculture in places that had more Church land that was auctioned off was higher than places that didn’t have this happen — up until the end of the 19th century — as we might expect, because over time, all these assets are being reallocated, and investments are ultimately being made.

你会看到，有更多教会土地被拍卖的地方的农业生产力高于没有发生这种情况的地方 ——“直到19世纪末”——正如我们所预期的那样，因为随着时间的推移，所有这些资产都在重新分配，投资最终也会被进行。

So I do think, in that case, this was a circumstance where you had a land redistribution that led to greater efficiency.

所以我确实认为，在这种情况下，土地重新分配可以提高效率。

If you look at the literature, people have looked at preferences over welfare.

如果你看一下文献，人们会关注对福利的偏好。

And there are big differences between German-speaking and French-speaking and Italian-speaking regions within Switzerland.

而且瑞士境内的德语区和法语区、意大利语区之间存在很大差异。

So I don’t know the answer.

所以我不知道答案。

I think there’s something in there that has to do with size, that it can work in a place the size of Switzerland.

我认为其中有一些与规模有关的东西，它可以在瑞士这么大的地方发挥作用。

They definitely have a national identity, which is very strong.

他们肯定有民族认同感，这​​种认同感非常强烈。

And I’m not sure exactly how that emerged.

我不确定这是如何出现的。

One could tell stories about the Swiss being surrounded for so long and cutting off the mountain passes and acting in this way that sometimes I hear.

人们可以讲述瑞士人被包围这么久、切断山口以及以我有时听到的这种方式行事的故事。

But otherwise, I actually don’t know the answer.

但除此之外，我实际上不知道答案。

That was an empire that lasted for 300 years, but they experienced all these crop failures.

那是一个持续了三百年的帝国，但他们经历了所有这些农作物歉收。

And then once you look at it, you see that in Indonesia, all these major volcanic eruptions were happening in perfect timing with these crop failures that were taking place.

一旦你仔细观察，你就会发现在印度尼西亚，所有这些大型火山喷发都恰逢农作物歉收的发生。

Actually, they can tell from looking at the Nile and how much it’s flooding and things.

事实上，他们可以通过观察尼罗河以及洪水的程度等来判断。

Another example of this happening — although one has to be careful — another volcano that went off was in 1257.

这种情况发生的另一个例子 ——“尽管必须小心”—— 另一座火山爆发是在 1257 年。

Samalas?

萨马拉斯？

While people have been looking at it, you see that the timing’s not perfect, but it did pile on additional agricultural pressure on these nobles at a time when they were all discontented with the king’s power.

虽然人们一直在关注它，但你会发现时机并不完美，但在这些贵族都对国王的权力感到不满的时候，它确实给这些贵族带来了额外的农业压力。

They might have been individually upset before, but now they’re all becoming upset at the same time because you have crops failing, the king is still asking for revenues, and they all are feeling the pressure at the same time.

以前他们可能会单独感到不安，但现在他们都同时感到不安，因为庄稼歉收，国王仍然要求收入，他们都同时感受到压力。

And you end up getting a coordinated political action against the rulers.

最终你会得到针对统治者的协调一致的政治行动。

Now, as it turns out, there happened to be bad weather occurring in the two years previous to Samalas as well, so this wasn’t just the volcano in that circumstance.

现在，事实证明，萨马拉斯的前两年也发生过恶劣天气，所以这种情况不仅仅是火山。

It was the volcano in addition to some other bad luck.

除了火山之外还有其他一些坏运气。

But it’s the environment, the climate playing a role, taking on an agency role in generating political change.

但环境、气候在产生政治变革中发挥着重要作用。

And that’s through coordinating activity that I think is interesting.

这就是通过我认为有趣的协调活动。

There’s also something interesting to be said, that these events, these large climactic events and large epidemiological events that I’m talking about — they also have a bias, in that they tend to be worse when you have places that are networked together and people that are integrated.

还有一些有趣的事情要说，我正在谈论的这些事件，这些大型高潮事件和大型流行病学事件，它们也有偏见，因为当你有联网的地方和融合的人们时，它们往往会变得更糟。

So you could also look at, say, 1815 — there’s another big volcano that goes off that’s called Tambora.

所以你也可以看看 1815 年——还有另一座大火山喷发，叫做坦博拉火山。

In the case of Tambora, you have market integration, more or less, within Europe by 1815, meaning that when you have idiosyncratic shocks, climate shocks hitting places across Europe, you tend to have trade smoothing those over, so you don’t see it in grain prices very much, or anything like this.

就坦博拉而言，到 1815 年，欧洲内部或多或少已经实现了市场一体化，这意味着当欧洲各地出现特殊冲击、气候冲击时，往往会通过贸易来平滑这些冲击，所以你在谷物价格或类似的价格中看不到它。

But when you have something like Tambora, which is a VEI 7 — it’s a very, very large volcano, the largest since Samalas.

但是，当你拥有像坦博拉这样的火山时，它的 VEI 7    它是一座非常非常大的火山，是自萨马拉斯以来最大的火山。

And it in the 13th century would go off, it makes it snow in Maine in June and all over the world because of all the particulates in the air and so forth, blocking the sun in April of 1816 and in 1817.

它在 13 世纪会爆发，它使缅因州六月下雪，全世界各地都下雪，因为空气中的颗粒物等等，遮挡了 1816 年 4 月和 1817 年的阳光。

And you see very much in that circumstance, the markets can’t handle it.

你会看到，在这种情况下，市场无法应对。

Another project that I’ve been working on actively is trying to put together as much information as I can about that circumstance, about that event, and to basically see what was the effect that it had on these markets.

我一直在积极开展的另一个项目是尝试收集尽可能多的有关该情况、该事件的信息，并基本上了解它对这些市场的影响。

What sort of effects did it have on how people were impacted with their health?

它对人们的健康产生了什么样的影响？

And basically, to ask questions about how robust market institutions are to dealing with basically correlated supply shocks that are very, very large.

基本上，是要询问市场机构在应对非常非常大的基本上相关的供应冲击方面的稳健程度。

And we really don’t have many like that, so I find that interesting as well.

我们确实没有很多这样的，所以我也觉得这很有趣。

However, I think there is a general sense that’s been absorbed into the culture that this is no longer a thing that is acceptable.

然而，我认为这种文化已经融入了一种普遍的感觉，即这不再是一件可以接受的事情。

And I think that is a strong sense that still exists, and there are a lot of states that also feel strongly about this.

我认为这种强烈的感觉仍然存在，并且有很多州对此也有强烈的感受。

Even if you look at World War II, the worst atrocities that occurred against Jews — they happened in the regions that had states that were weakened at the time, during World War II.

即使你看看第二次世界大战，你也会发现针对犹太人发生的最严重的暴行——它们发生在二战期间当时国家被削弱的地区。

What I’m most pessimistic about is in a developing country context.

我最悲观的是发展中国家的情况。

I don’t see any reason why a developing country, say in Africa, is going to decide to adopt liberal values about toleration just because they observe them in another place.

我不明白为什么一个发展中国家，比如非洲国家，会仅仅因为在另一个地方观察到这些价值观而决定采用有关宽容的自由主义价值观。

I think they have to go through a somewhat similar process of building up state capacity and running into these practical reasons why a system of intolerance doesn’t work in order to get there.

我认为他们必须经历一个有点类似的过程，即建立国家能力，并找出不宽容制度不起作用的实际原因，才能实现这一目标。

And this can be very hard.

这可能非常困难。

And I think we also push things too hard, as a Western society, in terms of development sometimes.

我认为，作为西方社会，我们有时在发展方面也把事情逼得太紧了。

I like to tell my students about, in England, that the Glorious Revolution is in 1688, which is when we typically place them as having their representative revolution.

我喜欢告诉我的学生，在英国，光荣革命发生在 1688 年，那时我们通常将他们视为代议革命。

However, they adopt things like the Test Acts, which are preventing Catholics from matriculating at Oxford or from sitting in Parliament, all the way up until — I mean, without being Catholic — all the way up until 1828, when these things are eliminated.

然而，他们采用了《考试法案》之类的规定，阻止天主教徒进入牛津大学就读或进入议会，一直到“——我的意思是，如果不是天主教徒”——一直到 1828 年，这些规定都被消除了。

So when we try to jump the cart, go too fast in a place and say, “Well, you need to have women’s rights now.

因此，当我们试图跳车时，在某个地方走得太快并说：“好吧，你现在需要拥有妇女权利。

You need to respect all these different groups in your society, in addition to adopting institutions of capitalism,” these sorts of things.

除了采用资本主义制度之外，你还需要尊重社会中所有这些不同的群体。”诸如此类的事情。

That’s not the way it occurred in places like England.

在英国这样的地方，情况并非如此。

There was actually a lot of restraint.

实际上有很多克制。

That doesn’t mean we have to wait 200 years or 150 years to move through these phases in other parts of the world.

这并不意味着我们必须等待 200 年或 150 年才能在世界其他地区经历这些阶段。

But I think it’s often realistic and destabilizing for us to think we can.

但我认为，我们认为自己可以做到的想法往往是现实且不稳定的。

The other thing to keep in mind — if you don’t mind, I’ll say a little bit more — is the amount of homogeneity that was present in a lot of these European states when they went through these transitions was very high.

另一件需要记住的事情——如果你不介意的话，我会多说一点——许多欧洲国家在经历这些转型时存在的同质性非常高。

If you read about the United States, for example — Albion’s Seed.

如果您读到有关美国的信息，例如 — Albion 的种子。

This was basically four different groups from England that came in and then were asked to eventually adopt the US Constitution as we have it today.

这基本上是来自英国的四个不同团体加入，然后被要求最终采用我们今天的美国宪法。

And these were all white men who were Christian.

这些都是白人，都是基督徒。

And furthermore, they were Protestant for the most part.

此外，他们大部分都是新教徒。

So this is an extremely homogenous group.

所以这是一个极其同质的群体。

And then they barely got it, right?

然后他们就勉强得到了，对吧？

If you look at the literature on voting at the Constitutional Convention, one of my favorite footnotes in the academic literature is from a paper that looks at the economic and ideological factors that generated voting at the US Constitutional Convention.

如果你看一下有关制宪会议投票的文献，我在学术文献中最喜欢的脚注之一是一篇论文，该论文研究了美国制宪会议投票产生的经济和意识形态因素。

It claims that, according to their model, if three or four more backcountry farmers from Virginia had showed up , it might not have worked.

它声称，根据他们的模型，如果来自弗吉尼亚州的三到四个偏远农民出现，它可能不会起作用。

It was a fairly close-run deal.

这是一笔相当接近的交易。

So I think we often have a lack of appreciation for the amount of homogeneity and the amount of time it took in order to get the political arrangements to take seed in what we are, the modern Western liberal democracies.

因此，我认为我们常常缺乏对同质性程度的认识，以及为了让政治安排在现代西方自由民主国家中播下种子所花费的时间。

I got into it for different reasons than I’ve stuck with it.

我进入它的原因与我坚持下去的原因不同。

Initially, I got into it because I thought it was a .

最初，我进入它是因为我认为它是一个。

.

。

.

。

You know, with science, and I would read the Foundation series by Issac Asimov or things like this.

你知道，对于科学，我会阅读伊萨克·阿西莫夫的《基础》系列或类似的东西。

And I was very interested in just learning about the stars.

我对了解星星非常感兴趣。

It made me feel good about myself.

这让我自我感觉良好。

But then over time, it really does give you an appreciation for the scales involved with the universe, and it gives you a sense of proportion.

但随着时间的推移，它确实会让你对宇宙的尺度有所了解，并给你一种比例感。

I mean, what they say, the closest planet to us right now is TRAPPIST-1 or something like that?

我的意思是，他们说，现在离我们最近的行星是 TRAPPIST-1 或类似的行星？

It’s 37 light years away.

距我们37光年。

That means if we want to talk to them, it’s going to take 80 years, assuming we can.

这意味着如果我们想与他们对话，假设我们可以的话，需要 80 年的时间。

These are scales that I have a hard time appreciating, but I think everybody has a hard time appreciating, even if you sit under the sky occasionally and look at these stars.

这些是我很难欣赏的尺度，但我想每个人都很难欣赏，即使你偶尔坐在天空下看着这些星星。

Amateur astronomy is a dying hobby.

业余天文学是一种正在消亡的爱好。

You can tell that by going to a meeting of amateur astronomers.

你可以通过参加业余天文学家的会议来判断这一点。

They tend to be males who are about 20 or 30 years older than I am at these.

他们往往是比我大 20 或 30 岁左右的男性。

Nonetheless, if we could get the lights to be turned off — like they do in Switzerland — at 11 o’clock at night, I think we would all benefit from that.

尽管如此，如果我们能够在晚上 11 点关掉灯 ——就像瑞士的做法一样，我想我们都会从中受益。

The instabilities that are generated because of the EU are not awesome sometimes.

由于欧盟而产生的不稳定有时并不可怕。

And they also have generated a new source of rent seeking.

他们还产生了新的寻租来源。

For example, if you’re a French farmer, and you want protection for your cheese, you can go to the EU for it.

例如，如果您是法国农民，并且想要保护您的奶酪，您可以去欧盟寻求保护。

You don’t have to go to France.

你不必去法国。

That’s not always a good thing.

这并不总是一件好事。

Politically, though, I think there’s still a great value to having an organization in Europe which is formally meeting from time to time and discussing these sorts of issues.

不过，从政治上讲，我认为在欧洲建立一个不时举行正式会议并讨论此类问题的组织仍然具有很大的价值。

And I don’t see NATO doing that necessarily in the same way.

我不认为北约一定会以同样的方式这样做。

But I’m not sure.

但我不确定。

I asked your coauthor Noel this question.

我问了你的合著者诺埃尔这个问题。

I’d like your take.

我想听听你的看法。

It’s often alleged by historians that, as the Renaissance came about, capitalism was more prominent.

历史学家经常声称，随着文艺复兴的到来，资本主义变得更加突出。

Prejudice against Jews, other minorities, went up when there was more capitalism.

当资本主义更加发达时，对犹太人和其他少数民族的偏见就会加剧。

Is this true?

这是真的吗？

And if so, what was the mechanism?

如果是这样，其机制是什么？

There’s the Crusades.

有十字军东征。

The Crusades initially exhibited a lot of religious violence and intolerance.

十字军东征最初表现出大量的宗教暴力和不宽容。

But as the Crusaders come back to Europe, they’re bringing with them knowledge of Arabic numerals, and there’s actually quite .

但当十字军回到欧洲时，他们带来了阿拉伯数字的知识，而且实际上相当多。

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。

.

。

There’s a cosmopolitan flavor to that period, to the high Middle Ages.

那个时期、中世纪盛期有一种国际化的气息。

Then you get to the 14th century and the Black Death, which is a terrible economic collapse.

然后你进入了 14 世纪和黑死病，这是一场可怕的经济崩溃。

But it’s an economic collapse which changes the ratio between labor and land, so incomes go up.

但经济崩溃改变了劳动力和土地之间的比例，因此收入增加。

Incomes go up, and that changes the nature of the European economy in certain ways which does favor the rise of art.

收入的增加，在某些方面改变了欧洲经济的性质，这确实有利于艺术的崛起。

Incomes are higher.

收入更高。

People can afford luxuries.

人们买得起奢侈品。

So maybe cities, to some extent, are growing.

所以也许城市在某种程度上正在发展。

But whether or not the Renaissance is a period of dramatic economic change is, I think, open to questioning.

但我认为，文艺复兴是否是一个经济剧烈变革的时期，值得商榷。

A lot of merchant ventures and trading ventures are still controlled by charter companies or by royal agents.

许多商业企业和贸易企业仍然由特许公司或皇家代理人控制。

So I don’t see it as a decisive break in the same way I see, say, post-17th-century Industrial Revolution period.

因此，我并不像 17 世纪后工业革命时期那样将其视为决定性的突破。

I see that as a seismic change on the scale of economic activity.

我认为这是经济活动规模的巨大变化。

The Renaissance is .

文艺复兴是。

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。

.

。

It’s not clear to me that it’s qualitatively different from what went before.

我不清楚这与以前有什么本质上的不同。

A separate question is, why is violence and intolerance and religious violence going up?

另一个问题是，为什么暴力、不容忍和宗教暴力不断增加？

And I see that in terms of more conventional noneconomic factors: the printing press, the Reformation, those types, and other shocks you see.

我从更传统的非经济因素角度看待这一点：印刷机、宗教改革、这些类型以及你看到的其他冲击。

That’s what I see as being associated with this kind of greater intolerance in the Renaissance.

我认为这与文艺复兴时期这种更大的不宽容有关。

There’s historical literature about the formation of religious identities in this period.

有关于这一时期宗教身份形成的历史文献。

And it makes the point that .

这表明了这一点。

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。

.

。

John Bossy is one person associated with this.

约翰·博西 (John Bossy) 就是与此相关的人之一。

The Reformation Christianized Europe.

宗教改革使欧洲基督教化。

Prior to the Reformation, people had their local saints.

在宗教改革之前，人们有当地的圣人。

They knew they were Christian in some background sense, but it wasn’t at the forefront of their identity.

他们知道自己在某种背景意义上是基督徒，但这并不是他们身份的最重要的。

Whereas, with the Reformation it’s like, “I’m Catholic.

然而，在宗教改革运动中，“我是天主教徒。

You’re Protestant.” This becomes more salient.

你是新教徒。”这一点变得更加突出。

And that’s partly due to technology, the printing press.

这部分归功于技术，即印刷机。

For example, Poland.

例如波兰。

Poland is sometimes celebrated by historians as a state without stakes, which is not exactly true.

波兰有时被历史学家称赞为一个没有利害关系的国家，但这并不完全正确。

There are some people who are killed for religious beliefs in early-16th-century Poland.

在 16 世纪初的波兰，有些人因宗教信仰而被杀害。

But actually, there are a lot of Protestants.

但实际上，有很多新教徒。

Protestantism is spreading, and there’s no oppression of Protestantism.

新教正在传播，并且没有对新教的压迫。

So it looks tolerant.

所以看起来很宽容。

Why is it tolerant?

为什么它能容忍？

Well, it’s tolerant because there’s no strong central authority.

嗯，它是宽容的，因为没有强大的中央权威。

The nobility are very powerful, so if a nobleman is sympathetic to Protestantism, he can protect it.

贵族非常强大，所以如果一个贵族同情新教，他就可以保护它。

There’s no state capable of enforcing religious conformity.

没有一个国家有能力强制遵守宗教信仰。

That’s a reliable predictor — a weak state, federalism, fragmentation, is a reliable predictor of an absence of persecution.

这是一个可靠的预测因素——软弱的国家、联邦制、分裂，是不存在迫害的可靠预测因素。

But what you see subsequently going forward is, that’s not a strong predictor of getting a liberal state later, or enduring religious freedom.

但你随后看到的是，这并不是后来建立自由国家或持久宗教自由的有力预测。

Whereas England and France are quite different.

而英国和法国则截然不同。

They see extreme religious violence in the mid-16th century as rulers attempt to maintain or restore religious conformity.

他们看到了 16 世纪中叶统治者试图维持或恢复宗教一致性时出现的极端宗教暴力。

But in most societies, once the tipping point is reached where it is seen as impossible — too costly — to restore religious conformity, then actually you’ve got to set about this task of building a society where there will be religious differences and religious pluralism.

但在大多数社会中，一旦达到了被认为不可能恢复宗教一致性的临界点——“成本太高”，那么实际上你就必须着手建设一个存在宗教差异和宗教多元化的社会。

This is a 150-, 200-year process.

这是一个150年、200年的过程。

England, in the 16th century, is nowhere close to being that, but it’s on this road which is going to lead to it eventually, say, by the late 17th century, early 18th century.

16 世纪的英国远未实现这一目标，但它正走在这条道路上，最终（比如 17 世纪末、18 世纪初）将通向这一目标。

So what gives rise to greater religious freedom?

那么是什么带来了更大的宗教自由呢？

It doesn’t seem to be the personality of rulers, for example, their beliefs.

这似乎不是统治者的个性，例如他们的信仰。

Elizabeth I in her private beliefs is, we think .

我们认为，伊丽莎白一世的私人信仰是。

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。

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She claims not to want to make windows into men’s souls.

她声称不想为男人的灵魂打开窗户。

She seems quite eclectic and sympathetic to pluralism.

她看起来相当不拘一格，并且同情多元化。

But her state is basically a police state, which kills up to 300 people, basically for being Catholic in the 16th century.

但她的州基本上是一个警察国家，杀害了多达 300 人，基本上是因为 16 世纪是天主教徒。

Why does it change?

为什么会改变？

I don’t think the intellectual debates are the forefront of what’s going on.

我不认为知识分子的争论是正在发生的事情的最前沿。

The political economy seems much more important.

政治经济似乎更为重要。

Charles II — again, he doesn’t really care about persecuting nonbelievers.

查理二世——再说一次，他并不真正关心迫害非信徒。

But the Parliament in his period is a royalist Parliament.

但他那个时期的议会是保皇党议会。

They’re desperate to maintain the Church of England, so they’re very cruel towards Quakers and so on.

他们迫切希望维持英国国教，所以他们对贵格会等非常残酷。

So yeah, me and Noel, together in our book, we don’t think the intellectual ideas are meaningless.

所以，是的，我和诺埃尔在我们的书中一起认为，知识分子的想法并不是毫无意义的。

We don’t think they play no role, but they’re always being mediated through the incentives of the actors who have political power.

我们不认为他们没有发挥任何作用，但他们总是通过拥有政治权力的参与者的激励来调节。

Then there’s other cases, maybe like 17th-century Japan, a relatively strong state for Asia, east Asia.

还有其他的例子，可能像17世纪的日本，亚洲东亚相对强大的国家。

And it persecutes Christians a great deal, in part because it is a strong state.

它大量迫害基督徒，部分原因是它是一个强大的国家。

So if either weak states or strong states can persecute minorities more, what’s the variable that determines which of those cases you get?

那么，如果弱国或强国都可以更多地迫害少数群体，那么决定你得到哪种情况的变量是什么？

The Japanese case is interesting.

日本的案例很有趣。

It’s the most thorough suppression, at least of Christianity, that I’m aware of historically.

这是我所知道的历史上最彻底的镇压，至少是对基督教的镇压。

And it’s done precisely because the state has .

这正是因为国家已经这样做了。

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Whether it’s a strong state is a difficult thing to measure.

一个国家是否强大是一个很难衡量的事情。

But it has sufficient coercive power, relative to the minority in question.

但相对于相关少数群体而言，它拥有足够的强制力。

They pay a huge cost, by the way.

顺便说一句，他们付出了巨大的代价。

The main motivation for sealing off the borders of Japan is to stop Christianity seeping through.

封锁日本边境的主要动机是阻止基督教渗透。

So this is a state which is willing to pay huge costs to do this.

所以这是一个愿意付出巨大成本来做到这一点的国家。

It’s not a strong state in the sense of .

从某种意义上来说，这并不是一个强大的国家。

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Tokugawa shogunate actually only controlled part of the country.

德川幕府实际上只控制了国家的一部分。

The independent daimyo have a lot of power.

独立大名拥有很大的权力。

But they’re strong relative to religion, and the rulers seem committed.

但他们相对于宗教来说很强大，而且统治者似乎也很忠诚。

They see Christianity as such a threat, they’re committed to paying this tremendous cost of isolating the entire country from trade to do so.

他们将基督教视为一种威胁，他们致力于为此付出巨大的代价，将整个国家与贸易隔离。

And then, obviously, 20th-century examples.

显然，还有 20 世纪的例子。

You have the Soviet Union repressing Christianity very comprehensively, and you have the Nazis as well.

苏联非常全面地镇压基督教，还有纳粹。

So obviously, the power of the state is going to be necessary.

显然，国家的力量是必要的。

You need a strong state to really completely suppress a religion.

你需要一个强大的国家来真正彻底镇压宗教。

On the other hand, as a precondition for enforcing liberal values or allowing liberalism to flourish, I’m just not convinced that you have many examples of extremely weak states where this takes place.

另一方面，作为执行自由价值观或允许自由主义蓬勃发展的先决条件，我只是不相信有很多极端弱国发生这种情况的例子。

Because it seems to me that very weak states, like, say, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, are too easily captured by a few nobles or vested interests.

因为在我看来，非常弱小的国家，比如波兰立陶宛联邦，太容易被少数贵族或既得利益集团占领。

So the state, in some sense, becomes privatized, and the best you’ll get is some kind of almost feudal arrangement.

因此，从某种意义上说，国家变得私有化，而你所能得到的最好的结果就是某种近乎封建的安排。

Historically, at least, that’s not been a conducive environment for even markets, actually, to flourish, in my view.

在我看来，至少从历史上看，这实际上对于市场的繁荣来说并不是一个有利的环境。

Or for human freedom, more generally, to flourish.

或者更广泛地说，是为了人类自由的繁荣。

What we add to that is, then, the religious story, that religion is at the heart of this rise of liberal states, and it’s at the heart of a rise of the shift from identity rules to general rules.

那么，我们要补充的是宗教故事，即宗教是自由国家崛起的核心，也是从身份规则向一般规则转变的崛起的核心。

Again, I’m going way over one sentence.

我再说一遍。

I think that’s the bottom line, what we have.

我认为这就是我们所拥有的底线。

I’d also say another contribution we make is distinguishing between states where there’s no persecution, or there’s de facto .

我还想说，我们做出的另一个贡献是区分不存在迫害或事实上存在迫害的国家。

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There’s some bunch of religions, and people are not being burned alive all the time.

有一些宗教，人们并不总是被活活烧死。

We distinguish that from the idea of a liberal state, which is committed to pluralism, to free expression, free thought, and a multiplicity of religions.

我们将其与自由国家的理念区分开来，自由国家致力于多元化、言论自由、思想自由和宗教多样性。

But when you actually look at the details, it’s quite different to what we see in modern liberal societies.

但当你真正审视细节时，你会发现这与我们在现代自由社会中看到的情况截然不同。

We’re making a claim that political philosophers, social scientists who are interested in liberalism or liberal societies, haven’t actually done a good job of engaging with the actual history of how these societies emerge.

我们声称，对自由主义或自由社会感兴趣的政治哲学家和社会科学家实际上并没有很好地研究这些社会如何出现的实际历史。

That comparison really rests .

这种比较确实很可靠。

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It’s most persuasive when you compare the Middle East or Islamic societies with Europe.

当你将中东或伊斯兰社会与欧洲进行比较时，这是最有说服力的。

I’m not sure it’s as persuasive if you want to explain the rise of Europe vis-à-vis the experience of, say, China or Japan, where I know less about the prevalence of cousin marriage, for example.

如果你想用中国或日本的经验来解释欧洲的崛起，我不确定这是否有说服力，例如，我对中国或日本的表亲婚姻的盛行情况知之甚少。

Aristotle believed that interest was theft.

亚里士多德认为利息就是盗窃。

People think that a certain level of interest might be justifiable, but at some level which can’t be explained through underlying economic fundamentals.

人们认为一定程度的兴趣可能是合理的，但在某种程度上无法通过潜在的经济基本面来解释。

And it’s a misunderstanding of the fact that we have different preferences, different attitudes toward intertemporal smoothing.

这是对我们对跨期平滑有不同偏好和不同态度这一事实的误解。

And in some situations, the only way I’m going to be able to get a loan is if I’m willing to pay a high rate of interest.

在某些情况下，我获得贷款的唯一方法是我愿意支付高利率。

So there’s an atavistic, very common assumption or antipathy towards these types of .

因此，对这些类型有一种返祖现象，非常常见的假设或反感。

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That said, I have a strong view about regulating them at some level.

也就是说，我强烈主张在某种程度上对它们进行监管。

The fact that we know, in general, these laws are bad doesn’t mean that, in some circumstances, we might want to limit them.

事实上，我们知道这些法律总体上是不好的，但这并不意味着在某些情况下我们可能想要限制它们。

For example, one of the…

例如，其中之一...

there are accounts — you can write out a model where it makes sense under some circumstances — if it’s a severe moral hazard, or adverse selection, perhaps there’s some justifiable reason for them.

有一些说法 ——你可以写出一个在某些情况下有意义的模型 ——如果这是严重的道德风险或逆向选择，也许有一些合理的理由。

However, to come back to my paper, I tend not to think that’s the reason.

然而，回到我的论文，我倾向于认为这不是原因。

So if you see these interest rates restrictions in European history, an economist can come forward with an adverse selection or moral hazard story which would justify the restriction.

因此，如果你看到欧洲历史上的这些利率限制，经济学家可以提出逆向选择或道德风险的故事来证明这种限制的合理性。

But actually, if you look at the history, it doesn’t seem to explain why Europe, for example, banned all interest rates throughout most of the Middle Ages.

但实际上，如果你回顾一下历史，它似乎并不能解释为什么欧洲（例如欧洲）在中世纪的大部分时间里禁止所有利率。

That seems to be a combination of rent-seeking by merchants who could evade these laws, by rulers who might license some groups — often Jews — to lend at interest, and thereby collect monopoly rents from that practice.

这似乎是商人寻租的结合，他们可以逃避这些法律，统治者可能会许可某些群体——通常是犹太人——放贷以收取利息，从而从这种做法中收取垄断租金。

Essentially there are two core geographic regions in China around the Yellow and Yangtze river deltas, which produced a huge amount of grain or rice.

本质上，中国有两个核心地理区域，即黄河三角洲和长江三角洲，生产了大量的粮食或稻米。

If you control those core regions, you can raise large armies.

如果你控制了这些核心地区，你就可以召集大军。

You can have a large population and dominate the subsequent regions.

你可以拥有大量人口并统治后续地区。

Whereas, the argument is for Europe that these core regions are, perhaps, arguably more separated by geographical boundaries.

然而，欧洲的论点是，这些核心区域可能因地理边界而更加分离。

The limitation of that argument on its own is that geography is static, so it doesn’t really tell you anything about the timing.

该论点本身的局限性在于地理位置是静态的，因此它并不能真正告诉您有关时间的任何信息。

The interesting thing about China, in my view, is not just that it was once unified, or unified early.

在我看来，中国的有趣之处不仅仅在于它曾经统一，或者很早就统一了。

But it’s persistently unified.

但它始终是统一的。

It reunifies.

它重新统一。

Interestingly enough, the periods of de-unification get consistently smaller.

有趣的是，分裂的时期持续变短。

So there are always periods where it’s fragmented, like the warlord period in the early 20th century, but over time may become smaller.

所以总有一些时期是支离破碎的，比如20世纪初的军阀时期，但随着时间的推移可能会变得更小。

Europe doesn’t seem to have that centrifugal force, so a lot of Europe is unified by the Romans, but it’s not able to come back together along those lines later.

欧洲似乎没有那种离心力，所以欧洲很多地方都被罗马人统一了，但后来却无法沿着这些路线重新走到一起。

And the argument that I put forward in an article with Tuan-Hwee Sng and Chiu Yu Ko of National University of Singapore is that it’s not just the core geographical reason.

我在与新加坡国立大学的Tuan-Hwee Sng和Chiu Yu Ko的一篇文章中提出的论点是，这不仅仅是核心的地理原因。

That’s part of it.

这是其中的一部分。

But actually, the periodic threat from a nomadic steppe is another key factor.

但实际上，来自游牧草原的周期性威胁是另一个关键因素。

This is geographic because China has a very sharp slope from really productive agricultural land to land which is only fit for horses, for Eurasian steppe.

这是地理上的原因，因为中国从真正多产的农业用地到只适合马匹、欧亚草原的土地，有一个非常陡峭的坡度。

China could be invaded very easily from the north by these steppe nomads, whereas Europe — it was much less vulnerable to this.

中国很容易被这些草原游牧民族从北方入侵，而欧洲则不易受到这种影响。

And that helps to explain why the Chinese state is often a northern state.

这有助于解释为什么中国国家往往是北方国家。

So if I can add, if you think about China today, or even China in the past, the really productive land — a lot of it’s in the quite far south, in Shanghai, Yangtze delta.

所以我可以补充一点，如果你想想今天的中国，甚至过去的中国，真正肥沃的土地 ——其中很多都在相当遥远的南方，在上海、长江三角洲。

But the political center of China is near Beijing, or it’s in the north.

但中国的政治中心在北京附近，或者说在北方。

And that’s due to this political economy threat from the steppe.

这是由于草原的政治经济威胁。

And it’s these periodic steppe invasions which we argue are responsible for the centralization, an almost militarized character of the Chinese state through history.

我们认为，正是这些周期性的草原入侵造成了中央集权，这是中国历史上近乎军事化的特征。

So the most nationalistic, pro-CCP Chinese are often from the north.

因此，最具民族主义、亲中共的中国人往往来自北方。

And it’s there that the identity of the Chinese state and the Chinese people are really bound together.

正是在那里，中国国家和中国人民的身份真正紧密地联系在一起。

Whereas, the people on the periphery — it seems less so.

而外围的人 —— 则似乎不那么重要了。

Put it this way: China has fragmented every couple of hundred years in its history.

可以这样说：中国在其历史上每隔几百年就会分裂一次。

The most recent one, though, was still not that long ago, so I don’t see it happening anytime soon.

不过，最近的一次还是不久前的事，所以我认为它不会很快发生。

But in the wake of a disaster or some catastrophic collapse, you can imagine it happening.

但在灾难或灾难性崩溃之后，你可以想象它会发生。

What you can put your money on is that the Chinese state is going to be .

你可以把钱押在中国政府将会成为的样子上。

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You know, it’s unthinkable for them.

你知道，这对他们来说是不可想象的。

That’s why they’re so keen on Taiwan becoming part of China again.

这就是为什么他们如此热衷于台湾再次成为中国的一部分。

The ideology is based on one China.

这一意识形态基于一个中国。

We’re going to focus on the science.

我们将专注于科学。

The science is very different.

科学是非常不同的。

China is just vast, so even if the most developed parts of China, like the Yangtze area, are urbanized and commercialized — and they’re probably doing quite well until at least 1750 — you have these peripheral regions which are facing very different climatic and economic conditions.

中国幅员辽阔，因此，即使中国最发达的地区，如长江地区，已经城市化和商业化——而且至少到1750年为止，它们可能表现得相当不错——但这些外围地区面临着截然不同的气候和经济条件。

Both China and Japan are basically insulated from Western threats until the mid-19th century.

直到19世纪中叶，中国和日本都基本上免受西方威胁。

Then they faced them very .

然后他们非常面对他们。

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It’s very stark.

这非常明显。

It’s very quick.

非常快。

You have the ability of Americans and British to sail steamships into the harbor of Yokohama.

美国和英国有能力将轮船驶入横滨港。

Japan is very small, and all of Japan is vulnerable, so this is a geopolitical crisis of the highest order for Japan.

日本很小，整个日本都很脆弱，所以这对日本来说是一场最严重的地缘政治危机。

China, initially — they don’t necessarily care about the British.

中国，最初——他们不一定关心英国人。

They didn’t take them very seriously.

他们并没有很认真地对待他们。

It’s huge.

这是巨大的。

And once they do take them seriously, they have to face threats from both Russia .

一旦他们认真对待这些问题，他们就必须面对来自俄罗斯的威胁。

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Russians are really pressing in on the Chinese in the 1850s.

1850年代，俄罗斯人确实对中国人施加了压力。

And they’ve got these coastal threats from the British.

他们还受到来自英国的沿海威胁。

It’s very difficult for this traditional Chinese state, which has emerged and developed to protect and dominate the steppe.

对于这个产生并发展起来的中国传统国家来说，保护和统治草原是非常困难的。

There’s no navy, for example.

例如，没有海军。

It’s extremely difficult for that state to adapt to face the threat from Britain and France.

该国很难适应英法的威胁。

Agility is kind of a term — we sometimes think about it with respect to states as well as individuals, that premodern states are not agile.

敏捷是一个术语——我们有时会考虑国家和个人，认为前现代国家并不敏捷。

They can’t redeploy resources, reprioritize.

他们无法重新部署资源、重新确定优先顺序。

So the Chinese state really struggles to do this.

所以中国政府确实很难做到这一点。

Japan also struggles.

日本也陷入困境。

Japan undergoes political crisis for 15 years, from Perry’s arrival in 1853 — I believe that’s when the black ships first arrived — to 1868, which is the Meiji Restoration.

日本经历了15年的政治危机，从1853年佩里到来——“我相信那是黑船第一次抵达的时候”——到1868年明治维新。

It’s 15 years of total chaos.

这是完全混乱的 15 年。

Individual Japanese daimyo and statelets are basically going to war with Westerners.

个别日本大名和小国基本上正在与西方人开战。

English ambassadors are being killed.

英国大使被杀害。

But once they overthrow the shogunate and restore the emperor, they’re able — partly I think because it’s a cohesive territory — to develop this modern state which can respond to the West.

但一旦他们推翻了幕府并恢复了天皇，他们就能够——“我认为部分原因是因为这是一个有凝聚力的领土”——发展这个能够对西方做出反应的现代国家。

That said, I don’t think we have a total explanation for it.

也就是说，我认为我们对此没有完整的解释。

It’s still a bit of a mystery they were as successful as they were.

他们如此成功仍然是一个谜。

We are squared of my explanation about the size, and their political histories is quite small.

我们对我对规模的解释是平方的，他们的政治历史相当小。

I think a large part of it is very difficult to explain.

我认为其中很大一部分是很难解释的。

And one either has to make recourse to luck, to some amazing abilities of specific statesmen, or to cultural factors, which are quite difficult there.

人们要么必须依靠运气，要么依靠特定政治家的某些惊人能力，要么依靠文化因素，而这在那里是相当困难的。

One piece of research, which I remember — the modern histography, to the extent that I’m up to date with it, on the Japanese — it emphasizes that they’re reading Western texts, the so-called Dutch learning.

我记得有一项关于日本人的研究，即现代史学，据我所知，它强调他们正在阅读西方文本，即所谓的荷兰学问。

They’re increasingly reading Western texts in the 19th century, and they’re paying attention to what happened to China.

他们越来越多地阅读19世纪的西方文本，并且关注中国发生的事情。

So, for example, when the Opium War happens, the Japanese initially think that the British can be swatted aside, and China will just destroy them.

例如，当鸦片战争发生时，日本人最初认为英国人可以被打到一边，中国就会消灭他们。

And so they’re shocked.

所以他们很震惊。

And the Chinese — the Qing court initially sends word to the Japanese that they’ve destroyed the British.

而中国人——清廷最初向日本人发出消息说他们已经消灭了英国人。

And this is like, they’re the victors.

这就像，他们是胜利者。

And then the Japanese find out what really happened, and that’s a shock to them.

然后日本人发现了到底发生了什么，这让他们感到震惊。

They get that shock in the 1840s, and they have 10 years or 20 years to adjust to the new realities.

他们在 1840 年代受到了冲击，他们有 10 年或 20 年的时间来适应新的现实。

So maybe that gives them something of an edge.

所以也许这给了他们一些优势。

A final thing is the Chinese minority Manchu state.

最后一件事是中国少数民族满族国家。

I think that really shapes their vulnerability.

我认为这确实塑造了他们的脆弱性。

They’re really worried about a Han uprising.

他们真的很担心汉人起义。

And they have the Taiping Rebellion to deal with.

他们还要对付太平天国运动。

The Japanese are ethnically cohesive.

日本人的民族凝聚力很强。

Now, the question is how much further it goes back before then.

现在的问题是，它还要追溯到那之前多久。

How much is the Anglo-Saxon experience crucial?

盎格鲁撒克逊人的经验有多重要？

There are about two experts on this, but certainly, Anglo-Saxon England seems to be a fairly cohesive state.

大约有两位专家对此进行了研究，但可以肯定的是，盎格鲁撒克逊英格兰似乎是一个相当有凝聚力的国家。

That’s the state created out of Wessex in the late 9th and then the 10th century.

这是 9 世纪末和 10 世纪在威塞克斯建立的国家。

I just don’t know enough about how to believe .

我只是不太了解如何相信。

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The English Anglo-Saxon historians think of this as a very powerful state for its age.

英国盎格鲁-撒克逊历史学家认为，就其时代而言，这是一个非常强大的国家。

The Domesday Book testifies to the bureaucratic capabilities of the Anglo-Saxon state, which the Normans then take over.

《末日审判书》证明了盎格鲁撒克逊国家的官僚能力，后来诺曼人接管了这个国家。

So there is something there.

所以那里有一些东西。

I don’t know quite what causes .

我不太清楚是什么原因造成的。

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。

England ends up being this strong nation-state, and I don’t know if it’s just an artifact of that, that we then look back and see the antecedents of this strong state in all this early medieval stuff.

英国最终成为了这个强大的民族国家，我不知道这是否只是一个产物，然后我们回顾过去，在所有这些中世纪早期的东西中看到这个强大国家的前身。

Whereas, had Catalonia become a powerful state, we could find evidence of that in the early Middle Ages.

然而，如果加泰罗尼亚成为一个强大的国家，我们可以在中世纪早期找到这方面的证据。

So there’s an element of survivorship bias.

所以存在幸存者偏差的因素。

But I’m definitely always impressed by whatever I read about Anglo-Saxon England.

但我读到的有关盎格鲁-撒克逊英格兰的内容绝对给我留下了深刻的印象。

One noticeable thing about the English Industrial Revolution is it doesn’t occur in a political center.

英国工业革命值得注意的一件事是它并不是发生在政治中心。

It occurs in the periphery, in Manchester, Yorkshire, Birmingham, Derbyshire.

它发生在曼彻斯特、约克郡、伯明翰、德比郡的外围地区。

If we look at economic miracles or effervescences, I don’t know how many of them arise in the capital region, in the political center, and how many arise in peripheral regions.

如果我们看经济奇迹或繁荣，我不知道有多少是在首都地区、在政治中心，有多少是在外围地区。

Maybe more than I think.

也许比我想象的还要多。

But something about English society that allows a bunch of entrepreneurs to basically kick-start this revolution far away from what’s going on in London seems to be quite important to me.

但英国社会允许一群企业家基本上在远离伦敦的地方启动这场革命，这对我来说似乎相当重要。

And it takes many years of experimentation, that these industrialists are self-funding many of these developments.

这些实业家需要进行多年的实验，才能自行资助其中许多开发项目。

London has a sophisticated banking sector, but the London bankers are not financing the Industrial Revolution.

伦敦拥有成熟的银行业，但伦敦银行家并没有为工业革命提供资金。

They’re being financed out of savings.

他们的资金来自储蓄。

So it does take a long while to get going.

所以确实需要很长时间才能开始。

And it’s being neglected.

而且它正在被忽视。

Not many people are talking about it in the 1750s, 1760s, 1770s.

在 1750 年代、1760 年代、1770 年代，没有多少人谈论它。

Famously, Adam Smith doesn’t really talk much about what’s happening in terms of industrialization at the time he’s writing.

众所周知，亚当·斯密在写作时并没有过多谈论工业化方面正在发生的事情。

But the Jews — they’re invited in, in a favorable time.

但犹太人——他们是在一个有利的时机被邀请进来的。

There’s a lot of anti-Semitism in English history.

英国历史上有很多反犹太主义。

Shakespeare.

莎士比亚。

There’s a crypto-Jewish doctor of Elizabeth I who’s hung, drawn, and quartered or burnt alive — I can’t remember which — in the 1590s.

伊丽莎白一世时期有一位神秘的犹太医生，在 1590 年代被绞死、抽搐、分尸或活活烧死——我不记得是哪一件事了。

So a lot of anti-Semitism.

所以有很多反犹太主义。

But the Puritans, the religious independents, of whom Cromwell is basically the leader, they identify with Zion and Israel.

但克伦威尔基本上是清教徒的领袖，他们是宗教独立派，他们认同锡安和以色列。

They give their kids Israelite and Abrahamic and Old Testament names.

他们给孩子起以色列名字、亚伯拉罕名字和旧约名字。

And the Jews who petitioned Cromwell to settle in England — Sephardic Jews from Amsterdam — they have capital.

而请求克伦威尔定居英国的犹太人——“来自阿姆斯特丹的塞法迪犹太人”——他们有资本。

They have money.

他们有钱。

They’re allied in a war against Spain and the Spanish Empire.

他们在对抗西班牙和西班牙帝国的战争中结盟。

So it’s a very politically opportune moment for them to come, and they secure good terms.

因此，这对他们来说是一个非常政治上的时机，而且他们也获得了良好的条件。

Then subsequently, there’s really not many problems with them.

那么接下来，他们真的就没有什么问题了。

There are some issues.

有一些问题。

There are some riots.

有一些骚乱。

But in general, they’re allies with the Protestants.

但总的来说，他们是新教徒的盟友。

And they’re small.

而且它们很小。

They’re a small community.

他们是一个小社区。

So at least until the late 18th century, there’s not really much reason to be really hostile to them unless you’re a virulent anti-Semite.

因此，至少在 18 世纪末之前，没有太多理由真正敌视他们，除非你是一个恶毒的反犹太主义者。

Whereas other cases, it’s a little bit different.

而其他情况则略有不同。

The Irish are coming in large numbers.

爱尔兰人大量涌入。

They’re Catholic, and Catholicism is seen as suspect because of the geopolitical consequences of it.

他们是天主教徒，而天主教因其地缘政治后果而被视为可疑。

So they’re just less favored for those reasons.

因此，他们只是因为这些原因而不太受青睐。

Similarly, the British behavior in the colonies is very repressive, often.

同样，英国在殖民地的行为往往非常压制。

But that’s again .

但这又是这样。

.

。

.

。

the schizophrenia is not within Britain.

精神分裂症不在英国境内。

It’s between what’s inside and what’s outside.

它介于内部和外部之间。

The ones which are big, like Manchester and Liverpool — actually, they have cultural amenities, which mean that there are still flourishing parts of them.

像曼彻斯特和利物浦这样的大城市——实际上，它们有文化设施，这意味着它们仍然有繁荣的部分。

And they literally revived a little bit in the last 20 years, I would say.

我想说，在过去 20 年里，它们确实有所复兴。

It’s places like Doncaster and Barnsley, which were often mining towns or one-industry towns, which have really fallen into disrepair.

像唐卡斯特和巴恩斯利这样的地方，通常是矿业城镇或单一工业城镇，现在已经年久失修。

Germany, I’m not surprised, because German manufacturing has survived to a much larger extent than British manufacturing.

德国，我并不感到惊讶，因为德国制造业的生存程度比英国制造业要大得多。

I don’t know if a comparison with France or America might be more salient because you have coal towns, for example.

我不知道与法国或美国的比较是否更重要，因为例如，你们有煤炭城镇。

And I think coal towns in Pennsylvania or West Virginia have done very badly as well.

我认为宾夕法尼亚州或西弗吉尼亚州的煤炭城镇也表现得很糟糕。

The German example would be manufacturing, which has survived much more compared to, say .

德国的例子是制造业，与其他国家相比，它的生存率要高得多。

.

。

.

。

These British towns, by the way, have been declining since World War II.

顺便说一句，这些英国城镇自二战以来一直在衰落。

So Britain lost .

所以英国输了。

.

。

.

。

these are the so-called industries of the first Industrial Revolution.

这些就是所谓的第一次工业革命的产业。

And they were driving Britain’s progress in the 19th century.

他们推动了 19 世纪英国的进步。

They’ve been in decline since the 1930s, 1920s.

自 20 世纪 30 年代、1920 年代以来，它们一直在衰落。

And there are many high-skill people leaving.

而且还有很多高技能人才离开。

But I think there are just too many of them.

但我认为这样的人太多了。

There’s no way these people are returning to their countries.

这些人不可能返回自己的国家。

They’ve made their lives in the UK.

他们在英国谋生。

And so as long as they’re there, you’re not going to go back to being in the 1950s, which was quite boring, at least anecdotally.

因此，只要它们还在那里，你就不会回到 20 世纪 50 年代，至少从传闻来看，那是相当无聊的。

The other factor we talked about in team sports — there’s a shirking problem.

我们在团队运动中谈到的另一个因素 —— 存在逃避问题。

Each individual player might have an incentive to, at the margin, shirk a little bit because they’re on a team.

每个球员都可能有动机在一定程度上逃避一点，因为他们是一个团队。

And if their team’s going to win two-nil anyway, they’ll underinvest a little bit.

如果他们的球队无论如何都要以二比零获胜，他们的投资就会有点不足。

So the argument is, when you’re following your team just by reading the scores in the newspaper, or maybe hearing it on the radio, I just know the team won, two-nil.

所以争论是，当你仅仅通过阅读报纸上的比分或者在广播中听到比分来关注你的球队时，我就知道球队赢了，二比零。

I don’t know of individual performances very well.

我不太了解个人的表现。

So that might describe English soccer or football in the 1980s or ’70s.

这可能是对 20 世纪 80 年代或 70 年代英国足球或足球的描述。

The idea is now, with every game being televised .

现在的想法是，每场比赛都会进行电视转播。

.

。

.

。

And not just that, to be honest.

老实说，不仅如此。

With the internet, we have — every player’s performance can be rated.

有了互联网，我们就可以对每个球员的表现进行评估。

And they know with statistics, now, how many kilometers each player is running.

现在，他们通过统计数据知道每个球员跑了多少公里。

Then it’s much harder for any individual player to shirk.

那么对于任何个人玩家来说都很难逃避。

And the idea was that the home fan base or audience or stadium — they get much better information on each individual player’s performance.

我们的想法是，主场球迷、观众或体育场——他们可以更好地了解每个球员的表现。

That said, this goes back to something you like to talk about.

也就是说，这又回到了你喜欢谈论的事情。

It depends if you’re judging the high points or the average.

这取决于你判断的是高点还是平均值。

The high points of Monet are fantastic, and it’s hard to overrate them.

莫奈的高点令人惊叹，很难高估它们。

But the average is not that special.

但平均水平并没有那么特别。

But there are many, many others.

但还有很多很多其他的。

I think the Americans and British don’t do as good a job of historical movies compared to French, Japanese, or many other cultures.

我认为与法国、日本或许多其他文化相比，美国人和英国人在历史电影方面做得并不好。

Italians.

意大利人。