Mark Zuckerberg Interviews Patrick Collison and Tyler Cowen on the Nature and Causes of Progress (BONUS)
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注:为了清晰起见,本文字稿经过轻微编辑。
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Hey, everyone, and welcome to the next in our series of discussions on the internet and technology and progress and some of the social issues that we face.
大家好,欢迎来到我们关于互联网、技术和进步以及我们面临的一些社会问题的系列讨论的下一个部分。
We’ve done a number of these this year focused on topics ranging from regulation to journalism to biomedical research.
今年我们做了一些这样的工作,重点关注从监管到新闻再到生物医学研究等主题。
And today what we’re gonna focus on a discussion on what progress is, how we might study it, what academic work is already going on in the space, and what we might think about to look at examples from the past to determine how we can make more progress for humanity going forward.
今天我们将重点讨论什么是进步,我们如何研究它,该领域已经开展了哪些学术工作,以及我们可能会考虑如何通过过去的例子来确定我们如何为人类未来取得更多进步。
Today joining me is Tyler Cowen, who studies economics at George Mason University and is also the coauthor of the popular blog Marginal Revolution, and Patrick Collison, who’s the cofounder and CEO of Stripe which is a pretty amazing company that basically does payments and economic infrastructure for the internet.
今天加入我的是泰勒·考恩 (Tyler Cowen),他在乔治梅森大学学习经济学,也是热门博客“边际革命”(Marginal Revolution) 的合著者;帕特里克·科里森 (Patrick Collison),他是 Stripe 的联合创始人兼首席执行官,这是一家非常棒的公司,主要从事互联网支付和经济基础设施业务。
So we’ve been talking about these topics for a while now.
所以我们已经讨论这些话题有一段时间了。
I mean, this is something that you guys have both studied in a lot of depth.
我的意思是,这是你们俩都深入研究过的东西。
And you recently wrote an op-ed together in the Atlantic about how we might have a new or different approach for studying the nature of progress.
你们最近在《大西洋月刊》上共同撰写了一篇专栏文章,讨论我们如何采用新的或不同的方法来研究进步的本质。
And in order to mine historical examples to figure out how we can make more progress in the future.
为了挖掘历史例子,找出我们如何在未来取得更多进展。
I think it’d be interesting just to start off by hearing how you’re thinking about it and the basic summary and what feedback you’ve gotten on the piece that you wrote.
我认为首先听听您的想法、基本摘要以及您对所写文章的反馈会很有趣。
Sure.
当然。
So I think one of the most important facts in the world and sort of the history of civilization today is that the rate of progress has not been constant, right?
所以我认为世界上最重要的事实之一以及当今文明史上最重要的事实之一是进步的速度并不是恒定的,对吧?
If you look at sort of what happened in the world say between 0 and 1700, 1800, thereabouts, at the rate of progress, by any major metric in terms of, you know, average income or average life expectancy or infant mortality, any of these measures, it was either constant or only improving at a very slow rate, right?
如果你看一下世界上发生的事情,比如说0到1700年、1800年左右,按照任何主要指标的进展速度,你知道,平均收入或平均预期寿命或婴儿死亡率,任何这些指标,它要么是恒定的,要么只是以非常缓慢的速度改善,对吗?
And then something happened, something changed around sort of 1700, 1750, you know, the Industrial Revolution, the Enlightenment, the advent of something approximating modern science, and once that happened, so many things started to get better together.
然后发生了一些事情,在 1700 年、1750 年左右发生了一些变化,你知道,工业革命、启蒙运动、接近现代科学的东西的出现,一旦发生这种情况,很多事情就开始变得更好。
Incomes improved, life expectancies increased, we started to discover really fundamental knowledge about the world, we started to invent really important new technologies and these things, over the last couple of centuries, really diffused around the world, right?
收入提高了,预期寿命增加了,我们开始发现关于世界的真正基础知识,我们开始发明真正重要的新技术,而这些东西在过去的几个世纪里确实传播到了世界各地,对吗?
So that’s interesting and important, and the thing that has been a focus of both of ours for the past couple years is thinking about, well, we sort of transitioned from this regime where we weren’t making much progress to one where we had been making much more.
所以这很有趣也很重要,过去几年我们双方关注的焦点就是思考,我们从没有取得太大进展的体制转变为取得了更多进展的体制。
Is this the best we can do, right?
这是我们能做的最好的事情,对吗?
Or is there something that looks compared to status quo today, you know, so much better again that it’s sort of like a status quo before the Industrial Revolution.
或者有什么东西看起来比今天的现状要好得多,有点像工业革命前的现状。
And as you look around the world today, on the one hand, we see the tremendous importance of the progress that we are generating and that for example the number of people in extreme poverty has declined by more than a billion people since I was born.
当你环顾今天的世界时,一方面,我们看到我们正在取得的进步的巨大重要性,例如,自我出生以来,极端贫困人口数量已经减少了超过十亿。
But on the other hand, there’s a lot of suggestive evidence that maybe we aren’t as effective at generating progress today as we have been in the past.
但另一方面,有很多暗示性证据表明,我们今天在取得进展方面可能不如过去那么有效。
So for example, if you look at the U.S., productivity growth mid-century or say between, you know, 1920, 1970, was maybe about 1.9% a year.
举例来说,如果你看看美国,本世纪中叶或者说 1920 年至 1970 年之间的生产率增长可能约为每年 1.9%。
Now most economists think it’s much lower, maybe around sort of .4% a year, something like that.
现在大多数经济学家认为这个数字要低得多,大约是每年 0.4% 左右。
So we’re at least by economic measures, generating progress more slowly than we used to be.
因此,至少从经济指标来看,我们取得的进展比以前要慢。
Now, whatever the rate at which we’re kind of making progress or figuring out ways to do things better today, whatever that absolute level is, it would be much better if we were doing it more effectively, if we were able to solve the most important problems that face us today in 50 years and 100 years rather than 500 years or a thousand years, right?
现在,无论我们今天取得进展的速度有多快,或者想办法把事情做得更好,无论绝对水平是多少,如果我们能够更有效地做得更好,如果我们能够在 50 年和 100 年而不是 500 年或 1000 年里解决我们今天面临的最重要的问题,那就更好了,对吗?
So the meta question we’re really interested in is how does progress happen, how do we discover useful knowledge, how is that diffused, and how can we do it better?
因此,我们真正感兴趣的元问题是进步是如何发生的,我们如何发现有用的知识,这些知识是如何传播的,以及我们如何才能做得更好?
It’s important to understand, I think, how much this is an invisible crisis.
我认为,重要的是要了解这在多大程度上是一场看不见的危机。
So if you have a growth rate that is 1 percentage point lower, over the course of a bit more than a century, you could have been three times richer with a higher growth rate.
因此,如果你的增长率低 1 个百分点,那么在一个多世纪的时间里,你的财富可能会在更高的增长率下增加三倍。
That would be something like the difference between the United States today and Mexico.
这就像今天的美国和墨西哥之间的区别。
So by having a lower rate of productivity growth, in no given year does it feel that bad, but two, three generations later, you’re much worse off, it’s harder to pay off your debts, harder to solve climate change, harder to address a whole host of problems.
因此,生产率增长率较低,在任何一年都不会让人感觉那么糟糕,但两、三代人之后,你的境况会更糟,更难偿还债务,更难解决气候变化,更难解决一系列问题。
Yeah, so before we kinda dive into how we can improve this, what do you say to the people who question whether all this progress is positive?
是的,所以在我们深入探讨如何改进这一点之前,您对那些质疑所有这些进展是否积极的人有什么想说的?
I mean, certainly as we make progress in one area, it creates issues in other areas, and that’s been a big topic that I focused on in my work at Facebook over the last few years and a lot of these challenge discussions.
我的意思是,当然,当我们在一个领域取得进展时,它会在其他领域产生问题,这是我过去几年在 Facebook 工作以及许多此类挑战讨论中关注的一个大话题。
But how does that fit into the overall framework of what you’re studying and this discipline here?
但这如何融入你正在学习的内容和这个学科的整体框架呢?
I don’t think economic growth is always a positive, but the world and America has serious problems.
我不认为经济增长总是积极的,但世界和美国都存在严重问题。
I would rather address those problems with more resources rather than fewer, whether it is paying off our debts, addressing climate change, fixing global poverty.
我宁愿用更多的资源而不是更少的资源来解决这些问题,无论是偿还债务、应对气候变化、解决全球贫困。
And knowledge matters too.
知识也很重要。
So there’s a recent paper by Ester Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee and they find if you give foreign aid combined with coaching, the rate of return to that intervention is maybe 100 to 400%.
Ester Duflo 和 Abhijit Banerjee 最近发表了一篇论文,他们发现如果将外援与教练相结合,干预的回报率可能是 100% 到 400%。
And that may or may not be true, but what I would like to see is a world where everyone is obsessing over that claim, over that debate, working very hard to figure out that it’s true, that should be on the front page.
这可能是真的,也可能不是真的,但我希望看到的是一个每个人都痴迷于这个主张、痴迷于这场辩论的世界,努力弄清楚它是真的,这应该出现在头版上。
People should be talking about it, calling up their siblings: “My goodness, I just read this, what are we gonna do?
人们应该谈论它,打电话给他们的兄弟姐妹:“天哪,我刚刚读到这篇文章,我们该怎么办?
Do you agree or not?”
你同意还是不同意?”
Yeah, and look, while again, I think it’s unequivocally the case that sort of certain kinds of progress in certain places to a certain extent can have harms and externalities and all the rest, and a really important part of progress is figuring out how do we mitigate those, how do we solve them and so on — I think climate change is probably kind of the foremost global example today.
是的,我认为,毫无疑问,某些地方的某些进步在某种程度上可能会带来危害和外部性以及其他所有方面,而进步的一个真正重要的部分是弄清楚我们如何减轻这些影响,如何解决它们等等——我认为气候变化可能是当今最重要的全球例子。
But I think it’s really important — or it is easy for us sitting here in the Bay Area in California to undervalue the prosperity and the kind of wealth we’ve been able to generate over the past couple hundred years.
但我认为这真的很重要——或者说,我们坐在加利福尼亚湾区很容易低估过去几百年来我们能够创造的繁荣和财富。
Since I was born, for example, global life expectancy has increased by about six years, and infant mortality has fallen by more than 50%.
例如,自从我出生以来,全球预期寿命增加了约六年,婴儿死亡率下降了 50% 以上。
Again, I mentioned the statistic of the number of people who have left extreme poverty.
我再次提到脱贫人口统计。
This is incredibly important, right?
这非常重要,对吧?
And so I think there’s — we’re not the first people to say it, but there is a moral imperative to this kind of progress, and we shouldn’t lose sight of that fact.
所以我认为——我们不是第一个这么说的人,但这种进步有道义上的必要性,我们不应该忽视这一事实。
Yeah, I agree.
是的,我同意。
I just think it’s important to acknowledge that a lot of these things are not uniform and you know from running a company that when you look at averages it hides a lot of issues.
我只是认为重要的是要承认很多事情并不统一,而且你从经营一家公司的过程中知道,当你查看平均值时,它隐藏了很多问题。
Your example on the rates of poverty going down I think is an interesting one in this because what a lot of people don’t particularly wanna talk about these days is that most of the benefit of people coming out of poverty has happened in China, and in some places in the world poverty has actually increased.
我认为你关于贫困率下降的例子很有趣,因为现在很多人不太想谈论的是,人们摆脱贫困的大部分好处都发生在中国,而世界上一些地方的贫困实际上有所增加。
So I generally agree with the premise — and I think studying this stuff will generally help us to make more progress in those places.
所以我总体上同意这个前提——而且我认为研究这些东西通常会帮助我们在这些地方取得更多进展。
I mean, that may be a good example because perhaps looking at some of the examples of what has done well in China could be applied to other places where there have been issues.
我的意思是,这可能是一个很好的例子,因为也许看看在中国做得很好的一些例子可以应用于其他存在问题的地方。
But before we dive into the discussion on this, I just wanted to make sure that we didn’t cover this is a way that comes across as if every step forward comes without a cost.
但在我们深入讨论这个问题之前,我只是想确保我们没有涵盖这种方式,好像每一步的进步都是没有成本的。
And I’m sure as we talk through the different examples, I mean, that’ll come up as well.
我确信当我们讨论不同的例子时,我的意思是,这也会出现。
Yeah, and we should emphasize that, you know, when we sort of talk about the phenomenon of “progress,” you know, I think GDP or GDP per capita is a pretty good first approximation measure of it and it correlates strongly with many of the things we care about.
是的,我们应该强调一点,你知道,当我们谈论“进步”现象时,你知道,我认为 GDP 或人均 GDP 是一个很好的初步近似衡量标准,它与我们关心的许多事情密切相关。
But they’re definitely not the same thing.
但它们绝对不是同一件事。
I think an important question for anybody interested in this area to think about is, well, how should we define progress?
我认为对于任何对此领域感兴趣的人来说,一个重要的问题是,我们应该如何定义进步?
And what are the better and worse kinds of it.
以及其中更好和更坏的类型是什么。
Again, in GDP, we have a relatively effective metric we can use across countries, but there already is interesting work on what might better measures be, and I think that’s really important to study.
同样,在 GDP 中,我们有一个可以在各个国家使用的相对有效的指标,但已经有一些关于更好的衡量标准的有趣工作,我认为这非常值得研究。
Well, let’s say you want to improve the lot of people in West Virginia.
好吧,假设您想改善西弗吉尼亚州的人民生活。
One growth-enhancing way of doing that is to make it easier to build, say, in Washington D.C. and the Bay Area.
一种促进增长的方法是让华盛顿特区和湾区的建设变得更容易。
Right now, to move from West Virginia, say, to Menlo Park, it’s extraordinarily expensive.
现在,从西弗吉尼亚州搬到门洛帕克的费用非常昂贵。
You can’t just pick up and show up here and hope to get a job washing dishes the way one might have done in America 50 years ago.
你不能只是来到这里,希望能找到一份像 50 年前在美国那样洗碗的工作。
So by having more building, more economic growth, also more GDP, it would increase more opportunity.
因此,通过拥有更多的建筑、更多的经济增长以及更多的GDP,就会增加更多的机会。
So economic growth and opportunity — they do tend to be correlated, and sometimes the problem is we don’t have enough growth, not that we have too much.
因此,经济增长和机会——它们确实往往是相关的,有时问题是我们没有足够的增长,而不是我们有太多。
And look, not to hammer this point too strongly, but, you know, you did invite the two people who wrote the piece for our progress here —
看,不要过分强调这一点,但是,你知道,你确实邀请了为我们的进步撰写这篇文章的两个人——
Yeah, and I wanna spend most of the time actually talking about that.
是的,我想花大部分时间来讨论这个问题。
I just wanted to make sure that we hit that up front.
我只是想确保我们能提前实现这一目标。
So there are a lot of people who already are studying this in different ways, right?
所以有很多人已经在以不同的方式研究这个问题,对吧?
They’re historians, economists.
他们是历史学家、经济学家。
When you’re thinking about what the field is, when you’re talking about trying to create a new science of studying progress, what more do you think needs to get done, or what do you envision on that?
当你思考这个领域是什么时,当你谈论尝试创建一门研究进展的新科学时,你认为还需要完成哪些工作,或者你对此有何设想?
I mean, I know you have a fund that you’ve put together, Emergent Ventures.
我的意思是,我知道你有一个基金,Emergent Ventures。
And where you’re basically finding academics who are studying examples of where there’s progress in the past to start this field.
你基本上会找到一些学者,他们正在研究过去在该领域取得进展的例子。
But what does this add up to?
但这意味着什么呢?
What form does this take over time?
随着时间的推移,这会采取什么形式?
One view of mine is that not enough philanthropy is long-term oriented.
我的一种观点是,没有足够的慈善事业以长期为导向。
In this regard, I’ve been influenced by your Chan Zuckerberg Initiative.
在这方面,我受到了陈·扎克伯格倡议的影响。
And also in philanthropy, there are too many choke points that can say no, so foundations become their own bureaucracies.
同样在慈善事业中,有太多的瓶颈无法拒绝,因此基金会变成了自己的官僚机构。
They become very risk-averse.
他们变得非常厌恶风险。
So Emergent Ventures is a new kind of philanthropy.
因此,Emergent Ventures 是一种新型慈善事业。
There’s one layer of yes or no. People are encouraged to apply.
有一层是或否。鼓励人们申请。
If the payoff is 30, 40 years down the road, the attitude is, “Great.” Take a lot of chances.
如果 30、40 年后能得到回报,人们的态度就是“太棒了”。抓住很多机会。
Worry about getting some winners and some risk and not expect the median project to be something that necessarily looks good when taken to a board.
担心获得一些赢家和一些风险,并且不要指望中值项目在提交给董事会时一定看起来不错。
So that’s one way that thinking in terms of progress helps us restructure at the micro level the particular decisions we’re making.
因此,这是从进步角度思考的一种方式,可以帮助我们在微观层面上重组我们正在做出的特定决策。
Yeah.
是的。
I strongly agree that sort of there’s a lot of important work already happening across multiple disciplines that is relevant to these questions.
我强烈同意,与这些问题相关的多个学科已经开展了大量重要的工作。
Like the idea of there being “a new science of progress” — that was the headline placed on the article but not exactly what we’re saying.
就像存在“一门新的进步科学”的想法一样——这是这篇文章的标题,但并不完全是我们所说的。
What we’re arguing is that the work that’s already happening should be receiving more attention and there should be much more of us.
我们认为,已经发生的工作应该受到更多关注,我们的参与也应该更多。
And just to give a couple of quick examples: there’s strongly suggested evidence that we can teach management practices so people can run firms more effectively, right?
举几个简单的例子:有强有力的证据表明,我们可以教授管理实践,以便人们能够更有效地经营公司,对吗?
So there’s a couple of studies on this.
因此有一些关于此的研究。
There’s a good one from some folks at Stanford that did a randomized trial in India.
斯坦福大学的一些人在印度做了一项很好的随机试验。
And there’s a really neat one that came out last year from Michela Giorcelli looking at firms in Italy and showing that over 15 years after a management training program with some natural randomization, that those firms were employing more people, paying more wages, being more successful.
去年,Michela Giorcelli 发表了一项非常精彩的研究,该研究对意大利的公司进行了调查,结果显示,在进行了自然随机化的管理培训计划 15 年后,这些公司雇佣了更多的人,支付了更多的工资,取得了更大的成功。
And another randomized trial in Mexico conducted over the past couple years, again, 600 firms, ensuring that just teaching better management practices actually makes those companies much better off.
过去几年在墨西哥进行的另一项随机试验同样是在 600 家公司中进行,确保仅仅教授更好的管理实践实际上就能使这些公司的状况变得更好。
If that’s true, that’s amazing low-hanging fruit, right?
如果这是真的,那真是一个令人惊奇的唾手可得的果实,对吗?
We should be investing much more in this area.
我们应该在这个领域投入更多。
We should be figuring out which kinds of management training work better or worse than others, is this generalized to all countries, how can we actually implement and execute this in the world more broadly?
我们应该弄清楚哪种管理培训比其他管理培训效果更好或更差,这是否适用于所有国家,我们如何在世界范围内更广泛地实际实施和执行?
So that’s one.
这就是其中之一。
Second is, Tyler mentioned this point about geographic mobility, right?
其次,泰勒提到了关于地理流动性的这一点,对吗?
When you think about how do we grow GDP or how do we generate progress maybe housing policy’s not the first thing we’re naturally drawn to thinking about.
当你思考如何增长 GDP 或如何取得进步时,住房政策可能并不是我们自然而然想到的第一件事。
However, if you look at the USA in 1980, 40% of people moved somewhere else when they took a new job.
然而,如果你看看 1980 年的美国,40% 的人在找到新工作后就搬到了其他地方。
So those things went together much more.
所以这些事情更多地结合在一起。
If you look last year, about one in ten people moved when they took a new job, right?
如果你看看去年,大约十分之一的人在接受新工作时搬家,对吗?
So within the U.S., geographic mobility really declined.
因此,在美国境内,地域流动性确实下降了。
That is in large part because the costs of movement have enormously increased as housing costs have increased especially in our most productive regions over the past couple decades.
这在很大程度上是因为过去几十年来,随着住房成本的增加,特别是在我们生产力最高的地区,流动成本大幅增加。
Now if you look into that sort of more closely, there are economists who’ve been studying these questions quite closely for the past couple of years.
现在,如果你更仔细地研究这一点,就会发现过去几年有些经济学家一直在仔细研究这些问题。
These two guys Hsieh and Moretti published an updated version of a previous paper this summer putting forward a model showing that if you look at the zoning restrictions that existed in the Bay Area and New York between 1964 and 2009, and you imagine a counter-factual world where there was much more supply elasticity in these places and we built way more homes here in the Bay Area and in New York.
Hsieh 和 Moretti 这两个人在今年夏天发表了一篇论文的更新版本,提出了一个模型,表明如果你看看 1964 年至 2009 年间湾区和纽约存在的分区限制,你会想象一个反事实的世界,这些地方的供应弹性更大,我们在湾区和纽约建造了更多的房屋。
In that counter-factual world, average U.S. income would be, in their model, $3,700 higher per person .
在那个反事实的世界中,根据他们的模型,美国的人均收入将高出 3,700 美元。
Again, not just for people in those places, but across the country, right?
再说一次,不仅仅是那些地方的人们,而是全国各地的人们,对吧?
That’s a huge effect size.
这是一个巨大的效应量。
And so again, we should be studying these questions much more closely and we should be figuring out, okay, well, if that’s true, what are the policy prescriptions?
再说一次,我们应该更仔细地研究这些问题,我们应该弄清楚,好吧,如果这是真的,政策处方是什么?
How do we actually go act upon that?
我们实际上该如何采取行动呢?
It’s amazing low-hanging fruit.
这是令人惊奇的唾手可得的果实。
And then to give a third one, as those two examples show, funding science is incredibly important.
然后给出第三个例子,正如这两个例子所示,资助科学非常重要。
But there’s surprisingly little work about how we should be funding science and how could we do that most effectively?
但令人惊讶的是,关于我们应该如何资助科学以及我们如何才能最有效地做到这一点的工作却很少?
And actually, beneath the surface, it’s been changing a tremendous amount here in the U.S. over the past couple of decades, and whether that’s a good thing is an important policy question.
事实上,在过去的几十年里,美国的情况在表面之下发生了巨大的变化,这是否是一件好事是一个重要的政策问题。
So for example, in 1980 the NIH spent 12x more dollars on researchers under 40 than researchers over 50.
例如,1980 年,美国国立卫生研究院 (NIH) 在 40 岁以下研究人员身上的花费是 50 岁以上研究人员的 12 倍。
So they predominately funded younger people.
所以他们主要资助年轻人。
Today they spend 5x more dollars on people over 50 than under 40.
如今,他们在 50 岁以上人群上的花费是 40 岁以下人群的 5 倍。
And so it’s really inverted — it’s kind of gone from primarily funding these young investigators to this gerontocracy where they’re funding older scientists.
所以它确实是颠倒的——它从主要资助这些年轻的研究人员变成了资助年长科学家的老年人统治。
Maybe that’s good, maybe that’s bad, I don’t know — but that seems like a very important question to answer.
也许这是好事,也许是坏事,我不知道——但这似乎是一个需要回答的非常重要的问题。
And so part of our point in arguing for progress studies is when you really look at kind of the expansive version of all the different things that can sort of, you know, influence our ability to discover new useful knowledge to generate economic growth, the set of questions is super-broad, and we should be trying to kind of synthesize this effectively.
因此,我们主张进步研究的部分观点是,当你真正审视所有不同事物的扩展版本时,你知道,这些事物会影响我们发现新的有用知识以促进经济增长的能力,这组问题非常广泛,我们应该尝试有效地综合这一点。
On medical research
关于医学研究
Yeah.
是的。
So let’s go deep on medical research here for a second, because this is an area that you wrote this paper about before about how the progress in the field might be slowing.
因此,让我们在这里深入讨论一下医学研究,因为这是您之前写过这篇论文的一个领域,内容是该领域的进展可能会放缓。
And like you mentioned, The Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, the philanthropy that I run with my wife, a big focus of it is on medical research and trying to — we have this aspirational goal that we wanna help build tools that can help scientists cure, prevent, or manage all diseases by the end of this century.
就像你提到的,陈·扎克伯格倡议,这是我和我妻子共同经营的慈善事业,它的一个重点是医学研究,并试图——我们有一个雄心勃勃的目标,我们希望帮助开发工具,帮助科学家在本世纪末治愈、预防或管理所有疾病。
And basically, the math of how you get there is, starting about 100 years ago there was really this uptick in medical research where we started doing randomized control experiments, treating it more like an experimental science.
基本上,从数学上讲,从大约 100 年前开始,医学研究确实有了很大的发展,我们开始进行随机对照实验,更像是一门实验科学。
Since around that time, the average life expectancy has increased by a quarter of a year every year, relatively linearly.
从那时起,平均预期寿命每年增加四分之一,相对线性。
There’s no guarantee, of course, that that continues, but if we’re able to have that continue, then that would imply that by the end of the century we will generally have had to have either cured, prevented, or been able to manage most if not all of the diseases that we’re aware of now.
当然,不能保证这种情况会持续下去,但如果我们能够继续这种情况,那就意味着到本世纪末,我们通常必须治愈、预防或能够控制大多数(如果不是全部)我们现在意识到的疾病。
So there’s some trend that suggests that this should be reasonable, and the approach that we’re taking in the work at CZI is largely about building tools to help compound the rate of science.
因此,有一些趋势表明这应该是合理的,而我们在 CZI 的工作中采取的方法主要是构建工具来帮助提高科学速度。
And what we see is that, like you mentioned, the government is the largest and most important funder of science and it basically funds the whole establishment of scientists across the country.
我们看到的是,就像你提到的,政府是最大、最重要的科学资助者,它基本上资助了全国各地的科学家队伍。
But the grants tend to be very spread out across a lot of people.
但补助金往往分布在很多人身上。
They’re not typically put into big infrastructure projects.
它们通常不会投入大型基础设施项目。
And that’s the niche that we felt through CZI that we can help to fill: instead of investing a million dollars in a lab, put $100 million or a couple hundred million dollars over time into building up really important scientific assets for the community.
这就是我们通过 CZI 感受到的可以帮助填补的空白:与其在实验室投资 100 万美元,不如随着时间的推移投入 1 亿或几亿美元来为社区建立真正重要的科学资产。
Like helping to fund scientists to go put together this Human Cell Atlas.
比如帮助资助科学家整理这份人类细胞图谱。
Think about it as like the periodic table of elements but for biology — all the different kinds of cells in the human body.
把它想象成元素周期表,但对于生物学来说——人体中所有不同种类的细胞。
And the goal is just, if you look throughout the history of science, at least, most major scientific breakthroughs have been preceded by the invention of new tools that help people look at things in different ways.
我们的目标是,如果你纵观整个科学史,至少大多数重大科学突破都是在新工具的发明之前实现的,这些新工具可以帮助人们以不同的方式看待事物。
And so the theory is similar to what you’re going at of how you increase the compounding rate of progress.
因此,该理论与您所要讨论的如何提高复合进展率的理论类似。
There are a couple of different directions that I think we could go in here.
我认为我们可以朝几个不同的方向发展。
One is that I’m curious what you’ve seen in your studies in the space that suggest to you that the rate of progress is actually slowing.
一是我很好奇你在这个领域的研究中看到了什么,这表明进展速度实际上正在放缓。
And I’m also curious about the examples you’ve seen overall of how the science around studying progress would potentially lead to a different approach or a different portfolio of how this kind of work gets done.
我也对你所看到的总体例子感到好奇,围绕研究进展的科学如何可能导致完成此类工作的不同方法或不同组合。
So I don’t know where you want to start with that, but there’s a lot here to do.
所以我不知道你想从哪里开始,但这里有很多事情要做。
Here’s what worries me, and it should worry you too.
这就是我担心的事情,你也应该担心。
So as you mentioned, U.S. life expectancy is basically going up in linear fashion.
正如您提到的,美国人的预期寿命基本上呈线性增长。
But if you look at expenditures, we used to spend a few percentage points of GDP on healthcare, and now it’s about 18%.
但如果你看一下支出,我们过去在医疗保健上的支出占 GDP 的几个百分点,现在约为 18%。
So we’ve gone up to 18%, and we’re not even boosting the rate.
所以我们已经提高到了 18%,而且我们甚至没有提高这个比率。
I’m not saying it’s the fault of any one group of people, but something has gone wrong.
我并不是说这是任何一群人的错,但确实出了问题。
There’s some kind of last-mile problem.
存在某种最后一英里的问题。
You can turn to the newspapers and read all kinds of fantastic stories — new research, new ideas, new tools — but when the rubber hits the road, people living longer, we’re spending more and more and more for exactly the same returns.
你可以翻阅报纸,阅读各种奇妙的故事——新研究、新想法、新工具——但当橡胶上路时,人们的寿命更长,我们花越来越多的钱来获得完全相同的回报。
So if that trend continues — and you see a similar trend in many areas: crop yields, feeding the world, other areas — the question becomes, where does all the progress go?
因此,如果这种趋势持续下去——而且你在许多领域都看到了类似的趋势:农作物产量、养活世界、其他领域——问题就变成了,所有的进步都去哪儿了?
So the idea that you need to look at each structure and encourage more risk-taking, better decisions with the money, less bureaucratization — maybe in some cases more centralization, whatever it takes — but that there is this invisible crisis, and people are distracted by the headlines about CRISPR or whatever.
因此,我们的想法是,你需要审视每一个结构,鼓励更多的冒险,用钱做出更好的决策,减少官僚化——也许在某些情况下更多的集中化,无论如何——但是存在着这种看不见的危机,人们被有关 CRISPR 或其他什么的头条新闻分散了注意力。
But actually what you get for the money — performance is so-so, I think.
但实际上,我认为你花的钱所得到的——性能马马虎虎。
Yeah, and so what we wrote in this article a year ago about what’s going on in science — if you look at it by the most kind of microscopic measures, like the number of PhDs in the U.S, —actually if you take all the microscopic measures, they all have grown by about a factor between 50 and 100.
是的,所以我们一年前在这篇文章中写的关于科学界正在发生的事情——如果你用最微观的衡量标准来看待它,比如美国博士的数量——实际上,如果你采取所有微观衡量标准,它们都增长了大约 50 到 100 倍。
Number of PhDs, number of papers published every year, actual dollars into the science funding, and so on.
博士学位数量、每年发表的论文数量、科学经费的实际投入金额等等。
So in a very stylized way, if you look at the first half of the twentieth century as compared to the second half, there’s way more input in the second half of the century.
因此,以一种非常程式化的方式,如果你将二十世纪上半叶与下半叶进行比较,就会发现本世纪下半叶的投入要多得多。
And again, not by 50%, but by orders of magnitude.
再说一遍,不是 50%,而是几个数量级。
And so then I think the question for all of us would be, well, in which half of the century did we get more out in terms of useful scientific knowledge?
因此,我认为我们所有人面临的问题是,在这半个世纪中,我们在有用的科学知识方面获得了更多的知识?
And then whichever we think did better, to what degree?
然后我们认为哪一个做得更好,达到什么程度?
And again, this is a very difficult question to answer of how do you weigh scientific knowledge?
再说一遍,这是一个很难回答的问题:如何衡量科学知识?
And so you have to look at it, I think, into various applied contexts.
所以我认为你必须在各种应用环境中看待它。
Like life expectancy or semiconductors or, as Tyler mentioned, crop yields or whatever.
就像预期寿命或半导体,或者正如泰勒提到的,农作物产量或其他什么。
And I think what’s interesting and, anyway should be concerning, is that for almost every conceivable applied measure we seem to be getting at best constant returns.
我认为有趣的是,无论如何应该令人担忧的是,对于几乎所有可以想象的应用措施,我们似乎最多只能获得恒定的回报。
But that’s really bad because we see exponentially increasing inputs and constant return outputs.
但这确实很糟糕,因为我们看到输入呈指数级增长,而输出回报恒定。
That is almost by definition not a process that we can sustain.
从定义上来说,这几乎不是一个我们能够维持的过程。
Now, there’s two broad possibilities there.
现在,有两种广泛的可能性。
One is it’s just getting intrinsically harder to generate progress and to discover these things.
一是产生进步和发现这些东西本质上变得越来越困难。
And who knows, maybe some significant part of that is true.
谁知道呢,也许其中一些重要部分是真的。
But the other possibility is it’s somehow more institutional, right?
但另一种可能性是它在某种程度上更加制度化,对吧?
It’s more contingent, it’s more sociological.
它更加偶然,更加社会学。
And again, we do have suggestive evidence that our institutions are — well, they’re certainly older than they used to be, and as in the NIH funding example, there are changes happening beneath the surface and so on that may or may not be good.
再说一次,我们确实有暗示性的证据表明,我们的机构——嗯,它们肯定比以前更老了,就像美国国立卫生研究院资助的例子一样,表面之下正在发生变化,等等,这些变化可能是好事,也可能不是好事。
So I don’t think we should write off the possibility that it’s not inevitable, and that there do exist alternate forms of organization where things would work better.
因此,我认为我们不应该排除这种可能性:这并非不可避免,而且确实存在其他组织形式,可以让事情运作得更好。
And again, if we dig a little bit into the evidence there, you see things like — there’s a science funding program that, obviously, you’re familiar with called HHMI at the Howard Hughes Medical Institute.
再说一次,如果我们深入研究一下那里的证据,你会看到类似的东西——显然,你很熟悉霍华德休斯医学研究所有一个名为 HHMI 的科学资助计划。
They give grants along the lines of how CCI does where they’re longer term, they’re more open-ended and so on.
他们按照 CCI 的长期做法提供资助,而且更加开放等等。
Pierre Azoulay at MIT wrote a paper a couple years ago in trying to look at, well, if you take ostensibly identical scientists, some of whom receive HHMI grants, and some of whom don’t, how much more successful are the HHMI recipients?
麻省理工学院的皮埃尔·阿祖莱(Pierre Azoulay)几年前写了一篇论文,试图研究一下,如果你选取表面上相同的科学家,其中一些人获得了 HHMI 的资助,而另一些人没有,那么 HHMI 的接受者会成功多少?
And he concluded they’re about twice as likely to produce a top 1% paper by citation count.
他得出的结论是,按引用次数计算,他们发表前 1% 论文的可能性大约是他们的两倍。
Again, that’s really suggestive.
再说一遍,这确实很有启发性。
Top 1% if they do what?
Top 1% 如果他们做什么?
They’re about twice as likely to produce a top 1% paper by citation count.
他们发表引用次数排名前 1% 的论文的可能性大约是他们的两倍。
If they…
如果他们……
Oh, say, if they receive an HHMI grant.
哦,比如说,如果他们获得 HHMI 拨款。
Well, that might be correlation, not causation.
嗯,这可能是相关性,而不是因果关系。
Yeah, so he tries —
是的,所以他尝试——
They do get a lot of the best people.
他们确实拥有很多最优秀的人才。
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
是啊,是啊,是啊。
So he tries to control for that and use a reasonable methodology for it, but some of it could totally be that just a selection effect.
因此,他试图控制这一点并使用合理的方法,但其中一些完全可能只是选择效应。
But again, I think it’s very suggestive that maybe there are things we could do that would better enable this discovery.
但我再次认为,这很有启发性,也许我们可以做一些事情来更好地实现这一发现。
And, this might seem like a bit of a red herring, but I think it is suggestive that in many other domains where we can objectively assess progress, it’s very clear that our productivity has fallen off a cliff and for reasons that we can be pretty sure are not that it’s getting intrinsically harder.
而且,这可能看起来有点转移注意力,但我认为这表明,在我们可以客观评估进展的许多其他领域,很明显我们的生产力已经跌落悬崖,而我们可以非常确定的原因并不是它本质上变得更加困难。
And so, for example, when New York decided to build the subway in 1900: 4.7 years later, they opened 23 subway stations, and in 2019 dollars, they spent just over a billion dollars doing so.
例如,当纽约在 1900 年决定修建地铁时:4.7 年后,他们开设了 23 个地铁站,按 2019 年美元计算,他们为此花费了超过 10 亿美元。
So 23 stations, just over a billion dollars.
23 个电台,刚刚超过 10 亿美元。
When New York decided to build the Second Avenue subway in the year 2000, 17 years later they opened three stations and they spent $4.5 billion doing so.
当纽约于 2000 年决定修建第二大道地铁时,17 年后,他们斥资 45 亿美元开设了三个车站。
And so our productivity in subway construction has, at least in New York, decreased by a factor of 40.
因此,我们地铁建设的生产力(至少在纽约)下降了 40 倍。
Here in the Bay Area, we decide to build the Golden Gate Bridge and the Bay Bridge starting in 1933.
在湾区,我们决定从 1933 年开始建造金门大桥和海湾大桥。
Both projects finished within four years, and to celebrate it we decide to build man-made island, and we built that island in 18 months.
这两个项目都在四年内完成,为了庆祝,我们决定建造人造岛,我们用了 18 个月建成了那个岛。
And I haven’t tried but I would wager that if one tried to build a new island in San Francisco, it would be difficult to do so today in 18 months.
我还没有尝试过,但我敢打赌,如果有人试图在旧金山建造一座新岛,18 个月后的今天将很难做到。
When France decided to build the TGV, its high speed rail, it opened the first line after five years.
当法国决定建造高速铁路TGV时,五年后开通了第一条线路。
California started pursuing high speed rail 11 years ago.
加州11年前就开始建设高铁。
We forecast being finished in 2033, so we project a 25-year project, but of course that’s a projection.
我们预计将于 2033 年完成,因此我们预计项目为期 25 年,但这当然只是一个预测。
It’ll probably end up being much longer still.
它最终可能会更长。
So this is the domain where it’s hard to imagine that building infrastructure had gotten intrinsically harder, right?
因此,很难想象在这个领域建设基础设施本质上变得更加困难,对吗?
The atoms aren’t physically heavier than they used to be, right?
原子的物理重量并不比以前重,对吗?
And so clearly there’s something institutional, sociological going on with infrastructure.
很明显,基础设施方面存在一些制度性、社会性的问题。
Larry Summers talks about the idea of the promiscuous distribution of the veto power and how much harder it is to get things done.
拉里·萨默斯 (Larry Summers) 谈到了否决权的混杂分配的想法以及完成任务的难度。
Inasmuch as that’s true, then there’s the question of, well, have other institutions, other progress-generating mechanisms in our society — have they also got less efficient?
既然这是事实,那么问题来了,我们社会中的其他机构、其他促进进步的机制——它们的效率是否也降低了?
And if so, what can we do about it?
如果是这样,我们能做些什么呢?
So as an aside, if you’re watching this, Patrick collects these examples of of historical projects that went fast and that you can’t imagine how they went that fast.
顺便说一句,如果你正在观看这个,帕特里克收集了这些进展迅速的历史项目的例子,你无法想象它们是如何进展得这么快的。
So if you Google his website, he has like a whole list of these that I think is pretty interesting and compelling when you go through all of them.
因此,如果你用谷歌搜索他的网站,你会发现他有一个完整的列表,我认为当你浏览所有这些内容时,这些列表非常有趣且引人注目。
Yeah, I think it’s just important to understand how effectively we as a species can do things when we’re organized the right way.
是的,我认为了解我们作为一个物种在以正确的方式组织时能够如何有效地做事非常重要。
Humanity is pretty amazing.
人性真是太奇妙了。
And when possibilities are unlocked, when efficacy is enabled, we can do great things.
当可能性被释放、当功效被启用时,我们就能做出伟大的事情。
Sometimes it is a matter of actual will.
有时这是实际意愿的问题。
So for the last 40 years, getting around for almost all Americans, it is slower.
因此,在过去 40 年里,几乎所有美国人的出行速度都变慢了。
And before that, we had a period from 1800 say to 1970 when it got quicker and quicker and quicker.
在此之前,我们经历了从 1800 年到 1970 年的一段时期,它变得越来越快。
And now even flying in airplanes for most people is slower.
现在,对于大多数人来说,乘坐飞机的速度也变得更慢。
Traffic is worse.
交通状况更糟。
Those are solvable problems.
这些都是可以解决的问题。
Manhattan should have congestion pricing and a stiffer form of it than they’re likely to opt for.
曼哈顿应该实行拥堵收费,而且形式应该比他们可能选择的更严格。
So the notion that people have lost the ability to imagine a future much different and much better than what they know to me is one of the most worrying aspects of where we are now.
因此,人们已经失去了想象未来的能力,这个未来与他们所知道的截然不同、更好,这是我们现在所处的最令人担忧的方面之一。
Yeah, and quantitatively, I mean, if you look at the percentage of Americans who think that their kids’ lives will be better than theirs, that has been in monotonic decline — not strictly monotonic — but generally declining since World War II until, on an empirical basis, Americans are getting less hopeful about their futures, their kids’ futures, and that’s a really bad thing because it can be an auto-catalyzing process and a self-fulfilling prophecy.
是的,我的意思是,从数量上看,如果你看看认为自己孩子的生活会比自己更好的美国人的比例,你会发现这一比例一直在单调下降——不是严格单调——而是自二战以来普遍下降,直到根据经验,美国人对自己的未来、孩子的未来越来越不抱希望,这是一件非常糟糕的事情,因为它可能是一个自动催化过程和一个自我实现的预言。
And we’re supposed to be the most optimistic, forward-looking country.
我们应该是最乐观、最有远见的国家。
The data on France, how many people think their kids will be worse off — that’s much more worrying yet.
法国的数据显示,有多少人认为他们的孩子的情况会更糟——这更令人担忧。
And there may be a self-fulfilling prophecy to this.
这可能有一个自我实现的预言。
If you think the future won’t be so great, you’ll invest less, you won’t work as hard, you’ll contract your risk-taking.
如果你认为未来不会那么美好,你就会减少投资,你不会那么努力工作,你就会减少冒险。
And you end up with a social and economic malaise.
最终你会陷入社会和经济困境。
And, indeed, you see falling rates of economic growth in most of the Western world.
事实上,大多数西方世界的经济增长率都在下降。
So I’m curious how you would think about going about and studying these organizational changes.
所以我很好奇你会如何考虑和研究这些组织变革。
Going back to biomedical science, for example, just because this is an area we do a lot of work in.
例如,回到生物医学科学,因为这是我们做了大量工作的领域。
The woman who runs CZI Science Initiative, Cori Bargmann, she’s a very renowned scientist, and she has this theory that a lot of the granting process that NIH does — but also HHMI — it basically encourages very individualistic work, right?
CZI 科学计划的负责人科里·巴格曼 (Cori Bargmann) 是一位非常著名的科学家,她有这样的理论:美国国立卫生研究院 (NIH) 以及 HHMI 所做的许多资助过程基本上都鼓励非常个人主义的工作,对吗?
You give people grants, they work on their own, you’re not incentivizing people to work together.
你给人们补助,他们自己工作,你没有激励人们一起工作。
People actually want to work together, they want to coordinate.
人们实际上想要一起工作,他们想要协调。
And when I was talking about the Human Cell Atlas, a lot of the issue there that needed to get dealt with was that a lot of people were working on cell atlases for different parts of the body, the liver cell atlas, whatever.
当我谈论人类细胞图谱时,需要解决的很多问题是很多人正在研究身体不同部位的细胞图谱,肝细胞图谱等等。
But they were all in different data types and formats, so that way you couldn’t compile a holistic thing.
但它们的数据类型和格式都不同,因此您无法编译出一个整体的东西。
So a lot of what she did and the work of CZI was basically helping to coordinate.
所以她所做的很多事情和CZI的工作基本上都是在帮助协调。
That way when these grants were given, everything — like the teams worked together, the data types were similar, so that way it all added up to a bigger thing.
这样,当给予这些资助时,一切——就像团队一起工作一样,数据类型是相似的,这样所有的东西加起来就变成了一个更大的事情。
And that certainly seems like one of many theories that one could have for how you could organize this stuff better.
这当然看起来像是人们可以拥有的关于如何更好地组织这些东西的众多理论之一。
But there’s this question of how much of progress — whether that’s something that one could have determined just through historical data versus this is the type of thing you need people or the government or foundations to go out and just run different experiments and see how this works.
但问题是,进步有多大——这是否是人们可以通过历史数据来确定的事情,还是需要人们、政府或基金会出去进行不同的实验,看看它是如何运作的。
And I’m curious how you think about, in terms of studying this, how much this is like this history and history of science based on data that’s already out there versus “we should just try different models of things and encourage more creativity and more competition and try different things.”
我很好奇你在研究这个问题时如何看待,这与基于现有数据的历史和科学史有多少相似之处,而不是“我们应该尝试不同的事物模型,鼓励更多的创造力和更多的竞争,并尝试不同的事物。”
It’s striking to me, if you look at American universities, the list of the top places in 1920 and the list today — it’s completely the same, except we’ve added on California.
让我惊讶的是,如果你看看美国的大学,1920 年的排名和今天的排名完全一样,除了我们增加了加州。
Otherwise, no change.
否则,没有变化。
Top 50 universities — if you look at —
排名前 50 的大学——如果你看看——
It’s very different for companies.
对于公司来说这是非常不同的。
Of course, even from 1980, it’s —
当然,即使从 1980 年开始,也是——
Decade over decade, the list of the top ten companies by market cap almost completely turns over.
十几年来,市值排名前十的公司名单几乎全部翻转。
Yes.
是的。
Procedures for tenure in the top 50 research universities — almost exactly the same.
排名前 50 的研究型大学的终身教职程序几乎完全相同。
Whatever you think of those, there’s something gone wrong in the sector.
不管你怎么看,这个行业确实出了问题。
There’s not enough experimentation with how you reward people.
对于如何奖励人们还没有进行足够的实验。
More schools should experiment with a different tenure or reward people more on the basis of practical impact.
更多的学校应该尝试不同的任期,或者根据实际影响给予更多的奖励。
And again, you might object to any particular solution, but the extent to which experimentation has died at the institutional level, to me, is striking.
再说一次,你可能会反对任何特定的解决方案,但对我来说,实验在制度层面上的消亡程度是惊人的。
And to underscore that point, if you look at the top 25 universities in the world today or the kinds of ranking, there’s lots of them.
为了强调这一点,如果你看看当今世界排名前 25 的大学或各种排名,就会发现有很多这样的大学。
Seven of the top 25 are American universities that were started in a single 30-year period between 1861 and 1891.
排名前 25 名的大学中有 7 所是在 1861 年至 1891 年 30 年间创办的美国大学。
And if you look at where those universities come from and what were the people behind them thinking, they were very deliberately and specifically reform-minded.
如果你看看这些大学的起源以及它们背后的人在想什么,就会发现它们非常有意识且具有明确的改革意识。
And progress-minded.
并且有进取心。
Absolutely.
绝对地。
They thought well, obviously, academic institutions exist.
他们认为,学术机构显然是存在的。
Harvard, Yale, and so on were already around.
哈佛大学、耶鲁大学等已经存在。
But they saw the success of German research university model, they saw the possibilities of the U.S., and they saw at least what they thought was required for the future.
但他们看到了德国研究型大学模式的成功,他们看到了美国的可能性,他们至少看到了他们认为未来需要的东西。
And they very deliberately decided, “We will try something different.” And again, that yielded now seven of the top 25 universities today.
他们非常慎重地决定,“我们将尝试一些不同的东西。”再次,今天排名前 25 的大学中,有 7 所是这样产生的。
So I think it strongly empirically underscores the value of the experimentation you’re talking about.
所以我认为它从经验上强烈强调了你所谈论的实验的价值。
And, I fully agree.
而且,我完全同意。
I think we should be historically informed but ultimately, a certain amount of commitment, decision, and just willingness to experiment is going to be required.
我认为我们应该了解历史,但最终需要一定程度的承诺、决定和实验意愿。
The other thing I think your point with — so the teams gets at is there are these really thought-provoking examples of just like productive cultures through history?
我认为你的观点的另一件事是——所以团队要理解的是,历史上有这些真正发人深省的例子,就像富有成效的文化一样?
Look at Vienna, 1880 to 1940 or something.
看看 1880 年到 1940 年的维也纳等等。
In so many different fields you have people who do this incredibly informative work: Klimt and you had Mahler and you had Mach in physics and you had, of course, Austrian economics and von Mises and Hayek and all the rest and you had Freud and you had Wittgenstein.
在许多不同的领域,都有人从事这项内容丰富的工作:克里姆特、马勒、物理学领域的马赫,当然还有奥派经济学、冯·米塞斯、哈耶克等等,还有弗洛伊德和维特根斯坦。
Vienna was amazing in this period.
维也纳在这一时期是令人惊叹的。
And when you dig into the specific stories you realize a lot of these people knew each other and they were inspired by each other.
当你深入研究具体的故事时,你会发现很多人彼此认识,并且彼此受到启发。
They give credit to each other for, again, across multiple disciplines, different parts of their thinking.
他们再次在多个学科、不同的思维领域相互赞扬。
Or if you look at Edinburgh during the Scottish Enlightenment, again, a tiny place.
或者,如果你看看苏格兰启蒙运动时期的爱丁堡,你会发现,它又是一个很小的地方。
Edinburgh in 1780 was like the size of Santa Cruz, right?
1780 年的爱丁堡就像圣克鲁斯那么大,对吧?
And yet you get modern economics from Smith, you have Hume, you have the birth of modern geology, amazing literature, poetry and so on.
然而,你从斯密那里得到了现代经济学,休谟,现代地质学的诞生,令人惊叹的文学、诗歌等等。
And so clearly there was something excellent in Edinburgh in 1780 that was not there in Dublin in 1780.
很明显,1780 年的爱丁堡有一些 1780 年都柏林所没有的优秀东西。
And I think obviously it’s hard to pin down what was that thing, but at the same time the difficulty in defining it doesn’t mean it wasn’t there or it’s not important.
我认为显然很难确定那东西是什么,但同时定义它的困难并不意味着它不存在或不重要。
I would say this.
我会这么说。
I’m sitting here with two university dropouts.
我和两个大学辍学生坐在这里。
That’s notable to me.
这对我来说很值得注意。
The Bay Area is our modern Vienna.
湾区就是我们现代的维也纳。
Bravo to the Bay Area.
湾区太棒了。
But we’re not working nearly hard enough to build other new Viennas and other places.
但我们的工作还不够努力,无法建造其他新的维也纳和其他地方。
And I don’t really think it’s quite Manhattan anymore.
我真的不认为这里不再是曼哈顿了。
It’s a wonderful city and amazing place to go, but it is not a world leader for ideas in the way in it was, say, in the 1920s through the 1980s.
这是一座美妙的城市,也是一个令人惊叹的旅游胜地,但它并不像 20 世纪 20 年代到 80 年代那样成为世界思想领袖。
People study this, right?
人们研究这个,对吗?
I mean, so what would have been the main things that people have learned so far from studying Vienna or Edinburgh?
我的意思是,到目前为止,人们从维也纳或爱丁堡的研究中学到的主要东西是什么?
Well, I don’t think there’s a rich literature of lessons from those places.
嗯,我不认为这些地方有丰富的经验教训。
Obviously, lots has been written about them.
显然,有很多关于它们的文章。
There are great historical accounts.
有很多伟大的历史记载。
I’ve enjoyed reading them.
我很喜欢读它们。
But it’s an intrinsically very difficult thing to do to figure out which things causally mattered.
但要弄清楚哪些事情具有因果关系本质上是一件非常困难的事情。
And these things, there’s a certain degree to which they might be over-determined.
而这些事情,在某种程度上可能是被过度决定的。
And so I think it’s very hard.
所以我认为这非常困难。
You don’t have counterfactuals.
你没有反事实。
Obviously, you can’t run trials, and so I think it is a very difficult question to answer.
显然,你不能进行试验,所以我认为这是一个很难回答的问题。
And I think for understandable reasons, people studying these questions are reluctant to take definitive stances that “this is what mattered” in 1900 Vienna.
我认为出于可以理解的原因,研究这些问题的人们不愿意采取明确的立场,认为“这就是 1900 年维也纳最重要的事情”。
But one lesson I would say — the Scottish islands, people moved to Edinburgh, right?
但我要说的一个教训是——苏格兰群岛上的人们搬到了爱丁堡,对吗?
Vienna, you have Jews coming in from the Pale of Settlement.
维也纳,有来自定居点的犹太人。
The Bay Area, people coming from all over the world, and indeed, you are from Ireland.
湾区,来自世界各地的人们,事实上,你来自爱尔兰。
So immigration — immigration is not a guarantee of things going well.
所以移民——移民并不能保证一切顺利。
But the bringing together of different ideas and cultures and the new clash of opposing perspectives has been correlated with a lot of these Viennas in the world history.
但不同思想和文化的汇集以及对立观点的新冲突与世界历史上的许多维也纳有关。
Very true, although I’m pretty sure that in the 1900s, Paris had more foreigners than Vienna.
确实如此,尽管我很确定在 1900 年代,巴黎的外国人比维也纳还多。
I think it was like 2% in Vienna, so —
我想维也纳的比例大概是 2%,所以——
If you go from the Scottish islands to Edinburgh in 1740, that’s a huge difference.
如果你在 1740 年从苏格兰群岛去爱丁堡,那就是一个巨大的差异。
It’s a bigger difference than maybe Mexico to Los Angeles today.
这可能比今天的墨西哥和洛杉矶的差异更大。
So if you’re thinking about what work to fund in terms of studying historical progress, what’s your framework for figuring out where to even begin studying?
因此,如果您正在考虑在研究历史进展方面需要资助哪些工作,那么您确定从哪里开始研究的框架是什么?
Because I mean, what you’re talking about here is basically studying the economic and scientific result of immigration, which is obviously a massively socially important debate that’s at the center of a lot of political debates and has been for a long time.
因为我的意思是,你在这里谈论的基本上是研究移民的经济和科学结果,这显然是一个具有重大社会意义的辩论,长期以来一直是许多政治辩论的中心。
So from one perspective, it’s surprising that it wouldn’t have been studied in more detail to understand the impact of it.
因此,从一个角度来看,令人惊讶的是,没有对其进行更详细的研究以了解其影响。
But that’s very different from the biomedical science-type stuff that we were talking about a second ago.
但这与我们刚才讨论的生物医学科学类型的东西非常不同。
Do you have a framework in your head for how would think about or prioritize study in different areas, or is it mostly just about finding really sharp people who have new ideas and funding them to do different kinds or work?
你的头脑中是否有一个框架来思考或优先考虑不同领域的学习,或者主要是寻找有新想法的真正敏锐的人并资助他们做不同的种类或工作?
How do you think about that overall?
总体而言您对此有何看法?
People who are curious.
充满好奇心的人。
People who have bold ambitions.
有远大抱负的人。
People who have what I call stamina — they just don’t even stop.
那些拥有我所说的耐力的人——他们根本就不会停下来。
People who are working in productive small groups that maybe through WhatsApp, in fact, or it could be their next door neighbors, their colleagues at a university.
事实上,那些在富有成效的小团体中工作的人们可能通过 WhatsApp 进行工作,也可能是他们的隔壁邻居、大学同事。
When those, say, four items come together, then I think you have possibly what is a very good funding decision, and I would take a lot of chances on those people, not worry too much about the micromanaging, and let talent rip and let groups form and see what happens.
当这四个项目结合在一起时,我认为你可能会做出一个非常好的资助决策,我会在这些人身上冒很多机会,不要太担心微观管理,让人才发挥作用,让团队形成,看看会发生什么。
Got it.
知道了。
So it’s very much like entrepreneurship in that way.
所以这很像创业精神。
You’re betting on the person more than the idea —
你对人的赌注比对想法的赌注更多——
But also the vision, right?
但也有愿景,对吧?
There has to be a vision, and there are plenty of successful entrepreneurs who are not curious.
必须有远见,有很多成功的企业家并不好奇。
So for intellectual progress, to really put curiosity very highly is part of my philosophy.
因此,为了智力的进步,真正高度重视好奇心是我的哲学的一部分。
On the one hand, not only do we acknowledge that an immense amount of very important insightful work has already been created, and it’s that work that has to a large degree inspired both of our viewpoints.
一方面,我们不仅承认大量非常重要、富有洞察力的工作已经被创造出来,而且正是这些工作在很大程度上激发了我们的观点。
For example, the paper Tyler mentioned about declining research productivity in semiconductors, crop yields and a couple of other fields, that was done fairly close to here and that is work squarely relevant to these questions that I think is really important and we may not be here in the same way without it.
例如,泰勒的论文提到了半导体、农作物产量和其他几个领域的研究生产力下降,这篇论文是在离这里相当近的地方完成的,这项工作与我认为非常重要的这些问题直接相关,如果没有它,我们可能不会以同样的方式在这里。
On the other hand, it is simultaneously true that major swathes of these questions really are surprisingly under-investigated.
另一方面,令人惊讶的是,这些问题的大部分都没有得到充分的研究。
And so, again, to return to biomedical funding and the NIH, as far as I can tell, there are no books assessing how well the NIH is working.
因此,再次回到生物医学资助和 NIH,据我所知,没有任何书籍评估 NIH 的运作情况。
And I don’t have a strong view on the answer to that question, but I do have a strong view on the importance of knowing.
我对这个问题的答案没有强烈的看法,但我确实对了解的重要性有强烈的看法。
Which parts of the NIH are working better and worse?
NIH 的哪些部分工作得更好,哪些部分工作得更差?
And inasmuch as the NIH has changed over the last couple of decades, was the old NIH better or the new one?
鉴于 NIH 在过去几十年里发生了变化,旧的 NIH 好还是新的 NIH 好?
Like, this stuff is so important, and so while it’s the case that there’s a huge amount of good research happening today with fantastic researchers, in a sense, there aren’t enough of them.
就像,这些东西是如此重要,所以虽然今天有大量优秀的研究人员正在进行大量的优秀研究,但从某种意义上说,他们的数量还不够。
And a lot of the central questions are still unanswered.
许多核心问题仍然没有答案。
Yeah, interesting.
是的,有趣。
So you were talking a minute ago about the explosion in costs in healthcare.
所以你一分钟前谈论了医疗保健成本的爆炸式增长。
And right now, I think one of the defining aspects of the moment that we’re in is a lot of the basic costs of living for a lot of people have just increased a lot.
现在,我认为我们所处时刻的决定性方面之一是很多人的基本生活成本刚刚增加了很多。
The story that we tell about our society is that you have technology and you have competition and it drives down prices.
我们讲述的关于我们社会的故事是,你拥有技术,你有竞争,它会压低价格。
So if you bought a ten-year-old TV today it would cost 5% of what it cost ten years ago.
因此,如果您今天购买一台使用了 10 年的电视,其价格将是 10 年前的 5%。
So clearly, the value and efficiency has increased a lot there.
很明显,那里的价值和效率增加了很多。
But then in things that matter so much like healthcare, education, rent — those things have generally just increased, right?
但在医疗保健、教育、租金等非常重要的事情上,这些事情通常只是增加,对吗?
And the normal dynamics that you’d be hoping would play out aren’t.
而你希望的正常动态却没有发生。
And to some degree, for the quality of life for a lot of people, the increases in those costs may even be dwarfing all the other advances in everything else.
在某种程度上,为了提高很多人的生活质量,这些成本的增加甚至可能使其他方面的所有其他进步相形见绌。
Sure.
当然。
Absolutely.
绝对地。
So do you think that those things are all related?
那么你认为这些事情都是相关的吗?
I think you used the phrase “cost disease”when referring to the cost explosion of things like healthcare and education, student debt, and rent.
我认为您在提到医疗保健和教育、学生债务和租金等成本爆炸时使用了“成本疾病”这个词。
Do you think that’s a different type of problem, or do you think that is fundamentally related to the rate of progress in biomedicine, as an example?
您认为这是一个不同类型的问题吗?或者您认为这与生物医学的进步速度有根本相关吗?例如?
I think there are common features to these problems, though each one is different.
我认为这些问题虽然各有不同,但都有共同特征。
Restrictions on entry is one, highly bureaucratized institutions.
入境限制是一种高度官僚化的制度。
Sometimes a lot of third party payment — which may be required in the case of catastrophic healthcare, but it nonetheless has distorting effects.
有时,在灾难性医疗保健的情况下可能需要大量第三方付款,但它仍然会产生扭曲效应。
Areas where people have very strong moral feelings I think we often make worse decisions about.
我认为,在人们有强烈道德情感的领域,我们经常会做出更糟糕的决定。
We’re not analytical enough.
我们的分析能力还不够。
And you put all of those together.
然后你把所有这些放在一起。
But I would stress, say healthcare — if you go to Singapore, healthcare there, I think it’s about 4% of GDP.
但我要强调的是,医疗保健——如果你去新加坡,那里的医疗保健,我认为大约占 GDP 的 4%。
They have slightly higher life expectancy than we do.
他们的预期寿命比我们略高。
Their system is by no means perfect.
他们的系统绝不是完美的。
But we can see, though comparative analysis, there are ways of doing this better.
但我们可以看到,通过比较分析,还是有办法做得更好的。
The NIMBY problem, cost of living, getting an apartment.
邻避问题、生活成本、买公寓。
In Japan, it is mostly solved because building in Japan tends to be regulated at higher levels than the city or the county, so more gets built.
在日本,这个问题大部分已经得到解决,因为日本的建筑往往受到比市或县更高的监管,因此建造了更多建筑。
Living in Japan is cheaper, the cost of renting an apartment.
在日本生活比较便宜,租房的费用也比较便宜。
So often we know the answers.
我们常常知道答案。
We shy away from really focusing on a concerted effort to get to doing them in this country.
我们回避真正集中精力在这个国家共同努力来实现这些目标。
Yeah, and agree with all of that, and I would just underscore the entry costs aspect.
是的,我同意所有这些,我只想强调进入成本方面。
And the entry costs aren’t always — they take different forms, right?
而且进入成本并不总是如此——它们有不同的形式,对吧?
And empirically the entry costs of forming a new university are really high, but that’s not because there’s a kind of formal toll you have to pay.
从经验来看,组建一所新大学的进入成本确实很高,但这并不是因为你必须支付某种正式的费用。
It’s not like zoning where there are deliberate, specific legal restrictions that prohibit you from doing so.
这不像分区,有故意的、具体的法律限制禁止你这样做。
But just as a practical matter: sociologically, institutionally, accreditation dynamics, who knows, it’s apparently almost impossibly difficult to create a successful new university today.
但正如一个实际问题一样:从社会学、制度、认证动态来看,谁知道呢,今天创建一所成功的新大学显然几乎不可能困难。
And so I think answering the cost disease question is one of the most important set of subcomponents in this broader question of what is it that enables our progress.
因此,我认为回答成本病问题是这个更广泛的问题中最重要的组成部分之一,即是什么使我们取得进步。
And at an overarching level, it’s just surprising to me that we don’t have more definitive and clear answers there.
在总体层面上,令我惊讶的是我们没有更明确和明确的答案。
Alex Tabarrok, a colleague of Tyler —
亚历克斯·塔巴罗克 (Alex Tabarrok),泰勒的同事 —
Wrote a long paper on cost disease.
写了一篇关于成本病的长论文。
Exactly, last summer.
没错,去年夏天。
And there are other papers also analyzing the question, but it’s a surprisingly sparse literature.
还有其他论文也在分析这个问题,但文献数量却出奇地少。
Alex’s list of citations was not that long.
亚历克斯的引用列表并没有那么长。
And he had some suggestions as to what the underlying etiology might be — maybe he’s right, maybe he’s wrong — but again, to your point, it’s one of the most pressing questions for American society, for global society in 2019.
他对潜在病因可能是什么提出了一些建议——也许他是对的,也许他是错的——但同样,就你的观点而言,这是 2019 年美国社会和全球社会最紧迫的问题之一。
We really have to know what’s happening.
我们确实必须知道发生了什么。
And to return to something Tyler said earlier, part of our hope — it’s not to promote any specific solution, any specific aspect of it, but rather that even though this is not what’s focally central in the headlines today, it should be.
回到泰勒之前所说的,我们希望的一部分——并不是要提倡任何具体的解决方案、它的任何具体方面,而是即使这不是今天头条新闻的焦点,但它应该是。
As we think about what the world is gonna look like in 50 years or 100 years, it, plausibly more than anything else, is going to determine the shape of that.
当我们思考 50 年或 100 年后世界会是什么样子时,它似乎比其他任何东西都更能决定世界的形态。
As an entrepreneur, what is it you find most striking about America’s dysfunctional economic sectors?
作为一名企业家,您认为美国功能失调的经济部门最引人注目的是什么?
Because you intersect with them all the time, right?
因为你一直和他们有交集,对吗?
Yeah, I mean, I would want to see this get studied more.
是的,我的意思是,我希望看到对此进行更多研究。
There are just so many different factors, and I think part of it what is a little bit confusing is that the things that are making healthcare so expensive — they may have some fundamental link to the things that make college tuition so expensive.
有很多不同的因素,我认为其中有点令人困惑的是,导致医疗保健如此昂贵的因素——它们可能与大学学费如此昂贵的因素有一些基本的联系。
But on its surface it seems like there are also more proximate causes that are quite different.
但从表面上看,似乎还有更多截然不同的近因。
So with college tuition, the fact that it’s really expensive, so then we do more to subsidize the cost of it, and then by doing so, we’re not providing any pressure on colleges to make it more efficient, and then the cost just goes up further is a pretty different dynamic than what’s going on with healthcare where basically Americans want to know that if someone in their family gets sick, they’re going to be able to get every treatment possible, which ends up — I’m sure you’ve seen all the stats on this, — that half of the healthcare costs someone incurs is during the last six months of their life.
因此,对于大学学费来说,事实上它非常昂贵,所以我们会采取更多措施来补贴它的成本,然后通过这样做,我们不会向大学施加任何压力,以提高其效率,然后成本进一步上升,这与医疗保健的情况截然不同,基本上美国人想知道,如果他们的家人生病了,他们将能够得到一切可能的治疗,最终 - 我相信你已经看到了所有的统计数据这——一个人承担的医疗费用的一半是在他们生命的最后六个月期间发生的。
And that’s, I guess, part of what you’re saying is an American moral value, which is that we believe that you should do everything you can to help someone who’s sick, whereas in a lot of other countries — I don’t know what Singapore’s situation is — but a lot of the ones that are often cited as more efficient healthcare systems don’t have that approach.
我想,你所说的部分内容是美国的道德价值观,即我们相信你应该尽你所能来帮助病人,而在许多其他国家——我不知道新加坡的情况如何——但很多经常被认为是更高效的医疗保健系统的国家却没有这种方法。
They say, okay, if someone in your family has this form of cancer, we’ll do these two treatments, and then we’re done.
他们说,好吧,如果你家里有人患有这种癌症,我们将进行这两种治疗,然后就完成了。
And part of that is because they may not be able to incur the level of debt as a country that the U.S. can, so they may just have to make that tradeoff.
部分原因是他们可能无法承担美国那样的债务水平,因此他们可能不得不做出这种权衡。
But it creates all these downstream dynamics where now if you as a society are willing to say we’re going have two treatments for this cancer and not try all seven things, then now France can go, for example, negotiate with the drug companies and say, all right, I’m only going support the two that are the most cost-effective, and the other ones are out to dry.
但它创造了所有这些下游动力,现在如果你作为一个社会愿意说我们将对这种癌症采取两种治疗方法而不是尝试所有七种方法,那么现在法国可以与制药公司谈判并说,好吧,我只会支持最具成本效益的两种方法,其他的都可以晾干。
Whereas in the American system you don’t have that negotiating leverage.
而在美国体系中,你没有这样的谈判筹码。
So it seems like they’re very different things.
所以看起来它们是非常不同的东西。
But intuitively, it seems like at their root there should be some commonalities.
但直觉上,它们的根源似乎应该有一些共同点。
And I would be very interested to understand that in more detail.
我非常有兴趣更详细地了解这一点。
I’m curious why from what you’re saying about — that the literature is sparse —
我很好奇为什么从你所说的——文献很少——
On cost disease in particular.
特别是关于成本疾病。
Yeah, why do you think more people aren’t studying this?
是的,你认为为什么更多的人不研究这个?
I mean given that this is just such a central thing in the lives of most people, right, I mean, the cost of living in the city has gone up so much.
我的意思是,鉴于这是大多数人生活中如此重要的事情,对,我的意思是,城市的生活成本已经上涨了很多。
We have a whole generation of students — I think the total student debt is now almost $2 trillion, right?
我们有整整一代学生——我认为学生债务总额现在接近 2 万亿美元,对吗?
I think it was $1.7 trillion the last stat that I saw.
我认为我看到的最后一个统计数据是 1.7 万亿美元。
And of course healthcare is — the number of people in the country who are one issue away from being bankrupt is just staggering.
当然,医疗保健也是——这个国家距离破产仅一步之遥的人数令人震惊。
So what’s preventing people from studying this?
那么是什么阻止人们研究这个呢?
Tyler’s the economist.
泰勒是经济学家。
In academia I wouldn’t say anything’s preventing them.
在学术界,我不会说有什么可以阻止他们。
The incentive is to build a brick and to build a brick that can survive scrutiny by referees.
其动机是建造一块砖,并建造一块能够经受裁判审查的砖。
The incentive is not to build a building, in most cases.
在大多数情况下,动机并不是建造一座建筑物。
Biomedicine actually is often different.
生物医学实际上常常是不同的。
But in the social sciences there’s so many bricks out there and so people want to say, oh, we’re already studying this.
但在社会科学领域,有太多的障碍,所以人们想说,哦,我们已经在研究这个了。
It’s correct, the bricks are there in the millions.
是的,砖块有数以百万计。
But the bricks and the buildings are a different thing.
但砖块和建筑物是不同的东西。
But I have a question for you, if I may be allowed.
但我有一个问题想问你,如果可以的话。
Go for it.
大胆试试吧。
What is it you would most like to see from academics?
您最希望从学术界看到什么?
And I don’t mean research on social media.
我指的不是对社交媒体的研究。
I mean America, the world.
我指的是美国,全世界。
What do you want?
你想要什么?
Although I would like more research on social media.
尽管我想对社交媒体进行更多研究。
Absolutely.
绝对地。
That’s fine.
没关系。
No, look, I think these issues on exploding costs and why the systems aren’t working the way that they’re supposed to for people is probably one of the most pressing questions.
不,你看,我认为这些关于成本爆炸性增长的问题以及为什么系统没有按照人们应有的方式工作可能是最紧迫的问题之一。
And when I think about our work over the next decade, it’s like what are we going do that’s will fundamentally make people’s lives better?
当我思考未来十年我们的工作时,我们会做什么才能从根本上改善人们的生活?
There’s a lot that we can do.
我们可以做很多事情。
But if these problems continue at the rate that they’re going at, it’s actually quite hard for me to imagine how we could do enough good to overcome the increase in costs that people are incurring at things that are so fundamental.
但如果这些问题以目前的速度持续下去,我实际上很难想象我们如何才能做得足够好,以克服人们在如此重要的事情上所付出的成本增加。
So we’re working on them in somewhat different ways.
所以我们正在以不同的方式研究它们。
But I think healthcare is difficult because it is so inherently political because it touches on moral values.
但我认为医疗保健很困难,因为它本质上是政治性的,因为它涉及道德价值观。
If you wanna have a difference in approach of how we treat the last six months of people’s lives, that’s something that’s more of a democratic question than a technocratic one, I think.
如果你想改变我们对待人们生命最后六个月的方式,我认为这更多的是一个民主问题,而不是一个技术官僚问题。
People need to be able to support that.
人们需要能够支持这一点。
So I don’t personally feel like that’s an area that I’m gonna have a huge impact.
所以我个人并不认为这是一个我会产生巨大影响的领域。
A lot of people are focused on that.
很多人都关注这一点。
But the area that I do think we can make a big impact is on long-term science research.
但我确实认为我们可以产生重大影响的领域是长期科学研究。
So if you can just make it more efficient to cure, prevent, or manage diseases, then that over the long-term should really be the answer for bringing healthcare costs in line, not in the next ten years, but maybe in over the next 50 years.
因此,如果你能够更有效地治疗、预防或管理疾病,那么从长远来看,这确实应该是控制医疗成本的答案,不是在未来十年,而是在未来 50 年。
I’d like to see a solution before that, so I’d love to see more studying of the healthcare part of this.
我希望在此之前看到一个解决方案,所以我希望看到更多关于医疗保健部分的研究。
But on the science side, I’m quite optimistic about that.
但在科学方面,我对此相当乐观。
On housing, I don’t know.
至于住房,我不知道。
There’s always the question of which forces in technology — which trends — end up being stronger?
始终存在这样的问题:技术中的哪些力量——哪些趋势——最终会变得更强大?
So on the one hand you have this giant mismatch of opportunity where people feel compelled to move to cities because that’s where a lot of the jobs are.
因此,一方面,机会存在巨大的不匹配,人们感到被迫搬到城市,因为那里有很多工作机会。
But then there’s not enough building of supply of housing, so rent just increases.
但随后没有足够的住房供应建设,所以租金就会上涨。
And then that means that even though people are going and doing higher-value things, their lives actually aren’t benefiting as much from that because so much of their costs are just of the value that they’re generating is just going to housing because rent is getting so high.
这意味着,即使人们去做更高价值的事情,他们的生活实际上并没有从中受益太多,因为他们产生的大部分成本只是用于住房,因为租金变得如此之高。
So historically, what have people done?
那么历史上,人们做了什么?
We invented cars and freeways.
我们发明了汽车和高速公路。
That way people could live further out.
这样人们就可以住得更远。
Maybe something like the Hyperloop could extend suburbs like five times as far, so that could make it so someone could live quite further away.
也许像超级高铁这样的东西可以将郊区延伸五倍,这样就可以让人们住得更远。
And that would be good, right, if you can increase the effective radius of a city — that’s one way to alleviate constraints, political constraints or concerns about people building things, so that way you can get more supply, bring the cost down.
如果你能增加城市的有效半径,那就太好了——这是减轻限制、政治限制或人们对建筑的担忧的一种方法,这样你就可以获得更多的供应,降低成本。
I happen to think a different thing is probably the right solution.
我碰巧认为不同的事情可能是正确的解决方案。
In 2019, it’s a lot easier to move bits around than it is atoms.
2019 年,移动比特比移动原子容易得多。
So rather than people inventing a new Hyperloop or cars, I tend to think the set of technologies — whether it’s augmented reality or virtual reality or video presence that just lets people be where they wanna be physically and feel present with other people wherever they need to be to do their job, to connect with the people they care about — that feels to me the better long-term solution.
因此,我倾向于认为,与人们发明新的超级高铁或汽车相比,这一系列技术——无论是增强现实、虚拟现实还是视频呈现——让人们能够在他们想要的地方,无论他们需要在哪里完成工作,与他们关心的人联系,感受到与其他人的存在——对我来说,这是更好的长期解决方案。
Don’t make everyone move to cities.
不要让每个人都搬到城市。
Make it so people can choose where they wanna be and can get access to all the opportunities they want.
让人们可以选择他们想去的地方,并获得他们想要的所有机会。
It’s hard for me to imagine more important problems over the next decade.
我很难想象未来十年还会出现更重要的问题。
I think over the longer term potentially climate change is more of an existential issue.
我认为从长远来看,气候变化可能更像是一个关乎生存的问题。
But in terms of people’s lives today, I think the exploding costs from these areas is such a profound issue, and the trend is so out of control.
但就今天人们的生活而言,我认为这些领域的成本爆炸是一个非常深刻的问题,而且趋势已经失控。
Three three quick points on that.
对此,我要快速说三三点。
One is, I think these questions are often a little bit — like the cost of disease question, I think one of the reasons it’s difficult to study is because you have to take this very macroscopic and potentially this very microscopic view.
一是,我认为这些问题通常有点像疾病成本问题,我认为难以研究的原因之一是因为你必须采取非常宏观和可能非常微观的观点。
And so say, for example in science, if it were the case that the administrative burden on scientists had increased by say two-thirds over the last 40 years.
以科学为例,如果科学家的行政负担在过去 40 年里增加了三分之二的话。
I’m not saying it has and not saying that even if it has that is, in fact, the cause of any kind of slowdown.
我并不是说它已经发生了,也不是说即使它发生了,事实上,这也是任何经济放缓的原因。
But if it had, that might be quite difficult to observe because it can come in the form of, well, it takes twice as long on average for things to be approved and the forms are longer and you’re interrupted more.
但如果确实如此,那可能很难观察到,因为它的形式可能是,嗯,批准事情平均需要两倍的时间,而且表格更长,你被打断的次数也更多。
And so actually specifically diagnosing that causal pathways can really be quite tricky, and I think that generalizes a lot of the fields.
因此,实际上具体诊断因果路径确实非常棘手,我认为这概括了很多领域。
Secondly, to your point about technology solving the agglomeration imperative of cities, I think that could be true, although, you know, here we are in person.
其次,对于你关于技术解决城市集聚势在必行的观点,我认为这可能是真的,尽管你知道,我们亲自在这里。
Others are watching —
其他人正在观看——
Yeah, the people are watching wherever else.
是的,人们在其他地方观看。
Very fair.
非常公平。
But even if technology solved that, I guess my worry would be that the socio-institutional dynamics that have ruined cities or made them less effective or whatever, probably also generalized and applied to other domains.
但即使技术解决了这个问题,我想我担心的是,破坏城市或降低城市效率或其他什么的社会制度动态可能也会普遍化并应用于其他领域。
And so we’re going to suffer the costs of those same phenomena elsewhere.
因此,我们将在其他地方遭受同样现象的代价。
Oh, yeah.
哦,是的。
And what do you wanna ask Mark?
你想问马克什么?
What have you learned from doing CZI?
您从 CZI 中学到了什么?
You launched it five years ago?
你是五年前推出的吗?
Four years ago.
四年前。
Okay, yeah.
好吧,是的。
How will the next four years be different to the first four?
未来四年与前四年有何不同?
Well, so one of the things that we struggle with here that these are such a long-term projects.
好吧,我们在这里遇到的困难之一是这些是一个长期项目。
So we talked a lot about the scientific research.
所以我们谈论了很多关于科学研究的事情。
We’re also doing a bunch of work with education to build tools for teachers to do more project-based learning, more personalized learning for kids.
我们还在教育领域做了大量工作,为教师构建工具,以便为孩子们进行更多基于项目的学习、更个性化的学习。
But basically make it so that teachers have tools to do the work that they want to do, like mentoring students and not just having to lecture and have everyone learn at the same pace.
但基本上要让教师拥有工具来完成他们想做的工作,比如指导学生,而不仅仅是讲课并让每个人都以相同的速度学习。
We’re making progress in all of these areas.
我们在所有这些领域都取得了进展。
And I think one of the meta questions in running CZI is at what point to check in and consider evolving the direction.
我认为运行 CZI 的元问题之一是在什么时候检查并考虑发展方向。
I mean, obviously, there’s minor execution things that you try to improve along the way.
我的意思是,显然,你在执行过程中会尝试改进一些小的执行方面的事情。
But I want to make sure that we have an awareness that fundamentally these are problems that we’re gonna be working on for 10 or 20 years and not — I think a lot of these things just a consistency of approach, and building trust is more important than constantly evaluating or potentially thrashing.
但我想确保我们认识到,从根本上来说,这些问题是我们需要花 10 或 20 年时间来解决的问题,而不是——我认为其中很多事情只是方法的一致性,建立信任比不断评估或潜在的打击更重要。
In science, we’ve had the benefit of taking on a number of different projects.
在科学领域,我们受益于承担许多不同的项目。
So the Human Cell Atlas was one of the original ones.
因此,人类细胞图谱是最初的图谱之一。
Now one of the next areas that we’re really excited to work on is imaging.
现在,我们真正兴奋的下一个领域之一是成像。
There’s a lot of advances in microscopy, but there are a lot of things that we still can’t see.
显微镜技术取得了很多进步,但仍有很多东西我们仍然看不到。
And as engineers, I think one of the things that you can probably appreciate is when you’re trying to debug a system, you really want to get into the code and step through it to see where the thing is breaking down.
作为工程师,我认为您可能会欣赏的一件事是,当您尝试调试系统时,您确实想要进入代码并单步执行它以查看问题出在哪里。
But we don’t really have a way today to see a white blood cell eat a a virus, right?
但今天我们确实没有办法看到白细胞吞噬病毒,对吗?
Like in vivo, right?
就像体内一样,对吧?
In the body.
体内。
To see proteins folding live.
观察蛋白质的实时折叠。
And I think that there are certain optical thresholds on the physics that you might not be able to get beyond, but between that and the advances in AI, I do think that it’s possible to give scientists new imaging capacity that hasn’t been possible before.
我认为物理学上存在某些光学阈值,你可能无法超越,但在这一点和人工智能的进步之间,我确实认为有可能为科学家提供以前不可能的新成像能力。
So a lot of what we’re trying to do is — so with the Human Cell Atlas, we took an approach that was very broad and collaborative and somewhat chaotic, even, in a way.
所以我们想做的很多事情是——所以在人类细胞图谱中,我们采取了一种非常广泛和协作的方法,甚至在某种程度上有点混乱。
And I think we were able to learn some of the lessons from that as we’re now thinking about how we organize the imaging project about, okay, maybe it would be helpful to have more clearly established leadership around it up front.
我认为我们能够从中吸取一些教训,因为我们现在正在考虑如何组织成像项目,好吧,也许预先建立更明确的领导力会有所帮助。
Maybe there are things that rather than having just one big project, there’re gonna be areas where we can just build tools that go into every lab.
也许有些事情不是只有一个大项目,而是在某些领域我们可以构建适用于每个实验室的工具。
There’s one software package called that a lot of scientists — right now, the actual technology of microscopes is ahead of scientists’ ability to process the data.
有一个软件包被称为“很多科学家”——目前,显微镜的实际技术领先于科学家处理数据的能力。
There’s this weird mismatch because —and it makes sense, because the NIH funding supports people to basically have a lab.
这种奇怪的不匹配是因为——而且这是有道理的,因为 NIH 的资金支持人们基本上拥有一个实验室。
Yeah, tool building is not really subsidized or supported that well.
是的,工具构建并没有得到很好的补贴或支持。
Yeah if you want to have a team of ongoing software engineers, you’re going to want an effort that’s going on for a while and that’s more than a couple of people.
是的,如果你想拥有一支由持续不断的软件工程师组成的团队,你就需要持续一段时间的努力,而且这不仅仅是几个人的努力。
So kind of thing, I think, there’s a real niche that no one is doing that stuff at the scale it needs to get done.
我认为,这样的事情存在一个真正的利基市场,那就是没有人以需要完成的规模来做这些事情。
So just pushing on both of things.
所以只是推动这两件事。
Yeah, and there’s uniform agreement on that particular point with every biomedical scientist that I speak with.
是的,与我交谈过的每一位生物医学科学家都在这一点上达成了一致。
Tool-building is under-supported.
工具构建缺乏支持。
Yeah, so I don’t know.
是的,所以我不知道。
From a meta point I’m a little wary of concluding which things have worked and not worked well yet.
从元角度来看,我对断定哪些事情有效、哪些事情尚未有效的结论有些谨慎。
I mean, certainly not everything we’re gonna do is gonna work —
我的意思是,当然不是我们要做的一切都会奏效——
Four years — it’s too early to say.
四年——现在说还为时过早。
Yeah, but it’s certainly interesting.
是的,但这确实很有趣。
And what I try to push the teams to do is make sure that the work that we’re doing are things that clearly would not have happened otherwise.
我试图推动团队做的是确保我们正在做的工作是否则显然不会发生的事情。
Where I think, especially in a lot of these fields — in philanthropy, I think there are a lot of potential issues where it’s easy to give money to something and feel like you’re doing good because you probably are doing some good but lack the discipline to say, “am I doing the most good that I can?” And I think we have a responsibility to do that.
我认为,特别是在很多这样的领域——在慈善事业中,我认为存在很多潜在的问题,人们很容易把钱捐给某件事,并感觉自己做得很好,因为你可能做了一些好事,但缺乏纪律说:“我是否尽了最大的努力?”我认为我们有责任这样做。
So that’s the thing I push our team to do is develop really different theories.
所以我推动我们的团队要做的就是开发真正不同的理论。
I’m quite confident that in education the work that we’re doing is just stuff that if we weren’t trying it, it’s not clear that anyone else would be doing an effort like this at scale.
我非常有信心,在教育领域,我们正在做的工作只是如果我们不尝试的话,不清楚其他人是否会大规模地做这样的努力。
I feel really good about that.
我对此感觉很好。
I think in imaging, something like that is going to be similar.
我认为在成像方面,类似的事情会是相似的。
Even in social advocacy, we’re doing a lot of work in criminal justice reform that’s a combination of advocacy and building tools for accountability and working with reform-minded prosecutors, that they can be more data-driven about who they try to bring charges against.
即使在社会宣传方面,我们也在刑事司法改革方面做了大量工作,这些工作将宣传和建立问责工具相结合,并与具有改革意识的检察官合作,使他们能够更多地以数据为依据来确定他们试图对谁提出指控。
Because they want to be fair, or at least a lot of folks want to be fair, and they don’t have the data to either optimize how they run their office or to hold the people in there accountable, so building those kinds of tools can be super helpful.
因为他们想要公平,或者至少很多人想要公平,但他们没有数据来优化他们的办公室运营方式或让办公室里的人承担责任,所以构建这类工具非常有帮助。
And I’m quite confident that if we weren’t pushing on that — that’s a good theory to at least try to push on.
我非常有信心,如果我们不推动这一点,那么至少可以尝试推动这一点,这是一个很好的理论。
So that’s what we try to do in the work.
这就是我们在工作中尝试做的事情。
So like the criminal justice work, education, biomedical — what’s the underlying view or insider experience of yours that’s the common element behind those areas?
那么,就像刑事司法工作、教育、生物医学一样——您的基本观点或内部经验是什么,这是这些领域背后的共同要素?
Like, how do we boil down Mark Zuckerberg philanthropy to a smaller number of dimensions?
比如,我们如何将马克·扎克伯格的慈善事业归结为较小的维度?
Well, first of all, it’s not just me.
好吧,首先,这不仅仅是我。
I do it with my wife.
我和我的妻子一起做。
Oh sorry, my apologies, yes.
哦,抱歉,抱歉,是的。
She’s an important element to this because she is a teacher.
她是其中的一个重要因素,因为她是一名老师。
She’s building a school.
她正在建造一所学校。
I mean, she spends a lot of time over there.
我的意思是,她在那里度过了很多时间。
She is a doctor, so if you’re looking at the education in health aspects, the domain expertise is more hers than mine.
她是一名医生,所以如果你关注健康方面的教育,你会发现她的领域专业知识比我的更多。
And she is quite compelling and insightful on some of the things that need to get done there.
她对一些需要在那里完成的事情非常有说服力和富有洞察力。
In terms of the approach, that may be more inspired by me in some ways where it’s the very long-term focus which I think it comes from a lot of the lessons I’ve learned from Facebook.
就方法而言,这可能在某些方面更能受到我的启发,因为它是非常长期的焦点,我认为它来自我从 Facebook 学到的很多教训。
It’s the tool-building which comes from having the experience building engineering teams.
工具的构建来自于构建工程团队的经验。
And it’s some of what we’ve learned just in managing and partnering with folks through building the company is that — it’s a lot of what you said.
我们在创建公司的过程中管理和与人们合作时学到的一些东西是——这就是你所说的很多内容。
It’s like you want to bet on the best individuals in different spaces and give them room to run.
这就像你想把赌注押在不同空间中最优秀的人身上,并给他们发挥的空间。
In managing complex projects, you need to know when something needs to be a little more directive versus when you want it to just be an open thing that can make progress in a more chaotic way.
在管理复杂的项目时,您需要知道什么时候需要更有指导性,什么时候您希望它只是一个开放的东西,可以以更混乱的方式取得进展。
And that might be more art than science — or at least until your field fully solves all these questions.
这可能更多的是艺术而不是科学——或者至少在你的领域完全解决所有这些问题之前。
But yeah, it’s an interesting set of questions, and certainly one animating theme certainly is as our kids grow up, we want to make sure that they live better lives.
但是,是的,这是一系列有趣的问题,当然,一个生动的主题肯定是随着我们的孩子长大,我们希望确保他们过上更好的生活。
So these aren’t things that are primarily gonna benefit us, right?
所以这些并不是主要让我们受益的事情,对吧?
If we were trying to benefit us, we wouldn’t be working on education.
如果我们试图让自己受益,我们就不会致力于教育。
I think the health work is very long-term oriented.
我认为卫生工作是非常长远的。
If we were focused on our own health, you’d be probably be doing more disease-specific work rather than fundamental science — or tool-building for fundamental science — which might even be a level more abstract that fundamental science to try to compound the rate of progress in science.
如果我们关注自己的健康,你可能会做更多针对特定疾病的工作,而不是基础科学——或者基础科学的工具构建——这甚至可能比基础科学更抽象,试图提高科学进步的速度。
And then a lot of work on equality: the criminal justice work.
然后还有很多关于平等的工作:刑事司法工作。
A lot of the way that our country handles this stuff is just such an unfortunate outlier compared to other countries and the amount of human capital that is locked away is its own thing that I think deserves a lot more than just studying.
与其他国家相比,我们国家处理这些问题的很多方式都是如此不幸的异常值,而被封锁的人力资本数量是它自己的东西,我认为值得不仅仅是学习。
But certainly I think just improving that would be a big advance.
但我当然认为仅仅改进这一点就将是一个巨大的进步。
This conversation is interesting because I think it highlights somewhat of a distinction in — I guess my approach to learning or studying these things is more the “try different things and experiment” and then play it forward, generate new data that doesn’t exist and see how that goes.
这次谈话很有趣,因为我认为它强调了一些区别——我想我学习或研究这些东西的方法更多的是“尝试不同的东西和实验”,然后继续前进,生成不存在的新数据,看看情况如何。
And talking to you and seeing the work that you do, and I guess this is probably intrinsic to being an academic too, where more of the work is about looking at datasets that can exist and studying what is already there rather than trying to create the new datasets or approaches.
与你交谈并查看你所做的工作,我想这可能也是作为一名学者的本质,其中更多的工作是查看可能存在的数据集并研究已有的内容,而不是尝试创建新的数据集或方法。
There are two approaches that I think complement each other but are actually quite different in terms of how you approach learning about how to do the best work going forward.
我认为有两种方法可以相互补充,但实际上在学习如何将工作做得最好方面方面却有很大不同。
Well, I think there is a very important complementarity where for any of these really important questions about how should science be organized, or which kinds of policies generate the most economic growth, or how one should support the diffusion of innovation, or whatever — I don’t think there exists definitive data on that question.
嗯,我认为,对于任何这些真正重要的问题,比如科学应该如何组织,或者哪种政策能够产生最大的经济增长,或者应该如何支持创新的传播,或者诸如此类的问题,我认为存在一个非常重要的互补性——我认为在这个问题上没有明确的数据。
I don’t think by just going deep into the literature you’re going come up with clear answers that one can feel confident in going and executing it or implementing.
我不认为仅仅通过深入研究文献就能得出明确的答案,让人们有信心去执行或实施它。
I think of the data, such that it exists, and the exiting findings as food for hypothesis-generation.
我认为数据是存在的,现有的发现可以作为假设生成的依据。
For example, to return to the management training, that’s one.
例如,回到管理培训,就是这样。
But I would probably not have guessed the effect sizes would be that large, right?
但我可能不会想到效果会那么大,对吧?
And so if those studies hadn’t been conducted, I don’t think I would have ascribed sufficient expectation value to the effort of Stripe going and doing something better.
因此,如果没有进行这些研究,我认为我不会对 Stripe 的努力和做得更好的事情给予足够的期望值。
But now because of those studies, I think perhaps there are things we could do on the margins.
但现在,由于这些研究,我认为也许我们可以在边缘做一些事情。
Maybe there are things that end up being quite materially valuable over time.
也许随着时间的推移,有些东西最终会变得非常有价值。
And so I think being able to marshal those, potentially being able to encourage people to dig more in particular directions and then to combine that with a willingness to experiment and a willingness to frankly just be wrong.
因此,我认为能够整理这些内容,有可能鼓励人们在特定方向上进行更多挖掘,然后将其与尝试的意愿和坦率地说是错误的意愿结合起来。
And I think the synthesis of that is really powerful.
我认为综合起来非常强大。
And again, if you go back and you look at the foundations that I think have really had significant impact over the past one hundred, two hundred years, I think it’s that kind of combination.
再说一次,如果你回顾一下我认为在过去一百、两百年中真正产生重大影响的基础,我认为这就是这种组合。
Look at Warren Weaver, who was the guy at Rockefeller who funded Norman Borlaug, right?
看看沃伦·韦弗(Warren Weaver),他是洛克菲勒公司资助诺曼·博洛格的人,对吧?
He’d worked with Vannevar Bush at OSRD during World War II.
第二次世界大战期间,他曾在 OSRD 与万尼瓦尔·布什 (Vannevar Bush) 共事。
I think he was familiar with a lot of the data and just empirical realities of how different kinds of scientific and technological ventures were likely to work.
我认为他熟悉大量数据和不同类型的科技企业如何运作的经验现实。
But he was also willing to just place a bold bet and that pursue the hypothesis that agronomy could be radically improved.
但他也愿意下一个大胆的赌注,并追求农学可以从根本上改进的假设。
But there was no particularly strong basis to truly have conviction of that.
但并没有特别有力的基础来真正相信这一点。
And so I think it’s all in the combination.
所以我认为这一切都在于组合。
Yeah, interesting.
是的,有趣。
So I’m curious to push further on one question.
所以我很想进一步探讨一个问题。
You asked me what I would want to be studying: why don’t you think people are studying the cost questions as much as it seems like they should be?
你问我想研究什么:你认为人们为什么不像看起来应该那样多地研究成本问题?
If these are as big a questions for society, and it certainly seems like they’re issues that most people have — what are the structural barriers that are preventing the top people in these fields from deciding to go study it?
如果这些对社会来说是一个大问题,而且看起来确实是大多数人都面临的问题,那么阻止这些领域的顶尖人士决定去研究它的结构性障碍是什么?
Is it that the fields don’t line up with it?
是不是字段与它不对齐?
Is it that there’s not funding for it?
难道是没有资金支持吗?
Is it too hard in certain ways?
在某些方面是不是太难了?
Like, what are the dynamics that are going on here?
比如,这里正在发生什么动态?
There are many big questions.
有很多大问题。
It’s hard to study them.
研究它们很难。
So at the end, you have quite a speculative answer or set of hypothesis.
所以最后,你得到了一个相当推测性的答案或一组假设。
So the world as a whole isn’t sure what to make of that.
所以整个世界都不确定该怎么做。
Is it a real contribution?
这是真正的贡献吗?
So the private return to you as a researcher maybe is unclear.
因此,作为一名研究人员,你的私人回报可能还不清楚。
So you tend to get very famous people who are quite well established looking at really big ideas maybe a bit later in their career.
因此,你往往会遇到非常有名的人,他们在职业生涯的后期可能会考虑真正伟大的想法。
And I’m not saying that’s bad work, but it’s not necessarily cutting-edge either.
我并不是说这是不好的工作,但它也不一定是前沿的。
And they spent their whole lives being famous, and they’re not necessarily in a position to actually make the breakthrough.
他们一生都在出名,但不一定能够真正取得突破。
And then younger people, their incentive is to first get established and do something that is quite defensible.
然后是年轻人,他们的动机是首先站稳脚跟,做一些站得住脚的事情。
So I think in general, big questions are under-studied.
所以我认为总的来说,大问题的研究还不够。
The tenure system, I think, increasingly is broken.
我认为,保有权制度正日益被打破。
A lot of academics do work pretty hard, but that so much of your audience is a narrowly defined set of peers who write you reference and tenure letters, I think we need to change.
很多学者确实工作得很努力,但你的听众中有很多是一群狭隘的同行,他们给你写推荐信和终身职位信,我认为我们需要改变。
And the incentive for academics to integrate with practitioners and learn from them and actually try doing things, we need more of that.
我们需要更多激励学者与实践者融合、向他们学习并实际尝试做事。
I’ve often suggested for graduate school, instead of taking a class, everyone should be sent to a not-so-high-income village for two weeks.
我经常建议读研究生,而不是上课,每个人都应该被送到收入不那么高的村庄去两周。
They can do whatever they want.
他们可以为所欲为。
Just go for two weeks, think about things.
就去两周吧,想想事情。
No one wants to do this.
没有人愿意这样做。
No one wants to experiment with it.
没有人愿意尝试它。
People who do development often do it on their own.
做开发的人往往是自己做的。
But the notion that every economist should have studied the East Asian economic miracle, the Industrial Revolution, and spent two weeks or more in a poor village — it’s just not how things are, and I’d like to change that.
但每个经济学家都应该研究东亚经济奇迹、工业革命,并在一个贫穷的村庄呆上两周或更长时间的想法——事实并非如此,我想改变这一点。
So how does one go about changing that?
那么如何改变这一现状呢?
So if you’re trying to create a network of people who feel like they have an incentive to study this because it’s gonna be good for their career, and they have a network of supportive people who might be reviewing the grants or the work that they’re doing and also think that this is important work to be done — how do you go about establishing that?
因此,如果你试图建立一个人际网络,让他们觉得自己有动力去研究这个问题,因为这对他们的职业生涯有好处,并且他们有一个由支持性的人组成的网络,这些人可能正在审查拨款或他们正在做的工作,并且认为这是一项需要完成的重要工作——你如何着手建立这个网络?
I can selfishly say that at George Mason, virtually all of our students have very directly studied these questions, and we funded a lot of them to go live other distant, strange, possibly poor places.
我可以自私地说,在乔治梅森大学,几乎我们所有的学生都非常直接地研究了这些问题,我们资助他们中的很多人去其他遥远、陌生、可能贫穷的地方生活。
Other departments may have more money than we do.
其他部门可能比我们有钱。
It can be done, because we’ve done it at George Mason.
这是可以做到的,因为我们在乔治梅森大学已经做到了。
So I think again it’s a question of the will and just the ability and desire to imagine that things could be quite different in a sense that I think was more common in the America, say, of 1958 or JFK’s decision to put a man on the moon than you see actually in 2019.
因此,我再次认为,这是一个意志问题,只是想象事情可能会完全不同的能力和愿望的问题,我认为这种情况在美国更为常见,例如 1958 年或肯尼迪决定将人类送上月球,而不是你在 2019 年实际看到的情况。
All right, is that a good place to wrap?
好吧,那是个包裹的好地方吗?
Fine by me.
对我来说很好。
All right.
好的。
Well, thank you, guys.
嗯,谢谢你们,伙计们。
This has been a great conversation.
这是一次很棒的谈话。
Thank you.
谢谢。
Thank you, Mark, Patrick.
谢谢你,马克,帕特里克。