Mark Carney on Central Banking and Shared Values (Ep. 123 - BONUS)
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today I’m chatting with Mark Carney.
今天我正在和马克·卡尼聊天。
Mark has a new book out, new and excellent.
马克出了一本新书，新书而且很棒。
It’s called Value(s): Building a Better World for All.
这就是所谓的“价值观：为所有人建设一个更美好的世界”。
Mark is best known for having run the Bank of Canada, having been head of the Bank of England.
马克因管理加拿大银行而闻名，并曾担任英格兰银行行长。
He has done much more than that, and he will do much more yet.
他所做的远不止这些，而且他还会做得更多。
Mark, welcome.
马克，欢迎。
Thanks for having me, Tyler.
谢谢你邀请我，泰勒。
It’s a great pleasure.
这是一种极大的乐趣。
On the Mark Carney production function
关于马克·卡尼生产函数
I’d like to start with what I call the Mark Carney production function.
我想从我所说的马克·卡尼生产函数开始。
Now, why didn’t you become a marine biologist?
现在，你为什么没有成为一名海洋生物学家？
Wow, that’s good research.
哇，这是很好的研究。
Partly growing up on the Prairies, number one.
第一，部分是在大草原上长大的。
You know what?
你知道吗？
It was only once I got to college that I started to give up that because I went to Harvard, so at least I’d got to the coast by that point, but I got hooked by economics and then followed through with that.
直到我上大学后，我才开始放弃这一点，因为我去了哈佛，所以至少那时我已经到了海岸，但我被经济学迷住了，然后就坚持了下来。
Something better came up.
更好的事情出现了。
What about economics is more satisfying?
经济方面什么更令人满意？
I wanted to try to understand how the world works, and in many respects it’s the only discipline, at least from my vantage point, that gave me the prospect of doing that both on a micro level and on a macro level — although I slightly feel we’re better at micro than macro.
我想尝试了解世界是如何运作的，在很多方面，它是唯一的学科，至少从我的角度来看，这让我有可能在微观层面和宏观层面上做到这一点 ——尽管我稍微觉得我们在微观方面比宏观方面更擅长。
Now, if I understand correctly, you were backup goalie on Harvard’s ice hockey team, and goalies deliberately try to put themselves in front of a moving, hard piece of rubber that can be going as fast as a hundred miles an hour.
现在，如果我理解正确的话，你是哈佛冰球队的替补守门员，守门员故意尝试将自己置于一块移动的坚硬橡胶前面，该橡胶的速度可以达到每小时一百英里。
Are most goalies a little crazy?
大多数守门员都有点疯狂吗？
Funnily enough .
有趣的是。
.
。
.
。
you could say that, although my position on it was always that you’re the one person on the ice that’s facing outwards at danger.
你可以这么说，尽管我的立场始终是你是冰上面临危险的一个人。
If you’re a defenseman or a forward or some, you can get hit from behind, you can get hit from the side, lots of bad things can happen to you.
如果你是后卫或前锋等，你可能会被后面击中，你可能会被侧面击中，很多不好的事情都可能发生在你身上。
Whereas you’re a goalie, at least you’re facing your opponent all the time, or at least you should be.
虽然你是一名守门员，但至少你一直面对你的对手，或者至少你应该面对。
In what way is it different temperamentally than being a central banker, if any?
如果有的话，它与央行行长在性格上有何不同？
Great question.
很好的问题。
You cannot be as anticipatory as a central banker.
你不能像央行行长那样具有前瞻性。
You’re building up muscle memory so that, particularly at the higher levels, that you realize what you’ve done after the fact you’ve done it.
你正在建立肌肉记忆，这样，特别是在较高水平上，你就会在完成某件事后意识到自己做了什么。
You move before you tell your body to move.
在你告诉你的身体移动之前，你就已经移动了。
As a central banker, obviously, what you need to do is anticipate where the economy is going and react in advance.
显然，作为央行行长，你需要做的是预测经济走向并提前做出反应。
If you meet someone who possibly is an eligible candidate to be a central banker, do you think you can tell how good of a central banker they will be, if you know them a bit?
如果你遇到一个可能有资格担任央行行长的人，如果你对他们有一点了解，你认为你能判断出他们会成为一名多么优秀的央行行长吗？
If you know them a bit, yes.
如果你对他们有一点了解，是的。
I think particularly for the higher levels of central banking, where you’re trying to combine analytic rigor and synthesizing that into an ability to communicate, which is often the toughest thing.
我认为特别是对于更高级别的中央银行来说，你试图将分析的严谨性结合起来并将其综合为沟通能力，这通常是最困难的事情。
Now, your book is about values.
现在，你的书是关于价值观的。
What would be the nonobvious value you look for in other potential central bankers?
您在其他潜在央行行长身上寻找的非显而易见的价值是什么？
Humility.
谦逊。
Humility?
谦逊？
I think that would be the biggest one.
我认为这将是最大的一个。
It took me a while to build up that value, full disclosure, but it’s incredibly important.
我花了一段时间才建立起这种价值，充分披露，但这非常重要。
If I may, I try to draw out why that value is relevant.
如果可以的话，我会尝试找出为什么该值是相关的。
One of the lessons, at least for me over the years as a central banker, as a policymaker, is you have to plan for failure.
至少对我多年来作为央行行长和政策制定者来说，其中一个教训是，你必须为失败做好计划。
Don’t always tell yourself you’ve got things sorted and that you can withstand the failure.
不要总是告诉自己你已经把事情解决了并且你可以承受失败。
Plan for the failure and think of “What would I wish I had done once that failure happens?” and think about whether you should do it in advance.
为失败做好计划，并思考“一旦失败发生，我希望我能做什么？”并考虑是否应该提前这样做。
Your father’s job, he worked on the affairs of native Canadians for some time.
你父亲的工作是，他有一段时间致力于加拿大原住民的事务。
What did you learn from him or from that experience of what he did?
你从他身上或从他所做的事情中学到了什么？
I learned — and I see this more clearly now — I learned just how long the tail of damage, how that passes through generations.
我了解到 ——我现在看得更清楚了 —— 我了解了损害的尾巴有多长，以及它如何传递给几代人。
It’s not just the generation that is affected initially, but it can have a life, and how hard it is to break that cycle.
最初受到影响的不仅仅是这一代人，而是他们可以拥有自己的生命，而打破这个循环是多么困难。
It’s almost a bit like macroeconomic persistence of unemployment, but squared or cubed or all the more so.
这几乎有点像宏观经济中失业的持续性，但是平方或立方，或者更是如此。
It is like that.
就是这样。
It’s also like — this is an imperfect analogy, but I enjoyed your conversation with Ben Friedman the other day, or a few months ago, I guess.
这也就像 ——这是一个不完美的类比，但我很喜欢你前几天或几个月前与本·弗里德曼的谈话。
His point about living on values — in his case, it was Presbyterian values — things can pass through both positively and negatively across generations.
他关于以价值观为生的观点——“在他的例子中，这是长老会的价值观”——“事物可以积极地或消极地跨越几代人。
You need bigger efforts either to reinforce them or to turn them the other way.
你需要付出更大的努力，要么强化它们，要么扭转它们。
You grew up in Northwest Territories and also Alberta, so western Canada.
您在西北地区和艾伯塔省（即加拿大西部）长大。
How do you think that’s shaped your perspective on economies?
您认为这如何影响了您对经济的看法？
Well, the big thing I took from my time in Alberta is just, I mean, it made me a market believer because I’ll give you an example.
嗯，我在阿尔伯塔省经历的最重要的事情就是，我的意思是，它让我成为了市场信徒，因为我会给你一个例子。
I was born just north of what was then known as the tar sands, now known as the oil sands, this huge deposit of oil which was virtually impossible to get out of the ground, economically.
我出生在当时被称为焦油砂（现在被称为油砂）的北部，这是一个巨大的石油矿藏，从经济上来说几乎不可能从地下开采出来。
It was sitting there literally on the surface, but to separate it from the sand was difficult.
它实际上就在表面上，但将其与沙子分开很困难。
Very quickly over the course of as I was growing up, by the time I was an adult, the issue had been cracked.
随着我的成长，当我成年时，这个问题很快就得到了解决。
The ability to innovate and make a profit out of an opportunity.
创新并从机会中获利的能力。
Your PhD thesis was called The Dynamic Advantage of Competition.
您的博士论文名为《竞争的动态优势》。
Writing that thesis, what did you learn, not about the topic but about yourself?
写这篇论文时，你学到了什么，不是关于这个主题，而是关于你自己？
I learned that I exhausted my capacity and desire to do game theory.
我发现我已经耗尽了我研究博弈论的能力和愿望。
In the end, the models were game theoretic.
最后，模型是博弈论的。
The explanations were rooted in case studies and some econometrics, but the models were formulized from a game theory perspective.
这些解释植根于案例研究和一些计量经济学，但模型是从博弈论的角度制定的。
I also learned that I wanted to do policy at some point as well.
我还了解到我也想在某个时候制定政策。
What’s the biggest misconception people have about Goldman Sachs?
人们对高盛最大的误解是什么？
That it’s everyone out for themselves.
每个人都是为了自己。
How is it?
如何？
When I was there, and I was there for 13 years in total, one of the biggest lessons I took from that place was teamwork, and I’ll give you an example.
当我在那里待了 13 年时，我从那里学到的最重要的教训之一就是团队合作，我举个例子。
It didn’t matter who you were; if you needed to get ahold of somebody in the organization, they would be back to you, certainly within 24 hours.
你是谁并不重要；重要的是。如果您需要联系组织中的某人，他们肯定会在 24 小时内回复您。
They might be on the other side of the world, and that went from the CEO.
他们可能在世界的另一边，这是首席执行官发出的。
Once when I was at the most junior level, I needed to speak to the CEO, Bob Rubin, and he didn’t know me, but he got back to me because I wouldn’t have left him a message if it wasn’t important.
有一次，当我处于初级阶段时，我需要与首席执行官鲍勃·鲁宾(Bob Rubin)交谈，他不认识我，但他回复了我，因为如果不重要的话我不会给他留言。
And that’s a lesson I’ve carried through.
这是我吸取的教训。
Now, it seems to me that a lot of people trust you.
现在，我觉得很多人信任你。
Even British people trust you, trusted you with their central bank.
甚至英国人也信任你，信任你和他们的央行。
That’s a skill.
这是一项技能。
What else is it that you did to learn that skill?
为了学习这项技能，你还做了什么？
Obviously you’ve decided to be trustworthy, but what else is in there?
显然你已经决定要值得信赖，但是还有什么其他的呢？
I think part of it is admitting when things go wrong or when you’ve learned new information and you’ve changed your view, which is difficult to do.
我认为其中一部分是承认当事情出错或当你了解到新信息并且你改变了你的观点时，这是很难做到的。
Maybe that’s another aspect of humility.
也许这就是谦虚的另一个方面。
Part of it is competence.
部分原因是能力。
I think it’s hard to fully be trusted unless you’re successful, you make more right decisions than not.
我认为除非你成功了，否则很难得到完全的信任，你做出的决定比不成功的更正确。
And then we can debate how much of that is the product of luck in the end, but a combination of those things.
然后我们可以讨论其中有多少最终是运气的产物，而是这些因素的结合。
Last thing, to be trusted, you need to feel someone’s on your side, that you’re aligned with the people you’re serving.
最后一件事，要获得信任，您需要感觉到有人站在您这边，您与您所服务的人保持一致。
As a public servant, as a central banker, you should be able to accomplish that, but it’s important to establish that.
作为一名公务员，作为一名央行行长，你应该能够做到这一点，但建立这一点很重要。
If someone comes up to you younger, and they say, “I would like to learn how to give good speeches.
如果有人年轻时来找你，他们说：“我想学习如何发表精彩的演讲。
How did you learn how to give good speeches?” What do you study?
你是怎么学会如何发表精彩演讲的？”你学什么？
Which speakers?
哪些扬声器？
Do you go to YouTube?
你去 YouTube 吗？
What do you do?
你做什么工作？
I didn’t have YouTube when I was — it wasn’t widely available when I was learning how to give speeches.
我小时候还没有 YouTube——当我学习如何发表演讲时，它还没有广泛使用。
One thing I would say is that you need to go over them multiple times.
我想说的一件事是你需要多次检查它们。
You need to give the speech in order to understand how — practice giving the speech, and then that reveals things that you can pull in or sentences which are too complicated, that which won’t be well understood.
你需要进行演讲才能理解如何 ——练习演讲，然后揭示你可以引入的东西或太复杂的句子，那些不太容易理解的句子。
Have stories, have things that illustrate your deeper point.
有故事，有能说明你更深层观点的东西。
I, as a central banker — and maybe you’re asking a general question, but as a central banker, put the substance as much as possible into footnotes, so you’re well grounded in terms of your argument but it’s not cluttering the argument and losing your audience.
我，作为一名央行行长，也许你问的是一个一般性问题，但作为一名央行行长，尽可能将实质内容放入脚注中，这样你的论点就有充分的基础，但又不会使论点混乱并失去听众。
I think the last point I’d make, and hopefully this isn’t the case on this conversation, but if you lose your audience, you’ve lost them.
我想我要说的最后一点，希望这次谈话的情况不是这样，但如果你失去了观众，你就失去了他们。
You don’t get them back while you’re giving the speech, and so it’s crucial to keep the pacing and the insights spread so that you’re retaining your audience.
当你发表演讲时，你无法得到他们的反馈，因此保持节奏和传播见解至关重要，这样才能留住听众。
Who as a speaker has influenced you?
作为演讲者，谁对你产生了影响？
I think Gordon Brown, who I had occasion to see on a number of occasions through the G7, G20 when I was a deputy governor, in terms of policymakers.
就政策制定者而言，我想到了戈登·布朗，当我担任副行长时，我曾在七国集团、二十国集团中多次见过他。
He is a technocrat that was a politician.
他是一位技术官僚，也是一位政治家。
He had an ability to turn on his political voice and inspire in a way that both told you that he knew what he was talking about but really helped to inspire you.
他有能力发出自己的政治声音并以一种既告诉你他知道他在说什么又真正有助于激励你的方式激励你。
If you’re speaking in a meeting as the central bank president, do you prefer to speak first or speak last?
如果您作为央行行长在会议上发言，您喜欢先发言还是最后发言？
I prefer — I tend to speak early.
我更喜欢 — 我倾向于早点发言。
Yes, I tend to speak early.
是的，我倾向于提早发言。
I’m not sure that’s always the best strategy, but I tend to speak early.
我不确定这总是最好的策略，但我倾向于尽早发言。
I will say, one thing that’s happened over the years at places like the G20, I noticed, is the prevalence of social media and devices.
我想说，我注意到，多年来在 G20 等地方发生的一件事是社交媒体和设备的盛行。
The audience drifts away over time, even at the G20, even on a discussion of the global economy.
随着时间的推移，观众会逐渐离去，即使是在 G20 峰会上，即使是在讨论全球经济时也是如此。
Maybe especially on the discussion of the global economy.
也许尤其是关于全球经济的讨论。
Well, maybe especially in discussion of the global economy.
嗯，也许尤其是在讨论全球经济时。
I will say — and I’ve mentioned it in the book — that it was the discussion in Riyadh in February on COVID which was one time that you saw everyone’s head snap up from their iPads and pay attention, because it was the moment the pin dropped for the vast majority that we were in big trouble.
我会说——我在书中提到过，二月份在利雅得举行的有关新冠病毒的讨论中，你会看到每个人都从 iPad 上抬起头来集中注意力，因为正是在那个时刻，我们陷入了大麻烦。
On the liquidity trap
关于流动性陷阱
Let’s move to the thrilling central banking topic of the liquidity trap.
让我们转向令人兴奋的央行话题——流动性陷阱。
What I observe in my own country is that for over a decade, we have rates of price inflation really very close to 1.8 percent, close to 2 percent.
我在自己的国家观察到，十多年来，我们的物价通胀率确实非常接近 1.8%，接近 2%。
The liquidity trap in its essence claims the central bank can’t control the price level; maybe the price level is indeterminate.
流动性陷阱的本质是央行无法控制物价水平；也许价格水平是不确定的。
My view is simply the liquidity trap theories are wrong, but what’s your view?
我的观点是流动性陷阱理论是错误的，但你的观点是什么？
My view has been that there is a liquidity trap, or there can be a liquidity trap.
我的观点是存在流动性陷阱，或者可能存在流动性陷阱。
I guess I wouldn’t fully subscribe that there can’t be.
我想我不会完全同意这是不可能的。
I would say wasn’t.
我想说不是。
Ah, but there wasn’t.
啊，但是没有。
I think you’re absolutely right on that, there wasn’t.
我认为你在这一点上绝对正确，没有。
It is revealed that there wasn’t a liquidity trap.
据透露，不存在流动性陷阱。
Further, for a large portion of that period, it was not that fiscal policy was providing the support, so it wasn’t the substitute for monetary policy.
此外，在那段时期的很大一部分时间里，财政政策并没有提供支持，因此它不能替代货币政策。
I think the innovation that was done on the monetary policy side helped ensure that the Fed — it didn’t quite get to its dual mandate, but it got pretty close.
我认为货币政策方面的创新有助于确保美联储——它没有完全实现其双重使命，但已经非常接近了。
In the end, actually, by 2019 it certainly was there, in my judgment, at its dual mandate.
事实上，到 2019 年，根据我的判断，它肯定已经履行了双重使命。
That showed the ability to innovate in terms of policy tools and provide that, at the cost of some other risks that built up, of course.
这表明我们有能力在政策工具方面进行创新，并提供这种工具，当然，这是以一些其他风险的积累为代价的。
What’s the model you use for thinking about why the liquidity trap may not have applied?
您使用什么模型来思考为什么流动性陷阱可能不适用？
Because as you well know, interest was being paid on reserves.
因为众所周知，准备金要支付利息。
It wasn’t identically equal to the T-bill rate, but it was very close.
它并不完全等于国库券利率，但非常接近。
T-bill markets are extremely liquid.
国库券市场流动性极强。
Why are bank reserves and T-bills sufficiently different assets to give monetary policy traction?
为什么银行准备金和国库券的资产差异很大，能够为货币政策提供牵引力？
Well, of course, bank reserves exist for settlement between banks.
当然，银行准备金是为了银行之间的结算而存在的。
Bank reserves are not liabilities that the commercial bank can actually act on and lend out.
银行准备金不是商业银行可以实际行动和贷出的负债。
Furthermore, of course, with quantitative easing, banks were in effect forced to carry these reserves, blessed with these extra reserves in order for the central bank, the Fed in this instance, to buy bonds.
此外，当然，通过量化宽松，银行实际上被迫持有这些准备金，并拥有这些额外的准备金，以便央行（在本例中为美联储）购买债券。
The reason the liquidity trap has not existed particularly in the United States, and UK as well, has been because financial conditions have been easier than they otherwise would be because of asset purchases and other measures that have been put in place.
流动性陷阱之所以不存在，尤其是在美国和英国，是因为由于资产购买和其他措施的实施，金融状况比原本要宽松。
What I would argue — sorry, Tyler — is that there comes a point, even with those where — for example, I would say that Japan very close in fact has been in a liquidity trap.
我想说的是，“对不起，泰勒”，即使是在某些情况下，例如，我想说日本实际上已经非常接近陷入流动性陷阱了。
As you know, right now, we Americans are all debating as to whether the measured higher rate of price inflation will simply be transitory.
如你所知，现在，我们美国人都在争论测得的较高的物价通胀率是否只是暂时的。
Other than market prices, which is obvious, what are the indicators we should be looking at more closely that are perhaps a little underrated?
除了显而易见的市场价格之外，我们应该更密切关注哪些可能被低估的指标？
Underrated.
被低估了。
First thing, let me tell you what I would go to first.
首先，让我告诉你我首先要做什么。
I would look to the labor market, adjust for compositional effects.
我会关注劳动力市场，调整成分效应。
In other words, to what extent is wage inflation being driven by more high-wage jobs being created than lower-wage jobs?
换句话说，工资上涨在多大程度上是由创造的高薪工作多于低薪工作所推动的？
Look for a broad suite of labor market indicators, including participation rates, hourly earnings, cut across various different segments.
寻找涵盖各个不同领域的广泛的劳动力市场指标，包括参与率、每小时收入。
What is developing, though, is it’s becoming obvious that input costs are moving more rapidly than one would have expected — at least, I would have expected.
然而，正在发生的事情是，投入成本的变化速度明显快于人们的预期——至少是我的预期。
Part of that is a product of supply bottlenecks, as well.
部分原因也是供应瓶颈造成的。
I’ll go .
我去。
.
。
.
。
That tells us something about, potentially, supply capacity in the economy.
这可能告诉我们一些有关经济供给能力的信息。
If I go back to what I just said on the labor market, because I didn’t quite finish the thought, is that — something I shouldn’t do in a speech, by the way, but I didn’t quite finish the thought, which is that one would expect that the natural rate of unemployment has gone up as a consequence of a relatively large proportion of the population being effectively out of work.
如果我回到我刚才在劳动力市场上所说的话，因为我没有完全结束这个想法，那么顺便说一句，我不应该在演讲中做这件事，但我没有完全结束这个想法，那就是人们会预期，由于相对较大比例的人口实际上失业，自然失业率会上升。
One’s looking for the risk here, is that as the economy gets back to the level it was before, the supply in the economy is not going to get back to the level it was before, or at least not quickly.
人们在这里寻找的风险是，当经济恢复到以前的水平时，经济中的供给不会恢复到以前的水平，或者至少不会很快恢复到以前的水平。
And so those price pressures will come through more quickly.
因此，这些价格压力将会更快地显现出来。
And we’re seeing some early indicators.
我们看到了一些早期指标。
We’re seeing some indicators, I would say, that’s consistent with that.
我想说，我们看到了一些与此相符的指标。
On central banks
关于央行
Let’s say we put you in charge of our central bank, the Fed.
假设我们让你负责我们的中央银行美联储。
How would you change governance?
您将如何改变治理？
Not monetary policy, not regulation, but the actual structure of the Federal Reserve System?
不是货币政策，不是监管，而是美联储系统的实际结构？
That is a really tricky one.
这是一个非常棘手的问题。
There’s path dependence in all regulatory frameworks in central banks.
央行的所有监管框架都存在路径依赖。
The rotating regional Fed chair — I understand why the regional Feds exist, but the rotating chair system, I probably would not have that.
地区联储轮值主席 ——我理解地区联储为何存在，但轮值主席制度，我可能不会接受。
I would have a clearer obligation on the Federal Reserve to identify and use its tools to address financial stability risks.
我对美联储有更明确的义务来识别和使用其工具来应对金融稳定风险。
Ultimately, that’s housed in something called the FSOC chaired by the Treasury secretary, but I would have the Fed more on the hook.
最终，它被安置在由财政部长主持的金融稳定委员会（FSOC）中，但我会让美联储承担更多责任。
I think they’d be happy with this for identifying what can go wrong and what should be done about it.
我认为他们会对此感到满意，因为这样可以确定可能出现的问题以及应该采取的措施。
I’m not saying add powers to them in order for that to be the case.
我并不是说要给他们增加权力才能实现这一点。
What we would like to see — look, I thought the system — and I’m a prisoner of my past, but the system in the UK, where there was quite a rigorous independence of the committee members on what’s called the Monetary Policy Committee, the equivalent of the FOMC, and they felt individual responsibility, they definitely would vote in different ways than the governor.
我们希望看到的是——我认为这个体系是我过去的囚徒，但在英国的体系中，所谓的货币政策委员会（相当于联邦公开市场委员会）的委员会成员具有相当严格的独立性，他们感到个人责任，他们肯定会以与行长不同的方式投票。
They didn’t feel the need to have a consensus that was consistent with what the governor thought because they were individually on the hook for their votes and knew how people had voted.
他们觉得没有必要达成与州长想法一致的共识，因为他们各自都为自己的选票负责，并且知道人们是如何投票的。
And that led to quite robust discussions, in a healthy way, about the outlook for the economy.
这引发了关于经济前景的相当热烈的健康讨论。
The Fed has elements of that, but it also — and sorry, I’ll finish on this topic, which is, it has a tradition or a convention that is more consensus based than we had in the UK.
美联储有这样的要素，但它也——抱歉，我会结束这个话题，也就是说，它有一个比我们在英国更加基于共识的传统或惯例。
Thinking of central banks just as autonomous institutions, putting aside monetary policy, putting aside regulation, just running them — what’s the greatest challenge?
将央行视为自治机构，抛开货币政策，抛开监管，只是运行它们 —— 最大的挑战是什么？
They’re very hierarchical institutions, historically have been, and the older they are, the more hierarchical they are.
从历史上看，它们是等级森严的机构，而且历史越悠久，等级越高。
The greatest challenge is to — well, you have a formal structure for who makes the decision, whether the committee or the individual.
最大的挑战是——嗯，你有一个正式的结构来决定谁来做决定，无论是委员会还是个人。
The greatest challenge is to empower people below to say what they think and to be clear and to act as if they are making the decision.
最大的挑战是让下面的人能够说出自己的想法，表达清楚，并表现得好像他们正在做决定一样。
They give clear advice as opposed to classic “on the one hand, on the other hand” type advice.
他们给出明确的建议，而不是经典的“一方面，另一方面”类型的建议。
And we tried various ways to make that happen at the Bank of England, I think with some success.
我们在英格兰银行尝试了各种方法来实现这一目标，我认为取得了一些成功。
I’m sure they’re doing it much better after I left.
我确信我离开后他们会做得更好。
Should boards of governors of central banks, in essence, have COOs so they don’t have to actually run the central bank?
从本质上讲，央行理事会是否应该设立首席运营官，这样他们就不必实际管理央行？
Absolutely.
绝对地。
We did have that at the Bank of England.
我们在英格兰银行确实有这样的做法。
How should central bankers treat off-balance-sheet risk differently, if at all?
如果有的话，央行官员应该如何以不同的方式对待表外风险？
Easy question.
简单的问题。
Off-balance-sheet risk of private financial institutions, you mean?
你指的是民间金融机构的表外风险吗？
Of course, yes.
当然，是的。
Okay.
好的。
They should — and we started to take steps in this way, something called step-in risks.
他们应该——并且我们开始以这种方式采取措施，这就是所谓的“介入风险”。
The assumption is that the off-balance-sheet risk, there will be either a moral or some other quasi-legal responsibility for the connected institution to assume those risks.
假设对于表外风险，关联机构将承担道德或其他准法律责任来承担这些风险。
You should always assume that those risks collapse back on the central balance sheet.
您应该始终假设这些风险会重新出现在中央资产负债表上。
Just as, if you recall, the SIVs in 2008 collapsed back on the balance sheets of major institutions like Citibank, for example, and Merrill Lynch, and all of a sudden balance sheets that looked relatively healthy looked awful because they’re substantially higher-risk assets.
如果你还记得的话，就像 2008 年结构性投资工具重新出现在花旗银行和美林银行等主要机构的资产负债表上一样，看起来相对健康的资产负债表突然变得很糟糕，因为它们实际上是风险较高的资产。
Of course, the assets that were off balance sheet were off balance sheet because they weren’t that high quality.
当然，资产负债表外的资产之所以不在表内，是因为它们的质量不高。
Now, this — yourself through Stanley Fischer — as you know, there’s a trend of recruiting central bankers from other countries.
现在，正如你所知，现在有一种从其他国家招募央行行长的趋势。
So far, it seems it’s worked quite well.
到目前为止，似乎效果很好。
But what are the limits of this process of recruiting leaders in government from abroad?
但从国外招募政府领导人的过程有哪些局限性呢？
You wouldn’t name someone to run the Department of Defense who is from another country, right?
你不会任命来自其他国家的人来管理国防部，对吗？
Yes.
是的。
What’s the margin where that doesn’t work anymore?
不再起作用的余量是多少？
Well, candidly, I think it was a relatively unique set of circumstances when I was put in place.
嗯，坦白说，我认为当我就职时，这是一个相对独特的情况。
The UK had had a very bad financial crisis.
英国经历了一场非常严重的金融危机。
We had a new central bank, in other words; the powers had been tripled, it had been doubled in size.
换句话说，我们有了一个新的中央银行；力量增加了三倍，规模也增加了一倍。
There’s an opportunity to bring an outsider in, in order to help try to make that work.
有机会引入外部人员，以帮助实现这一目标。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
I’m a little hard pressed to see the set of circumstances where it would be immediately obvious to bring an outsider back in again.
我有点难以想象在那种情况下，很明显要把一个外来者再次带回来。
My answer is there have been examples.
我的回答是已经有例子了。
The governor of the Bank of Ireland, for example, is a third example: Gabriel Makhlouf, head president.
第三个例子是爱尔兰银行行长：行长加布里埃尔·马赫卢夫 (Gabriel Makhlouf)。
But it’s very much the exception as opposed to the rule.
但这在很大程度上是例外，而不是规则。
It relies heavily on the technocratic nature of the role.
它在很大程度上依赖于该角色的技术官僚性质。
Are there classes of decisions where such a head should recuse himself or herself, or would just feel hesitant — very risky decisions or extending foreign lines of credit, which the Fed of course has done a lot, or exchange rate policy?
是否有这样的领导人应该回避的决策，或者只是感到犹豫——风险很大的决策或扩大外国信贷额度（美联储当然已经做了很多这样的事情），或者汇率政策？
No. I think if you take these roles, you have to be able to take every decision no matter how small or how large.
不，我认为如果你担任这些角色，你必须能够做出每一个决定，无论大小。
I never felt any circumstance where either I didn’t have adequate information or, God forbid, that I was somehow conflicted in my loyalties that it would have influenced the decision.
我从来没有感觉到任何情况下，要么我没有足够的信息，要么，上帝禁止，我在我的忠诚度上存在某种冲突，这会影响我的决定。
On digital currencies
关于数字货币
Topic of the day is central bank digital currencies, as you know.
如您所知，今天的主题是央行数字货币。
Jay Powell spoke about that just the other day.
杰伊·鲍威尔前几天谈到了这一点。
If we move to some form of a central bank digital currency, how do we avoid or limit disintermediation as people pull their assets out of commercial banks and go directly through the central bank?
如果我们转向某种形式的央行数字货币，当人们将资产从商业银行撤出并直接通过央行时，我们如何避免或限制脱媒？
Well, there’s a couple of ways.
嗯，有几种方法。
I think the most likely route that this is — and I’ll come to an issue with it — is that there are two tiers to the central bank digital currency.
我认为最有可能的途径是，央行数字货币有两层。
The digital currency is as much a wholesaler — it’s principally a wholesale digital currency.
数字货币就像一个批发商——它主要是一种批发数字货币。
What faces you and I and those listening is some form of wallet we have a relationship with, whether it’s a commercial bank or an emerging tech company or a fintech company that is through the wallet.
你我以及听众所面临的是某种形式的钱包，我们与之有关系，无论是通过钱包的商业银行还是新兴科技公司或金融科技公司。
That’s how we access currency.
这就是我们获取货币的方式。
Now as you know, but it bears repeating, most of that currency, most of that money will have been created by the private financial system itself.
现在如你所知，但值得重复的是，大部分货币、大部分货币将是由私人金融体系本身创造的。
Very little of it actually is the digital currency.
实际上，其中很少一部分是数字货币。
One of the decision points is whether we as citizens have a right to access the ultimate safe asset, or at least a portion of our earnings in the ultimate safe asset.
决策点之一是我们作为公民是否有权获得最终的安全资产，或者至少将我们收入的一部分用于最终的安全资产。
In one model, the safest model, the one that doesn’t avoid the question — it solves the question that you very rightly put on the table — the digital currency is only at the wholesale level.
在一种模型中，最安全的模型，不能回避问题的模型——它解决了你正确提出的问题——数字货币仅处于批发层面。
It’s the top tier between institutions, not at the customer-facing, the retail-facing level.
这是机构之间的顶层，而不是面向客户、面向零售的层面。
As you know, there’s the Modigliani-Miller theorem.
如您所知，有莫迪利亚尼-米勒定理。
Maybe I, Tyler Cowen, can’t legally access the digital currency, but an intermediary will give me an equivalent service, if only through crypto.
也许我，泰勒·考恩，无法合法地访问数字货币，但中介会给我提供同等的服务，哪怕只是通过加密货币。
There can be a private layer that in essence gives me that access.
可以有一个私有层本质上为我提供了这种访问权限。
There will be a private layer .
将会有一个私有层。
.
。
.
。
The extreme version of that is private stablecoins, in which a form of crypto which is backed with — could be the central bank digital currency or Treasury bills and some other safe assets that mimic it.
其极端版本是私人稳定币，其中一种由“支持”的加密货币形式可能是央行数字货币或国库券以及其他一些模仿它的安全资产。
That’s possible.
这是可能的。
It doesn’t in and of itself, since it’s a private layer, isn’t of itself fully resilient.
它本身并不具有完全的弹性，因为它是一个私有层。
I use the example in the book of, effectively, the Bank of Amsterdam, which lasted almost a century — well, more than a century — was a form of stablecoin.
我在书中使用了阿姆斯特丹银行的例子，该银行持续了近一个世纪——嗯，一个多世纪——是一种稳定币形式。
They were offering the bank bills supposedly fully backed by the gold that people had deposited.
他们提供的银行票据据称完全由人们存入的黄金支持。
Now, over time, they gradually ran a mismatch.
现在，随着时间的推移，他们逐渐出现了不匹配。
That’s the danger with that structure if that becomes the core structure.
如果它成为核心结构，这就是该结构的危险。
Tyler, sorry, I didn’t quite finish my point earlier.
泰勒，抱歉，我刚才没说完我的观点。
I gave you one model which keeps the central bank digital currency at the top layer, the wholesale.
我给大家提供了一种模型，将央行数字货币保持在顶层，即批发。
I think there is a very legitimate argument of citizens and others to say, “Well, actually, today I can carry around cash.
我认为公民和其他人有一个非常合理的论点说：“好吧，实际上，今天我可以随身携带现金。
I have access to the ultimate safe asset.
我可以获得最终的安全资产。
If we’re only going to be in a digital world, I should have a right to that safe asset as well.”
如果我们只想进入数字世界，我也应该有权获得该安全资产。”
I think at this stage, at least for the limits of my imagination, the only way I can see directly around your issue is to limit the portion of my assets that I can hold in cash — sorry, central bank digital currency in this example — because otherwise, that instantaneous run risk very much does exist.
我认为，在现阶段，至少在我的想象力有限的情况下，我能直接解决你的问题的唯一方法是限制我可以持有现金的资产部分 ——对不起，在这个例子中是央行数字货币——因为否则，瞬时挤兑风险确实存在。
You collapse the private money into public money in times of stress, so it is a real issue.
在压力时期，你会把私人资金变成公共资金，所以这是一个真正的问题。
If it’s wholesale only, the digital currency, or if my participation is limited, those are like limits on capital flows.
如果只是批发，数字货币，或者如果我的参与受到限制，那么这些就像对资本流动的限制。
Will the digital currency sell at a different price than say the dollar, the euro, the regular currency?
数字货币的售价是否会与美元、欧元或普通货币不同？
It should not because money will be indistinguishable between the private money that’s created, just as it is today between central bank reserves and cash.
不应该这样做，因为货币与所创造的私人货币之间无法区分，就像今天央行储备与现金之间无法区分一样。
But they do different things.
但他们做不同的事情。
Cash and the digital currency, they do different things.
现金和数字货币，它们做不同的事情。
There’s a capital flow restriction on funds in and out from one to the other.
资金从一国到另一国的进出受到资本流动限制。
It would seem you’d end up with separation of the unit of account, and you’d have two media of exchange, two currencies.
看起来你最终会分离记账单位，并且拥有两种交换媒介、两种货币。
I don’t mind this scenario.
我不介意这种情况。
We don’t want to have separation either.
我们也不想分离。
Exactly.
确切地。
I like exotic.
我喜欢异国情调。
Exactly.
确切地。
In the wholesale example, I can’t reach up to that level.
在批发的例子中，我达不到那个水平。
I can’t.
我不能。
Now, you can say in the wholesale market then you could, and stress there would be a premium for that, which I suppose is a possibility.
现在，你可以说在批发市场可以，并强调会有溢价，我认为这是有可能的。
In hybrid models, there’s some retail and the bulk of it is private, there is a — I don’t envision — I’m sorry, I guess I left out an important point.
在混合模式中，有一些零售，大部分是私人的，有一个 —— 我没有预见到 —— 对不起，我想我遗漏了一个重要的观点。
I don’t envision the central bank digital currency paying a return.
我不认为央行数字货币会带来回报。
I’m not one who says, “Let’s have a central bank digital currency so we can have wildly negative interest rates, so we can add another tool to the toolbox.” That exchange ratio — my term, but I think it’s the same concept — ends up showing up in what the deposit rate is at the financial institution as it does today.
我不会说：“让我们拥有一种央行数字货币，这样我们就可以实现大幅负利率，这样我们就可以在工具箱中添加另一种工具。”这个汇率 ——我的术语，但我认为这是同一个概念——最终会出现在金融机构的存款利率中，就像今天一样。
How should we regulate decentralized finance, DeFi as they call it?
我们应该如何监管去中心化金融（即所谓的 DeFi）？
Another great question.
另一个很好的问题。
I think the first thing is recognizing that that is a real possibility, that we will have a world which is a combination of centralized and decentralized finance, that there is potential value.
我认为首先要认识到这是一种真正的可能性，我们将拥有一个集中心化和去中心化金融相结合的世界，并且存在潜在的价值。
I hedge it a bit because I can see the potential, but I haven’t really seen it at scale being applied in so-called native currencies that exist and facilitate decentralized finance and the smart contracts that are part of that.
我对它进行了一些对冲，因为我可以看到潜力，但我还没有真正看到它大规模应用于所谓的本地货币，这些货币存在并促进去中心化金融和其中的智能合约。
There’s a couple of obvious things we have to do in terms of regulation.
在监管方面，我们必须做一些明显的事情。
Going in and out of decentralized finance, which is classic Know Your Customer, anti–money laundering, counterterrorist financing, those boundaries between the two.
进出去中心化金融，这是经典的“了解你的客户”，反洗钱，反恐融资，以及两者之间的界限。
The resilience of the institutions that operate within decentralized finance.
在去中心化金融中运作的机构的弹性。
Thirdly, the nature of the crypto asset that’s used as the, quote, “native currency” and its resilience, its supply algorithm, whether or not it’s backed, whether or not it is itself a stablecoin.
第三，用作“原生货币”的加密资产的性质及其弹性、供应算法，无论是否有支持，无论它本身是否是稳定币。
If it is a stablecoin, who oversees the nature of that stablecoin.
如果它是稳定币，那么谁来监督该稳定币的性质。
There are some that had represented — as you probably know, I’m sure — that they were fully backed by cash, and it turns out that they’re very much not.
有些人曾表示“——正如你可能知道的那样，我确信”——他们完全有现金支持，但事实证明他们并非如此。
There’s a conduct, anti–money laundering, Know Your Customer element going in and out of DeFi, and then there’s the resilience of the DeFi segment itself.
进出 DeFi 涉及行为、反洗钱、了解你的客户等要素，此外还有 DeFi 领域本身的弹性。
As you know, there are truly anonymous forms of crypto, whether we like it or not.
如您所知，无论我们喜欢与否，加密货币都有真正匿名的形式。
How many degrees of freedom do we really have in regulating non-anonymous crypto given that people have the option of switching into anonymous crypto?
考虑到人们可以选择切换到匿名加密货币，我们在监管非匿名加密货币方面真正拥有多少自由度？
We can only regulate them as it comes into the formal financial system, but we certainly can regulate anybody who is in the formal financial system and how they dock into that system, a crypto exchange.
我们只能在它们进入正式金融体系时对其进行监管，但我们当然可以监管正式金融体系中的任何人以及他们如何接入该系统（即加密货币交易所）。
I’ve long been saying that crypto exchanges should be regulated as other exchanges are and should be subject to the same quality standards and Know Your Customer standards and others.
我长期以来一直在说，加密货币交易所应该像其他交易所一样受到监管，并且应该遵守相同的质量标准和“了解你的客户”标准等。
I think the best crypto exchanges absolutely agree with that.
我认为最好的加密货币交易所绝对同意这一点。
Private financial institutions and their interactions between — ultimately, it is interesting how essential much of crypto — that crypto for a decentralized system ultimately needs to come back into the centralized system in order to be a true medium of exchange.
私人金融机构及其之间的互动——最终，有趣的是，加密货币的重要性有多大——去中心化系统的加密货币最终需要回到中心化系统才能成为真正的交换媒介。
Those who have been taking ransomware in crypto likely will ultimately come back into the formal financial system at some point.
那些在加密货币中获取勒索软件的人最终可能会在某个时候回到正式的金融系统。
That’s where the regulation has to catch.
这就是监管必须抓住的地方。
If I look at IPCC estimates of the costs of climate change, I see talk of a base case of maybe 5 percent to 6 percent of global GDP, possible risks of up to 20 or maybe 30 percent of GDP.
如果我查看 IPCC 对气候变化成本的估计，我会看到有关基本情况的讨论可能占全球 GDP 的 5% 至 6%，可能的风险高达 GDP 的 20% 或 30%。
All this you discussed in your book, of course.
当然，您在书中讨论了所有这些。
Given that wide range of estimates, which perhaps will get wider yet, what can central banks usefully do with this information, given that they’re not really special adjudicators of wisdom about climate change?
鉴于估计范围广泛（可能还会进一步扩大），鉴于央行并不是气候变化智慧的真正特殊裁决者，它们可以如何有效地利用这些信息？
That’s right.
这是正确的。
We’re not special adjudicators of wisdom about climate change.
我们不是气候变化智慧的特别裁决者。
There’s a couple of things we can do, and of course, there’s a difference between the flow estimate, the GDP estimates — and I’d center it, and I do in the book, more around 25 percent of GDP.
我们可以做一些事情，当然，流量估计和 GDP 估计之间存在差异，我会将其集中在 GDP 的 25% 左右，我在书中也是这样做的。
That’s a level effect further out, and we can debate that.
这是进一步的水平效应，我们可以对此进行辩论。
But also, there’s the asset price effect.
而且，还有资产价格效应。
This is a critical element, whether it’s commercial real estate or value of fossil-fuel assets or other investments and/or loans that banks themselves and investment pools have.
这是一个关键因素，无论是商业房地产还是化石燃料资产的价值，还是银行本身和投资池拥有的其他投资和/或贷款。
What can central banks do?
央行能做什么？
First thing is to take a look at the risk profile associated with climate change.
首先要了解与气候变化相关的风险状况。
Most of the risk in the course of, let’s say, the next decade, 15 years, relates to what’s called transition risk.
比如说，未来十年、十五年的大部分风险都与所谓的转型风险有关。
Yes, there is risk for certain activities because of increase of extreme weather events and the knock-on effects of that.
是的，由于极端天气事件的增加及其连锁反应，某些活动存在风险。
That’s absolutely there, but most of the risk .
这绝对是存在的，但风险很大。
.
。
.
。
And I’ll give you an example.
我给你举个例子。
If you’re lending or investing in the European auto industry now, you probably want to take into account that you can’t sell an internal combustion engine vehicle in Europe after 2030.
如果您现在正在向欧洲汽车行业提供贷款或投资，您可能需要考虑到 2030 年后您将无法在欧洲销售内燃机汽车。
That is a regulation.
这是一个规定。
That is transition risk.
这就是转型风险。
The question that central banks can do with financial institutions is working through with them the extent to which they’ve assessed, those financial institutions have assessed these types of risk, and then those private financial institutions make the judgments about which ones are worth bearing.
中央银行可以与金融机构做的问题是与他们一起研究评估的程度，这些金融机构评估了这些类型的风险，然后这些私人金融机构做出判断哪些风险值得承担。
Just to be clear, some of the biggest risks in the system are that, if I can put it this way, we do what we say.
需要明确的是，系统中一些最大的风险是，如果我可以这样说的话，我们会按照我们所说的去做。
In other words, whether it’s through private innovation, public regulation, some combination of the two that we move to an economy that is lower carbon and more consistent with the overall objective of 130 countries, which is one-and-a-half-degree temperature increase.
换句话说，无论是通过私人创新、公共监管，还是两者的某种结合，我们都能迈向低碳经济，更符合 130 个国家的总体目标，即气温升高 1 度半。
Twenty-five percent of global GDP seems very, very high to me.
对我来说，占全球 GDP 的 25% 似乎非常非常高。
As central bankers, we look at market prices.
作为央行行长，我们关注市场价格。
Most insurance companies are not insolvent.
大多数保险公司都没有资不抵债。
That’s a forward-looking market price.
这是一个前瞻性的市场价格。
Coastal property, the prices of some of it are down, but not radically so.
沿海房产，其中一些价格下降了，但下降幅度并不大。
Obama bought a house at Martha’s Vineyard.
奥巴马在玛莎葡萄园岛买了一栋房子。
No one said that was a huge mistake.
没有人说这是一个巨大的错误。
If the actual costs are 5, 6 percent of GDP, maybe that’s a year and a half’s global growth, which is still highly significant.
如果实际成本占GDP的5%、6%，也许相当于全球一年半的增长，这仍然是非常重要的。
But a lot of it happens slowly.
但很多事情都是慢慢发生的。
It’s predicted.
这是预测的。
It’s signaled by market prices in advance.
它是由市场价格提前发出的信号。
If the central bank just went about doing its old ordinary business and did a good job, what exactly is going to go wrong that makes it necessary to extend their mandate to climate change?
如果央行只是继续做其老生常谈的事情并且做得很好，那么究竟会出现什么问题，以至于有必要将其职责范围扩大到气候变化？
A couple of things.
有几件事。
Three things, and you added a third at the end.
三件事，最后你又添加了第三件事。
First is, having been a regulator of the insurance industry, I can tell you, and particularly the property and casualty and the reinsurance industry, they think this is a big risk.
首先，作为保险业的监管者，我可以告诉你，特别是财产险和再保险业，他们认为这是一个很大的风险。
In fact, if you were the regulator of Lloyd’s of London, one of the biggest reinsurers in the world, it’s number one, number two in terms of their risk.
事实上，如果你是世界上最大的再保险公司之一伦敦劳合社的监管者，那么就风险而言，它是第一、第二位。
The reason why Lloyd’s does well — it has some years better than others — and these big P&C companies is because they write relatively short-term contracts, and they reprice.
劳合社之所以表现出色，是因为它们签订的合同期限相对较短，并且会重新定价。
They reprice coverage and they reprice risk.
他们重新定价承保范围并重新定价风险。
They’re following the impact of climate change on the physical risk, and they’re able to react to it because they’re not writing a whole ton of 30-year catastrophe risk in their books.
他们正在跟踪气候变化对自然风险的影响，并且能够对此做出反应，因为他们没有在书中写下大量的 30 年巨灾风险。
They write some, but they don’t write — that’s not at the core.
他们写了一些，但他们不写——这不是核心。
That’s the first point.
这是第一点。
Second point is that — and it goes to your last point, which is that some central banks have this responsibility because of whom they oversee.
第二点是 —— 这就是你的最后一点，即一些央行因为他们的监管而负有这项责任。
Some central banks, Bank of Canada, for example, it’s a monetary institute, for lack of a better word.
一些中央银行，例如加拿大银行，它是一个货币机构，因为没有更好的词了。
Its job is price stability largely.
它的工作主要是稳定价格。
It does a bit of analysis on the financial stability side, a bit on payments, but it’s largely price stability.
它在金融稳定方面做了一些分析，在支付方面做了一些分析，但主要是价格稳定。
If you oversee major financial institutions and there is large prospective risk, clearly in insurance, potentially in banking because of the transition risk I was talking about a moment ago — and just give an example, this week, the week we’re talking, the IAA has come out with their forecasts for, or their scenarios, I should say, for what’s necessary in order to achieve one and a half degrees.
如果你监管主要的金融机构，并且存在很大的潜在风险，显然在保险业，可能在银行业，因为我刚才谈到的转型风险 ——举个例子，本周，我们正在讨论的这一周，IAA 已经发布了他们的预测，或者他们的情景，我应该说，为了实现一个半学位所需的条件。
The orders of magnitude of stranded assets of known reserves in energy are three-quarters of coal, proven reserves; half of gas; and more than a third of oil.
能源领域已知储量的搁浅资产数量级为煤炭探明储量的四分之三；一半的气体；以及超过三分之一的石油。
You have to think about, as a bank or as an investor, “Well, am I exposed to the bit that gets produced or the bit that won’t get produced if we’re in this scenario, or do I think we won’t end up in this scenario and it’ll all get produced and the real risk will be on the physical side?”
作为银行或投资者，你必须思考，“那么，如果我们处于这种情况下，我是否会面临已生产的部分或不会生产的部分，或者我是否认为我们最终不会陷入这种情况，所有这些都会生产出来，真正的风险将在物理方面？”
Just to wrap up, some central banks have that direct responsibility.
总而言之，一些央行负有直接责任。
Bank of England absolutely, clearly did as the insurance regulator, but also the financial stability, the macroprudential regulator.
英国央行绝对、明确地充当了保险监管者，同时也是金融稳定、宏观审慎监管者。
Others don’t because they only do monetary policy, and many are somewhere in between.
其他人则不这样做，因为他们只制定货币政策，而且许多人介于两者之间。
I would say — I said that was going to be the last point; I’ll make one other — that we have 90 central banks from around the world that cover 85 percent of global GDP, which is part of the central bank group, self-selected into that group that is looking at these risks and how to make sure the system is resilient, because to loop back to something else we were talking about earlier, we need to plan for failure.
我会说 — 我说过这将是最后一点；我再说一个——我们有来自世界各地的 90 家中央银行，覆盖全球 GDP 的 85%，它们是中央银行集团的一部分，是自行选择加入的集团，负责研究这些风险以及如何确保系统具有弹性，因为回到我们之前讨论的其他问题，我们需要为失败做好计划。
We need to make sure the system is resilient for these type of risks so that the financial system is not part of the problem and it can help support things going forward.
我们需要确保该体系能够抵御此类风险，这样金融体系就不会成为问题的一部分，并且可以帮助支持未来的发展。
Given that climate change is such a highly politicized topic, do we endanger the independence of central banks by giving them a climate change mandate?
鉴于气候变化是一个高度政治化的话题，我们赋予中央银行应对气候变化的授权是否会危及它们的独立性？
It depends — that presumes that there is a new mandate and the nature in which it’s given.
这取决于——假设存在新的任务及其所赋予的性质。
What has happened in the UK is that the chancellor — and this is the way the system works in the UK is, for the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Stability Committee and then the regulatory committee, the one that oversees just the microprudential health of banks and insurers, the government has clearly said, “Your responsibility includes taking into account climate change risk,” each of those committees.
英国发生的事情是，财政大臣——这就是英国的制度运作方式，对于货币政策委员会、金融稳定委员会和监管委员会来说，政府明确表示，“你的责任包括考虑气候变化风险”，每个委员会都负责监督银行和保险公司的微观审慎健康状况。
That is a direction.
那是一个方向。
That is democratic accountability.
这就是民主问责制。
It’s consistent with the law.
这是符合法律规定的。
It’s consistent with the set of risks, the law that governs the central bank, but it is not the central bank reading into its mandate a new responsibility.
它与一系列风险和管理央行的法律是一致的，但这并不是央行将其授权解读为新的责任。
There’s a difference between given something or directed to do something, again, consistent with the legal framework, and having the central bank appropriate that responsibility, which is not the case in the UK.
再次强调，符合法律框架的给予某事或指示做某事与让央行承担该责任之间是有区别的，而英国的情况并非如此。
On living in Canada
关于在加拿大生活
As we’re talking in mid-May, Canada is doing a wonderful job catching up with vaccinating Canadians.
正如我们在五月中旬所说的那样，加拿大在疫苗接种方面做得非常出色，赶上了加拿大人的接种速度。
That’s great.
那太棒了。
But if we think of the very slow initial procurement and the pretty slow initial rollout, is that telling us something about problems with state capacity in Canada, which we typically think of as a very well-governed nation, but is there anything we’re learning there?
但如果我们考虑到非常缓慢的初始采购和相当缓慢的初始推出，这是否告诉我们加拿大政府能力存在问题，我们通常认为加拿大是一个治理非常良好的国家，但我们在那里学到了什么？
Absolutely.
绝对地。
I think you put it well.
我觉得你说得很好。
Three things.
三件事。
One is, there’s a problem with state capacity in advance.
一是国家提前能力存在问题。
We had inadequate vaccine production capacity.
我们的疫苗生产能力不足。
We didn’t have any; that’s the bottom line.
我们没有；这是底线。
We had inadequate supplies of PPE and arguably inadequate capacity in our healthcare system.
我们的个人防护装备供应不足，医疗保健系统的能力也可能不足。
As you well know, the less the capacity in your healthcare system, the riskier it gets, even small increases in infections.
众所周知，医疗保健系统的容量越小，风险就越大，即使感染人数略有增加。
All of that was in advance.
所有这一切都是提前的。
Secondly, in terms of — the track-and-trace system put in place in Canada is not really operable.
其次，加拿大的追踪系统实际上并不具有可操作性。
It’s there in theory, but it is not an effective part of the pandemic response.
理论上是存在的，但它并不是应对大流行的有效部分。
Then thirdly, the vaccine rollout has been slow relative to the US and the UK.
第三，与美国和英国相比，疫苗的推出速度缓慢。
Now it is catching up.
现在它正在迎头赶上。
It’s very much catching up.
它正在迎头赶上。
Why did those go wrong?
为什么这些会出错？
What’s the general problem or reconsideration about Canadian government?
加拿大政府的普遍问题或重新考虑是什么？
A lot of people think you’re better governed than a lot of places.
很多人认为你的治理比很多地方都好。
Well, we are better governed.
嗯，我们管理得更好。
COWEN: Then why it didn’t work?
COWEN：那为什么它不起作用呢？
We are better governed than a lot of places.
我们的治理比很多地方都好。
I think that in the case of systemic risk, we’re talking about another systemic risk around pandemics.
我认为，就系统性风险而言，我们正在讨论围绕流行病的另一种系统性风险。
There was an absence of clear responsibility, who’s responsible for it, and empowering those who’s responsible still.
缺乏明确的责任，没有明确的责任人，也没有赋予那些仍然负有责任的人权力。
There’s a lot of finger-pointing between the federal government and the provincial governments.
联邦政府和省政府之间存在很多相互指责。
Some of it is a question of responsibility across jurisdictions as opposed to taking full ownership of the issue and saying that we are jointly responsible for Canadians’ health in the middle of a pandemic, and we will jointly work together and share the positives and the negatives of the outcomes for Canadians — because after all, I’m talking to you from Ottawa.
其中一些是跨司法管辖区的责任问题，而不是完全掌控这个问题，并说我们在大流行期间对加拿大人的健康共同负责，我们将共同努力，为加拿大人分担结果的积极和消极因素 ——因为毕竟，我是在渥太华与你们交谈。
I don’t view myself as Ottawan and Ontarian; I view myself as a Canadian first and foremost, and I expect my governments to deliver for me.
我不认为自己是渥太华人和安大略人；我不认为自己是渥太华人和安大略人。我首先认为自己是加拿大人，我希望我的政府能够为我提供帮助。
Why is Ottawa such a nice and interesting city and yet so cheap?
为什么渥太华是一个如此美丽有趣的城市，而且物价如此低廉？
COWEN: Serious question.
考恩：严肃的问题。
It’s cold in the winter.
冬天很冷。
The whole of Canada is cold, right?
整个加拿大都很冷吧？
Well, it’s not as cold.
还好，没那么冷。
This is the second-coldest capital in the world after Ulaanbaatar.
这是继乌兰巴托之后世界上第二冷的首都。
It’s not as cheap as it used to be, but it is certainly value for money, yes.
它不像以前那么便宜，但绝对物有所值，是的。
I don’t have a good answer for that.
对此我没有一个好的答案。
Why is there so little populism in Canada?
为什么加拿大的民粹主义如此之少？
You have plenty of immigrants, right?
你们有很多移民，对吗？
Arguably, in Ontario, you’ve had some local populism, but nationally it doesn’t seem to have taken off.
可以说，在安大略省，当地有一些民粹主义，但在全国范围内，它似乎还没有兴起。
Well, I think it’s a good observation.
嗯，我认为这是一个很好的观察。
It’s partly, populism, the way I think of it is, it moves into an “us versus them, the people versus the elite” type approach.
我认为这在一定程度上是民粹主义，它进入了“我们与他们，人民与精英”类型的方式。
Part of what determines populism, in my way of thinking, is how much do people believe that there is equality of opportunity or an ability to move through the system?
在我看来，决定民粹主义的部分因素是人们在多大程度上相信机会均等或有能力通过这个体系？
How much should people believe that there is equal access?
人们应该在多大程度上相信机会平等？
A couple of things that underscore that in Canada: universal healthcare.
在加拿大，有几件事强调了这一点：全民医疗保健。
Virtually everybody sends their kids to the state education system, so you have universal on that.
几乎每个人都把自己的孩子送到公立教育系统，所以这是普遍的。
One of the things which has slowed our response, and actually on the pandemic, is application of that universality, for example, for vaccines and universality for lockdowns and other requirements in a way that meets equality but is not as effective as it could be on a risk-management basis.
减缓我们反应速度的因素之一，实际上是在大流行方面，是这种普遍性的应用，例如，疫苗的普遍性以及封锁和其他要求的普遍性，其方式满足了平等，但在风险管理的基础上却没有那么有效。
Give you an example: it would make more sense to go and vaccinate the teachers and vaccinate those who are working in meatpacking plants and Amazon warehouse and other hot spots for the disease, but that’s not the approach.
举个例子：去给老师接种疫苗、给在肉类加工厂、亚马逊仓库和其他疾病热点地区工作的人接种疫苗会更有意义，但这不是方法。
The approach has been very rigorously equal working down through age cohorts.
这种方法对于各个年龄段的人来说都是非常严格平等的。
I think that has its downsides, but it reinforces “We’re all in this together” and therefore weighs against the populism possibilities.
我认为这有其缺点，但它强化了“我们都在一起”，因此不利于民粹主义的可能性。
Are the Toronto Raptors doomed to be, on average, a subpar NBA team due to higher taxes?
由于税收较高，多伦多猛龙队是否注定会成为一支平均水平低于 NBA 水平的球队？
Well, they —
嗯，他们 ——
Fiscal policy question, right?
财政政策问题吧？
Fantastic question.
很棒的问题。
No, short answer.
不，简短的回答。
Wildly popular, and they were able to gross up second from a basketball competitiveness perspective.
非常受欢迎，从篮球竞争力的角度来看，他们能够获得第二名。
We’re pleased to see the Biden tax proposals and the effects coming in this direction.
我们很高兴看到拜登的税收提案及其朝着这个方向产生的影响。
I think the track record does indicate an NBA championship, and getting close last time is so far so good.
我认为往绩记录确实预示着 NBA 总冠军的到来，而且上次接近冠军的成绩到目前为止还算不错。
Where’s the best food in Canada?
加拿大哪里的美食最好吃？
For me, Vancouver.
对我来说，温哥华。
Chinese or nouvelle or what?
中国式的还是新派的还是什么？
Everything, because of the range.
一切，都是因为范围。
Fantastic Indian nouvelle, absolutely amazing Japanese izakaya type — and part of it is, my parents are originally from that area, not Vancouver itself.
奇妙的印度新风尚，绝对令人惊叹的日本居酒屋类型 ——其中一部分是，我的父母来自那个地区，而不是温哥华本身。
So, I have nice associations with it.
所以，我和它有很好的联系。
What’s your favorite movie and why?
你最喜欢的电影是什么？为什么？
My favorite movie was Gallipoli, oddly, which is an Australian movie, Peter Weir.
奇怪的是，我最喜欢的电影是《加里波利》，这是一部澳大利亚电影，彼得·威尔。
It’s about World War I and the attack on the Dardanelles.
这是关于第一次世界大战和达达尼尔海峡的袭击。
I just thought it was a brilliant film, and the sense of foreboding that comes with it, and beautifully shot.
我只是觉得这是一部精彩的电影，以及随之而来的不祥预感，而且拍摄精美。
I don’t know, it’s always stuck with me.
我不知道，它一直困扰着我。
To refer back to the theme of your book, how does that stem from your values?
回到你的书的主题，它是如何源于你的价值观的？
There’s a couple of things in that.
其中有几件事。
One is, the main characters, who are — actually, one of them is Mel Gibson, but they basically have to sacrifice themselves for the group.
一是主要人物，他们是——实际上，其中之一是梅尔·吉布森，但他们基本上必须为团队牺牲自己。
That sense of solidarity, that is part and parcel of that and a big component of the book.
这种团结感是其中的重要组成部分，也是本书的重要组成部分。
What’s your favorite O.
你最喜欢什么O
Henry story?
亨利的故事？
“The Magi.”
“魔法师们。”
Why?
为什么？
Because it has a — which I use for two reasons.
因为它有一个 — ，我使用它有两个原因。
One, I liked it as a child, the irony of the — Della cuts her hair in order to buy Jim a watch chain, and Jim sells his watch in order to give her a hair comb.
第一，我小时候就喜欢它，讽刺的是，黛拉剪掉头发是为了给吉姆买一条表链，而吉姆卖掉手表是为了给她一把梳子。
I like the irony of it.
我喜欢它的讽刺意味。
I did like O.
我确实喜欢O。
Henry a lot, actually, as a kid.
事实上，亨利小时候经常。
Then stumbling across this Joel Waldfogel article and him saying that this is — well, actually, it wasn’t — he didn’t use that as an example; I’m using it as a counterexample to him.
然后偶然发现了这篇 Joel Waldfogel 的文章，他说这是“——”好吧，实际上，不是“——”他没有用它作为例子；他没有用它作为例子。我用它作为他的反例。
But there’s a paper in the AER which is about the deadweight loss of gift-giving at Christmas because I can’t perfectly — even with all these questions, you won’t be able to perfectly anticipate what I want next year for Christmas.
但 AER 上有一篇论文是关于圣诞节送礼的无谓损失，因为我不能完美地 —— 即使有所有这些问题，你也无法完美地预测我明年圣诞节想要什么。
The story is about the primacy of values, right?
这个故事是关于价值观至上的，对吗？
Absolutely.
绝对地。
The fact that they were willing to sacrifice that which was most dear in order for their beloved to get a present at Christmas demonstrated their love for each other more than hanging on to that which they cared most about.
事实上，他们愿意为了心爱的人在圣诞节得到一份礼物而牺牲最珍贵的东西，这一事实表明他们对彼此的爱，而不是紧紧抓住他们最关心的东西。
Alice Munro or Margaret Atwood?
艾丽丝·门罗还是玛格丽特·阿特伍德？
Margaret Atwood.
玛格丽特·阿特伍德。
I’ve read more.
我读过更多。
What’s the best Clash album?
最好的 Clash 专辑是什么？
Fantastic question.
很棒的问题。
London Calling, and one of my best memories — I was very fortunate; they came to Edmonton when I was in 12th grade in high school.
伦敦的召唤，这是我最美好的回忆之一——我非常幸运；当我高中 12 年级时，他们来到了埃德蒙顿。
I went to the concert and that was fantastic, yes.
我去看了音乐会，那真是太棒了，是的。
I also saw them, I think in what would have been 12th grade had I been in school that year.
我也看到了他们，我想如果那一年我在学校的话，那应该是12年级的事了。
But London Calling is too commercial for me.
但伦敦电话对我来说太商业化了。
I much prefer the Green album, like “Career Opportunities,” “Janie Jones.”
我更喜欢 Green 专辑，比如《Career Opportunities》、《Janie Jones》。
Well, “I Fought the Law” was the best song at the concert.
嗯，“I Fought the Law”是音乐会上最好的歌曲。
I have to say, they had got to Combat Rock by this time, which was relative — Combat Rock was more commercial, I thought, than London Calling, although they threw it all out the door with Sandinista!
我不得不说，他们此时已经到了 Combat Rock，这是相对的——我认为 Combat Rock 比 London Calling 更商业化，尽管他们与 Sandinista 一起把这一切都抛在了门外！
Why was there such a big productivity slowdown in the United Kingdom, if indeed you accept that premise?
如果你确实接受这个前提，为什么英国的生产率会出现如此大幅度的下降？
The productivity slowdown, you mean in the last decade?
你指的是过去十年生产力下降？
More than a decade, but again, people dispute exactly the nature of the facts here.
十多年来，人们再次对这里事实的本质提出质疑。
Okay.
好的。
I think there’s a few factors.
我认为有几个因素。
I do think, broad brush — and I’ll give you four explanations.
我确实认为，粗略地说——我会给你四种解释。
First is, a bigger aftermath of the financial crisis than in many jurisdictions, just access to capital and the starving of investment that came from that.
首先，金融危机的后果比许多司法管辖区都严重，只是获得资本和由此产生的投资匮乏。
Relatedly, from a statistical perspective, quite a lot of the productivity — as much as a third of the productivity in the run-up to the crisis — came from financial services, at least as productivity was measured.
与此相关的是，从统计的角度来看，相当多的生产率（多达危机前夕生产率的三分之一）来自金融服务业，至少在衡量生产率时是这样。
Basically, lending, the lending spread — I’m simplifying — counted as productivity.
基本上，贷款、贷款利差 —— 我正在简化 —— 算作生产率。
If you were in a credit boom, you were getting productivity.
如果你处于信贷繁荣时期，你就会提高生产力。
That’s one aspect.
这是一方面。
Second aspect is a managerial explanation that my colleague Andy Haldane did a lot of work on and has written extensively on, which is that there’s a longer tail of — if you look at productivity on a firm basis, the tails have lengthened and fattened.
第二个方面是我的同事安迪·霍尔丹 (Andy Haldane) 做了大量工作并撰写了大量文章的管理解释，即“尾巴更长”——如果你从坚实的基础上审视生产力，就会发现尾巴已经拉长、变肥了。
There’s less of a diffusion of productivity and, obviously, economies of scope and scale that are also concentrated in those larger firms.
生产力的扩散较少，显然，范围经济和规模经济也集中在那些较大的企业中。
Then the third thing — and there’s different views on this; I think the numbers are pretty clear — is from 2016 to 2020, from the Brexit referendum until Brexit, a period of pretty intense uncertainty and basically a flatlining of investment over that period.
那么第三件事 —— 对此有不同的看法；我认为这些数字非常清楚——从 2016 年到 2020 年，从英国脱欧公投到英国脱欧，这是一个充满不确定性的时期，并且在此期间投资基本上持平。
It’s hard to grow productivity as fast if you’re not investing.
如果不投资，就很难快速提高生产力。
On Brexit
关于英国脱欧
Now, you’ve been a well-known critic of Brexit, and I was myself pro-Remain.
现在，您是英国脱欧的著名批评者，而我本人则支持留欧。
But when you watch the handling of the pandemic, especially the vaccines, the EU doing such a bad job on procurement, do you have second thoughts and think, as I do, maybe Brexit wasn’t so terrible after all?
但当你看到疫情尤其是疫苗的处理、欧盟在采购方面做得如此糟糕时，你是否会像我一样重新思考，也许英国脱欧并没有那么糟糕？
Two things.
有两件事。
One, my job, again, was to plan for a difficult outcome, and so, we had to make sure that the financial system was ready in case there was a no-deal Brexit or a very disruptive Brexit.
第一，我的工作就是为艰难的结果做好计划，因此，我们必须确保金融体系做好准备，以防出现无协议脱欧或极具破坏性的脱欧。
In the end, we didn’t have that, but we put the financial system in a position so they could withstand that.
最终，我们没有做到这一点，但我们让金融体系处于能够承受的位置。
A lot of what we said and did was interpreted — as one of my colleagues said, we’ve been called at the Bank of England “merchants of doom,” which he took as a compliment because our job was to plan for that failure.
我们所说和所做的很多事情都被解释了——正如我的一位同事所说，我们在英格兰银行被称为“末日商人”，他认为这是一种恭维，因为我们的工作就是为失败做好计划。
That’s the first thing.
这是第一件事。
We put the system in a stronger position so that the financial system at least could be part of the solution as we came out.
我们将该体系置于更有利的地位，以便金融体系至少可以成为我们提出的解决方案的一部分。
In terms of the pandemic, I think it is clear that the UK had its issues — we’ve all had our issues — but it has handled it better than the EU, and that elements of the EU’s approach have been actively counterproductive.
就疫情而言，我认为很明显英国有自己的问题——“我们都有自己的问题”——但英国处理得比欧盟更好，而欧盟的做法却适得其反。
In that respect, yes, it has been better.
在这方面，是的，它已经更好了。
As you know, the British pound has bounced back entirely.
如您所知，英镑已全面反弹。
There was a plunge right after the referendum, which was truly a surprise to the markets, but now the pound is back.
公投后立即暴跌，这确实让市场感到意外，但现在英镑又回来了。
Doesn’t that mean, in essence, there weren’t really macro costs to Brexit?
这是否意味着，从本质上讲，英国脱欧并没有真正的宏观成本？
It just looked that way for a short while?
看起来只是一小会儿？
Well, I’m not sure.
嗯，我不确定。
If you look at broader asset prices, there has been some recovery in UK equities and other assets, but I would be hard pressed to say that they followed the trajectory that they would have if this hadn’t happened.
如果你看看更广泛的资产价格，英国股市和其他资产已经有所复苏，但我很难说它们遵循了如果这种情况没有发生的话将会出现的轨迹。
That’s not to say that — these are all relative.
这并不是说 — 这些都是相对的。
And so, it matters what the UK does with Brexit, and there’s talk of new trade deals and using more and more of this flexibility that they’ve gained from the consequence.
因此，英国在脱欧问题上的做法很重要，人们正在谈论新的贸易协议，并越来越多地利用他们从脱欧后果中获得的灵活性。
And so, that can lead to growth as well.
因此，这也可以带来增长。
If Scotland and Northern Ireland were to leave the United Kingdom, would that make being the central banker of England alone harder or easier?
如果苏格兰和北爱尔兰离开英国，单独担任英格兰央行行长会变得更困难还是更容易？
It’s not a desirable outcome.
这不是一个理想的结果。
No, I agree it’s bad, but Northern Ireland doesn’t look to me like an optimal currency area with the rest of the UK.
不，我同意这很糟糕，但在我看来，北爱尔兰与英国其他地区相比并不是一个最佳的货币区。
Scotland does.
苏格兰确实如此。
Yes, Scotland is more of an optimal currency area.
是的，苏格兰更像是一个最佳货币区。
And certainly, I think the challenges, which were a little underestimated by some, of Scotland leaving the UK and losing the fiscal stabilizer that came naturally as being part of the United Kingdom, that was underestimated.
当然，我认为一些人有点低估了苏格兰离开英国并失去作为英国一部分而自然产生的财政稳定器所面临的挑战，这些挑战被低估了。
On the margin, would it make it easier?
在边缘，它会让事情变得更容易吗？
Yes, the honest answer, and since this is Marginal Revolution, yes.
是的，诚实的答案，因为这是边际革命，是的。
On the margin, it would be, so yes.
就边际而言，是的，所以是的。
But it would be harder for Scotland, the mix, I think.
但我认为，对于苏格兰这样的混合体来说，情况会更困难。
To be clear, neither of us favor Scotland leaving, but if they did leave, should they choose the British pound, the euro, or a new currency of their own?
需要明确的是，我们都不赞成苏格兰离开，但如果他们确实离开，他们应该选择英镑、欧元还是自己的新货币？
I think the logic of the governing party in Scotland is that they would likely — they’re a little hedged on this, but part of the purpose of leaving — there are other motivations, but a part of the economic purpose would be to be part of the European Union.
我认为苏格兰执政党的逻辑是，他们很可能会“——他们对此有点回避，但离开的部分目的是”——“还有其他动机，但经济目的的一部分是成为欧盟的一部分。
If they were part of the European Union, they would have to at least agree to be on a path to choosing the euro.
如果他们是欧盟的一部分，他们至少必须同意选择欧元。
There’s a challenge of retaining the pound and losing the integration of the financial system.
保留英镑并失去金融体系一体化是一个挑战。
It’s one of the financial risks there.
这是那里的金融风险之一。
The question is, would they have a time path so that they could move directly from sterling to euro?
问题是，他们是否有时间路径可以直接从英镑转向欧元？
It’s a big, big issue, I don’t pretend to have the answer.
这是一个很大很大的问题，我不会假装知道答案。
I would think it would be more likely to choose the euro.
我认为选择欧元的可能性更大。
Certainly, for Northern Island, if it were to leave — and we’re deeply into speculation here — it’s almost certain it would be the Euro.
当然，对于北岛来说，如果它要离开——而且我们对此进行了深入的猜测——几乎可以肯定，它会离开欧元。
Would Scotland have a problem of oversized banks relative to GDP of an independent Scotland, and what should they do about that?
相对于独立苏格兰的国内生产总值而言，苏格兰是否会出现银行规模过大的问题？他们应该采取什么措施？
It is possible to redomicile those banks.
这些银行可以重新注册。
One of the challenges — and the short answer is, it’s an addressable issue, with sufficient time to address it.
挑战之一——简单来说，这是一个可以解决的问题，有足够的时间来解决。
One of the challenges with the last referendum is the timetable.
上次公投的挑战之一是时间表。
Withdrawal was on the order of magnitude of 18 months.
撤资时间约为 18 个月。
That was not sufficient time to do it.
时间不够。
What should Switzerland do about having had banks that are quite large relative to GDP?
对于拥有相对国内生产总值而言相当大的银行的瑞士该怎么办？
They’re not in the EU in the typical way, as you know.
如你所知，他们并不以典型的方式身处欧盟。
No, what Switzerland has done is a couple of things.
不，瑞士所做的有几件事。
One, it’s made those banks less likely to fail by running higher capital requirements and higher liquidity than even the new standards.
第一，它通过比新标准更高的资本要求和更高的流动性来降低这些银行倒闭的可能性。
Secondly, been pretty rigorous — and one of my responsibilities at Bank of England was working with them, because they had big UK operations, in terms of putting in place what are called living wills, so an ability to unwind aspects of those banks if they hit the rocks, separate out the domestic banking assets of those banks so that retail banking continues on, and the hit is seen largely in the wholesale side.
其次，要相当严格——我在英格兰银行的职责之一就是与他们合作，因为他们在英国拥有庞大的业务，即制定所谓的生前遗嘱，因此，如果这些银行遇到困难，有能力解除这些银行的某些方面，分离出这些银行的国内银行资产，以便零售银行业务继续存在，而受到的打击主要体现在批发方面。
As an Irish citizen, what should the Irish government have done in 2008?
作为爱尔兰公民，爱尔兰政府在2008年应该做什么？
Irish austerity is much criticized, but it does seem they ran out of money.
爱尔兰的紧缩政策饱受批评，但他们似乎确实没钱了。
What could they have done better?
他们可以在哪些方面做得更好？
They ran out of money; what could they have done better?
他们没钱了；他们可以在哪些方面做得更好？
I think, broadly, they handled a terrible situation well.
我认为，总的来说，他们很好地处理了可怕的情况。
We worked closely with, funnily enough — well, not funny, but Canada and Ireland are in the same constituency in the IMF, and we worked closely with them during the crisis, including with determining how and when to support their financial institutions.
有趣的是，我们与加拿大和爱尔兰密切合作，但加拿大和爱尔兰在国际货币基金组织中属于同一选区，我们在危机期间与他们密切合作，包括确定如何以及何时支持他们的金融机构。
And how that support ranked in terms of the overall — it sounds like an esoteric point, but it’s an important point in terms of the overall debts of the country — that, in other words, that support was junior as opposed to pari passu and, I think that contributed to their recovery.
以及这种支持在整体方面的排名——这听起来像是一个深奥的问题，但就国家整体债务而言这是一个重要的点——换句话说，这种支持相对于同等地位来说是次要的，我认为这有助于他们的复苏。
Now, as you know, Mario Draghi, who was a central banker — he’s now running Italy for at least some while.
现在，如您所知，马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）曾是一名央行行长，现在至少在一段时间内执掌意大利。
He’s put forward a plan to have a very aggressive fiscal policy, spending about 200 billion dollars, euros, whatever.
他提出了一项非常激进的财政政策计划，支出约 2000 亿美元、欧元等。
From my great distance, it seems to me Italy’s problem is not mainly one of demand.
从我遥远的距离来看，在我看来，意大利的问题主要不在于需求问题。
It’s been running on for 25 years.
它已经运行了 25 年。
It’s a real problem often resulting from local or even municipal rigidities.
这是一个真正的问题，通常是由当地甚至市政的僵化造成的。
If that’s the case, why would spending 200 billion, when debt levels are quite high already, why would that help?
如果是这样的话，在债务水平已经相当高的情况下，为什么还要花2000亿美元，这有什么帮助呢？
What do you think?
你怎么认为？
First thing, obviously, I can’t speak for Prime Minister Draghi , but I get used to saying that.
首先，显然，我不能代表德拉吉总理发言，但我已经习惯了这么说。
I would think that he would agree with much of your premise, and I’ll make the following observations.
我认为他会同意你的大部分前提，我将提出以下意见。
First thing, Italy, the level of GDP is the same as it was in 1999.
首先，意大利的GDP水平与1999年持平。
It’s an absolutely astonishing figure.
这绝对是一个惊人的数字。
We’ve had a COVID shock and everything, but there was just so — and whereas Germany is 25, 27 percent above today, even before they get the COVID recovery.
我们经历了新冠疫情冲击等等，但情况就是如此——而德国的比例比今天高出 25%、27%，甚至在新冠疫情恢复之前也是如此。
That is fundamentally your point.
这从根本上就是你的观点。
It’s a question of supply capacity, ultimately, productivity given weak population growth, where productivity has not gone in Italy.
归根结底，这是一个供应能力的问题，因为人口增长疲弱，而意大利的生产力并没有下降。
Part of that is absolutely the regulatory aspect.
其中一部分绝对是监管方面。
One famous example, a very important example is around bankruptcy laws in Italy.
一个著名的例子，一个非常重要的例子是意大利的破产法。
It just takes a very long time to unwind a business and prosecute bankruptcy.
解散一家企业并申请破产需要很长时间。
Then, of course, you don’t want to lend if it takes a long time to do that or start a business if it does.
当然，如果需要很长时间才能放贷，你就不想放贷；如果需要很长时间，你就不想创业。
There’s a series of those types of reforms that are necessary.
有必要进行一系列此类改革。
That said, most of that 200 billion is around infrastructure, around measures to improve the supply side of the economy.
也就是说，这 2000 亿美元中的大部分都用于基础设施建设，以及改善经济供给侧的措施。
I think the prime minister would absolutely agree we need these other reforms on the regulatory side and the way business operates in Italy, but at the same time, bridges need to be built.
我认为总理绝对同意我们需要在监管方面和意大利的商业运作方式上进行这些其他改革，但与此同时，需要建立桥梁。
There’s a grid that needs to be greened.
有一个网格需要绿化。
There were a series of opportunities — for example, we talked earlier about climate change, and Italy is one of the jurisdictions that has huge opportunities in the hydrogen economy, actually.
有一系列机会 ——例如，我们之前谈到了气候变化，而意大利实际上是在氢经济方面拥有巨大机会的司法管辖区之一。
And there’s ways for them to kick-start that, which would provide an export engine.
他们有办法启动这一进程，从而提供出口引擎。
To return to your new book, Value(s), which was the hardest part of it to write?
回到你的新书《价值》，其中最难写的部分是什么？
The hardest part was going through the history of value theory and trying to condense that and whether I got that right.
最困难的部分是回顾价值理论的历史并试图浓缩它以及我是否做对了。
I mean, you’re condensing the canonists to a couple of paragraphs, the physiocrats, and then trying to draw the distinction — I mean, the distinction between objective value and subjective value, as you know, is straightforward to draw, but to try to give a fair representation of that.
我的意思是，你将正典主义者浓缩为几个段落，即重农主义者，然后试图区分 —— 我的意思是，正如你所知，客观价值和主观价值之间的区别很容易区分，但要尝试给出一个公平的表示。
What was the most surprising thing you learned writing the book that you hadn’t known before you started?
在开始写这本书时，你学到的最令人惊讶的、在你开始之前不知道的事情是什么？
The most surprising thing that came to me as I was writing, but this was also in real time in the world, was this point about moving from a tradeoff approach on a big issue — the flattening of values, is what I talk about, to a hierarchy — just how powerful that can be in terms of market dynamics and investment.
在我写作时，最令我惊讶的事情是，从重大问题上的权衡方法——我所说的价值观扁平化，转向等级制度——这在市场动态和投资方面有多么强大。
Something I believe, but I didn’t think I would necessarily see.
我相信一些东西，但我认为我不一定会看到。
What I’m talking about is that, over the course of the time of writing that book — it started before and it’s really accelerated after — is that the world has been moving more and more towards saying, “Let’s deal with climate change.
我要说的是，在写这本书的过程中——“它从之前就开始了，之后确实加速了”——世界越来越倾向于说：“让我们应对气候变化。
Let’s anchor this on net zero, and then let’s figure out how to get there.” In that process, we talked a lot about the risks around climate change, but one of the core points in the book is that you can flip that risk into value creation if there’s a shared objective, the shared objective around net zero.
让我们将其锚定在净零基础上，然后再弄清楚如何实现这一目标。”在此过程中，我们讨论了很多有关气候变化的风险，但书中的核心观点之一是，如果有一个共同的目标，即净零排放的共同目标，你就可以将风险转化为价值创造。
That’s what we’re seeing today in financial markets and in the real economy.
这就是我们今天在金融市场和实体经济中看到的情况。
It surprised me that I had that thought with me, but I thought I would spend more time in the book about the values that are necessary for markets to function well, as opposed to this other point, which has the bigger real-world impact, which is, if you have a hierarchy of value, if you have a clear objective — and those don’t come along every day, but a clear social objective like sustainability, net zero said another way — just the power of the market that is starting to be unleashed as a consequence.
令我惊讶的是，我有这样的想法，但我想我会花更多的时间在书中讨论市场良好运作所必需的价值观，而不是其他一点，后者对现实世界的影响更大，也就是说，如果你有一个明确的价值层次，如果你有一个明确的目标 ——这些不会每天都出现，但像可持续发展这样明确的社会目标，净零换句话说 —— 只是市场的力量开始发挥作用。结果被释放。
What did you most learn about yourself writing the book?
关于你自己写这本书，你学到最多的是什么？
Sorry to hesitate.
抱歉犹豫了。
I learned that there’s a lot that I didn’t know, number one.
我了解到有很多我不知道的事情，第一。
And in reinforcing that — and it sounds trite, but just reinforcing this point on humility and where that is valuable.
并强调这一点——这听起来很陈词滥调，但只是强调了谦虚这一点及其有价值的地方。
It’s not just about knowing that things can fail, but also recognizing that you need to combine that with ambition in order to move things forward.
这不仅仅是要知道事情可能会失败，还要认识到你需要将其与雄心结合起来才能推动事情向前发展。
Last question.
最后一个问题。
You wake up each morning.
你每天早上醒来。
Surely you still think about central banking.
当然，您仍然会想到中央银行业务。
What for you is the open question about central banking, where you don’t know the answer, that you think about the most?
对您来说，关于央行的开放性问题（您不知道答案）是您最常思考的是什么？
I gave a speech at Jackson Hole on this issue, and I started — which is the future of the international monetary system and how we adjust the international monetary system.
我在杰克逊霍尔就这个问题发表了演讲，我开始了“国际货币体系的未来以及我们如何调整国际货币体系”。
I’ll say parenthetically that we’re potentially headed to another example of where the structure of the system is going to cause big problems for the global economy.
我想说的是，我们可能会看到另一个例子，说明该系统的结构将给全球经济带来重大问题。
Because it’s quite realistic, sadly, that we’re going to have a fairly divergent recovery with a number of emerging, developing economies really lagging because of COVID — not vaccinated, limited policy space, and the knock-on effects, while major advanced economies move forward.
因为可悲的是，现实情况是，我们将出现相当不同的复苏，许多新兴、发展中经济体由于新冠病毒未接种疫苗、有限的政策空间和连锁反应而确实滞后，而主要发达经济体却在前进。
That’s a world where rates rise and the US dollar strengthens and you get this asymmetry, and the challenge of the way our system works bears down on these economies.
在这个世界里，利率上升，美元走强，出现了这种不对称，我们的体系运作方式面临着这些经济体的挑战。
I think about that a lot.
我想了很多。
I gave a speech at Jackson Hole on this, and I started it by saying, Ben Bernanke’s last speech to central bankers — it was in Basel central bank club — he said, “The one thing I can’t figure out” — he didn’t quite put it — he’s a modest person, but he basically said, “is what to do about the international monetary system.
我在杰克逊霍尔就此事发表了演讲，我一开始就说，本·伯南克对中央银行家的最后一次演讲 ——是在巴塞尔中央银行俱乐部 ——他说，“我无法弄清楚的一件事”————他没有完全说清楚——他是一个谦虚的人，但他基本上说，“是如何对待国际货币体系。
It’s a big problem.” Then five years passed, and then I gave this speech and I said, “Well, this is the one thing I can’t figure out.
这是一个大问题。”然后五年过去了，然后我发表了这次演讲，我说：“嗯，这是我无法弄清楚的一件事。
I’m going to describe the problem.
我将描述这个问题。
I’ll give a half-hearted attempt to try to fix it.” I continue to think about how we can adjust that.
我会半心半意地尝试修复它。”我继续思考我们如何调整这一点。
Last point, Tyler, is that I think that there is something in the move to digital, the move towards digital currencies, how that shapes out, that could help with this.
泰勒，最后一点是，我认为向数字化、向数字货币的转变，以及它的形成方式，可能会有所帮助。
It won’t necessarily do so, but it’s in my mind that in past times, when there had been a shift in reserve assets, when there had been a rebalancing, it starts first with means of payment.
不一定会这样做，但在我看来，在过去，当储备资产发生变化时，当发生再平衡时，首先是从支付手段开始。
Dollars started to take over from sterling as means of payment, that helped accelerate a shift, and that’s how we organize the payment system.
美元开始取代英镑作为支付手段，这有助于加速转变，这就是我们组织支付系统的方式。
If we organize it as opposed to we just let it happen organically, there’s a potential for some rebalancing.
如果我们组织它而不是让它自然发生，那么就有可能进行一些重新平衡。
I underscore potential.
我强调潜力。
I’m not as convinced we’ll get it.
我不太相信我们会得到它。
Again, everyone, Mark Carney’s new book is Value(s): Building a Better World for All.
再次，各位，马克·卡尼的新书是《价值：为所有人建设一个更美好的世界》。
Mark Carney, thank you very much.
马克·卡尼，非常感谢你。
Thank you, Tyler.
谢谢你，泰勒。
It’s a great pleasure.
这是一种极大的乐趣。
Photo credit: Toby Madden
照片来源：托比·马登