Liaquat Ahamed on Financial Crises, Gold, and the Lessons of 1873 (Ep. 293)

Hello everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.

大家好，欢迎回到与泰勒对话。

Today I am chatting with Liaquat Ahamed, who is the author of a new and wonderful book, 1873: The Rothschilds, the First Great Depression, and the Making of the Modern World, which I enjoyed very much.

今天我正在与利亚卡特·艾哈迈德聊天，他是一本精彩的新书的作者，《1873：罗斯柴尔德家族、第一次大萧条和现代世界的形成》，我非常喜欢这本书。

Many of you will know him as the author of Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World, from 2009, a book that won the Pulitzer Prize for history and numerous other awards.

你们中的许多人都知道他是 2009 年出版的《金融之王：打破世界的银行家》一书的作者，该书荣获普利策历史奖和众多其他奖项。

Liaquat also has extensive experience in the private sector, dealing with the World Bank and the IMF, and he has headed the World Bank’s investment decisions.

利亚卡特还在私营部门与世界银行和国际货币基金组织打交道方面拥有丰富的经验，并领导了世界银行的投资决策。

He’s also produced a movie about Iraq and done much more as well.

他还制作了一部关于伊拉克的电影，并做了更多的事情。

Liaquat, welcome.

利亚卡特，欢迎。

Thank you, Tyler.

谢谢你，泰勒。

I have a general question about how your work fits together.

我有一个关于你的工作如何配合的一般性问题。

Your book Lords of Finance, it convinced me that financial crises really matter, and your new book, 1873, almost convinced me that financial crises don’t really matter, because the world just keeps on growing.

你的书《金融之王》让我相信金融危机确实很重要，而你的新书《1873》几乎让我相信金融危机并不重要，因为世界只是在不断增长。

What makes the difference for when, historically speaking, crises will really matter?

从历史上看，危机何时真正产生影响，有何不同？

I think the first book, Lords of Finance, was about the financial crisis that really plunged the world into a Great Depression.

我认为第一本书《金融之王》是关于真正使世界陷入大萧条的金融危机的。

The second, 1873, is about a crisis that didn’t actually plunge the world into a terrible great depression, but what it did was cause a sequence of effects throughout the world which damaged the political economy of the world for the next 20 years.

第二次是1873年，它讲述的是一场危机，这场危机实际上并没有让世界陷入可怕的大萧条，但它在全世界范围内造成了一系列影响，损害了未来20年世界的政治经济。

A better title would have been The First Great Deflation.

更好的标题是《第一次大通货紧缩》。

We’re supposed to believe that deflation is bad, nominal wages are sticky.

我们应该相信通货紧缩是不好的，名义工资是粘性的。

This was a pretty slow deflation, but by one measure, the major world economies are growing 2.5 percent over the next 20 years from 1873 onwards.

这是一种相当缓慢的通货紧缩，但按照一项衡量标准，从 1873 年开始的未来 20 年里，世界主要经济体的增长率为 2.5%。

How did we adjust so well to this?

我们如何适应得这么好？

Because prices were flexible.

因为价格是灵活的。

Nominal wages went down.

名义工资下降了。

I think the distributional consequences and the political impact of those distributional consequences were much more damaging than the pure economic consequences.

我认为分配后果以及这些分配后果的政治影响比纯粹的经济后果更具破坏性。

In the 1920s, and a bit afterwards, of course, you could say politics goes crazy in many countries, most of all in Europe.

当然，在 20 年代以及之后不久，你可以说许多国家的政治变得疯狂，尤其是在欧洲。

After 1873, would you say politics went crazy, or it just continued along its 19th-century path?

1873 年之后，你会说政治变得疯狂，还是继续沿着 19 世纪的道路前进？

No, I don’t think it went crazy, but it wasn’t a happy time politically—it’s populism in the United States, the resurgence of protectionism in Europe, the retreat from liberal ideas, the revival of imperialism by Britain when it invaded Egypt.

不，我不认为它变得疯狂，但在政治上这并不是一个快乐的时光——美国的民粹主义、欧洲的保护主义死灰复燃、自由主义思想的倒退、英国入侵埃及时帝国主义的复兴。

Those were not happy things that happened.

那些发生的事情并不令人高兴。

I wouldn’t endorse any of those, but they sound a bit like business as usual for Europe in the 19th century.

我不会赞同其中任何一个，但它们听起来有点像 19 世纪欧洲的一切如常。

England goes many places in that century, often with bad results, but Egypt hardly seems like a major outlier, right?

英格兰在那个世纪去了很多地方，往往都取得了糟糕的结果，但埃及似乎并不是一个主要的异常值，对吧？

There was protectionism throughout.

保护主义贯穿始终。

It was the beginning of the scramble for Africa and gave a second wind to imperialism because you could argue that until then there was actually a retreat away from the growth of imperialism.

这是争夺非洲的开始，给帝国主义带来了第二次喘息，因为你可以说，在那之前，实际上帝国主义的增长已经出现了退却。

Do you view imperialism as a natural expression of liberalism, or as something contrary to its spirit?

您是否认为帝国主义是自由主义的自然表现，还是与其精神相反的东西？

Because the liberals themselves often favored it.

因为自由主义者自己也常常赞成它。

There’s a whole literature called liberal imperialism as a topic.

有一个完整的文献以自由帝国主义为主题。

No, I think it’s definitely contrary to the spirit of liberalism.

不，我认为这绝对违背自由主义精神。

The liberalism of that era, surely it was a doctrine that thought England and some other countries could improve the rest of the world.

那个时代的自由主义，无疑是一种认为英国和其他一些国家可以改善世界其他地区的学说。

They thought of that as quite a liberal idea.

他们认为这是一个相当自由的想法。

Malthus and Mill, of course, worked for the East India Company.

当然，马尔萨斯和米尔都曾在东印度公司工作。

They don’t seem so morally torn over that.

他们似乎并没有因此在道德上陷入困境。

I’m not saying they were correct, but isn’t that in some way a high watermark of liberalism to think you can reengineer the whole world along liberal lines?

我并不是说他们是正确的，但在某种程度上，认为你可以沿着自由主义路线重新设计整个世界，这难道不是自由主义的高标准吗？

Yes, you’re right.

是的，你说得对。

They didn’t think that they were damaging these societies, but I think the long-run consequences weren’t happy.

他们并不认为自己正在破坏这些社会，但我认为长期后果并不令人高兴。

If we look at the somewhat fragmentary data we have, I see that the estimated rate of per capita economic growth for the United States over the period you consider it’s below 2 percent.

如果我们看一下我们掌握的有些零散的数据，我发现在你认为的这段时间内美国的人均经济增长率估计低于 2%。

Some sources would estimate 1.7 percent to 1.8 percent, but this seems to be the time in American life where just everything is starting to change.

一些消息来源估计为 1.7% 至 1.8%，但这似乎是美国人生活中一切都开始改变的时期。

It’s not fully taking off until the 1920s, but fossil fuels are being mobilized.

直到 20 年代它才完全起飞，但化石燃料正在被动员起来。

Some centerpieces of modern society are being laid.

现代社会的一些核心正在被奠定。

Am I right to think below 2 percent is a mistake, and we’re not hedonically measuring the improvements carefully enough, and the real rate of growth was, in fact, considerably higher?

我认为低于 2% 是一个错误，而且我们没有足够仔细地衡量改进情况，而实际增长率实际上要高得多，这样的想法对吗？

God, that’s way outside my expertise.

天哪，这超出了我的专业范围。

Sorry.

对不起。

You’ve read plenty about this period.

你已经读过很多关于这一时期的内容。

You have a sense of life in 1873 and, say, 1896, which is sometimes when the depression or recession is supposed to have ended.

你会感觉到 1873 年和 1896 年的生活，有时大萧条或经济衰退应该已经结束。

Don’t you feel that it’s a bigger difference than just real incomes doubling every 40 years, which is like a 1.8 percent rate of growth would imply?

难道你不觉得这比实际收入每 40 年翻一番（就像 1.8% 的增长率所暗示的那样）有更大的差异吗？

Oh, yes.

哦是的。

No question that it truly transformed the United States.

毫无疑问，它真正改变了美国。

When I talk about the distributional consequences and the political consequences, I think the thing that I focused on was at the beginning of the period, the Republican Party looked as if it was going to dominate American political life for a generation or two.

当我谈论分配后果和政治后果时，我认为我关注的焦点是在这个时期的初期，共和党看起来似乎将主宰美国的政治生活一两代人。

It had the presidency.

它获得了总统职位。

It had both houses of Congress.

它拥有国会两院。

The 1873 depression or crisis and the subsequent monetary policy decisions set that back.

1873 年的萧条或危机以及随后的货币政策决定使这一情况发生了逆转。

As you well know, we built a lot of railroads over the last 30 years of the 19th century.

众所周知，我们在 19 世纪最后 30 年里修建了大量铁路。

There was the boom-bust cycle, but we got the railroads.

虽然经历了繁荣-萧条周期，但我们却拥有了铁路。

We still have them, in fact.

事实上，我们仍然拥有它们。

The people who did all that, who extended the credit, should we just think of them as heroes and not villains?

那些做了这一切的人，那些给予我们荣誉的人，我们是否应该将他们视为英雄而不是恶棍？

They’re the good guys in the story, just like the people today building AI.

他们是故事中的好人，就像今天构建人工智能的人们一样。

Some of them will go broke, whatever.

无论如何，其中一些人会破产。

It’s their money.

这是他们的钱。

They’re building stuff.

他们正在建造东西。

Oh, yes, very much so.

哦，是的，非常如此。

As you said, we had boom-bust cycles.

正如你所说，我们经历了繁荣-萧条周期。

We had three railroad booms and three busts.

我们经历了三次铁路繁荣和三次萧条。

We ended up with a fantastic transportation system that knitted the country together.

我们最终建立了一个将整个国家连接在一起的出色的交通系统。

No question, we should think of them as heroes.

毫无疑问，我们应该将他们视为英雄。

There were a few villains along the way, though.

不过，一路上也遇到了一些坏人。

Sure.

当然。

The institutions of this period, like very loosely regulated credit, if it’s regulated at all, and flexible nominal wages and prices, due in part to less regulation, though there might be other reasons, should we just look back at those and say, “Oh, that’s better than what we have now?” Is that the correct conclusion?

这一时期的制度，比如监管非常宽松的信贷（如果有监管的话），以及灵活的名义工资和价格（部分原因是监管较少，尽管可能还有其他原因），我们是否应该回顾这些并说，“哦，这比我们现在的更好？”这是正确的结论吗？

If you could have a big thing that you’re calling a depression, and we just have a lot of steady growth and lay the ground for some great infrastructure, wasn’t that just a better set of systems to have?

如果你可能会遇到一场你称之为萧条的大事，而我们只是有很多稳定的增长，并为一些伟大的基础设施奠定了基础，那么这难道不是一套更好的系统吗？

Did we have steady growth?

我们有稳定的增长吗？

Half the period from 1873 to 1896 was classified as recessionary.

1873年至1896年的一半时间被归类为经济衰退期。

The growth was very opposite of steady.

增长与稳定截然相反。

It was very unsteady and highly unstable.

它非常不稳定，而且非常不稳定。

The average growth seems quite good, especially if one believes, as you do, that we’re underestimating true growth over that 30-year period.

平均增长率似乎相当不错，尤其是如果有人像您一样相信我们低估了这 30 年期间的真实增长率。

Yes.

是的。

No question.

毫无疑问。

I agree.

我同意。

Those were just great institutions?

这些只是伟大的机构吗？

Why shouldn’t we just like them?

我们为什么不应该喜欢他们呢？

Well, can we restore flexible prices?

那么，我们可以恢复灵活价格吗？

Can we get rid of nominal wage rigidity?

我们能否摆脱名义工资刚性？

I could lessen it.

我可以减少它。

I don’t think our current political system could.

我认为我们目前的政治制度不能。

I know what to do.

我知道该怎么做。

Trade union privileges, minimum wages, a bunch of other things, right?

工会特权、最低工资，还有很多其他的东西，对吧？

Yes.

是的。

That’s good, or that’s bad in your view?

在您看来这是好事还是坏事？

I don’t think it’s politically feasible.

我认为这在政治上不可行。

Neither do I, but I could do it.

我也不会，但我能做到。

Could you?

您可以...吗？

Tell me the story of William Gladstone buying so many Egyptian bonds.

告诉我威廉·格莱斯顿购买这么多埃及债券的故事。

The story is that when Britain invaded Egypt in the 1880s, Gladstone had put 40 percent of his net worth into Egyptian bonds.

故事是这样的：当英国在 1880 年代入侵埃及时，格莱斯顿将其净资产的 40% 投入了埃及债券。

He’d accumulated them over a few years, but he’d progressively put more and more money into Egyptian bonds until, at their peak, they were yielding probably 12 percent to 14 percent.

他花了几年的时间积累了这些资金，但他逐渐将越来越多的资金投入到埃及债券中，直到达到顶峰时，这些债券的收益率可能达到 12% 到 14%。

He thought this was a great buy.

他认为这是一个很好的选择。

It proved to be a fantastic investment because he invaded Egypt.

事实证明这是一项很棒的投资，因为他入侵了埃及。

Britain insisted that the Egyptians pay off their bonds at par.

英国坚持要求埃及按面值偿还债券。

There was very little restructuring.

几乎没有进行重组。

Anyone who invested in Egyptian bonds at that point got 100 cents on the dollar or 90 cents on the dollar.

那时，任何投资埃及债券的人都可以得到 1 美元 100 美分或 90 美分 1 美元。

Could it be Gladstone thought that insisting on full repayment from Egypt was optimal, and he bought the bonds because he knew he would enforce it, but he wasn’t doing it to be corrupt.

难道格莱斯顿认为坚持要求埃及全额偿还是最佳选择，他购买了这些债券，因为他知道他会执行它，但他这样做并不是为了腐败。

He simply was trading on inside information, the way you might find today inside parts of the Trump administration.

他只是利用内幕信息进行交易，就像你今天在特朗普政府内部可能看到的那样。

Yes, probably.

是的，可能是。

I’m sure he thought that it was the moral thing for Egypt to pay its debts in full.

我确信他认为埃及全额偿还债务是道德上的事情。

If he could have insisted that Turkey pay its debts in full, he would have also insisted that Turkey pay its debts in full.

如果他能够坚持要求土耳其全额偿还债务，他也会坚持要求土耳其全额偿还债务。

He just didn’t have the power.

他只是没有权力。

He wasn’t going to invade Turkey.

他不会入侵土耳其。

He needed the Ottoman Empire to remain intact as a bulwark against Russia.

他需要奥斯曼帝国保持完整，作为对抗俄罗斯的堡垒。

Yes, I think you’re right that he didn’t invade Egypt in order to make a lot of money on his bond investments.

是的，我认为你是对的，他入侵埃及并不是为了通过债券投资赚很多钱。

Given how Victorian the Victorians were, are you surprised that the Egyptian bonds were yielding 12 percent to 14 percent?

鉴于维多利亚时代的维多利亚时代，您对埃及债券的收益率为 12% 至 14% 感到惊讶吗？

They don’t seem like that risky an investment if you know Gladstone will back you up and insist on repayment.

如果你知道格莱斯顿会支持你并坚持要求还款，那么他们的投资似乎就不那么冒险了。

I would have bought some.

我本来会买一些。

Maybe you too, right?

也许你也是，对吧？

You’ve managed the portfolio of the World Bank.

您管理过世界银行的投资组合。

Fourteen percent sounds pretty good.

百分之十四听起来不错。

Yes, at a time when 14 percent nominal and goodness knows what real because prices were falling, it was a brilliant investment.

是的，当时名义利率为 14%，天知道实际利率是多少，因为价格正在下跌，这是一项出色的投资。

Now, you’ve done a great deal of reading about this era starting 1873 or even a bit before.

现在，您已经阅读了大量关于这个从 1873 年甚至更早开始的时代的文章。

What has surprised you the most or what views have you revised the most as a result of all that reading?

阅读完所有内容后，最令您惊讶的是什么或者您对哪些观点修改最多？

I think that the downturn, the depression portion, was not that great.

我认为经济衰退、萧条部分并没有那么严重。

Surprisingly, the economic growth was surprisingly resilient.

令人惊讶的是，经济增长的弹性惊人。

That’s not the most important thing.

这还不是最重要的。

The striking thing about this whole period was the fractured political economy.

整个时期最引人注目的是政治经济的支离破碎。

Societies were totally divided in a way that they hadn’t been before.

社会以前所未有的方式完全分裂。

The liberalism, which was at its high noon during the mid-Victorian period, took a big retreat.

维多利亚时代中期的自由主义如日中天，出现了大退却。

It laid the foundations for many of the things that afflicted the global economy in the early part of the 20th century.

它为 20 世纪初困扰全球经济的许多事情奠定了基础。

Who, for you, are the “good guys” of this era?

对你来说，谁是这个时代的“好人”？

I take it not Gladstone, not Joseph Chamberlain?

我认为不是格莱斯顿，不是约瑟夫·张伯伦？

Actually, I’m going to disagree that not Gladstone.

事实上，我不同意这一点，而不是格莱斯顿。

I think he wasn’t a bad guy.

我认为他不是一个坏人。

The biggest villain in my whole book is Bismarck.

我整本书中最大的反派是俾斯麦。

In an attempt to bring France to its knees, he not only imposed this giant reparation bill on France, which then disrupted the financial markets in Europe; he also destroyed what was actually a very stable monetary system, which is bimetallism.

为了让法国屈服，他不仅向法国征收了巨额赔款，扰乱了欧洲金融市场，而且还向法国征收了巨额赔款。他还摧毁了实际上非常稳定的货币体系，即复本位制。

I’ve never quite understood why he decided to hit France while it’s down.

我一直不太明白为什么他决定在法国低迷时袭击法国。

Is bimetallism stable?

双本位制稳定吗？

Doesn’t it tend to collapse into monometallism?

难道它不会陷入单一本位制吗？

Because over time, it may be corrected first, but the actual market values will diverge from the pegged price, and you end up with one currency or the other, which is okay from my point of view.

因为随着时间的推移，它可能会首先被修正，但实际市场价值将与挂钩价格背离，你最终会得到一种货币或另一种货币，从我的角度来看，这是可以的。

It’s not really bimetallism in an active sense anymore.

它不再是真正意义上的复本位制了。

Not if you have a stabilizing central bank.

如果你有一个稳定的央行，那就不会了。

France had successfully stabilized gold and silver prices throughout the 19th century, even after you’d had massive expansions in gold supply.

法国在整个 19 世纪成功稳定了黄金和白银的价格，即使在黄金供应大幅扩张之后也是如此。

There’s an argument that they could have done it even with the massive expansions in silver supply.

有人认为，即使白银供应大幅增加，他们也能做到这一点。

You’re right.

你说得对。

If there’s giant increases in the supply of one metal versus another, that will cause bimetallism to collapse, but there’s no evidence that they couldn’t have stabilized gold and silver prices.

如果一种金属的供应量相对于另一种金属大幅增加，这将导致复本位制崩溃，但没有证据表明它们无法稳定黄金和白银的价格。

Most currency pegs don’t last for that long.

大多数货币挂钩都不会持续那么久。

There’s plenty of 20th-century evidence for that.

20世纪有大量证据证明这一点。

You might get lucky they last a while, but eventually the central bank runs out of reserves, runs out of credibility.

你可能会很幸运，它们会持续一段时间，但最终央行会耗尽准备金，失去信誉。

You’re right, eventually.

最终你是对的。

After the massive expansion of gold supplies, the bulk, the fronts, and if you’d had other central banks doing the same thing, the central banks collectively, I think, could have stabilized gold and silver prices.

在黄金供应大规模扩张之后，如果其他央行也做同样的事情，我认为，央行集体可以稳定黄金和白银的价格。

They would have probably stabilized gold and silver prices through the big increase in the silver supply of the 1880s and 1890s.

他们可能会通过 1880 年代和 1890 年代白银供应的大幅增加来稳定黄金和白银的价格。

They could have then shifted their holdings into gold.

然后他们可以将持有的资产转为黄金。

I think they could have kept the bimetallic system going for a lot longer than they did.

我认为他们本可以让双金属系统运行的时间比原来长得多。

Is it correct for me to think that the South African gold discoveries, in effect, ended the impetus for bimetallism?

我认为南非黄金的发现实际上结束了复本位制的动力，这样的想法正确吗？

Yes.

是的。

How significant were they?

它们有多重要？

They essentially bailed out the gold standard.

他们基本上拯救了金本位制。

Until then, during the gold drought of the 1870s and 1880s, it looked as if the gold standard was becoming a sort of ever-tightening vice on the global money supply.

在那之前，在 1870 年代和 1880 年代的黄金荒期间，金本位似乎正在成为全球货币供应的一种日益紧缩的恶习。

I think another decade of declining prices you could have seen the US abandon the gold standard and move to silver.

我认为如果价格再下跌十年，美国可能会放弃金本位并转向白银。

I think the South African gold discoveries essentially saved the gold standard.

我认为南非黄金的发现基本上拯救了金本位。

What do you think of symmetallism as an option?

您如何看待对称金属论作为一种选择？

You have two monies, gold and silver, but you don’t peg them.

你有两种货币，黄金和白银，但你不将它们挂钩。

You just let the prices float.

你只需让价格浮动即可。

You deal with the inconvenience of having two monies.

你要应对拥有两块钱的不便。

Some medieval systems approximated this.

一些中世纪的系统近似于此。

Could that have worked for the late 19th century?

这在 19 世纪末有效吗？

God, you know, I’ve never thought of it.

天哪，你知道，我从来没有想过。

I think that if the goal is to stabilize prices, the average price level, I think a group of central banks stabilizing and holding reserves in both metals would have been optimal.

我认为，如果目标是稳定价格、平均价格水平，我认为一组央行稳定并持有这两种金属的储备将是最佳选择。

The countries that were on silver flat out—Netherlands, Mexico, Austria—how did they do?

荷兰、墨西哥、奥地利等白银国家的表现如何？

How was just having a silver standard?

刚刚拥有银本位怎么样？

They devalued.

他们贬值了。

Essentially, India, China, everyone devalued against the gold standard currencies.

本质上，印度、中国，每个人都对金本位货币贬值。

They didn’t face deflation.

他们没有面临通货紧缩。

There was no deflation in India.

印度没有出现通货紧缩。

There was no deflation in China, but it meant their currencies were going down.

中国没有出现通货紧缩，但这意味着他们的货币正在贬值。

It would have been hard to think of their currencies as reserve asset currencies.

很难将它们的货币视为储备资产货币。

If the US had become a silver currency, I think it would have delayed the development of the US as a major financial market.

如果美国成为白银货币，我认为这会推迟美国作为主要金融市场的发展。

Say Mexico was not going to have a reserve currency, anyway, the Netherlands, from the vantage point of the 1930s or even ’20s, the silver standard back then sounds pretty good.

说墨西哥不会有储备货币，反正荷兰，从1930年代甚至20年代的角度来看，当时的银本位听起来还不错。

Oh, devalue, get rid of the deflationary pressure.

噢，贬值，摆脱通缩压力。

I totally agree.

我完全同意。

Why did we just push out silver as a money altogether?

为什么我们完全取消白银作为货币的地位？

Do you blame Britain for that, or who’s the villain there?

你会为此责怪英国吗？或者谁是罪魁祸首？

Is that Bismarck again?

又是俾斯麦吗？

Yes, totally Bismarck.

是的，完全是俾斯麦。

Why did he do that?

他为什么这么做？

I’ve never quite understood it.

我一直不太明白。

The Germans claimed that they wanted to emulate Britain, and Britain was on the gold standard.

德国人声称他们想效仿英国，而英国实行的是金本位制。

Because you can have a bimetallic global system with individual currencies, individual countries being either on gold or silver.

因为你可以拥有一个包含各种货币的双本位全球体系，各个国家要么使用黄金，要么使用白银。

That was the situation during, let’s say, 1820 to 1870.

比方说，这就是 1820 年至 1870 年期间的情况。

You just need some key countries and key central banks to stabilize the gold and silver price.

你只需要一些主要国家和主要央行来稳定金银价格。

Bismarck’s a bad guy, Gladstone’s okay.

俾斯麦是个坏人，格莱斯顿还好。

Who then are the real good guys for you?

那么谁才是对你来说真正的好人呢？

The ones you sit down with, have a beer, and say, “Hey, I’m on your side, let’s plot something.”

那些和你坐下来喝啤酒的人说：“嘿，我站在你这边，我们来策划一些事情吧。”

I don’t think of this system, or I certainly don’t think of the 19th century as divided between good guys and bad guys.

我不认为这个体系，或者说我当然不认为 19 世纪有好人与坏人之分。

Essentially, all of the people in charge had no clue how the system worked.

本质上，所有负责人都不知道系统是如何运作的。

I can think of good guys and bad guys in the 1920s and ’30s, but I’m not sure that I would think of the 1870s to 1890s as divided between good guys and bad guys.

我可以想到 1920 年代和 30 年代的好人和坏人，但我不确定我是否会认为 1870 年代到 1890 年代分为好人和坏人。

At least post-1815, the 19th century seems like it was, by far, and I do mean by far, the most successful human era ever.

至少在 1815 年之后，19 世纪似乎是迄今为止（我的意思是迄今为止）人类有史以来最成功的时代。

It’s weird not to have good guys, I think.

我认为没有好人是很奇怪的。

Right.

正确的。

I have some questions about the 1920s, which, of course, you’re also an expert on.

我有一些关于 20 年代的问题，当然，你也是这方面的专家。

If you had to steelman the British decision to re-peg the pound at its previous parity—that’s what, 1926 they did that?

如果你不得不阻止英国决定将英镑重新与之前的平价挂钩——那就是，1926 年他们就这么做了？

Yes.

是的。

How would you steelman that decision?

钢铁侠你会如何决定？

Is it defensible at all?

它完全可以辩护吗？

Is it defensible?

它可以辩护吗？

Because Germany chooses a lower valuation, and they end up in a lot of currency trouble.

因为德国选择了较低的估值，他们最终陷入了很多货币问题。

They end up with a hyperinflation.

他们最终会陷入恶性通货膨胀。

The record of fiat currency up to that time was not very good.

到那时为止，法定货币的记录并不是很好。

Although we know it’s wrong, was it defensible in some way?

尽管我们知道这是错误的，但它在某种程度上是可以辩护的吗？

It was defensible.

这是有道理的。

I think the problem was could they have fixed it at a lower price or a higher price for gold?

我认为问题是他们能否将黄金价格固定在较低或较高的价格？

Could they have gone back and said, “Look, all prices have gone up by 50 percent because of the First World War?

他们是否可以回过头来说：“看，由于第一次世界大战，所有价格都上涨了 50%？

We need to revalue gold by 50 percent, all collectively, or change the price of gold.” I think that would have been a much better decision because that would have, with the stroke of a pen, increased the availability of global reserves and eliminated many of the constraints of the 1920s.

我们需要将黄金整体重估 50%，或者改变黄金的价格。”我认为这会是一个更好的决定，因为大笔一挥，就会增加全球储备的可用性，并消除 20 年代的许多限制。

If Britain had just gone off gold altogether, and said it’s a fiat currency world from here on out, would that have worked or would that have been a global financial crisis?

如果英国完全放弃黄金，并表示从现在开始这是一个法定货币世界，这会奏效还是会引发全球金融危机？

Oh, I think it would have been a global financial crisis.

哦，我认为这将是一场全球金融危机。

I think the fear was that ultimately—and the example of Germany and France in the immediate post-war period, with no link to gold—investor confidence would not have allowed Britain to do that.

我认为人们担心的是，最终——以战后时期德国和法国为例，与黄金无关——投资者的信心不会允许英国这样做。

What do you think is the time in world history where a true fiat currency order actually becomes feasible?

您认为世界历史上什么时候真正的法定货币秩序变得可行？

Is it as late as 1971?

晚到1971年了吗？

That sounds so strange to me.

这对我来说听起来很奇怪。

I somehow intuitively have the sense, like in 1890, someone like Sweden could have just done it.

我凭直觉感觉到，就像在 1890 年，像瑞典这样的国家就可以做到。

It would have been fine.

本来就好。

Is that wrong?

这是错误的吗？

I don’t know enough about Sweden.

我对瑞典了解不够。

But some smaller country.

但一些较小的国家。

Yes.

是的。

As long as you had credibility, as long as there was a belief that you would not allow the currency to collapse, people could do it.

只要你有信誉，只要有信念你不会让货币崩溃，人们就可以做到。

Could we have had a global fiat currency system?

我们可以拥有一个全球法定货币体系吗？

I think we did after ’45.

我想我们是在 45 年后做到的。

There’s still a tie to gold through the dollar.

美元仍然与黄金存在联系。

Keynes made sure there was.

凯恩斯确保了这一点。

It was weird.

很奇怪。

It was both.

两者都是。

It was not really a tie to gold.

这并不是真正与黄金挂钩的。

Witness what happened when they broke the link with gold in ’71.

看看 71 年他们打破与黄金的联系时发生的事情吧。

At least for a few decades, there’s a sense if the US inflates too much to just turn seigniorage against the world, that the French or someone else will convert into gold.

至少在几十年内，人们有一种感觉，如果美国通货膨胀率过高，以至于仅用铸币税来对抗世界，那么法国人或其他国家就会将其兑换成黄金。

That did constrain us somewhat, right?

这确实在一定程度上限制了我们，对吧？

Weren’t the ’50s and ’60s, pretty good, macroeconomically speaking?

从宏观经济角度来说，50 年代和 60 年代不是相当不错吗？

Yes.

是的。

Did it actually constrain us?

它真的限制了我们吗？

I don’t think so.

我不这么认为。

Until Nixon, it constrained us, I think.

我认为，在尼克松之前，它限制了我们。

Now, the German money printing of the ’20s, why does that get so out of hand?

现在，德国二十世纪二十年代的印钞行为为何变得如此失控？

Germans, of course, were pretty smart back then.

当然，当时的德国人非常聪明。

It’s not seigniorage maximizing to hyperinflate to the point where people push money around in wheelbarrows.

恶性通货膨胀并不是铸币税最大化，以至于人们用手推车推着钱到处走。

Why didn’t they just inflate at 40 percent or 60 percent and try to get through at that level?

为什么他们不直接通胀 40% 或 60%，并尝试在这个水平上度过难关？

Why did it go so crazy?

为什么它变得如此疯狂？

I don’t know.

我不知道。

It happened over a very short period of time.

它发生在很短的时间内。

That’s the first thing, so they lost control.

这是第一件事，所以他们失去了控制。

Secondly, were they deliberately doing it to convince the world that they couldn’t pay reparations or to convince their creditors that they couldn’t pay reparations?

其次，他们是否故意这样做是为了让全世界相信他们无法支付赔偿，或者让债权人相信他们无法支付赔偿？

I totally agree with you.

我完全同意你的观点。

I think there was, under any sort of revenue-maximizing strategy, it didn’t make sense.

我认为，在任何一种收入最大化策略下，这都是没有意义的。

Yes, I don’t know.

是的，我不知道。

The only plausible explanation is that they said, look, the only way that we will get out of paying reparations is if they realize that it’ll destroy our financial system, which they did.

唯一合理的解释是，他们说，看，我们摆脱赔偿的唯一方法是，如果他们意识到这会摧毁我们的金融体系，他们确实做到了。

I had Katja Hoyer, the historian, on the show a while back.

不久前，历史学家卡佳·霍耶 (Katja Hoyer) 参加了我的节目。

She postulated that Gustav Stresemann was a kind of hero of the ’20s.

她认为古斯塔夫·施特雷泽曼 (Gustav Stresemann) 是 20 年代的英雄。

His death was a great tragedy.

他的死是一场巨大的悲剧。

He’s underrated.

他被低估了。

Do you agree with that assessment?

你同意这个评价吗？

Yes, yes.

是的，是的。

I think it was under him that we got the appointment of Schacht as the governor of the central bank.

我认为正是在他的领导下，我们才任命沙赫特为央行行长。

He’s the one who stabilized the currency, so yes.

他是稳定货币的人，所以是的。

What’s your view on Schacht?

您对沙赫特有何看法？

Why did he turn bad?

他为什么变坏了？

It seemed he was so reasonable, so smart.

看起来他是那么的理智，那么的聪明。

Do you think he was always bad, or he was an opportunist, or he was pressured, or he thought he could still do best that way?

你认为他总是很糟糕，或者他是一个机会主义者，或者他受到压力，或者他认为这样他仍然可以做得最好？

I think he was an opportunist.

我认为他是一个机会主义者。

He presided over the German economic miracle of the ’20s by stabilizing the currency, was never able to get reparations down to a reasonable level, but presided over a Germany that got them down at reasonable levels.

他通过稳定货币创造了二十世纪二十年代的德国经济奇迹，从未能够将赔款降到合理水平，但他领导的德国却将赔款降到了合理水平。

Borrowed heavily from the US and had an economic boom of the late ’20s.

从美国大量借贷，并在 20 年代末实现了经济繁荣。

He always thought that the Allied powers should have done a better job about reducing reparations, and he was quite bitter about that.

他一直认为盟军应该在减少赔款方面做得更好，对此他感到非常痛苦。

What was Montagu Norman’s weirdest belief?

蒙塔古·诺曼最奇怪的信念是什么？

I think he claimed that people could walk through walls.

我认为他声称人们可以穿过墙壁。

He had some very weird spiritualist beliefs.

他有一些非常奇怪的唯灵论信仰。

He was a theosophist, right?

他是神智学家，对吗？

Is that where it comes from?

它是从那里来的吗？

I’m not sure.

我不知道。

Yes.

是的。

I think he was part of that generation of the 1920s where they dabbled in all sorts of esoteric spiritual practices.

我认为他属于 20 年代那一代人，他们涉足各种深奥的精神实践。

As you know, the 1920s, they’re a very rich time culturally for much of Europe.

如您所知，20 年代对于欧洲大部分地区来说是一个文化非常丰富的时期。

What is it from that period, from culture, that you feel closest to?

那个时期、那个文化中，你觉得最亲近的是什么？

Oh, fascinating question.

哦，有趣的问题。

I suppose I’m not a great modernist in terms of literature, so I couldn’t say that I love the modernist novels.

我想我在文学方面不是一个伟大的现代主义者，所以我不能说我喜欢现代主义小说。

I’m not sure the answer to that.

我不确定答案。

I’ve never really thought about it.

我从来没有真正想过这个问题。

I actually prefer the American novels of the 1920s.

其实我更喜欢20年代的美国小说。

Like?

喜欢？

Fitzgerald, Hemingway, those, rather than Joyce and Ulysses.

菲茨杰拉德、海明威这些人，而不是乔伊斯和尤利西斯。

Why do you think it’s seen as such a creative period?

您认为为什么现在被视为一个充满创造力的时期？

Because we’d eliminated the sort of constraints, the Victorian constraints.

因为我们已经消除了维多利亚时代的限制。

And yet there was a much more sort of a shared belief in what was great art, great literature.

然而，对于什么是伟大的艺术、伟大的文学，人们有着更多的共同信念。

I know literature better than I know art.

我对文学的了解胜过对艺术的了解。

We’d eliminated constraints, and yet there was a sort of shared culture about what made for great writing.

我们消除了限制，但对于如何创造伟大的写作却存在着某种共同的文化。

Now, there’s a third book you wrote, which is much less well known, and much of it deals with your experiences at the IMF.

现在，您写了第三本书，但不太为人所知，其中大部分内容涉及您在国际货币基金组织的经历。

It’s a shorter book.

这是一本较短的书。

It’s quite vertical.

这是相当垂直的。

I have a few questions from that book.

我有几个关于那本书的问题。

Here’s a very simple and stupid question.

这是一个非常简单且愚蠢的问题。

Given the price of homes in Ireland today and the fact that it’s so hard to get anything built, before 2008, did Ireland actually have a housing bubble, or were those the correct prices?

考虑到如今爱尔兰的房价以及建造任何东西都非常困难的事实，在 2008 年之前，爱尔兰是否真的存在房地产泡沫，或者这些价格是正确的吗？

God, you’re taking me back.

天哪，你要把我带回来。

You worked on this, right?

你致力于这个，对吗？

I did, although I was not a staff member of the IMF.

我做到了，尽管我不是国际货币基金组织的工作人员。

This book came out of a strange idea that you could write about institutions by embedding yourself in for a few weeks and essentially try and describe what these institutions did from a journalistic point of view.

这本书源于一个奇怪的想法，即你可以通过几周的时间来写有关机构的文章，并从本质上尝试从新闻的角度描述这些机构的所作所为。

When I started the book, my approach was, let’s suppose you are someone whose son has just got a job at the IMF.

当我开始写这本书时，我的方法是，假设你的儿子刚刚在国际货币基金组织找到工作。

You ask your son, what does the IMF do?

你问你的儿子，国际货币基金组织是做什么的？

This book was designed to provide an answer to that.

本书旨在提供这个问题的答案。

That was the origin of the book.

这就是这本书的由来。

It didn’t do well.

效果并不好。

It turns out I’m not a very good journalist.

事实证明我不是一个很好的记者。

It’s a good book.

这是一本好书。

I like it.

我喜欢它。

Okay, great.

好的，太好了。

Then turning back to Ireland, I don’t think you can judge a mania purely by the level.

然后回到爱尔兰，我认为不能纯粹通过程度来判断狂热。

I think you can judge a mania by the rate of change as well.

我认为你也可以通过变化的速度来判断狂热。

Prices were going up at an unsustainable rate, people were buying three, four, five houses.

价格以不可持续的速度上涨，人们购买三、四、五栋房子。

That’s, to me, the sign of an unstable economic situation.

对我来说，这是经济形势不稳定的迹象。

We got that in the US.

我们在美国得到了这个。

We got that in Spain.

我们在西班牙得到了这个。

We got that in many places in the world.

我们在世界许多地方都得到了这一点。

A bubble has both to do with the level, but also the rate of change.

泡沫既与水平有关，也与变化率有关。

Isn’t this a bit like the railroads?

这不是有点像铁路吗？

A lot of the railroad companies went under.

许多铁路公司倒闭了。

We got the railroads built.

我们修建了铁路。

Ireland needed to build a lot of homes.

爱尔兰需要建造很多房屋。

They actually didn’t build enough.

他们实际上建造得还不够。

People should have been buying 10, 15 homes, not just six or seven.

人们应该购买 10 套、15 套房屋，而不仅仅是 6 套或 7 套。

They didn’t have a big enough bubble, ex post.

事后他们没有足够大的泡沫。

They should have been building homes.

他们应该一直在建造房屋。

I’m not sure they should have been trading on existing homes, but maybe one couldn’t happen without the other.

我不确定他们是否应该对现有房屋进行交易，但也许两者缺一不可。

Now, as you probably know, Pakistan has been through what, it’s either 23, 24 IMF bailouts.

现在，正如您可能知道的那样，巴基斯坦已经经历了 23 次、24 次国际货币基金组织的救助。

There’s something wrong there, right?

那里有问题，对吗？

Okay, it’s a poorly run country, but there’s a lot of poorly run countries that don’t go through so many IMF bailouts.

好吧，这是一个管理不善的国家，但有很多管理不善的国家没有经历过如此多的国际货币基金组织的救助。

If we make you dictator of the IMF, what would you do differently?

如果我们让你成为国际货币基金组织的独裁者，你会采取什么不同的做法？

I would not respond to pressure from the US to put money into unsustainable countries.

我不会回应美国向不可持续国家投入资金的压力。

It’s happened time and time again.

这种事已经发生了一次又一次。

The US has used the IMF as a vehicle for foreign policy objectives which essentially distort the IMF’s very reasonable economic practices.

美国利用国际货币基金组织作为实现外交政策目标的工具，这实质上扭曲了国际货币基金组织非常合理的经济实践。

The eurozone crisis, what should we have done differently?

欧元区危机，我们应该采取哪些不同的做法？

The optimal thing when people borrow too much is to find a way to restructure their debts.

当人们借贷过多时，最好的办法就是找到重组债务的方法。

Now, I don’t remember all of the details, but it seems to me that that should have happened.

现在，我不记得所有的细节，但在我看来，这应该发生。

I don’t remember quite how that eventually happened, but that, it seems to me, is the flaw in the eurozone crisis.

我不太记得这最终是如何发生的，但在我看来，这就是欧元区危机的缺陷。

That was the flaw in the US housing bubble problem.

这就是美国房地产泡沫问题的缺陷。

That whole era was we had too much debt by people who couldn’t pay it back.

整个时代我们欠下了太多无力偿还的债务。

We should have found a better way to have restructured those debts.

我们应该找到更好的方法来重组这些债务。

Was the problem that Europe had no distributional mechanism for allocating the costs of that restructuring?

问题是欧洲没有分配重组成本的分配机制吗？

Say they had been more liberal with Greece, treated it as Gladstone had treated Turkey, but then which country exactly picks up which part of that bill?

假设他们对希腊更加自由，像格莱斯顿对待土耳其一样对待它，但是哪个国家到底接受了该法案的哪一部分呢？

Is that the thing that hadn’t been solved, or something else went wrong?

是事情没有解决，还是有其他问题？

No, I think that was essentially the problem.

不，我认为这本质上是问题所在。

What you need is a sort of, I don’t know, a hegemon, Germany, taking charge and deciding how that should have happened.

你需要的是一个，我不知道，一个霸主，德国，负责并决定这应该如何发生。

Germany was too reluctant because Germany was Germany?

德国太不情愿了，因为德国就是德国？

Yes.

是的。

Why does the United Kingdom now seem economically and politically to be so stuck?

为什么英国现在在经济和政治上似乎陷入困境？

They have a system of government that, at least on paper, allows for a lot of decisive change, and yet they cycle through prime ministers and nothing gets better, and they haven’t had much real wage or productivity growth since 2008.

他们的政府体系至少在纸面上允许进行许多决定性的变革，但他们更换总理却没有任何改善，而且自 2008 年以来，他们的实际工资或生产率没有太大增长。

What’s gone wrong?

出了什么问题？

God, I wish I knew.

天哪，我希望我知道。

I totally subscribe to the view that things have gone wrong.

我完全同意事情出了问题的观点。

I really don’t know because there are so many impressive things about the UK.

我真的不知道，因为英国有太多令人印象深刻的事情。

One of the striking things is how many inventors of AI were British.

引人注目的事情之一是有多少人工智能发明者是英国人。

An educational system that can throw up that many innovative thinkers and yet not be able to capitalize on it, there’s something wrong there.

一个教育体系可以培养出如此多的创新思想家，但却无法充分利用它们，这肯定是出了问题。

What’s a part of the world you’re especially optimistic about right now?

您现在对世界的哪个部分特别乐观？

Oh, I’m generally optimistic about most of the world.

哦，我对世界上大部分地区总体上持乐观态度。

I’m not very optimistic about India because of the environmental damage and because of the water problems and the inability of the authorities to deal with that.

我对印度不太乐观，因为环境破坏、水问题以及当局处理这些问题的无能。

I’m optimistic about the US just because I think we will see ourselves through this downturn in our political fortunes and the inherent innovation that is coming out of the United States will see us through.

我对美国持乐观态度，因为我认为我们将度过这次政治命运的低迷，而美国固有的创新将帮助我们渡过难关。

You’re a workaholic, right?

你是个工作狂，对吧？

No, I’m not.

不，我不是。

You’ve been very successful in the private sector.

您在私营部门非常成功。

You’ve produced a movie.

你制作了一部电影。

You’ve written two extremely notable books.

您写了两本非常著名的书。

You’re well known world over.

你在世界各地都很有名。

You have the Pulitzer Prize, and you’re talking to me about work-leisure balance?

你获得了普利策奖，还跟我谈论工作与休闲的平衡？

Well, it’s just I don’t like golf.

好吧，只是我不喜欢高尔夫。

What is it you see yourself as maximizing?

你认为自己最大化的是什么？

You left Harvard.

你离开了哈佛。

You didn’t finish a PhD, which I can very well understand, but later in life, you come back, you write these two books when you’re not needing them for the income.

你没有完成博士学位，我非常理解，但在以后的生活中，你回来了，当你不需要这两本书来获得收入时，你写了这两本书。

What are you pursuing?

你在追求什么？

An interesting life.

有趣的生活。

What makes what you do interesting?

是什么让你所做的事情变得有趣？

I don’t know.

我不知道。

Intellectual stimulation.

智力刺激。

I’m not a great athlete, but ideas stimulate me.

我不是一名出色的运动员，但想法会激励我。

When you want to find out about something, writing a book about it is a remarkably good way of learning it.

当你想了解某件事时，写一本关于它的书是一种非常好的学习方式。

That’s what I’m trying to maximize to stave off dementia.

这就是我试图最大限度地避免痴呆症的方法。

David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest.

大卫·哈尔伯斯坦的《最好的和最聪明的》。

Why do you find that book so notable?

为什么你觉得那本书如此引人注目？

Oh, it was probably the first book I read when I came to the United States in ’74.

哦，这可能是我74年来到美国读的第一本书。

I find it’s just remarkable how it opened up the US political system.

我发现它对美国政治体系的开放是非常了不起的。

I learned so much about how the United States worked just by reading that book.

通过阅读那本书，我对美国的运作方式了解了很多。

GPT said about you, “Think tanks are your hobby.” What might it have meant by that?

GPT 谈到你时说：“智囊团是你的爱好。”这可能意味着什么？

Oh, for a while, I used to kid around that when I retired from the investment business, and I was writing Lords of Finance, I joined the boards of several think tanks.

哦，有一段时间，我曾经开玩笑说，当我从投资行业退休时，当我在写《金融之王》时，我加入了几个智囊团的董事会。

I found it quite fascinating because these are organizations that didn’t seem to have the dysfunction of universities where people were paid and got a stipend to be able to come up with good ideas.

我发现这非常有趣，因为这些组织似乎没有大学那样的功能障碍，在大学里，人们获得报酬并获得津贴，以便能够想出好主意。

Being on the board of them exposed you to some wonderful thinkers.

作为他们的董事会成员，你可以接触到一些出色的思想家。

I suppose I became disillusioned after a point.

我想我在某一点之后就变得幻灭了。

In part because these were almost all policy ideas, and policy seemed to have nothing to do with good ideas.

部分原因是这些几乎都是政策想法，而政策似乎与好想法无关。

I suppose 2016 was the turning point in my mind.

我想2016年是我心目中的转折点。

That since then, for the last 10 years, so little policy is driven by great ideas.

从那时起，在过去的十年里，很少有政策是由伟大的想法驱动的。

If old-style think tanks are somewhat obsolete, what should we replace them with?

如果旧式智库已经有些过时了，我们该用什么来替代呢？

God, I don’t know.

天哪，我不知道。

I wish I knew.

我希望我知道。

It’s maybe a model which was less top-down driven.

这可能是一个不太自上而下驱动的模型。

A model that essentially was more allowing a thousand flowers to bloom and create institutions where you allow people, you get great writers and thinkers to write about subjects they’re interested in, and then see what rises to the surface.

这种模式本质上是让一千朵花绽放并创建机构，让人们、伟大的作家和思想家撰写他们感兴趣的主题，然后看看浮出水面的内容。

You produced a movie called The Situation, and it’s set in Iraq.

你们制作了一部名为《局势》的电影，以伊拉克为背景。

Why did you do that?

你为什么这么做？

This gets back to what do you optimize.

这又回到了你优化什么的问题。

No, I had a friend who was a director.

不，我有一个朋友是导演。

We were talking about the situation in Iraq.

我们正在谈论伊拉克局势。

It was more and more depressing.

心里越来越郁闷了。

This was in 2003, 2004, after we’d invaded.

那是2003年、2004年，我们入侵之后。

We’d met a journalist who’d been stationed there.

我们遇到了一位驻扎在那里的记者。

We approached her about writing the script.

我们就写剧本的事宜与她接洽。

It was a fun project.

这是一个有趣的项目。

It was a total failure financially, so I would not do it again, but it was a fascinating project.

这在经济上完全失败了，所以我不会再做一次，但这是一个令人着迷的项目。

Do you follow how Iraq is doing these days?

您关注伊拉克最近的情况吗？

A little bit.

一点点。

I’ve got a couple of Iraqi friends.

我有几个伊拉克朋友。

Yes, yes, a little bit.

是的，是的，有一点。

Now, I know you’re listed as non-practicing, but I’m quite curious about Ismaili Muslims and why they seem to be so much more pro-progress, on average, than other parts of the Muslim world.

现在，我知道你被列为非实践者，但我对伊斯玛仪派穆斯林很好奇，以及为什么他们似乎比穆斯林世界的其他地区平均而言更加支持进步。

Do you have a view on this?

您对此有何看法？

Yes, very much so, because of our leadership.

是的，非常重要，因为我们的领导力。

We Ismailis believe in the leadership of a man, the Aga Khan.

我们伊斯玛仪派相信阿迦汗这个人的领导。

We believe he’s the direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, and he sets the agenda for the whole community.

我们相信他是先知穆罕默德的直系后裔，他为整个社区制定了议程。

Many, in the old days, people believed he was divine or he had divine spirit.

很多人，在过去，人们相信他是神，或者他有神灵。

I don’t think many people believe that anymore, but he’s invested with so much moral authority that if he says, move to Africa, big chunks of the community will do that.

我认为很多人不再相信这一点，但他被赋予了如此多的道德权威，如果他说，搬到非洲，社区中的大部分人都会这么做。

He has charted an incredibly enlightened direction for the community.

他为社区制定了令人难以置信的开明方向。

It’s not very large.

它不是很大。

There are maybe two or three million Ismailis in the world.

世界上大约有两三百万伊斯玛仪派教徒。

You think it’s that the Imam is nonhidden that’s useful because he’s a source of ongoing change?

你认为伊玛目的非隐藏性才是有用的，因为他是持续变革的源泉？

Yes.

是的。

That was the whole rationale for Shiism.

这就是什叶派的全部理由。

Why is it so persecuted by the mainstream in Iran?

为什么会受到伊朗主流的迫害？

Because it’s a threat to the Ayatollahs?

因为这对阿亚图拉构成威胁？

I don’t actually know how many remain in Iran.

我实际上不知道还有多少人留在伊朗。

It was a very important community in Iran in the 19th century.

这是19世纪伊朗非常重要的社区。

The Aga Khan, in fact, came from Iran and moved to India.

事实上，阿迦汗来自伊朗，移居印度。

The British sponsored him and invested him with the title “his highness,” making him, putting him on a par with other Indian princes.

英国人资助他，授予他“殿下”的称号，使他与其他印度王子平起平坐。

I think there were probably 20,000 or 30,000 Ismailis left in Iran in the latter days of the Shah of Iran.

我认为在伊朗国王统治的后期，伊朗可能还剩下两万或三万伊斯玛仪派。

I don’t even know how many remain there now.

我什至不知道现在还剩下多少人。

Maybe this is a naive question, but given that the Ismailis are so successful, why aren’t there more of them?

也许这是一个天真的问题，但既然伊斯玛仪派如此成功，为什么没有更多的人呢？

You’re allowed to convert, right?

你可以转换，对吗？

There’s no barrier to entry.

没有进入障碍。

No. Right.

不，对。

All religions have some strange beliefs.

所有宗教都有一些奇怪的信仰。

Perhaps believing in the potential divinity of a man is not something that people believe in.

也许相信一个人的潜在神性并不是人们所相信的。

Some number of Christians seem okay with that postulate, right?

有些基督徒似乎同意这个假设，对吗？

Well, not someone who’s alive.

好吧，不是一个活着的人。

That’s a little harder, but he was alive at some point in time.

这有点困难，但他在某个时候还活着。

Well, there weren’t that many Christians in those days.

嗯，那个时候基督徒还没有那么多。

Sure.

当然。

They believed it retrospectively after he was crucified.

在他被钉十字架之后，他们才相信这一点。

Very last question—really combining two questions.

最后一个问题——实际上是两个问题的结合。

What is it you want to learn about next, and what is it you want to do next?

接下来您想了解什么？接下来您想做什么？

Oh, okay.

哦好的。

I’ve been reading a great book about the intellectual movement in France during the ’40s, ’50s, ’60s.

我一直在读一本关于20世纪40年代、50年代、60年代法国知识分子运动的好书。

The Eakin book.

艾金的书。

Yes.

是的。

I find that so fascinating.

我觉得这很有趣。

That’s what I’m reading at the moment.

这就是我现在正在读的内容。

What do I want to do next?

接下来我想做什么？

I would like to write another book.

我想再写一本书。

It probably is going to be a book about some aspect of the global economy.

这可能是一本关于全球经济某些方面的书。

I would like to find a subject that draws on what I’ve been doing up to now, which is the interaction among countries with a few central characters as driving the story.

我想找到一个能够借鉴我迄今为止所做的事情的主题，即国家之间的互动以及几个核心人物推动故事的发展。

A narrative about the global economy.

关于全球经济的叙述。

I thought initially, or the one that I’ve stumbled across is the ’71 collapse of Bretton Woods.

我一开始以为，或者说我偶然发现的是 71 年布雷顿森林体系的崩溃。

I’m not sure that has enough broad appeal, but that sort of checks many of the boxes of the things that I find fascinating.

我不确定这是否具有足够广泛的吸引力，但这在某种程度上检查了许多我觉得有趣的事情。

I hope you do that topic.

我希望你能做这个话题。

Liaquat Ahamed, thank you very much.

利亚卡特·艾哈迈德，非常感谢你。

Thank you, Tyler.

谢谢你，泰勒。

You took me in directions that I did not expect.

你带我走向了我意想不到的方向。

Always the case.

总是如此。

Thanks.

谢谢。