Kenneth Rogoff on Monetary Moves, Fiscal Gambits, and Classical Chess (Ep. 241)
Thanks to Ethan Monreal-Jackson of Newtype Ventures for sponsoring this transcript.
感谢 Newtype Ventures 的 Ethan Monreal-Jackson 赞助这份文字记录。
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today, I am chatting with Kenneth Rogoff, who is one of America’s best economists.
今天，我正在与美国最好的经济学家之一肯尼思·罗格夫聊天。
He is a professor at Harvard, and he has a new book out called Our Dollar, Your Problem: An Insider’s View of Seven Turbulent Decades of Global Finance, and the Road Ahead.
他是哈佛大学的教授，他出版了一本新书，名为《我们的美元，你的问题：全球金融七个动荡十年的内部人士的看法，以及未来的道路》。
Ken also has extensive experience in the IMF and dealing with various global crises.
肯还在国际货币基金组织和处理各种全球危机方面拥有丰富的经验。
Ken, welcome.
肯，欢迎。
Thank you.
谢谢。
It’s a pleasure to be here, Tyler.
很高兴来到这里，泰勒。
Good to speak to you.
很高兴和你说话。
Circa early 2025, the big debate is whether there’s such a thing as an unsustainable international trade balance.
大约在 2025 年初，一场大争论是是否存在不可持续的国际贸易平衡。
Oren Cass says there is.
奥伦·卡斯说有。
Michael Pettis says there is.
迈克尔·佩蒂斯说有。
Traditional theory is more skeptical or agnostic.
传统理论更加持怀疑态度或不可知论。
What’s your view?
你的看法是什么？
No. There’s unsustainable debt.
不，存在不可持续的债务。
There’s not particularly an unsustainable trade deficit.
不存在特别不可持续的贸易逆差。
There’re good things about having a trade deficit, bad things, but it’s a result of many factors.
贸易逆差有好处，也有坏处，但这是多种因素共同作用的结果。
No, I wouldn’t agree with Pettis on that.
不，我不同意佩蒂斯的观点。
What is the mistake he and Oren Cass are making?
他和奥伦·卡斯犯了什么错误？
The trade balance depends a lot on your savings and your investment, these macro-economic factors.
贸易平衡在很大程度上取决于你的储蓄和投资，这些宏观经济因素。
If there’s an underlying problem — and to be fair, when your trade deficit’s really negative, there often is — it could be something.
如果存在根本问题——公平地说，当你的贸易赤字确实为负时，通常会存在——它可能是有问题的。
I think in the case of the United States, when it hit a real peak in 2005 to 2007, I thought there was a problem.
我认为就美国而言，当它在2005年至2007年达到真正的峰值时，我认为存在问题。
I must say, I didn’t know until very close to the event, what was going on.
我必须说，直到活动临近时我才知道发生了什么事。
We weren’t regulating well, but I didn’t even know what their point is, to be honest.
我们监管得不好，但说实话，我什至不知道他们的意义是什么。
There’s this mercantilist view.
有这种重商主义观点。
I want to collect all the gold in the world.
我想收集世界上所有的黄金。
We want to be able to buy things.
我们希望能够买东西。
Back in the day, you used to have to hire an army or navy to help fight off invaders and such, but today, that’s not so true.
过去，你必须雇佣陆军或海军来帮助击退入侵者等，但今天，情况并非如此。
I think the current account deficit — that’s a broader measure of the deficit — it’s important, and if it’s really large, you can probably bet that it might go down, but it’s not something to try to wrestle to the ground.
我认为经常账户赤字 ——这是对赤字更广泛的衡量标准——很重要，如果它真的很大，你可能会打赌它可能会下降，但这不是一个需要努力解决的问题。
On China’s macro policy
关于中国的宏观政策
There’s an associated claim I hear, including from Martin Wolf, that China needs to substitute more into consumption to remedy some longer-term macroeconomic imbalance.
我听到一个相关的说法，包括来自马丁·沃尔夫的说法，即中国需要更多地替代消费，以纠正一些长期的宏观经济失衡。
I can see that, from a welfare point of view, the Chinese over-subsidize investment and might be better off consuming more, but is it going to boost their growth rate to consume more?
我可以看到，从福利的角度来看，中国人过度补贴投资，增加消费可能会更好，但增加消费会提高经济增长率吗？
First of all, they subsidize investment like crazy.
首先，他们疯狂补贴投资。
Of course.
当然。
Investment has been 40 percent of GDP.
投资占GDP的40%。
Consumption — there are different measures, but 50 percent of GDP, maybe.
消费 — 有不同的衡量标准，但也许占 GDP 的 50%。
We’re 70 percent of GDP by comparison, and it’s been very imbalanced.
相比之下，我们占GDP的70%，而且非常不平衡。
It’s for a command-and-control economy, and China is a hybrid economy.
这是一个命令和控制经济，而中国是一个混合经济。
The central government plays a big role doing infrastructure investment.
中央政府在基础设施投资方面发挥着重要作用。
Subsidizing real estate is easy to do, and they’ve been doing that for a long time, and their growth has been very imbalanced.
补贴房地产容易做，而且已经做了很长时间了，而且增长很不平衡。
Everybody has been telling them for years, why don’t you build up your consumption?
多年来每个人都在告诉他们，为什么不增加消费呢？
But it’s been hard because they don’t have medical care in their old age.
但这很困难，因为他们年老时没有医疗保健。
They don’t have social security in their old age.
他们晚年没有社会保障。
They had this one-child policy for a long time.
他们实行独生子女政策很长时间了。
There are a lot of reasons everyone has had to say it, and now, their house prices are plummeting, and that’s, for Chinese, where a lot of their wealth is.
每个人都不得不这么说的原因有很多，现在，他们的房价暴跌，而这对于中国人来说，是他们很多财富所在。
I would say it’s not a bad idea to try a little bit of that, but they’ve dug a very deep hole.
我想说，尝试一下并不是一个坏主意，但他们已经挖了一个很深的洞。
It’s not easy to dig their way out.
要挖出他们的出路并不容易。
Putting aside the microeconomic distortions, which macro model do you use to think through the question of whether or not China should consume more?
抛开微观经济扭曲，您用哪种宏观模型来思考中国是否应该增加消费的问题？
Do you use the Solow model or Romer or something else?
你使用索洛模型或罗默模型还是其他模型？
What’s your guide?
你的指导是什么？
Those are nice models, but let’s be honest.
这些都是不错的模型，但说实话。
They’re just a piece of things.
它们只是其中的一部分。
They do tell us that at the end of the day, you need to have innovation.
他们确实告诉我们，归根结底，你需要创新。
If you’re just growing by building more machines, by building more roads, you run into diminishing returns, and you get less and less with the output.
如果你只是通过建造更多的机器、修建更多的道路来实现增长，你就会遇到收益递减的情况，而且你得到的产出会越来越少。
That’s what happened to Russia.
这就是俄罗斯发生的事情。
That’s what happened to Japan.
这就是日本发生的事情。
That’s what happened to a lot of Asia.
这就是亚洲很多国家所发生的事情。
For some reason, people thought that wouldn’t happen to China.
出于某种原因，人们认为这种情况不会发生在中国。
Their rate of innovation over the whole economy — I’m not talking about the highest level — has collapsed by many different measures.
他们在整个经济中的创新率——“我不是在谈论最高水平”——按照许多不同的标准衡量，它们的创新率已经崩溃。
The private sector is, of course, the root of all of the innovation.
当然，私营部门是所有创新的根源。
They have oppressed the private sector, particularly in the last 10 years, and for them to grow again, they need to restore some agency to the private sector.
他们压迫私营部门，特别是在过去十年里，为了让他们再次增长，他们需要恢复私营部门的一些代理权。
We’re in the midst of some tariff debates right now, as you know.
如您所知，我们现在正处于一些关税辩论之中。
One argument I hear, sometimes, even from the anti-tariff people, is that if the US puts higher tariffs on China, the Chinese currency just depreciates.
我有时甚至从反关税人士那里听到的一个论点是，如果美国对中国征收更高的关税，人民币就会贬值。
The dollar strengthens.
美元走强。
There isn’t that much of a net effect because, arguably, they’re propping up their currency some amount now.
净效应并没有那么大，因为可以说，他们现在正在一定程度地支撑本国货币。
Do you agree with that?
你同意吗？
What you said is exactly right.
你说的完全正确。
To a first approximation, if we put on a — I don’t know, whatever it is — 20 percent tariff, it has an effect on our exchange rate of making it go up, which makes our exports more expensive and makes their goods less expensive.
初步估计，如果我们征收“——我不知道，不管它是什么”——“20%的关税，它会对我们的汇率产生影响，使其上升，这使得我们的出口更加昂贵，而他们的商品则更加便宜。
I don’t want to get wonky, but if you did it on the whole world —
我不想变得古怪，但如果你对整个世界都这么做了 ——
You can get wonky.
你可能会变得不稳定。
I can get wonky with you?
我可以和你搞暧昧吗？
Absolutely.
绝对地。
If you did 20 percent tariff on the whole world, to a first approximation, your exchange rate goes up 10 percent the dollar and that rebalances everything.
如果你对全世界征收 20% 的关税，初步估计，你的汇率会比美元上涨 10%，从而重新平衡一切。
That brings the cost of their goods back to just the 10 percent rise, and it makes your exports 10 percent more expensive because the currency appreciated.
这使得他们的商品成本回升至仅上涨 10%，并且由于货币升值，您的出口产品价格会上涨 10%。
That’s definitely an effect.
这绝对是一个效果。
Of course, they’re probably going to retaliate, and then that cancels it out.
当然，他们可能会报复，然后就取消了。
But do they want to retaliate?
但他们想报复吗？
Don’t they prefer the outcome where the tariff approach is some kind of neutrality, given that they have an overvalued currency right now?
鉴于他们现在的货币被高估，难道他们不更喜欢关税方法是某种中立的结果吗？
They could have a decline, basically be insulated from the tariff, not have to worry about Trump so much anymore.
他们的业绩可能会下降，基本上不会受到关税的影响，不必再担心特朗普了。
Why should they retaliate?
他们为什么要报复？
I feel there are a lot of distortions in their economy, but the days when it was very clear-cut that they had an overvalued currency — they’re far gone.
我觉得他们的经济存在很多扭曲，但他们的货币被高估的日子已经一去不复返了。
It used to be undervalued, right?
它曾经被低估了，对吗？
Those days are very far gone.
那些日子已经一去不复返了。
You’re saying that their currency now is overvalued —
你是说他们的货币现在被高估了 ——
I think so.
我想是的。
— and they want to bring it down.
——他们想要把它打倒。
How do you figure that?
你怎么看出来的？
They have all this producer price deflation, so they should be expansionary on the monetary side to have a more predictable path of nominal GDP growth, but they’re not doing it, so probably their currency is a bit too high relative to an optimum.
他们面临生产者价格通缩，因此他们应该在货币方面进行扩张，以获得更可预测的名义GDP增长路径，但他们没有这样做，所以他们的货币相对于最佳值可能有点太高了。
A logical way to do it would be to do more expansionary fiscal policy, more expansionary monetary policy.
一个合乎逻辑的方法是采取更多扩张性财政政策、更多扩张性货币政策。
We don’t try to deal with producer price inflation through the exchange rate.
我们不会试图通过汇率来应对生产者价格通胀。
Exports and imports are important to China, but it’s also a very big economy.
出口和进口对中国很重要，但它也是一个非常大的经济体。
There’s a lot of stuff like the infrastructure investment and other investment that’s internal.
有很多东西，比如基础设施投资和其他内部投资。
Sure, but if they had higher price inflation, the value of the renminbi in real terms would fall somewhat, at least for a while, and that would be better, which means the current rate is somewhat higher than it ought to be.
当然，但如果物价通胀较高，人民币的实际价值会有所下降，至少在一段时间内会有所下降，这会更好，这意味着当前的汇率比应有的要高一些。
They’re running a massive surplus to the rest of the world.
他们向世界其他地区提供了大量盈余。
The total size of their trade balance surplus is only 2 percent of GDP.
他们的贸易顺差总规模仅占GDP的2%。
It’s not 10 percent, the way it was in 2010, but they’ve gotten a lot bigger.
虽然不是 2010 年的 10%，但比例已经大了很多。
It’s still huge compared to the world.
与世界相比，它仍然很大。
In crude measures, if their exchange rates is overvalued and undervalued, I don’t think you’d come to a simple answer.
以粗略的衡量，如果它们的汇率被高估和低估，我认为你不会得出一个简单的答案。
The dollar is very rich.
美元非常丰富。
In a sense, everybody seems cheap to the dollar right now.
从某种意义上说，现在每个人对美元来说似乎都很便宜。
I’m sure you’ve experienced that with anyone coming from abroad, even from Japan or Switzerland.
我相信任何来自国外的人（甚至来自日本或瑞士）都经历过这种情况。
They’re, “Oh my gosh.
他们是，“天哪。
It’s so expensive here.”
这里太贵了。”
Feel free to give a wonky answer to this one.
请随意对此问题给出一个奇怪的答案。
Why do you think it’s been so hard for economics to develop a satisfactory theory of exchange rates?
您认为为什么经济学很难发展出令人满意的汇率理论？
Purchasing power parity seems to hold only within very broad bands, something like 2x, and the rest just seems very murky.
购买力平价似乎仅在非常宽的范围内成立，例如 2 倍，其余部分似乎非常模糊。
Why is that so difficult?
为什么这么难？
Part of that is if you have floating exchange rates.
其中一部分是如果你有浮动汇率。
There’re a lot of financial factors that are hard to understand that move it around a lot.
有很多难以理解的财务因素会导致它发生很大的变化。
We’re not able to easily identify those factors, but I think, more and more, theory, empirics is coalesced around things like bank balance sheets.
我们无法轻易识别这些因素，但我认为，理论和经验越来越多地围绕银行资产负债表等问题进行结合。
Can banks arbitrage exchange rates and various pricing imperfections?
银行可以套利汇率和各种定价缺陷吗？
I think the way to research the past 10 or 15 years has been that the exchange rate moves a lot but it’s not suddenly moving around the economy with it.
我认为研究过去 10 或 15 年的方法是，汇率变动很大，但它并没有突然随之影响经济。
We thought that for a long time, but I think the general view today — it isn’t always true — but that a lot of the movements have to do with financial frictions and financial factors, not some gnomes controlling the exchange rate, that there’s a lot of random noise.
我们很长一段时间都这么认为，但我认为今天的普遍观点 ——“这并不总是正确的”—— 但很多变动与金融摩擦和金融因素有关，而不是一些控制汇率的侏儒，存在很多随机噪音。
Do you think we need a good theory of both real and nominal exchange rates to make reliable policy recommendations?
您认为我们需要一个关于实际汇率和名义汇率的良好理论来提出可靠的政策建议吗？
If we don’t really know what the exchange rate will be doing and why, doesn’t that put us in the slightly odd position that we’re saying do this, do that, but the most fundamental price variable is a mystery to us?
如果我们真的不知道汇率会发生什么以及为什么，这是否会让我们处于一个有点奇怪的位置，我们说这样做，这样做，但最基本的价格变量对我们来说是一个谜？
As you may know, I think my first important paper was showing how hard it was to explain exchange rates.
如您所知，我认为我的第一篇重要论文展示了解释汇率有多么困难。
I’m embarrassed to say it’s like 45 years ago.
我很不好意思地说，那已经是 45 年前的事了。
I think the policy conclusions people drew out of that is, don’t look at the exchange rate.
我认为人们从中得出的政策结论是，不要看汇率。
When you’re trying to figure out what policy should be, look at inflation rate, look at output.
当你试图弄清楚应该采取什么政策时，看看通货膨胀率，看看产出。
I think for some countries, they’re so deep into dollar debt, they’re so connected with the dollar and trade, they do worry about their exchange rate.
我认为对于一些国家来说，他们深陷美元债务，他们与美元和贸易联系如此紧密，他们确实担心自己的汇率。
It depends on if you’re talking about a big country like the United States, or are you talking about New Zealand or something like that.
这取决于你是在谈论像美国这样的大国，还是在谈论新西兰或类似的国家。
I think generally, policymakers need to recognize there’s a lot of noise.
我认为总的来说，政策制定者需要认识到存在很多噪音。
Trying to target the exchange rate is a fool’s game.
试图以汇率为目标是愚蠢的游戏。
If the Trump administration’s trying to do it, they might get lucky, but it’s pure luck.
如果特朗普政府试图这样做，他们可能会很幸运，但这纯粹是运气。
On Pakistan’s bailouts
关于巴基斯坦的救助
If I take the country of Pakistan, I think it’s now been through maybe 23 or 24 IMF bailouts.
如果以巴基斯坦为例，我认为它现在已经经历了 23 或 24 次国际货币基金组织的救助。
That’s a lot.
就这么多了。
The problems aren’t fixed, so we would all say here’re ways Pakistan could improve.
问题还没有得到解决，所以我们都说巴基斯坦可以采取以下改进措施。
Probably you and I would largely agree on those.
也许你和我在这些方面基本达成一致。
Just from an external point of view — say you’re dictator of the IMF, you’re the managing director, you’re the board, you’re the staff — what is it you would actually do with Pakistan?
仅从外部角度来看 —— 假设你是国际货币基金组织的独裁者，你是总裁，你是董事会，你是工作人员 —— 你实际上会对巴基斯坦做什么？
The deep-seated problems — the military is very, very powerful in the country.
深层次的问题——这个国家的军队非常非常强大。
The military is very corrupt, runs a lot of the businesses, has a lot of control.
军队非常腐败，经营着很多企业，拥有很多控制权。
It really runs deep into the institutions in the country.
它确实深入到该国的机构中。
It’s not something where you can airlift some expert like you or I and just tell them what to do.
这不是你可以空运像你我这样的专家然后告诉他们该怎么做的事情。
Believe me, there are a lot of very smart Pakistani economists who know what to do.
相信我，有很多非常聪明的巴基斯坦经济学家知道该怎么做。
Sure, but do you sign off on bailout number 25 when that comes along?
当然可以，但是当第 25 号救助出现时，你会签署吗？
You’re in charge.
你负责。
First of all, if you don’t sign off on bailout number 25, they’re going to default on bailout number 24.
首先，如果你不签署 25 号救助计划，他们将默认执行 24 号救助计划。
You’re rolling over this debt all the time.
你一直在滚动偿还这笔债务。
It’s very sensitive politically.
这在政治上非常敏感。
Pakistan’s a country that’s very, very geopolitically important.
巴基斯坦是一个地缘政治非常非常重要的国家。
You can’t look at the programs there as if you’re lending to the UK.
你不能像向英国贷款一样看待那里的项目。
It’s something very different.
这是非常不同的事情。
The amounts are small compared to if you’re lending to the UK.
与贷款给英国相比，这笔金额很小。
Frankly, what I have advised on things like Pakistan is, just give them aid, don’t give loans.
坦率地说，我对巴基斯坦这样的事情的建议是，只给他们援助，不要提供贷款。
You’re never going to collect the loans.
你永远无法收回贷款。
You’re not seriously meeting their loans.
你并没有认真偿还他们的贷款。
It sounds great to say, “We just lent the money to Pakistan.” But I think in general, in money we’re giving to developing countries, too much of it comes in the form of loans, and it distorts what we do because we don’t get them all repaid.
“我们刚刚借钱给巴基斯坦”听起来很棒。但我认为总的来说，在我们向发展中国家提供的资金中，太多是以贷款的形式出现的，这扭曲了我们所做的事情，因为我们没有得到全部偿还。
On dollarizing Latin and Caribbean economies
关于拉丁美洲和加勒比经济体的美元化
How many Latin and Caribbean economies should dollarize?
有多少拉丁美洲和加勒比经济体应该美元化？
A few have.
有几个有。
Should more?
应该更多吗？
It’s a pretty desperate measure when you dollarize.
当你美元化时，这是一个非常绝望的措施。
There are different ways to dollarize.
美元化有多种方式。
When I just came into the International Monetary Fund in 2001, Argentina had dollarized.
2001年我刚加入国际货币基金组织时，阿根廷已经美元化。
They had been dollarized for 10 years.
它们已经美元化十年了。
I said, “Isn’t this great?”
我说：“这不是很棒吗？”
But that was a peg.
但那是一个钉子。
It wasn’t real dollars.
这不是真正的美元。
I mean like El Salvador, Ecuador, Panama.
我的意思是萨尔瓦多、厄瓜多尔、巴拿马。
You want to actually circulate the dollar.
你想让美元真正流通。
Right, because that’s credible.
没错，因为这是可信的。
Whether you like them or not, they’ve all stuck, right?
不管你喜欢与否，它们都已经卡住了，对吧？
You can do it.
你可以做到的。
It has its costs.
它有其成本。
The biggest cost is if your banking system runs into trouble, you can’t bail them out.
最大的成本是，如果您的银行系统遇到麻烦，您无法救助它们。
In most countries, the currency that we think of, the physical currency, is just a little piece of the animal.
在大多数国家，我们所想到的货币，即实物货币，只是动物的一小部分。
A lot of it — you might not think of your checking account or your savings account as dollars, but they are.
很多 ——你可能不认为你的支票账户或储蓄账户是美元，但它们确实是。
That’s a lot of the money supply.
这是大量的货币供应量。
When you say they’re just using real dollars, they don’t have real dollars to back those bank accounts.
当你说他们只是使用真实的美元时，他们没有真实的美元来支持这些银行账户。
It can work, but you run into banking crises, you run into debt crises, and then when you’re dollarized, it’s hard to fight it.
它可以起作用，但是你会遇到银行危机，你会遇到债务危机，然后当你被美元化时，就很难与之抗争了。
It’s doable.
这是可行的。
It’s absolutely doable, but I’m not sure necessarily it’s advisable.
这绝对可行，但我不确定这是否是可取的。
It depends on the alternative.
这取决于替代方案。
If the country’s been run into the ground for 50 years and you’re trying to reclaim territory, it makes sense.
如果这个国家已经陷入困境 50 年了，而你正试图收复失地，那么这是有道理的。
Why isn’t it easy for a lot of countries?
为什么很多国家都不容易？
Say you’re Barbados.
假设你是巴巴多斯。
That’s a small country.
那是一个小国家。
Most of your visitors are from the US also.
大多数访客也来自美国。
Your banking system — you can just buy external insurance.
您的银行系统 — 您可以购买外部保险。
There’s an insurer that can cover the Barbados banking system if need be.
如果需要的话，有一家保险公司可以为巴巴多斯银行系统提供保险。
Buy it from China if you have to, and then just dollarize.
如果有必要的话，从中国购买，然后美元化。
Why aren’t they just better off?
他们为什么不过得更好呢？
I’m being naive, but is there an insurer who’s going to bail out the Barbados banking system?
我很天真，但是有保险公司能够救助巴巴多斯银行系统吗？
I think our regulators would make that difficult.
我认为我们的监管机构会让这变得困难。
Their regulators would make it difficult.
他们的监管者会让事情变得困难。
You would need to have something like that, and there’re a lot of moral hazards.
你需要有这样的东西，而且存在很多道德风险。
If you’re going to be an insurer, you can’t just insure.
如果你想成为一名保险公司，你就不能只提供保险。
You have to have 150 people on shore looking at them all the time.
岸上必须有 150 个人一直看着它们。
It’s not easy to do.
这并不容易做到。
The only country in the world, really, which can bail out its banking system is Hong Kong.
事实上，世界上唯一能够救助其银行体系的国家是香港。
They have enough dollar reserves to bail out everything.
他们有足够的美元储备来救助一切。
That’s the problem with dollarization is that, if you’re not going to have banks, it’s great, but we want to have lending and mortgages and car loans and stuff, and it’s very easy to run into trouble.
美元化的问题在于，如果你不打算拥有银行，那很好，但我们想要贷款、抵押贷款、汽车贷款等等，这很容易遇到麻烦。
On Japan
关于日本
Why did Japan never have a financial crisis?
为什么日本从未发生过金融危机？
Very high debt to GDP ratio.
债务占 GDP 的比例非常高。
Growth rate is mostly slow.
增长速度大多缓慢。
In per capita terms, it’s not as bad as it sounds at first, but nothing gangbusters.
按人均计算，情况并不像乍听起来那么糟糕，但也算不上什么大事。
How have they held on?
他们是怎样坚持下来的？
They did have a financial crisis, the mother of all financial crises, in the ’90s.
他们确实在 90 年代经历了一场金融危机，这是所有金融危机之母。
Oh sure, but since then.
哦，当然，但从那时起。
Since then, well, have they hung on?
从那时起，他们还坚持下去吗？
In 1990, and even in the early ’90s, their per capita GDP was 80 percent of the United States, and purchasing power parity measures trying to put into common price level, but in dollars, it was well over 100 percent of the US.
1990年，甚至90年代初，他们的人均GDP是美国的80%，购买力平价指标试图纳入共同物价水平，但以美元计算，却远远超过美国的100%。
Today, it’s 60 percent in those measures.
如今，这些指标的比例已达到 60%。
It has not held on in per capita terms.
从人均计算来看，这种情况并没有持续下去。
It has just not had growth for a long time, and they’re running into trouble.
它已经很长时间没有增长了，他们遇到了麻烦。
There’s per capita growth in Japan, maybe.
也许日本的人均增长。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
Yes, but nothing like in the United States.
是的，但与美国不同。
We’ve beaten every advanced economy, not just Japan.
我们击败了所有发达经济体，而不仅仅是日本。
Yes, that’s fair, but they’ve fallen behind France, the UK, Germany.
是的，这是公平的，但他们落后于法国、英国、德国。
They were ahead of all, and they’ve fallen far behind.
他们走在了前面，又远远地落在了后面。
They’re in trouble now because they’re finally having inflation.
他们现在遇到了麻烦，因为他们终于遇到了通货膨胀。
They’re needing to raise interest rates.
他们需要提高利率。
They’ve stuffed government debt into every orifice of the economy, into the pension systems, into the banks, into their postal savings system.
他们把政府债务塞进了经济的每一个孔口，塞进了养老金系统、塞进了银行、塞进了邮政储蓄系统。
Now, they’re talking about cutting pensions, cutting old age benefits because suddenly, they’re having to make interest payments on the debt, and it’s hard.
现在，他们正在谈论削减养老金、削减老年福利，因为突然之间，他们不得不支付债务利息，这很困难。
I think people who use Japan as an example of everything’s fine have their head in the sand.
我认为那些用日本作为一切都很好的例子的人是把头埋在沙子里。
It’s an example of, if you’re very rich, you can go down slowly, but it’s not an example of how you can have fantastic economy with debt like that.
这是一个例子，如果你非常富有，你可以慢慢地走下去，但这并不是一个例子，说明你如何通过这样的债务拥有出色的经济。
Why do some places, say, the much earlier UK — they have crises, and Japan, whatever the standard of living issues may be, there’s no crisis.
为什么有些地方，比如说，早得多的英国——它们就出现了危机，而日本，无论生活水平问题如何，都没有危机。
There’s no run on anything.
没有什么可以跑的。
It’s quite peaceful.
很平静。
It is a society which obviously has a very high degree of cohesion, and that’s a tremendous strength of Japan.
这是一个显然具有非常高凝聚力的社会，这也是日本的巨大优势。
I just have an aside mention if I can.
如果可以的话我只是顺便提一下。
I was a visitor at the Bank of Japan in the early ’90s in the middle of their meltdown, although I didn’t see it, and I don’t think anyone did at the time.
上世纪 90 年代初，日本央行正处于崩溃之中，我曾到访过该银行，尽管我没有亲眼目睹，而且我认为当时也没有人亲眼目睹过。
I had to eat at the cafeteria every day.
我每天都必须在食堂吃饭。
They had almost the same food that you had to eat, and it was good.
他们提供的食物几乎和你必须吃的一样，而且很好吃。
Then I saw another line once, and I asked, “Can I go in that line?” The people said, “Oh, that’s if you want a smaller portion.”
然后我看到另一条线，我就问：“我可以进去那条线吗？”人们说：“哦，那是如果你想要小一点的话。”
It’s a very different society than we have, but they have a lot of financial repression.
这是一个与我们截然不同的社会，但他们有很多金融抑制。
Financial repression is going to be part of the solution in every advanced country where you force banks, insurance companies, pension funds to hold more debt.
在每一个迫使银行、保险公司、养老基金持有更多债务的发达国家，金融抑制将成为解决方案的一部分。
We’ve done that already, and they’ve done it in a big way.
我们已经做到了，他们也做得很大。
It’s hurt their financial intermediation, so it makes lending less efficient, and that’s part of why their growth has suffered.
这损害了他们的金融中介，因此降低了贷款效率，这也是他们的增长受到影响的部分原因。
They’ve done a good job becoming sclerotic slowly, but I hardly think we would want to imitate them, especially if we intend to compete with China.
他们在缓慢硬化方面做得很好，但我认为我们几乎不会想要模仿他们，特别是如果我们打算与中国竞争的话。
On financial repression in the EU
关于欧盟的金融抑制
Is that what the European Union is going to do, financial repression?
这就是欧盟要做的事情——金融压制吗？
They did it already.
他们已经做到了。
They’ll have to do it again.
他们必须再做一次。
They still have all these major debt problems.
他们仍然面临所有这些重大债务问题。
Yes.
是的。
They did it big time after the European debt crisis.
欧洲债务危机后，他们取得了巨大的成功。
Just a simple fact about that is, it used to be that, say, Italian debt was held in Germany, Spanish debt was held in Germany, spread all over.
一个简单的事实是，过去意大利债务在德国持有，西班牙债务在德国持有，分布在各地。
Now, the vast majority of Italian banks are holding all the Italian bank debt.
现在，绝大多数意大利银行持有意大利全部银行债务。
Spanish banks are holding all the Spanish debt.
西班牙银行持有所有西班牙债务。
Do you think that’s because they’re diversifying?
您认为这是因为他们正在多元化吗？
No, it’s because they’re being ordered to do that.
不，这是因为他们被命令这样做。
They have a lot of financial repression already.
他们已经受到了很多金融抑制。
They don’t have dynamic capital markets for a lot of reasons.
由于多种原因，他们没有充满活力的资本市场。
And obviously, they need to remilitarize now.
显然，他们现在需要重新武装起来。
Germany has a lot of fiscal space, so they can go all out.
德国有很大的财政空间，所以可以全力以赴。
Especially now that real interest rates are hitting a higher level, they’re going to have to do it, but I think they’re going to find they have to give things up in order to do it, because the interest rates aren’t zero anymore.
特别是现在实际利率达到更高水平，他们将不得不这样做，但我认为他们会发现他们必须放弃一些东西才能做到这一点，因为利率不再为零。
You think they’ll actually cut spending, say, in France?
你认为他们实际上会削减开支，比如说在法国？
That’s hard for me to believe.
这让我很难相信。
I don’t disagree with you, but it somehow feels unimaginable to me.
我不同意你的观点，但对我来说这有点难以想象。
Yes.
是的。
Many of the European countries actually tightened their pension systems a lot during the European crisis.
事实上，许多欧洲国家在欧洲危机期间收紧了养老金制度。
They set it in place to take place 10 or 15 years later.
他们将其定为 10 或 15 年后举行。
Not France.
不是法国。
Yes, I do.
是的，我愿意。
I think this is a real existential challenge to the French state.
我认为这对法国政府来说是一个真正的生存挑战。
Maybe they’ll take over as the tech capital of the world.
也许他们会成为世界科技之都。
Maybe they’ll find ways to solve their problems, but they’ve been free-riding off the United States.
也许他们会找到解决问题的方法，但他们一直在搭便车离开美国。
There’s no question about that, and now they have to spend more.
毫无疑问，现在他们必须花更多的钱。
I’m not praising Trump’s policies.
我并不是在赞扬特朗普的政策。
Let’s not conflate those two things, but yes, I think they’re going to find their taxes are very, very high in Europe.
我们不要将这两件事混为一谈，但是，是的，我认为他们会发现欧洲的税收非常非常高。
In fact, so much so that there’s no question it holds back a lot of investment.
事实上，如此之多以至于毫无疑问它阻碍了大量投资。
Oh, my God.
我的天啊。
Europe has very few world beaters in terms of tech, finance.
欧洲在科技、金融方面很少有世界领先者。
The biggest companies — set aside the Danish company, that’s Ozempic — there’re things like Hermes, Prada, lifestyle superpower stuff.
最大的公司 —— 抛开丹麦公司，那就是Ozempic —— 有爱马仕、普拉达、生活方式超级大国之类的东西。
No, I think this is absolutely an existential crisis here.
不，我认为这绝对是一场生存危机。
It may lead to them becoming more cohesive.
这可能会导致他们变得更有凝聚力。
It may lead to them becoming more of a geopolitical power, but yes, they’re going to have to make choices which they haven’t had to make.
这可能会导致他们变得更像是一个地缘政治大国，但是，是的，他们将不得不做出他们不必做出的选择。
If the nation is Italy, and I think that the birth rate, TFR, is about 1.3 on average, are they just going to wake up one morning and say, “The whole welfare state thing was a mistake, and we’re getting rid of it?” Isn’t that the implication?
如果这个国家是意大利，我认为出生率（TFR）平均约为 1.3，他们是否会有一天早上醒来说：“整个福利国家的事情是一个错误，我们正在摆脱它？”是不是这个寓意呢？
Well, that’s a strong statement, and they’re not going to do that, but —
嗯，这是一个强有力的声明，他们不会那样做，但是 ——
But if the country keeps on shrinking, the age pyramid gets worse and worse.
但如果国家继续萎缩，年龄金字塔就会变得越来越糟。
Yes, we all face this issue and hope that innovation and growth or something will help, but, yes, I know that the demographics is a problem.
是的，我们都面临这个问题，并希望创新和增长或其他什么能有所帮助，但是，是的，我知道人口统计是一个问题。
Every country and Italy, as you say, is far, far ahead of the United States on the demographics.
正如你所说，每个国家和意大利在人口统计方面都远远领先于美国。
An interesting fact is, they spend a mind-numbing 15 percent of GDP on old age pensions and support now.
一个有趣的事实是，他们现在将 GDP 的 15% 用于养老金和赡养费，这一数字令人震惊。
We’re half that all in — 15 percent of GDP.
我们占 GDP 的一半——15%。
Yes, they have a lot of constraints, and their tax rates are very high.
是的，他们有很多限制，而且税率很高。
They’re not corrupt like in Pakistan, but it’s not Sweden either.
他们不像巴基斯坦那样腐败，但也不像瑞典。
It’s got a lot of problems.
它有很多问题。
On the US fiscal position
关于美国的财政状况
Just predictively, what do you think the United States will do with its fiscal position?
只是预测一下，您认为美国将如何处理其财政状况？
That is a darn good question.
这是一个非常好的问题。
Looking way forward, I would just say we’re on an unsustainable path.
展望未来，我只能说我们正走在一条不可持续的道路上。
We will continue to have our debt balloon.
我们的债务将继续膨胀。
Eventually — not necessarily in a planned or coherent way — I think we’re going to have another big inflation soon, next five to seven years, maybe sooner with what’s going on, and that’s going to bring it down just like it did under Biden.
最终 ——“不一定以有计划或连贯的方式”—— 我认为我们很快就会出现另一场大规模通胀，未来五到七年，也许会更快，而这将导致通胀下降，就像拜登领导下的情况一样。
It brought the debt down.
它降低了债务。
Then the markets are, fool me once, shame on you.
那么市场就愚弄了我一次，让你感到羞耻。
Fool me twice, no, we’re raising the interest rate, and then we’ll have to make choices.
骗我两次，不，我们要提高利率，然后我们就必须做出选择。
I think in the United States, a lot of the choices, I’m sorry to say, probably point towards higher taxation because we’re hardly running a welfare state.
我很遗憾地说，我认为在美国，很多选择可能都指向更高的税收，因为我们几乎没有运行一个福利国家。
All due respects — and I’m not sure I have any due respects to DOGE — there’re not that many things to cut in the United States compared to many other countries.
恕我直言，我不确定我对 DOGE 是否有任何应有的尊重，与许多其他国家相比，美国并没有那么多需要削减的东西。
I don’t know what the choice will be.
我不知道会做出什么选择。
I probably won’t be here, and you might not be either, when we’re making the choices, but if actually we’ll —
当我们做出选择时，我可能不会在这里，你也可能不会，但如果我们真的会 ——
Oh, I think we’ll both be here.
哦，我想我们都会在这里。
It could happen much sooner.
它可能会发生得更早。
On the other hand, it’s hard to know what’s going through Trump’s head.
另一方面，很难知道特朗普脑子里在想什么。
I presumed he was going to blow up the deficit, like everybody else.
我以为他会像其他人一样扩大赤字。
We’ll see.
我们会看到的。
When you say big inflation, how big is big?
当你说大通胀时，多大才算大？
Last time we probably had a bonus 10 percent inflation over the 2 percent target cumulatively, maybe 12 percent.
上次我们的通胀率可能比 2% 的目标累计高出 10%，也许是 12%。
I think this time, it’ll be more on the order of cumulatively over the 2 percent target, 20 percent, 25 percent.
我想这一次，累计会超过2%、20%、25%的目标。
There’s going to be an adjustment.
将会有一个调整。
I don’t think the debt is going to be the sole contribution to that.
我认为债务不会是唯一的贡献。
There are many factors.
有很多因素。
You have to impinge on Federal Reserve independence.
你必须侵犯美联储的独立性。
Probably, there’ll be some shock, which will justify it.
也许，会有一些震惊，这将证明它是合理的。
I don’t know how it’s going to play out.
我不知道结果会如何。
I know that for years, people have said the US debt is unsustainable, but it hasn’t come to roost because we’ve lived through this post-financial crisis, post-pandemic era of very, very low and negative real interest rates.
我知道多年来，人们一直在说美国债务是不可持续的，但它并没有得到解决，因为我们经历了这个后金融危机、后大流行时代，实际利率非常非常低和为负。
That is not the norm.
这不是常态。
There’s regression to mean.
有回归的意思。
You know what?
你知道吗？
It’s happened.
它发生了。
Suddenly, the interest payments start piling up.
突然间，利息支付开始堆积起来。
I think they’ve at least doubled over the last few years.
我认为在过去几年里它们至少增加了一倍。
They’re quickly on their way to tripling, of going up to $1 trillion.
它们的价值很快就会增加两倍，达到 1 万亿美元。
Suddenly, it’s more than our defense spending.
突然间，这超出了我们的国防开支。
That’s the most important macro change in the world, that real interest rates appear to have regressed more towards long-term trend.
这是世界上最重要的宏观变化，实际利率似乎更接近长期趋势。
What’s the most plausible scenario you can imagine where the US does not have to make any major adjustment?
您能想象的最合理的情况是，美国不必做出任何重大调整？
I’m not saying you’re predicting it.
我并不是说你在预测它。
I’m not saying you think it’s very plausible, but you have to come up with something.
我并不是说你认为这很合理，但你必须想出一些办法。
What is it?
它是什么？
Oh, I don’t think there’s any question.
哦，我认为没有任何问题。
It’s that the AI revolution turns out to just work magically much better than anyone imagined, that people like me quietly acquiesce to just getting transfers from the government instead of having jobs, and we just continue to have a high income, and the robot income pays for everything.
事实证明，人工智能革命神奇地比任何人想象的都要好，像我这样的人默默默许只接受政府的转移支付而不是找到工作，而我们只是继续拥有高收入，而机器人的收入支付了一切。
AI is absolutely the thing which is most likely, some kind of technological change.
人工智能绝对是最有可能发生的某种技术变革。
But other than that, the problem is in our politics.
但除此之外，问题出在我们的政治上。
It’s in our DNA.
它存在于我们的 DNA 中。
We’re convinced that we’re immortals, and we can just do whatever we want.
我们坚信我们是不朽的，我们可以做任何我们想做的事。
You go around Washington, whatever they say, I think that’s what they think.
你到华盛顿走一圈，无论他们说什么，我想他们就是这么想的。
Again, this key thing is that real interest rates, the interest rate adjusted for expected inflation — and I’m looking at the long term — they’ve come up.
再说一遍，关键是实际利率，根据预期通胀调整后的利率——我着眼于长期——它们已经出现了。
They’re not super high, but they’re more like they were in the early 2000s, and, I think, of reasonable projections, they’re going to stay around the level they are now.
它们并不是很高，但更像是 2000 年代初期的水平，而且我认为，根据合理的预测，它们将保持在现在的水平左右。
I’m sure you know the classic Paul Samuelson paper on overlapping generations model.
我相信你知道保罗·萨缪尔森关于重叠代模型的经典论文。
In that paper, the real interest rate is equal to the rate of population growth.
在那篇论文中，实际利率等于人口增长率。
There’re other papers where the real interest rate is in broad harmony with the rate of productivity growth.
还有其他论文认为实际利率与生产率增长率大致一致。
If either of those models are correct, aren’t we okay again?
如果这两个模型中的任何一个是正确的，我们不是又可以了吗？
First of all, it’s different.
首先，它是不同的。
You look, if it’s population growth and productivity alone, then you’re losing tax dollars at the same time you’re paying less interest.
你看，如果仅考虑人口增长和生产力，那么你在支付较少利息的同时，也会损失税收。
But it turns out, those variables don’t work so well over a longer period.
但事实证明，这些变量在较长时期内效果不佳。
I have a paper in the American Economic Review just last August about this.
去年八月，我在《美国经济评论》上发表了一篇关于此的论文。
If you look over longer time periods, just because economists think that those should be the dominant variables, it doesn’t turn out to work that well.
如果你看更长的时间段，仅仅因为经济学家认为这些应该是主导变量，结果并没有那么有效。
All this stuff — there’ve been a lot of papers by economists looking at the decline.
所有这些东西 ——经济学家已经发表了很多论文来研究经济衰退。
The real interest rate going down, demographics going down, productivity going down, looks great.
实际利率下降、人口结构下降、生产率下降，看起来很棒。
If you look at a longer period, there’s no there, there.
如果你看更长的时期，就会发现那里不存在。
It just doesn’t stand up.
它就是站不起来。
I think there are other factors having to do with liquidity, default risk, changing nature of the production function, globalization.
我认为还有其他因素与流动性、违约风险、生产函数性质的变化、全球化有关。
I think there are many variables where assuming there’s going to be some reversion to mean is just a pretty good thing to have in the back of your head.
我认为有很多变数，假设会有一些回归意义是一件很好的事情。
You know, Carmen Reinhart and I have this book, This Time Is Different — very much on the theme of people just looking at five years or ten years and thinking, “Oh, it’s just great.
你知道，卡门·莱因哈特和我有这本书，《这次不一样》——主要讨论的主题是人们回顾五年或十年并思考：“哦，这真是太棒了。
It’s just going to go like this.” I think the real interest rate is an example.
事情就会这样发展。”我认为实际利率就是一个例子。
I would say the low inflation is another example.
我想说的是低通胀是另一个例子。
My students, for a long time, just didn’t believe there’d ever be inflation again.
我的学生很长一段时间都不相信通货膨胀会再次出现。
I would teach it; they would fall asleep.
我会教它；他们会睡着的。
I remember asking a question even to someone who was a research assistant at a big central bank, “Explain this to me about inflation.” She said, “My generation doesn’t ever expect to think about inflation.
我记得我什至向一位大型中央银行的研究助理提出了一个问题：“向我解释一下关于通货膨胀的问题。”她说：“我们这一代人从来没有想到会考虑通货膨胀。
We don’t have it.
我们没有。
Please give examples of this.” So no, I would suspect we will have high real interest rate.
请举例说明这一点。”所以不，我怀疑我们的实际利率会很高。
And by the way, AI will raise the interest rate.
顺便说一下，人工智能会提高利率。
But productivity, too.
但生产力也是如此。
That’s a case where it goes up with productivity.
在这种情况下，它会随着生产力的提高而提高。
It does raise productivity, but the usual thing about demographics is, there are less people to work with the machines, and therefore, the return on the machines is lower, and the interest rate goes down.
它确实提高了生产率，但人口统计的通常情况是，使用机器工作的人较少，因此机器的回报较低，利率也会下降。
But if the people are being substituted for, which is new — we’ve always found a way to reinsert ourselves — you won’t necessarily, even in a theoretical model like Samuelson’s or Solow’s, get that effect.
但如果人们被取代，这是新的——“我们总是找到一种重新插入自己的方法”——“即使在萨缪尔森或索洛这样的理论模型中，你也不一定能达到这种效果。
You wrote a famous 1987 paper on political business cycle theory.
您在 1987 年写了一篇关于政治经济周期理论的著名论文。
How relevant do you think political business cycles have been since then?
您认为自那时以来政治商业周期的相关性如何？
Well, there’ve been a lot of papers on it.
嗯，已经有很多论文了。
I don’t think there’s any question every politician in the world, if they have the power, tries to goose up the economy before it happens.
我认为世界上每个政客如果有权力，都会在经济复苏之前试图提振经济，这是毫无疑问的。
I think empirically, it’s overwhelming that it’s true.
我认为从经验来看，这是事实，这是压倒性的。
The question is, why does it fool anyone?
问题是，为什么它能欺骗别人呢？
Everybody should understand why that’s going on.
每个人都应该明白为什么会这样。
Without going into details, that paper was about the paradox that I know you’re just making things look good.
没有详细说明，那篇论文是关于一个悖论，我知道你只是让事情看起来很好。
I know you’re hiding something from me, so that you’re exaggerating how long this can go on, how much it’s costing, but I’m going to vote for you anyway.
我知道你对我隐瞒了一些事情，所以你夸大了这会持续多久，要花多少钱，但无论如何我都会投票给你。
That’s what that paper was.
那张纸就是这样的。
It looked at it as a signaling model that’s getting really wonky.
它将其视为一种非常不稳定的信号模型。
The fiscal versions of political business cycle theory — they don’t have to fool anyone.
政治商业周期理论的财政版本 ——它们不必欺骗任何人。
You do get the money, and society as a whole has to pay it back, but you can come out ahead.
你确实得到了钱，整个社会都必须偿还，但你可以领先。
There’s another, I’m going to just translate it a little bit from my model, one that my late colleague, Alberto Alesina, did, and a number of others, that said part of the reason debt keeps piling up is we have the liberal party and the conservative party.
还有另一个，我将根据我已故同事阿尔贝托·阿莱西纳（Alberto Alesina）和其他一些人所做的模型稍微翻译一下，他们说债务不断堆积的部分原因是我们有自由党和保守党。
When the liberal party is in power, they know that debt is bad, but they know they can spend now.
当自由党执政时，他们知道债务不好，但他们知道现在可以花钱。
They know they might not control it in the future, so they spend a lot and they borrow.
他们知道他们将来可能无法控制它，所以他们花很多钱并借钱。
When the conservatives are in power, they cut taxes and build up the debt.
当保守派掌权时，他们会减税并增加债务。
I think that’s a very, very powerful theory of part of why debt builds up is, whoever is in power says, “Don’t pay any attention to it.” Of course, I think we end up where we are now.
我认为这是一个非常非常有力的理论，解释债务积累的部分原因是，无论谁掌权，都会说：“不要关注它。”当然，我认为我们最终会达到现在的水平。
On phasing out (some) currency
关于逐步淘汰（某些）货币
In an earlier book, you called for phasing out of currency and large denomination bills.
在之前的一本书中，您呼吁逐步淘汰货币和大面额纸币。
Do you still want to do this?
你还想这样做吗？
Oh, I call out for phasing most currency.
哦，我呼吁逐步使用大多数货币。
I’m not phasing it all out right away.
我不会立即将其全部淘汰。
That takes a generation.
这需要一代人的时间。
Sweden has done it.
瑞典已经做到了。
It doesn’t take that long if people are on board.
如果有人在船上的话，不需要那么长时间。
It’s very hard to run across currency in Sweden today, and they didn’t even pass laws.
今天在瑞典很难遇到货币，他们甚至没有通过法律。
You’re right.
你说得对。
You have to travel 150 kilometers to get to an ATM machine, but it’s not completely phased out by any means.
你必须行驶 150 公里才能到达 ATM 机，但无论如何它还没有完全被淘汰。
It’s still there.
它还在那里。
First of all, we’ve had enough inflation that the $100 bill is now a $75 bill, I’ll say to start with.
首先，我首先要说的是，我们已经经历了足够的通货膨胀，100 美元的钞票现在变成了 75 美元的钞票。
I think most of the world’s currencies held in these large denomination notes.
我认为世界上大多数货币都以这些大面额纸币形式存在。
I’ve done further work — very little of it’s used in transactions.
我做了进一步的工作 —— 其中很少用于交易。
I think most of it is in the underground economy.
我认为大部分是在地下经济。
It’s not necessarily nefarious.
这并不一定是邪恶的。
There’s drug dealing, human smuggling, and everything, human trafficking, but I think the large majority of it is tax evasion.
有毒品交易、人口走私以及一切人口贩运，但我认为其中绝大多数是逃税。
Lots of people do that.
很多人都这么做。
I’m not trying to be holier than thou and just say everybody who does that is evil, but I’m looking from the government’s point of view.
我并不是想比你更神圣，只是说这样做的每个人都是邪恶的，但我是从政府的角度来看的。
Making money by saying, hey, people love these $100 bills and not figuring out that they’re using them not to pay taxes — I’ve argued that that’s penny-wise and pound-foolish.
赚钱的方法是说，嘿，人们喜欢这些 100 美元的钞票，却没有意识到他们用这些钞票是为了不纳税 —— 我认为这是因小失大。
That’s the core of the argument.
这就是争论的核心。
From an efficiency point of view, don’t you want to price discrimination in your tax system?
从效率的角度来看，您不想在税收制度中实行价格歧视吗？
Say people pay their nannies with $100 bills.
假设人们用 100 美元的钞票支付保姆的工资。
They wouldn’t hire the nanny if they had to pay taxes.
如果他们必须纳税，他们就不会雇用保姆。
Furthermore, if the transaction were recorded, they’d have to worry about social security issues.
此外，如果交易被记录，他们还得担心社会保障问题。
It’s a lot of paperwork and bureaucracy, very forbidding for a lot of people.
这是大量的文书工作和官僚作风，对很多人来说非常令人生畏。
You’re just lowering output by not making it easy for them to pay the nanny with cash.
你不让他们轻松地用现金支付保姆，只会降低产出。
I do think about that, but the question is why we need $100 bills for that.
我确实考虑过这一点，但问题是为什么我们需要 100 美元的钞票。
You can pay your nanny with 20s, and they’ll be perfectly happy because, actually, the $100 bills are harder to work with for them.
你可以用 20 美元付给你的保姆，他们会非常高兴，因为实际上，100 美元的钞票对他们来说更难工作。
No, I think you want to have ways that you can evade the law up to a point.
不，我认为你希望有办法在一定程度上逃避法律。
Marijuana is now legal in most places, and maybe the whole culture in society wouldn’t have evolved if we didn’t have a cash economy that could pay for that.
大麻现在在大多数地方都是合法的，如果我们没有可以支付大麻费用的现金经济，也许整个社会文化就不会进化。
Again, I think it’s a question of calibration, regulation, where you want to put things.
再说一遍，我认为这是一个校准、调节以及你想把东西放在哪里的问题。
Do you worry about the example of the Canadian truckers, where it becomes too easy to cut off people’s bank accounts, and there’s too much social power over a lot of people?
你是否担心加拿大卡车司机的例子，在这个例子中，切断人们的银行账户变得太容易了，而且社会权力对很多人来说太多了？
Again, I’m getting rid of the large denomination notes and not straightforwardly the others.
再说一次，我要扔掉大面额纸币，而不是直接扔掉其他纸币。
I absolutely agree there’re government excesses.
我绝对同意政府存在过度行为。
The question is, we have drugs that help people after an operation, and we want to have them, but it doesn’t mean we want to have them freely floating in the economy.
问题是，我们有可以帮助手术后患者的药物，我们希望拥有它们，但这并不意味着我们希望它们在经济中自由流动。
Also, we can phase out $100 bills and $50 bills.
此外，我们可以逐步淘汰 100 美元和 50 美元的钞票。
We can change our mind later and decide that we overdid it.
我们可以稍后改变主意并认为我们做得太过分了。
I don’t think we would.
我认为我们不会。
I think it will continue to go in that direction, but it’s a matter of costs and benefits.
我认为它会继续朝这个方向发展，但这是一个成本和收益的问题。
Do we also have to ban stablecoins then?
那么我们是否也必须禁止稳定币呢？
Because you can make $100, $500 transactions in stablecoins, and not everyone is used to doing that now, but you figure, within two years, your AI can do it for you if need be, and we’re just pushing more people into stablecoins.
因为你可以用稳定币进行 100 美元、500 美元的交易，现在并不是每个人都习惯这样做，但你认为，两年内，如果需要的话，你的人工智能可以为你做到这一点，而我们只是在推动更多的人进入稳定币。
Absolutely.
绝对地。
In the same book, I said we need to regulate cryptocurrency.
在同一本书中，我说我们需要监管加密货币。
There are different kinds of stablecoins, and it’s not clear where it’s ending up in the long run, but I think stablecoins eventually have to have some kind of parallel revealability to what bank accounts have.
稳定币有不同种类，目前还不清楚它最终会走向何方，但我认为稳定币最终必须具有某种与银行账户类似的可披露性。
Not necessarily exactly the same, but I know that’s where we’re headed.
不一定完全相同，但我知道这就是我们的前进方向。
I think the regulators are pretty favorable to stablecoins, actually, on the whole, but not if they’re being used to evade taxes and all kinds of regulations.
我认为监管机构实际上总体上对稳定币非常有利，但如果它们被用来逃避税收和各种监管，则情况并非如此。
The issuers can be abroad.
发行人可以在国外。
In that sense, it’s quite different from domestic banks, from currency.
从这个意义上说，它与国内银行、货币有很大不同。
If someone has a stablecoin account in the Cayman Islands, and they make a transaction with someone with a stablecoin account in Estonia, how much say do the US regulators really have over that?
如果有人在开曼群岛拥有稳定币账户，并且他们与在爱沙尼亚拥有稳定币账户的人进行交易，美国监管机构对此到底有多少发言权？
We don’t have much say over that.
我们对此没有太多发言权。
You already have that the case to some extent with bank accounts.
在某种程度上，银行账户已经存在这种情况。
You can mitigate the problem.
您可以缓解这个问题。
You can’t eliminate it.
你无法消除它。
That’s generally true of cryptocurrency.
加密货币通常也是如此。
You can try to regulate it.
你可以尝试调节一下。
You can’t completely eliminate it.
你无法完全消除它。
Probably, a lot of sanctions evasion is being done with stablecoins in cryptocurrency, and clearly, we have not been able to touch that.
也许，很多制裁逃避都是通过加密货币中的稳定币来完成的，显然，我们还无法触及这一点。
Should the US issue a CBDC, a digital coin?
美国应该发行CBDC（一种数字货币）吗？
Let me put it this way, I don’t think we should be the first to try this.
让我这样说吧，我认为我们不应该第一个尝试这个。
Right now, we’re on top.
现在，我们处于领先地位。
I think we peaked, but that’s another question.
我认为我们已经达到顶峰，但那是另一个问题了。
We are winning.
我们正在获胜。
Why do you want to change the rules of the game when we’re winning?
当我们获胜时，你为什么要改变游戏规则？
Because it’s not about the currency.
因为这与货币无关。
It’s about treasury bills, it’s about the interest payment, it’s about market clearing.
这与国库券有关，与利息支付有关，与市场出清有关。
Also, we’re so big.
而且，我们都这么大了。
We probably are more likely headed towards having competitive stablecoins which are regulated, which have some kind of lender of last resort than a CBDC.
我们可能更有可能倾向于拥有受监管的有竞争力的稳定币，这些稳定币有某种最后贷款人而不是 CBDC。
I’m skeptical of that.
我对此表示怀疑。
You put yourself in a position where one screw-up can paralyze everything.
你把自己置于这样一个境地：一个失误就能让一切瘫痪。
It wouldn’t be good if we had five stablecoins, and one of them had a problem.
如果我们有五个稳定币，其中一个出现问题，那就不好了。
I tend to think that’s something for Latvia or Singapore to try, and not necessarily the US.
我倾向于认为这是拉脱维亚或新加坡可以尝试的事情，而不一定是美国。
Yes, maybe in 50 years.
是的，也许50年后。
To be fair, Europe’s talking about it, but they’re talking about what we call a wholesale CBDC, which is among the banks, and that’s a completely different animal.
公平地说，欧洲正在谈论它，但他们正在谈论我们所说的批发 CBDC，这是在银行之间，这是一种完全不同的动物。
On macro puzzles
关于宏观谜题
A standard macro puzzle today.
今天的标准宏观难题。
We had a disinflation from post-COVID inflation.
我们经历了新冠疫情后通胀的通货紧缩。
It went from 8.9 percent to something not too far from 3 percent, and there’s no big recession.
它从 8.9% 下降到离 3% 不远的水平，而且没有出现大的衰退。
How do you interpret that?
你如何解释这一点？
Were the rational-expectations people right that it was credible, and we just did it?
理性预期的人们是否认为它是可信的，而我们就这么做了？
Or the people who say it was all supply shocks — are they right?
或者那些说这都是供应冲击的人——他们是对的吗？
It’s a big puzzle to me.
这对我来说是一个很大的谜题。
What do you think?
你怎么认为？
I think it is a big puzzle is the first thing to say.
我认为这是一个很大的谜题，这是首先要说的。
I’m not going to claim I thought that was going to be painless, bringing the inflation rate down.
我不会说我认为这会毫无痛苦地降低通货膨胀率。
I don’t think I was out there quite at the Larry Summers level, banging on the table, saying that there had to be a big recession.
我认为我还没有达到拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）的水平，敲着桌子说一定会出现一场大衰退。
I certainly do not buy the idea it was all supply shocks.
我当然不相信这都是供应冲击造成的。
That’s just nonsense.
那只是无稽之谈。
There are these people who say, “Oh, it was just the supply chain.
有些人说：“哦，这只是供应链。
The shipping lanes were closed and all that stuff.
航道被关闭等等。
As soon as the supply chains were back, inflation was down.”
一旦供应链恢复，通胀就会下降。”
Excuse me, the supply chain problems make the price go up.
抱歉，供应链问题导致价格上涨。
When they go away, the price should come down.
当他们离开时，价格应该会下降。
It did not.
但事实并非如此。
Even in countries which didn’t do as much macro stimulus as we did, they did a lot, and they all, of course, kept their monetary policy easy.
即使在那些没有像我们那样实施那么多宏观刺激的国家，他们也做了很多，当然，他们都保持宽松的货币政策。
Yes, the credibility is remarkable.
是的，可信度很高。
If you look at inflation expectations, they moved a little bit.
如果你看一下通胀预期，就会发现它们发生了一些变化。
I’m talking about the professional.
我说的是专业人士。
The consumer ones moved a little more.
消费者的移动幅度更大一些。
But considering what just happened, that inflation expectations didn’t move more — it’s remarkable.
但考虑到刚刚发生的事情，通胀预期并没有发生更大的变化，这很了不起。
To come back to the earlier point about solving our debt if we ever have an inflation, I don’t think that’s going to happen again.
回到之前关于如果出现通货膨胀如何解决我们的债务的问题，我认为这种情况不会再次发生。
When we have a second inflation, that time the credibility’s really going to be shot.
当我们出现第二次通货膨胀时，可信度真的会受到打击。
What else do you think of as an unresolved puzzle in macro, besides the disinflation?
除了通货紧缩之外，您认为宏观上还有哪些未解决的难题？
Boy, that’s a really good think because I think about research questions all the time.
天哪，这真是个好主意，因为我一直在思考研究问题。
It’s certainly been very surprising to me how much bank regulation has created all these arbitrage issues across things that didn’t exist.
让我感到非常惊讶的是，银行监管在不存在的事物上造成了所有这些套利问题。
I’m not sure this is completely unresolved, but when I was doing my book with Maurice Obstfeld, we thought of what we call covered interest parity as just something that holds like law.
我不确定这个问题是否完全没有得到解决，但是当我和莫里斯·奥布斯特菲尔德（Maurice Obstfeld）一起写书时，我们认为我们所说的备兑利率平价只是像法律一样成立的东西。
In other words, if you borrow in one country and you borrow in another country but do some kind of forward contract to undo it, you got the same interest rate.
换句话说，如果您在一个国家借款并在另一个国家借款，但签订了某种远期合约来撤销，那么您将获得相同的利率。
It’s not true anymore.
这不再是真的了。
I think there’s just a range of these puzzles that have come up since the crisis.
我认为自危机以来出现了一系列这样的难题。
I suppose another one would be, what kind of inflation rate do we really want to have?
我想另一个问题是，我们真正想要什么样的通货膨胀率？
There’s a lot of debate about that.
对此有很多争论。
There are people who say it shouldn’t be 2 percent; it should be 4 percent.
有人说不应该是2%，应该是2%。应该是4%。
Some people say it should be 0 percent.
有人说应该是0%。
I think that’s a big question.
我认为这是一个大问题。
Do you have any guess on the covered interest parity issue?
您对涵盖利息平价问题有什么猜测吗？
Because that bugs me all the time.
因为这一直困扰着我。
Do you think it’s an institutional friction?
您认为这是制度摩擦吗？
Or there’s some kind of unmeasured risk that we’re not seeing or picking up?
或者存在某种我们没有看到或发现的无法衡量的风险？
Or something else?
或者其他什么？
It seems to be that the banks are prevented from undoing it, that we have some of these regulations, for example, that just restrict the size of your balance sheet.
银行似乎无法撤销它，例如，我们有一些法规，只是限制资产负债表的规模。
The banks used to just be able to freely borrow and lend and undo things.
银行过去只能自由地借贷和撤消事情。
So, you’d borrow in one currency, lend in the other currency, and that’s how you’d undo it.
因此，您可以借入一种货币，借出另一种货币，这就是撤销的方式。
There’s just been a range of puzzles like that.
诸如此类的谜题层出不穷。
Of course, the biggest puzzle is productivity.
当然，最大的难题是生产力。
If I go to a country like the UK, how do we get productivity?
如果我去英国这样的国家，我们如何提高生产力？
And exchange rates are still a puzzle.
汇率仍然是一个谜。
You asked a question about it before, but we don’t have a good, fully satisfactory explanation of them.
你之前问过这个问题，但我们没有一个很好的、完全令人满意的解释。
You’ll be doing a book tour in the UK soon.
你很快就会在英国进行巡回售书活动。
Why has their growth, their productivity growth, been so slow?
为什么他们的增长、生产率增长如此缓慢？
Again, we all might admit this is a puzzle, but it surprised me.
再说一遍，我们都可能承认这是一个谜题，但这让我感到惊讶。
They have plenty of science.
他们有很多科学知识。
They have some great universities.
他们有一些很棒的大学。
They played a key role in developing vaccines and other innovations, and they seem entirely stuck.
他们在开发疫苗和其他创新方面发挥了关键作用，但他们似乎完全陷入困境。
Yes, it’s been a generalized problem in Europe, although you think they’d be doing better, but I think part of it is this sucking sound of the United States with the brain drain that we have.
是的，这是欧洲的一个普遍问题，尽管你认为他们会做得更好，但我认为部分原因是美国的人才流失造成的。
You and I both know about DeepMind, British company ends up in California.
你我都知道 DeepMind，这家英国公司最终落户加州。
I think there are many examples like that where, when something goes well, the US sucks them off.
我想这样的例子还有很多，当事情进展顺利时，美国就会把他们吸走。
Probably, they have this profound problem of the north and the south.
也许，他们有这个深刻的南北问题。
The south is rich, and the north is poor, and they just have not been able to figure that out.
南方富，北方穷，他们只是想不通。
If you go to London, they’re doing great, and they’re still doing great, but they’ve had trouble finding jobs.
如果你去伦敦，他们做得很好，而且仍然做得很好，但他们很难找到工作。
The manufacturing jobs are going.
制造业的工作岗位正在消失。
They haven’t figured out how to substitute for them.
他们还没有弄清楚如何替代它们。
The US is at the tech revolution.
美国正处于科技革命之中。
If you took that away, we don’t look so good anymore.
如果你把它拿走，我们看起来就不再那么好了。
A lot of countries don’t seem to have a sucking-sound problem though.
不过，许多国家似乎并不存在吸音问题。
The talented people in northern UK go to southern UK, but you look at Germany, the Netherlands — you don’t see the same thing happening in those places.
英国北部的人才去了英国南部，但你看看德国、荷兰——你看不到这些地方发生同样的事情。
Is it because London is so good that the country as a whole grows more slowly?
是不是因为伦敦太好了，所以整个国家的发展速度就慢了？
Is that a curse for the aggregate number?
这是对总数的诅咒吗？
It’s still the case that those countries have hardly been models of dynamism — Germany and the Netherlands.
事实仍然是，这些国家很难成为活力的典范——德国和荷兰。
You’re right, they’ve been able to keep people more, partly because they’re not English-speaking.
你是对的，他们能够留住更多的人，部分原因是他们不会说英语。
Again, a lot of the difference in how we’ve done is our tech sector.
同样，我们的做法有很多不同之处在于我们的科技领域。
That’s been a lot of the innovation going through the economy.
这是经济中的大量创新。
I don’t want to sound like I’m drunk with what’s going on with our tech sector and how it affects other things, but if you took that away, our numbers would look like theirs.
我不想听起来像是我对我们科技行业正在发生的事情以及它如何影响其他事情感到陶醉，但如果你把这一点拿走，我们的数字看起来就会像他们的一样。
Is Milei going to make it succeed in Argentina?
Milei 能否在阿根廷取得成功？
What does it depend upon?
它取决于什么？
I hope so.
我希望如此。
I think he’s the best chance that Argentina’s had in a long time, which is, fair to say, a very low bar.
我认为他是阿根廷队长期以来最好的机会，公平地说，这是一个非常低的标准。
The thing that he’s done that I have not seen before is balancing the budget.
他所做的事情是我以前从未见过的，那就是平衡预算。
If you’re a big borrower and you keep defaulting, a starting point is figuring out how not to have to borrow money, and he’s managed to do that.
如果你是一个大借款人并且一直违约，那么你的起点就是弄清楚如何不必借钱，而他已经成功做到了这一点。
I don’t know that all his libertarian visions necessarily will come to pass, but he’s provided some stability, bringing inflation down.
我不知道他所有的自由主义愿景一定会实现，但他提供了一定的稳定性，降低了通货膨胀。
It’s so sad.
太难过了。
Argentina, as you know, was one of the richest countries in the world by any measure at the turn of the 20th century in 1900.
如您所知，在 1900 年 20 世纪之交，阿根廷是世界上最富有的国家之一。
Now they’re a lower middle-income country.
现在他们是一个中低收入国家。
Their per capita income is below Brazil, which is hard to get your head wrapped around.
他们的人均收入低于巴西，这很难让人理解。
I think there are many reasons, but certainly Peronism, socialism has not done well by Argentina.
我认为原因有很多，但肯定是庇隆主义、社会主义在阿根廷做得不好。
But has he balanced the budget?
但他平衡了预算吗？
I know he announced a balanced budget, but this is April 2025, and they just borrowed $20 million from the IMF.
我知道他宣布了平衡预算，但现在是 2025 年 4 月，他们刚刚从国际货币基金组织借了 2000 万美元。
It doesn’t sound like a very balanced budget.
这听起来不像是一个非常平衡的预算。
It’s counting the interest payments on the IMF, and yes, he inherited this big debt.
算上国际货币基金组织的利息支付，是的，他继承了这笔巨额债务。
They’re paying the interest.
他们正在支付利息。
It’s very low interest on the big debt, and I don’t know how that’s ultimately going to get resolved.
大笔债务的利息非常低，我不知道这最终将如何解决。
They have a lot of problems ahead, but there’s a lot of strength in Argentina if they can grow again.
他们前面有很多问题，但如果阿根廷能够再次成长，他们就有很大的实力。
I don’t want to sound Panglossian about Argentina, but goodness, they had inflation of 200 percent when he took over.
我不想让阿根廷显得过于乐观，但天哪，他接任时阿根廷的通货膨胀率高达 200%。
The economy was in free fall.
经济直线下滑。
Look, there’s no magic wand you can wave over the last 80, 90 years of Argentina and make everything right.
听着，没有什么魔杖能让你在阿根廷过去的 80、90 年里挥舞一切，让一切都好起来。
On chess
论国际象棋
Some chess questions.
一些国际象棋问题。
Once a grandmaster, always a grandmaster, so you can’t just say you don’t know.
一日为宗师，终生为宗师，不能说不知道。
Is Gukesh the next dominant chess player, or will he be first among the equals?
古克什会是下一个占据主导地位的国际象棋棋手，还是会成为与他平起平坐的第一人？
He’s not even nearly first now, even among others.
即使在其他人中，他现在甚至还不是第一。
There’re a number of Indian players who are very good.
印度有很多非常优秀的球员。
I wouldn’t put him ahead of Nakamura or Caruana, much less Carlsen.
我不会把他放在中村或卡鲁阿纳之前，更不用说卡尔森了。
But he’s ambitious.
但他雄心勃勃。
He’s talented.
他很有才华。
I wish him the best.
我祝他一切顺利。
It’s wonderful that he won, but he has got a long way to go to beat Kasparov, Fischer, Carlsen.
他赢了真是太好了，但要击败卡斯帕罗夫、费舍尔、卡尔森，他还有很长的路要走。
It’d be fabulous for chess if he does that.
如果他能做到这一点，那对国际象棋来说真是太棒了。
I don’t see it yet.
我还没看到。
Do you?
你？
Well, Nakamura, Caruana — in five years, they’ll be out of the scene, maybe before then.
嗯，中村、卡鲁阿纳——五年后，他们就会退出舞台，也许在那之前。
Carlsen is already, in a sense, out of the scene.
从某种意义上说，卡尔森已经退出了舞台。
I think he has a 30 percent or 40 percent chance of being not a truly dominant player, but say the way Anand or Kramnik were at their peak.
我认为他有 30% 或 40% 的机会不是真正的统治级球员，但要说阿南德或克拉姆尼克在巅峰时期的表现。
One of the top two or three very consistently, and world champion for some number of cycles.
一直是前二名或前三名之一，并且是一些周期的世界冠军。
Not the way Kasparov was, but something quite impressive.
不像卡斯帕罗夫那样，但令人印象深刻。
I’m close to thinking that.
我快要这么想了。
It’d be fantastic.
那就太棒了。
I thought you were asking a different question.
我以为你问的是不同的问题。
No, the next, not the current dominant, but is he the next dominant player?
不，下一个，不是现在的统治者，但他是下一个统治者吗？
Oh, he could absolutely.
哦，他绝对可以。
Anand and Kramnik were amazing, and he could absolutely do that.
阿南德和克拉姆尼克太棒了，他绝对可以做到这一点。
He’s close to having done it.
他即将完成这件事。
He’ll have a much more difficult challenger next time I would suspect.
我怀疑下次他会遇到一个更难对付的挑战者。
Ding is an uber-talent — the person he beat — but clearly had all sorts of mental problems in the match.
丁是一个超级天才——“被他打败的人”——但在比赛中显然有各种各样的心理问题。
He’s been depressed, and you could see him losing it in some games.
他一直很沮丧，你可以看到他在某些比赛中失落。
What were your impressions of Bobby Fischer when you met him?
当您见到鲍比·费舍尔时，您对他的印象如何？
He was amazing, first of all.
首先，他太棒了。
When I met him, he came every day to the 1969 US Junior Championship over 10 days.
当我遇见他时，他每天都来观看1969年美国青少年锦标赛，连续10天。
He sat and he analyzed with us.
他坐下来和我们一起分析。
The first thing was just, “What’s he doing with us?
第一件事就是：“他对我们做什么？
Why is he wasting his time with us?” We just thought he was so generous.
他为什么要在我们身上浪费时间？”我们只是觉得他很慷慨。
Obviously, his absolute intensity, his commitment.
显然，他的绝对强度，他的承诺。
I don’t know if you remember, it’s hard to imagine, but he actually used to be weak at rook endings, weak for somebody like that.
我不知道你是否还记得，这很难想象，但他实际上曾经在车结局上很弱，对于这样的人来说很弱。
He locked himself in a room for three months and did nothing but study rook endings and got to be very good.
他把自己关在房间里三个月，除了研究车结局什么都不做，结果变得非常好。
He told us about it.
他告诉了我们这件事。
Got a hotel room with no view.
得到了一个没有风景的酒店房间。
Certainly, some of the ideas he showed, I still think about.
当然，他所表现出的一些想法，我仍然在思考。
I won a game, and he went over it with me, against Steve Spencer.
我赢了一场比赛，他和我一起讨论了，对阵史蒂夫·斯宾塞。
It was the last game of the tournament, which I won.
这是锦标赛的最后一场比赛，我赢了。
He showed me his ideas.
他向我展示了他的想法。
I was like, “I hadn’t thought of any of them.” It was just his fertile .
我当时想，“我没有想到其中任何一个。”这只是他的生育能力。
.
。
.
。
I don’t know if they were better — to be completely honest — than what I played.
我不知道他们是否比我玩的更好（老实说）。
Of course, he’s much better than me.
当然，他比我好得多。
Just the imagination of there was this, and we’re talking about on move four, on move five, just things that wouldn’t occur to me.
只是想象而已，我们正在谈论第四步、第五步，只是我不会想到的事情。
Part of the Fischer legend was that, at least supposedly, he was the greatest over-the-board analyst of any chess player.
费舍尔传奇的一部分是，至少据推测，他是所有国际象棋棋手中最伟大的全面分析师。
Well, Garry Kasparov was no fool and same with Carlsen.
好吧，加里·卡斯帕罗夫并不傻，卡尔森也一样。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
He was way above everybody in his generation.
他远远高于他那一代人。
He did not have the prep that the Russians had.
他没有像俄罗斯人那样做好准备。
He worked on his own.
他自己干活。
He was not working with a team.
他没有与团队一起工作。
The Russians had all this communication and coaches and everything.
俄罗斯人拥有所有这些沟通和教练以及一切。
By the way, I was representing the US in the World Junior Championships and things like that.
顺便说一句，我代表美国参加了世界青年锦标赛之类的比赛。
It was a big disadvantage that you didn’t have a trainer or a coach organizing information.
没有培训师或教练来组织信息是一个很大的缺点。
Fischer was doing that at the highest level.
费舍尔以最高水平做到了这一点。
He must have been, by far, the best over-the-board player then.
到目前为止，他一定是当时最好的全面球员。
Not player.
不是玩家。
Just someone, if you would sit down with them at the board and show them your game, the claim I’ve heard is that Fischer was a more astute analyst even than Kasparov.
只是一个人，如果你愿意和他们坐在棋盘上并向他们展示你的游戏，我听到的说法是费舍尔甚至比卡斯帕罗夫更精明的分析师。
Kasparov might have been the better player, but just willing to put his entire mental energy into over-the-board analysis, sitting there.
卡斯帕罗夫可能是更好的选手，但只是愿意将他的全部精神能量投入到全面的分析中，坐在那里。
I think that’s part of the Fischer legend.
我认为这是费舍尔传奇的一部分。
It’s part of the legend.
这是传说的一部分。
He was amazing.
他太棒了。
I played against, really, all the top players then with the exception of Spassky.
事实上，我和当时除了斯帕斯基之外的所有顶级棋手都交过手。
They were all phenomenal, but they weren’t all equally good calculators.
他们都是非凡的，但他们并不是同样优秀的计算器。
The best calculator I ever played was actually a Yugoslav player who reached second or third, named Ljubojević.
我玩过的最好的计算器实际上是一位获得第二或第三名的南斯拉夫选手，名叫柳博耶维奇（Ljubojević）。
He beat me.
他打败了我。
I don’t know, I was 16 years old.
我不知道，那年我16岁。
To try to salvage some ego, I said, “What if I did this?
为了挽回一些自我，我说：“如果我这样做怎么办？
What were you going to do?” And I showed him my best.
你打算做什么？我向他展示了我最好的一面。
I thought it was just like a great variation.
我认为这就像一个巨大的变化。
I don’t remember how long, 10 moves.
不记得多久了，10步。
He goes, “Mm-hmm, but then I do this.
他说：“嗯嗯，但我会这样做。
Actually, it’s this,” and he goes something, 15 moves.
事实上，就是这个”，然后他做了 15 个动作。
I never played Fischer.
我从来没有玩过费舍尔。
He wrote an article about me once, as you know, but I never played him.
如你所知，他曾经写过一篇关于我的文章，但我从来没有和他比赛过。
Of course, I could well imagine it would be the same.
当然，我完全可以想象它会是一样的。
I’m not sure I could tell the difference with Kasparov, Carlsen at that level.
我不确定我能在那个级别上与卡斯帕罗夫、卡尔森区分开来。
When Magnus spoke with Lex Fridman, he drew a distinction between players who were incredible calculators — he called Gukesh one of those — and players who were incredible with evaluation, and he called himself one of those.
当马格努斯与莱克斯·弗里德曼交谈时，他区分了具有令人难以置信的计算能力的球员（他称古克什是其中之一）和具有令人难以置信的评估能力的球员，他称自己是其中之一。
He thinks he’s actually not the best calculator.
他认为他实际上不是最好的计算器。
Do you broadly agree with that distinction?
您大体上同意这种区别吗？
I think it’s an interesting question.
我认为这是一个有趣的问题。
It’s funny because I’ve seen him write about Karpov, who I did play, and he said, “I don’t know how Karpov does it.
这很有趣，因为我看过他写过我扮演的卡尔波夫，他说：“我不知道卡尔波夫是怎么做到的。
He just knows where to put the pieces.
他只知道把碎片放在哪里。
He just knows where everything goes, and he’s not having to calculate like I do.”
他只知道一切的进展，而不必像我一样计算。”
His great nemesis was Karpov, and between the two of them, he was the calculator.
他的宿敌是卡尔波夫，而他就是他们两人之间的计算器。
Karpov was no slouch, but Kasparov was better.
卡尔波夫并不逊色，但卡斯帕罗夫更胜一筹。
I think maybe as Garry gets older, your comparative advantage as a calculator is probably at your peak at a younger age.
我认为，随着加里年龄的增长，你作为计算器的相对优势可能会在年轻时达到顶峰。
Garry developed other tools, but he was really good at both.
加里还开发了其他工具，但他在这两方面都非常擅长。
But I would’ve put Kasparov as a calculator, like a fierce calculator.
但我会把卡斯帕罗夫当作一个计算器，就像一个强大的计算器。
Now, you must have been out of practice, but I believe you drew Magnus in a game of speed chess in 2012.
现在，你一定已经缺乏练习了，但我相信你在 2012 年的一场快速国际象棋比赛中画了马格努斯。
Is that the correct year?
这是正确的年份吗？
Yes, it really happened.
是的，这确实发生了。
How did it happen?
它是怎么发生的？
What’s the story?
这是什么故事？
What I tell people is, if you were a professional golfer once, and you play three holes with somebody, anything can happen — the law of large numbers.
我告诉人们的是，如果你曾经是一名职业高尔夫球手，并且与某人一起打三个洞，那么任何事情都可能发生 - 大数定律。
But going more into it, he let me have white, we played a Ruy Lopez Spanish opening, which he had been playing all the time.
但更深入地说，他让我喝白棋，我们演奏了鲁伊·洛佩兹（Ruy Lopez）的西班牙开场曲，他一直在演奏。
He played a variation.
他演奏了变奏曲。
I looked; I hadn’t prepared.
我看了看；我没有做好准备。
It’s just what he was playing all the time.
这就是他一直在玩的东西。
Did he play the Breyer like he used to do?
他还像以前那样演奏布雷耶吗？
He played the Breyer.
他演奏了布雷耶。
That’s right.
这是正确的。
He played the Breyer, and I didn’t even know that he played it at the time.
他弹的是布雷耶琴，我当时根本不知道他弹过。
He played a lot of things.
他玩了很多东西。
I didn’t know he was playing that.
我不知道他在玩那个。
I knew where the pieces go.
我知道碎片去哪儿了。
I knew what I was trying to do and where the pieces go.
我知道我想做什么，也知道这些碎片去哪里了。
At one point he made an overly aggressive move that just was a big mistake.
有一次，他做出了过于激进的举动，这是一个很大的错误。
I saw it, and I got a winning advantage.
我看到了，我获得了制胜优势。
It wasn’t an easy winning advantage.
这并不是一个容易获胜的优势。
I’m convinced that if he had continued the game, he would’ve won.
我坚信，如果他继续比赛，他就会赢。
At some point, he had a choice of repeating moves, and he was losing.
在某些时候，他可以选择重复动作，但他输了。
So, he just repeated moves.
所以，他只是重复动作。
I’m not saying I would’ve won.
我并不是说我会赢。
I think I would’ve lost if he kept playing, but it just happened.
我想如果他继续打我就会输，但事情就这样发生了。
If I did it 10,000, 20,000 times more, I don’t think it would happen.
如果我再做一万次、两万次，我认为这不会发生。
What do you think of Fischer Random as the future of chess?
您如何看待 Fischer Random 作为国际象棋的未来？
Because that’s seems to be what Magnus wants.
因为这似乎就是马格努斯想要的。
I don’t like it, frankly, but what’s your opinion?
坦率地说，我不喜欢它，但你的意见如何？
I’m with you, Tyler.
我和你在一起，泰勒。
I take joy from classical chess.
我从古典象棋中获得乐趣。
I love watching a beautiful classical chess game.
我喜欢看一场优美的古典象棋比赛。
I can relate to it.
我能理解它。
I’m hardwired to think about it.
我本能地去思考这个问题。
Fischer Random Chess — it’s a little bit like looking at problems.
费舍尔随机象棋 — 有点像看问题。
I respect chess problems, but the positions are often weird and improbable.
我尊重国际象棋问题，但棋局往往很奇怪且不可能。
I just have trouble relating to Fischer Random Chess.
我只是对费舍尔随机象棋有疑问。
I hope I change.
我希望我能改变。
I’m just speaking from my age, but I’m so invested in classical chess.
我只是从我的年龄来说，但我对古典象棋非常投入。
I love classical chess.
我喜欢古典象棋。
I think about classical chess all the time.
我一直在思考古典象棋。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
Why don’t you like it?
你为什么不喜欢它？
With classical chess, not every game, but most games, I feel I can look at the board and have a decent idea of what’s going on.
对于古典象棋，不是每场比赛，而是大多数比赛，我觉得我可以看着棋盘，对正在发生的事情有一个很好的了解。
I might be wrong, but even then, I can figure out ex post why I was wrong.
我可能是错的，但即便如此，我也能事后找出我错的原因。
With Fischer Random, I don’t have that sense unless it evolves back into a classical-looking position.
对于费舍尔随机，我没有这种感觉，除非它演变成一个经典的位置。
From a spectator’s point of view, why should I care?
从旁观者的角度来看，我为什么要关心？
That’s how I would put it.
我就是这么说的。
Yes, we’re on the same page on that, but on the other hand, you mentioned Gukesh.
是的，我们在这一点上意见一致，但另一方面，你提到了古克什。
The computers just dominate the preparation.
计算机只是主导了准备工作。
That’s why Carlson stopped.
这就是卡尔森停下来的原因。
He didn’t want to spend all the time —
他不想把所有的时间都花在——
How are we going to solve that problem then if we don’t do Fisher Random, what is your proposed solution?
如果我们不进行费舍尔随机，我们将如何解决这个问题，您建议的解决方案是什么？
I have one.
我有一个。
I’ll tell you mine, but you tell me yours first.
我会告诉你我的，但你先告诉我你的。
Tell me yours.
告诉我你的。
That we randomize the first few moves of the opening, so some percentage of games through computer randomization would be like b4, 1, b6, 1, and then they start playing.
我们对开局的前几个动作进行随机化，因此通过计算机随机化的一定比例的游戏将是 b4, 1, b6, 1，然后他们开始玩。
But you do that with many permutations.
但你可以通过许多排列来做到这一点。
They’re all playable positions.
它们都是可玩的位置。
As you well know, no grandmaster game would go b4, 1, b6, 1, but there’s no reason why you can’t play from that position.
如您所知，没有大师游戏会走 b4, 1, b6, 1，但您没有理由不能从该位置玩。
If you have 500 opening alternatives like that, that the players don’t control, I just don’t think they can prep that much.
如果你有 500 个这样的开局选择，玩家无法控制，我只是认为他们无法准备那么多。
The Berlin, the Marshall, the whatever — all these forced draws.
柏林、马歇尔，无论什么——所有这些强制抽签。
I think they actually have to play chess.
我认为他们实际上必须下棋。
I love that idea and, yes, it creates some randomness in what initial positions you get.
我喜欢这个想法，是的，它会为你获得的初始位置带来一些随机性。
I love that idea.
我喜欢这个主意。
That sounds much better to me.
这对我来说听起来好多了。
I have to say, as a player, I played like that because I was very isolated in the United States.
我不得不说，作为一名球员，我这样打球是因为我在美国非常孤立。
I wasn’t following all the opening innovations.
我并没有关注所有的开放式创新。
I played all kinds of openings to be unpredictable.
我打出了各种难以预测的开局。
If everyone does it, it’s easier to do.
如果每个人都这样做，那就更容易做到。
It’s like every game is between two Ken Regans, is one way to put it.
一种说法是，就像每场比赛都是在两个肯·雷根之间进行的。
Yes, I like your idea.
是的，我喜欢你的想法。
I think it’s a great idea, I endorse it.
我认为这是一个好主意，我赞同它。
Thank you.
谢谢。
Final question for you, for our listeners.
最后一个问题问你，问我们的听众。
Your book’s coming out.
你的书要出版了。
It’s on very important issues of currencies, international trade, international finance.
它涉及货币、国际贸易、国际金融等非常重要的问题。
It draws upon a lifetime of your learning and practice and advising.
它借鉴了你一生的学习、实践和建议。
What is it you think you’ll do next?
您认为接下来会做什么？
Like any academic, I already have my next few years of projects.
像任何学者一样，我已经有了未来几年的项目。
Some of them, frankly, grow out of the book.
坦率地说，其中一些是从书中发展出来的。
I think people have forgotten about political economy.
我认为人们已经忘记了政治经济学。
They just think if the central bank says the inflation rate’s 2 percent, on average, it’ll be 2 percent, and we go home.
他们只是认为，如果央行说通胀率为 2%，那么平均通胀率就是 2%，然后我们就回家了。
I worked on that early in my life.
我很早就致力于此。
I wrote the first paper on why you should have an independent central bank.
我写了第一篇关于为什么应该拥有独立中央银行的论文。
I’m working on it again, admittedly with some very talented young people, including Marina Halac at Yale and Pierre Yared, who’s at Columbia, but now actually on the Council of Economic Advisors.
我正在再次研究这个问题，诚然，我和一些非常有才华的年轻人一起工作，其中包括耶鲁大学的玛丽娜·哈拉克（Marina Halac）和哥伦比亚大学的皮埃尔·亚里德（Pierre Yared），他现在实际上是经济顾问委员会的成员。
And just thinking that, no, the political pressures are important, so that’s an important topic.
只是想，不，政治压力很重要，所以这是一个重要的话题。
I’m also working on China.
我也在中国工作。
It’s an area I’ve been working on for a long time.
这是我长期以来一直致力于的领域。
I have some thoughts about comparing China and Japan, for example.
例如，我对比较中国和日本有一些想法。
I have a lot of things I’m excited about.
我有很多令我兴奋的事情。
Part of what was so great about the book is, I had, I would describe, a mini Renaissance in my research.
这本书的伟大之处在于，我的研究经历了一次迷你文艺复兴。
At least I feel that way.
至少我是这么感觉的。
I don’t know if the rest of the world thinks that.
我不知道世界其他地方是否也这么认为。
It gives me joy to have some confidence about some of the ideas, although, as you say, there’s much more to it.
对某些想法有信心让我很高兴，尽管正如你所说，还有更多的东西。
Again, everyone, Ken’s new and excellent book is Our Dollar, Your Problem.
各位，肯的新书《我们的钱，你的问题》是一本优秀的新书。
Ken Rogoff, thank you very much.
肯·罗格夫，非常感谢你。
Thank you.
谢谢。