Joseph Stiglitz on Pioneering Economic Theories, Policy Challenges, and His Intellectual Legacy (Ep. 215)
This transcript is sponsored “in tribute to my father Jim Watson, who like his favorite blogger, Tyler Cowen, is enormously curious and optimistic.”
这份文字记录的赞助“是为了向我的父亲吉姆·沃森致敬，他像他最喜欢的博主泰勒·考恩一样，充满好奇和乐观。”
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today I’m with Joseph Stiglitz.
今天我和约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨在一起。
He has won a Nobel Prize in economics, and if they did such things, he could have won several Nobel prizes in economics.
他获得过诺贝尔经济学奖，如果他们做这样的事，他本来可以获得好几个诺贝尔经济学奖。
He has a 153-page vitae online, which is neither complete nor really has any chaff.
他在网上有一份长达 153 页的简历，既不完整，也没有任何废话。
Most notably today, he has a new book out called The Road to Freedom: Economics and the Good Society.
今天最引人注目的是，他出版了一本新书，名为《自由之路：经济学与美好社会》。
Joe, welcome.
乔，欢迎。
Nice to be here.
很高兴来到这里。
I’d like to talk about just how your career has evolved.
我想谈谈您的职业生涯是如何发展的。
There’s an anecdote I read, your breakthrough piece.
我读过一则轶事，是你的突破性作品。
We’re going back now to about 1970.
我们现在要回到 1970 年左右。
You’re writing with Michael Rothschild on the issue of increasing risk, and I read that these two pieces actually came from an eight-hour lecture you gave in Japan.
您正在与迈克尔·罗斯柴尔德（Michael Rothschild）就风险增加的问题撰写文章，我读到这两篇文章实际上来自您在日本进行的一次八小时的讲座。
Is that true?
这是真的吗？
Well, actually, not those two pieces, but a series of pieces on corporate governance and market value maximization came from an eight-hour lecture I gave in Hakone, Japan.
嗯，实际上，不是这两篇文章，而是一系列关于公司治理和市场价值最大化的文章，来自我在日本箱根所做的八小时讲座。
How can you lecture for eight hours?
你怎么能讲八个小时？
It’s easier to lecture than to listen for eight hours.
讲课比听八个小时容易。
I didn’t understand that then, but I now understand it a little bit better.
当时我不太明白，但现在我明白了一些。
Easier to talk than to listen.
说比听容易。
Did your audience even understand you?
你的观众理解你吗？
Did you have that sense?
你有这样的感觉吗？
Oh, I did.
哦，我做到了。
I did have a sense they understood me.
我确实有一种感觉，他们理解我。
They understood the major themes.
他们理解主要主题。
Much of what I was talking about was mathematical, and it was a more mathematically trained audience, so they could follow the scribbles, but I also think they could follow the ideas.
我谈论的大部分内容都是数学的，而且受众都是受过更多数学训练的，所以他们可以遵循那些涂鸦，但我也认为他们可以遵循这些想法。
One of the ideas was whether a firm that maximized its value — if all firms did that, would that lead to the well-being of society, the well-being of welfare?
其中一个想法是，一家企业是否能够实现其价值最大化——如果所有企业都这样做，这会带来社会的福祉、福利的福祉吗？
The result of that was that shareholder value maximization did not, in general, lead to welfare maximization.
其结果是，股东价值最大化通常不会导致福利最大化。
In those talks, did you outline what’s sometimes called the unanimity theorem in a way shareholders agree?
在这些谈话中，您是否以股东同意的方式概述了有时被称为一致定理的内容？
Yes, that was one of the ideas in that long lecture.
是的，这就是那个长篇演讲中的想法之一。
The lecture then got published in about four or five different papers, and one of the papers with Sandy Grossman was an articulation of that unanimity theorem.
该演讲随后发表在大约四到五篇不同的论文中，其中一篇与桑迪·格罗斯曼合作的论文是对一致定理的阐述。
That theorem said, what were the conditions under which all shareholders would agree with each other, regardless of what their beliefs were or perceptions, just like if they knew what prices were?
该定理说，在什么条件下，所有股东都会彼此达成一致，无论他们的信念或看法是什么，就像他们知道价格是多少一样？
The answer was very, very restrictive conditions.
答案是非常非常严格的条件。
When you’re presenting ideas to an audience, do you find that as you talk about the idea, that you actually develop the idea itself?
当你向观众展示想法时，你是否发现当你谈论这个想法时，你实际上在发展这个想法本身？
Or is it simply something pre-packaged and it stays as it was?
或者它只是预先包装好的东西并且保持原样？
No, every lecture is a learning experience for me.
不，每一次讲座对我来说都是一次学习经历。
I learned that often, questioning will stimulate me to think of other developments of the idea, other aspects I hadn’t thought of.
我了解到，提问常常会刺激我思考这个想法的其他发展，以及我没有想到的其他方面。
Most importantly, I come to understand better the mindset of the listener, how they think about the topic, and then what are the difficulties, the obstacles they have to understanding my perspective.
最重要的是，我开始更好地理解听众的心态，他们如何看待这个话题，以及他们理解我的观点时遇到的困难和障碍。
In future lectures, then, I can adapt my presentations to better reflect how they’re seeing the world and hopefully do a better job of explaining.
那么，在未来的讲座中，我可以调整我的演讲，以更好地反映他们如何看待世界，并希望能更好地解释。
This is really part of the art of pedagogy, the art of teaching.
这确实是教育学艺术、教学艺术的一部分。
How did being a debater earlier in your life influence your intellectual career?
您早年成为一名辩手对您的学术生涯有何影响？
It had an enormous influence.
它产生了巨大的影响。
Debating was a very valuable skill in terms of organizing ideas and making you see both sides of the topic because the peculiar way that debating is organized in our high schools is, you have to take both sides.
辩论是一项非常有价值的技能，它可以组织想法并让你看到主题的双方，因为我们高中组织辩论的特殊方式是，你必须站在双方的立场上。
You don’t know until you go to a debating tournament, are you on one side or the other?
直到你去参加辩论比赛你才知道你是站在一边还是另一边？
Of course, after you study a topic, you may wind up on one side, but you have to be able to think, to understand the other side so well that you can even present their argument.
当然，当你研究一个主题后，你可能会站在某一方，但你必须能够思考，能够很好地理解另一方，甚至可以提出他们的论点。
That’s a really important skill.
这是一项非常重要的技能。
The other aspect of debating that was really important for me as I was growing up is, it really got me interested in economics and public policy issues.
在我的成长过程中，辩论对我来说非常重要的另一个方面是，它确实让我对经济和公共政策问题产生了兴趣。
I still remember one of the issues that we debated way back in the ’50s was, should the government be providing support to the agricultural sector, subsidies?
我还记得我们在五十年代争论的问题之一是，政府是否应该向农业部门提供支持、补贴？
That’s an issue that we are still debating 60 years later.
这是 60 年后我们仍在争论的一个问题。
You were a debater, and when you were at Amherst, you were also head of student government, right?
你是一名辩手，当你在阿默斯特时，你也是学生会主席，对吧？
That’s right.
这是正确的。
You voted to abolish fraternities.
你投票决定废除兄弟会。
Isn’t there good evidence that fraternities raise wages?
难道没有充分的证据表明兄弟会可以提高工资吗？
That was unions raise wages.
那就是工会提高工资。
Fraternities — I was opposed to fraternities because Amherst was a small college, a thousand boys, men, and they had the effect of dividing the community.
兄弟会——我反对兄弟会，因为阿默斯特是一所小型大学，有一千名男孩、男人，他们具有分裂社区的效果。
The philosophy that I had was that we should be one community.
我的理念是我们应该成为一个社区。
The fraternities tended to interfere with that.
兄弟会往往会干涉这一点。
Students from one fraternity would always sit at dinner at the same tables with the members of their fraternity.
来自某个兄弟会的学生总是会与该兄弟会的成员坐在同一张桌子上吃饭。
There were class aspects of fraternities.
兄弟会也有阶级的一面。
They were just, I thought, very divisive in a small community, and it turned out that my perspective eventually prevailed.
我认为他们只是在一个小社区中造成了很大的分歧，结果我的观点最终占了上风。
A number of years later, Amherst did abolish the fraternities.
几年后，阿默斯特确实废除了兄弟会。
It’s an important lesson to me in my political life.
这对我的政治生活来说是一个重要的教训。
Sometimes you begin a campaign knowing that in the next year, two years — while you’re actually there — you may not succeed, but sowing the seeds of discussion, debate, maybe in 5, sometimes 10, sometimes 15, 20 years, things turn out and you wind up winning the debate.
有时你开始一场竞选活动时知道，在接下来的一年、两年————当你真正在那里的时候————你可能不会成功，但播下讨论、辩论的种子，也许在 5 年、有时是 10 年、有时是 15 年、20 年里，事情就会发生，你最终会赢得辩论。
You didn’t think it was efficient Tiebout clustering for networks?
您不认为这是高效的 Tiebout 网络聚类吗？
If you hang out with a bunch of people, you get to know them very well; they recommend you for jobs.
如果你和一群人一起出去玩，你就会非常了解他们；他们推荐你找工作。
That’s why the wage is higher.
这就是工资比较高的原因。
Well, my view is, you can hang out, you can form networks, but the way that fraternities were organized was more divisive than the positive benefits that you talk about.
嗯，我的观点是，你可以出去玩，你可以建立网络，但兄弟会的组织方式比你谈论的积极好处更具争议性。
Amherst with 1,000 kids, 250 in a class, our objective was to have a network of all the kids working together.
阿默斯特有 1,000 名孩子，每班 250 名孩子，我们的目标是建立一个所有孩子一起工作的网络。
Of course, within that, there’ll be tighter clusters.
当然，其中会有更紧密的集群。
There are the physics majors, there are the kids that are interested in sports.
有物理专业的孩子，也有对运动感兴趣的孩子。
There are multiple networks within that small group, and it was trying to foster that kind of diversity of networks that we wanted to emphasize.
这个小组中有多个网络，它试图培养我们想要强调的网络多样性。
The late 1960s — for how long are you in Kenya, and where are you spending your time?
20 世纪 60 年代末 ——您在肯尼亚待了多久？您在哪里度过了时光？
The late 1960s — I got invited by the Rockefeller Foundation to go to Kenya just a few years after it got independence.
20 世纪 60 年代末——肯尼亚独立几年后，我受洛克菲勒基金会邀请前往肯尼亚。
In fact, if you remember the history before independence, there were the Mau Mau attacks.
事实上，如果你还记得独立之前的历史，就会发生茅茅袭击事件。
A lot of European colonialists got killed.
许多欧洲殖民者被杀。
One night I looked under the bed I was sleeping in at Karen, which was a suburb of Nairobi, and found a machete underneath there that the people who had lived there had kept to protect themselves.
一天晚上，我在内罗毕郊区的卡伦睡觉时，在床底下发现了一把砍刀，那是住在那里的人为了保护自己而保留的。
It was striking.
这是惊人的。
It was an eye-opening visit, teaching research, because I saw the colonial heritage, the fact that there weren’t enough civil servants, people trained to run the government, that the “colonial masters” had failed in their duty to enable it to be a well-functioning government, and the legacy of colonialism was very present.
这是一次令人大开眼界的访问，教学研究，因为我看到了殖民遗产，事实是没有足够的公务员和受过培训的人来管理政府，“殖民主人”未能履行其职责，使政府成为一个运作良好的政府，而且殖民主义的遗产仍然存在。
But it was also very interesting to see what it was like to live in a developing country and to think very deeply about what one could do to promote development.
但了解生活在发展中国家的情况并深入思考人们可以采取哪些措施来促进发展也非常有趣。
I went back to Nairobi 50 years later to give a lecture at the University of Nairobi, and what had happened in those 50 years was so striking.
50年后我回到内罗毕，在内罗毕大学演讲，这50年发生的事情是如此令人震惊。
Nairobi had grown from a small city to a huge metropolitan area, one of the largest in Africa.
内罗毕已从一个小城市发展成为一个巨大的都市区，是非洲最大的都市区之一。
The university had grown to be a very large university.
这所大学已经发展成为一所非常大的大学。
It was a really heartwarming event — my lecture, the response, the engagement of the students.
这是一次非常温馨的活动——我的演讲、学生的回应和参与。
Fifty years — it was a big transformation.
五十年——这是一个巨大的转变。
What was it that had puzzled you about Kenyan sharecropping back then?
当时，是什么让您对肯尼亚佃农感到困惑？
Back then, one of the issues that, of course, as public finance economists, we worried about was the adverse incentive effect on taxation.
当时，作为公共财政经济学家，我们当然担心的问题之一是对税收的不利激励效应。
If a government takes 50 percent of your product, we all say, “Oh, that’s a terrible system.
如果政府拿走你产品的 50%，我们都会说，“哦，这是一个糟糕的系统。
It discourages work.” General sense in the United States is that even the top rate shouldn’t be higher than 40 percent.
这会阻碍工作。”美国的普遍观念是，即使是最高税率也不应该高于40%。
I think that’s wrong, but that was certainly a sentiment, a very strong sentiment.
我认为这是错误的，但这确实是一种情绪，一种非常强烈的情绪。
Well, here you had sharecropping — not only in Kenya but many other countries around the world — where one-half to two-thirds of the produce was taken by the landlord.
嗯，这里有佃农制——“不仅在肯尼亚，而且在世界上许多其他国家都如此”——其中二分之一到三分之二的农产品被地主拿走。
That was equivalent to a tax of 50 percent to 67 percent, and yet this was a prevalent form of tenancy, the arrangement that people had with a landlord.
这相当于 50% 至 67% 的税收，但这是一种普遍的租赁形式，即人们与房东之间的安排。
One had to ask, why was that?
人们不禁要问，这是为什么呢？
How could this seemingly inefficient system persist for thousands of years?
这个看似效率低下的系统怎么能持续数千年呢？
That was what motivated one of my most influential papers.
这就是我撰写最具影响力的论文之一的动机。
That was the idea that there was a risk-incentive tradeoff, that in the absence of perfect information and the presence of a lot of risk, farmers couldn’t bear the risk of land ownership.
这是一种风险激励权衡的想法，即在缺乏完善信息和存在大量风险的情况下，农民无法承担土地所有权的风险。
If they owned the land, or rented the land more accurately, they’d have to absorb all the residual, the fluctuations in the weather, and all the other fluctuations, disease, that they would confront.
如果他们拥有土地，或者更准确地说是租用土地，他们就必须吸收所有的残余物、天气的波动以及他们将面临的所有其他波动、疾病。
With sharecropping, they divided that risk, and a lot of the risk was borne by the landlord.
通过佃农，他们分担了风险，很多风险由地主承担。
That was a model of what came to be called the principal-agent problem, and it’s part of the incentive model that now is really fundamental.
这是一个后来被称为委托代理问题的模型，也是现在非常重要的激励模型的一部分。
It was a first formalization of that basic incentive model that is now basic to modern economics.
这是现代经济学基础的基本激励模型的首次形式化。
Is some of that that the landowner was providing fertilizer, machinery — that that’s the principal-agent problem on both sides, and you need to weigh off the marginal incentives?
其中一些是土地所有者提供化肥、机械——这是双方的委托代理问题，你需要权衡边际激励吗？
Or was it just monopolization of the land?
或者只是土地的垄断？
No, I had a separate paper where I looked at this issue.
不，我有一篇单独的论文研究过这个问题。
Several papers where I looked at the role of the landlord in providing seed, fertilizer, and credit and what was called interlinking of markets.
我在几篇论文中研究了地主在提供种子、化肥和信贷方面的作用以及所谓的市场互联。
You might ask again, why not have separate markets for credit, separate markets for seed, for milling the grain at the end of the harvest?
您可能会再问，为什么不建立单独的信贷市场、单独的种子市场以及在收获结束时碾磨谷物的市场？
The answer was that in the presence of these incentive problems, it turned out to be efficient to have this integration of these various activities.
答案是，在存在这些激励问题的情况下，将这些不同的活动整合起来是有效的。
For instance, by providing the right kind of seed, subsidizing the seed, maybe subsidizing the fertilizer, the landlord could elicit more effort on the part of the tenant.
例如，通过提供合适的种子，补贴种子，也许补贴化肥，房东可以促使租户付出更多努力。
And that was a good thing because on his own, the tenant had less incentive to work because he was being taxed effectively by 50 percent because 50 percent of his effort went to the benefit of the landlord.
这是一件好事，因为租客自己工作的积极性较低，因为他实际上要缴纳 50% 的税，因为他 50% 的努力都为房东带来了利益。
So, it became a whole theory of rural organization.
因此，它成为一整套农村组织理论。
What is it you think of Henry George and George’s economics today?
您如何看待亨利·乔治和乔治今天的经济学？
Well, that was another set of articles that I wrote in the late ’70s concerning the land rents associated with the cities.
嗯，这是我在 70 年代末写的另一组关于与城市相关的地租的文章。
You have a city; it has transportation costs.
你有一座城市；它有运输成本。
It’s expensive to go from the fringes of the city to the center where economic activity occurs, and people want to pay more for being closer to the center.
从城市边缘到经济活动发生的中心的成本很高，而且人们希望为靠近中心而支付更多费用。
I developed a whole theory of the rents that would arise in that kind of context, as people facing costly transportation would bid up the price of land.
我开发了一套关于在这种情况下产生的租金的完整理论，因为面临昂贵交通的人们会抬高土地价格。
Then I asked the question, what is the relationship between the optimal size of the city, the optimal spending on public goods by the city, and the rents that were generated in the way I just described?
然后我问一个问题，城市的最优规模、城市公共产品的最优支出和我刚才描述的方式产生的租金之间有什么关系？
There was a remarkable theorem that came out, which was that if you have optimal-size cities and you tax the rents 100 percent, that would be exactly the right amount to finance the optimal amount of public goods.
出现了一个引人注目的定理，即如果你拥有最佳规模的城市，并且对租金征收 100% 的税，那么这将是为最佳数量的公共产品提供资金的正确金额。
It was a very theoretical idea, but it captured an important idea that Henry George, who was one of the great economists of the 19th century, had enunciated, which was, taxing land rents was the most efficient way for raising revenues.
这是一个非常理论化的想法，但它抓住了 19 世纪最伟大的经济学家之一亨利·乔治阐明的一个重要思想，即对土地租金征税是增加收入的最有效方式。
Is that true today?
今天是这样吗？
For a given level of taxation, do you think we should take more of it from landlords?
对于给定的税收水平，您认为我们应该从房东那里收取更多税收吗？
Yes, I think the ownership of land still provides one of the most important bases of taxation, and we almost surely do not tax it as much as we should.
是的，我认为土地所有权仍然是最重要的税收基础之一，而且我们几乎肯定不会对土地征税。
When the government, say, in New York City, builds a subway, those near the subway have an enormous increase windfall gain from the value of their land.
例如，当政府在纽约市修建地铁时，地铁附近的人们就会从他们的土地价值中获得巨大的意外收益。
You can actually document the land goes up.
您实际上可以记录土地的上升。
The city is paying, all the citizens are paying for it, and yet the owners of the land get a windfall.
城市在付出，所有公民都在付出，而土地所有者却获得了意外之财。
Now, one of the difficulties in practice is the following, that the theory applies to the ground rent, the real value of the land, and property taxes apply both to the land and the buildings that are built on top of them.
现在，实践中的困难之一是，该理论适用于地租、土地的实际价值，而财产税则适用于土地和建在土地上的建筑物。
Differentiating between the two is not always an easy matter.
区分两者并不总是一件容易的事情。
This is a general principle in taxation, again, something my economics of information tried to clarify, that one of the principles of taxation is it’s often difficult to identify the real variables that you would like to tax, and this is an example of that.
这是税收的一般原则，我的信息经济学试图澄清这一点，税收原则之一是通常很难确定您想要征税的真实变量，这就是一个例子。
Do you favor the deregulations of the current YIMBY movement — allow a lot more building?
您是否赞成放松当前 YIMBY 运动的管制——允许更多的建设？
No. That goes actually to one of the themes of my book.
不，这实际上符合我书的主题之一。
One of the themes in my book is, one person’s freedom is another person’s unfreedom.
我书中的主题之一是，一个人的自由就是另一个人的不自由。
That means that what I can do .
这意味着我能做什么。
.
。
.
。
I talk about freedom as what somebody could do, his opportunity set, his choices that he could make.
我所说的自由是指一个人可以做什么、他有什么机会、他可以做出什么选择。
And when one person exerts an externality on another by exerting his freedom, he’s constraining the freedom of others.
当一个人通过行使自己的自由对另一个人施加外部性时，他就限制了他人的自由。
If you have unfettered building — for instance, you don’t have any zoning — you can have a building as high as you want.
如果你有不受约束的建筑 ——比如，你没有任何分区—— 你可以拥有你想要的任意高度的建筑。
The problem is that your high building deprives another building of light.
问题是你的高层建筑剥夺了另一座建筑的采光。
There may be noise.
可能会有噪音。
You don’t want your children exposed to, say, a brothel that is created next door.
你不希望你的孩子接触隔壁开设的妓院。
In the book, I actually talk about one example.
在书中，我实际上讲了一个例子。
Houston is a city with relatively little zoning, and I have some quotes from people living there, describing some of the challenges that that results in.
休斯顿是一个分区相对较少的城市，我引用了居住在那里的人们的一些话，描述了由此带来的一些挑战。
Now, when you’re young, you spend some time at Cambridge University.
现在，当你年轻的时候，你会在剑桥大学度过一段时间。
What was it like being tutored by Joan Robinson?
接受琼·罗宾逊辅导是什么感觉？
Joan Robinson was one of the great economists of the last century.
琼·罗宾逊是上世纪最伟大的经济学家之一。
She was, you might say, very idiosyncratic.
你可能会说，她非常独特。
She had a peculiar set of beliefs that got more peculiar as she got older.
她有一套独特的信念，随着年龄的增长，这种信念变得更加独特。
When she was younger, she did some fantastic economic work — theory of monopoly — trying to understand the role of monopolies in our economy.
当她年轻的时候，她做了一些出色的经济工作——“垄断理论”——试图理解垄断在我们经济中的作用。
But as she got older, she was very supportive of the Cultural Revolution in China.
但随着年龄的增长，她非常支持中国的文化大革命。
You could imagine: When I went to Cambridge as a Fulbright scholar, she was assigned as my tutor.
你可以想象：当我以富布赖特学者的身份去剑桥时，她被指派为我的导师。
One of the reasons she was assigned as my tutor was that when I went to Cambridge on this Fulbright, the department of economics had to discuss whether I would be accepted, and her view was that my mind had been ruined by two years at MIT, and that I —
她被指派为我导师的原因之一是，当我以富布赖特的身份去剑桥时，经济系必须讨论我是否会被录取，而她的观点是，我在麻省理工学院的两年时间已经毁了我的思想，而且我——
You were too right-wing for her.
对她来说你太右翼了。
I was too right-wing.
我太右翼了。
I had to start not as a graduate student.
我必须从一名研究生开始。
I had to be deprogrammed by beginning as a first-year undergraduate.
我必须从一年级本科生开始，重新编程。
There had been a fierce fight in the faculty at Cambridge about whether I should be accepted as a Fulbright graduate student.
关于我是否应该被接受为富布赖特研究生，剑桥大学的教员们曾发生过激烈的争论。
Those arguing that I should prevailed, but the quid pro quo was that she would be my tutor.
那些人认为我应该获胜，但交换条件是她将成为我的导师。
Well, you could imagine, I learned a lot from her.
嗯，你可以想象，我从她身上学到了很多东西。
I came to understand better her way of thinking, but after eight weeks, we parted, and I got another tutor, Frank Hahn.
我开始更好地理解她的思维方式，但八周后，我们分手了，我找到了另一位导师，弗兰克·哈恩。
One thing that’s striking to me about the arc of your career, if I think geographically where you’ve been — you start in Gary, Indiana.
关于你的职业生涯，有一件令我印象深刻的事情，如果我从地理位置上考虑你去过的地方，那么你是从印第安纳州加里开始的。
There’s Amherst, there’s MIT, there’s Kenya, there’s Yale, there’s Cambridge, there’s Oxford, there’s Princeton, there’s Boston University, there’s Columbia, there’s seven years in Washington.
有阿默斯特，有麻省理工，有肯尼亚，有耶鲁，有剑桥，有牛津，有普林斯顿，有波士顿大学，有哥伦比亚，还有华盛顿七年。
I’m sure I’ve left some out.
我确信我遗漏了一些。
Being in so many different places — how has that influenced what you’ve produced and what you’ve thought?
去过这么多不同的地方 —— 这对你的创作和想法有何影响？
And why didn’t you just stay at MIT your whole life?
你为什么不一辈子都留在麻省理工学院呢？
Surely you had that option.
当然你有这个选择。
Yes, but you could have asked why didn’t I just stay in Gary?
是的，但你可能会问我为什么不留在加里？
As a young person, I read about this big world outside of Gary, and I just wanted to see it.
作为一个年轻人，我读到了加里之外的这个大世界，我只是想看看它。
As I went to Amherst, my eyes opened up more, and I wanted to see more.
当我去阿默斯特时，我的眼睛开阔了，我想看到更多。
I just had this thirst for seeing more and more of the world, and the more I saw it, the more I wanted.
我只是渴望看到越来越多的世界，而我看到的越多，我想要的就越多。
That had an enormous influence.
这产生了巨大的影响。
I think coming from Gary, Indiana, gave me empathy for those who didn’t start at the top in life.
我认为，来自印第安纳州加里的经历让我对那些并非出身于人生巅峰的人产生了同情心。
It certainly made me much more interested in development.
这无疑让我对开发更感兴趣。
Gary was beginning to go through the process of de-development that we see over the next 30 years after I left.
在我离开后的 30 年里，加里开始经历我们所看到的去发展过程。
It was the epitome of de-industrialization in the United States.
这是美国去工业化的缩影。
I think it affected me, made my career very different.
我认为它影响了我，让我的职业生涯变得非常不同。
It affected my economics in a lot of ways.
它在很多方面影响了我的经济。
I was more concerned about inequality than most of my colleagues.
我比大多数同事更关心不平等问题。
I wrote my thesis on inequality.
我的论文是关于不平等的。
It’s been a thread throughout my career.
这是贯穿我职业生涯的一条主线。
I wrote in 2012 the book The Price of Inequality, and a couple of years later, The Great Divide.
我在 2012 年写了《不平等的代价》一书，几年后又写了《大鸿沟》。
The good news is, with that long arc, the economics profession, our society is finally catching up on, coming to terms, recognizing the importance of studying inequality and the important role that inequality plays in creating the great divides in our society.
好消息是，经过这么长的一段时间，我们的社会经济学界终于迎头赶上，认识到研究不平等的重要性以及不平等在造成我们社会的巨大鸿沟中所发挥的重要作用。
Paul Samuelson also was from Gary, right?
保罗·萨缪尔森也来自加里，对吗？
And the Jackson 5.
还有杰克逊五兄弟。
That’s right.
没错。
It was impressive, you might say an impressive trio in the library in Gary, Indiana.
令人印象深刻，你可能会说印第安纳州加里图书馆里的三人组令人印象深刻。
There’s a mural that they made recently.
有一幅他们最近制作的壁画。
I went back to Gary just a few years ago, and they were very proud to show me the mural in which the Jackson 5, Paul Samuelson, and I are all on that mural.
几年前我回到加里，他们非常自豪地向我展示了一幅壁画，其中杰克逊五兄弟、保罗·萨缪尔森和我都在壁画上。
Something else striking about your career that I noticed reviewing for this podcast.
我注意到在这个播客中评论过你的职业生涯中还有一些引人注目的事情。
This is especially at a time when co-authorship is not nearly as normal as it is now.
尤其是在合着并不像现在那么正常的时候。
The number of distinct co-authors you have — and they’re each famous in their own right — there’s Michael Rothschild, Avinash Dixit, Sandy Grossman, Tony Atkinson, Carl Shapiro, Andrew Weiss, Greenwald, I’m sure there are others I’ve forgotten about.
你们有多少位不同的合著者 ——他们每个人都以自己的方式出名——比如迈克尔·罗斯柴尔德、阿维纳什·迪克西特、桑迪·格罗斯曼、托尼·阿特金森、卡尔·夏皮罗、安德鲁·韦斯、格林沃尔德，我确信还有其他人我已经忘记了。
I don’t see anyone else doing that.
我没有看到其他人这样做。
There are people who have standing co-authors, like there’s Sargent and Wallace for a while, but what led you to have this pattern of co-authorship?
有些人有固定的共同作者，比如萨金特和华莱士有一段时间，但是什么导致你有这种共同作者的模式？
And how has that shaped your thought?
这对你的想法有何影响？
Well, quite frankly, I like interacting with other people.
嗯，坦白说，我喜欢与其他人互动。
I think I’m a social person, and I’ve been lucky, you might say, to bubble up with ideas.
我认为我是一个善于交际的人，你可能会说，我很幸运，能够冒出各种想法。
I share those ideas with other people over dinner, over lunch, in the coffee room, and then we start talking, and those ideas start jelling, and we wind up writing a paper together.
我在晚餐时、午餐时、在咖啡室里与其他人分享这些想法，然后我们开始交谈，这些想法开始凝结，最后我们一起写一篇论文。
I’ve always felt that each of us has something to contribute.
我一直觉得我们每个人都可以做出一些贡献。
Many of my co-authors bring a lot of mathematical skills to the table, but many of them bring other skills, empirical skills.
我的许多合著者都带来了很多数学技能，但他们中的许多人还带来了其他技能，即经验技能。
So, I’ve been just very, very lucky.
所以，我非常非常幸运。
Some of these, like Andy Weiss and Avishay Braverman, were students of mine, and we would start talking about ideas as I try to guide them in their PhD.
其中一些人，比如安迪·韦斯（Andy Weiss）和阿维谢·布雷弗曼（Avishay Braverman），是我的学生，当我试图指导他们攻读博士学位时，我们会开始讨论想法。
And when they finish their PhD, there are a whole set of other ideas that we haven’t fully developed in their thesis, so we start working together in a whole set of papers that follow on.
当他们完成博士学位时，我们在他们的论文中还没有充分发展出一整套其他想法，因此我们开始在接下来的一整套论文中一起工作。
If I think about your 1980 piece with Sandy Grossman, what are your current views on why trading volume is so high?
如果我想想您 1980 年与桑迪·格罗斯曼 (Sandy Grossman) 的文章，您目前对交易量为何如此之高的看法是什么？
It seems to violate a lot of rationality theorems.
这似乎违反了很多理性定理。
Well, if someone’s trading with you, you might plausibly assume they know at least as much as you do.
好吧，如果有人与你进行交易，你可能会合理地认为他们至少和你一样了解。
Fischer Black famously said, “We just need to put trading in the utility function.” That’s a kind of deus ex machina.
费舍尔·布莱克（Fischer Black）有句名言：“我们只需要把交易放在效用函数中即可。”这是一种机械神。
What do you think now, 44 years later?
44年后的今天，你有何感想？
Well, I think the basic idea of that paper is still obviously correct.
嗯，我认为那篇论文的基本思想显然还是正确的。
The title of that paper was “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets.” It was an argument against the view that was held by people like Eugene Fama that markets were informationally efficient, that they transmitted efficiently all the information from the informed to the uninformed.
该论文的标题是“论信息有效市场的不可能性”。这是反对尤金·法玛（Eugene Fama）等人所持有的观点的论点，即市场是信息有效的，它们有效地将所有信息从知情者传递到不知情者。
We made the obvious observation that if that were the case, there would be no incentive for anybody to gather information.
我们做出了明显的观察，如果是这样的话，任何人都没有动力去收集信息。
So the market might be transmitting information, but it would be all free information.
所以市场可能会传递信息，但都是免费信息。
It would be information that nobody had done any work to collect.
这将是没有人做过任何工作来收集的信息。
That idea, actually, in another context worries me very much today, that with Google and AI scraping so much information off of our newspapers, off of our podcasts, off of everything they can get a hold of, they’re trying to appropriate the value of the knowledge that’s been created by other people without paying for it.
实际上，这个想法在今天的另一个背景下让我非常担心，谷歌和人工智能从我们的报纸、播客、他们能掌握的一切中抓取了如此多的信息，他们试图在不付费的情况下侵占其他人创造的知识的价值。
If they succeed in doing that, of course, that will decrease the incentives for others to produce information of high quality and of value.
当然，如果他们成功做到这一点，就会降低其他人生产高质量和有价值信息的动力。
It’s that kind of interaction that was at the heart of our 1980 paper, and the themes that we talked about there are still the critical themes that we’re talking about today.
这种互动是我们 1980 年论文的核心，我们当时讨论的主题仍然是我们今天讨论的关键主题。
You think today that liquidity from market makers is oversupplied or undersupplied relative to a social optimum, say, in New York?
您认为今天做市商的流动性相对于社会最佳状态（例如在纽约）是供应过剩还是供应不足？
Well, the issue here turns out to be, the measurement of liquidity is very difficult.
那么，这里的问题是，流动性的衡量非常困难。
A lot of the liquidity are these fast traders, flash traders, people who are in the market for a moment.
很多流动性来自于那些快速交易者、闪电交易者、那些在市场上短暂停留的人。
We saw that in a couple of the crashes that we’ve had.
我们在发生的几起事故中都看到了这一点。
It seems like there’s a lot of liquidity, but then all of a sudden, when you have a big event, that liquidity dries up.
看起来流动性很多，但突然之间，当你举办大型活动时，流动性就会枯竭。
Part of what is going on — let’s be frank — is computers trading with other computers, so it’s not informed people trading with uninformed people.
正在发生的事情的一部分——“坦白说”——是计算机与其他计算机进行交易，因此消息灵通的人不会与不知情的人进行交易。
It’s really computers with one body of data trying to make a micro cent from another trader, and they each are going back and forth very fast.
这实际上是拥有一组数据的计算机试图从另一位交易者那里赚取一微分，而且它们的来回速度都非常快。
They’re trying to elicit information.
他们试图获取信息。
It’s not trading for holding a position, it’s trading to elicit information.
它不是为了持有头寸而进行交易，而是为了获取信息而进行交易。
But as the spreads widen, why doesn’t someone with a lot of capital just step in and earn that spread?
但随着利差扩大，为什么拥有大量资本的人不介入并赚取利差呢？
It would seem there’s a self-correcting aspect to this if you have high enough capitalization.
如果你有足够高的资本，这似乎有一个自我纠正的方面。
What I was going to say is, what happens is that at those critical moments when we really need liquidity, the market freezes.
我想说的是，在我们真正需要流动性的关键时刻，市场会冻结。
We’ve had some very bad days of that kind.
我们经历过一些非常糟糕的日子。
And at that particular moment, markets may not even clear, and actually, they cease to function, and when they cease to function, nobody wants to come in.
在那个特定时刻，市场甚至可能还不清楚，实际上，它们停止运作，当它们停止运作时，没有人愿意进入。
So it’s not just that there’s a spread — they’re just not functioning.
因此，这不仅仅是存在传播——而是它们没有发挥作用。
You don’t know when you make a trade whether it actually will be .
当你进行交易时，你不知道它是否真的会发生。
.
。
.
。
you think you made a trade, but it may not actually, eventually, be executed.
您认为您进行了一笔交易，但实际上最终可能不会执行。
We are in this very precarious world where most of the time, the market works — a lot of seeming liquidity, but it’s a liquidity that can dry up just when we need it.
我们生活在一个非常不稳定的世界，大多数时候，市场都在发挥作用——表面上有很多流动性，但这种流动性可能会在我们需要的时候枯竭。
You have a very famous 1977 paper with Dixit, and one of the things you show in that paper is, there’s a coherent way to model firms that (a) face downward-sloping demand curves but (b) don’t have to worry very much about what other firms are doing — a kind of monopolistic competition.
Dixit 在 1977 年发表了一篇非常著名的论文，论文中展示的内容之一是，有一种连贯的方法可以对公司进行建模，这些公司 (a) 面临向下倾斜的需求曲线，但 (b) 不必太担心其他公司正在做什么 - 一种垄断竞争。
People have since used that as a rationale for strategic trade policy.
此后，人们将此作为战略贸易政策的理由。
Do you agree with that use of the model?
您同意该模型的使用吗？
Or what qualifications would you add?
或者你会添加什么资格？
Well, I think that model is a way of thinking about, as you said, a world in which there’s some market power, but limited market power.
嗯，我认为这个模型是一种思考方式，正如你所说，一个存在一定市场力量但市场力量有限的世界。
Each of the firms themselves doesn’t have to worry about strategic interaction.
每家公司本身都不必担心战略互动。
In my mind, the more critical issues in strategic trade policy that we’re facing today are not those that Paul Krugman argued for based on our monopolistic competition model some quarter-century ago, and for which he got the Nobel Prize working off of our model.
在我看来，我们今天面临的战略贸易政策中更关键的问题并不是保罗·克鲁格曼在大约四分之一个世纪前根据我们的垄断竞争模型提出的问题，也不是他根据我们的模型获得诺贝尔奖的问题。
It’s really about dynamics, learning, and resilience.
这实际上与动力、学习和适应能力有关。
Today, the critical issue in trade policy is US CHIPS Act and the IRA.
如今，贸易政策的关键问题是美国芯片法案和爱尔兰共和军。
The CHIPS Act was, we had lost the ability to make chips.
《芯片法案》是，我们失去了制造芯片的能力。
That meant that if anything happened to Taiwan or Korea, we were in a very vulnerable position.
这意味着如果台湾或韩国发生任何事情，我们就会处于非常脆弱的境地。
Markets don’t take into account that kind of defense concern, or even the resilience.
市场没有考虑到这种防御担忧，甚至没有考虑到弹性。
That goes back to some of my earlier work that markets aren’t very good at assessing risk and pricing risk into the decision-making process.
这可以追溯到我早期的一些工作，即市场不太擅长评估风险并将风险定价到决策过程中。
Here we are — 2023, 2024 — and we feel very vulnerable because of this potential lack of resilience, which would be disastrous if there were a war between Taiwan and China.
现在是“2023年、2024年”，我们感到非常脆弱，因为这种潜在的弹性缺乏，如果台湾和中国之间爆发战争，这将是灾难性的。
That is the argument for our current industrial policies, which are almost a clear violation of the WTO rules.
这就是我们现行产业政策的论点，这些政策几乎明显违反了世贸组织规则。
Then, the IRA Act is another example where we have a strategic trade policy to help move the economy toward a green transition and worry that we were falling behind in learning about the new green technologies.
然后，《爱尔兰共和军法案》是另一个例子，我们制定了战略贸易政策，帮助经济向绿色转型，但我们担心我们在了解新的绿色技术方面落后。
Now, there are a couple of important issues on this that are very much related to the themes of my book, and that is, what one person does or one country does can harm another person or another country.
现在，有几个重要问题与我本书的主题密切相关，那就是一个人或一个国家所做的事情可能会伤害另一个人或另一个国家。
Here, we’re trying to grab more jobs for us in this green transition, but the developing countries and emerging markets don’t have the resources to engage in that kind of policy.
在这里，我们试图在绿色转型中为我们争取更多就业机会，但发展中国家和新兴市场没有资源参与此类政策。
Even Europe has complained about the fact that we seemingly are succeeding in getting firms that were going to build factories in Europe shifting to the United States, so our success in some of these areas comes at the expense of others.
甚至欧洲也抱怨这样一个事实：我们似乎成功地让原本要在欧洲建厂的公司转移到美国，因此我们在其中一些领域的成功是以牺牲其他领域为代价的。
The old model of trade was, everybody can benefit.
旧的贸易模式是，每个人都可以受益。
Some of the things we’re doing are clearly benefiting us at the expense of others, and that’s why you need a rules-based order.
我们正在做的一些事情显然是以牺牲他人利益为代价使我们受益的，这就是为什么你需要一个基于规则的秩序。
This point about trade aside, at a conceptual level, what do you think would be the biggest difference between you and Paul Krugman?
抛开贸易这一点，从概念层面来看，您认为您和保罗·克鲁格曼之间最大的区别是什么？
Two very well-known writers — broadly you would each be placed on the left, but how do you two think about the world differently?
两位非常著名的作家 ——大体上你们都会被放在左边，但是你们两个对世界的看法有何不同？
I think that he thinks that monetary policy has a bigger role than I think it does.
我认为他认为货币政策的作用比我想象的更大。
You think it’s credit?
你以为这是信用？
Or you think it’s real factors at this point in time?
或者您认为这是目前的真实因素？
I think what matters is not the money supply, not the interest rate; it’s the credit availability of monetary policy, so it’s the mechanism.
我认为重要的不是货币供应量，也不是利率；而是货币供应量。是货币政策的信贷可得性，所以是机制。
What we saw in 2008 — that providing so much liquidity to the banking system didn’t help that much, that the banks were very reluctant to lend out that money.
我们在 2008 年看到的是——向银行系统提供如此多的流动性并没有多大帮助，银行非常不愿意借出这笔钱。
Therefore, the recovery was a very slow recovery.
因此，恢复是一个非常缓慢的恢复。
We would have been better off if we had relied more on fiscal policy than on monetary policy.
如果我们更多地依赖财政政策而不是货币政策，我们的境况会更好。
That, I think, is maybe, from an analytic point of view, the main distinction that I think I’ve discovered in our work.
我认为，从分析的角度来看，这可能是我在我们的工作中发现的主要区别。
Now, your best-cited piece is your 1981 article with Andy Weiss on credit rationing, which is a macroeconomic idea.
现在，您引用次数最多的文章是 1981 年与 Andy Weiss 合作的关于信贷配给的文章，这是一个宏观经济理念。
But do you think that since then, the real problem has more often been that we’ve thrown too much credit at things?
但你是否认为从那时起，真正的问题往往是我们对事物给予了太多的信任？
So, the housing bubble, the student loan crisis — wouldn’t we have been better off with a lot more credit rationing?
那么，房地产泡沫、学生贷款危机——如果实行更多的信贷配给，我们的情况不是会更好吗？
The issue here was that we weren’t very good at credit allocation and that we thought, let the market rip.
这里的问题是，我们不太擅长信贷分配，我们认为，让市场撕裂吧。
We lowered interest rates.
我们降低了利率。
We deregulated, so we didn’t look at where the credit was going.
我们放松了管制，所以我们没有考虑信贷的去向。
The bank supervisors the Federal Reserve is supposed to oversee — and there are actually several other supervisors that are supposed to oversee the riskiness of the lending — that’s where the fault came.
美联储应该监管的银行监管者——而且实际上还有其他几个监管者应该监管贷款的风险——这就是问题所在。
Now, one of the things that, when I was at the World Bank and since then, I’ve emphasized very heavily: One of the signs that there’s a problem in the credit allocation is when you see a very rapid increase in the credit in one particular area.
现在，当我在世界银行工作时以及从那时起，我一直非常强调的一件事是：信贷分配存在问题的迹象之一是当你看到某一特定领域的信贷非常快速增加时。
It’s a sign that, probably, people aren’t paying enough attention.
这可能表明人们没有给予足够的关注。
Particularly, when we saw the increase in credit to housing, we should have been worried.
特别是，当我们看到住房信贷增加时，我们应该感到担忧。
As it turned out, the banks weren’t doing the kind of diligence that they should have done.
事实证明，银行没有尽到应有的尽职调查。
They were passing these mortgages on to investors, effectively lying, committing fraud.
他们将这些抵押贷款转嫁给投资者，实际上是在撒谎，进行欺诈。
There have been a lot of cases of this, where they said, “Well, we’ve been very careful.
这样的例子有很多，他们说：“好吧，我们一直非常小心。
We’ve inspected.
我们检查过。
These are mortgages originating in owner-occupied homes, people with this income.” They hadn’t done any of that, and all of that contributed to the financial crisis of 2008.
这些抵押贷款源自拥有这种收入的自住房屋。”他们什么都没做，而所有这些都导致了 2008 年的金融危机。
So, the issue isn’t the amount of credit.
因此，问题不在于信贷金额。
It was the allocation of credit.
这是信贷的分配。
If they had used that credit for productive uses, how much better our economy would have been.
如果他们将这些信贷用于生产用途，我们的经济将会好得多。
Well, we built a lot of homes, right?
好吧，我们建造了很多房子，对吗？
It’s turned out we’ve needed them.
事实证明我们需要它们。
The home prices that looked crazy in 2006 now seem somewhat reasonable.
2006年看起来疯狂的房价现在看起来有些合理。
A lot of them were built in the wrong place and were shoddy.
其中很多都是建在错误的地方，而且质量很差。
I used to joke that there were a huge number of homes built in the Nevada desert, and the only good thing about them is they were built so shoddily that they won’t last that long.
我曾经开玩笑说，内华达州的沙漠里建造了大量的房屋，它们唯一的好处就是它们建造得非常粗劣，以至于它们不会持续那么久。
Your 1984 piece with Carl Shapiro on efficiency wage theory — looking back at that now, 40 years later, you think of that mainly as a contribution to understanding organizations, an explanation of unemployment, a claim about sticky wages?
您 1984 年与卡尔·夏皮罗 (Carl Shapiro) 发表的关于效率工资理论的文章 ——40 年后的今天回头看，您认为这主要是对理解组织的贡献、对失业的解释、对粘性工资的主张？
Or how do you frame that article?
或者你如何构建这篇文章？
Because in the piece itself, the wage is actually flexible, at least the real wage is.
因为就计件本身来说，工资其实是灵活的，至少真实工资是。
Actually, it really is an argument that to understand how labor markets work — or any market for that matter, because we look at the labor market, but we point out, it’s through product markets — one has to take on board the fact that there’s imperfect information, and in that particular case, imperfect monitoring of what workers are doing, and that you have to have an incentive to make sure that they work well.
事实上，这确实是一个论点，要理解劳动力市场如何运作——或任何与此相关的市场，因为我们着眼于劳动力市场，但我们指出，它是通过产品市场运作的——人们必须接受这样一个事实：信息不完善，在这种特殊情况下，对工人所做的事情的监控不完善，并且你必须有动力确保他们运转良好。
One aspect of the incentive is that there have to be consequences when they don’t work well.
激励措施的一方面是，如果效果不佳，就必须承担后果。
One of the theses of that paper is that the standard articulation of what free markets are like are just wrong.
该论文的论点之一是，对自由市场的标准表述是错误的。
For instance, the standard view was that demand for labor was equal to the supply of labor; there’s no unemployment.
例如，标准观点是劳动力需求等于劳动力供给；没有失业。
What we point out is, if you couldn’t monitor labor at every moment of time, workers would have an incentive to shirk.
我们要指出的是，如果不能时时监控劳动，工人就会有偷懒的动机。
The worst that could happen to them is they would be fired.
对他们来说最糟糕的情况就是被解雇。
But if they were fired, with no unemployment, they’d be hired the next moment, so there’d be no incentive to work.
但如果他们被解雇，没有失业，他们下一刻就会被雇用，所以就没有工作的动力。
So, part of that equilibrium, there had to be some unemployment to induce people not to shirk.
因此，作为均衡的一部分，必须有一定程度的失业才能促使人们不逃避责任。
Now, there are many other mechanisms, and later work would try to talk about — there are other aspects of what was called the efficiency wage model, where you have to pay enough to induce people to produce and to work hard.
现在，还有很多其他的机制，以后的工作会尝试谈论 ——所谓的效率工资模型还有其他方面，你必须支付足够的钱来诱导人们生产和努力工作。
There are other aspects of the labor market as an institution where the rewards are done over the long term.
作为一个机构，劳动力市场还有其他方面的回报是长期的。
I think I maybe overemphasized the role of unemployment as an incentive device, but the critique of the standard model, I think, is still there, and the importance of taking a broader view of the labor market is still there.
我认为我可能过分强调了失业作为激励机制的作用，但我认为对标准模型的批评仍然存在，并且以更广泛的视角看待劳动力市场的重要性仍然存在。
From 1986 until about 1990, you wrote a series of papers with Sah on information architectures, hierarchies versus polyarchies, Type-I versus Type-II errors.
从 1986 年到大约 1990 年，您与 Sah 撰写了一系列关于信息架构、层次结构与多头结构、I 类错误与 II 类错误的论文。
Then the 1990s come, and you spend, I think, about seven years working in different roles in Washington, D.C. How did that cause you to revise what you had done with Sah?
然后 20 世纪 90 年代到来，我想，您在华盛顿特区担任了不同角色大约七年。这如何促使您修改对萨赫所做的事情？
Well, I had never been in a real hierarchy at the time I wrote those papers.
嗯，在我写这些论文的时候，我从未处于真正的等级制度中。
Those papers were asking the question, what are the relative merits in decision-making when you have a hierarchy where a decision has to be approved by one person after another, versus what we often think of as the merit of a decentralized economy where you have many, many, many different decision-makers, and you let each of them take their chance.
这些论文提出了这样一个问题：当你有一个等级制度，一项决策必须得到一个又一个人的批准时，决策的相对优点是什么，而我们通常认为的去中心化经济的优点是什么，在去中心化经济中，你有很多很多不同的决策者，你让他们每个人都有自己的机会。
Underneath this was the idea that all humans are fallible.
其背后的观念是：所有人类都会犯错。
There are going to be some cases of disapproving good projects and some cases of approving bad projects.
会有一些不批准好项目的情况，也会有一些批准坏项目的情况。
How do you balance the two?
你如何平衡两者？
And how do different systems strain out bad projects without straining out good projects?
不同的系统如何过滤掉坏项目而不过滤掉好项目？
When I came to live in a world of hierarchy, which was what I saw in Washington, I came to appreciate why, in some circumstances, you had that hierarchy.
当我生活在一个等级制度的世界中时，就像我在华盛顿看到的那样，我开始理解为什么在某些情况下会有这种等级制度。
But I think I came to appreciate even more the virtues of decentralization, of what I call polyarchy.
但我想我开始更加欣赏权力下放的优点，即我所说的多头制。
I guess I became more of a critic of hierarchy.
我想我变得更像是一个等级制度的批评者。
I saw too many cases where there was too much fallibility built in, and too many good ideas got screened out by the hierarchy, and hierarchies when the guys at the top are not good decision-makers are particularly problematic.
我见过太多的案例，其中存在太多的错误，太多的好想法被等级制度筛选掉，而当高层的人不是好的决策者时，等级制度的问题尤其严重。
Should the World Bank right now be emphasizing climate change, as they seem to be doing?
世界银行现在是否应该像他们现在所做的那样强调气候变化？
A lot of the poorer nations have complained.
许多较贫穷的国家都在抱怨。
They say it’s not their priority.
他们说这不是他们的首要任务。
They actually want to use more energy, some of which will be dirty energy.
他们实际上想要使用更多的能源，其中一些是肮脏的能源。
What’s your view on that?
您对此有何看法？
I think the World Bank’s emphasis on climate change is important, is critical.
我认为世界银行对气候变化的重视很重要，也很关键。
Climate is a public good.
气候是一项公共物品。
It’s a global public good from which all of us will benefit, and most especially those in the developing world and emerging markets, which disproportionately are located along the tropics, and those are going to be most adversely affected if we have the kind of climate change that will occur if we don’t curb the emissions of carbon, of greenhouse gases.
这是一项全球公共利益，我们所有人都将从中受益，尤其是那些位于热带地区的发展中国家和新兴市场，如果我们不遏制碳和温室气体的排放，就会发生气候变化，这些国家将受到最不利的影响。
So, it’s in their interest that these be curbed.
因此，限制这些行为符合他们的利益。
Now, we are at a lucky time for them because over the last 15 years, the price of renewable energy has come down 90 percent or more.
现在，我们正处于他们的幸运时刻，因为在过去 15 年里，可再生能源的价格已经下降了 90% 或更多。
In fact, at the current time, by moving to renewable energy — which is actually more decentralizable; you have fewer of these big mega projects — developing countries actually, I think, can do more smaller projects better.
事实上，目前，通过转向可再生能源 ——这实际上更加去中心化；这些大型项目越来越少 ——我认为，实际上发展中国家可以更好地开展更多小型项目。
I think they’re really advantaged by going more and more towards renewable energy.
我认为越来越多地采用可再生能源确实使他们受益匪浅。
A more recent paper that I’ve written with Nick Stern, head of the Stern Review — written at the UK about moving them along to green transition — was that growth and a green transition are very compatible, that making an early move to the green transition is actually a pro-growth move for developing countries in emerging markets.
我最近与《斯特恩评论》负责人尼克·斯特恩在英国撰写的一篇关于推动绿色转型的论文指出，增长和绿色转型是非常相容的，尽早转向绿色转型对于新兴市场的发展中国家来说实际上是一种有利于增长的举措。
To me, that kind of tension which they argue, I think is a misframing of the issue.
对我来说，他们所说的那种紧张气氛是对这个问题的错误表述。
I understand their view that the whole issue is inflicted on them because the advanced countries put so much carbon into the atmosphere, beginning with the Industrial Revolution.
我理解他们的观点，即整个问题都是由他们造成的，因为发达国家从工业革命开始就向大气中排放了大量的碳。
So, I understand their sense of grievance.
所以，我理解他们的委屈。
But right now, actually, the developing countries in emerging markets are the larger emitter of greenhouse gases, so they really have a responsibility, and we’re not going to address climate change unless they’re on board.
但现在，实际上，新兴市场的发展中国家是温室气体的最大排放国，因此他们确实负有责任，除非他们参与，否则我们不会解决气候变化问题。
Climate change is a real example of the major theme of my book, On the Road to Freedom.
气候变化是我的书《自由之路》主题的一个真实例子。
It’s a real case where one country’s freedom imposes a cost on others, where the freedom to pollute really does constrain what others can do.
这是一个真实的案例，一个国家的自由给其他国家带来了成本，污染的自由确实限制了其他国家的行动。
If we have more pollution, we’re going to get more desertification.
如果污染越严重，荒漠化就会越严重。
We’re going to get more floods, more droughts.
我们将会遭遇更多的洪水、更多的干旱。
It is probably one of the most important examples of how the expansion of freedom by some constrains that of others.
这可能是一些人扩大自由如何限制另一些人自由的最重要的例子之一。
What’s your current view of Hugo Chávez, who is not himself, in every way, pro-green?
您目前对乌戈·查韦斯（Hugo Chávez）有何看法，因为他本人在各方面都不是支持环保的？
Well, he’s no longer on the scene, but —
好吧，他已经不在现场了，但是 ——
Should we be glad he’s gone?
我们应该为他的离开感到高兴吗？
I’m very glad he’s gone.
我很高兴他走了。
I think he was terrible.
我认为他很糟糕。
He contributed to ruining a whole country.
他为毁掉整个国家做出了贡献。
That’s right, I think he has.
是的，我认为他有。
It’s the cost to his society, particularly even more of his successor, has been enormous.
他的社会，尤其是他的继任者，为此付出了巨大的代价。
I actually think it’s had an enormous cost to the whole, I would say, Western Hemisphere because of the flood of migrants from Venezuela.
事实上，我认为，由于委内瑞拉移民的大量涌入，整个西半球都付出了巨大的代价。
Just finding a place to live a decent life has created problems of migration and affected the politics of much of North and South America.
仅仅找到一个过上体面生活的地方就造成了移民问题，并影响了北美和南美大部分地区的政治。
Poland is now converging on Western European living standards.
波兰现在的生活水平正在向西欧靠拢。
Does that show that shock therapy simply can work if you stick with it?
这是否表明只要坚持下去，休克疗法就能发挥作用？
That would be my conclusion.
这就是我的结论。
No, I think it shows quite the opposite, and I’ve had a lot of discussions with the architects of Poland’s you might call “miracle.” The reason Poland is the most successful of the Eastern European countries are several, but it wasn’t the shock therapy that had such a negative macroeconomic effect.
不，我认为事实恰恰相反，我与波兰的建筑师进行了很多讨论，你可以称之为“奇迹”。波兰成为东欧国家中最成功的国家有几个原因，但并不是休克疗法对宏观经济产生了如此负面的影响。
It was the fact that after that moment of shock, they began a gradualistic policy of reform, of creating the institutional infrastructure that is the basis of the market economy.
事实上，在那一刻的震惊之后，他们开始了渐进的改革政策，建立作为市场经济基础的制度基础设施。
They were lucky that the EU embraced them, and as they became part of the EU, they got, you might say, the legal framework that is necessary for a well-functioning market from the EU.
他们很幸运，欧盟接受了他们，当他们成为欧盟的一部分时，你可能会说，他们从欧盟获得了市场运作良好所必需的法律框架。
They had a lot of migrants from Poland that went to the UK and around Europe that then brought skills and money back to Poland.
他们有很多来自波兰的移民前往英国和欧洲各地，然后将技能和金钱带回波兰。
It was really their walking away from shock therapy after a very short period and moving to this gradualist policy that was the foundation of their success in this now three decades since the beginning of the transition from communism to a market economy.
实际上，他们在很短的时间内就放弃了休克疗法，转向了渐进主义政策，这是他们从共产主义向市场经济过渡以来三十年来成功的基础。
You’re known as a big fan of reading fiction.
众所周知，您是小说的忠实粉丝。
Is there a work of fiction you would care to recommend to us all, something you’ve been reading lately?
您最近读过一本小说，有什么想推荐给我们大家的吗？
That’s a good question.
这是一个好问题。
Most recently, I’ve been busy writing this book.
最近，我一直在忙着写这本书。
As you may know, writing a book takes a lot of time.
如您所知，写一本书需要花费很多时间。
I suppose I’ve always found reading books from the Third World authors writing about Kenya, about Nigeria, ones that I find particularly interesting because they give me insights into the countries that I’ve been so engaged in, in another way through my economics.
我想我总是发现阅读第三世界作家写的关于肯尼亚、尼日利亚的书，我觉得这些书特别有趣，因为它们让我通过经济学以另一种方式深入了解我一直如此参与的国家。
Final question: what will you do next?
最后一个问题：接下来你会做什么？
Almost surely write another book.
几乎肯定会再写一本书。
On what?
靠什么？
I think there are many themes in this book and in my previous book, People, Power, and Profits, where I didn’t have time or space to fully articulate my views.
我认为这本书和我之前的书《人、权力和利润》中有很多主题，我没有时间或空间来充分表达我的观点。
I think the problem of rent-seeking, which I talked about in The Price of Inequality and I talk about in People, Power, and Profits, has become an increasingly important issue.
我认为我在《不平等的代价》和《人、权力和利润》中谈到的寻租问题已经成为一个越来越重要的问题。
It has meant that there’s a big divergence of what gives rise to the wealth of nations, and what gives rise to the wealth of particular individuals.
这意味着国家财富的产生与特定个人财富的产生存在巨大差异。
Trying to understand what is, in the 21st century, the basis of the wealth of nations, and what gives rise in the 21st century to the wealth of individuals, and how they’re similar and how they’re different, seems to me a very interesting question that I want to think about.
试图了解21世纪国家财富的基础是什么，以及21世纪个人财富的产生因素是什么，以及它们有何相似之处和不同之处，对我来说似乎是一个非常有趣的问题，我想思考。
Just to repeat for our audience, the new book is The Road to Freedom: Economics and the Good Society.
向我们的读者重复一遍，这本新书是《自由之路：经济学与美好社会》。
Joe Stiglitz, thank you very much.
乔·斯蒂格利茨，非常感谢你。
Nice to be here.
很高兴来到这里。