Joseph Henrich on Cultural Evolution, WEIRD Societies, and Life Among Two Strange Tribes (Ep. 16 - Live at Mason)

Joe’s book is called The Secret of Our Success.

乔的书名叫《我们成功的秘密》。

The secret of his success is amazing intellect and drive.

他成功的秘诀在于惊人的智慧和干劲。

I would describe him as currently the leading theorist on how cultural and biological evolution interact.

我将他描述为目前文化和生物进化如何相互作用的领先理论家。

Sure.

当然。

That’s a great question.

这是一个很好的问题。

One example that I’ve been working a lot on lately is how it is that in modern societies and in the last few hundred years, people all over the world have come to believe in big gods — gods that have power over life and death, can reward you in the afterlife — and what the implications are for cooperation, the scaling up of human societies.

我最近一直在研究的一个例子是，在现代社会和过去的几百年里，世界各地的人们如何开始相信大神——“神拥有掌控生死的力量，可以在来世奖励你”——以及这对合作和人类社会的扩大有何影响。

These kinds of supernatural beliefs.

这些超自然的信仰。

You think there’s some kind of natural progression of religion, as societies become wealthier and more complex, and intersecting cultural and genetic evolution help explain that?

你认为随着社会变得更加富裕和更加复杂，宗教会出现某种自然的发展，而交叉的文化和基因进化有助于解释这一点？

Yes.

是的。

Just fill in the pieces of that a little bit?

只要稍微填写一下就可以了？

Sure.

当然。

Some basic aspects of human cognition — for example, our ability to read other minds, to do mentalizing, to infer the thoughts inside of other people’s heads — makes it susceptible to dualism.

人类认知的一些基本方面——例如，我们读懂他人思想、心智化、推断他人头脑中想法的能力——使其容易受到二元论的影响。

To thinking that minds and bodies are separable.

认为思想和身体是可分离的。

Cultural evolution, in a sense, carries those memes.

从某种意义上说，文化进化承载着这些模因。

You don’t necessarily need group selection, though that may be part of the story.

你不一定需要群体选择，尽管这可能是故事的一部分。

But the cultural evolution is a more powerful way of propagating and replicating the memes without groups having to die out, necessarily.

但文化进化是一种更强大的传播和复制模因的方式，而群体不一定会消亡。

Though both of those could be happening at the same time.

尽管这两件事可能同时发生。

Yeah.

是的。

You have intergroup competition.

你有团体间的竞争。

You don’t want to get tied up in the semantic debate of group selection.

你不想陷入群体选择的语义争论中。

But if some groups come to have sets of rituals and beliefs that allow them to out-compete other groups, then those beliefs are going to spread.

但如果某些群体拥有一套仪式和信仰，使他们能够在竞争中胜过其他群体，那么这些信仰就会传播开来。

That’s what seems to have occurred with certain kinds of supernatural beliefs.

这似乎就是某些超自然信仰所发生的情况。

Let me give you a super-simple take I hear from a lot of people on how genetic and cultural evolution interact, and tell me if you agree with it.

让我给你一个我从很多人那里听到的关于遗传和文化进化如何相互作用的超级简单的看法，并告诉我你是否同意它。

The standard story is we have genes that were optimized to some earlier environment, maybe being hunter-gatherers.

标准的故事是，我们的基因针对某些早期环境（可能是狩猎采集者）进行了优化。

Now we eat too much sugar, we become too fat, we have diabetes too often.

现在我们吃太多糖，我们变得太胖，我们经常患糖尿病。

Certainly, part of that is an accurate account.

当然，其中一部分是准确的账目。

The importance of, say, our taste for sugar, our taste for fat seems to be a misfiring from our ancestral environments.

例如，我们对糖的口味、对脂肪的口味的重要性似乎与我们祖先的环境有关。

But I think in the case of human cooperation that doesn’t fit the story.

但我认为在人类合作的情况下，这与故事不符。

Now, another feature of your model, if I understand it correctly, is that you get more rapid or more complex or more interesting cultural evolution when you have a larger number of moving parts: more people, or more wealth, or more complexity.

现在，如果我理解正确的话，你的模型的另一个特征是，当你有更多的移动部分时，你会得到更快、更复杂或更有趣的文化进化：更多的人，或者更多的财富，或者更多的复杂性。

Is it kind of increasing returns to scale to cultural evolution?

文化进化是规模报酬递增吗？

Is that fair to say?

这么说公平吗？

Yeah.

是的。

There’s a couple of different ways that that comes out.

有几种不同的方式。

I think the simplest and clearest one is this idea that I call the collective brain.

我认为最简单、最清晰的就是我称之为集体大脑的想法。

This is simply the idea because we’re so dependent on learning from each other in order to do innovations and to construct increasingly fancy technologies, larger and more interconnected populations tend to have fancier tools and technologies.

这只是一个想法，因为我们非常依赖相互学习来进行创新和构建越来越奇特的技术，更多、更相互联系的人群往往拥有更奇特的工具和技术。

That connection between size and speed of cultural evolution, that’s true at most margins?

文化进化的规模和速度之间的联系在大多数情况下都是如此吗？

Say, India evolves culturally more rapidly than Denmark because it’s larger?

比如说，印度在文化上的发展比丹麦更快，因为它更大？

There’s lots of pieces to this puzzle.

这个谜题有很多部分。

The key is to create interconnectedness.

关键是要建立互联互通。

To explain the difference between Denmark and India: of course, Denmark is interconnected with many other populations, but the flow of information is much less constricted.

解释丹麦和印度之间的差异：当然，丹麦与许多其他人口相互联系，但信息流动的限制要少得多。

Let’s say I’m a cultural pessimist, and try to talk me out of this.

假设我是一个文化悲观主义者，请尝试说服我不要这样做。

Here would be my worry.

这就是我的担忧。

If your theory implies cultural evolution speeds up as you have more parts, more people, more interconnections, I worry that social evolution will bring us further from the point of what our genes can handle.

如果你的理论意味着文化进化随着你有更多的部分、更多的人、更多的相互联系而加速，我担心社会进化将使我们远离我们的基因可以处理的点。

Before I get to the cultural pessimist question, a key insight is that we’ve been in that situation for probably over a million years.

在我讨论文化悲观主义问题之前，一个关键的见解是我们处于这种情况可能已经超过一百万年了。

Human cultural products like tools and food processing abilities have been shaping our guts and our teeth and our hands for a really long time.

人类文化产品，如工具和食品加工能力，长期以来一直在塑造我们的内脏、牙齿和双手。

Now we have the Internet.

现在我们有了互联网。

That’s very rapidly multiplied the number of combinations and connections over a 20-year period.

20 年间，组合和连接的数量迅速增加。

Much quicker than almost anyone had forecast.

比几乎任何人预测的都要快得多。

Certainly in the short term, it should increase the rate of innovation.

当然，在短期内，它应该提高创新率。

It’s easy to exchange ideas amongst very diverse minds.

不同的思想之间很容易交换想法。

But productivity growth is falling, right?

但生产率增长正在下降，对吧？

In most countries?

在大多数国家？

This baffles me.

这让我很困惑。

You mean why productivity growth is falling?

你的意思是为什么生产率增长下降？

Right.

正确的。

Japan, US, Western Europe.

日本、美国、西欧。

Productivity growth is lower than it was, say, before the ’80s.

生产率增长低于 80 年代之前的水平。

I don’t blame the Internet for that, but it doesn’t seem to have helped very much.

我并不为此责怪互联网，但它似乎并没有多大帮助。

I’m a cultural evolutionist so I want to see this on much longer time scale.

我是一名文化进化论者，所以我希望在更长的时间尺度上看到这一点。

Ask me in 200 years.

200年后问我。

OK.

好的。

200 years, we’ll have you back for a second episode.

200 年后，我们会带你回来观看第二集。

Now, another area of interaction between genetic and cultural evolution — people talk about it a lot, but they don’t always agree on the facts — and that’s assortative mating.

现在，遗传和文化进化之间相互作用的另一个领域 ——“人们经常谈论它，但他们并不总是同意事实”—— 那就是选型交配。

That’s not something I’ve looked into.

这不是我研究过的事情。

I certainly think, compared to small-scale societies, it seems like there’s a lot more opportunity for assortative mating in the world today because your choices were just quite limited.

我当然认为，与小规模社会相比，当今世界似乎有更多的选型交配机会，因为你的选择非常有限。

In which ways does culture make us dumb?

文化在哪些方面让我们变得愚蠢？

It removes a lot of need to think because it gives us prebuilt solutions to problems.

它消除了很多思考的需要，因为它为我们提供了预先构建的问题解决方案。

It gives us protocols so that we don’t have to figure out things for ourself.

它为我们提供了协议，这样我们就不必自己解决问题。

Just lots of prebuilt solutions.

只是很多预构建的解决方案。

It tells us what we need to think and what we need to know in order to survive in the world.

它告诉我们为了在世界上生存，我们需要思考什么，需要知道什么。

It’s made us dumb in ways x, y, and z, but what would be an example today?

它在 x、y 和 z 方面让我们变得愚蠢，但今天的例子是什么？

It’s also made us smarter, though, which I think is the more .

不过，它也让我们变得更聪明，我认为这更重要。

.

。

.

。

Sure, it’s made us much smarter, but what would be an area today where we’re acting in a dumber way because of culture?

当然，它让我们变得更聪明，但是今天我们在哪些领域会因为文化而表现得更加愚蠢呢？

For one thing, we’re all much dumber, at least in the amount of societal knowledge we have in our heads compared to our ancestors.

一方面，与我们的祖先相比，我们都愚蠢得多，至少在我们头脑中拥有的社会知识方面是这样。

If we go far enough back, every single person had to know everything about how to find food, cook food, every feature of the productive system, how to make all the tools.

如果我们追溯到足够远的地方，每个人都必须知道如何寻找食物、烹饪食物、生产系统的每个功能、如何制造所有工具的一切。

As you know, it’s a common 18th-century theme that the division of labor possibly will make us stupid or uninteresting.

如您所知，劳动分工可能会让我们变得愚蠢或无趣，这是 18 世纪的一个常见主题。

It seems that was wrong in the 18th century.

这在18世纪看来是错误的。

Nicholas Carr has argued, “Well, Google makes us all shallow, and we lose the ability to remember things.” Will that also be wrong?

尼古拉斯·卡尔 (Nicholas Carr) 认为，“好吧，谷歌让我们变得肤浅，我们失去了记住事情的能力。”会不会也有错呢？

The thing is, we probably have been losing memory ability.

问题是，我们可能已经失去了记忆能力。

As soon as we can write, we can offload lots of information that we normally have to keep in our heads.

一旦我们能够写作，我们就可以摆脱通常必须记住的大量信息。

From what I understand, people had larger brains 20,000 or 30,000 years ago.

据我了解，两万、三万年前，人们的大脑更大。

Brain size, roughly, is correlated with intelligence.

粗略地说，大脑的大小与智力相关。

Is it possible that they were smarter than we are?

有没有可能他们比我们更聪明？

We’re a kind of mental cripple, in a way?

在某种程度上，我们是一种精神上的残疾人？

But we get by, because, in essence, we’re riding on the back of this marvelous cultural evolution.

但我们还是挺过来了，因为从本质上讲，我们正骑在这种奇妙的文化进化的背后。

I do think that the division of labor could explain that decline, but there’s also been a self-domestication process, where domesticated animals have smaller brains.

我确实认为劳动分工可以解释这种衰退，但也存在一个自我驯化的过程，即家养动物的大脑较小。

We’ve been gradually domesticating each other.

我们已经逐渐驯化彼此。

For some reason, which is a little bit unclear, animals that have to engage in more aggression against each other have larger brains.

由于某种原因（尚不清楚），必须对彼此进行更多攻击的动物拥有更大的大脑。

That would be us, right?

那就是我们，对吧？

We’ve been getting less violent for quite a long time, actually.

事实上，我们已经减少暴力很长一段时间了。

There could be a long-run dysfunctionality.

可能会出现长期的功能障碍。

The more peaceful we become, there’s less competitive pressure put on us, and we’ll stultify mentally, institutionally, other ways.

我们变得越平和，我们承受的竞争压力就越小，我们就会在精神上、制度上和其他方面变得愚蠢。

I’m not sure that that necessarily follows.

我不确定这是否必然成立。

But it’s a coherent cultural pessimist scenario.

但这是一种连贯的文化悲观主义情景。

I’ll have to think about it more.

我得再考虑一下。

Presumably, in your model, unless intergroup competition kicks in in some new way, which it might, but it’s implicitly a tale of cultural decline.

据推测，在你的模型中，除非群体间的竞争以某种新的方式开始，这是可能的，但这隐含着一个文化衰落的故事。

It looks wonderful on the surface, and you’re getting net benefits any period of time, but the longer-run mismatch between culture and the genes seems to be increasing.

表面上看起来很美好，而且你在任何时间段都能获得净收益，但从长远来看，文化和基因之间的不匹配似乎正在增加。

Actually, genetic evolution has been speeding up for the last 10,000 years.

事实上，过去一万年来，基因进化一直在加速。

Genes are trying — and actually genes can evolve faster in larger populations.

基因正在尝试——实际上基因可以在更大的群体中进化得更快。

As the population gets bigger, genes can actually respond more.

随着人口的增加，基因实际上可以做出更多的反应。

Of course, it will never go with the rate of cultural evolution.

当然，它永远不会跟上文化进化的速度。

You think that’s sexual selection, group selection, speeding-up genetic evolution?

你认为这是性选择、群体选择、加速基因进化？

Something else?

还有别的事吗？

I think it’s individual, garden-variety selection responding to a culturally constructed environment.

我认为这是对文化构建环境的个体化、普通的选择。

A lot of the genes that we know that have been selected over the last 10,000 years are response to agriculture.

我们知道，过去一万年中选择的许多基因都是对农业的反应。

Blue eyes in people of the Baltic area is due to high-latitude agriculture.

波罗的海地区人们的蓝眼睛是由于高纬度农业的影响。

Galor at Brown University, you probably know this work: there’s a number of papers arguing societies that have been producing agriculture for longer periods of time, they’re today much more cooperative.

布朗大学的加洛尔（Galor），你可能知道这项工作：有很多论文认为，在较长时期内生产农业的社会，如今他们更加合作。

There’s something, if not quite permanent about that, something long-run, something enduring about that.

这是有某种东西的，即使不是非常永久的，也是有某种长期的、持久的东西。

Do you agree with that hypothesis?

你同意这个假设吗？

I think the data is there.

我认为数据就在那里。

The question is why.

问题是为什么。

One of the things I don’t think he takes into account sufficiently is that there could be long-run cultural differences between populations.

我认为他没有充分考虑到的一件事是，人群之间可能存在长期的文化差异。

What he really means by “more cooperative” is that they’re better at doing state-level societies.

他所说的“更加合作”的真正意思是他们更擅长建立国家级的社会。

Right.

正确的。

But if they play economic games with each other, they’ll share more.

但如果他们互相玩经济游戏，他们就会分享更多。

They’re less likely to take the whole pie.

他们不太可能拿走整个馅饼。

Yeah, dealing with strangers, higher levels of patience, but that could all be .

是的，与陌生人打交道，需要更高程度的耐心，但这一切都可能是。

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。

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we know we can move patience around, for example, with cultural differences.

例如，我们知道我们可以通过文化差异来调动耐心。

How persistent do you think those cultural differences are?

您认为这些文化差异有多持久？

You also know the literature.

你也了解文学。

When migrants come to the United States, two or three generations later, their children, grandchildren tend to have a lot of the cooperative traits of the country their grandparents came from.

当移民来到美国，两三代之后，他们的孩子、孙子往往会拥有祖父母所在国家的许多合作特征。

Right.

正确的。

That decays, but it decays more slowly than a lot of people had thought.

它会衰减，但衰减速度比很多人想象的要慢。

Yeah.

是的。

I think that’s great evidence that it’s likely to be cultural and likely not to be genetic.

我认为这是一个很好的证据，表明它可能是文化因素，而不是遗传因素。

If it was genetic, it wouldn’t go away in a few generations.

如果它是遗传的，那么它不会在几代人的时间内消失。

It seems like they’re bringing heritage from the place, and it’s getting retransmitted because they’re in ethnic communities or they’re parents.

看起来他们从这个地方带来了遗产，并且因为他们身处少数民族社区或者他们是父母而被重新传播。

Then it disappears once they converge to the local mean.

一旦它们收敛到局部均值，它就会消失。

Say the Bill Easterly paper (I think it’s Bill Easterly) that goes back to the year 500 AD.

比如说比尔·伊斯特利 (Bill Easterly) 的论文（我想是比尔·伊斯特利），它可以追溯到公元 500 年。

Per capita GDP in 500 AD predicts per capita GDP today relatively well, at least much better than almost any other model would lead you to think.

公元 500 年的人均 GDP 相对较好地预测了今天的人均 GDP，至少比几乎任何其他模型会让你想到的要好得多。

Now, it could be cherry-picking.

现在，它可能是精挑细选的。

500 AD actually may do better than 1500 AD.

公元 500 年实际上可能比公元 1500 年做得更好。

Yeah, because you’re developing all kinds of institutions that themselves can endure — both formal institutions and informal institutions — family practices, cultural values.

是的，因为你正在发展各种本身能够承受的制度——“正式制度和非正式制度”——“家庭习俗、文化价值观”。

Yeah, so I think you’re capturing a lot of that.

是的，所以我认为你捕捉到了很多。

How quick is the catch-up in that process?

这个过程的追赶速度有多快？

The West has a lot of contact with the world in the 18th and 19th centuries or maybe a bit earlier, brings Western norms, not always in a welcomed manner and often with violence.

西方在 18 世纪和 19 世纪或更早的时期与世界有很多接触，带来了西方规范，但并不总是以受欢迎的方式，而且常常带有暴力。

Yes.

是的。

I think we’ve seen a lot of convergence.

我认为我们已经看到了很多融合。

Certainly, lots of places that were poor a hundred years ago are now relatively richer, so that you’re seeing a certain amount of convergence.

当然，许多一百年前贫穷的地方现在相对富裕，所以你会看到一定程度的趋同。

Let’s say we take Brazil, which is actually a pretty well-off society compared to a lot of parts of the world.

假设我们以巴西为例，与世界上许多地方相比，巴西实际上是一个相当富裕的社会。

The ratio of American, North American, US per capita GDP to Brazilian in the year 1900 is pretty much the same as it is now as best we can measure it.

1900 年美国、北美、美国的人均 GDP 与巴西的人均 GDP 之比与现在我们所能衡量的最佳水平几乎相同。

Well, do you disagree that as a broad statistical pattern there’s been a lot of economic growth in the rest of the world in which there’s convergence?

好吧，您是否不同意作为一种广泛的统计模式，世界其他地区的大量经济增长存在趋同？

East Asia, for sure.

东亚，当然。

I think we don’t know from the numbers.

我认为我们无法从数字中得知。

I think if you look at all countries together, you can debate either side, whether countries as a whole are converging on the richest countries.

我认为，如果你把所有国家放在一起来看，你可以对任何一方进行辩论，即各国作为一个整体是否正在向最富裕的国家靠拢。

I would say I’m not sure.

我想说我不确定。

The data that I’ve seen seems to suggest some convergence.

我看到的数据似乎表明存在一些趋同。

Certainly, within the United States for sure, there is the opposite of convergence.

当然，在美国内部肯定存在趋同的对立面。

Silicon Valley and Bethesda, Maryland, are getting richer, and West Virginia’s not catching up with them.

硅谷和马里兰州贝塞斯达正在变得越来越富有，而西弗吉尼亚州却没有赶上他们。

There was convergence in the ’50s and ’60s.

20世纪50年代和60年代出现了趋同。

But across cities, counties in the US, we’re quite sure there’s the opposite of convergence.

但在美国的各个城市、县，我们非常确定存在着趋同的反面。

Yeah.

是的。

The challenge that complex societies have always faced is that when they get big enough, they break down into little pieces.

复杂社会一直面临的挑战是，当它们变得足够大时，它们就会分解成小块。

Systems for maintaining uniformity have always been a problem.

保持一致性的系统一直是一个问题。

You have a view communicated in a lot of your research, some of your most famous pieces, that people in the West or at least some people in the West, they are what you call WEIRD — that’s an acronym for Western-educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic — and we should not draw general conclusions about humanity on the basis WEIRD people.

您在许多研究中，在您最著名的一些作品中，都传达了一个观点，即西方人，或者至少是西方的某些人，他们就是您所谓的“WEIRD”——“这是受西方教育的、工业化的、富裕的和民主的缩写”——我们不应该根据“WEIRD”人得出关于人类的一般性结论。

Most of us here, or possibly all of us, we’re deeply WEIRD.

我们这里的大多数人，或者可能是我们所有人，我们都非常奇怪。

Tell us a little more about that.

请告诉我们更多相关信息。

In around 2006, I arrived at the University of British Columbia, and I’d been in an anthropology department at Emory University, and I met a couple of cultural psychologists.

2006年左右，我来到了不列颠哥伦比亚大学，在埃默里大学的人类学系工作，认识了几位文化心理学家。

We got to talking over lunch and we realized in each of the areas for which we were experts on, that Westerners were unusual compared to all the other populations that had been studied.

我们在午餐时进行了交谈，我们意识到，在我们所擅长的每个领域，与所有其他被研究的人群相比，西方人都是不同寻常的。

For instance, peoples are better at cooperating if they have had many generations in a market economy or needing to do a lot of cooperative hunting.

例如，如果人们在市场经济中生活了很多代，或者需要进行大量的合作狩猎，那么他们就更擅长合作。

That would be an example of how we’re WEIRD.

这就是我们很奇怪的一个例子。

We have some positive-sum mentality that maybe is relatively rare in the world.

我们有一些正和心态，这在世界上可能是比较罕见的。

Right.

正确的。

The case that I’ve made for this particular is that in order to make markets work, we need particular social norms for how to deal with strangers and interact with them in a mutually beneficial way.

我为此提出的理由是，为了使市场发挥作用，我们需要特定的社会规范来指导如何与陌生人打交道并以互利的方式与他们互动。

In the smallest-scale human societies, you have social norms for dealing with different kinds of relatives and people you have a certain kind of relationship with.

在最小规模的人类社会中，你有处理不同类型的亲戚和与你有某种关系的人的社会规范。

Culturally local.

具有当地文化特色。

I don’t think there’s any relation between these numbers.

我认为这些数字之间没有任何关系。

Efforts to control for IQ or intelligence scores don’t seem to predict behavioral games.

控制智商或智力分数的努力似乎并不能预测行为游戏。

(There’s a few exceptions to that.) I don’t think those are linked.

（有一些例外。）我认为这些没有联系。

The Flynn effect in the short run puzzles me more than in the long run.

短期的弗林效应比长期的弗林效应更让我困惑。

If I compare today to the 18th century, I can see where the difference might be.

如果我将今天与 18 世纪进行比较，我就能看出其中的差异。

But in many countries, it seems the Flynn effect hasn’t stopped.

但在许多国家，弗林效应似乎并未停止。

Nutritional gains probably are over.

营养收益可能已经结束。

It’s a cultural-evolutionary treadmill.

这是一个文化进化的跑步机。

One place where you see this is the complexity of television shows.

你可以从电视节目的复杂性中看到这一点。

Now, you have an ensemble cast and 20 different plots going on.

现在，你已经有了一个完整的演员阵容和 20 个不同的情节。

You’ve got to track all these different plots.

你必须追踪所有这些不同的情节。

That wasn’t the television of the 1950s.

那不是 20 世纪 50 年代的电视。

It was one plot, one thing after another.

这是一个情节，一件又一件的事情。

Simple.

简单的。

The whole world is getting more complex, at least in terms of your need for analytic thinking.

整个世界变得越来越复杂，至少在你对分析思维的需求方面是这样。

Some of that in your view is the supply-side effect.

您认为其中一些是供给侧效应。

It’s not that we got smarter and they made TV better, it’s also they made TV better and that made some of us smarter.

这并不是说我们变得更聪明，他们让电视变得更好，而是他们让电视变得更好，这让我们中的一些人变得更聪明。

Coevolutionary.

共同进化。

Coevolutionary.

共同进化。

This is going to make you out to be quite an optimist, then, because TV is going to get better and better.

那么，这会让你成为一个相当乐观的人，因为电视会变得越来越好。

We’re just going to keep on getting smarter.

我们将继续变得更加聪明。

Yeah, of course.

是的，当然。

When we tie that back in with the people 30,000 years ago having bigger brains and maybe they were smarter.

当我们将这一点与三万年前的人们联系起来时，他们拥有更大的大脑，也许他们更聪明。

Somehow, how the whole picture operates: Is it that the variance of our smarts goes up and we use society as a crutch for the areas where we’re really stupid?

不知何故，整个情况是如何运作的：我们的智慧差异是否增加，我们利用社会作为我们真正愚蠢的领域的拐杖？

Is that what the picture looks like?

是图片上的样子吗？

One of the cases I make in the book is that we have this tendency to think that our intelligence is about raw brain processing power.

我在书中提出的一个例子是，我们倾向于认为我们的智力取决于原始的大脑处理能力。

But I make the case that a lot of our intelligence comes from our culturally downloaded tools.

但我认为，我们的很多智慧都来自于我们文化下载的工具。

We’re at George Mason University.

我们在乔治梅森大学。

I need to ask you about Hayek.

我需要问你关于哈耶克的事。

Hayek had a theory that we still have atavistic instincts.

哈耶克有一个理论，认为我们仍然有返祖本能。

We have the instincts of a collectivist people with strong sharing norms, which we needed when we were near subsistence.

我们具有集体主义民族的本能，具有强烈的共享规范，这是我们在勉强维持生计时所需要的。

But we’re now much wealthier and these norms are dysfunctional and, in fact, they give us a bad politics.

但我们现在变得更加富裕，而这些规范却功能失调，事实上，它们给我们带来了糟糕的政治。

Agree, disagree?

同意，不同意？

What’s your take on this?

您对此有何看法？

I think I can agree with the broad claim.

我想我可以同意这个广泛的主张。

One of the things we always face in complex societies, meritocratic-based societies, is there’s a tendency for people to want to surround themselves by people that are loyal to them, by family and friends and people who owe them things, right?

在复杂的社会中，即以精英为基础的社会中，我们总是面临的一件事是，人们倾向于希望周围都是忠于他们的人、家人、朋友以及欠他们东西的人，对吗？

We call this corruption.

我们称之为腐败。

In most human societies, this was called business as usual.

在大多数人类社会中，这被称为一切照旧。

Let me try a somewhat related question.

让我尝试一个有点相关的问题。

I’m not at all intending this as asking you about your personal views on politics.

我并不是想问你对政治的个人看法。

But let me pose the question, and then circle back to what I’m really trying to ask.

但让我提出这个问题，然后回到我真正想问的问题。

I just follow the trail where it goes.

我只是顺着小路走去的地方。

I don’t think of these things as conservative ideas although —

我不认为这些事情是保守的想法，尽管——

I don’t mean conservative in the sense of modern political parties, but in the sense of the broad sweep of human history there are conservative thinkers such as Edmund Burke would be one, or Adam Smith.

我指的不是现代政党意义上的保守派，而是从人类历史的广泛意义来看，存在保守派思想家，例如埃德蒙·伯克（Edmund Burke）或亚当·斯密（Adam Smith）。

I’m not sure.

我不知道。

I don’t think I’ve really thought about that question.

我想我并没有真正思考过这个问题。

One of the things I think thinking about cultural evolution and the scaling up of human societies and the adaptive nature of culture means that when you see a practice you’re thinking about how could that have emerged, why would it have spread?

我认为思考文化进化、人类社会规模扩大和文化适应性的一件事意味着，当你看到一种实践时，你会思考它是如何出现的，为什么它会传播？

It’s a kind of redistribution in a sense.

从某种意义上来说，这是一种重新分配。

Of sex.

性的。

Yeah, it’s sexual egalitarianism.

是的，这就是性平等主义。

There is a wisdom to that even before we could articulate those gains from monogamy.

甚至在我们能够清楚地阐明一夫一妻制带来的好处之前，这一点就已经是一种智慧了。

Right.

正确的。

And the people who spread that themselves don’t appear to have known what it was doing.

而传播该消息的人自己似乎并不知道它在做什么。

They believe God wanted it that way or something.

他们相信上帝想要那样或其他什么。

That was an efficient form of cultural evolution .

这是一种有效的文化进化形式。

.

。

.

。

It gave a competitive advantage to the societies that adopted it and then other societies began copying the West.

它为采用它的社会提供了竞争优势，然后其他社会开始效仿西方。

For example, China adopts Western marriage norms in 1950, Japan adopted it in the Meiji restoration in the 1880s, Nepal doesn’t adopt it until 1963; it’s all relatively recent.

例如，中国在1950年采用西方婚姻规范，日本在1880年代明治维新时采用，尼泊尔直到1963年才采用；这都是相对较新的。

In all of these dialogues we have a segment in the middle called underrated versus overrated and I name a thing, a person, a thinker.

在所有这些对话中，中间有一个部分称为被低估与高估，我命名了一个事物、一个人、一个思想家。

You’re always free to pass and you tell us if you think it’s underrated or overrated.

您可以随时通过，并告诉我们您是否认为它被低估或高估。

I’ll start with secular humanism.

我将从世俗人文主义开始。

Pass.

经过。

You pass, OK.

你通过了，好吧。

Steven Pinker would not have passed, I think.

我认为史蒂文·平克不会通过。

Maybe my pronunciation is wrong: Sawana, the village in the islands of Fiji.

也许我的发音是错误的：Sawana，斐济群岛上的村庄。

Sawana?

萨瓦纳？

The outlying islands in Fiji where you’ve done fieldwork.

您曾在斐济的离岛进行实地考察。

They’re great.

他们很棒。

They’re great?

他们很棒吗？

Properly rated; I don’t know.

正确评价；我不知道。

What’s interesting about them that you don’t see when you go to the more heavily touristed parts of Fiji?

当您去斐济游客较多的地区时，它们有什么有趣的地方是您看不到的？

People still live in traditional ways of life.

人们仍然过着传统的生活方式。

They plant yams, they live in complex kinship groups, they cooperate, they have hereditary chiefs.

他们种植山药，生活在复杂的亲属群体中，他们合作，他们有世袭的酋长。

You’ve done a lot of fieldwork in Michigan studying Iraqi Chaldean Christians.

您在密歇根州做了很多田野调查，研究伊拉克迦勒底基督徒。

That’s a long-standing cultural norm.

这是一个长期存在的文化规范。

The City of Detroit, underrated or overrated?

底特律市被低估还是高估？

Properly rated.

正确评价。

Properly rated, OK.

评级正确，OK。

I’ll give him an underrated just because I feel like there’s a lot of good stuff there that one could still learn from, even if you don’t agree with everything he said.

我会给他一个被低估的评价，只是因为我觉得那里有很多好东西值得人们学习，即使你不同意他所说的一切。

Sometimes people say they don’t like him because he had this kind of evolutionist view of humanity, but there’s still some good stuff there that’s worth checking out.

有时人们说他们不喜欢他，因为他对人类有这种进化论观点，但那里仍然有一些好东西值得一看。

Claude Lévi-Strauss, underrated or overrated?

克洛德·列维-斯特劳斯，被低估还是高估？

Overrated.

被高估了。

Why?

为什么？

No evolutionary approach.

没有进化方法。

Too much nativism without evolution; I don’t like nativism without evolution.

太多的本土主义而没有进化论；我不喜欢没有进化论的本土主义。

When you say nativism what do you mean?

当你说本土主义时，你的意思是什么？

The idea that there are innate structures without supplying a theory about why those structures would have emerged.

存在先天结构的想法，但没有提供关于为什么这些结构会出现的理论。

What’s your favorite television show?

你最喜欢的电视节目是什么？

Star Trek.

星际迷航。

Which one?

哪一个？

I’m really a next generation guy although I think I like them all.

我确实是下一代人，尽管我认为我喜欢他们所有人。

Why next generation?

为什么是下一代？

What have we learned from Star Trek?

我们从《星际迷航》中学到了什么？

Lots of great things.

很多很棒的事情。

It’s kind of like an anthropological quest: Captain Kirk was originally based on Captain Cook, and the idea was you’re going out to encounter new, different peoples and of course in Star Trek you go out into space and do it.

这有点像人类学探索：柯克船长最初是根据库克船长改编的，其想法是你要出去遇到新的、不同的人，当然在《星际迷航》中你要进入太空并做到这一点。

Captain Cook was doing it in the Pacific, around the world.

库克船长在太平洋和世界各地都这样做。

If you think of the implicit vision of how cooperative different groups can become, including people from different planets in various varieties of Star Trek, as an anthropologist that seems realistic to you or utopian?

作为一名人类学家，你是否会想到不同群体之间如何合作的隐含愿景，包括《星际迷航》中来自不同星球的人们，这对你来说是现实的还是乌托邦式的？

I just thought it was fun.

我只是觉得这很有趣。

Coconut milk as a cooking medium, overrated or underrated?

椰奶作为烹饪介质，被高估还是被低估？

Underrated.

被低估了。

Underrated?

被低估？

Yeah.

是的。

What do you enjoy in coconut milk?

您喜欢椰奶中的什么？

Fish.

鱼。

Fish?

鱼？

Fish in coconut milk.

椰奶里的鱼。

In the village I work in, in Fiji, we do a lot of fish in coconut milk.

在我工作的斐济村庄里，我们用椰奶做很多鱼。

That’s your favorite thing to eat in Fiji?

这是你在斐济最喜欢吃的东西吗？

Yeah, I especially .

是的，我尤其是。

.

。

.

。

well, I like the eel.

嗯，我喜欢鳗鱼。

We do a lot of moray eel.

我们做很多海鳗。

You’ve done a lot fieldwork in southern-central Chile with the Mapuche.

您在智利中南部对马普切人进行了大量实地考察。

What would you say is the main thing you personally have learned from the Mapuche in terms of your research?

您认为您个人从马普切人的研究中学到的主要内容是什么？

The Mapuche was the main source for an idea that I’m working on now and the idea is that one of the cultural ways I’m interpreting the world is as a zero-sum game and that envy and witchcraft can play an important role in influencing economic behavior and economic development.

马普切人是我现在正在研究的一个想法的主要来源，这个想法是我解释世界的文化方式之一是零和游戏，嫉妒和巫术可以在影响经济行为和经济发展方面发挥重要作用。

Amongst the WEIRD people, how fragile do you think the positive-sum mentality is?

您认为在WEIRD人群中，正和心态有多脆弱？

Can you readily imagine that 30, 40, 50 years from now we’ve in some way regressed and become much more zero-sum?

你能轻易想象 30 年、40 年、50 年后我们会在某种程度上倒退并变得更加零和吗？

Or would that be extremely unlikely?

或者说这极不可能发生？

I think it’s a ready ability for us to see the world in zero-sum terms and I don’t think it takes very much to push people into zero-sum thinking.

我认为这是我们以零和方式看待世界的一种现成能力，而且我认为不需要太多就能让人们陷入零和思维。

You think it’s scarcity or slow growth or ethnic conflict or what?

你认为这是稀缺、增长缓慢、种族冲突还是什么？

What are the triggers?

触发因素是什么？

The main thing would be negative growth, and yeah, conflict with various groups.

最主要的是负增长，是的，与各个群体的冲突。

We don’t know yet, but those are my suspicions.

我们还不知道，但这是我的怀疑。

We have some cases, like, say, the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.

我们有一些案例，比如 20 世纪 90 年代初的前南斯拉夫。

It fights a vicious war; not too long before it seemed levels of ethnic conflict were going to prove manageable if you look at measures such as intermarriage or just domestic violence.

它进行的是一场恶毒的战争；不久之后，如果你考虑一下异族通婚或家庭暴力等措施，种族冲突的程度似乎将被证明是可以控制的。

Well, I don’t know much about that conflict.

好吧，我对这场冲突了解不多。

I don’t want to speak too quickly on the idea that the zero-sum thing can change.

我不想太快地谈论零和事物可以改变的想法。

I think it can go from positive-sum to zero-sum relatively quickly, but at least in the studies that anthropologists have done in different parts of the world the zero-sum thinking can get really embedded.

我认为它可以相对较快地从正和转向零和，但至少在人类学家在世界不同地区所做的研究中，零和思维可以真正深入人心。

You’ve done a lot of work on religion and the social role of religion and how religion can have a prosocial role, and the costly signaling of certain things through religion can be useful.

您在宗教、宗教的社会角色以及宗教如何发挥亲社会作用方面做了很多工作，通过宗教传递某些事情的昂贵信号可能是有用的。

The case we make in this paper we wrote recently reviewing all this work is that these big-god religions that we talk about allowed for the construction of well-functioning secular institutions, but once you have well-functioning secular institutions then religion loses its functionality and begins to ebb away.

我们在最近撰写的回顾所有这些工作的论文中提出的观点是，我们谈论的这些大神宗教允许建立运作良好的世俗机构，但是一旦拥有运作良好的世俗机构，那么宗教就会失去其功能并开始消退。

But say Japan, which doesn’t have an enormous safety net — it has in some ways more cooperation through families — and they’re possibly the most atheistic society in the world.

但以日本为例，它没有庞大的安全网——“在某些方面它通过家庭进行了更多的合作”——而且他们可能是世界上最无神论的社会。

Is it ethnonationalism that carries that, or some embedded ethics since medieval times?

是民族主义所承载的，还是中世纪以来的一些根深蒂固的道德规范？

I think it’s an open question as to how much religion there is in Japan.

我认为日本有多少宗教信仰是一个悬而未决的问题。

Certainly, when you ask people, people think religion means the Christian God and people say no to that question.

当然，当你问人们时，人们会认为宗教意味着基督教的上帝，而人们对这个问题说不。

But then if you start talking about other kinds of beings and spirits and agents, people get a little bit softer .

但如果你开始谈论其他种类的生物、灵魂和代理人，人们就会变得更加温和。

.

。

.

。

Sure, quite a bit softer perhaps.

当然，也许更柔和一些。

I think the standard way from looking at religions all around the world is that most people accepted that their tribe or their clan or their group had a god and naturally that meant that other people’s tribes or groups had a god, so there were lots of gods and you dealt with your god and they had their god.

我认为看待世界各地宗教的标准方式是，大多数人接受他们的部落或氏族或群体有一个神，这自然意味着其他人的部落或群体有一个神，所以有很多神，你对付你的神，他们也有他们的神。

Henotheism, yeah.

单一神论，是的。

Right.

正确的。

And what was unique about the Abrahamic religions was that they at a certain point in their history — in the past they were more similar to everybody else, but then they decided there was only one God and the other gods were nonexistent.

亚伯拉罕宗教的独特之处在于，它们在历史的某个时刻——过去它们与其他宗教更加相似，但后来他们决定只有一位神，其他神都不存在。

That’s a competitive advantage through group selection or through the memes of cultural evolution?

这是通过群体选择或文化进化的模因获得的竞争优势吗？

It’s divided loyalty.

这是忠诚度的分裂。

The problem in Europe was that people still maintain their ancestor gods and the Catholic Church wanted them to believe in the Catholic God, and it’s trying to serve two masters.

欧洲的问题是人们仍然保留他们的祖先神，而天主教会希望他们相信天主教的上帝，并且它试图侍奉两个主人。

That’s correlated with higher cooperation on other matters?

这与在其他事务上加强合作有关吗？

Here’s what we know —

这是我们所知道的——

People being WEIRDer?

人们很奇怪吗？

Our effort to test this is to go to places around the world where people believe in the Christian God but also maintain local gods, and then we look at their willingness to cheat in an experiment.

我们测试这一点的努力是去世界各地人们信仰基督教上帝但也保留当地神的地方，然后我们在实验中看看他们是否愿意作弊。

So maybe more cosmopolitan, more likely to buy internationalism for larger —

所以也许更加国际化，更有可能为了更大的利益而购买国际主义——

Yeah.

是的。

The idea is the one god is for building a big society and the other god is for galvanizing cooperation in this village.

这个想法是一个神是为了建立一个大社会，另一个神是为了激发这个村庄的合作。

Then if you have cultural evolution operating more quickly for larger units, that will be correlated with a more rapid pace of cultural evolution and carrying more positive things.

那么，如果你的文化进化对于更大的单位来说运行得更快，那么这将与更快的文化进化步伐和携带更多积极的东西相关。

It allows you to scale up, basically.

基本上，它允许您扩大规模。

There is in this account some positive external social benefit to a lot of forms of monotheism?

从这个角度来看，许多形式的一神论有一些积极的外部社会效益吗？

Yeah, that’s the idea.

是的，就是这个想法。

That’s very interesting.

这很有趣。

The typical evolutionary approaches to religion don’t take into account that the kinds of gods we see in religions in the world today are not seen in small-scale societies.

典型的宗教进化论没有考虑到我们在当今世界的宗教中看到的神灵在小规模社会中是看不到的。

I mentioned the ancestor gods; other kinds of spirits can be tricked, duped, bought off, paid; you sacrifice in order to get them to do something; they’re not concerned about moral behavior.

我提到了祖先神；其他种类的精神可能会被欺骗、欺骗、收买、支付；你为了让他们做某事而做出牺牲；他们不关心道德行为。

If you’re thinking about a series of connected problems — say the origins of the Industrial Revolution, how we should spend foreign aid, how economic development can be encouraged — for this reason, do you see the roles of ideas and religions as primary, as driving forces?

如果你正在思考一系列相互关联的问题——比如工业革命的起源、我们应该如何使用外援、如何鼓励经济发展——因此，你是否认为思想和宗教的作用是首要的，是驱动力？

Or not so much?

或者没有那么多？

In my latest project I’m really looking at the kind of spread of the Western church into Europe and how it transformed the social structure in ways that I think led to individualism, it led to a different kind of cultural psychology that would eventually pave the way for secular institutions and economic growth.

在我最新的项目中，我真正关注的是西方教会向欧洲的传播，以及它如何以我认为导致个人主义的方式改变社会结构，它导致了一种不同的文化心理，最终为世俗制度和经济增长铺平了道路。

The church is the first mover in that account.

教会是这方面的先行者。

What did the British and Dutch arguably have that, say, other parts of Europe or for that matter China might not have had as much of?

英国和荷兰有哪些可以说拥有而欧洲其他地区或中国可能没有的东西？

When the church first began to spread its marriage-and-family program where it would dissolve all these complex kinship groups, it altered marriage.

当教会第一次开始传播其婚姻和家庭计划并解散所有这些复杂的亲属群体时，它改变了婚姻。

So it ended polygyny, it ended cousin marriage, which stopped the kind of .

所以它结束了一夫多妻制，结束了表亲婚姻，结束了那种……。

.

。

.

。

forced people to marry further away, which would build contacts between larger groups.

迫使人们嫁给更远的地方，这将在更大的群体之间建立联系。

That actually starts in 600 in Kent, Anglo-Saxon Kent.

这实际上始于 600 年的盎格鲁-撒克逊肯特郡肯特郡。

What’s your take on how China fits into this picture?

您对中国如何融入这一图景有何看法？

Because during the Song dynasty a lot of economic historians feel, well, there might have been, could have been, should have been an industrial revolution.

因为在宋朝，很多经济史学家认为，可能、可能、应该发生工业革命。

There’s two questions.

有两个问题。

One is why didn’t you get an industrial revolution in China.

一是为什么中国没有发生工业革命。

They’re always going to be impeded by the fact that there was a strong patrilineal clan system, cousin marriage, all these things that prevent individualism which is the fuel for entrepreneurship and individual innovation.

他们总是会受到强大的父系氏族制度、表亲婚姻等事实的阻碍，所有这些都会阻碍个人主义，而个人主义是创业和个人创新的动力。

They somehow maintained that cultural capital without moving onto the most rapid growth path?

他们以某种方式保持了文化资本，却没有走上最快速的增长道路？

You mean why China doesn’t move on?

你的意思是为什么中国不继续前进？

Right, China now arguably is moving onto that path.

是的，中国现在可以说正在走上这条道路。

But if you start at say 1730 when China might have been wealthier per capita than France, you have a long period of decline, maybe two and half centuries for the most part, and yet so much of that remains intact at the level of individual family, that Chinese migration in terms of per capita incomes goes very well very quickly.

但如果你从1730年开始，当时中国的人均收入可能比法国更富裕，那么你会经历很长一段时期的衰退，大部分时间可能是两个半世纪，但在个人家庭层面上，其中很大一部分仍然完好无损，因此中国的人均收入移民进展得非常快。

There were still functioning markets, there was still a functioning state, there was still an economic system that was pretty complex, linked lots of different places.

仍然有正常运转的市场，仍然有正常运转的国家，仍然有一个相当复杂、连接着许多不同地方的经济体系。

Of course since the 1950s China has been pushing exactly the same marriage-and-family program that the Catholic Church started pushing in 600 in Europe, so they dissolved cousin marriage.

当然，自20世纪50年代以来，中国一直在推行与天主教会在600年开始在欧洲推行的婚姻和家庭计划完全相同的计划，因此他们废除了表亲婚姻。

What’s your opinion on American exceptionalism, culturally?

您对文化上的美国例外论有何看法？

I know you’re from Canada.

我知道你来自加拿大。

In terms of the WEIRD psychology?

就奇怪的心理而言？

The —

该——

Yes.

是的。

Are we special in some way?

我们在某些方面很特别吗？

In a lot of our measures, you can’t always detect it, but Americans turn out to be WEIRDer than Canada, and WEIRDer than the rest of Europe.

在我们的许多衡量标准中，你并不总能察觉到这一点，但事实证明美国人比加拿大更奇怪，也比欧洲其他国家更奇怪。

In which way are we WEIRDer than Canadians?

我们在哪些方面比加拿大人更奇怪？

More individualistic, a little more analytic thinking —

更加个人主义，更加分析性思维——

Do we really have more instrumental rationality?

我们真的有更多的工具理性吗？

I don’t observe it these days.

这些天我没有观察它。

Yeah, valid point.

是的，有道理。

Let’s see, what was the other .

让我们看看，另一个是什么。

.

。

.

。

greater overconfidence, more focus on the self.

更加过度自信，更加关注自我。

Part of the individualism thing is an obsession with the self and the attributes and individual achievements.

个人主义的一部分是对自我、特质和个人成就的痴迷。

Americans are particularly obsessed with themselves.

美国人特别着迷于自己。

Do you have an account of how much neighbors matter?

您知道邻居有多重要吗？

It’s a common debate in development economics, like Mexico versus Brazil.

这是发展经济学中的常见争论，就像墨西哥与巴西的争论一样。

They’re right about the same level of per capita income.

他们的人均收入水平大致相同。

Mexico’s immediate neighbor, of course, is the US and also a link to Canada through NAFTA.

当然，墨西哥的近邻是美国，并且还通过北美自由贸易协定与加拿大有联系。

Well, I think there is some evidence to suggest that you’re more likely to copy useful institutions, social norms from nearby neighbors, so there is a proximity effect that could result in both positive and negative copying.

嗯，我认为有一些证据表明，你更有可能复制附近邻居的有用制度和社会规范，因此存在邻近效应，可能会导致积极和消极的复制。

So yeah, I think neighbors matter.

所以是的，我认为邻居很重要。

Your work on animals, we have a little time to talk about this.

你在动物方面的工作，我们有一点时间来讨论这个。

You’ve studied chimpanzees, their termite-fishing, their ant-dipping, their nut-cracking.

你研究过黑猩猩，研究过它们捕白蚁的行为，研究过它们的蚂蚁浸泡行为，研究过它们的坚果碎裂行为。

How conservative are chimpanzees?

黑猩猩有多保守？

How much is there chimpanzee culture in addition to their instincts?

黑猩猩除了本能之外还有多少文化？

Chimps definitely have some culture.

黑猩猩肯定有一些文化。

They do some social learning; they learn a few tools.

他们进行一些社交学习；他们学习一些工具。

The key difference between other animals and humans is that human culture is cumulative.

其他动物和人类之间的主要区别在于人类文化是累积的。

We’re able to learn stuff from the previous generation, add a little bit to it, pass it down to the next generation, add a little bit to it.

我们能够从上一代人那里学习东西，添加一些东西，然后将其传递给下一代，添加一些东西。

There’s some breakthrough in the past that’s quite remarkable.

过去有一些突破是相当了不起的。

What are now human beings start doing something that the other great apes don’t.

现在人类开始做其他类人猿不做的事情。

This is all speculative, of course, but what in your opinion is that confluence of events that leads to this great filter: What are now human beings pass through it, but the other great apes basically do not?

当然，这都是推测，但在你看来，导致这个巨大过滤器的事件汇合是什么：现在人类通过了它，但其他类人猿基本上没有？

That’s the start-up problem.

这就是启动问题。

The key thing to understand the start-up problem is how humans went down the special trajectory.

理解创业问题的关键是人类是如何走上特殊轨迹的。

The way I think about it is you want to think about natural selection as investing either in bigger brains that make you better at figuring stuff out by yourself — better at individual learning — or better at cultural learning, at learning from others.

我的想法是，你想把自然选择视为投资于更大的大脑，让你更好地自己解决问题——“更好地进行个人学习”——或者更好地进行文化学习，向他人学习。

But it’s odd in a way there are not intermediate species, or maybe there were and we killed them off, but like Neanderthals, Denisovans, might they have been smarter than humans?

但奇怪的是，没有中间物种，或者也许有，但我们把它们杀死了，但像尼安德特人、丹尼索瓦人一样，他们可能比人类更聪明吗？

Yeah.

是的。

In the book, I make the case that Neanderthals were probably smarter than us.

在书中，我证明尼安德特人可能比我们更聪明。

In primates, basically, it’s overall brain size predicts how good you are on various cognitive tests.

对于灵长类动物来说，基本上，大脑的整体大小可以预测你在各种认知测试中的表现。

Neanderthals are our cousins.

尼安德特人是我们的表兄弟。

They’re around, say, from 200,000 to 25,000 .

比如说，他们的数量大约在 200,000 到 25,000 之间。

You’re an anthropologist.

你是一位人类学家。

You’ve spent a lot of time with economists — coauthored, worked with Paul Romer, Colin Camerer, others.

你花了很多时间与经济学家一起工作，与保罗·罗默（Paul Romer）、科林·卡默勒（Colin Camerer）等人合着。

As an anthropologist, what do you find strange about the tribe known as econ?

作为一名人类学家，您对这个被称为“经济人”的部落有什么奇怪的地方吗？

HENRICH: I had a real opportunity.

亨里奇：我有一个真正的机会。

I was very fortunate in my career to be a professor of psychology and a professor of economics at the same time but to be neither in some deep sense.

在我的职业生涯中，我非常幸运能够同时担任心理学教授和经济学教授，但从某种深层意义上来说，两者都不是。

I would get to go back and forth from seminars in economics and psychology.

我会经常参加经济学和心理学的研讨会。

Whereas psychologists, they’ll sit quietly.

而心理学家，他们会安静地坐着。

They watch your talk.

他们会看你的谈话。

You go through your whole PowerPoint.

您浏览整个 PowerPoint。

You probably touched a lot of different research projects.

您可能接触过很多不同的研究项目。

What’s strange about the anthropologists?

人类学家有什么奇怪的？

That’s a whole other thing.

那完全是另一回事。

Anthropology is strange field because it’s split not down the middle but about 75 percent of the way through between the humanities on one side and then evolutionary biologists on the other who call themselves anthropologists.

人类学是一个奇怪的领域，因为它不是从中间分裂，而是大约 75% 地分裂为一边是人文学科，另一边是自称为人类学家的进化生物学家。

There’s this science, antiscience war that goes on within the same department.

同一个部门内部正在上演着这场科学与反科学的战争。

That’s a whole other thing.

那完全是另一回事。

Now, what I would call narrative, or more subjective or interpretive anthropology, does that have a future in a world where everyone has access to audiences?

现在，我所说的叙事，或更主观或解释性的人类学，在每个人都可以接触到观众的世界中是否有未来？

People post anthropological accounts on the Internet every day.

人们每天都会在互联网上发布人类学记录。

Some of them are quite wonderful.

其中一些非常精彩。

They’re typically by people with little or no training in anthropology.

他们通常是由很少或根本没有接受过人类学训练的人撰写的。

That’s possible.

这是可能的。

Although in my work, I’ve always tried to say that there’s — and make the case and do — that there’s real value to ethnographic work.

尽管在我的工作中，我总是试图说，民族志工作具有真正的价值。

That you really learn a lot and you get lots of ideas when you’re in a village and you’re living with the people, you’re working with them, you’re eating their food, and you’re just watching village life go on.

当你在一个村庄里，与人们一起生活，与他们一起工作，你吃他们的食物，你只是看着村庄生活继续进行时，你真的学到了很多东西，你得到了很多想法。

If you had to name two or three thinkers and/or books that were your main intellectual inspirations, what would they be?

如果您必须说出两三个思想家和/或书籍是您主要的智力灵感来源，他们会是什么？

I’m a big fan of Guns, Germs, and Steel (Jared Diamond).

我是《枪炮、病菌与钢铁》（贾里德·戴蒙德）的忠实粉丝。

I would also have to say Culture and the Evolutionary Process (Boyd and Richerson, 1985).

我还不得不说文化和进化过程（Boyd 和 Richerson，1985）。

Yes.

是的。

Boyd and Richerson.

博伊德和里克森。

We have a copy of that here.

我们这里有一份副本。

I guess those are the main two.

我想这就是主要的两个。

There’s a book by Steve Frank called Foundations of Social Evolution, which I really enjoyed as well.

史蒂夫·弗兰克（Steve Frank）写了一本书，名为《社会进化基础》，我也很喜欢。

Outside of your field, what’s really influenced you?

在你的领域之外，什么真正影响了你？

Outside of my field.

在我的领域之外。

My undergraduate degree was aerospace engineering, or one of my undergraduate degrees.

我的本科学位是航空航天工程，或者是我的本科学位之一。

That gave me a real appreciation for a body of math and a way of thinking that’s very different from the field I went into, which was anthropology at first.

这让我真正欣赏了数学体系和思维方式，这与我最初进入的领域（人类学）非常不同。

I think I always had that kind of engineer in me, which might’ve led me to think ways different from your usual anthropologist.

我想我身上一直有这样的工程师，这可能会让我以不同于通常的人类学家的方式思考。

That’s quite unusual for an anthropologist, correct?

这对于人类学家来说很不寻常，对吗？

I think so.

我想是的。

And it’s unusual for an aerospace engineer, correct?

对于航空航天工程师来说这很不寻常，对吗？

As far as I know, yeah.

据我所知，是的。

When you originally became an aerospace engineer, what was the thought in your mind for doing that and not anthropology or something else?

当你最初成为一名航空航天工程师时，你脑子里的想法是什么，而不是人类学或其他什么？

I like Star Trek.

我喜欢《星际迷航》。

Sure, you like Star Trek.

当然，你喜欢《星际迷航》。

HENRICH: Actually, I wanted to do space propulsion.

HENRICH：实际上，我想做太空推进。

When I was at the end of my undergraduate, I was trying to decide if I wanted to go to grad school in anthropology or study space propulsion.

当我本科毕业时，我试图决定是否要去人类学研究生院或学习太空推进。

I took a job actually here in Northern Virginia, and thought about it for a while.

我实际上在北弗吉尼亚州找到了一份工作，并考虑了一段时间。

Then I decided, then I quit my job and drove to California and became a grad student at UCLA.

然后我决定，然后我辞掉了工作，开车去了加利福尼亚州，成为加州大学洛杉矶分校的研究生。

If you’ve watched Star Trek and thought about space, let’s say someday, whenever, we encounter intelligent aliens.

如果您看过《星际迷航》并思考过太空，那么假设有一天，无论何时，我们都会遇到智慧外星人。

How intelligible do you think they will be to us?

您认为它们对我们来说有多容易理解？

I wouldn’t be very optimistic.

我不会很乐观。

Wouldn’t be very optimistic?

会不会很乐观？

I can imagine an evolutionary track that is so different from anything we can comprehend.

我可以想象一条与我们所能理解的任何事物都截然不同的进化轨迹。

They’re not going to be like Vulcans and Romulans?

他们不会像瓦肯人和罗慕伦人那样吗？

I don’t think so.

我不这么认为。

They’ll be a kind of pulsating mass mind and we’ll never be able to translate into their language, and we won’t even be sure how smart they are for a long time?

他们将成为一种脉动的大众思想，而我们永远无法翻译成他们的语言，而且我们甚至在很长一段时间内都无法确定他们有多聪明？

Yeah.

是的。

I think that seems like the most likely scenario.

我认为这似乎是最有可能的情况。

In your own work and in the social sciences, what are you currently most excited about?

在您自己的工作和社会科学领域，您目前最兴奋的是什么？

Well, I’m most excited about this book, which I was partially describing.

嗯，我对这本书最感兴趣，我已经部分描述了这本书。

I’m writing a book on the WEIRD people problem on this question of how Westerners became psychologically unusual.

我正在写一本关于奇怪的人问题的书，关于西方人如何在心理上变得不寻常的问题。

That’s taken me kind of deep-dive into European history.

这让我深入了解了欧洲历史。

That’s what I’m working on now.

这就是我现在正在做的事情。

You’re mainly working on the historical side of that?

您主要从事历史方面的工作？

No. I move back and forth, so there’s tons of experiments and lots of work from economics, actually, lots work on institutions and culture from economics.

不。我来回走动，所以有大量的实验和大量的经济学工作，实际上，有很多关于经济学的制度和文化的工作。

But I’m trying to weave that together where I move back and forth from the history.

但我试图将它们编织在一起，让我在历史中来回走动。

You’re allowed to go back in time and visit one historical era as an anthropologist.

作为一名人类学家，你可以回到过去，参观一个历史时代。

Assuming you can speak the language and won’t catch a disease, when and where would it be?

假设你会说这种语言并且不会感染疾病，那么它会在何时何地发生？

600 AD in Kent, when the first missionaries arrived.

公元 600 年，第一批传教士抵达肯特郡。

What would you ask them?

你会问他们什么？

I’d observe them.

我会观察他们。

I’d live among them —

我会住在他们中间——

Sure, you’d live among them.

当然，你会生活在他们中间。

But at some point, you’d sit down for breakfast .

但在某个时候，你会坐下来吃早餐。

.

。

.

。

We have some insights, but what was the social structure at the time?

我们有一些见解，但当时的社会结构是怎样的？

How were people living?

人们过着怎样的生活？

What was the real political power of the chiefs?

酋长们的真正政治权力是什么？

What were the missionaries really up to?

传教士到底在做什么？

We have a few letters they sent back to the pope, but I’d want to get the whole story.

我们有几封他们寄回给教皇的信，但我想了解整个故事。

As to what life in Kent was like in the 6th century.

至于六世纪肯特郡的生活是什么样的。

And what the missionaries were actually up to.

以及传教士实际上在做什么。

Like, were they actually trying to ban cousin marriage and all the stuff that they purported to do in their letters back to the pope.

就像，他们是否真的试图禁止表兄弟结婚以及他们在给教皇的信中声称要做的所有事情。

Joe, we look forward to your next book.

乔，我们期待你的下一本书。

His current book, The Secret of Our Success, will be available for sale outside afterwards.

他目前正在出版的书《我们成功的秘密》随后将在外面出售。

We will move in just a second to question-and-answer.

我们稍后将进入问答环节。

We have microphones on each side.

我们的每一侧都有麦克风。

But before we do that, let’s give Joe a big round of applause.

但在此之前，让我们给乔以热烈的掌声。

This is about cousin marriage.

这是关于表弟婚姻的事情。

I’ll try to be quick.

我会尽量快点。

If it begins with the churches undermining cousin marriage around 600, and then European economic success only really takes off maybe a thousand years later — depending on what you think about the economic history — is it plausible that the initial effects of undermining cousin marriage may have been quite detrimental, weakening social stability?

如果从教会在 600 年左右开始破坏表亲婚姻开始，然后欧洲的经济成功也许要在一千年后才真正起飞——“取决于你对经济史的看法”——破坏表亲婚姻的最初影响是否可能是相当有害的，削弱了社会稳定？

Making societies more fragmented?

让社会更加分裂？

Yes, absolutely.

是的，绝对是。

The first thing: in order to get to individuals, you had to break down the social safety nets and the fabric of complex kinship societies which were really fundamental to help people who were able to survive, and inheritance patterns had to be changed.

第一件事：为了接触到个人，你必须打破社会安全网和复杂的亲属社会的结构，这些对于帮助那些能够生存的人来说确实是至关重要的，并且继承模式必须改变。

Next question.

下一个问题。

I work for an Internet company so I have to ask an Internet question.

我在一家互联网公司工作，所以我必须问一个互联网问题。

I was looking at your Twitter feed.

我正在看你的 Twitter 消息。

Right.

正确的。

Jess Tracy is a collaborator of mine.

杰西·特雷西是我的合作者。

We were colleagues at the University of British Columbia.

我们是不列颠哥伦比亚大学的同事。

We did research on how different forms of status affect leadership.

我们研究了不同形式的地位如何影响领导力。

We did a number of different studies.

我们做了许多不同的研究。

I write about sex and politics.

我写的是性和政治。

I was curious about if society got better, more prosperous, more peaceful by making monogamous marriage a norm, by taking some extraneous males out of society — then would it not follow that a social norm that has one female with multiple husbands would be even better?

我很好奇，如果通过让一夫一妻制成为一种规范，通过将一些外来男性排除在社会之外，社会会变得更好、更繁荣、更和平——那么，一女多夫的社会规范不是会更好吗？

Yeah, that’s a great question.

是的，这是一个很好的问题。

Here’s the issue.

这就是问题所在。

When I assemble this argument, taking what we know about evolutionary biology and about male-female differences: you very rarely see polyandrous societies.

当我根据我们对进化生物学和男女差异的了解来整理这个论点时：你很少看到一妻多夫的社会。

Next question.

下一个问题。

You talked a little bit about — well, you talked a lot about — the role of gods in society.

你谈了一点——嗯，你谈了很多——神在社会中的角色。

You mentioned how having one big god creates a bigger society while other smaller gods, I think you said, galvanizes cooperation in local communities.

您提到拥有一位大神如何创造一个更大的社会，而其他较小的神，我想您说过，可以激发当地社区的合作。

Now that’s a tough one.

现在这是一项艰难的任务。

Tell me more about human dignity.

告诉我更多关于人的尊严的事。

My gut reaction would be, “Oh, you’re thinking we’re all children of God.” Whereas if I am paying tribute to the god of my city, I’m more kin to the people in my city.

我的直觉反应是：“哦，你以为我们都是上帝的孩子。”然而，如果我向我所在城市的神致敬，我就会更亲近我所在城市的人们。

Somebody else living elsewhere, they’re completely different from me.

生活在其他地方的其他人，他们与我完全不同。

I can’t judge them by the same standards.

我不能用同样的标准来评判他们。

Some historians — this relates to some of my thinking and research and reading about European history — have made the case that the kind of human universalism that we see emerging in Europe, notions of human rights and stuff, come in part from this notion that we’re all children of the same God rather than each of our tribes or each of our clans having its own independent gods.

一些历史学家——“这与我对欧洲历史的一些思考、研究和阅读有关”——已经证明，我们在欧洲看到的人类普遍主义、人权概念等部分来自这样的观念：我们都是同一个神的孩子，而不是我们的每个部落或每个氏族都有自己独立的神。

You can see, if you’re in this mindset, it might be easier to come up with the idea of individual rights or some kind of universalism.

你可以看到，如果你处于这种心态，可能会更容易提出个人权利或某种普遍主义的想法。

Question here.

问题在这里。

There’s been a decline in the number of languages spoken worldwide, as well as the number of dialects in the languages that are spoken.

全世界使用的语言数量以及使用语言中的方言数量都在减少。

From your cultural-evolutionary perspective, is that a benefit from the perspective of increased interconnectivity between the people?

从您的文化进化角度来看，这是否是人与人之间互联性增强的好处？

Or is it a loss of cultural biodiversity?

或者是文化生物多样性的丧失？

I would see it as a great loss because languages contain rich ideas about the culture.

我认为这是一个巨大的损失，因为语言包含了关于文化的丰富思想。

When people learn languages they may actually come to think about the world differently.

当人们学习语言时，他们实际上可能会以不同的方式思考世界。

If I could just follow up on that, though.

不过，如果我能跟进的话。

If we think the larger cultural units have more rapid cultural evolution and they carry memes better .

如果我们认为更大的文化单位有更快的文化进化并且它们更好地传播模因。

.

。

.

。

and a second language is much tougher.

而第二语言则要困难得多。

You go to India.

你去印度。

The percentage of people who really speak English well in India, it’s probably below 10 percent would be my sense.

我的感觉是，在印度真正能说流利英语的人所占的比例可能低于 10%。

I think when people use different languages, they can think about things in different ways and it’ll highlight different features of the problem.

我认为当人们使用不同的语言时，他们可以用不同的方式思考事物，这会突出问题的不同特征。

I think it’s still valuable.

我觉得还是很有价值的。

I would encourage people to learn multiple languages.

我会鼓励人们学习多种语言。

But if you’re just betting on countries: here’s a country with only one language, here’s a country with five languages — which will be more creative?

但如果你只是押注于国家：这是一个只有一种语言的国家，这是一个拥有五种语言的国家 —— 哪个更有创意？

What’s your bet?

你的赌注是什么？

It’s unclear because if you have multiple languages, you can potentially learn from people.

目前还不清楚，因为如果你会多种语言，你就有可能向人们学习。

Suppose you speak Spanish, Mandarin, and English: then you can search the web in three languages.

假设您会说西班牙语、普通话和英语：那么您可以用三种语言搜索网络。

You get access to a much wider collective brain than if you can just read the English.

与仅仅阅读英文相比，你可以接触到更广泛的集体大脑。

The extra languages can actually expand the size of the collective brain.

额外的语言实际上可以扩大集体大脑的规模。

Next question.

下一个问题。

To the extent that you think that human beings are hardwired to be tribalistic, do you think that the modern world’s cultures are strong and good enough to overcome the effects of violence and tribalism and its negative effects?

如果您认为人类生来就具有部落主义，那么您认为现代世界的文化是否强大且足以克服暴力和部落主义的影响及其负面影响？

My take on this is that we do have a tribal psychology.

我对此的看法是我们确实有部落心理。

The key to building nation states and religions was to harness this tribal instinct.

建立民族国家和宗教的关键是利用这种部落本能。

One of the things nations do is try to create a uniform language because language is one of the key cues that people use in figuring out what group they’re in.

各国所做的事情之一就是尝试创建一种统一的语言，因为语言是人们用来确定自己属于哪个群体的关键线索之一。

Establishing other similar cultural patterns and beliefs helps in establishing a nation.

建立其他类似的文化模式和信仰有助于建立一个国家。

Next question here.

下一个问题在这里。

I’m really curious about your thoughts on the maverick versus the cultural learner and what you think today the role of the maverick is.

我真的很好奇你对特立独行者与文化学习者的看法，以及你对今天特立独行者的角色的看法。

One thing that’s interesting about the maverick question is we tend to think of the maverick as the individual learner, the person who comes up with their own idea, their own new idea.

关于特立独行问题的一件有趣的事情是，我们倾向于将特立独行者视为个人学习者，提出自己的想法、自己的新想法的人。

But my take on the history, at least of invention (that’s something I’ve spent a little bit of time on; it could be different in other domains), is great ideas actually come from a recombination.

但我对历史的看法，至少是发明的历史（这是我花了一点时间研究的事情；在其他领域可能会有所不同），伟大的想法实际上来自重组。

To follow up on that, in the 19th century, Tocqueville wrote that Americans were among the most conformist of people.

托克维尔在 19 世纪写道，美国人是最墨守成规的人之一。

It was precisely because they were free, and that they could be organized in mass numbers in a larger market setting and you had a lot of economies of scale.

正是因为它们是免费的，并且它们可以在更大的市场环境中大量组织起来，并且具有很大的规模经济。

He thought that made us, on average, quite conformist.

他认为这使得我们平均而言非常墨守成规。

Do you agree with that portrait?

你同意那幅肖像吗？

Americans had — at least some of them — had relatively similar cultural backgrounds.

美国人——至少其中一些人——拥有相对相似的文化背景。

I guess I don’t know enough about the data at the time to say.

我想我对当时的数据还不够了解。

OK.

好的。

Next question.

下一个问题。

I’m recalling your observation of the attack mentality of economic seminars and adding to that the observation that over my 50 years an economist, the literature has changed completely so that now, every article in a journal begins, “I construct a model which .

我回想起您对经济研讨会的攻击心态的观察，并补充说，在我 50 年的经济学家生涯中，文献已经完全改变，因此现在，期刊上的每一篇文章都以这样的开头：“我构建了一个模型……

.

。

.” so that you can’t argue about the economics of it.

”。这样你就无法争论它的经济性。

I tend to think of disciplines as — they’re really cultures, right?

我倾向于将学科视为“——”它们确实是文化，对吗？

Because you’re training graduate students.

因为你正在培养研究生。

They’re being taught what counts as evidence, what’s a good project, what’s a good paper, how do you do a presentation.

他们被教导什么才是证据，什么是一个好的项目，什么是一篇好的论文，如何进行演示。

You mentioned anthropologists.

你提到了人类学家。

Anthropologists read their papers, so they stand up in the front and just read it.

人类学家读他们的论文，所以他们站在前面就读。

That’s a quite different cultural style.

这是一种完全不同的文化风格。

Next question.

下一个问题。

When Tyler asked you whether the US or Canada was WEIRDer, I was surprised that you didn’t mention the American obsession with American football and baseball.

当泰勒问你美国还是加拿大是 WEIRDer 时，我很惊讶你没有提到美国人对美式橄榄球和棒球的痴迷。

I’m curious.

我很好奇。

In any of your books, have you explored how sport affects culture and culture affects sport?

在您的任何书中，您是否探讨过体育如何影响文化以及文化如何影响体育？

Have you read the book How Soccer Explains the World?

你读过《足球如何解释世界》这本书吗？

No, I haven’t read How Soccer Explains the World.

不，我还没读过《足球如何解释世界》。

I do think sport is potentially a great cultural technology for bringing people together because they all get together to watch the event.

我确实认为体育可能是一种将人们聚集在一起的伟大文化技术，因为他们都聚在一起观看赛事。

You have high emotions.

你的情绪很高涨。

Sport as religion.

体育作为宗教。

Next question.

下一个问题。

You wrote a lot about prestige.

你写了很多关于声望的文章。

I’m interested in lack of prestige and the effect on us, particularly men, and what behavior that may cause.

我感兴趣的是缺乏威望以及对我们（尤其是男性）的影响，以及可能导致的行为。

You’re thinking that when males don’t achieve very much prestige, how that affects them?

你在想，当男性没有获得太多威望时，这会对他们产生什么影响？

Right.

正确的。

There’s a lot of copying and mimicry amongst people who are prestigious .

有声望的人之间有很多抄袭和模仿的行为。

.

。

.

。

you’re prestigious, so I’ll mimic you.

你很有名望，所以我会模仿你。

But what if a person who lacks prestige — there’s a phrase that I’ve come across recently called “damaged masculinity.” What would happen to those people in their little tribes or whatever, and what would that cause them potentially to do?

但如果一个人缺乏声望呢？——我最近看到一个短语，叫做“男性气质受损”。那些小部落或其他地方的人会发生什么，这会导致他们做什么？

One of the things that comes up in polygyny research: When you have high rates of polygyny, you get this group of low-status males.

一夫多妻制研究中出现的一件事是：当一夫多妻制比例很高时，就会得到这群地位低下的男性。

In order to increase their status, they have to take big risks.

为了提高自己的地位，他们必须冒很大的风险。

They go into a mindset where they’re willing to do anything that’ll allow them to hop up into the higher-status states.

他们的心态是愿意做任何能让他们跳入更高地位的州的事情。

Next question.

下一个问题。

I was thinking with the example of the monks going into, or the missionaries going into, different tribal situations or just even with cultural evolution in general.

我正在思考僧侣进入或传教士进入不同部落情况甚至一般文化进化的例子。

To what extent do the established norms try to punish difference?

既定规范在多大程度上试图惩罚差异？

That’s part of the story.

这是故事的一部分。

Part of being a cultural norm is to say that if you deviate from it, people are going to be annoyed with you in some way.

作为一种文化规范的一部分是，如果你偏离它，人们就会以某种方式对你感到恼火。

There’s going to be some kind of punishment or sanctioning, people won’t marry you, all kinds of things like that.

会有某种惩罚或制裁，人们不会嫁给你，诸如此类的事情。

That’s what creates the stability.

这就是创造稳定性的原因。

I guess I was thinking it’s like how do the missionaries, these outsiders coming in, how does that culture “win out”?

我想我在想，传教士、这些外来者如何进来，这种文化如何“获胜”？

I see, OK.

我明白了，好吧。

Great.

伟大的。

Not to think of it in zero-sum terms, but —

不要以零和的方式来思考它，但是——

Both from my own experience and from reading, the way Protestant missionaries operate in South America is that they show up with radios, steel tools, and antibiotics.

根据我自己的经验和阅读，新教传教士在南美洲的运作方式是他们带着收音机、钢铁工具和抗生素出现。

Right away, they seem like a more successful group so they’re able to influence people.

立刻，他们看起来像是一个更成功的群体，因此他们能够影响人们。

Just tell us who are Machiguenga are.

请告诉我们谁是马奇根加人。

This is this group I worked with in the Peruvian Amazon: traditional, small-scale, lived in single families scattered throughout the forest.

这就是我在秘鲁亚马逊地区工作的这个群体：传统的、小规模的、居住在分散在森林各处的单一家庭中。

I spent a few months palling around in a dugout trying to learn about their society.

我花了几个月的时间在防空洞里闲逛，试图了解他们的社会。

Question over here.

问题就在这里。

Hi.

你好。

I was just wondering if you could talk a little bit about China because I personally think China is a pretty successful society just because there are so many Chinese people in the world and they have not had a single god.

我只是想知道你是否可以谈谈中国，因为我个人认为中国是一个非常成功的社会，因为世界上有这么多的中国人，而且他们没有一个上帝。

Just any comments you might have on them.

只是您对它们可能有的任何评论。

Sure.

当然。

In our religion project, we’ve actually brought a bunch of historians of China into the project.

在我们的宗教项目中，我们实际上邀请了一群中国历史学家参与该项目。

There seems to be quite a bit of debate in the field about whether there were high gods in ancient China.

关于中国古代是否有至高神，业界似乎存在不少争论。

Question.

问题。

Do you think that modern cultural evolution, at least in the US, is making people more individualistic and selfish, or do you think it’s leading to a more collectivist society?

您认为现代文化的演变，至少在美国，是让人们变得更加个人主义和自私，还是导致社会变得更加集体主义？

I think that individualism is still increasing, certainly, I think in the last 50 years or so.

我认为，在过去 50 年左右的时间里，个人主义当然仍在增长。

We now have psychological measures, for example conformity, showing that Americans have gotten less conformist over the last 50 years.

我们现在有心理测量，例如从众行为，表明美国人在过去 50 年里不再那么从众了。

Last question.

最后一个问题。

What proportion of the variation in cooperation, let’s say in a prisoner’s dilemma, would you say is phenotypic versus cultural?

比方说，在囚徒困境中，你认为合作变异中表型与文化的比例是多少？

I ask because you seemed very much on the side of culture earlier in the talk.

我问这个问题是因为在谈话的早些时候你似乎非常站在文化一边。

Thinking about phenotype, we have evidence from twin studies in Sweden and the US suggesting that about half of the variation, say behavioral economic games, is explained by genes.

考虑到表型，我们从瑞典和美国的双胞胎研究中得到的证据表明，大约一半的变异（比如行为经济游戏）是由基因解释的。

There’s no reason to think that that actually extends to other populations.

没有理由认为这实际上会扩展到其他人群。

Let’s give a big round of applause for Joe.

让我们为乔送上热烈的掌声。

Thanks a lot.

多谢。