John Nye on Revisionist Economic History and Having Too Many Hobbies (Ep. 54)
I’m here today with my colleague John Nye, who is a renowned economic historian, professor of economics at George Mason University.
今天我和我的同事约翰·奈 (John Nye) 一起来到这里，他是著名的经济历史学家、乔治梅森大学的经济学教授。
He holds a chair at the Mercatus Center, and he is also international adviser to Higher School of Economics in Moscow.
他是莫卡图斯中心的主席，也是莫斯科高等经济学院的国际顾问。
John, welcome.
约翰，欢迎。
Thank you, Tyler.
谢谢你，泰勒。
Let’s start with a few questions about France and French economic history.
让我们从几个有关法国和法国经济史的问题开始。
It’s commonly believed that from the 17th through 19th centuries, French per capita income was about 70 percent that of Great Britain.
人们普遍认为，从 17 世纪到 19 世纪，法国的人均收入约为英国的 70%。
Why was France poorer, if indeed you accept those numbers?
如果你确实接受这些数字，为什么法国会更穷？
I think it’s complicated, but the simple story is France was more agricultural.
我认为这很复杂，但简单的故事是法国更加农业化。
England urbanized much more quickly.
英国的城市化速度要快得多。
France covered a much larger area with a larger population and a much more diverse population than Britain did.
与英国相比，法国的面积更大，人口更多，人口也更加多样化。
But mostly I’d say the answer has to do with France having lower agricultural productivity and being more heavily rural than England was.
但我想说的主要是，答案与法国的农业生产力较低且农村人口比英国更多有关。
And why did it take longer for France to urbanize?
为什么法国的城市化进程需要更长时间？
This is a bigger issue.
这是一个更大的问题。
I think it has a lot to do with their arrangement of their property rights and the difficulties of transferring, of moving people from the land to the cities.
我觉得这和他们的产权安排和转移的困难、把人从土地转移到城市有很大关系。
Was the backwardness of French agriculture a reason why, to this day, France, in some ways, has better food than Great Britain?
法国农业的落后是否是迄今为止法国在某些方面比英国拥有更好食物的原因？
I’m not sure about that.
我对此不太确定。
There’s a lot of discussion about this, but certainly I’d say the regional nature of the agriculture contributed to a lot of what we think of as good food, but it’s not just that.
关于这一点有很多讨论，但我当然会说农业的区域性质促成了很多我们认为的优质食品，但不仅如此。
I’m not going to get into it since that’s really one of these big, long, drawn-out debates in economic history that isn’t fully .
我不打算深入讨论这个问题，因为这确实是经济史上一场尚未完全展开的大型、长期、旷日持久的辩论之一。
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Basically, nobody quite agrees on some of these issues of why France was behind England, and how much was it behind, if at all.
基本上，在一些问题上，没有人完全同意法国为何落后于英格兰，以及落后了多少（如果有的话）。
So if the French, during these centuries, are poorer, why are relatively so few of them moving to the New World compared, for instance, to Germans, or British for that matter?
因此，如果法国人在这几个世纪里比较贫穷，为什么与德国人或英国人相比，移居新世界的法国人相对较少呢？
One of the issues is why aren’t they moving at all to the city in the sense that .
问题之一是他们为什么不从这个意义上搬到城市。
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One way to think about it is that French industrial production is much closer in productivity to English industrial production, that is per capita, whereas French agricultural production, well through the 19th century, is below that of England per capita, or Britain per capita.
一种思考方式是，法国工业生产在人均生产率方面与英国工业生产更为接近，而法国农业生产在整个 19 世纪都低于英国的人均生产率。
Yet there’s a much slower transformation of French agriculture to industry.
然而，法国农业向工业的转型要慢得多。
Some of that may have to do with various cuts of land taxes and regulations that encouraged people to stay on the land and discouraged investment in the cities, but it’s very unclear.
其中一些可能与各种土地税削减和鼓励人们留在土地上并抑制对城市投资的法规有关，但目前还不清楚。
It is exactly one of those big puzzles in French economic history that people are still worrying about.
这正是人们至今仍担心的法国经济史上的一大难题。
It’s not unlike the problem of structural backwardness in a lot of poorer countries today.
这与当今许多较贫穷国家的结构性落后问题没有什么不同。
When was it exactly that France caught up to Britain in terms of per capita income, and how was that fundamental underlying immobility somehow neutered or erased?
法国在人均收入方面到底是什么时候赶上英国的？这种根本性的停滞状态是如何以某种方式被削弱或消除的？
Depending upon whom you believe, some people say it wasn’t till the ’60s that they fully catch up.
有些人说直到 60 年代他们才完全迎头赶上，这取决于你相信谁。
It’s unclear about this.
对此尚不清楚。
I would say things are a bit blurry in the early 1900s, but probably it’s not till sometime in the early 20th century that they fully catch up.
我想说 1900 年代初的情况有点模糊，但可能直到 20 世纪初的某个时候他们才完全迎头赶上。
We think of France, or at least I do, as having a fairly high-quality bureaucracy and quality civil service.
我们认为法国，或者至少我是这么认为，拥有相当高质量的官僚机构和优质的公务员服务。
Where does that come from in French economic or political history?
这在法国经济史或政治史中来自哪里？
A lot of that has to do with the old imperial tradition and with the French basically creating the beginnings of the modern education system.
这在很大程度上与古老的帝国传统和法国人基本上创造了现代教育体系的开端有关。
To some extent, what the revolution did was, they took a number of the old imperial academies and turned them into what are now known as the Grandes Écoles.
在某种程度上，革命所做的是，他们夺走了一些旧的帝国学院，并将它们变成了现在所谓的大学院。
You have the Polytechnique, and you have Normale Supérieure, and part of what they did is that they turned these into feeding grounds for the state, but also as a means of attracting the best and the brightest, no matter where they came from.
你有综合理工学院，也有巴黎高等师范学院，他们所做的一部分就是将这些学校变成国家的温床，同时也是吸引最优秀和最聪明的人才的一种手段，无论他们来自哪里。
They were, for example, one of the earliest to make, say, mathematics an important part of the curriculum instead of just, say, Latin and Greek, as was more common in the British elite schools.
例如，他们是最早将数学作为课程重要组成部分的学校之一，而不是像英国精英学校中更常见的那样，将拉丁语和希腊语作为课程的重要组成部分。
The Polytechnique, which was developed during the revolution, produced many of the major political leaders in France in the 19th and 20th centuries.
在大革命期间发展起来的综合理工学院，培养了法国19世纪和20世纪的许多主要政治领导人。
If we go, say, to early 19th century France, and we just look at quality of economists and quality of thought on free trade, are the French ahead or behind the British?
比如说，如果我们回到19世纪初期的法国，我们只看经济学家的素质和自由贸易思想的质量，法国人是领先还是落后于英国？
Hmmm, that gets a little tricky, but I’d say they’re a little bit behind the British, but not very much.
嗯，这有点棘手，但我想说他们有点落后英国人，但不是很多。
You have Bastiat, you have Jean-Baptiste Say in mathematical economics, you have —
你有巴夏特，你有数理经济学领域的让-巴蒂斯特·萨伊，你有——
That’s late-middle 19th century.
那是19世纪中后期。
Then the French are fully equal.
那么法国人就完全平等了。
Cournot, of course.
当然是古诺。
Cournot, mathematically, probably develops a lot the things we tend to think of as modern economics.
从数学上来说，古诺可能发展了很多我们通常认为的现代经济学的东西。
The way we do monopoly analysis, simple monopoly, supply, demand, these are all Cournot, as well as duopoly and so forth and so on.
我们做垄断分析的方式，简单的垄断，供给，需求，这些都是古诺，还有双头垄断等等等等。
Overall, it’s not as integrated as the group in Britain, but they’re very similar.
总体而言，它不像英国的团体那样一体化，但它们非常相似。
You’ve argued that we’ve underrated how free trade France was throughout much of the 19th century.
您认为我们低估了法国在 19 世纪大部分时间里的自由贸易程度。
What exactly is the myth there?
到底有什么神话呢？
And how would you describe the reality?
你会如何描述现实？
That’s a long project I worked on for over 15 years of my life, and it led to my 2007 book, War, Wine, and Taxes.
这是我一生中超过 15 年的一个长期项目，它催生了我 2007 年的书《战争、葡萄酒和税收》。
It starts from the fact when, early on in my career, I was doing some work in Second Empire France and looking at their tariff policies, and one of the things I did routinely was to compare average tariffs in Britain and France, something which apparently, at the time I was doing it, no one had ever bothered to do.
这要从以下事实开始：在我职业生涯的早期，我在法国第二帝国做了一些工作，研究他们的关税政策，而我经常做的事情之一就是比较英国和法国的平均关税，显然，在我做这件事的时候，没有人费心去做。
One of the things that shocked me was that, from about the 1850s, or certainly the 1860s, to the end of the 19th century, France had, in fact, much earlier, going back to the ’30s, France seemed to have lower average tariffs than the British did, for I would say three-quarters of the 19th century.
让我震惊的事情之一是，从大约 1850 年代，或者肯定是 1860 年代，到 19 世纪末，法国实际上早得多，可以追溯到 30 年代，法国的平均关税似乎比英国低，因为我想说是 19 世纪的四分之三。
It’s not till the end of the 19th century that Britain catches up with France in terms of openness of trade.
直到19世纪末，英国在贸易开放度上才赶上法国。
That led me to investigate both why this important fact was so misunderstood in economic history, that the French were, de facto, less protectionist in many ways than Britain for, say, more than half of the century, and why people didn’t notice that amid all the fanfare about the Corn Laws.
这促使我调查为什么这个重要的事实在经济史上受到如此大的误解，即在半个多世纪的时间里，法国实际上在许多方面比英国的保护主义程度要低，以及为什么人们在对《谷物法》的大肆宣传中没有注意到这一点。
What are the intellectual origins of this myth of free-trade Britain?
英国自由贸易神话的思想根源是什么？
Where does it come from?
它从哪里来？
Are we overrating the British in every other way, or is there some specific reason?
我们是否在其他方面高估了英国人，或者有什么具体原因吗？
Well the specific reason there definitely has to do with the Corn Laws.
具体原因肯定与《谷物法》有关。
With the repeal of the Corn Laws, Britain also repealed lots and lots of tariffs, but if you go back— Taussig first noticed this — that they removed lots of tariffs, but often on things that were a trivial part of trade.
随着《谷物法》的废除，英国也废除了很多很多的关税，但如果你回去——陶西格首先注意到这一点——他们取消了很多关税，但往往是在贸易中微不足道的部分。
In contrast, many of the tariffs that even Adam Smith complained about in The Wealth of Nations, in particular the wine tariffs, were not touched.
相比之下，连亚当·斯密在《国富论》中抱怨的许多关税，特别是葡萄酒关税，都没有被触及。
When the British often proposed bilateral free-trade agreements with both France and Spain, the first things the French and the Spanish asked for was to renegotiate tariffs on wine, and the British said, “No, no, no, we can’t touch that,” and they said, “Well, those are our big exports to you.
当英国经常提出与法国和西班牙签订双边自由贸易协定时，法国和西班牙要求的第一件事就是重新谈判葡萄酒关税，英国人说，“不，不，不，我们不能碰这个”，他们说，“好吧，这些是我们对你们的大宗出口。
How do you expect us to have a free-trade agreement?” So that killed any attempt at bilateral trade.
您希望我们如何达成自由贸易协定？”因此，这扼杀了任何双边贸易的尝试。
I think the modern analogy would be to think about Japan.
我认为现代的类比是考虑日本。
Japan could negotiate completely open tariffs in every manufacturer item, but so long as they kept agricultural tariffs, and their heavy constraints — in fact, virtual prohibitions — in the US rice in many cases, there’s not much change there.
日本可以就所有制造商产品进行完全开放的关税谈判，但只要他们保留农产品关税，以及在许多情况下对美国大米的严格限制（事实上，实际上是禁止），那就没有太大变化。
That’s what Britain did.
英国就是这么做的。
Britain had a comparative advantage in manufacturers, so they were willing to go to free trade in manufacturers, but they were very, very protectionist when it came to consumption items and, in particular, beverages — wine, but also all alcoholic products, rum, sugar, tea, coffee, et cetera.
英国在制造商方面有比较优势，所以他们愿意在制造商方面实行自由贸易，但在消费品方面，他们非常非常保护主义，特别是饮料——葡萄酒，还有所有酒精产品、朗姆酒、糖、茶、咖啡等等。
If elites have so much influence over trade policy, why is it that Britain got rid of the Corn Laws at all?
如果精英对贸易政策有如此大的影响力，为什么英国要废除《谷物法》呢？
Because the Americans were one of the major beneficiaries.
因为美国人是主要受益者之一。
It hurt some British interest groups.
这伤害了一些英国利益集团。
Why did that happen?
为什么会发生这种事？
I think part of the reason for that is that the long 19th century is a period in which the industrialists are becoming much more important.
我认为部分原因在于，在漫长的 19 世纪，实业家变得更加重要。
And you have two aspects about this.
关于这个你有两个方面。
The bilateral agreement in 1860 between Britain and France allows Britain to get access now to French markets in terms of their manufactures by having the French remove their prohibitions and lower their tariffs.
1860 年英国和法国签订的双边协议允许英国取消其禁令并降低关税，从而让英国的制成品进入法国市场。
But it also is a world in which increasingly those who were benefiting from some of these restrictions wanted to have them removed as freer trade was being more and more favorable to Great Britain.
但在这个世界上，越来越多的受益于这些限制的人希望取消这些限制，因为自由贸易对英国越来越有利。
Finally, the other thing that occurred is that people forget that initially, the wine tariffs, which go back to the late 1600s and early 1700s, were primarily protectionist.
最后，发生的另一件事是人们忘记了，最初可追溯到 1600 年代末和 1700 年代初的葡萄酒关税主要是保护主义的。
They were an attack on France, but because of the high tariffs, the British were able to impose very high taxes on domestic alcohol, in particular things like beer, but also gin, whiskey, et cetera.
这是对法国的攻击，但由于高关税，英国能够对国内酒类征收非常高的税，特别是像啤酒这样的东西，还有杜松子酒、威士忌等。
They became so dependent on the revenues from those alcoholic products that, in fact, one of the things that happened is, even when the consensus was growing for liberating trade in alcohol, there was still concern about tariffs, and so the rise of the income tax and other forms of taxation gave them increased leeway to make these changes.
他们变得如此依赖这些酒精产品的收入，事实上，发生的事情之一是，即使在解放酒精贸易的共识日益增强的情况下，人们仍然对关税感到担忧，因此所得税和其他形式税收的增加给了他们更大的余地来做出这些改变。
On free trade
关于自由贸易
As you know, in today’s America, there’s a major debate between bilateral and multilateral approaches to free trade, and most intellectuals, maybe without even thinking about it very much — they tend to think the multilateral approach is necessarily better.
如你所知，在当今的美国，关于自由贸易的双边和多边方式存在着一场重大争论，而大多数知识分子，也许甚至没有想太多，他们倾向于认为多边方式必然更好。
What is it you think we learn from the 19th century experience?
您认为我们从 19 世纪的经验中学到了什么？
In fact, one of the things I do know about the 19th century is that there’s no evidence that either unilateral free trade or multilateral did very much.
事实上，我确实了解 19 世纪的一件事是，没有证据表明单边自由贸易或多边贸易发挥了很大作用。
Almost all the free trade in Europe in the 19th century was a product of, initially, the bilateral trade agreement between Britain and France, sometimes known as the Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860, in which they each agreed to much more liberalized trade on a most-favored-nation basis.
19 世纪欧洲几乎所有的自由贸易最初都是英国和法国之间双边贸易协定（有时称为 1860 年英法商业条约）的产物，其中双方都同意在最惠国待遇基础上实行更加自由化的贸易。
Once they accepted this, then what happened is, anyone who signed on to either Britain or France on the most-favored-nation basis then bought into, in some sense, this system.
一旦他们接受了这一点，接下来发生的事情就是，任何在最惠国待遇基础上与英国或法国签约的人，在某种意义上都接受了这个体系。
What’s interesting is that after the Corn Laws, Britain is telling everybody to unilaterally lower their tariffs because free trade’s so good.
有趣的是，《谷物法》之后，英国告诉大家单方面降低关税，因为自由贸易太好了。
And the French and the Spanish are screaming, “What about your wine tariffs?” But then in 1860 they negotiate this secret treaty between England and France, or Britain and France.
法国人和西班牙人尖叫着，“你们的葡萄酒关税呢？”但后来在 1860 年，他们在英格兰和法国之间或英国和法国之间谈判了这项秘密条约。
Again, I have to keep repeating, even though it’s called Anglo-French Treaty.
再次，我必须不断重复，尽管它被称为英法条约。
Suddenly, pretty much every power in Europe joins in.
突然间，欧洲几乎所有强国都加入了进来。
Within the decade, virtually all the major powers in Europe are locked into a free trade agreement with Britain and France because they’re afraid of being left out because the two major powers in the continent have negotiated this treaty.
十年内，欧洲几乎所有主要大国都与英国和法国签订了自由贸易协定，因为它们担心因为欧洲大陆的两个主要大国已经就该条约进行了谈判而被排除在外。
In fact, the only Western power who sees their tariffs rise is the United States, thanks to the Civil War.
事实上，由于内战，唯一一个关税上升的西方国家是美国。
Is there a bilateral approach to trade agreements that, today, could give us freer trade than multilateralism?
如今，是否有一种双边贸易协定方式可以为我们带来比多边主义更自由的贸易？
I think it certainly hasn’t been tried.
我想这肯定还没有尝试过。
For example — I’m just throwing this from out of nowhere — if the US were to negotiate a genuinely strong bilateral agreement with the UK and, perhaps, one Asian partner, I wouldn’t be surprised if that would essentially create huge incentives for most of the EU and large chunks of Asia to join in.
例如，“我只是凭空提出这个问题”——“如果美国要与英国以及也许还有一个亚洲伙伴谈判一项真正强有力的双边协议，如果这实质上会为大多数欧盟国家和大部分亚洲国家的加入创造巨大的动力，我不会感到惊讶。”
Thinking about economic history more generally, if we look at America today, and if our goal is economic growth, what would you say is America’s biggest institutional deficit?
更广泛地思考经济史，如果我们看看今天的美国，如果我们的目标是经济增长，你会说美国最大的机构赤字是什么？
What institution would benefit us the most if it were to marginally increase in status?
如果哪个机构的地位稍微提高的话，对我们来说最有利？
Would it be university?
会是大学吗？
Family?
家庭？
Church?
教会？
Business?
商业？
Something else?
还有别的事吗？
What’s gone wrong in America from a moral/ideological point of view?
从道德/意识形态的角度来看，美国出了什么问题？
That’s getting into too many things, but if we just stick to things I personally care very deeply about, I would like to see a return to an earlier period of pure meritocracy.
这涉及的事情太多了，但如果我们只专注于我个人非常关心的事情，我希望看到回到早期的纯粹精英统治时期。
I would like to see that much more, both at the level of university, at companies, and so forth and so on.
我希望看到更多这样的事情，无论是在大学层面，还是在公司层面，等等。
I would like to see objective tests and standards used to judge quality whenever possible, and I think that the rise of an anti-meritocratic notion or the idea that meritocracy should be adjusted for social needs has made it very hard to have, I think, state-of-the-art production in many areas.
我希望尽可能使用客观的测试和标准来判断质量，而且我认为，反精英观念的兴起或精英管理应根据社会需求进行调整的想法使得许多领域很难拥有最先进的生产。
What do you think of the argument that people are, in some ways, not morally strong enough to live with meritocracy?
您如何看待“人们在某些方面道德上不够坚强，无法与精英统治共处”的论点？
You think of the chess world — people have ratings.
你想想国际象棋世界 —— 人们有评级。
The ratings really do reflect how good a player you are.
评分确实反映了您的玩家水平。
Adam Smith himself suggested that when quality is transparent, people will tend to be depressed.
亚当·斯密本人提出，当质量透明时，人们往往会感到沮丧。
He compared the mathematicians to the poets and said the poets were happier because each could believe he was a great poet.
他将数学家与诗人进行了比较，并说诗人更快乐，因为每个人都可以相信他是一位伟大的诗人。
Are we strong enough to live with meritocracy?
我们是否足够强大，可以接受精英统治？
I think the problem with that is the following.
我认为问题如下。
I agree with you, it really upsets people, and for that reason, we don’t see meritocracy in most venues, even in academia.
我同意你的观点，这确实让人们感到不安，因此，我们在大多数场合都看不到精英管理，甚至在学术界也是如此。
But I think the real problem that you get in the United States is, given the ethnic and cultural diversity of the United States, then what you get is, you get tribalism along lines that recreate many of the things that I think the liberal republic was designed to get rid of.
但我认为，美国面临的真正问题是，考虑到美国的种族和文化多样性，你会得到部落主义，它重现了许多我认为自由共和国旨在摆脱的东西。
You basically recreate factionalism.
你基本上重现了派系之争。
Some questions from American economic history.
美国经济史的一些问题。
If we think of the decline of slavery in the 19th century and then the Civil War, was that the result, ultimately, of economic factors?
如果我们想想 19 世纪奴隶制的衰落以及随后的内战，这最终是经济因素的结果吗？
Or it simply was political force, and there was a war, and the South lost?
或者这只是政治力量，发生了战争，南方失败了？
But was slavery evolving out of the South for economic reasons?
但奴隶制是出于经济原因而从南方发展出来的吗？
I’m not an expert in this area, so I’m just going to recite the consensus.
我不是这方面的专家，所以我只是背诵一下共识。
I believe the consensus is that pure economic factors weren’t going to drive it out, at least in the short to the medium run.
我相信，人们的共识是，纯粹的经济因素不会消除这种情况，至少在中短期内是这样。
Perhaps over another century it would have, but the evidence, as at least it was presented to me in economic history classes — which I haven’t always kept up with — suggests that the political factors were very important in getting rid of it, including the war.
也许再过一个世纪就会有这样的情况，但至少在经济史课上向我展示的证据——“我并不总是跟上”——表明政治因素对于消除它非常重要，包括战争。
If you think more generally about 19th century economic growth, the numbers we have for GDP growth — they often don’t appear impressive.
如果你更普遍地思考 19 世纪的经济增长，我们掌握的 GDP 增长数据 ——它们通常看起来并不令人印象深刻。
Is it that growth actually was slow, the numbers are wrong, the big effect was simply getting more people into the country?
是不是增长实际上很慢，数字是错误的，最大的影响只是让更多的人进入这个国家？
How do you interpret the 19th century American episode — slavery aside — the growth of the rest of the country?
您如何解读 19 世纪美国的历史事件——“抛开奴隶制”——“国家其他地区的发展”？
I think American growth was quite impressive.
我认为美国的增长非常令人印象深刻。
I mean, 2.5 percent averaged over a century or a century and a half is quite a lot of growth, in fact, especially if you take into account the standard biases and the way in which GDP does things.
我的意思是，事实上，一个世纪或一个半世纪平均增长 2.5% 是相当大的增长，特别是如果你考虑到标准偏差和 GDP 运作方式的话。
Moreover, I think there was slow growth in the sense that you were integrating a large, very poor population, both domestically and through immigration, and all these things contributed to what looks like slow growth.
此外，我认为增长缓慢是因为你在国内和通过移民融合了大量非常贫困的人口，所有这些因素都导致了看似缓慢的增长。
But it’s not really slow growth by historical standards, and I don’t think that’s a surprise at all.
但以历史标准来看，这并不是真正的缓慢增长，我认为这根本不令人意外。
Moreover, we tend to overvalue the ways in which the First Industrial Revolution transformed things.
此外，我们往往高估了第一次工业革命改变事物的方式。
Most of the big growth boosts come in the second half of the 19th century in what people call the Second Industrial Revolution.
大多数大幅增长的推动发生在 19 世纪下半叶，人们称之为第二次工业革命。
If you look at the statistics for the First Industrial Revolution, there’s no evidence that the workers’ living standards dramatically improved till about the ’40s or ’50s — I mean the 1840s or 1850s.
如果你看一下第一次工业革命的统计数据，没有证据表明工人的生活水平在大约 40 年代或 50 年代之前有显着提高——我指的是 1840 年代或 1850 年代。
If you, say, date the Industrial Revolution to 1760, what you observe is very slow growth in England.
比如说，如果你将工业革命的日期定为 1760 年，你会发现英国的经济增长非常缓慢。
Fast in comparison to what had happened in previous centuries, but slow in to what happens today, and even slower for the working classes.
与前几个世纪发生的情况相比，速度较快，但与今天发生的情况相比，速度较慢，对于工人阶级来说甚至更慢。
You only see this acceleration that we think of as modern economic growth in the Western states, in particular Britain, France, the US, and Germany, starting in the 1850s and ’60s or so.
你只能看到这种我们认为是西方国家现代经济增长的加速，特别是英国、法国、美国和德国，从 1850 年代和 60 年代左右开始。
What spurs that second wave?
是什么推动了第二波浪潮？
Is that fossil fuels or something else?
是化石燃料还是其他什么？
I think there, it’s agglomeration of mass urbanization, industrialization, innovation, across the board in multiple manufacturing.
我认为，这是大规模城市化、工业化、创新以及多种制造业的全面聚集。
Everything is — not just fossil fuels — railroads, steam technology, production, greater trade, all these things are coming together.
一切都是————不仅仅是化石燃料————铁路、蒸汽技术、生产、更大的贸易，所有这些东西都聚集在一起。
Now you’re seeing what we think of in these big waves of changes and things of that sort.
现在你已经看到了我们对这些巨大的变革浪潮和诸如此类的事情的看法。
Do you view American 19th century history as having had a resource bounty or a resource curse?
您认为美国 19 世纪的历史是资源丰富还是资源诅咒？
I think the evidence is strong there — again, this is not my area — but the evidence is that that is one case in which the United States had institutions that were good enough to take advantage of the resource bounty.
我认为那里的证据是强有力的——“再说一次，这不是我的领域”——但证据表明，在这个案例中，美国拥有足够好的机构来利用丰富的资源。
If we think about the First Industrial Revolution in Britain, many factors driving that revolution have been cited: ideology, coal, population growth in demographics, the building of a culture of science and engineering, and so on.
如果我们思考英国的第一次工业革命，就会提到许多推动这场革命的因素：意识形态、煤炭、人口增长、科学和工程文化的建设等等。
What’s the underrated factor behind the First Industrial Revolution?
第一次工业革命背后被低估的因素是什么？
Luck?
运气？
Luck?
运气？
What is the good luck?
什么是好运气？
What’s the lucky event?
幸运事件是什么？
Not being invaded or .
没有被入侵或。
.
。
.
。
?
？
I think, or not having the war turn out worse.
我认为，或者不让战争变得更糟。
Britain was at war for 50 percent of the 18th century, and that’s up to the early 1800s.
英国在 18 世纪 50% 的时间里都处于战争状态，一直到 1800 年代初。
I think, in many ways, one of the things we underestimate is the extent to which the wars in Europe did not lead to greater destruction.
我认为，在很多方面，我们低估的事情之一是欧洲战争没有造成更大破坏的程度。
If something had led to a more cataclysmic event, if Napoleon had won the war but then there had been a fight back, you might have had a far greater upheaval.
如果有什么事情导致了一场更加灾难性的事件，如果拿破仑赢得了战争，但随后发生了反击，那么你可能会遇到更大的剧变。
It sounds fancifully science fiction today, but I really think that Europe has benefited from an extreme degree of political and economic competition.
这在今天听起来像是科幻小说，但我确实认为欧洲从极端程度的政治和经济竞争中受益。
But extreme political and economic competition is beneficial if you don’t destroy the underlying order that makes competition and innovation possible in the first place.
但如果你不破坏最初使竞争和创新成为可能的基本秩序，极端的政治和经济竞争是有益的。
Frank Fukuyama has suggested that, whether Britain or England — I’m not sure — had a more mature state early on, along with Denmark, and this is why they were not successfully invaded.
弗兰克·福山提出，无论是英国还是英格兰——“我不确定”——很早就和丹麦一样拥有一个更成熟的国家，这就是他们没有被成功入侵的原因。
They were fiscally strong, they could build a navy.
他们财政实力雄厚，可以建立海军。
They didn’t lose any of those wars in the sense of being conquered.
从被征服的意义上来说，他们并没有输掉任何一场战争。
Do you agree with his argument?
你同意他的论点吗？
Do you think that was luck?
你认为那是运气吗？
No. I don’t think it’s luck, but I think there’s a number of things to consider.
不，我不认为这是运气，但我认为有很多事情需要考虑。
To begin with, the fact that you need to cross the water to get to Britain is an advantage in their favor.
首先，你需要跨海才能到达英国，这一事实对他们有利。
In much the same way, Britain had some advantages, say, Japan had in Asia, where that the Chinese were never able to overwhelm Japan for similar reasons.
与此类似，英国在亚洲也有一些优势，比如日本在亚洲的优势，但由于类似的原因，中国永远无法压倒日本。
Having to cross the channel — it was nontrivial, given older technologies.
考虑到较旧的技术，必须跨越海峡 ——这并不是一件小事。
It was not an easy thing to conquer Britain in the same way that it wasn’t easy for Britain to hang onto Normandy, or England to hang onto Normandy.
征服英国并不是一件容易的事，就像英国想要保住诺曼底、英国想要保住诺曼底一样不容易。
I think the geography matters.
我认为地理很重要。
Secondly, England did have a more centralized state earlier, but that was made possible by fiscal reforms, which is another thing I discuss in my book.
其次，英国早些时候确实有一个更加集权的国家，但这是通过财政改革成为可能的，这是我在书中讨论的另一件事。
War, Wine, and Taxes talks about the fact that it’s ironic that in the period we think of as liberal Britain, Britain had the fastest-growing tax revenues throughout the 18th century of any country in western Europe.
《战争、葡萄酒和税收》讨论了这样一个事实：具有讽刺意味的是，在我们认为的自由主义英国时期，英国的税收收入在整个 18 世纪是西欧国家中增长最快的。
British tax revenues rose 450 percent from the 1700s through to the end of the 18th century, which is remarkable since everybody else was trying to raise revenues and were unsuccessful at doing so.
从 1700 年代到 18 世纪末，英国的税收收入增长了 450%，这一成绩非常引人注目，因为其他所有人都在努力增加收入，但都没有成功。
On the Industrial Revolution
论工业革命
What do you think of the argument that classical liberal ideology was somehow an essential part of the Industrial Revolution?
您如何看待古典自由主义意识形态在某种程度上是工业革命的重要组成部分的论点？
I think it played a role, but it was one of these Baptists and bootleggers stories.
我认为它发挥了作用，但这是浸信会和走私者的故事之一。
There were both those who ideologically were in favor of greater liberalism and free trade, but I don’t think they would have succeeded if they hadn’t benefited from the venality of many of the ministers who wanted to increase the power of the city and increase the power of the British civil state at the expense of the landed aristocracy.
这两个人在意识形态上都赞成更大程度的自由主义和自由贸易，但我认为，如果他们没有从许多大臣的唯利是图中受益，这些大臣想要以牺牲土地贵族为代价来增强城市的权力和英国公民国家的权力，我认为他们不会成功。
If you think about it, one of the things that improved markets did — and, in particular, improved national markets in agriculture — was to make agriculture more efficient.
如果你想一想，市场改善——尤其是全国农业市场改善——所做的事情之一就是提高农业效率。
But in making it more efficient, they essentially destroyed the local monopoly of many agricultural landholders who weren’t that very efficient.
但在提高效率的过程中，他们从本质上摧毁了许多效率不高的农业土地所有者的当地垄断。
So you had some big winners, but one of the things it did is that it made England a more efficient whole.
所以你有一些大赢家，但它所做的一件事是它使英格兰成为一个更有效率的整体。
You get consolidation, both in terms of the most powerful domestic and commercial industries, and you get consolidation in agriculture.
在最强大的国内和商业领域，你会得到整合，在农业方面也会得到整合。
And consolidation in agriculture eventually made it possible for people to move out of agriculture as well.
农业的整合最终也使人们有可能离开农业。
Growth in both agriculture and industry favored a more powerful Britain, but a much weaker set of dispersed aristocratic elites, who altogether had the control of the British Parliament.
农业和工业的增长有利于更强大的英国，但也有利于一群弱得多的分散的贵族精英，他们完全控制了英国议会。
But as these dispersed elites were getting weakened, both the rise of the state directly through greater regulation and indirectly through having more concentrated, in some sense, centers of power.
但随着这些分散的精英逐渐被削弱，国家的崛起既直接通过加强监管，也间接通过拥有更集中的权力中心（在某种意义上）。
There is a lot of evidence that British landholders were much more concentrated by the mid-19th century than the French were.
有大量证据表明，到 19 世纪中叶，英国土地所有者比法国土地所有者更加集中。
So there was a greater inequality in ownership, and that was favorable, again, to certain elites, who benefited from the shift to liberalism.
因此，所有权方面存在更大的不平等，这再次有利于某些精英，他们从向自由主义的转变中受益。
Now it’s often argued that the British economy — or maybe it’s just British companies — they fall behind in some regards in the mid-to-late 19th century.
现在人们经常争论英国经济 ——或者也许只是英国公司 ——他们在 19 世纪中后期在某些方面落后了。
Do you agree, and if so, why did that happen?
您同意吗？如果同意，为什么会发生这种情况？
This, I am not so sure about.
这个，我不太确定。
I think we see a lot of things there, and it’s hard to tell how much of that is what’s happening interwar period and how much of it is the turn to socialism around the time of World War II.
我认为我们在那里看到了很多事情，很难说其中有多少是两次世界大战期间发生的事情，有多少是二战期间向社会主义的转变。
But there’s certainly the case that Britain loses some of its innovative edge.
但毫无疑问，英国会失去一些创新优势。
On the other hand, Britain does still play a very big role intellectually.
另一方面，英国在知识分子方面确实仍然发挥着非常大的作用。
So I’m not quite sure I understand why Britain underperforms, but there is something to be said for both a regulatory story and, in some sense, a breakdown of the state capacity having to do with greater conflict between the upper classes and the working classes in Britain.
所以我不太确定我理解为什么英国表现不佳，但监管故事和从某种意义上说，国家能力的崩溃都与英国上层阶级和工人阶级之间更大的冲突有关。
Now, there’s a collapse of globalization occurring in 1914, in the First World War.
现在，全球化在 1914 年第一次世界大战期间崩溃了。
If you think about this in terms of an abstract model, what exactly happened?
如果你从抽象模型的角度来思考这个问题，到底发生了什么？
And was it inevitable?
这是不可避免的吗？
I don’t think it was inevitable at all.
我认为这根本不是不可避免的。
I do think World War I was a genuine shock to that.
我确实认为第一次世界大战对此造成了真正的冲击。
That is to say, I think that you could have imagined a world in which globalization would have received more support and more development for at least a couple of more decades.
也就是说，我认为你可以想象一个全球化至少在几十年内会得到更多支持和更多发展的世界。
But it is also true that what you see is that historically, there doesn’t .
但你所看到的事实是，历史上并不存在。
.
。
.
。
Put it another way: There’s not much evidence that human beings somehow evolve into very liberal political entities.
换句话说：没有太多证据表明人类以某种方式演变成非常自由的政治实体。
So the periods that promote political and economic liberalism tend to be short-lived, historically.
因此，从历史上看，提倡政治和经济自由主义的时期往往是短暂的。
There’s not much evidence that human beings somehow evolve into very liberal political entities.
没有太多证据表明人类以某种方式演变成非常自由的政治实体。
So the periods that promote political and economic liberalism tend to be short-lived, historically.
因此，从历史上看，提倡政治和经济自由主义的时期往往是短暂的。
What’s interesting about the last 250 years is how relatively stable political liberalism has been.
过去 250 年的有趣之处在于政治自由主义的相对稳定。
Whether or not that’s an anomaly, or that’s the beginning of a totally different change in the way human beings organize themselves is, I think, for the future.
我认为，无论这是否是一种异常现象，还是人类组织自身方式发生完全不同变化的开始，都是为了未来。
But I think the assumption that political liberalism, as we’ve seen, that foments both increased individual freedoms as well as increased economic freedoms, plus economic growth, is either stable or sustainable is not clear-cut to me.
但我认为，政治自由主义，正如我们所看到的，既促进了个人自由的增加，也促进了经济自由的增加，再加上经济增长，是稳定的或可持续的，这一假设对我来说并不明确。
Particular mistakes aside, what were the systemic mistakes the Western world was making in, say, 1910, 1912?
抛开具体错误不谈，西方世界在 1910 年、1912 年犯下的系统性错误是什么？
I think the systemic mistake really boils down to how do you deal with the problem of power?
我认为系统性错误实际上归结为你如何处理权力问题？
How do you deal with the problem of different groups, different cultures wanting their place at the table?
您如何处理不同群体、不同文化想要在谈判桌上占有一席之地的问题？
It’s clear that, if you look, a lot of the fight of imperialism was great-power competition.
很明显，如果你仔细观察，就会发现帝国主义的很多斗争都是大国竞争。
If you look in the Far East, for example, some people may know that the United States took the Philippines from Spain at the end of the period of Spanish control of the Philippines in 1898, and partly this was due to Perry’s decision to sail into Manila Bay.
例如，如果你看看远东，有些人可能知道，1898年西班牙控制菲律宾时期末期，美国从西班牙手中夺取了菲律宾，部分原因是佩里决定驶入马尼拉湾。
One of the things that’s not discussed — most people are unaware of — is that the German and British fleets were waiting in Hong Kong.
其中一件没有被讨论的事情——“大多数人都不知道”——是德国和英国舰队正在香港等待。
They were waiting to see what the Americans did.
他们等着看美国人会做什么。
And it’s quite likely that, had the Americans not steamed into Manila Bay, that the Germans or British would have intervened in the Philippines once the Spanish collapsed.
如果美国人没有驶入马尼拉湾，一旦西班牙崩溃，德国人或英国人很可能就会介入菲律宾。
On things under- and overrated
关于被低估和高估的事情
Now in many of these discussions, we have an interlude called overrated versus underrated.
现在，在许多这样的讨论中，我们有一个插曲，称为高估与低估。
And since you’re a polymath, I thought we would make ours slightly longer than usual.
既然你是个博学多才的人，我想我们的内容应该比平时稍微长一些。
Are you game?
你是游戏吗？
Let’s try.
我们来试试吧。
Okay.
好的。
Napoleon III.
拿破仑三世。
Oh, vastly underrated.
哦，被严重低估了。
Why?
为什么？
Napoleon III — he’s the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte.
拿破仑三世——他是拿破仑·波拿巴的侄子。
He’s often referred to as the idiot emperor or the little Napoleon.
他经常被称为白痴皇帝或小拿破仑。
And a lot of that has to do with the fact that he’s considered to be a bumbler.
这很大程度上与他被认为是一个笨手笨脚的事实有关。
He lost trust .
他失去了信任。
.
。
.
。
he basically lost large parts of eastern France in the Franco-Prussian War.
他在普法战争中基本上失去了法国东部的大部分地区。
But in fact, Napoleon III ushered in many of the great reforms of the 19th century, not least of which, the 1860 Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce.
但事实上，拿破仑三世开创了 19 世纪的许多伟大改革，其中最重要的是 1860 年英法商业条约。
But also, under Napoleon III’s regime, he was able to promote not just freer trade but greater industry, modern banking.
而且，在拿破仑三世的统治下，他不仅能够促进更自由的贸易，而且能够促进更大的工业和现代银行业。
A lot of what is modern Paris comes about under Napoleon III.
现代巴黎的许多事物都是在拿破仑三世时期发生的。
The development of the railroad and the road networks comes under Napoleon III.
铁路和公路网的发展是在拿破仑三世的领导下进行的。
Moreover, the growth in the wages of the working classes starts to increase after the 1850s.
此外，工人阶级的工资增长在1850年代后开始增加。
The late 19th century, contrary to what people think of, is not, in fact, a period of massive inequality, but it’s a period of greater consumption equality all across western Europe.
与人们想象的相反，19世纪末实际上并不是一个严重不平等的时期，而是整个西欧消费更加平等的时期。
And certainly in France, Napoleon III has a great deal to do with that.
当然，在法国，拿破仑三世与此有很大关系。
Filipino food, overrated or underrated?
菲律宾食品，被高估还是被低估？
And why isn’t there more of it in the United States that’s good?
为什么美国没有更多的好东西呢？
Well, since I like Filipino food, I’d say it’s underrated.
好吧，既然我喜欢菲律宾菜，我想说它被低估了。
But if we just focus on the question, why isn’t there more Filipino food, there are two things to note.
但如果我们只关注这个问题，为什么没有更多的菲律宾食物，有两件事需要注意。
One is that the biggest reason, I would say, is that no one has yet found a sufficiently America-centric Filipino food to sell.
我想说，其中一个最大的原因是，还没有人找到一种足够以美国为中心的菲律宾食品来销售。
Think about the most common popular American Asian foods.
想想最常见的美国亚洲食品。
That would be Chinese.
那将是中国人。
And when we think of the good Chinese food, it’s not, in fact, what made Chinese food a household name.
当我们想到美味的中国菜时，事实上，这并不是中国菜家喻户晓的原因。
The fact that you and I can buy very good Sichuan or Cantonese food is not a function of the best dishes.
事实上，你我能买到很好的川菜或粤菜，并不是因为菜品最好。
It’s a function of the kind of mediocre chow mein, fried rice, which has nothing to do with the chow mein or fried rice that you get in Hong Kong, and things like moo goo gai pan and sweet and sour pork.
这是一种平庸的炒面、炒饭的功能，与你在香港吃到的炒面或炒饭无关，还有诸如moo goo gai pan和咕噜肉之类的东西。
Because you don’t have this mass appeal food underlying it, you can’t experiment with the better stuff.
因为你没有这种大众吸引力的食物作为基础，所以你无法尝试更好的东西。
Secondly, I don’t think Filipinos know how to pick the dishes that are not just good for the Philippines, but good for Americans, so that, in particular .
其次，我认为菲律宾人不知道如何挑选不仅适合菲律宾而且适合美国人的菜肴，因此尤其如此。
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again, think about, say, even Korean food, which is probably the most authentic food I think of in America relative to the home base.
再说一次，想想，甚至韩国菜，这可能是我认为在美国相对于家乡来说最正宗的食物。
It’s not the same thing.
这不是同一件事。
Even with the Koreans, Americans tend to like stuff like bulgogi and the barbecues and their fried chicken.
即使是韩国人，美国人也倾向于喜欢烤肉、烧烤和炸鸡之类的东西。
The boring dishes.
无聊的菜肴。
But in fact, the dishes that a lot of people eat in Korea are not things most Americans would like to eat on a regular basis, which is big emphasis on the various kinds of kimchi, the pickles, the hot soups, the noodles.
但事实上，很多人在韩国吃的菜并不是大多数美国人喜欢经常吃的东西，重点是各种泡菜、泡菜、热汤、面条。
In the same way, there’s a lot of Asian dishes that are not as common.
同样，有很多亚洲菜肴并不常见。
Or if you look at Thai food — Thai food that’s served in most Thai restaurants has very little to do with what you would eat in Thailand.
或者，如果你看看泰国菜 ——大多数泰国餐馆提供的泰国菜与你在泰国吃的东西几乎没有关系。
I think Filipinos haven’t found a way of packaging food that is sufficiently exotic and uniquely Filipino but will appeal to American tastes.
我认为菲律宾人还没有找到一种包装食品的方式，既具有足够的异国情调和菲律宾特色，又能满足美国人的口味。
Once you can do that, then it’s possible for, I think, the more interesting regional dishes that will also be interesting to foodies to get introduced as well.
我认为，一旦你能做到这一点，那么就有可能推出更有趣的地方菜肴，这些菜肴也会让美食家感兴趣。
And for those of you who don’t know, John grew up in the Philippines and was born there.
对于那些不知道的人来说，约翰在菲律宾长大并出生在那里。
The movie by Alfred Hitchcock, Vertigo?
阿尔弗雷德·希区柯克的电影《迷魂记》？
It’s one of the greatest movies of all time.
这是有史以来最伟大的电影之一。
Is it underrated?
它被低估了吗？
It is underrated.
它被低估了。
I think that, despite its high ranking, it should be rated even further.
我认为，尽管它的排名很高，但它应该得到更高的评价。
I mean, look at this movie.
我的意思是，看看这部电影。
On all margins, it’s great.
从各个方面来说，这都很棒。
Jimmy Stewart, who is often thought of as this aw-shucks kind of guy is portrayed in a very dark kind of way.
吉米·斯图尔特（Jimmy Stewart）经常被认为是那种很糟糕的人，他被描绘成一种非常黑暗的方式。
It’s a very maudlin take on the average American, as well as being very introspective and very suspenseful.
这是对普通美国人的一种非常伤感的看法，同时也非常内省和悬疑。
And there are so many things that other directors steal or take from Hitchcock from these pictures.
其他导演从这些影片中偷走了希区柯克的很多东西。
I think Vertigo, Rear Window, To Catch a Thief and North by Northwest are all peerless.
我认为《迷魂记》、《后窗》、《抓贼》和《西北偏北》都是无与伦比的。
And if there’s an underlying political subtext or import of Hitchcock, what do you think that would be?
如果希区柯克有潜在的政治潜台词或意义，你认为那会是什么？
Not what he necessarily intended as his politics, but what’s in the movies in terms of human nature and political man?
这不是他的政治意图，而是电影中的人性和政治人是什么？
Well, I think there’s this question of suspicion and the tendency to not appreciate how much is going on under the surface.
嗯，我认为存在怀疑的问题，以及不了解表面之下发生的事情的倾向。
I think people tend to see these things narrowly in terms of Cold War paranoia.
我认为人们倾向于从冷战偏执的角度狭隘地看待这些事情。
But Hitchcock was a political conservative, and he was much more of the very old British conservative view that one should be wary in times of —
但希区柯克是一位政治保守派，他更像是英国古老的保守派观点，即人们应该在以下时期保持警惕——
Suspicion is metaphysical, right?
怀疑是形而上的，对吗？
Yes, exactly.
是的，完全正确。
Yeah.
是的。
That in times of peace, be aware that these things are not necessarily self-sustaining.
在和平时期，要意识到这些东西不一定是自给自足的。
I would say that’s the conservative worldview — that civilization and order are not default states of mankind.
我想说的是，这是保守的世界观——文明和秩序不是人类的默认状态。
It’s very Hobbesian.
这是非常霍布斯式的。
The classical pianist, Vladimir Horowitz, overrated or underrated?
古典钢琴家弗拉基米尔·霍洛维茨被高估还是低估？
Well, I’m not a musician, but for me — personal taste — I think he’s overrated.
好吧，我不是音乐家，但对我来说 —— 个人品味 —— 我认为他被高估了。
Why?
为什么？
There’s a certain flashiness about him, and I much prefer other pianists to him.
他身上有一种华而不实的气质，与他相比，我更喜欢其他钢琴家。
Who’s the underrated classical pianist then?
那么谁是被低估的古典钢琴家呢？
Oooh, that’s hard.
哦，这很难。
Dinu Lipatti, if you don’t like Horowitz?
迪努·利帕蒂（Dinu Lipatti），如果你不喜欢霍洛维茨？
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
是啊，是啊，是啊。
Arthur Rubinstein?
阿瑟·鲁宾斯坦？
Pollini.
波里尼。
Pollini.
波里尼。
Gilels more than Pollini.
吉列尔斯比波里尼更多。
Okay.
好的。
In chess, Magnus Carlsen, overrated or underrated?
在国际象棋领域，马格努斯·卡尔森是被高估还是被低估？
I think he’s neither.
我认为他两者都不是。
I think he’s properly rated.
我认为他的评价是正确的。
Properly rated.
正确评价。
I think he’s properly rated, yes.
我认为他的评价是正确的，是的。
And is he going to beat Caruana?
他会击败卡鲁阿纳吗？
There, I’d say yes, probably, but two to one.
在那里，我会说是的，可能，但二比一。
I think Caruana has maybe a one-in-four— maybe not even a one-in-three — one-in-four chance, at most.
我认为卡鲁阿纳最多有四分之一——甚至可能不是三分之一——四分之一的机会。
But Carlsen is clearly the most phenomenal player to come along since Kasparov.
但卡尔森显然是继卡斯帕罗夫之后最杰出的球员。
In the history of ideas, John Stuart Mill?
在思想史上，约翰·斯图尔特·穆勒？
Overrated.
被高估了。
Why?
为什么？
I think John Stuart Mill’s take on liberalism is too much of an ivory tower take, and I think that it doesn’t take into consideration .
我认为约翰·斯图尔特·密尔对自由主义的看法过于象牙塔式的看法，而且我认为它没有考虑在内。
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it’s too normative.
这太规范了。
It’s too much what should liberalism be about as opposed to what I think of as a lot of my career has been about, which is just trying to understand what kinds of things made liberal reform possible in the real world?
自由主义应该是关于什么，而不是我所认为的我职业生涯的大部分内容，这只是试图理解什么样的事情使得自由主义改革在现实世界中成为可能？
What kinds of things made liberal reform sustainable in the real world?
什么样的事情使得自由主义改革在现实世界中可持续？
I often talk about it — the way I tell my classes is something like the following.
我经常谈论它——我在课堂上讲课的方式如下。
In economics, we’re always talking about the benefits of free markets, the benefits of trade, the benefits of open competition.
在经济学中，我们总是谈论自由市场的好处、贸易的好处、公开竞争的好处。
And yet, by that standard, the revealed preference of humanity is to be poor, since the periods of really open trade growth and innovation are very tiny in the long span of world history.
然而，按照这个标准，人类明显的偏好是贫穷，因为真正开放的贸易增长和创新的时期在漫长的世界历史中非常短暂。
Or innovations take a long time to develop, and they’re often held back, and the waves of innovation and growth often crash on the rocks of stagnation or even failure.
或者创新需要很长时间才能发展，而且常常受到阻碍，创新和增长的浪潮常常会碰上停滞甚至失败的岩石。
So in that sense, what we really need to understand is, why is that so hard to do?
所以从这个意义上说，我们真正需要理解的是，为什么这么难做到？
What is it about the human condition?
人类的状况又是怎样的呢？
What is it about the problems of organizing mankind in the world that includes problems of political organization, coercion, violence, dissent, that makes order such a constraint on what is permissible in terms of freedom?
世界上人类的组织问题，包括政治组织、胁迫、暴力、异议等问题，是什么使得秩序成为对自由所允许的限制？
Russia’s economic future — are we underrating it?
俄罗斯的经济未来 ——我们是否低估了它？
No, unfortunately.
不，不幸的是。
I think Russia suffers very much from two problems.
我认为俄罗斯深受两个问题的困扰。
One is the well-known problem of resource curse.
一是众所周知的资源诅咒问题。
I do think that Russia having abundant oil and gas makes it very hard for them, for their political economy to develop properly, for all the known reasons.
我确实认为，由于众所周知的原因，俄罗斯拥有丰富的石油和天然气，这使得他们的政治经济很难正常发展。
But the other thing I think is not talked about is that, since Russia became such a gigantic empire, in particular in the 19th century, Russia has had such a hard time.
但我认为没有谈到的另一件事是，自从俄罗斯成为如此庞大的帝国以来，特别是在19世纪，俄罗斯度过了一段艰难的时期。
I would argue the political impetus, the imperatives of holding together such a large land mass and all the peoples in it, and worrying about its borders, overwhelms incentives to promote growth and development within the country.
我认为，政治动力、将如此大片土地和其中所有人民团结在一起的必要性以及对其边界的担忧，压倒了促进该国国内增长和发展的动力。
But the USSR is gone.
但苏联已经消失了。
Say they would hand over parts of eastern Russia to China, just as a gift, write them off —
说他们会把俄罗斯东部的部分地区交给中国，只是作为礼物，把它们注销——
(laughs)
（笑）
I’m not predicting this, but let’s take this as a hypothetical.
我不是在预测这一点，但让我们把它当作一个假设。
Isn’t it then a fairly well-defined national unit?
那么它不是一个相当明确的国家单位吗？
They have a lot of human capital, still some good systems of training.
他们拥有大量的人力资本，还有一些良好的培训体系。
Look, but that’s different.
瞧，但那是不同的。
If Russia could hand over two-thirds of its land mass and keep a large chunk of what we think of as western Russia, I think it would develop a lot faster.
如果俄罗斯能够交出三分之二的土地并保留我们所认为的俄罗斯西部的大部分地区，我认为它会发展得更快。
But that’s exactly what will not happen.
但这正是不会发生的事情。
Look, forget about handing anything over to the Chinese.
听着，别忘了把任何东西交给中国人。
The Russians don’t properly develop Vladivostok.
俄罗斯人没有正确开发符拉迪沃斯托克。
They don’t properly develop the Russian Far East.
他们没有正确开发俄罗斯远东地区。
Why shouldn’t Vladivostok, for example — just to take it off the top of my head — be as fully developed as San Francisco is for the United States?
例如，为什么符拉迪沃斯托克（海参崴）——“只是为了把它从我的脑海中抹去”——“像美国的旧金山一样得到充分发展？”
In some sense, it’s the other outpost.
从某种意义上说，它是另一个前哨站。
You have the eastern leaders and you have the western leaders.
有东方领导人，也有西方领导人。
What you don’t see is, you don’t see cities in Russia on the eastern part which are as advanced, as successful, as commercial, and as dynamic, both intellectually and commercially, as Moscow and St. Petersburg.
你看不到的是，你看不到俄罗斯东部的城市像莫斯科和圣彼得堡那样先进、成功、商业化、充满活力，无论是在智力上还是在商业上。
And their inability to permit that or encourage it — or in fact, in my view, their tendency to discourage it because, for various complicated reasons — is part of what holds Russia back.
他们无法允许或鼓励这种行为——或者事实上，在我看来，他们倾向于阻止这种行为，因为出于各种复杂的原因——是阻碍俄罗斯发展的部分原因。
But if we’re trying to think through Russian culture, clearly there are some things they’re very good at.
但如果我们试图思考俄罗斯文化，显然他们在某些方面非常擅长。
The history during World War II of disassembling and then reassembling factories in the east — that was astonishing.
二战期间东方工厂拆散再组装的历史——令人震惊。
Mobilizing manpower, building certain kinds of tanks pretty quickly and effectively.
动员人力，快速有效地建造某些类型的坦克。
Then in other areas, the performance is much weaker.
那么在其他方面，表现就弱很多。
Do you have an integrated theory of Russian culture that at least partially fits in what the country’s very good at and very bad at?
您是否有一个关于俄罗斯文化的综合理论，至少部分适合该国最擅长和最不擅长的方面？
No, I don’t.
不，我不。
But what I do think is the following: I think that much of the things that are very good about that state capacity are tied to the political constraints and also make it hard for them to encourage diverse competition.
但我确实认为以下几点：我认为国家能力的许多优点都与政治限制有关，也使他们很难鼓励多元化竞争。
And one of the fears they have is — and one could argue that this is part of what happened in the 1990s — is the breakdown of the worst aspects of the Soviet empire also broke down some of the many better aspects in terms of their ability to provide a high-quality, say, secondary educational system, high-quality average university quality, and to have very good state capacity.
他们的担忧之一是，“有人可能会说，这是 20 世纪 90 年代发生的事情的一部分”，即苏联帝国最糟糕的方面的崩溃，也破坏了苏联帝国许多较好方面的一些能力，例如提供高质量的中等教育体系、高质量的平均大学质量以及良好的国家能力。
So re-creating this state capacity while also promoting greater economic diversity and economic competition is, I think, one of the great challenges for Russia.
因此，我认为，重建这种国家能力，同时促进更大的经济多样性和经济竞争，是俄罗斯面临的巨大挑战之一。
What is it you think we know about religion and economic growth, if indeed anything?
您认为我们对宗教和经济增长了解多少（如果确实有的话）？
I think, to the extent that what we think of as modern economic growth began in the West and was a very uniquely Western phenomenon in the modern sense, only later adapted by Japan and then more recently by many Asian economies, it’s clear that Christianity played a very big role.
我认为，我们所认为的现代经济增长始于西方，并且是现代意义上非常独特的西方现象，后来被日本以及最近的许多亚洲经济体所采用，很明显基督教发挥了非常大的作用。
And I think one of the things that, say, Fukuyama mentions in one of his recent books, and others have mentioned, is the role the Catholic Church played in promoting the nuclear family: banning cousin marriage without special permission, focusing on trying to unify romantic love with formal marriage, asking for the consent of women in the marriage vows, focusing on the need for celibacy and the need for monogamy, discouraging polygamy and the extended family.
我认为，福山在他最近的一本书中提到的一件事，以及其他人提到的，是天主教会在促进核心家庭方面发挥的作用：禁止未经特别许可的表亲婚姻，专注于努力将浪漫爱情与正式婚姻统一起来，在婚姻誓言中征求女性的同意，专注于独身的需要和一夫一妻制的需要，不鼓励一夫多妻制和大家庭。
All these things were part and parcel, or at least supported what we think of as the underlying institutions that nourish capitalism.
所有这些都是重要的组成部分，或者至少支持我们所认为的滋养资本主义的基本制度。
Whether or not, say, for example, a more Eastern version of capitalism would have arisen under China with polygamy, with very soft pantheistic religions, that’s a separate question.
例如，在中国是否会出现一种更加东方化的资本主义，实行一夫多妻制，实行非常温和的泛神论宗教，这是一个单独的问题。
But as we think of the way in which modern economic development has occurred, it’s also co-evolved with the rise of the Western state, which is tied to the rise of the way in which Christianity played out, both as a secular force as well as a spiritual one.
但当我们思考现代经济发展发生的方式时，它也与西方国家的崛起共同演变，而西方国家的崛起与基督教作为一种世俗力量和精神力量的发展方式的崛起息息相关。
The French author Michel Houellebecq, his novel Submission — why is that an important book?
法国作家米歇尔·维勒贝克（Michel Houellebecq）的小说《服从》——为什么这是一本重要的书？
Well, Michel Houellebecq, I think —
好吧，米歇尔·维勒贝克，我想——
Forgive my pronunciation.
请原谅我的发音。
Houellebecq, in my view, is very interesting in that he’s an avowed anti-liberal.
在我看来，维勒贝克非常有趣，因为他是一个公开的反自由主义者。
But what’s interesting about him is that he sees two things, I think.
但我认为他有趣的是他看到了两件事。
He sees, in some sense, the loss of confidence in Western traditions that seems to be very typical of many leading Western elites today.
从某种意义上说，他看到了对西方传统失去信心的现象，这似乎是当今许多西方领先精英的典型现象。
And secondly, I think he sees the problems that were articulated very differently by people like Keynes or by Schumpeter, about the fact that capitalism evolved in the West against a certain background of social, religious, and cultural norms, which are often undermined by the aspect of competition itself.
其次，我认为他对凯恩斯或熊彼特等人所阐述的问题的看法截然不同，即资本主义是在一定的社会、宗教和文化规范背景下在西方发展起来的，而这些规范往往受到竞争本身的破坏。
In particular, Houellebecq is very big on the issue of sexual competition and the way in which breakdown of the nuclear family, the rise of open divorce, the sexual revolution — all these things create a market in which you have huge numbers of losers.
特别是，维勒贝克在性竞争问题上非常重视，以及核心家庭的破裂、公开离婚的兴起、性革命——所有这些都创造了一个存在大量失败者的市场。
Even without formal polygamy, that easy divorce and fairly loose sexual morals lead to a world in which you are re-creating some form of polygamy, and that these lead to stresses that go far beyond the standard inequalities that you talk about economically, and that, in many ways, are actually more intractable than the inequalities economically.
即使没有正式的一夫多妻制，简单的离婚和相当宽松的性道德也会导致你重新创造某种形式的一夫多妻制的世界，而这些所带来的压力远远超出了你所谈论的经济上的标准不平等，而且在许多方面，实际上比经济上的不平等更棘手。
You could imagine a world in which everyone had the Star Trek reproducer that allowed them to make any physical object available.
你可以想象这样一个世界：每个人都拥有《星际迷航》复制器，可以让他们制作任何物理对象。
You could get any food you wanted, any car, any clothing, but then that would make the inequalities based upon physical characteristics, whether they be beauty — and even if you could fix beauty with plastic surgery, you would still have charm and personality and intelligence and power, and all these things would be involved in those.
你可以得到任何你想要的食物、任何汽车、任何衣服，但这就会造成基于身体特征的不平等，无论它们是否美丽——即使你可以通过整容手术修复美丽，你仍然拥有魅力、个性、智慧和力量，所有这些都将涉及其中。
And that would be even more intractable — talk about meritocracies that you can’t do anything about.
这会更加棘手——谈论你无能为力的精英统治。
I think that Houellebecq makes that a very big part of this issue about the sense in which having an overriding religious belief and having very strong control of family and sexual relations is very appealing to large numbers of people in the world.
我认为维勒贝克在这个问题上提出了一个非常重要的部分，即拥有压倒性的宗教信仰以及对家庭和性关系的强有力的控制对世界上很多人来说非常有吸引力。
On the Philippines
关于菲律宾
A few questions about the Philippines.
关于菲律宾的一些问题。
Speaking of religion, why has the Philippines become so Christian, and Catholic in particular, when most of East Asia, or Asia, has not?
说到宗教，为什么菲律宾却变得如此基督教化，尤其是天主教徒，而东亚或亚洲的大部分地区却没有？
Well, to begin with, basically the Catholic Church colonized the Philippines.
好吧，首先，天主教会基本上殖民了菲律宾。
People may not realize that the Spanish had very little power to colonize the Philippines militarily.
人们可能没有意识到，西班牙人几乎没有能力对菲律宾进行军事殖民。
It was very difficult.
这是非常困难的。
The Philippines has over 7,000 islands.
菲律宾有7000多个岛屿。
It’s quite scattered; it’s a lot of mountains, jungles.
比较分散；有很多山脉、丛林。
Spanish soldiers would die of malaria.
西班牙士兵会死于疟疾。
So most of the colonization outside the Manila region was often handled by the Church in the sense that the Church had incentives to send people there and to kind of proselytize.
因此，马尼拉地区以外的大部分殖民活动通常是由教会处理的，因为教会有动机将人们送往那里并进行传教。
And it’s in the course of proselytization that they extended the influence of the central Spanish government.
正是在传教的过程中，他们扩大了西班牙中央政府的影响力。
In addition, the military intervened in much the same way they did in a lot of South America.
此外，军方的干预方式与他们在南美许多地区的干预方式大致相同。
There were many separate tribes; the Philippines was not united.
有许多独立的部落。菲律宾并不团结。
So very often, some of these deals, “I’ll help you defeat your enemy in exchange for your owing allegiance to the central power,” and things of that sort.
很多时候，有一些交易是“我帮你打败你的敌人，以换取你对中央政权的效忠”之类的东西。
But even after these deals were made, day-to-day Christianization, education, and in some sense homogenization of Filipinos into the greater Philippine nation was often taken care of by priests.
但即使在达成这些协议之后，日常的基督教化、教育以及某种意义上菲律宾人同质化到更大的菲律宾国家中也常常由神父们负责。
And the Philippines was formally divided by the Catholic Church into which areas were controlled by various orders, whether the Dominicans, the Benedictines, the Franciscans, or the Jesuits.
菲律宾被天主教会正式划分，各个地区由不同的教派控制，无论是多明我会、本笃会、方济各会还是耶稣会。
Are nations spread across many islands, including also Indonesia, inherently at a disadvantage for economic development?
分布在许多岛屿上的国家（包括印度尼西亚）是否在经济发展方面本质上处于劣势？
I certainly think they have a disadvantage in terms of some of the issues of state capacity and order that are a prerequisite for economic development.
我当然认为他们在一些国家能力和秩序问题上处于劣势，而这些问题是经济发展的先决条件。
Take Mindanao in the south, which is a constant problem for the Philippines.
以南部的棉兰老岛为例，这一直是菲律宾面临的一个问题。
In some ways, Mindanao has never fully colonized.
从某些方面来说，棉兰老岛从未完全被殖民化。
That is to say, neither the Spanish nor the Americans nor even the Japanese during World War II were able to fully control Mindanao.
也就是说，无论是西班牙人还是美国人，甚至二战期间的日本人都无法完全控制棉兰老岛。
Today, it is the scene of many struggles between the Muslims and the Christians there, as well as the various kinds of revolutionary factions that still exist in Mindanao.
今天，这里是棉兰老岛穆斯林和基督徒以及仍然存在的各种革命派系之间许多斗争的场所。
I remember having a discussion about this with the distinguished economist Jim Robinson, who wrote the paper about the fact that in Mindanao you have too many strong men, and that the problem in Mindanao is you have bad institutions.
我记得曾与杰出经济学家吉姆·罗宾逊讨论过这个问题，他写的论文指出，棉兰老岛有太多强人，而棉兰老岛的问题是制度糟糕。
I said, “Jim, you’re putting the cart before the horse.
我说：“吉姆，你本末倒置了。
You have bad institutions because it’s so hard to run Mindanao, so it’s not a surprise that the politicians that emerge in Mindanao are those who basically are good at forming private armies or making local connections.”
你的机构很糟糕，因为管理棉兰老岛非常困难，所以棉兰老岛出现的政客基本上都是那些擅长组建私人军队或建立当地关系的人，这并不奇怪。”
No one group is strong enough to make Mindanao totally independent, and yet the center in Manila is not strong enough to fully, in some sense, control that island either.
没有一个团体强大到足以使棉兰老岛完全独立，但马尼拉的中心也没有强大到在某种意义上完全控制该岛。
And so that area has always been a hotbed of political struggle and instability.
因此，该地区一直是政治斗争和不稳定的温床。
Now that China is a true world power, and China also tends to use some of the overseas communities of ethnic Chinese to further the ends of China as a nation, how will relations with the ethnically Chinese minority evolve in the Philippines?
既然中国是一个真正的世界强国，而且中国也倾向于利用一些海外华人社区来实现中国作为一个国家的目标，那么菲律宾与华裔少数民族的关系将如何演变？
Well, that is a big issue because I think there is a suspicion that many of the Chinese are working in the Chinese government’s interest.
嗯，这是一个大问题，因为我认为有人怀疑许多中国人正在为中国政府的利益而工作。
At the same time, there are many ethnically Chinese Filipinos who owe no allegiance to China and are much more loyal to the Philippines, and so you’re going to get these problems.
与此同时，有许多华裔菲律宾人不效忠中国，而是更加忠诚于菲律宾，所以你会遇到这些问题。
One of the very big issues is, how can, not just the Philippines, but all of East Asia take advantage of often very successful ethnic Chinese minorities without incurring the suspicion that they’re being disloyal to their home country or loyal to China instead?
其中一个非常大的问题是，不仅是菲律宾，而且整个东亚地区如何才能利用往往非常成功的华裔少数民族，而不引起他们对祖国不忠或对中国忠诚的怀疑？
And the more that China tries to intervene in local politics in the region, the more you’re going to see these kinds of clashes.
中国越是试图干预该地区的地方政治，就越会看到此类冲突。
I worry about this a lot because many of the greatest massacres that have occurred in history have occurred by rioting people against ethnic minorities like the Chinese in India or the Chinese in Southeast Asia.
我对此非常担心，因为历史上发生的许多最严重的屠杀都是由针对少数民族的骚乱造成的，比如印度的华人或东南亚的华人。
What’s the untold story of how China itself managed to reform?
中国自身的改革有哪些不为人知的故事？
Well, that is a deep issue, but I have a theory, or rather theory is too strong a word.
嗯，这是一个很深奥的问题，但我有一个理论，或者更确切地说，理论这个词太强烈了。
There is a phenomenon I’ve observed that I really haven’t seen written about.
我观察到一种现象，但我确实没有见过有文字记载。
One of the things that, for me, is very unique about China that not many people have discussed in any real detail is the extent to which China began its reforms outside of the biggest cities.
对我来说，中国非常独特的一件事是，中国在大城市以外开始改革的程度，没有多少人真正详细讨论过。
Just thinking about that alone, to begin with Guangdong and Fujin provinces and those regions, places like Shenzhen, Guangdong, Fujin, Xiamen — to think about those cities and regions is quite remarkable.
仅就这一点来说，先从广东、富锦两省和那些地区开始，像深圳、广东、富锦、厦门这样的地方——想想那些城市和地区就很了不起了。
Virtually every major reform always involves the major centers of commercial power, but those would have been Beijing and Shanghai, and they were totally left out of it.
事实上，每一项重大改革总是涉及主要的商业权力中心，但北京和上海却完全被排除在外。
In my view, that occurred for a number of reasons.
在我看来，造成这种情况的原因有很多。
One is that, by avoiding that, you avoid the usual problems — political, economic problems of interfering with the rents of the established companies.
一是，通过避免这种情况，你就可以避免常见的问题——干扰老牌公司租金的政治、经济问题。
Second, you have plausible deniability if it fails.
其次，如果失败了，你有合理的推诿能力。
You say, “Ahh, what did you expect of the backwater?”
你说：“啊，你对死水有什么期望？”
Third, Fujian, of course, is Fujianese, which shares a language and ethnic heritage with the majority of the people in Taiwan, and in Guangdong is Cantonese, which, of course, shares ethnic heritage and the language with Hong Kong, who are mostly Cantonese.
第三，福建当然是福建人，与台湾大多数人有共同的语言和民族传统；而广东是广东话，当然与香港有共同的民族传统和语言，香港人主要是广东话。
One of the things that’s very interesting in the early parts of China’s reforms, you had investors from abroad, mostly from Taiwan and Hong Kong, investing in China in a period in which China did not have formal property rights.
中国改革初期非常有趣的事情之一是，在中国没有正式产权的时期，有来自国外的投资者（主要来自台湾和香港）在中国投资。
Family and ethnic connections were often used to make informal social deals to maintain these relations.
家庭和种族关系经常被用来进行非正式的社会交易来维持这些关系。
Moreover, the Chinese government was well aware that if they defaulted in some way, then they were giving up the future stream of investment that would come from these places.
此外，中国政府很清楚，如果他们以某种方式违约，那么他们就会放弃来自这些地方的未来投资流。
So in many ways, this was very, very unusual.
所以从很多方面来说，这都是非常非常不寻常的。
The final and most unusual aspect about China’s reform is, once these new regions started to grow, the center was not successful in shutting them down.
中国改革的最后一个也是最不寻常的一点是，一旦这些新地区开始发展，中央并没有成功地关闭它们。
You need to understand that throughout history, whenever central powers saw regional powers in their countries develop, you often crushed it.
你要明白，历史上，每当中央国家看到自己国家的地区性国家发展起来，往往就会把它压垮。
Even this happened in conflict between the king and the big city.
甚至这件事也发生在国王和大城市之间的冲突中。
The good example is Francois I of France, who often had, because of the problems that people like Doug North have talked about, a credible commitment, could not borrow money except with very high interest rates.
法国的弗朗索瓦一世就是一个很好的例子，由于像道格·诺斯这样的人所谈论的问题，他常常有一个可信的承诺，除非利率非常高，否则无法借钱。
But by uniting with the city of Paris, he was able to actually borrow at lower interest rates than he could by himself.
但通过与巴黎市的联合，他实际上能够以比他自己更低的利率借款。
Yet he broke those deals, and he allowed himself to go back to higher interest rates because he was fearful that Paris becoming too powerful would weaken his authority.
然而他打破了这些协议，并允许自己恢复更高的利率，因为他担心巴黎变得过于强大会削弱他的权威。
And in the period particularly of the Reformation, seeing people like John Calvin being protected in Geneva was a concern that Paris would become a hotbed of reform or a hotbed of opposition to the central powers of the French government.
尤其是在宗教改革时期，看到像约翰·加尔文这样的人在日内瓦受到保护，人们担心巴黎会成为改革的温床或反对法国政府中央集权的温床。
If I think about the economy of Taiwan, two things strike me.
如果我思考台湾的经济，有两件事令我印象深刻。
First, in international supply chains, Taiwan reaps a pretty high percentage of value added, but at the same time you’ve had wage stagnation at the median in Taiwan longer than almost anywhere.
首先，在国际供应链中，台湾获得了相当高的附加值百分比，但与此同时，台湾工资停滞在中位数的时间比几乎任何地方都长。
How do we put the economic picture of Taiwan together?
我们如何看待台湾的经济图景？
I’m not very sure about this, but my guess is that in Taiwan, there’s too much of an incentive to take advantage of the Chinese market, of just use cheaper labor or of selling to Chinese rather than thinking about how do we reform Taiwan itself.
我对此不太确定，但我的猜测是，在台湾，人们有太多的动机去利用中国市场，只是使用更便宜的劳动力或向中国人出售产品，而不是考虑如何改革台湾本身。
And how do we — because Taiwan needs many more reforms — they’re very smart people, they’re highly developed, but somehow Taiwan has not been able to move up the food chain fast enough to develop, in some sense, very advanced technologies and to make Taiwan, say, an intellectual hub.
我们如何 ——因为台湾需要更多的改革 ——他们是非常聪明的人，他们高度发达，但不知何故，台湾未能足够快地向食物链上游移动，无法在某种意义上开发非常先进的技术，并使台湾成为一个知识中心。
I would say for example, take even universities.
我想说，甚至以大学为例。
There’s no reason that Chungda and Taida, the two leading universities in Taiwan, shouldn’t be more like the top university in Singapore, but they’re not.
台湾的两所顶尖大学中大和台达没有理由不更像新加坡的顶尖大学，但事实并非如此。
Some of this has to do with the unwillingness of Taiwanese to switch graduate programs to be much more heavily in English, and that there’s a certain reluctance to learn English or difficulty that they have.
这在一定程度上与台湾人不愿意将研究生课程转为更多地使用英语有关，而且他们有一定的不愿意学习英语或有困难。
On the one hand, if you talked to Taiwanese — like my in-laws — they are very much in favor of their kids learning English.
一方面，如果你和台湾人交谈——比如我的姻亲——他们非常支持孩子学习英语。
On the other hand, they perceive this as an impossibly difficult thing unless the kids live in the United States or Australia or England for a certain period of time.
另一方面，他们认为这是一件不可能的困难的事情，除非孩子们在美国、澳大利亚或英国生活了一段时间。
So all of these things swirl together.
所以所有这些事情都聚集在一起。
It’s not unlike some of the problems Japan has, but with the extra problem that Taiwan is torn between their desires to remain reasonably independent while at the same time being dependent on making deals with the mainland.
这与日本面临的一些问题没有什么不同，但还有一个额外的问题，那就是台湾在保持合理独立的愿望和同时依赖与大陆达成协议的愿望之间左右为难。
And how is it that you and your wife managed to bring up your son so he could speak Chinese?
您和您的妻子是如何将您的儿子培养成会说中文的？
Well, you have to understand that when I first met my wife, we met in Paris and I spoke no Mandarin; she spoke no English.
嗯，你必须明白，当我第一次见到我妻子时，我们是在巴黎见面的，我不会说普通话；她不会说英语。
And she’s from Taiwan, right?
她来自台湾，对吗？
She’s from Taiwan.
她来自台湾。
Eventually I learned conversational Mandarin, and she learned English, but we noticed that — we were going to bring up our son — she was very worried about the fact that many of our friends who were Taiwanese — even though both parents spoke Mandarin and, in fact, in many cases, both parents didn’t speak English very well — their kids would grow up not wanting to speak Chinese at all.
最终我学会了普通话，她也学会了英语，但我们注意到 ——“我们要抚养我们的儿子”——“她很担心我们的很多朋友都是台湾人”——“尽管父母双方都会说普通话，而且事实上，在很多情况下，父母双方的英语都说得不太好”——“他们的孩子长大后根本不想说中文。”
I chalked this up to the observation that little kids want to conform, and they don’t want to be picked on, especially if they grew up, say, speaking Mandarin.
我将此归因于这样的观察：小孩子想要顺从，他们不想被欺负，尤其是如果他们长大后说普通话。
But then they get picked on in kindergarten, or they just feel weird because they’re answering in a strange language.
但后来他们在幼儿园被欺负，或者他们只是觉得很奇怪，因为他们用一种奇怪的语言回答。
I did some reading into literature, and what I finally came up with was this suggestion to my wife.
我读了一些文学作品，最后向我妻子提出了这个建议。
I said, “Here’s what we’re going to do.
我说：“这就是我们要做的。
For the first two years of his life, our eldest son — you’re only going to speak to him in Mandarin, and I’m only going to speak to him in English.” So instead of it becoming a strange language, English becomes Daddy’s language and Mandarin becomes Mommy’s language.
在他生命的头两年里，我们的大儿子 —— 你只能用普通话和他说话，我只能用英语和他说话。”因此，英语没有成为一种奇怪的语言，而是成为爸爸的语言，普通话成为妈妈的语言。
And strangely enough, that worked.
奇怪的是，这确实有效。
Our son became very fluent.
我们的儿子变得非常流利。
I did some reading into literature, and what I finally came up with was this suggestion to my wife.
我读了一些文学作品，最后向我妻子提出了这个建议。
I said, “Here’s what we’re going to do.
我说：“这就是我们要做的。
For the first two years of his life, our eldest son — you’re only going to speak to him in Mandarin, and I’m only going to speak to him in English.” So instead of it becoming a strange language, English becomes Daddy’s language and Mandarin becomes Mommy’s language.
在他生命的头两年里，我们的大儿子 —— 你只能用普通话和他说话，我只能用英语和他说话。”因此，英语没有成为一种奇怪的语言，而是成为爸爸的语言，普通话成为妈妈的语言。
And strangely enough, that worked.
奇怪的是，这确实有效。
Our son became very fluent.
我们的儿子变得非常流利。
Now the downside of it is, actually, he got confused a bit early on.
事实上，它的缺点是，他很早就感到困惑了。
In some ways, some at the preschool said he’s a little developmentally handicapped, but it was really funny — he wasn’t, he was a little slower.
在某些方面，幼儿园里的一些人说他有点发育障碍，但这真的很有趣——他不是，他有点慢。
And then one day, it clicked, and he was fluent in both.
然后有一天，他灵机一动，这两件事他都精通了。
In fact, he was fluent in Chinese first, before English.
事实上，他首先能说流利的中文，然后才是英语。
The funny thing was, very often there was a period when he would say everything twice, so he would say, “Look, airplane, kàn kàn, fēijī!.” and he would just talk about these ways.
有趣的是，很多时候他会把每件事说两遍，所以他会说：“看，飞机，kàn kàn，fēijī！”他只会谈论这些方式。
Sadly, that theory didn’t work with our second son because we didn’t count on the fact that the second son has the older brother to play, and so the second son has the same phenomenon, where he understands quite a bit of Mandarin but doesn’t want to answer in Mandarin.
可悲的是，这个理论对我们的二儿子不起作用，因为我们没有想到二儿子有哥哥玩，所以二儿子也有同样的现象，他听得懂一点普通话，但不想用普通话回答。
Let’s say that a country with a fair amount of money, but not necessarily high credibility in every way, and a nondemocratic government — they appoint you to build a university system for them and to create a top world-class university.
假设一个国家有相当多的钱，但不一定在各方面都有很高的信誉，而且是一个非民主的政府，他们任命你为他们建立一个大学系统，创建一所世界一流的大学。
Say it’s a Gulf nation.
说它是海湾国家。
Is it even possible that they try to do this?
他们有可能尝试这样做吗？
Is the credibility gap too strong?
信誉差距太大了吗？
How much money do they need?
他们需要多少钱？
How would you think about actually trying to do this?
你会如何看待实际尝试这样做？
Well, I think there’s two factors.
嗯，我认为有两个因素。
One is, are they willing to commit the money to it?
一是，他们愿意投入资金吗？
And second, are they willing to go through the phase of credibility building?
其次，他们是否愿意经历建立信誉的阶段？
That’s the hardest thing.
这是最难的事情。
Many people make the early phase possible, but then they falter at the later one, and that’s the real issue.
许多人使早期阶段成为可能，但他们在后期阶段却犹豫不决，这才是真正的问题。
How credible are you going to be with respect .
您在尊重方面的可信度如何。
.
。
.
。
Even something like tenure is something not very well understood.
即使像终身教职这样的事情也不是很容易理解。
Are you willing to fire people before they get to tenure?
你愿意在员工获得终身职位之前解雇他们吗？
And are you willing to guarantee tenure after?
以后你愿意保证终身教职吗？
How do you do that?
你是怎么做到的？
How do you do it so it’s credible?
你如何做到这一点才可信？
Many countries cannot even guarantee that the policies instituted by one ruler will be followed by the next.
许多国家甚至不能保证一位统治者制定的政策会被下一位统治者遵循。
And this is a very, very big issue.
这是一个非常非常大的问题。
However, you see a lot try.
然而，你会看到很多尝试。
Singapore has done quite a very good job.
新加坡做得非常好。
Hong Kong has done quite a lot.
香港已经做了很多事。
The Gulf is trying now, I’m not quite sure with what success, but there’s surely — the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology has been hiring a lot of top people in the sciences.
海湾地区现在正在尝试，我不太确定会取得什么成功，但可以肯定的是，阿卜杜拉国王科技大学一直在招聘许多科学领域的顶尖人才。
But I’m not sure how successful they’re being at creating a really vibrant university that will attract the best and the brightest to come there.
但我不确定他们在创建一所真正充满活力的大学、吸引最优秀、最聪明的人才方面是否成功。
Russia, I don’t want to talk too much about that because that’s partly what I’m involved in in Russia as well.
俄罗斯，我不想谈论太多，因为这也是我在俄罗斯参与的部分内容。
The Russians have a program to try to provide incentives for their leading universities to hire on the international market and integrate that with their local professors.
俄罗斯制定了一项计划，试图激励本国顶尖大学在国际市场上招聘人才，并将其与当地教授结合起来。
I would say the Higher School of Economics in Moscow is the most successful university institution in Russia so far at doing that.
我想说，莫斯科高等经济学院是俄罗斯迄今为止在这方面最成功的大学机构。
But it’s still very early in the game, and it’s always a challenge.
但现在还处于游戏的早期阶段，而且始终是一个挑战。
On the John Nye production function
关于约翰·奈伊生产函数
Let me ask you just a little bit about what I call the John Nye production function.
让我问你一点关于我所说的约翰·奈生产函数的问题。
Economics aside, what would be an example of a book that had a great influence over you in your life?
抛开经济学不谈，有哪一本书对你的生活产生了巨大影响？
Not Doug North.
不是道格·诺斯。
No, no, I understand.
不，不，我明白。
Not The Downward Sloping Demand Curve.
不是向下倾斜的需求曲线。
I think I told you once that, as a boy, one of the most influential books to me was the book Memoirs of a Sword Swallower by Dan Mannix.
我想我曾经告诉过你，作为一个男孩，对我影响最大的书之一是丹·曼尼克斯的《吞剑者回忆录》。
This is a fairly obscure cult book, but it’s an autobiography of him running away to the circus, or the carnival actually, and learning to become both a sword swallower and a fire eater.
这是一本相当晦涩的邪教书籍，但却是他逃往马戏团，或者实际上是嘉年华，并学习成为吞剑者和食火者的自传。
What was interesting to me about that, at the age of 10, was both the interesting detail at the level of how he got involved in magic and in the carnival and the functionings of the day-to-day, as well as the exoticism for a boy in the Philippines — just thinking about the way the world had developed.
对我来说，十岁的时候，有趣的细节既在于他如何参与魔法、狂欢节和日常生活，也在于一个菲律宾男孩的异国情调——只是思考世界的发展方式。
It didn’t make me want to run away to the carnival or to the circus.
它并没有让我想跑去狂欢节或马戏团。
But it made me think about things in a very, very different way.
但这让我以一种非常非常不同的方式思考事情。
And it really spurred my interest in fantasy, in horror, in science fiction, all heavily driven by my interest in that book.
它确实激发了我对奇幻、恐怖、科幻小说的兴趣，所有这些都很大程度上是由我对那本书的兴趣驱动的。
And what would be a book from the history of ideas?
一本关于思想史的书会是什么？
More narrowly.
更狭隘一点。
That’s a little trickier.
这有点棘手。
I would say in recent years, the book I’ve been pondering a lot is Hobbes’s Leviathan.
我想说，近年来，我一直在思考的一本书是霍布斯的《利维坦》。
Why?
为什么？
Because I think we’ve lived through such a period of relative peace and order that we are taking for granted how unprecedented this is.
因为我认为我们已经经历了一段相对和平与秩序的时期，我们理所当然地认为这是前所未有的。
Despite all the wars that erupted since World War II, there has not been a major global conflict at that level in many, many .
尽管自二战以来爆发了许多战争，但许多国家都没有发生过这种程度的重大全球冲突。
.
。
.
。
in nearly, what, three-quarters of a century now?
近，什么，四分之三个世纪了？
And that’s quite unusual.
这很不寻常。
It’s also unusual that the number-one leading military power has done so little, contrary again to what a lot of people say about it, to expand its power militarily.
同样不寻常的是，第一大军事强国在军事扩张方面几乎没有采取任何行动，这再次与许多人的说法相反。
And there are a lot of reasons for that, many of them very good, both moral as well as practical.
这样做的原因有很多，其中很多都很好，既有道德的，也有实际的。
Nonetheless, that’s an anomaly in world history, I think, in many ways.
尽管如此，我认为这在很多方面都是世界历史上的反常现象。
And I still think there’s a kind of second law of thermodynamics for political economy in which disorder has a pull.
我仍然认为政治经济学中存在一种热力学第二定律，其中无序具有吸引力。
And I worry a lot about the stability of the liberal world order in the next century.
我非常担心下个世纪自由世界秩序的稳定性。
How much of a pessimist was Hobbes?
霍布斯到底有多悲观？
I don’t know.
我不知道。
I’m not very good at psychologizing older writers.
我不太擅长对老作家进行心理分析。
But there’s an optimistic interpretation, that what he called absolutism, which I think is not the same as modern totalitarianism at all — it’s a strong state of some kind.
但有一种乐观的解释，即他所谓的专制主义，我认为这与现代极权主义根本不同——它是某种强大的国家。
Correct.
正确的。
Correct.
正确的。
But that could in fact solve the problem, or no?
但这实际上可以解决问题吗？
But that’s almost like saying, let’s assume a can opener.
但这几乎就像在说，让我们假设一个开罐器。
It’s exactly the problem.
这正是问题所在。
The thing I’m really frustrated by is that it doesn’t matter whether people are writing from a socialist or a libertarian perspective.
我真正感到沮丧的是，人们是从社会主义还是自由主义的角度写作并不重要。
Too much of the discussion of political economy is normative.
太多政治经济学的讨论都是规范性的。
It’s about what should the ideal state be?
这是关于理想状态应该是什么样的？
I’m much more concerned with the questions of what good states are possible?
我更关心什么样的好状态是可能的？
And once good states are created that are possible, what good states are sustainable?
一旦建立了可能的良好国家，什么样的良好国家是可持续的？
And that, in my view, is a still understudied and very poorly understood issue.
在我看来，这是一个尚未得到充分研究且知之甚少的问题。
Now, as you know, we have many talented colleagues, but probably you would count as the best educated amongst the group — educated in the broad sense of the term — we all have PhDs.
现在，如您所知，我们有许多才华横溢的同事，但您可能会被视为团队中受过最好教育的 ——“广义上的教育”—— 我们都有博士学位。
To what would you attribute that?
您认为这归因于什么？
It’s two things.
这是两件事。
One is, I was raised and educated in the Jesuit tradition.
一是，我是在耶稣会传统中长大和接受教育的。
I went to an elite Jesuit school in the Philippines growing up.
我在菲律宾的一所精英耶稣会学校长大。
One of the things about that school was that there was a very big emphasis on the educated Catholic gentleman that it was supposed to produce.
那所学校的一个特点是，它非常重视培养受过教育的天主教绅士。
It was not enough to be good in the one subject.
仅仅在一门学科上表现出色是不够的。
You were presumed to be good in all subjects at the very high level.
人们认为你在所有科目上都取得了很高的水平。
Secondly, I felt, growing up, that the Philippines really was an intellectual backwater, and I had this mythic view in my mind of what the center would or should be like.
其次，在成长的过程中，我觉得菲律宾确实是知识分子的死水，我的脑海里对中心会是什么样子或应该是什么样子有一种神话般的看法。
And I thought to myself as wanting to learn things so that I would be prepared to play a role as a participant in world discussion.
我想自己想要学习一些东西，以便我准备好在世界讨论中扮演参与者的角色。
To that end, I studied many different things.
为此，我研究了许多不同的东西。
As you know, my undergraduate background is in physics, but I also was, for a while, a double major in literature.
如你所知，我的本科背景是物理学，但我也曾一度主修文学双学位。
I taught myself French, as well as, later, Mandarin, and now I’m trying to learn Russian.
我自学了法语，后来又自学了普通话，现在我正在努力学习俄语。
And all these things are part and parcel of my sense that it’s not enough to be good at .
所有这些事情都是我感觉的重要组成部分，即仅仅擅长还不够。
.
。
.
。
In some sense, the spirit of the age favors specialization, and my personal tastes favor generalization or being a polymath.
从某种意义上说，时代精神偏向专业化，而我个人的品味偏向泛化或博学。
Or as my advisor once to put it, I have too many hobbies.
或者正如我的导师曾经说过的，我有太多的爱好。
In some sense, the spirit of the age favors specialization, and my personal tastes favor generalization or being a polymath.
从某种意义上说，时代精神偏向专业化，而我个人的品味偏向泛化或博学。
Or as my advisor once to put it, I have too many hobbies.
或者正如我的顾问曾经说过的那样，我有太多的爱好。
Let’s say a smart young person were to come to you and ask for advice.
假设一个聪明的年轻人来找你寻求建议。
How do I self-educate myself in a broadly similar way?
我如何以大致相似的方式进行自我教育？
Well first, should they?
首先，应该吗？
I mean, the fact of the matter is that there’s a lot of costs of being broadly self-educated.
我的意思是，事实是，广泛的自学需要付出很多成本。
The fact of the matter is —
事情的真相是——
But you don’t regret it, right?
但你不后悔，对吧？
90 percent of the time; 10 percent of the time I do.
90%的时间；我有百分之十的时间这样做。
But clearly, a lot of it will have to just read a lot, read very deeply.
但显然，很多内容都需要大量阅读、深入阅读。
If you are a humanities person, take some hard math and science classes.
如果您是人文学科人士，请参加一些艰苦的数学和科学课程。
If you’re a science person, read Shakespeare.
如果你是一名科学家，请阅读莎士比亚。
Learn a foreign language, really learn it.
学一门外语，真正地学它。
Spend some time.
花一些时间。
And when people learn a foreign language, in particular, I would say the one aspect of foreign language learning that’s underappreciated is accent.
特别是当人们学习外语时，我想说外语学习中被低估的一个方面就是口音。
Most people say, “Oh, my accent is good enough, and then I’m fluent.” But in fact, for most people around the world, accent is the first thing you notice about someone when they’re speaking a foreign language.
大多数人会说：“哦，我的口音够好，然后我就很流利了。”但事实上，对于世界上的大多数人来说，口音是当某人说外语时你首先注意到的。
If you have bad grammar and have a very limited vocabulary, but you can say 100 basic phrases with 90 percent accurate accent, most people will say you speak fairly well.
如果你的语法很差，词汇量也很有限，但你可以说 100 个基本短语，口音准确率达到 90%，大多数人会说你说得不错。
If you have, however, a fairly high degree of fluency and you have a really strong American accent, a lot of people will still perceive you as not speaking well.
然而，如果你的流利程度相当高，而且你有很重的美国口音，很多人仍然会认为你说得不好。
Without acquiring or making the effort to acquire a decent accent — I’m not talking about perfectly mimicking someone who’s fluent, but of getting a decent accent — you won’t, in my view, get a full understanding of what that language and that culture brings to you.
如果不获得或努力获得像样的口音 ——“我不是在谈论完美地模仿一个流利的人，而是获得像样的口音”——“在我看来，你将无法充分理解这种语言和文化给你带来了什么。
And to close, please recommend a novel for us to read.
最后，请推荐一本小说供我们阅读。
Well, if I had to recommend a novel, the one that I like to come back to is The Idiot by Dostoevsky.
好吧，如果我必须推荐一本小说，我最喜欢的就是陀思妥耶夫斯基的《白痴》。
The others are more famous.
其他的就比较有名了。
But why The Idiot?
但为什么是白痴呢？
Well, The Idiot’s quite interesting because of the figure of Prince Myshkin, and that is the idea of the innocent surrounded by all this scheming, and this blood and gore and evil.
嗯，《白痴》非常有趣，因为梅什金王子的形象，这就是无辜者被所有这些阴谋、血腥和邪恶包围的想法。
Dostoevsky is always worried about the problem of spirituality within the context of a real world that’s changing, that’s dynamic, that has good and bad and evil, and how do we reconcile that?
陀思妥耶夫斯基总是担心现实世界中的灵性问题，这个现实世界正在变化，充满活力，有善有恶，我们如何调和它？
And I think The Idiot, even more than Crime and Punishment or The Brothers Karamazov, has, at least for me, a very uniquely appealing depth to it.
我认为《白痴》甚至比《罪与罚》或《卡拉马佐夫兄弟》更具有，至少对我来说，具有非常独特的吸引力深度。
John Nye, thank you very much.
约翰·奈，非常感谢你。
Thank you, Tyler.
谢谢你，泰勒。