Joe Studwell on Africa, Asia, and What Development Actually Requires (Ep. 270)
Hello everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到与泰勒对话。
Today, I’m speaking with Joe Studwell.
今天，我正在与乔·斯塔德韦尔交谈。
Joe has a long and distinguished career as a journalist for many publications, but I know him best for two of his books.
乔作为许多出版物的记者有着悠久而杰出的职业生涯，但我最了解他的是他的两本书。
The first is How Asia Works, which is extremely well known and has had major impact.
第一个是《亚洲如何运作》，该书非常知名并且产生了重大影响。
And now, this winter, he has a new book coming out, which I thought was great and enjoyed very much.
现在，今年冬天，他出版了一本新书，我认为这本书很棒并且非常喜欢。
It is called How Africa Works: Success and Failure on the World’s Last Developmental Frontier.
它的名字是《非洲如何运作：世界最后发展前沿的成功与失败》。
Joe, welcome.
乔，欢迎。
Thank you.
谢谢。
It’s nice to be here.
很高兴来到这里。
I have many questions about Africa.
我对非洲有很多疑问。
If lack of population density has been a major problem, does that mean we should now be especially optimistic about the Nigerian Delta, which is densely populated?
如果人口密度不足一直是一个主要问题，那么这是否意味着我们现在应该对人口稠密的尼日利亚三角洲特别乐观？
Yes, you’re right.
是的，你说得对。
The Nigerian Delta is more densely populated than most parts of Africa.
尼日利亚三角洲的人口密度比非洲大部分地区都高。
And it reminds us that population density or increased population density alone is not enough to solve all of Africa’s problems, because Nigeria’s been a country plagued with problems since independence.
它提醒我们，仅靠人口密度或人口密度的增加不足以解决非洲的所有问题，因为尼日利亚自独立以来一直是一个问题缠身的国家。
But Nigeria has also been looking in much better shape in the last 20 years compared with the period before that since independence.
但与独立以来相比，过去 20 年尼日利亚的状况也看起来好得多。
I would argue that a big part of that is increased population density.
我认为其中很大一部分是人口密度的增加。
More broadly, across Africa, there’s no doubt that very low population density has been the biggest problem for the continent’s development, contrary to what the academic literature has told us for the last 50 years, which was that it’s all to do with governance and civil war and civil strife and ethnic strife.
更广泛地说，在整个非洲，毫无疑问，极低的人口密度一直是非洲大陆发展的最大问题，这与过去 50 年来学术文献告诉我们的相反，即这一切都与治理、内战、内乱和种族冲突有关。
In reality, the biggest problem that Africa has had — and largely as a result of the disease burden on the continent, which is absolutely unique in its virulence — is having population density, which in 1960 was one-fifth that of Asia as a whole and one-seventh what it was in East Asia.
事实上，非洲面临的最大问题是人口密度，1960 年是整个亚洲的五分之一，是东亚的七分之一，这在很大程度上是由于该大陆的疾病负担造成的，其毒力绝对是独一无二的。
But is it the case Nigeria has relatively done so well compared to the rest of Africa?
但与非洲其他国家相比，尼日利亚的表现是否相对较好呢？
They have oil, of course, and they have remarkable talent in the population.
当然，他们拥有石油，而且他们的人口也拥有非凡的才能。
And relative to oil and talent, it seems to me, on average, they quite underperform.
相对于石油和人才，在我看来，平均而言，它们的表现相当不佳。
I see so many years where they grow 1 percent or maybe zero, or you’re not sure because someone’s fudging the numbers.
我看到这么多年它们增长了 1% 甚至零，或者你不确定，因为有人捏造了数字。
Why should we think the population density matters if the number one example of that underperforms?
如果第一个例子表现不佳，我们为什么要认为人口密度很重要呢？
I would say that Nigeria has been something of an outlier in terms of underperformance as a state which is densely populated by African standards.
我想说的是，按照非洲标准，尼日利亚作为一个人口稠密的国家，表现不佳，在某种程度上是个例外。
And as we all know, they had a terrible civil war there in the late 1960s.
众所周知，他们在 20 世纪 60 年代末爆发了一场可怕的内战。
The ethnic divisions in Nigeria, even by African standards, are particularly acute.
即使按照非洲标准，尼日利亚的种族分歧也特别严重。
You have a nation which is broadly divided in three with roughly equal numbers among those three groups, and they’ve always fought for power with each other.
你的国家大致分为三个，这三个群体的人数大致相等，而且他们总是互相争夺权力。
So, the ethnic fragmentation problem has been particularly difficult in Nigeria.
因此，种族分裂问题在尼日利亚尤为棘手。
Nonetheless, I would say that the population density is what has allowed Nigeria to have a better performance in agriculture than most people expected over the last 20, 30 years, and has also contributed to the outperformance of the whole Lagos area on the coast, which is a real hive of entrepreneurial activity.
尽管如此，我想说的是，人口密度使得尼日利亚在过去20、30年里在农业方面的表现比大多数人预期的要好，并且也促成了整个沿海拉各斯地区的优异表现，这是真正的创业活动蜂巢。
So, I would agree with you that Nigeria doesn’t give great hope to us that greater population density across Africa is going to produce better results, but I would say that there are particular reasons within Nigeria that we can point to as to why Nigeria hasn’t delivered as much as one would hope so far.
因此，我同意你的观点，尼日利亚并没有给我们很大的希望，即整个非洲人口密度的增加会产生更好的结果，但我想说，尼日利亚国内有一些特殊的原因，我们可以指出为什么尼日利亚迄今为止没有取得人们希望的那样多的成果。
Now you have very good coverage of Botswana in your book, which is arguably the greatest sub-Saharan African success story, putting aside South Africa as a special case.
现在，您在书中对博茨瓦纳进行了很好的报道，这可以说是撒哈拉以南非洲最伟大的成功故事，抛开南非作为一个特例。
And they obviously have very low population density, right?
而且他们的人口密度显然非常低，对吧？
Diamonds, not too many people — do the division.
钻石，不要太多人 — 进行划分。
People are relatively rich through some decent heritage from British colonial administration.
由于英国殖民政府留下的一些体面的遗产，人们相对富裕。
Does that also push against population density being a key issue?
这是否也促使人口密度成为一个关键问题？
No, because Botswana is an outlier in another sense, that essentially, the economy is a giant diamond mine.
不，因为博茨瓦纳在另一种意义上是一个异常者，本质上，经济是一个巨大的钻石矿。
There are three big diamond mines in Botswana.
博茨瓦纳有三个大型钻石矿。
That’s where all the money for development has come from, and it’s been well managed, and they didn’t need people.
所有发展资金都来自那里，而且管理得很好，而且他们不需要人。
Modern mining doesn’t require much labor.
现代采矿不需要太多劳动力。
There’re only 10,000 people working in the diamond industry in Botswana, so the low population density of Botswana doesn’t prove anything.
博茨瓦纳的钻石行业只有10,000人，所以博茨瓦纳的低人口密度并不能证明什么。
What we’re talking about is the possibilities that there are for development in countries that don’t have outsized mineral or hydrocarbon assets and are going to rely on their people to deliver development.
我们谈论的是那些没有大量矿产或碳氢化合物资产并依赖其人民来实现发展的国家的发展可能性。
Of course, people are the key input in a poor country because you don’t have cash, and you don’t have technology.
当然，在贫穷国家，人是关键投入，因为你没有现金，也没有技术。
You’ve got people, and it’s how you mobilize those people that determines your potential to develop rapidly.
你有人才，而你如何动员这些人才决定了你快速发展的潜力。
And if you don’t have enough of those people, you can’t move forward.
如果你没有足够的这些人，你就无法前进。
On the stability of governance
论治理的稳定性
Let me see if you are more optimistic about Africa than I am, because you might be.
让我看看你是否比我对非洲更乐观，因为你可能会。
If I look at the history of economic growth in Denmark, there are hardly any years where Denmark grows at 8 percent to 10 percent or even 6 percent.
如果我回顾一下丹麦经济增长的历史，丹麦几乎没有哪一年增长过8%到10%，甚至6%。
Maybe right after World War II, but that’s a special time.
也许是在第二次世界大战之后，但那是一个特殊的时期。
Denmark does well because they have very few years with big negative growth rates.
丹麦表现良好，因为他们很少有年份出现大幅负增长率。
Every now and then, a recession like anywhere else, but they just keep on plugging along at something not too far from 2 percent.
时不时地，就像其他地方一样出现经济衰退，但他们只是继续坚持在离 2% 不远的水平上前进。
And you can trust that Denmark just won’t do anything terribly stupid.
你可以相信丹麦不会做任何非常愚蠢的事情。
Is there any sub-Saharan African country where you have even a remotely equivalent faith in their governance, where you think, “Well, they’re going to be the next Denmark.
有没有哪个撒哈拉以南非洲国家让你对他们的治理抱有哪怕一点点的信心，你会想：“好吧，他们将成为下一个丹麦。
It might take longer than we would like, but they’re going to get there.”
这可能比我们希望的要花更长的时间，但他们一定会实现的。”
Well, to go back to Botswana, they managed growth very well.
好吧，回到博茨瓦纳，他们的增长管理得很好。
They had a sovereign wealth fund that allow them to stabilize growth rates.
他们拥有主权财富基金，可以稳定增长率。
But you’re absolutely right that this is something that African countries now need to do.
但你说得对，这是非洲国家现在需要做的事情。
African countries have been extremely bad about this.
非洲国家在这方面做得非常糟糕。
I talk about it in the book, but it’s principally been the hydrocarbon states that have had the most volatile growth over time.
我在书中谈到了这一点，但随着时间的推移，增长最不稳定的主要是碳氢化合物国家。
The evidence is that they’re becoming a little bit better at managing that growth, and we have to hope that that continues going forward.
有证据表明，他们在管理这种增长方面正在变得更好，我们必须希望这种情况能够继续下去。
Certainly, one of the biggest lessons of East Asia — and one that you almost never hear repeated — is that what developmental states in East Asia did was to get stable growth rates, which then signaled very effectively to the private sector that they could expect steady growth of 5, 6, 7, 8 percent going forward and encouraged private investment to increase.
当然，东亚最大的教训之一（也是你几乎从未听到重复的教训）是，东亚的发展型国家所做的是获得稳定的增长率，这向私营部门发出非常有效的信号，表明他们可以预期未来 5%、6%、7%、8% 的稳定增长，并鼓励私人投资增加。
And you’re absolutely right, you’re not going to do that with growth rates that bounce around, but I do think that this problem is at least being recognized now.
你是完全正确的，你不会在增长率反弹的情况下做到这一点，但我确实认为这个问题现在至少得到了认识。
But even Botswana worries me in this regard.
但即使是博茨瓦纳在这方面也让我担心。
They’ve had a pretty good heritage in history, but the last two years, corruption indices are up sharply.
他们在历史上有着相当好的传统，但最近两年，腐败指数急剧上升。
Their politics seems to have become a personal feud.
他们的政治似乎已经变成了个人恩怨。
There were all those recent articles that they can’t deliver basic health services to their population.
最近的所有文章都表明他们无法为其民众提供基本的医疗服务。
In terms of governance, they seem to be going backwards from a pretty good start, right?
在治理方面，他们似乎从一个很好的开始开始倒退，对吧？
I think you could say that, but I’m not sure that it’s fair yet to say that they are really going backwards.
我想你可以这么说，但我不确定说他们真的在倒退是否公平。
They’re in a major transition.
他们正处于重大转变之中。
The Botswana Development Party is out of power for the first time since independence, so there’s a lot of change going on in that respect.
博茨瓦纳发展党自独立以来首次下台，因此这方面正在发生很多变化。
I think they’re going through a difficult period, but I’m not sure that they’re definitely going backwards.
我认为他们正在经历一段困难时期，但我不确定他们肯定会倒退。
You could say similar things to what you’ve just said about Botswana, about the United States.
你可以说类似于你刚才谈到博茨瓦纳和美国的话。
Well, possibly we’re going backwards , but Tanzania worries me also.
好吧，也许我们正在倒退，但坦桑尼亚也让我担心。
Three years ago, I had many friends and acquaintances telling me the reforms were going wonderfully.
三年前，我有很多朋友和熟人告诉我，改革进展顺利。
This is the next market-oriented miracle, bet on Tanzania.
这是下一个市场化的奇迹，押注于坦桑尼亚。
I’ve only been there once.
我只去过那里一次。
I guess I was a little skeptical.
我想我有点怀疑。
And now, in the last year and a half, Tanzanian politics seems quite volatile.
现在，在过去一年半的时间里，坦桑尼亚的政治似乎相当不稳定。
It’s not stable anymore.
它不再稳定了。
It’s of course not a petro state.
它当然不是一个石油国家。
There’s not an issue comparable to diamonds.
没有什么问题可以与钻石相媲美。
Doesn’t this problem just crop up again and again and again, that there’s not a stable place where you would really want to put much of your money?
难道这个问题不是一次又一次地出现，没有一个稳定的地方让你真正愿意投入大量资金吗？
There certainly continue to be a lot of problems with politics, but you don’t see the levels of civil strife in Africa that we saw in the 1990s.
当然，政治方面仍然存在很多问题，但你看不到 20 世纪 90 年代非洲内乱的程度。
You don’t see the number of coups in Africa that we saw in the 1990s.
你看不到 20 世纪 90 年代非洲发生的政变数量。
What we have at the moment, if you think of violence, is mainly violence that is focused on the Sahel and all really relates to a very particular problem that’s partly climatological, partly demographic, and it’s just very difficult to manage.
如果你想到暴力，我们目前所面临的主要是针对萨赫勒地区的暴力，所有这些都确实与一个非常特殊的问题有关，这个问题部分是气候问题，部分是人口问题，而且非常难以管理。
So, I don’t think that the political story is great, but the data tell us that there is considerably more democracy in Africa than there was in the ’80s and ’90s, and that states are more stable.
所以，我不认为政治故事很棒，但数据告诉我们，非洲的民主程度比 80 年代和 90 年代要多得多，而且国家也更加稳定。
But is there still a lot of bad governance?
但治理不善的情况是否仍然存在？
I think that there is, but that is why my book concentrates — when it’s presenting optimism — on what is going on in the private sector, and particularly what’s going on in agriculture, which doesn’t require a lot of state input and state activity.
我认为是有的，但这就是为什么我的书重点关注“——当它表现出乐观情绪时”——私营部门正在发生的事情，特别是农业正在发生的事情，因为农业不需要大量的国家投入和国家活动。
And the numbers there are really pretty good.
那里的数字确实相当不错。
We’ve had the fastest average rate of agricultural GDP growth since 2000, about 4.5 percent in Africa, compared with anywhere else in the world.
自 2000 年以来，我们的农业 GDP 平均增长率是最快的，与世界其他任何地方相比，非洲的增长率约为 4.5%。
It’s been faster than anywhere else in the world.
它比世界上任何其他地方都快。
And that’s really a kind of night-and-day change to where Africa was at in the ’70s, ’80s, ’90s.
这确实是非洲在 70 年代、80 年代、90 年代的日夜变化。
Those sorts of things are very important.
这些事情非常重要。
The growth of the agricultural sector is also creating the first large private-sector firms in Africa because, of course, agriculture has a manufacturing component as well when we process all the stuff that is grown.
农业部门的增长也在非洲创造了第一批大型私营企业，因为当然，当我们加工所有种植的东西时，农业也具有制造业成分。
And we’re getting large firms operating across borders in Africa now, in the agribusiness sector.
现在，我们正在非洲农业综合企业领域开展跨国经营的大公司。
We’re talking about the politics of Tanzania as a cause for concern, but equally, you could look at Bakhresa, the biggest Tanzanian agribusiness firm.
我们正在谈论坦桑尼亚的政治，这是一个令人担忧的问题，但同样，您可以看看坦桑尼亚最大的农业综合企业 Bakhresa。
It now operates in eight, nine, or ten different countries in East and Southern Africa.
它现在在东非和南部非洲的八个、九个或十个不同的国家开展业务。
It’s moved into all sorts of other businesses.
它已转移到各种其他业务中。
They own a football club, they own a TV station, they’re in petroleum products, they’re in all sorts of stuff.
他们拥有一家足球俱乐部，他们拥有一家电视台，他们涉足石油产品，他们涉足各种各样的领域。
They’re a proper diversified conglomerate of the kind that I would associate with Southeast Asia.
他们是一家真正的多元化企业集团，我将其与东南亚联系在一起。
All that’s going on in the private sector, despite the still concerning politics that you rightly refer to.
尽管您正确地提到了仍然令人担忧的政治，但私营部门正在发生这一切。
On manufacturing capacity
论制造能力
Does Africa have a manufacturing future?
非洲有制造业的未来吗？
Is robotics coming, AI, possibly some reshoring?
机器人、人工智能、可能会出现回流吗？
Yes.
是的。
I believe that Africa does have a manufacturing future.
我相信非洲确实有制造业的未来。
But making what?
但做什么呢？
And at what cost of energy?
能源成本是多少？
They will start, as everybody does, producing garments, producing textiles, which in certain enclaves is already going on in Madagascar, in Lasutu, in Morocco, and they’ll move on to other things.
他们将像每个人一样开始生产服装、生产纺织品，这在马达加斯加、拉苏图、摩洛哥的某些飞地已经在进行，然后他们将转向其他事情。
They’ll start with those things because they are the most labor cost-sensitive products.
他们将从这些东西开始，因为它们是对劳动力成本最敏感的产品。
Africa is now in a position where — depending on which state you’re looking at, and taking China as a reference point — the cost of labor is now between a half and one-tenth of what it is in China.
非洲现在的处境是：“取决于你所关注的是哪个国家，并以中国为参照点”，目前的劳动力成本是中国的一半到十分之一。
Factory labor is now around $600 a month at its cheapest.
现在工厂的劳动力最便宜的价格是每月 600 美元左右。
In a country like Ethiopia or Madagascar, it’s $60 or $65 a month.
在埃塞俄比亚或马达加斯加这样的国家，每月费用为 60 或 65 美元。
So, it’s a 10th of the cost, and that’s already beginning to have a bit of effect, often with Chinese firms moving production to Africa.
因此，成本只有十分之一，而且已经开始产生一些影响，通常是中国公司将生产转移到非洲。
So, I think there is a future for manufacturing.
所以，我认为制造业有未来。
It will depend on the extent to which African governments understand that you don’t really move forward fast for very long without manufacturing, that every developed country — apart from a few petro states and financial centers — has gone through a manufacturing phase of development.
这将取决于非洲各国政府在多大程度上了解，如果没有制造业，就不可能真正快速前进很长时间，每个发达国家——除了少数石油国家和金融中心——都经历了制造业的发展阶段。
It depends on the extent to which African governments engage with that, but some, without doubt, will.
这取决于非洲政府参与其中的程度，但毫无疑问，有些政府会参与其中。
The Ethiopians, for instance, have already attempted to do that.
例如，埃塞俄比亚人已经尝试这样做。
What they’re trying to do has been somewhat derailed by the two-year civil war that took place from 2020, but they’re back on it now, and they’re trying to move forward.
2020 年开始的两年内战在一定程度上阻碍了他们的努力，但他们现在又回到了正轨，并且正在努力向前迈进。
The idea that robotics and AI are going to change the story I personally do not buy, principally for two reasons.
我个人并不认同机器人技术和人工智能将改变这个故事的想法，主要有两个原因。
One is the cost reason, because whenever people talk about what’s happening with robotics, no one ever talks about the cost of robots.
一是成本原因，因为每当人们谈论机器人技术时，没有人谈论机器人的成本。
In garmenting, for instance, even a basic robot will cost you in excess of $100,000, and you pay the cost upfront, and you’ve then paid that, whether there’s demand for your products or not.
例如，在服装行业，即使是一个基本的机器人也会花费超过 100,000 美元，而且你需要预先支付费用，然后再付款，无论你的产品是否有需求。
Also, in garmenting and in textiles, robots don’t work very well because they can’t work with material very well.
此外，在服装和纺织品领域，机器人的工作效果不佳，因为它们不能很好地处理材料。
They’re much better at working with solid things.
他们更擅长处理实体事物。
So, you’ve spent $100,000 for a robot when you can go out in somewhere like Tana in Madagascar and get another skilled — because they’ve been doing it now for 20 years — garmenting employee for $60 or $65 to make the new order that you just got.
所以，你已经花了 10 万美元买了一个机器人，但你可以去马达加斯加的塔纳这样的地方聘请另一位技术人员 ——因为他们已经这样做了 20 年了—— 花 60 或 65 美元为员工提供服装来完成你刚刚收到的新订单。
And if the order doesn’t come through, you can sack them.
如果订单没有完成，你可以解雇他们。
You see what I’m saying?
你明白我在说什么吗？
There’s a point about the cost of robotics.
关于机器人技术的成本是有道理的。
But think of automation more generally — it’s not that expensive.
但更广泛地考虑一下自动化——它并没有那么昂贵。
Most countries are de-industrializing.
大多数国家正在去工业化。
Even South Africa has been de-industrializing for a while, and China maybe has peaked out at industrialization, measured in terms of employment.
就连南非也已经去工业化一段时间了，而从就业角度来看，中国的工业化或许已经达到顶峰。
It’s hard to trust their numbers.
很难相信他们的数字。
But maybe just everywhere is going to deindustrialize, and that will be very bad for Africa.
但也许所有地方都会去工业化，这对非洲来说非常糟糕。
I don’t think so.
我不这么认为。
I think South Africa is deindustrializing because the ANC has followed a hyper-liberal approach to economic policy.
我认为南非正在去工业化，因为非国大奉行超自由主义的经济政策。
I don’t think the ANC has ever really understood economic policy, frankly, so South Africa is an outlier in that respect.
坦率地说，我认为非国大从未真正理解过经济政策，因此南非在这方面是一个例外。
There are many other states in Africa, whether Nigeria or Ethiopia, which understand they’ve got to have a manufacturing future and intend to pursue one.
非洲还有许多其他国家，无论是尼日利亚还是埃塞俄比亚，都明白自己必须拥有制造业的未来，并打算追求这一未来。
Then, as I was saying, the other point is, what people miss is the flexibility with robotics and AI.
然后，正如我所说，另一点是，人们错过的是机器人和人工智能的灵活性。
There’s very limited flexibility with robotic and automated production.
机器人和自动化生产的灵活性非常有限。
When demand goes up, you can’t just stick in more robots, but when demand goes up in a people-operated factory, where the cost of labor is low, you can stick in more people and produce more.
当需求上升时，你不能仅仅投入更多的机器人，但是当人工运营的工厂（劳动力成本较低）的需求上升时，你可以投入更多的人员并生产更多的产品。
Just one example: during COVID, when everybody was having home deliveries of supermarket goods, the price of a UK firm called Ocado, which runs a supermarket, but was also developing the software and consulting around building blind warehouses went up through the roof, but now it’s down through the floor.
仅举一个例子：在新冠疫情期间，当每个人都可以将超市商品送货上门时，一家名为 Ocado 的英国公司（该公司经营一家超市，同时也在开发软件并提供有关建造盲仓库的咨询服务）的价格一路飙升，但现在却跌至谷底。
And only last week, Kroger supermarket in the US said, “We’re closing five of these super-modern blind warehouses.” And the reason, fundamentally, is because they lack the flexibility that human labor brings to the job.
就在上周，美国克罗格超市表示，“我们将关闭五个超现代化的盲目仓库。”从根本上来说，原因是它们缺乏人类劳动力为工作带来的灵活性。
So, I’m not saying that robots, automation, and AI are not important.
所以，我并不是说机器人、自动化和人工智能不重要。
They are important.
它们很重要。
What I am saying is that they are not going to derail a manufacturing future for a number of African countries that aggressively pursue it.
我想说的是，他们不会破坏一些积极追求制造业未来的非洲国家。
But there’re a lot of developing nations around the world — you could look at India, you could look at Pakistan, even Thailand — where manufacturing has not taken off the way one might have wanted.
但世界上有很多发展中国家 ——你可以看看印度，你可以看看巴基斯坦，甚至泰国—— 这些国家的制造业并没有按照人们希望的方式起飞。
There’re just major forces operating against it.
只有主要力量在反对它。
And in the US, manufacturing employment was once 37 percent of the workforce; now it’s 7 percent to 8 percent.
在美国，制造业就业一度占劳动力的 37%；现在是 7% 到 8%。
It just seems like it’s swimming upstream for Africa — which again, has quite expensive energy — to think it will do that well.
非洲——同样拥有相当昂贵的能源——认为它会做得很好，这似乎是在逆流而上。
And again, South Africa had very good technology, pretty high state capacity.
再说一次，南非拥有非常好的技术和相当高的国家能力。
I don’t see the alternate world state where a wiser ANC would have made that work.
我不认为一个更明智的非国大会在另一个世界国家中实现这一目标。
Well, oddly enough, before the end of Apartheid, the manufacturing performance of South Africa was really not bad at all, with classic industrial policy, quite high levels of protection, and so forth.
嗯，奇怪的是，在种族隔离结束之前，南非的制造业表现确实一点也不差，有经典的产业政策、相当高水平的保护等等。
I think that demand for manufactured goods will continue to be high around the world, and the labor cost will continue to be a prime determinant of where producers go for low value-added goods.
我认为，世界各地对制成品的需求将继续保持高位，而劳动力成本将继续成为生产商转向低附加值产品的主要决定因素。
So, I think that the opportunity is there for African countries.
所以，我认为非洲国家有机会。
But say there’re transportation costs internally, energy costs, political order uncertainty.
但假设存在内部运输成本、能源成本、政治秩序的不确定性。
Where’s the place where people really want to put all these manufacturing firms?
人们真正想要把所有这些制造企业放在哪里？
On energy costs — these have traditionally been very high in Africa because there has not been the investment in energy, but with the development of massively reduced cost for solar and wind, actually, things look quite good, and the development of geothermal as well.
关于能源成本——非洲传统上能源成本非常高，因为没有能源投资，但随着太阳能和风能的发展，成本大幅降低，实际上，情况看起来相当不错，地热的发展也是如此。
There’s no reason that I can see why African countries aren’t going to be able to produce very cheap electricity, which as you say, is a critical input for a manufacturing economy.
我没有理由不明白为什么非洲国家不能生产非常便宜的电力，正如你所说，电力是制造业经济的关键投入。
In fact, we’ve seen that in Ethiopia already.
事实上，我们已经在埃塞俄比亚看到了这一点。
Ethiopia has electricity at a fraction of the cost of other African countries because they set out with an aggressive industrial policy to make that happen.
埃塞俄比亚的电力成本只是其他非洲国家的一小部分，因为他们制定了积极的产业政策来实现这一目标。
A lot of it’s through hydro, because of course they are one of the great water towers of Africa, but also wind and solar are being built out as well, and geothermal.
其中很多是通过水力发电的，因为它们当然是非洲最大的水塔之一，但风能、太阳能和地热也在建设中。
So, I think that there’s no reason why Africa can’t get towards cheap industrial electricity.
因此，我认为非洲没有理由不能获得廉价的工业电力。
And in terms of road connections, an awful lot of road connections have been built.
在道路连接方面，已经修建了大量的道路连接。
Africa’s not great, but road density has been, actually, a significant success story, not only of the last 20 years, but of the last 50 years.
非洲的情况并不好，但道路密度实际上是一个重大的成功故事，不仅是过去 20 年，而且是过去 50 年。
If you go somewhere like Rwanda, you’re blown away by the quality of the roads.
如果您去卢旺达这样的地方，您会被这里的道路质量所震撼。
And of course, since 2013, Belt and Road, the Chinese have put in $150 billion.
当然，自2013年“一带一路”以来，中国已经投入了1500亿美元。
But a lot of that is for their mining, right?
但其中很多都是为了他们的采矿，对吧？
It doesn’t necessarily help diversification.
它不一定有助于多元化。
No, 80 percent of that has gone to roads and power and water and other utility stuff.
不，其中 80% 都用于道路、电力、水和其他公用事业。
On infrastructure
关于基础设施
There’s a long history of big infrastructure projects that are then not maintained very well.
大型基础设施项目由来已久，但一直没有得到很好的维护。
It’s also a problem with solar power, right?
这也是太阳能的问题，对吧？
The World Bank, in the past, has put a lot of money into different projects involving dams or water systems, and then over time, many of them just decay.
世界银行过去曾向涉及水坝或供水系统的不同项目投入大量资金，但随着时间的推移，其中许多项目都逐渐衰败。
Well, yes, but again, Tyler, this goes back to what I was saying about if you look at the government stuff, you can still be pretty miserable about Africa.
嗯，是的，但是泰勒，这又回到了我所说的，如果你看看政府的东西，你仍然会对非洲感到非常痛苦。
But what we’re seeing on the continent is a level of traction from the private sector that we haven’t seen before.
但我们在非洲大陆看到的是来自私营部门的前所未有的吸引力。
If you think about use of water, for instance, a big reason for the very good agricultural performance in the last 20 years, and for around cities — African farmers now getting up towards Asian yields — a big reason for that is farmer-led irrigation.
例如，如果你考虑一下水的使用，它是过去 20 年农业表现非常好的一个重要原因，而对于城市周边地区——“非洲农民现在正在向亚洲产量靠拢”——一个重要原因就是农民主导的灌溉。
You referred to state-led projects that have just failed, and there were loads.
你提到了刚刚失败的国家主导项目，而且有很多项目。
To be fair, they were not always just African government projects in the past.
公平地说，过去它们并不总是只是非洲政府的项目。
If you go back to the ’60s and the ’70s, often there would be UN projects, World Bank projects —
如果你回到 60 年代和 70 年代，通常会有联合国项目、世界银行项目 —
Sure.
当然。
— and they were misconceived, not least actually, in relation to demographics, because there were projects which actually needed more labor and bigger markets than were there.
——而且他们的想法是错误的，尤其是在人口统计方面，因为有些项目实际上需要比现有更多的劳动力和更大的市场。
And this is the reason that they fell into disuse very often.
这就是它们经常被废弃的原因。
But what you have now all over Africa, and there’s already three, four million hectares of irrigated land that’s been added in the last couple of decades.
但现在整个非洲已经有了三四百万公顷的灌溉土地，在过去的几十年里已经增加了。
And it’s been added by individual farmers who buy pumps and either dig boreholes themselves or get them dug by people who are providing that service.
它是由个体农民添加的，他们购买泵并自己挖井或让提供该服务的人挖井。
It’s this much more micro approach to building business — whether it’s agricultural business or otherwise — that’s what I think gives some cause for optimism.
正是这种更加微观的方式来开展业务 ——“无论是农业业务还是其他业务”—— 我认为这给了我们一些乐观的理由。
Djibouti aside, what do you think is the best run African port?
除了吉布提，您认为非洲运营最好的港口是哪个？
That I don’t have a good answer to because I didn’t look at the ports very closely, but if we’re talking the whole of Africa, the obvious answer would be the Tanger Med port that the Moroccans have —
我没有一个好的答案，因为我没有仔细观察港口，但如果我们谈论整个非洲，明显的答案将是摩洛哥人拥有的丹吉尔梅德港口 -
Well, but sub-Saharan — again, putting aside South Africa as a special case — the port seems to be another level of mess that if you’re exporting, you have to deal with a bad port system.
好吧，但是撒哈拉以南地区 ——再次，抛开南非这个特例不谈——港口似乎又是另一层混乱，如果你要出口，你就必须应对糟糕的港口系统。
If you’re in East Africa, there’re even a lot of property rights still up for grabs.
如果你在东非，甚至还有很多产权可供争夺。
There’s Somali land, there’s Somalia, there’s Ethiopia, there’s Eritrea — they want access to the sea.
有索马里的土地，有索马里，有埃塞俄比亚，有厄立特里亚——他们想要出海口。
There’s Ethiopia versus Egypt.
埃塞俄比亚对阵埃及。
There’s Rwanda involved in the Congo.
卢旺达参与了刚果。
That’s the place where you ought to have a really great port driving growth in the whole region, but it just seems it’s not coming anytime soon.
那里应该有一个真正伟大的港口来推动整个地区的增长，但它似乎不会很快到来。
Again, Djibouti does seem to have a fair degree of water because people put military bases there, but that’s the exception.
同样，吉布提似乎确实有相当多的水，因为人们在那里建立了军事基地，但这是例外。
I agree, but again, what I’ve read in World Bank reports suggests that situation is still bad, but better than it was 10 and 20 years ago.
我同意，但我在世界银行报告中读到的内容表明，情况仍然很糟糕，但比 10 和 20 年前要好。
Why is Benin doing so well now?
为什么贝宁现在表现这么好？
Well, some people say the leader, Talon, who’s got his hands around the developmental situation, and I think that that is quite possibly the story.
嗯，有人说领导者泰隆掌控着发展局势，我认为这很可能就是这个故事。
We are seeing some genuinely positive leadership in Africa, and Benin — yes.
我们在非洲和贝宁看到了一些真正积极的领导——是的。
there’s a sensible approach to agricultural development, the beginnings of an industrial policy, and just getting things done and delivering things.
有一种明智的农业发展方法、产业政策的开始以及把事情做好、交付成果。
But then, go back to Nigeria.
但然后，回到尼日利亚。
In Nigeria’s defense, I would say that anybody, really, who follows Nigeria has been fairly impressed by what Tinubu has managed to do there.
在尼日利亚的辩护中，我想说，任何关注尼日利亚的人都对蒂努布在那里所做的事情印象深刻。
The guy came in and ended a petrol subsidy that everyone said would never end because it was too politically difficult to do it.
那家伙进来终止了汽油补贴，每个人都说这项补贴永远不会结束，因为政治上很难做到这一点。
It cost $10 billion a year, which is a lot of money in Nigeria, and he did it.
每年花费100亿美元，这对尼日利亚来说是一笔巨款，而他做到了。
He came in and he ended it, and there was no serious violence around that.
他进来并结束了这一切，周围没有发生严重的暴力事件。
On progress in education
论教育进步
In sub-Saharan Africa, which do you think are the two or three countries doing the best job on human capital?
在撒哈拉以南非洲，您认为哪两三个国家在人力资本方面做得最好？
Well, in West Africa, if we’re just looking here at the statistics about people graduating at different levels of education, of course, Ghana and Nigeria always did pretty well, always accounted for a high proportion of Africa’s university graduates.
那么，在西非，如果我们只看不同教育层次毕业生的统计数据，当然，加纳和尼日利亚一直表现得很好，一直在非洲大学毕业生中占据很高的比例。
In East Africa, I don’t think that Kenya does badly in terms of the human capital.
在东非，我认为肯尼亚在人力资本方面做得还不错。
It turns out very well-educated and entrepreneurial people.
事实证明，这些人受过良好教育，很有创业精神。
Again, the problem is the politics.
再说一次，问题是政治。
Ethiopia — big investment in vocational education that’s made a significant difference.
埃塞俄比亚 ——对职业教育的巨额投资产生了重大影响。
Rwanda similarly has made a significant investment in vocational education.
卢旺达同样对职业教育进行了大量投资。
There’re a lot of stories around that are really not too bad.
周围有很多故事，其实都还不错。
I also think that we have to be fair to Africa and remind ourselves that back in 1960 — proximate start of the independence era — Africa had the least educated population in the world by a long, long way.
我还认为，我们必须公平对待非洲，并提醒自己，早在 1960 年（独立时代即将开始），非洲就拥有世界上受教育程度最低的人口。
In 1960, literacy in Africa was 16 percent, one in six.
1960 年，非洲的识字率为 16%，即六分之一。
And according to a World Bank report that came out in the ’80s, they rolled out across Africa the fastest developed formal education system that the world has ever seen.
根据世界银行 80 年代发布的一份报告，他们在非洲推出了世界上发展最快的正规教育体系。
In some measures, education performance in Africa now exceeds South Asia, which is pretty remarkable, given that South Asia was very far ahead in 1960.
从某些指标来看，非洲的教育绩效现在超过了南亚，考虑到 1960 年南亚遥遥领先，这一点相当引人注目。
So, I don’t think that it’s fair to criticize Africa too aggressively on its education performance.
因此，我认为过于激进地批评非洲的教育表现是不公平的。
Governments around the continent have taken education very seriously.
非洲大陆各国政府都非常重视教育。
A classic was, again, Tanzania, right?
坦桑尼亚又是一个经典，对吧？
We can talk about how terrible the politics are in Tanzania, but Nyerere’s government increased literacy from just over 10 percent to 80 percent in one generation, and that was a huge mobilization of resources to achieve that.
我们可以谈论坦桑尼亚的政治有多么糟糕，但尼雷尔政府在一代人的时间里将识字率从刚刚超过 10% 提高到了 80%，为了实现这一目标，需要调动大量资源。
That’s another thing that African governments had to do that Asian governments didn’t have to do after independence.
这是非洲政府必须做而亚洲政府在独立后不必做的另一件事。
Asian governments didn’t have to worry about having an illiterate and innumerate population.
亚洲政府不必担心人口文盲和数不清的问题。
The comparison with South Asia — I think I see that differently.
与南亚的比较 —— 我想我的看法有所不同。
India has high variance, but at the upper end, the IITs are amazing, right?
印度的差异很大，但在高端，个人所得税是惊人的，对吧？
If you come out of a good IIT, your life is set.
如果你获得了良好的个人所得税，你的生活就已经确定了。
You’ll earn a lot of money.
你会赚很多钱。
You’ll be highly productive.
你的工作效率将会非常高。
You could get employment in the UK or the US.
您可以在英国或美国找到工作。
Africa doesn’t seem to have anything like that, not sub-Saharan Africa.
非洲似乎没有这样的东西，撒哈拉以南非洲地区就没有。
Or Sri Lanka, which is quite literate, well educated.
或者是斯里兰卡，那里文化程度很高，受过良好的教育。
It’s hard to find a sub-Saharan country that’s at all like Sri Lanka on educational indicators.
很难找到一个在教育指标上与斯里兰卡相媲美的撒哈拉以南非洲国家。
Rural Pakistan, clearly, might be worse than much of Africa, but isn’t South Asia just making much bigger strides?
显然，巴基斯坦农村地区的情况可能比非洲大部分地区更糟糕，但南亚不是正在取得更大的进步吗？
I don’t think so in the sense that I wouldn’t point to the IITs in India as evidence of the strength of India’s education system.
我不这么认为，因为我不会将印度的个人所得税作为印度教育体系实力的证据。
I agree the people who come out of the IITs are fantastic, but there are only 30,000 people in the IITs.
我同意印度理工学院出来的人都很棒，但印度理工学院只有三万人。
They’re just numerically inconsequential.
它们只是在数字上无关紧要。
But how much output they produce is what matters, right?
但他们产生多少产出才是重要的，对吗？
And it’s evidence that there’re feeder systems.
这也是存在供给系统的证据。
If you can produce some number of very, very, very good people, your feeder systems must also be doing pretty well, at least some of them.
如果你能培养出一定数量的非常非常优秀的人才，那么你的供给系统也一定做得很好，至少是其中一些。
Yes, but there’s also a question of timing.
是的，但还有一个时间问题。
I think that the point that you make about very high performing institutions in Africa begins to become more relevant now.
我认为您关于非洲表现出色的机构的观点现在开始变得更加重要。
The order of priorities in Africa after 1960 was to get the population literate and numerate, and that’s where resources went.
1960 年后非洲的首要任务是让人们识字和算数，这就是资源的去向。
Now there’s a change.
现在有变化了。
Yes, Africa, going forward, needs really elite universities.
是的，非洲的未来需要真正的精英大学。
There’s the beginning of efforts to create that in Rwanda, where there’re a couple of US universities that have gotten involved in the random tertiary education system.
卢旺达已经开始努力创造这一点，那里有几所美国大学已经参与了随机高等教育体系。
I hear what you say, but I think that’s a problem for Africa going forward and not a problem around which we should judge Africa today.
我听到你说的话，但我认为这是非洲未来发展的问题，而不是我们今天评判非洲的问题。
On progress in public health
关于公共卫生方面的进展
We agree that disease burden is very important.
我们同意疾病负担非常重要。
Which do you think are a few countries making the most progress on that?
您认为哪些国家在这方面取得了最大进展？
Well, again, I’d say that there’s been huge progress continent-wide, partly because outside institutions like the WHO or the Gates Foundation have operated in multiple states, but partly also because African states themselves have made it a high priority.
好吧，我再说一遍，整个非洲大陆都取得了巨大进展，部分原因是世界卫生组织或盖茨基金会等外部机构在多个国家开展业务，部分原因是非洲国家本身已将其列为高度优先事项。
The performance in terms of the reduction of deaths of under-fives, for instance, which is a fairly critical measure when you look at demographics — I don’t know where in the world beats Africa in terms of what’s been done over the last 50 years.
例如，在减少五岁以下儿童死亡方面的表现，当你考虑人口统计数据时，这是一个相当关键的衡量标准——我不知道世界上哪个地方在过去 50 年所做的事情上击败了非洲。
But say, predictively, the places that have cut disease burden down the most should do better first, right?
但可以预见的是，那些疾病负担减轻最多的地方应该首先做得更好，对吗？
There’s an implied prediction.
有一个隐含的预测。
Which particular places do you think those are?
您认为这些地方具体是哪些？
I haven’t looked in sufficient detail, country by country, to be able to say where.
我还没有对每个国家进行足够的详细研究，无法说出具体在哪里。
I would say that in Central Africa, Rwanda’s done very well on health.
我想说，在中部非洲，卢旺达在卫生方面做得非常好。
I’d say that Ethiopia has done very well on health, but I do think that it’s just a generally positive story across the continent of what has been done in terms of reducing this horrific disease burden that really has dominated African history.
我想说埃塞俄比亚在健康方面做得非常好，但我确实认为这只是整个非洲大陆在减少这种真正主导非洲历史的可怕疾病负担方面所做的努力的一个总体积极的故事。
Bruce Sacerdote of Dartmouth — he has a famous article where he argues — or some would say shows — that the longer a country has been colonized for, the better it’s likely to be doing.
达特茅斯的布鲁斯·萨克多特（Bruce Sacerdote）——他有一篇著名的文章，他认为——或者有些人会说这表明——一个国家被殖民的时间越长，它可能会做得越好。
Do you agree with that result?
你同意这个结果吗？
And do you think it’s true for Africa?
您认为非洲也是如此吗？
I think that you can find cases that bear that out, but I’m not sure that it’s a great rule of thumb when you’re just looking at duration rather than also how colonialism operated, what it did.
我认为你可以找到证明这一点的案例，但当你只关注持续时间而不是殖民主义如何运作、做了什么时，我不确定这是一个很好的经验法则。
When you look at the qualitative difference, for instance, between French colonialism in West Africa and Japanese colonialism in Taiwan, it’s not just about duration.
例如，当你观察法国在西非的殖民主义和日本在台湾的殖民主义之间的质的差异时，你会发现这不仅仅是持续时间的问题。
I don’t have a great answer to that question.
对于这个问题我没有很好的答案。
And most colonial stories in Africa were pretty short and fairly similarly short, right?
大多数非洲殖民故事都很短，而且相当短，对吧？
Because most colonization happens in the 1880s, and most colonization is over in the 1960s.
因为大多数殖民化发生在 1880 年代，而大多数殖民化在 1960 年代结束。
On foreign investment and special economic zones
关于外国投资和经济特区
Do you think the UAE will become a major financial center for much of Africa?
您认为阿联酋会成为非洲大部分地区的主要金融中心吗？
Very possibly, and I think it’s already happening to a significant extent.
很有可能，而且我认为这种情况已经在很大程度上发生了。
There’ll be Mauritius trying to compete as an offshore center, but certainly, when you get up to the Horn of Africa, UAE is already the preferred destination.
毛里求斯将试图作为离岸中心进行竞争，但当然，当你到达非洲之角时，阿联酋已经是首选目的地。
Let’s say you’re running a hedge fund, and you’re investing some number of billions of dollars.
假设您经营着一家对冲基金，并且投资了数十亿美元。
Would you be more likely to invest in East or West Africa, if you had to say?
如果一定要说的话，您更愿意投资东非还是西非？
I like the look of both for different reasons.
我出于不同的原因喜欢两者的外观。
Certainly, Nigeria tops out in terms of venture capital money coming into Africa at the moment, but when you’ve got a country like Ethiopia with 150 million people, that’s an attractive market if you develop a business that works.
当然，就目前进入非洲的风险投资而言，尼日利亚名列前茅，但当你拥有像埃塞俄比亚这样拥有 1.5 亿人口的国家时，如果你开发一项可行的业务，那么这就是一个有吸引力的市场。
So, I think that it won’t necessarily be about east or west going forward.
所以，我认为未来不一定是东方或西方。
I think that early entrants — whether they’re hedge funds or whether they are multinational companies — they’ll think first about the most populous countries on the continent.
我认为早期进入者——“无论是对冲基金还是跨国公司”——他们都会首先考虑非洲大陆人口最多的国家。
So, they will think about Nigeria and Ethiopia and then go down the list from there.
因此，他们会考虑尼日利亚和埃塞俄比亚，然后从那里开始考虑。
I think that there’ll also be differentiation based on regions, based on what’s grown in agriculture, what’s manufactured, and so forth.
我认为也会根据地区、农业种植的内容、制造的内容等而存在差异。
Should Africa have more special economic zones, say the way that Dominican Republic has?
非洲是否应该像多米尼加共和国那样建立更多的经济特区？
Well, Africa’s already had a good number of special economic zones, and they haven’t worked well, but the seven that the Chinese have opened seem to have worked better.
非洲已经有很多经济特区了，但效果不佳，但中国开设的七个经济特区似乎效果更好。
So, I think the jury is out on that question.
所以，我认为陪审团对这个问题还没有定论。
Down the road, yes, Africa will need more zones, but there’s no point in opening investment zones unless they get the political attention that is going to make them successful.
是的，未来非洲将需要更多的投资区，但开放投资区是没有意义的，除非它们得到了政治上的关注，从而取得了成功。
But don’t they just need a bit to be left alone?
但他们难道不只是需要一点独处吗？
I mean, Tatu City in Kenya is going pretty well, and the government hasn’t wrecked it, and there’s a lot of energy behind it and some capital.
我的意思是，肯尼亚的塔图市进展得很好，政府没有破坏它，而且它背后有很大的能量和一些资本。
Isn’t that likely to succeed?
这不是很可能成功吗？
It is if there’s a clear demand there to begin with and private-sector actors who are going to make it work.
问题在于是否有明确的需求以及能够使其发挥作用的私营部门参与者。
In that case, yes, the zone should always be left alone.
在这种情况下，是的，该区域应该始终保持独立。
For instance, outside Addis Ababa, there’s a successful Chinese-managed and Chinese-owned investment zone, and it does absolutely fine.
例如，在亚的斯亚贝巴郊外，有一个由中国人管理、中国人拥有的成功投资区，而且做得非常好。
So, that type of investment zone, I think, yes, just let people get on with it and leave them alone.
所以，我认为，这种类型的投资区，是的，只要让人们继续下去，别管他们。
I was thinking more of state-led investment zones where there’d been many failures, and that’s where African governments need to be more careful, more thoughtful, and more clearly committed when they open a zone, to making sure that it works.
我更多地想到了国家主导的投资区，这些投资区经历了很多失败，这就是非洲各国政府在开放投资区时需要更加谨慎、更加深思熟虑、更加明确承诺的地方，以确保其发挥作用。
Should Africa experiment with charter cities?
非洲应该尝试特许城市吗？
With charter cities?
有特许城市吗？
Charter cities, right.
特许城市，对。
It’s like a special economic zone, except more radical.
这就像一个经济特区，只不过更加激进。
There’s some actual surrender of sovereignty.
确实有一些主权的放弃。
Like Hong Kong was a charter city of the British Empire.
就像香港是大英帝国的特许城市一样。
Obviously, they did very well.
显然，他们做得很好。
I think that Africa should and probably will experiment with all sorts of things.
我认为非洲应该而且可能会尝试各种各样的事情。
I wouldn’t offer it as a prescription, but if there’s a government that’s thinking, right, let’s try this, good luck to them.
我不会将其作为处方提供，但如果有政府正在思考，对吧，让我们尝试一下，祝他们好运。
It’s not impossible.
这并非不可能。
It’s not impossible that it will work just as Hong Kong works for colonial Britain.
它并非不可能像香港为英国殖民地服务一样发挥作用。
On the permanency of African borders
关于非洲边界的永久性
How permanent do you think are the current borders of Africa, say over the next 30, 40 years?
您认为非洲目前的边界有多永久，比如在未来 30、40 年？
Not 500 years out, but the foreseeable future.
不是500年后，而是可预见的未来。
I think, Tyler, that we will continue to see the form that we’ve seen since independence in Africa.
泰勒，我认为我们将继续看到非洲独立以来所看到的形式。
I’m sure you’re aware that the African Union, really, since inception, has operated to head off any changes in borders in Africa.
我相信你知道，非洲联盟自成立以来，实际上一直在努力阻止非洲边界的任何变化。
That is really because the leading politicians have always taken the view that if you let African borders change once in one state, you open the door to absolute mayhem in this ethnically very diverse continent.
这实际上是因为主要政治家一直认为，如果你让非洲某个国家的边界发生一次改变，你就会为这个种族非常多元化的大陆带来绝对混乱之门。
So, there is very built-in, hardwired AU opposition to any change in borders, and you get classic cases where no one will even talk about it.
因此，非盟对边界的任何改变都有非常内在的、根深蒂固的反对，而且你会遇到甚至没有人会谈论它的经典案例。
For instance, the Somalis, where Somalis are split between Ethiopia, northeast Kenya, British Somaliland, and is it French and then Italian Somaliland?
例如，索马里人，索马里人分为埃塞俄比亚、肯尼亚东北部、英属索马里兰，是法属索马里兰还是意属索马里兰？
I can’t even remember that.
我什至不记得了。
It’s a five-way split.
这是一个五路分割。
They went to the AU back in the ’60s and have done it subsequently, said, “This is ridiculous.
他们在 60 年代就去了非盟，随后就这么做了，他们说：“这太荒谬了。
We’re all Somalis.
我们都是索马里人。
Why are we living in five different countries?” And the AU won’t touch it.
为什么我们生活在五个不同的国家？”非盟不会碰它。
As I say, that is because the received opinion of the senior leaders in the AU has been, if you start changing borders in Africa, you’ll never stop it.
正如我所说，这是因为非盟高级领导人的普遍看法是，如果你开始改变非洲的边界，你将永远无法阻止它。
I suspect that will remain the case going forward because the fear is there.
我怀疑未来的情况仍将如此，因为恐惧依然存在。
Really, the only case of a border change that you have in Africa since the Second World War is when Eritrea split from Ethiopia, and that was the result of a referendum that was 99 percent.
事实上，自第二次世界大战以来，非洲唯一一次边界变化是厄立特里亚从埃塞俄比亚分裂出来，这是 99% 的全民公投的结果。
But as we’re taping in late January, 2026, it at least seems as if the US and France will recognize Somaliland, and the UAE.
但正如我们在 2026 年 1 月下旬录制的那样，美国和法国至少看起来会承认索马里兰和阿联酋。
And Israel already has.
以色列已经这样做了。
Israel probably wouldn’t do that on its own without assurances.
如果没有保证，以色列可能不会自己这样做。
So that will be a border change.
所以这将是一个边界变化。
Doesn’t that, in fact, predict mayhem under your theory?
事实上，根据你的理论，这难道不是预示着混乱吗？
Which is, in fact, my expectation, I’m sorry to say.
很遗憾地说，这实际上是我的期望。
Well, I think the AU will continue to resist and resist and not recognize this.
嗯，我认为非盟将继续抵制和抵制，并且不承认这一点。
The EU you think won’t recognize it?
你认为欧盟不会承认吗？
No, no, the AU.
不，不，非盟。
Oh, AU.
哦，非盟。
But does that matter if the US and France and the UAE have recognized it?
但如果美国、法国和阿联酋都承认了，那还重要吗？
Isn’t that just what matters?
这难道不是最重要的吗？
It may not matter in practice for the outside world, but it matters in practice for Africa, so the AU will retain its position.
这对于外界来说可能并不重要，但对于非洲来说却很重要，因此非盟将保留其立场。
It’s a bit like Morocco and Western Sahara.
这有点像摩洛哥和西撒哈拉。
The AU still says that there are 55 states in Africa because it still counts Western Sahara as a state, even though the US is now in favor of that being turned over to Morocco.
非盟仍然称非洲有55个国家，因为它仍然将西撒哈拉视为一个国家，尽管美国现在赞成将西撒哈拉移交给摩洛哥。
Now, your recent book is on Africa, I’ll just hold this up again, How Africa Works.
现在，你最近写的书是关于非洲的，我再继续讲一下，《非洲是如何运作的》。
I don’t agree with everything in it, but I do really think it’s an excellent, well-researched, extremely well-written book.
我并不同意其中的所有内容，但我确实认为这是一本出色的、经过深入研究、写得非常好的书。
I’ll recommend it again to everyone.
我会再次向大家推荐它。
But I also have some questions for you about Asia, if you’re game.
但如果你感兴趣的话，我还有一些关于亚洲的问题想问你。
Yes, yes.
是的，是的。
On how Asia’s working
关于亚洲的运作方式
What has gone wrong in Thailand?
泰国到底出了什么问题？
The 1990s — it looked so good.
20 世纪 90 年代——看起来真好。
Foreign investment fell off.
外资下降。
They’re going to lose manufacturing to China, it seems.
看来他们的制造业将被中国夺走。
There’s a lot of stagnation.
有很多停滞。
Politics hasn’t gone so well.
政治进展不太顺利。
They were a relatively wealthy country for their region.
对于他们所在的地区来说，他们是一个相对富裕的国家。
Why didn’t that go better?
为什么事情没有进展得更好？
Well, it hasn’t gone so badly.
好吧，事情还没有那么糟糕。
Thailand’s always had a pretty strong currency, partly as a result of tourism being a great big part of the economy.
泰国的货币一直相当坚挺，部分原因是旅游业是其经济的重要组成部分。
The manufacturing has hardly been hollowed out, and the politics has always been a total mess.
制造业几乎没有空心化，政治也始终一团糟。
I don’t think the politics has become any worse, and the position of the monarchy — it’s always been a disaster.
我不认为政治变得更糟，而君主政体的地位——一直都是一场灾难。
But Thailand has always functioned fine despite all of that.
但尽管如此，泰国始终运转良好。
So, to me, Thailand doesn’t look like a big mess relative to what I’ve seen in the past at all.
所以，对我来说，与我过去看到的相比，泰国看起来一点也不乱。
I suspect that they will carry on with this very messy politics that they have until at some point the relationship between the monarchy and politics is confronted.
我怀疑他们会继续这种非常混乱的政治，直到有一天君主政体与政治之间的关系面临挑战。
But that’s an almost revolutionary thing to contemplate in terms of Thailand.
但对于泰国来说，这几乎是一件革命性的事情。
I’m sure you’re familiar with South Korean birth rates.
我相信你对韩国的出生率很熟悉。
What do you think is actually going to happen there over time?
您认为随着时间的推移，那里实际上会发生什么？
The country just disappears?
国家就这么消失了？
Or it becomes filled with immigrants, possibly from Africa?
或者它变得充满了移民，可能来自非洲？
Or they somehow manage massive birth subsidies which work?
或者他们以某种方式管理巨额生育补贴，这有效吗？
Those all seem quite improbable to me, but I’m not sure what I’m left with.
这些对我来说似乎都是不可能的，但我不确定我还剩下什么。
Yes.
是的。
it’s certainly very interesting.
这当然很有趣。
Of course, China has a very low birth rate.
当然，中国的出生率很低。
A little bit higher than Korea, but still very low.
比韩国高一点，但仍然很低。
One observation I would make is that China actually is a much more cosmopolitan society than either Korea or Japan, so having a falling population is more difficult for Korea and Japan because the populations don’t want foreigners coming in to do the jobs.
我想说的一个观察是，中国实际上是一个比韩国或日本更加国际化的社会，因此人口下降对韩国和日本来说更加困难，因为人们不希望外国人进来从事这些工作。
They don’t want those Africans coming in to do the jobs.
他们不希望那些非洲人进来做这些工作。
So, what else are you going to do?
那么，你还打算做什么？
Well, you’re going to offer them these great big subsidies, but there’s a very poor record for offering all kinds of subsidies in all kinds of countries around the world to try and get people to have kids when they don’t want to.
好吧，你将为他们提供这些巨大的补贴，但是世界各地的各个国家都在提供各种补贴以试图让人们在他们不愿意的情况下生孩子方面的记录非常糟糕。
So, I don’t know.
所以，我不知道。
The only forecast I have is that the problem will have to become significantly more acute than it is now before they begin to talk about it seriously.
我唯一的预测是，在他们开始认真讨论这个问题之前，这个问题将变得比现在更加严重。
But it can be too late, right?
但可能为时已晚，对吗？
Peter Thiel has this notion that you get stuck in a trap.
彼得·蒂尔（Peter Thiel）有这样一种观念：你会陷入陷阱。
Once your economy starts shrinking, it’s harder to do something about it because you have fewer resources, even if your per capita numbers are fine.
一旦你的经济开始萎缩，即使你的人均数字还不错，你也很难采取行动，因为你的资源更少。
Yes, well, maybe they’re relying on the robotics and AI that we were talking about.
是的，好吧，也许他们依赖我们正在谈论的机器人和人工智能。
Do you not feel confident about robotics and AI solving the Korean depopulation problem?
您对机器人和人工智能解决韩国人口减少问题没有信心吗？
Well, it may solve their production problem, but it doesn’t solve the problem of no one being around to enjoy it, right?
嗯，可能解决了他们的生产问题，但是并没有解决没有人享受的问题，对吧？
That’s still there.
那还在那里。
Now, Japan, as you know, depending how you measure it, has debt to GDP ratios of something between 200 to 230 percent.
现在，如你所知，日本的债务与 GDP 之比在 200% 到 230% 之间，具体取决于你如何衡量。
How will they get out of that mess?
他们将如何摆脱困境？
They have a higher birth rate, but it’s not that high, right?
他们的出生率较高，但也没有那么高，对吧？
It’s like 1.3.
好像是1.3。
Yes.
是的。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
The same way that Britain got out of the same level of debt after the Napoleonic Wars with inflation?
就像英国在拿破仑战争后因通货膨胀而摆脱相同水平的债务一样吗？
But when they inflate, their interest rate goes up, and their future borrowing costs rise.
但当它们通货膨胀时，利率就会上升，未来的借贷成本就会上升。
Can they even get traction that way?
他们还能通过这种方式获得吸引力吗？
Well, I don’t know, but I know that there are people who think that they can.
好吧，我不知道，但我知道有人认为他们可以。
I don’t know what the answer is.
我不知道答案是什么。
Not crazy inflation, but just a bit of steady inflation.
不是疯狂的通货膨胀，只是有点稳定的通货膨胀。
I’d have to go back and look at what happened in the UK after the Napoleonic Wars in order to understand how it was.
我必须回去看看拿破仑战争后英国发生的事情才能了解情况。
But I do remember that it was largely inflation that solved the problem.
但我确实记得解决这个问题的很大程度上是通货膨胀。
But UK — well, Britain, we’d have to call it at that time — had fantastic demographics, especially early to mid-19th century, and East Asia doesn’t.
但英国——好吧，我们当时不得不这么称呼它——拥有惊人的人口统计数据，尤其是在 19 世纪早期到中期，而东亚则不然。
Should we just way downgrade our estimate of East Asian futures?
我们是否应该下调对东亚期货的预期？
Is there a positive scenario for any of the main countries?
主要国家是否有积极的前景？
Yes, I think it certainly looks difficult.
是的，我认为这看起来确实很困难。
I tend to not get much further when I think about this than being profoundly amused by the fact that we have spent the last 250 years being obsessed with the Malthusian view of the world and believing that we’re going to breed ourselves into a disaster.
当我想到这个问题时，我往往会为这样一个事实感到深深的好笑：在过去的 250 年里，我们一直痴迷于马尔萨斯的世界观，并相信我们将让自己陷入一场灾难。
And of course, at the end of the day, there never was a Malthusian risk, at least in practical terms, but depopulation is way more serious than population growth ever was, I think.
当然，归根结底，至少在实践中，从来不存在马尔萨斯风险，但我认为，人口减少比人口增长要严重得多。
On the success of industrial policy
论产业政策的成功
For the world as a whole, how well do you feel industrial policy has worked?
对于整个世界来说，您认为产业政策的效果如何？
Oh, it’s worked extremely well, and it’s been refined well over a century.
哦，它的效果非常好，而且已经经过一个多世纪的改进。
Yes, the whole approach of targeting cheap money at manufacturing, putting some protection in place, rewarding exporters of manufactured goods — it’s created jobs, it’s raised the technological level at which the economy operates, and there’s really no substitute for it because, as has been shown, manufacturing is the only bit of the economy that really delivers the convergence that we’re supposed to get across the whole economy and the sort of orthodox view of life.
是的，将廉价资金瞄准制造业、采取一定的保护措施、奖励制成品出口商的整个方法——它创造了就业机会，提高了经济运行的技术水平，而且确实没有替代品，因为正如已经表明的那样，制造业是经济中唯一真正实现我们应该实现整个经济和正统生活观融合的部分。
So, I think that industrial policy has done very well.
所以我认为产业政策做得很好。
The problem is, of course, getting away from it then proves extremely difficult.
当然，问题是要摆脱它是极其困难的。
Not only getting away from industrial policy, but getting away from the trade surpluses that it tends to produce.
不仅摆脱产业政策，而且摆脱它往往产生的贸易顺差。
Whether it’s Japan or Germany, or now China, the countries that have run the most effective industrial policy become a problem for the whole of the rest of the world.
无论是日本、德国，还是现在的中国，那些实施最有效产业政策的国家都成为了全世界其他国家的问题。
But as a means to develop your economy, as a means to raise your people up, I think it’s had a very good performance.
但作为发展经济、提高人民素质的一种手段，我认为它的表现非常好。
But say you’re Brazil.
但假设你是巴西。
Brazil seems to have underperformed for almost 50 years, and they do plenty of industrial policy, and they have actual scale.
巴西近50年来似乎表现不佳，他们做了很多产业政策，而且有实际规模。
It’s now considered happy news that this year they might grow at 2 percent.
今年的增长率可能达到 2%，现在被认为是个好消息。
Hasn’t it just failed in Brazil, in addition to Mexico and many other places?
不是刚刚在巴西、墨西哥和其他许多地方都失败了吗？
I don’t know Brazil terribly well.
我不太了解巴西。
The first thing I’d say about Brazil is that it’s underperformed for the last 200 years, not just the last 50.
关于巴西，我首先要说的是，它在过去 200 年中表现不佳，而不仅仅是过去 50 年。
And the country is just a mess in terms of development.
而这个国家的发展却一团糟。
If you look at the agriculture sector, the dominance of scale agriculture, the appalling way in which smallholder agriculture is treated, and how it’s undervalued.
如果你看看农业部门，就会发现规模农业的主导地位、小农农业受到的令人震惊的对待方式以及它的价值是如何被低估的。
If I knew more about industrial policy in Brazil, I think what I would be saying is that it’s been ineffectively applied, patchily applied, not applied consistently over a long enough period.
如果我更多地了解巴西的产业政策，我想我想说的是，它的实施效率低下，实施不完整，并且在足够长的时间内没有一致地实施。
And sure enough, a large part of it is a total failure, but at the same time, you can point to bits that are clearly a success, and the obvious one that everyone always points to is Embraer.
果然，其中很大一部分是彻底失败，但与此同时，你可以指出明显成功的部分，而每个人总是指出的最明显的就是巴西航空工业公司。
Or take India, now the world’s most populous country.
或者以印度为例，它现在是世界上人口最多的国家。
They had plenty of industrial policy — mostly a failure, right?
他们有很多产业政策——但大多都是失败的，对吧？
Why be so convinced industrial policy, on average, is a good thing?
为什么如此确信产业政策总体来说是一件好事？
It works maybe when there’s very high human capital, which would be East Asia, and the rest of the world, it seems to me, to underperform.
当人力资本非常高时（在我看来，东亚和世界其他地区表现不佳），它也许会起作用。
No, I think it failed in India because people like Mahalanobis after the Second World War were just absolutely clueless, and India just never ran any kind of effective industrial policy.
不，我认为它在印度失败了，因为像第二次世界大战后的马哈拉诺比斯这样的人完全无知，而且印度从未实行过任何有效的产业政策。
They didn’t understand that competition is fundamental to effective industrial policy.
他们不明白竞争是有效产业政策的基础。
They thought it was much more organizational and you pick your winners, and you don’t subject them to competition.
他们认为这更有组织性，你可以选择你的获胜者，并且你不会让他们参与竞争。
So, I think there are pretty straightforward reasons why industrial policy didn’t work in India.
因此，我认为产业政策在印度不起作用的原因非常简单。
How much of economic growth do you think is just explained ethnically?
您认为经济增长有多少是由种族因素造成的？
So, the Chinese do well virtually everywhere.
所以，中国人几乎在任何地方都表现得很好。
Hong Kong didn’t have industrial policy.
香港没有产业政策。
It became rich just like the Chinese-based economies that did.
它就像中国的经济体一样变得富有。
Well, actually, I’d say that, to an extent that Hong Kong did have industrial policy inasmuch as, while Hong Kong was always very free in external trade, the domestic economy was a kind of colonial stitch up and there were some two of everything.
嗯，实际上，我想说的是，在某种程度上，香港确实有产业政策，因为虽然香港的对外贸易一直非常自由，但国内经济是一种殖民缝合，而且什么都有。
Two supermarket operators, one firm running the airport, the other firm running the airlines, and so on.
两家超市运营商，一家公司经营机场，另一家公司经营航空公司，等等。
And also, of course, when the textiles trade arrived in Hong Kong after ’49, it was already highly efficient.
当然，当纺织品贸易在49年后到达香港时，效率已经很高了。
It had gone through a very long period of development in Shanghai, so it wasn’t like it was beginning with zero knowledge.
它在上海经历了很长一段时间的发展，所以并不是从零开始的。
But as to how much is ethnic .
但至于有多少是种族的。
.
。
.
。
Ethnicity often embodies certain education backgrounds.
种族往往体现出一定的教育背景。
Some ethnicities have got to a point where they’re better off than others, so I think it’s easy to confuse what might be ethnic with what is just something reflected in that particular group of people for reasons other than ethnicity.
有些种族已经达到了比其他种族更好的地步，所以我认为很容易将可能属于种族的东西与由于种族以外的原因反映在特定人群中的东西混淆。
There’s the famous Comin/Gong/Easterly paper that shows per capita income in the year 1000 BC predicts per capita income today surprisingly well.
有一篇著名的 Comin/Gong/Easterly 论文显示，公元前 1000 年的人均收入对今天的人均收入的预测出奇地好。
So, maybe culture is just super persistent.
所以，也许文化就是超级持久的。
Ethnicity is one of the things that carries it, and a lot of development economics is maybe spinning its wheels.
种族是承载它的因素之一，而许多发展经济学可能只是在白费力气。
I’d like to think that’s not true, but I’ve never found a flaw in their paper.
我想这不是真的，但我从未在他们的论文中发现任何缺陷。
For me, policy makes a difference, and wherever I’ve looked in the world, I’ve seen clear evidence of policy making a difference.
对我来说，政策会带来改变，无论我走到世界的哪个地方，我都看到了政策带来改变的明显证据。
Oh, that’s true for sure.
哦，这确实是真的。
But it could be something like ethnicity carries good policy, right?
但这可能是种族带来了好的政策，对吧？
It could be, but for me, there’s so much noise in the data that I personally just find it hard to maintain credible attention.
可能是这样，但对我来说，数据中存在太多噪音，我个人发现很难保持可信的关注。
What’s so interesting to you about Central Italy?
意大利中部有什么让您如此感兴趣？
There’s nothing particularly interesting other than that, I suppose, it was an area where there was a bit of land reform, an area where industry took off in rural areas.
我想，除此之外没有什么特别有趣的地方，这是一个进行了一些土地改革的地区，一个工业在农村地区起飞的地区。
So, there’s stuff to be seen there, which is not what the tourists normally looks for.
所以，那里有可看的东西，这不是游客通常寻找的东西。
And you’ve lived there, right?
你也住在那里，对吗？
Yes, but I really lived in Italy for 10 years just because it was a relatively cheap place to live.
是的，但我确实在意大利住了 10 年，只是因为那里的生活成本相对便宜。
COWEN: And this was Perugia or where?
COWEN：这是佩鲁贾还是哪里？
Yes, near Perugia because it was a relatively cheap place to live.
是的，靠近佩鲁贾，因为这是一个相对便宜的居住地。
Before my last question, just to recap, Joe’s two books, How Asia Works and How Africa Works are essential reading.
在我提出最后一个问题之前，回顾一下乔的两本书，《亚洲如何运作》和《非洲如何运作》是必读的书。
His earlier books are interesting as well, on Southeast Asia and finance.
他早期关于东南亚和金融的书籍也很有趣。
Final question — what will you do next?
最后一个问题 — 你接下来要做什么？
I’m not sure what I’ll do next.
我不确定接下来要做什么。
I’m thinking about a developmental history of the UK because I’ve never written about my own country, and I think there are a number of things in the development of the UK that are not spelled out particularly clearly in what is generally a very good literature.
我正在思考英国的发展史，因为我从未写过关于我自己国家的文章，而且我认为英国的发展中有很多事情在通常非常好的文献中并没有特别清楚地阐明。
There’ve been some excellent books written about the UK economy, but I think there are one or two things that I’d like to explore more that haven’t really been covered.
有一些关于英国经济的优秀书籍，但我认为有一两件事我想进一步探讨，但尚未真正涵盖。
I think it’s also partly that I feel like I’ve done a lot of traveling, and I’d like to not travel for a while.
我想部分原因是我觉得自己已经旅行了很多次，并且我不想旅行一段时间。
Travel in the UK though, right?
不过在英国旅行，对吗？
That’s travel too.
这也是旅行吧。
Yes, yes.
是的，是的。
I can go and see the UK and go and see the grim post-industrial cities of the UK.
我可以去看看英国，去看看英国那些严峻的后工业城市。
Joe Studwell, thank you very much.
乔·斯塔德韦尔，非常感谢你。
Thank you, Tyler.
谢谢你，泰勒。
Image Credit: Nick J.B.
图片来源：Nick J.B.
Moore
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