Jennifer Pahlka on Reforming Government (Ep. 238)
Thanks to an anonymous listener for sponsoring this transcript.
感谢一位匿名听众赞助这份文字记录。
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today, I am here live, in person, chatting with Jennifer Pahlka.
今天，我亲自在这里与詹妮弗·帕尔卡进行现场聊天。
Jennifer is founder and former CEO of Code for America.
Jennifer 是 Code for America 的创始人兼前首席执行官。
She worked in the Obama administration, and she founded the United States Digital Service.
她曾在奥巴马政府工作，并创立了美国数字服务公司。
She has a background in computer gaming, media, and most importantly for our purposes, I’m a big fan of her 2023 book called Recoding America: Why Government Is Failing in the Digital Age and How We Can Do Better.
她拥有电脑游戏、媒体方面的背景，最重要的是，对于我们的目的来说，我是她 2023 年出版的书《重新编码美国：为什么政府在数字时代失败以及我们如何做得更好》的忠实粉丝。
Jennifer, welcome.
詹妮弗，欢迎。
So great to be here.
很高兴来到这里。
Thank you.
谢谢。
What is your model for why Congress has become so passive?
您认为国会为何变得如此被动？
And how important is solving that problem for reforming the bureaucracy?
解决这个问题对于官僚机构改革有多重要？
Oh, you did start with a hard one.
哦，你一开始确实很艰难。
They’re all hard ones.
他们都是很难的人。
I’m new to Congress.
我是国会新人。
I spent many years, really, in the executive branch agency, so I see Congress through the lens of people who are downstream of their actions.
事实上，我在行政部门工作了很多年，所以我通过那些处于其行动下游的人们的视角来看待国会。
I’ve only recently come to any theories at all about Congress.
我直到最近才开始了解有关国会的理论。
One observation I have is that they, I think, secretly will admit that they know that the laws that they pass don’t actually work.
我的一项观察是，我认为他们会秘密地承认他们知道他们通过的法律实际上不起作用。
They don’t want to admit this.
他们不想承认这一点。
That is not something you’d want to run on.
这不是你想要运行的东西。
But I think, increasingly, they’re aware that they are turning the steering wheel, but it’s not connected to the wheels of the car.
但我认为，他们越来越意识到自己正在转动方向盘，但方向盘并未连接到汽车的车轮。
They’re pressing the gas, but the car’s not going anywhere.
他们正在踩油门，但车却哪儿也去不了。
It’s probably not the only reason Congress is powerless, but I think it has really contributed to the sense of, what are we even doing here?
这可能不是国会无能为力的唯一原因，但我认为这确实有助于让人们意识到，我们到底在这里做什么？
We’re supposed to be steering this country, and when we turn the dial, maybe not nothing is happening, but less than we thought or something different is happening.
我们应该掌控这个国家，当我们转动旋钮时，也许并不是什么都没有发生，而是比我们想象的要少，或者正在发生一些不同的事情。
This law of unintended consequences is really kicking in.
这种意外后果法则确实在发挥作用。
Do we have a way of getting Congress to be less passive?
我们有办法让国会不那么被动吗？
I’m hopeful that these various strands of disruption that are happening right now will push them in some direction.
我希望现在正在发生的各种破坏能够将他们推向某个方向。
I think the challenge is to shape that direction.
我认为挑战在于塑造这个方向。
Certainly, you have something like the Loper Bright decision, which is going to disrupt a lot of the way they have done work.
当然，像洛珀·布莱特 (Loper Bright) 的决定一样，这将扰乱他们的很多工作方式。
If you really want to write a law, have it passed, and then have it have the impact in the real world that you intended, you can’t really do what you used to do.
如果你真的想制定一项法律，让它通过，然后让它对现实世界产生你想要的影响，你就不能真正做你以前做的事情了。
What that change will look like — it’s a very big question.
这种变化会是什么样子 ——这是一个非常大的问题。
I don’t have any simple answers, but I do think it’s a moment where you can say, “Look, we have been living in this essentially waterfall world.” The Waterfall process is, you do this thing and then it goes into this stepwise procedure and gets handed off to others.
我没有任何简单的答案，但我确实认为这是一个你可以说的时刻，“看，我们一直生活在这个基本上是瀑布的世界中。”瀑布过程是，你做了这件事，然后它进入这个逐步的过程并移交给其他人。
It’s really a one-way trip.
这确实是一次单程旅行。
It descends now through the hierarchy of the bureaucracy to get implemented.
现在它通过官僚机构的等级制度向下延伸以得到实施。
That’s not how stuff that works well in our real lives works.
在我们现实生活中运作良好的东西并不是这样运作的。
It works in a much more iterative way in which you’re coming back to the intent, checking on how it’s going.
它以一种更加迭代的方式工作，在这种方式中，你会回到意图，检查它的进展情况。
It’s more of a quick feedback loop than this long waterfall that descends away from you and away from any control that you have over it.
它更像是一个快速的反馈循环，而不是这个长长的瀑布，它远离你，远离你对它的任何控制。
Some element of the change, if it ends up being positive, I think, will be away from a waterfall process into something that’s much more agile, iterative, and closing the feedback loop.
我认为，如果最终是积极的，变革的某些要素将会从瀑布式流程转变为更加敏捷、迭代和闭合反馈循环的流程。
I do think that speaks to some of Congress’s anxiety.
我确实认为这反映了国会的一些焦虑。
They are anxious because they feel like the bureaucracy doesn’t do what they told them to do.
他们感到焦虑，因为他们觉得官僚机构没有按照他们的要求去做。
It’s not a surprise that they don’t because of the structures, but the change that we’re talking about, I think, is really profound.
由于结构原因，他们没有这样做并不奇怪，但我认为我们正在谈论的变化确实是深远的。
It’s moving from one paradigm that is very, very ingrained in how Congress operates, how the executive branch agencies operate, but also just how everybody thinks.
它正在摆脱一种在国会运作方式、行政部门机构运作方式以及每个人的思维方式中都根深蒂固的范式。
It’s such a profound change, we are going to need a fair amount of disruption to make that change happen.
这是一个如此深刻的变化，我们需要相当多的破坏才能实现这一变化。
Now, we’re talking in March 2025.
现在，我们谈论的是 2025 年 3 月。
To the extent Congress stays passive, that residual authority — where do you want to see that reallocated to?
如果国会保持被动，那么剩余的权力 ——你希望看到它重新分配到哪里？
To the executive branch?
到行政部门？
To the courts?
去法院？
Because a lot of what you write is very critical about the courts.
因为你写的很多内容都对法院非常批评。
There’s too much of the judiciary, but this is March 2025.
司法部门太多了，但现在是 2025 年 3 月。
Where should that power go?
那股力量应该去哪里呢？
Your question about Congress being passive in this moment, of course, I didn’t really answer.
当然，你关于国会此时此刻被动的问题，我并没有真正回答。
I’m talking more generally, I think, before the inauguration.
我想，在就职典礼之前，我说的是更一般的情况。
But no, I would agree.
但不，我会同意。
We have put far too much into the judiciary.
我们对司法部门的投入太多了。
We are having them make decisions that I think executive branch agencies should make.
我们让他们做出我认为行政部门应该做出的决定。
One of the big problems with punting everything out into the courts is that those tight feedback loops require you to act quickly, and the courts do not act quickly.
将一切都投入法庭的一大问题是，那些紧密的反馈循环要求你迅速采取行动，而法庭却不会迅速采取行动。
That’s going to be a very big problem, I think, just generally for this whole era where everybody is counting on the courts to get their thing done, especially on the left where there’s a desire to stop Trump.
我认为，这将是一个非常大的问题，一般来说，对于整个时代来说，每个人都指望法院来完成他们的事情，尤其是那些渴望阻止特朗普的左翼人士。
Well, if the lawsuits can’t get through the system in any meaningful amount of time, the harm is already done, so that’s already an issue.
好吧，如果诉讼无法在任何有意义的时间内通过系统，那么伤害就已经造成了，所以这已经是一个问题了。
But it’s an issue even, I think, in less dire times because you can’t operate iteratively if you’re just always waiting for a court decision or always waiting to be sued.
但我认为，即使在不那么可怕的时期，这也是一个问题，因为如果你总是等待法院判决或总是等待被起诉，你就无法迭代操作。
I think that’s how we’ve grown up — if you work in the bureaucracy, you’re just always waiting to be sued.
我认为这就是我们成长的方式 ——如果你在官僚机构工作，你总是在等待被起诉。
On whether DOGE is the best we can do
关于 DOGE 是否是我们能做的最好的事情
Does that mean we need something like DOGE?
这是否意味着我们需要像 DOGE 这样的东西？
I’ve lived near DC for about 40 years of my life.
我在华盛顿附近生活了大约 40 年。
I haven’t seen anyone succeed with regulatory reforms.
我还没有看到任何人在监管改革方面取得成功。
You can abolish an agency, but to really reform the process hasn’t worked.
你可以废除一个机构，但要真正改革这个过程却行不通。
Maybe the best iteration we can get is to break a bunch of things now.
也许我们现在能得到的最好的迭代就是打破一堆东西。
That will be painful, people will hate it, but you have a chance in the next administration to put some of them back together again.
这将是痛苦的，人们会讨厌它，但你有机会在下一届政府中将其中一些重新组合起来。
Maybe it’s just in a large country, there’s no other way to do it.
也许只是在一个大国，没有其他办法可以做到。
We have separation of powers.
我们实行权力分立。
The first two years of DOGE will seem terrible, but 8, 12, 16 years from now, we’ll be glad we did it.
DOGE 的前两年看起来很糟糕，但 8、12、16 年后，我们会很高兴我们做到了。
Is that possible?
这可能吗？
I don’t know what’s going to happen.
我不知道会发生什么。
I do think this is the disruption that we’re getting, whether it’s the disruption we wanted.
我确实认为这就是我们正在经历的颠覆，无论这是否是我们想要的颠覆。
The question of whether it could have been done in a more orderly manner is a tough one.
是否可以以更加有序的方式完成这一任务是一个棘手的问题。
I just feel sad that we didn’t try.
我只是为我们没有尝试而感到难过。
Are you sure we didn’t try?
你确定我们没有尝试过吗？
I don’t think we really tried.
我认为我们并没有真正尝试过。
The second Bush presidency, people talked about this, what we need to do.
布什第二任总统期间，人们谈论了这个，我们需要做什么。
Al Gore — some of that was good, in fact, reinventing government.
戈尔——事实上，其中一些是好的，重塑了政府。
We’ve been trying all along, but this is what trying looks like.
我们一直在尝试，但这就是尝试的样子。
Yes.
是的。
I think reinventing government happened at a time when we were just at the beginning of this digital revolution.
我认为重塑政府发生在我们刚刚开始数字革命的时候。
It was trying with a very 20th-century mindset.
这是一种非常 20 世纪思维方式的尝试。
Fine, did well within that context, but we don’t need that again.
很好，在这种情况下做得很好，但我们不再需要这样了。
We need 21st century change.
我们需要 21 世纪的变革。
We need true digital transformation.
我们需要真正的数字化转型。
We need something that’s not stuck in the industrial ways of thinking.
我们需要一些不拘泥于工业思维方式的东西。
I don’t think we tried that.
我认为我们没有尝试过。
I think the efforts have just been too respectful of old ways of working and the institutions.
我认为这些努力过于尊重旧的工作方式和机构。
There was really not an appetite, I think, for what I would call responsible disruptive change.
我认为，人们确实没有兴趣进行所谓负责任的颠覆性变革。
Would it have worked?
它会起作用吗？
Is there such a thing?
有这样的事吗？
I don’t know.
我不知道。
COWEN: Say you’re approaching USAID, where I think the best programs are great.
COWEN：假设您正在联系美国国际开发署，我认为那里最好的项目很棒。
A lot of it they shouldn’t be doing.
很多事情他们不应该做。
On net, it passes a cost-benefit test, but the agency internally never seemed willing to actually get rid of the bad stuff, all the contracting arrangements which made American Congress people happy because it was dollars sent to America, but way inflated overhead and fixed costs.
在网络上，它通过了成本效益测试，但该机构内部似乎从来不愿意真正摆脱那些不好的东西，所有让美国国会议员高兴的合同安排，因为它是美元送到美国，但管理费用和固定成本却大大增加了。
Why isn’t it better just to blow that up — some of it is great — and then rebuild the great parts?
为什么直接把它炸毁 ——“其中一些很棒”——然后重建重要的部分不是更好吗？
It’s so hard to say.
很难说。
I’ve had the same thought.
我也有同样的想法。
In fact, before inauguration, I wrote about the Department of Defense.
事实上，在就职之前，我写过有关国防部的文章。
It’s the same thing.
这是同样的事情。
There’s a clear recognition by the people in the institution, as you saw with USAID, that this is not okay, that this is not working.
正如您在美国国际开发署看到的那样，该机构的人员明确认识到这是不行的，这是行不通的。
It’s just strange to be in an institution that large where so many people agree that it’s not working, from the bottom to the top, and yet nobody can make really substantive change.
在这么大的机构里，从下到上，很多人都认为它不起作用，但没有人能够做出真正实质性的改变，这很奇怪。
You look at efforts like Unit X, this book out by Raj Shah and Chris Kirchhoff about their efforts to start the Defense Innovation Unit.
你可以看看像《Unit X》这样的努力，这本书由 Raj Shah 和 Chris Kirchhoff 出版，讲述了他们为建立国防创新单位所做的努力。
He’s been a guest on the show.
他是节目的嘉宾。
He was great.
他很棒。
Yes, of course.
是的当然。
Right.
正确的。
Unbelievable talent, unbelievable support from the secretary of defense, and, actually, then subsequent secretaries of defense, and good outcomes for sure, but is the Department of Defense fundamentally more agile than it was before?
令人难以置信的才华，来自国防部长以及后来的几任国防部长的令人难以置信的支持，当然会有好的结果，但国防部是否从根本上比以前更加敏捷？
Not meaningfully so.
没有意义。
So, we do have a real problem that isn’t even just that a lot of people are resisting change.
所以，我们确实面临一个真正的问题，不仅仅是很多人抵制变革。
I think most people want change, but somehow the system itself fights back against any individual who’s trying to change it.
我认为大多数人都希望改变，但不知何故，系统本身会反击任何试图改变它的个人。
I told a story about being at an event where the person next to me .
我讲了一个关于参加一个活动的故事，旁边的人。
.
。
.
。
It was one of these events where people are off the record.
这是人们不公开记录的事件之一。
This person was a pretty senior official in the Air Force.
此人是空军一位相当高级的官员。
I said that I thought we would have a safer country with a smaller defense budget.
我说我认为我们会有一个更安全的国家，国防预算更少。
People looked at me and they’re like, “Ah, she’s a hippie or something.
人们看着我，然后说：“啊，她是个嬉皮士什么的。
She just doesn’t care about our national defense.” I spent four years on the Defense Innovation Board, and I learned to care a lot about our defense and to be quite worried about it.
她只是不关心我们的国防。”我在国防创新委员会工作了四年，我学会了非常关心我们的国防并对此感到非常担心。
I felt a little awkward saying this next to this Air Force official because it sounds insulting.
我在这位空军官员旁边说这句话感觉有点尴尬，因为这听起来很侮辱。
“I want to cut your budget.” He turned to me and, in front of everyone, he said, “You’re right except it needs to be 50 percent because when we’ve had 15 percent or 20 percent cuts, it doesn’t shock the system enough to actually change behavior.” Of course, you can have a cut like that that would be a shock to the system.
“我想削减你的预算。”他转向我，当着所有人的面说：“你是对的，只是需要达到 50%，因为当我们削减 15% 或 20% 时，它不会对系统产生足够的冲击，不足以真正改变行为。”当然，你可以进行这样的削减，这会对系统造成冲击。
A hot war would be a shock to the system, and we all know, we will see change when that happens.
热战会对体系造成冲击，我们都知道，当这种情况发生时，我们会看到变化。
I have, in a sense, been an advocate for this kind of shock to the system.
从某种意义上说，我一直是对体制进行这种冲击的倡导者。
I was alarmed when Vivek Ramaswamy — when he was going to be on DOGE — was saying we just get rid of half the bureaucrats based on the last number of their Social Security numbers.
当维韦克·拉马斯瓦米（Vivek Ramaswamy）——当他即将加入 DOGE 时——说我们只是根据社会安全号码的最后数字解雇一半的官僚时，我感到震惊。
I was like, “Wow, what he’s saying and what I’m saying rhyme,” and yet, I feel like I come at it from fundamentally a desire for government to work.
我当时想，“哇，他说的和我说的押韵，”然而，我觉得我从根本上是出于对政府工作的渴望。
Sometimes, it’s hard to see whether what’s going on right now is about government working better or just being smaller.
有时，很难看出现在发生的事情是政府工作得更好还是政府规模更小。
I think it could be smaller and be better.
我认为它可以更小、更好。
That better is still really important to me.
更好对我来说仍然非常重要。
COWEN: You use the defense example.
COWEN：你用了防御的例子。
If we think about what has worked, it seems to me that outsourcing nonbureaucratic activity to, say, Palantir, Anduril has been very cost-effective, probably militarily effective.
如果我们考虑一下有效的方法，在我看来，将非官僚活动外包给 Palantir、Anduril 等公司非常具有成本效益，可能在军事上也很有效。
We’ll see.
我们会看到的。
Also, Christopher Kirchhoff’s unit has worked pretty well.
此外，克里斯托弗·基尔霍夫（Christopher Kirchhoff）的单位也运作得相当不错。
So, why don’t we do more of that?
那么，我们为什么不做更多这样的事情呢？
Just take government agencies and sidestep them.
只需采取政府机构并避开他们即可。
Create a new NIH, call it something else, figure it will be good for 10 or 20 years, and then we’ll need to start all over again.
创建一个新的 NIH，给它起个别的名字，认为它会持续 10 年或 20 年，然后我们需要重新开始。
In the meantime, we cut the budget of the current NIH, say, in half and create a new agency like a DARPA for health, which we have a version of already.
与此同时，我们将当前 NIH 的预算削减了一半，并创建了一个新的机构，例如负责卫生的 DARPA，我们已经有了一个版本。
Why not just keep on doing that?
为什么不继续这样做呢？
Create new things and destroy parts of old ones.
创造新事物并摧毁旧事物的一部分。
That does happen.
这确实发生了。
That’s what we call the bureaucratic rigidity cycle.
这就是我们所说的官僚僵化循环。
We haven’t, I think, been disciplined enough about dismantling the old when we create the new.
我认为，当我们创造新事物时，我们在拆除旧事物方面没有足够的纪律。
I experienced that myself helping start USDS, the United States Digital Service.
我亲身经历了自己帮助创办 USDS（美国数字服务）的经历。
It’s creating something new, but it still — and I think, even up until inauguration day — just had far less power than the existing infrastructures, CIOs of agencies, the procurement frameworks.
它正在创造一些新的东西，但它仍然——而且我认为，即使在就职日之前——它的权力仍然远小于现有的基础设施、机构的首席信息官和采购框架。
That stuff has a life of its own and a power of its own.
那东西有它自己的生命和它自己的力量。
If you are creating these skunk works to disrupt the old stuff, it has to actually disrupt the old stuff.
如果你创作这些臭鼬作品是为了颠覆旧事物，那么它就必须真正颠覆旧事物。
You can’t just add.
你不能只是添加。
If you’re just adding new layers on the face —
如果你只是在脸上添加新的图层 —
Yes, so start with the cuts.
是的，所以从削减开始。
What’s something right now you’d be willing to cut half of it?
现在有什么东西是你愿意削减一半的？
Not knowing what will be added.
不知道会添加什么。
No package deals.
没有套餐优惠。
You’ve just got to hope and pray for the best.
你只需要希望并祈祷最好的结果。
What would I cut if I — ?
如果我 — ，我会剪掉什么？
Something you’d cut half of.
你会砍掉一半的东西。
Some agency, some program.
一些机构，一些计划。
Not farm subsidies, everyone would agree, but something that would hurt a bit.
每个人都会同意，这不是农业补贴，而是有点伤害的东西。
I guess I’m on record as saying that the defense department should have a shock to the system.
我想我已经公开说过国防部应该对系统进行震惊。
I don’t know if it’s 50 percent, but it does need to be freed from the constraints that it seems not to be able to shake.
我不知道是不是50%，但它确实需要摆脱它似乎无法摆脱的束缚。
And the rest of government, other than defense?
除了国防之外，政府的其他部门呢？
Would I cut it 50 percent?
我会削减百分之五十吗？
Yes, and hope to grow new limbs for the lobster, so to speak.
是的，可以这么说，希望为龙虾长出新的四肢。
I guess I could imagine cutting something quite deep, but I would do it far more discriminately than what’s happening right now.
我想我可以想象把一些东西切得很深，但我会比现在发生的事情更加有区别地去做。
What would be your first target?
你的第一个目标是什么？
The discrimination is you’re in charge.
歧视是你负责的。
We all listen to you.
我们都听你的。
You’re dictator of the bureaucracy.
你是官僚机构的独裁者。
Other than DOD, you can cut something by 50 percent, and we’re all going to do it.
除了国防部之外，你可以削减 50% 的开支，我们都会这么做。
My metaphor is basically that we are imbalanced between brake and gas.
我的比喻基本上是我们在刹车和油门之间不平衡。
In any given agency right now, you could talk to someone who’s trying to create something new, stand up a new .
现在在任何特定机构中，您都可以与试图创造新事物、建立新事物的人交谈。
.
。
.
。
I’ll talk about the Direct File team for instance.
例如，我将谈论 Direct File 团队。
They were building something that was better, that works for people.
他们正在打造更好、更适合人们的东西。
They did it cheaper.
他们做得更便宜。
They did it faster than how things normally go.
他们做得比平常更快。
I’ll call them, the go energy.
我称它们为“前进能量”。
Around them, you have 10 times as much infrastructure, people, rules that are stopping them.
在他们周围，有十倍多的基础设施、人员和规则阻止他们。
That’s the stop energy.
这就是停止能量。
I don’t believe we should have no stop energy.
我不认为我们应该有没有停止的能量。
I just think that the balance between those two things is way, way off.
我只是认为这两件事之间的平衡还很遥远。
If you’re going to come in and change and what you want is government to be more effective, go faster, build stuff, and I mean build things in government like direct file, but I also mean enable the building of housing and energy infrastructure and transportation that we desperately need in this country.
如果你要进来改变，你想要的是政府更有效、更快、建设东西，我的意思是在政府里建设东西，比如直接文件，但我也意味着能够建设我们国家迫切需要的住房、能源基础设施和交通。
You’ve got to go identify, where is that stop energy?
你必须去识别，那个停止能量在哪里？
And how do you reduce or remove that so that you can enable the go energy and the people whose job it is to get the thing done?
如何减少或消除这种情况，以便能够激发工作能量和完成工作的人员？
You have to go do that analysis, or you’re just getting rid of the go energy first.
你必须去做这样的分析，否则你只是先摆脱了前进的能量。
A lot is the New Deal — it happened very quickly.
新政带来了很多影响——它发生得非常快。
There wasn’t always much analysis behind it.
其背后并不总是有太多的分析。
It’s like, “Let’s set up a bunch of things.” A lot of them did not run well at the beginning.
就像，“让我们设置一堆东西。”他们中的很多人一开始的表现并不好。
I don’t mean that as a criticism.
我的意思并不是批评。
It’s just inevitable, like who’s on the staff?
这是不可避免的，比如员工是谁？
If we’re going to recreate government, doesn’t it have to be at least as chaotic?
如果我们要重建政府，它是不是至少必须如此混乱？
Well, it is chaotic.
嗯，很混乱。
COWEN: There’s something very orderly about the current bureaucracy.
考恩：当前的官僚机构非常有秩序。
If we want to improve the SEC, HHS, whatever other agencies, don’t we just need a flat-out chaotic approach because they were created, in a sense, with chaos and no one asked too many questions?
如果我们想改进 SEC、HHS，无论其他什么机构，我们难道不需要一种彻底混乱的方法吗？因为从某种意义上说，它们是在混乱的情况下创建的，没有人提出太多问题？
I am somebody who would agree that you’re going to have to be far more tolerant of mistakes than we have been.
我同意你必须比我们更加容忍错误。
I think a lot of people that I worked with agreed with that.
我想很多和我一起工作过的人都同意这一点。
A lot of them are now in reaction to something that is just far more chaotic than it seems to need to be, and again, where the cuts are happening in the wrong places sometimes.
他们中的许多人现在正在对一些比看起来需要的更加混乱的事情做出反应，而且有时削减发生在错误的地方。
But that’s part of chaos.
但这是混乱的一部分。
You rebuild later on, and to me, it doesn’t feel that chaotic at all by global historical standards.
后来你重建了，对我来说，按照全球历史标准来看，它一点也不混乱。
Sure.
当然。
We’re in a remarkably orderly time, even with you-know-who as president.
我们正处于一个非常有序的时期，即使总统是个知名人士。
No, that’s fair.
不，这很公平。
I think the other thing that we should be thinking about .
我认为我们应该考虑的另一件事。
.
。
.
。
Everyone is very concerned — I think understandably so — about, for instance, some of the younger and less experienced members of the DOGE team getting access to systems.
每个人都非常担心（我认为这是可以理解的），例如，DOGE 团队中一些年轻且经验不足的成员能够访问系统。
I think we should not measure government by the degree to which it can fail, but more by how quickly it can recover, and we haven’t seen that yet.
我认为我们不应该根据政府失败的程度来衡量政府，而应该根据政府恢复的速度来衡量，而我们还没有看到这一点。
We haven’t actually yet seen Social Security checks stopping going out, for instance.
例如，我们实际上还没有看到社会保障支票停止发放。
That very well could happen.
这很可能发生。
What we should be looking for is, can it recover quickly if that happens and under what circumstances.
我们应该关注的是，如果发生这种情况，在什么情况下，它是否能够快速恢复。
One thing I worry about is, there are people with specialized knowledge that will be very hard to pull back in those times.
我担心的一件事是，有些拥有专业知识的人在那个时候很难撤退。
I think we’ve always had too much of a focus on get it perfect the first time rather than be tolerant of failures, but reduce the scope of those failures.
我认为我们总是过于关注第一次就完美，而不是容忍失败，而是减少失败的范围。
That’s what the whole lean startup movement was about.
这就是整个精益创业运动的意义所在。
When I came here in 2013 to help start USDS, we were talking about lean startup methodologies, and those really are fail fast, fail quickly, but fail on a very small scale so you’re not hurting a lot of people.
当我 2013 年来到这里帮助创办 USDS 时，我们正在谈论精益创业方法，这些方法确实是快速失败，快速失败，但失败的规模非常小，这样就不会伤害很多人。
Then by the time you’ve rolled it out to millions and millions of people, you’ve worked out those bugs.
然后，当您将其推广给数百万人时，您已经解决了这些错误。
But the way government does it, they try to serve everybody on the first day.
但政府的做法是，他们在第一天就努力为所有人服务。
They haven’t actually tested these things, and they’re trying to do things at scale without having those little failures early on to make a robust, resilient, and scalable system.
他们还没有真正测试过这些东西，他们正在尝试大规模地做事情，而不会在早期出现这些小故障，以打造一个强大的、有弹性的、可扩展的系统。
In some ways, I’m worried in this moment, when we’re talking about all this chaos and people reacting to the chaos of all these cuts and people getting access to systems, that they’re losing that view we had in 2013, 2014, which is, let’s actually be tolerant of failure.
在某些方面，我担心此刻，当我们谈论所有这些混乱以及人们对所有这些削减和人们访问系统的混乱做出的反应时，他们正在失去我们在 2013 年、2014 年的观点，也就是说，让我们真正容忍失败。
Let’s, in fact, intentionally do things that will help us learn what those failures are, and we’re just going to have a better government then.
事实上，让我们有意识地做一些事情来帮助我们了解这些失败是什么，然后我们就会有一个更好的政府。
But if we just go into full reaction mode, we’re going to lose all of that.
但如果我们只是进入全面反应模式，我们就会失去所有这些。
If someone says, when it comes to regulatory reform, accountability is not the solution, it’s the problem, do you agree?
如果有人说，在监管改革方面，问责不是解决方案，而是问题，你同意吗？
Accountability is not the solution, it’s the problem?
问责不是解决方案，而是问题？
You put in accountability, everything has to be measured, everything has to have a process.
你把责任放在心上，一切都必须衡量，一切都必须有一个过程。
It’s judicial review.
这是司法审查。
Should we have less accountability in government?
我们应该减少政府的责任吗？
In a certain sense, I would agree with that.
从某种意义上说，我同意这一点。
I don’t think in an absolute sense.
我不认为是绝对意义上的。
I think the way that we structure accountability is very flawed.
我认为我们构建问责制的方式非常有缺陷。
I think we are holding public servants essentially accountable to metrics that are not proxies for real outcomes that people care about.
我认为我们要求公务员对指标负责，而这些指标并不能代表人们关心的实际结果。
When you have a very high focus on accountability that is really about fidelity to procedure and process instead of to the actual outcome, that’s not accountability.
当你高度关注问责制时，这实际上是对程序和过程的忠诚，而不是对实际结果的忠诚，那么这就不是问责制。
Outcomes are heterogeneous, they’re tricky, they’re long term.
结果是多种多样的、棘手的、长期的。
When you ask people to measure, you end up with a lot more emphasis on process than you want.
当你要求人们进行衡量时，你最终会比你想要的更加强调过程。
So, maybe accountability is the problem.
所以，也许问责制就是问题所在。
To say accountability for outcomes — that’s just going to morph into accountability for process.
要说对结果负责 ——这只会演变成对过程负责。
That’s what I observe, even in private companies.
这就是我观察到的情况，即使是在私营公司也是如此。
Big, successful, profitable private companies that we’re all familiar with — they have the same problem, as I’m sure you know.
我们都熟悉的大型、成功、盈利的私营公司——他们也有同样的问题，我相信你也知道。
That they’re held accountable to the —
他们要对 ——
There’s far too much process, bureaucracy, delays.
有太多的流程、官僚主义和延误。
They’re slow.
他们很慢。
Look at construction productivity in the United States.
看看美国的建筑生产率。
It’s terrible.
太可怕了。
It’s declined.
已被拒绝。
Yes, I would agree with that.
是的，我同意这一点。
And that’s the private sector.
这就是私营部门。
Yes.
是的。
I think one of the issues though is that there is more accountability to process in government than in the private sector, I believe.
我认为问题之一是政府比私营部门有更多的责任。
More in government.
更多的是在政府。
More in government.
更多的是在政府。
Yes, sure.
是的，当然。
Because in the private sector, if you don’t get the outcomes, you are unlikely to succeed financially.
因为在私营部门，如果你没有取得成果，你就不太可能在经济上取得成功。
There’s a profit — clear goal.
有利润 ——明确的目标。
In government, it’s not the same kind of outcome.
在政府中，这不是同样的结果。
It collapses more into process.
它更多地融入到流程中。
Yes, it collapses more into process, absolutely.
是的，它绝对更多地融入到流程中。
I think also you have — what is it — Goodhart’s Law that says once a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be useful, and you see that everywhere in government.
我认为还有 —“它是什么”— 古德哈特定律说，一旦一项措施成为目标，它就不再有用，你在政府中随处可见这种情况。
I think that’s part of what I mean about the new public management and the reinventing government in the ’90s was highly reliant on “Let’s set a goal and follow that goal.”
我认为这就是我所说的新公共管理和 90 年代政府重塑的部分含义，它高度依赖于“让我们设定一个目标并遵循这个目标”。
There can be real value in that.
这可能具有真正的价值。
I’m not discrediting it entirely, but you do have that erosion of the value of those targets as people try to meet the target without actually meeting the outcome that was intended.
我并不是完全怀疑它，但当人们试图实现目标却没有真正达到预期结果时，这些目标的价值确实受到了侵蚀。
I think that a more digital transformation approach that is instead able to change over time more quickly and say, “Wait, this target is no longer helping us get where we wanted to go.
我认为，一种更加数字化的转型方法能够随着时间的推移更快地改变，并说：“等等，这个目标不再帮助我们实现我们想要的目标。
We’ve got to iterate on that.
我们必须重申这一点。
Let’s change it.” That can really, I think, get us out of that industrial era of thinking.
我们改变一下吧。”我认为，这确实可以让我们摆脱工业思维时代。
On preparing government for AGI
关于政府为 AGI 做好准备
How should we prepare government for AGI coming?
我们应该如何让政府为通用人工智能的到来做好准备？
That is such a good question.
这是一个很好的问题。
I think I’m going to ask everyone this question for the next two years.
我想在接下来的两年里我会问每个人这个问题。
Does it just mean firing a lot of people?
这是否意味着解雇很多人？
I don’t know.
我不知道。
Take social services for example.
以社会服务为例。
We have a lot of people in government doing pretty low-value work.
我们有很多政府人员从事低价值的工作。
It’s essentially paperwork.
这本质上是文书工作。
All of our social safety net is paperwork.
我们所有的社会安全网都是文书工作。
It’s lots and lots of different kinds of paperwork at lots of different levels.
这是很多不同级别的不同类型的文书工作。
People who fundamentally just want to help another human being just do paperwork and IT systems and compliance.
从根本上来说，只想帮助他人的人只需做文书工作、IT 系统和合规工作。
What a social safety net is supposed to be about is, actually, fundamentally helping someone get through a tough time, and that requires humans, I think.
实际上，社会安全网的作用是从根本上帮助某人度过困难时期，我认为这需要人类。
To the degree that it can, rather than just displace people — though it probably will displace workers — move people to higher-value work that helps people more, that is what we should be trying to craft it to do.
在一定程度上，它不仅仅是取代人们——尽管它可能会取代工人——让人们从事更高价值的工作，为人们提供更多帮助，这就是我们应该努力设计它的目的。
So, we should shift humans more into what kind of jobs?
那么，我们应该让人类更多地从事什么样的工作呢？
Imagine you’re an eligibility worker for SNAP, and imagine you got to actually talk to your clients and listen to them.
想象一下，您是 SNAP 的资格工作人员，并想象您必须与客户实际交谈并倾听他们的意见。
But the AGI can do that at scale, right?
但 AGI 可以大规模做到这一点，对吗？
And it will make better judgements than the human.
而且它会比人类做出更好的判断。
I understand that.
我明白这一点。
I’m trying to get my head around AGI as opposed to the chat bot that I think doesn’t actually fulfill that at the moment.
我正在尝试了解 AGI，而不是聊天机器人，我认为目前聊天机器人实际上还不能实现这一目标。
Not yet.
还没有。
Soon, especially when government trains it on the data government has.
很快，特别是当政府根据政府拥有的数据对其进行培训时。
Yes.
是的。
Maybe there won’t be any difference to somebody to know that it’s AGI versus a human.
也许对于某人来说，知道这是 AGI 与人类并没有什么区别。
Right now, I think people want to know it’s a human.
现在，我认为人们想知道它是一个人。
Well, people want a lot of things.
嗯，人们想要很多东西。
I would like personal chauffeur service.
我想要私人司机服务。
COWEN: But if you’re getting money, and an AGI hears your case, and it’s more fair than the human — if it’s indeed more fair — people should just have to deal with that.
COWEN：但是如果你得到了钱，并且 AGI 审理了你的案子，而且它比人类更公平——如果它确实更公平——那么人们就应该处理这个问题。
I agree they won’t like it.
我同意他们不会喜欢它。
AGI may be able to do this as well.
AGI 或许也能做到这一点。
I’m not talking about just adjudicating the case.
我说的不是仅仅审判案件。
I’m talking about saying things that I think our current chat bots wouldn’t say, which is displaying empathy —
我说的是我认为我们当前的聊天机器人不会说的话，这就是表现出同理心 ——
Oh, they’re great at empathy.
哦，他们很擅长同理心。
It’s hard to get them to be pissed off at you.
很难让他们对你生气。
— referring them to other services.
— 将他们转介至其他服务。
I get that we could go in that direction, too, but I still think that there’s higher-value work that people can do.
我知道我们也可以朝这个方向发展，但我仍然认为人们可以做更高价值的工作。
I think AGI being closer than we thought it was, say, even last week — yes, it’s disrupting my thinking on this, too.
我认为 AGI 比我们想象的更接近，甚至在上周 —— 是的，它也扰乱了我对此的思考。
But I also think that there is work that government doesn’t do today at all.
但我也认为，有些工作是政府今天根本没有做的。
If we can do a lot of these things .
如果我们能做很多这样的事情。
.
。
.
。
we’re not going to magically print money and have more safety net dollars for people, but what we care about, really, is addressing the needs.
我们不会神奇地印钞票并为人们提供更多的安全网资金，但我们真正关心的是满足需求。
There’s going to be, I think, a long time where it’s going to take us to figure out what are those needs that could be addressed by AGI.
我认为，我们需要很长时间才能弄清楚通用人工智能可以满足哪些需求。
How do we actually get that technology to address those needs accurately?
我们如何真正利用该技术来准确地满足这些需求？
Test, again, with limited risk, et cetera, not just roll stuff out willy-nilly.
再次强调，要以有限的风险进行测试，等等，而不是随心所欲地推出产品。
Then I think we get to, what were we not doing that we can do?
然后我想我们会思考，哪些是我们可以做而我们没有做的？
On public-sector unions
关于公共部门工会
Should we have public-sector unions?
我们应该有公共部门工会吗？
Because they’re going to fight AGI, right?
因为他们要对抗 AGI，对吧？
Should we consider just getting rid of all public-sector unions?
我们是否应该考虑取消所有公共部门工会？
They oppose reform.
他们反对改革。
They don’t really like accountability in the proper method.
他们并不真正喜欢以正确的方式承担责任。
Their goal, in part, is to protect jobs.
他们的部分目标是保护就业。
I don’t know if we should or could.
我不知道我们是否应该或可以。
In the current reality, I do see that they are often, I think, advocating for policies that are actually not in the interests of their members.
在当前的现实中，我确实看到他们经常提倡实际上不符合其成员利益的政策。
Sure.
当然。
Something’s gone wrong there that needs to go right if we’re going to continue to have them.
如果我们要继续拥有它们，那么那里出了问题就需要纠正。
For me, one example of that is, they’re so protective of underperformers.
对我来说，一个例子是，他们对表现不佳的人非常保护。
Underperformers are a very small part of the civil service.
表现不佳的人只占公务员队伍的一小部分。
I’m critical of the civil service in the sense that we just talked about, where there’re too many people whose jobs is to stop things, but that doesn’t mean that person is an underperformer.
从我们刚才谈到的意义上来说，我对公务员制度持批评态度，因为有太多人的工作就是阻止事情发生，但这并不意味着这个人表现不佳。
They can be doing a fantastic job at what they were told to do, which is, don’t let anything happen, or make sure you’re using these guardrails to the maximum extent, for instance.
他们可以出色地完成他们被要求做的事情，例如，不要让任何事情发生，或者确保最大限度地使用这些护栏。
But there are actual underperformers, too.
但也有一些实际表现不佳的人。
While there’re not that many of them, they really drive the rest of the public service crazy.
虽然数量不多，但他们确实让其他公共服务部门抓狂。
It’s crazy to me that the unions don’t say, “Actually, for the good of most public servants, let’s make it easier to remove these underperforming employees.”
对我来说，工会没有说：“实际上，为了大多数公务员的利益，让我们更容易地解雇这些表现不佳的员工，这真是太疯狂了。”
There’s some asymmetric information embedded in the problem.
问题中隐藏着一些不对称信息。
The people who are losing their jobs — they scream loudly.
那些失业的人——他们大声尖叫。
The other people don’t have to pay the cost of that, and so they’re willing to let the union be protectionist.
其他人不需要为此付出代价，因此他们愿意让工会实行保护主义。
Isn’t that more or less intrinsic?
这或多或少不是内在的吗？
I think the other people are paying the cost.
我认为其他人正在付出代价。
Very indirectly, right?
非常间接，对吧？
Asymmetric information.
信息不对称。
Those costs are very widely distributed.
这些成本分布非常广泛。
Whereas, if you’re losing your job for being an underperformer, you’re screaming.
然而，如果你因为表现不佳而失去工作，你就会尖叫。
Yes, that’s right.
是的，没错。
The unions — if they were performing properly to actually advance the needs and interests of all of their members — would take a different stance, I believe.
我相信，工会——“如果他们表现得当，真正促进了所有成员的需求和利益”——就会采取不同的立场。
But any institution, you can say that.
但任何机构，你都可以这么说。
“Well, if the people were doing their job properly .
“好吧，如果人们正确地做好他们的工作的话。
.
。
.” But you need to design the institutions for the fact that they’ll pursue their own self-interest.
”。但你在设计机构时需要考虑到他们会追求自己的利益。
We’re in a university.
我们在一所大学。
There’s university administration.
有大学行政部门。
Some things they do well, not well, but it’s never an answer to a problem to say they should do their job properly.
有些事情他们做得很好，有些事情做得不好，但说他们应该做好自己的工作并不能解决问题。
That’s fair.
这很公平。
I don’t know enough about unions to know how they would work if they were working properly.
我对工会的了解还不够，不知道如果他们正常工作的话，他们会如何运作。
Philip Howard’s made a bunch of points about this that I’ve warmed to over the years.
菲利普·霍华德（Philip Howard）对此提出了很多观点，这些年来我对这些观点很感兴趣。
There is a different set of circumstances for public-sector unions than those in the private sector.
公共部门工会的情况与私营部门工会不同。
I think that’s part of the problem, that it’s been directly translated into the public sector.
我认为这是问题的一部分，它已直接转化为公共部门。
Philip Howard’s much more articulate on this than I am, but I would, maybe slightly counter to Philip, say that there is a higher need to protect civil servants from firing for a certain set of reasons.
菲利普·霍华德（Philip Howard）在这一点上比我更清楚，但我可能会稍微与菲利普相反，说更需要保护公务员不因某些原因而被解雇。
We do want an independent civil service that can say, “Actually, the science says X.” Now, an administration may choose not to follow that science, but you want to retain that person and their, say, scientific expertise or their bureaucratic expertise, and not create a situation in which the entire civil service gets wiped out every time you get a new administration.
我们确实想要一个独立的公务员队伍，它可以说：“事实上，科学是这样说的。”现在，政府可能选择不遵循科学，但你想保留这个人以及他们的科学专业知识或官僚专业知识，而不是造成每次新政府出现时整个公务员队伍都被消灭的情况。
That seems to be where we’re headed.
这似乎就是我们前进的方向。
I don’t necessarily see public-sector unions succeeding in protecting against that, but to the extent that they exist to do that, I do value that.
我不一定认为公共部门工会能够成功地防止这种情况发生，但只要它们存在就是为了做到这一点，我确实很重视这一点。
I do think we need independence.
我确实认为我们需要独立。
On the UK
在英国
If we think about the United Kingdom — the country, their government — it seems quite stuck.
如果我们想想英国——“这个国家，他们的政府”——它似乎陷入了困境。
Do you have an interpretation of how that’s happened?
您对这是如何发生的有解释吗？
They haven’t had productivity growth since the great financial crisis.
自金融危机爆发以来，他们的生产率一直没有增长。
They have a big fiscal problem.
他们有一个很大的财政问题。
It’s hard to see signs of progress.
很难看到进展的迹象。
The government appears paralyzed.
政府似乎陷入瘫痪。
They’ve had many different prime ministers.
他们有很多不同的总理。
What are they doing wrong?
他们做错了什么？
I don’t know.
我不知道。
It’s not really my topic.
这不是我的主题。
I actually get a lot of inspiration from the UK because they started the Government Digital Service there, which was the inspiration for USDS.
事实上，我从英国得到了很多灵感，因为他们在那里启动了政府数字服务，这也是 USDS 的灵感来源。
In fact, a lot of the work they did for Code for America.
事实上，他们为美国代码做了很多工作。
Also, just picked up on their principles and their values, but I don’t think that has been a salve for stagnation economically.
另外，刚刚了解了他们的原则和价值观，但我认为这并不是经济停滞的一剂良药。
This is a little bit out of my territory, but when I look at what’s written about the problems in the UK, I see a lot of that here in the US as well.
这有点超出了我的理解范围，但是当我查看有关英国问题的文章时，我在美国也看到了很多这样的问题。
Take Singapore.
以新加坡为例。
I’ve been to Singapore many times.
我去过新加坡很多次了。
It’s arguably the best functioning government in the world.
它可以说是世界上运作最好的政府。
When you look at Singapore, does that in any way give you pause?
当你看到新加坡时，是否有任何让你犹豫的地方？
You just think, “We should be more like Singapore.” Or you see what has been required to make Singapore work, and it puts you off a bit.
你只是想，“我们应该更像新加坡。”或者你看到新加坡需要什么才能运转起来，这会让你有点失望。
I’m not talking about how democratic is it or not.
我不是在谈论它是否民主。
I know that’s one set of issues, but just the talent drain from the private sector.
我知道这是一系列问题，但只是私营部门的人才流失。
There’s a certain conformity in Singapore.
新加坡有一定的一致性。
Some of that comes from size.
其中一些来自规模。
But when you have the super cooperative, well-disciplined civil service, that does come with some costs.
但当你拥有超级合作、纪律严明的公务员队伍时，这确实会带来一些成本。
How well have they really done when you consider all possible factors?
当您考虑所有可能的因素时，他们的表现到底如何？
Look, I think there are obvious benefits to the system that they’ve set up, the value that they’ve placed on civil servants, the technocratic extreme competence that they display.
听着，我认为他们建立的体系有明显的好处，他们对公务员的重视，他们表现出的技术官僚极端能力。
You could also say the same thing for Estonia.
你也可以对爱沙尼亚说同样的话。
There’s always this desire to say the US should be like X or Y or Z.
人们总是希望说美国应该像 X、Y 或 Z。
The reality is, yes, you have a different culture.
事实是，是的，你们有不同的文化。
Would we be as orderly about it?
我们会这么有秩序吗？
No, we have a different culture.
不，我们有不同的文化。
I think another thing people don’t recognize when they’re trying to make comparisons between the way we run our government and any other country is that we have policy complexity and legacy that just goes back further than they do.
我认为，当人们试图将我们的政府管理方式与任何其他国家进行比较时，人们没有意识到的另一件事是，我们的政策复杂性和遗产比他们更早。
We didn’t clean up for 250 years.
我们已经 250 年没有打扫卫生了。
We’ve added and very rarely subtracted.
我们增加了，但很少减少。
If you look at a country like Estonia, their problem is not our problem.
如果你看看像爱沙尼亚这样的国家，他们的问题不是我们的问题。
They have a relatively greenfield environment in which to create the digital infrastructure, but also to implement in a policy framework.
他们拥有相对未开发的环境，可以在其中创建数字基础设施，也可以在政策框架中实施。
You look at something like unemployment insurance, and it doesn’t really work here.
你看看失业保险之类的东西，它在这里并不起作用。
It still doesn’t work.
还是不行。
We threw our hands up and screamed during the pandemic and said we would fix it, and we have not fixed it at all.
疫情期间，我们举手尖叫，说我们会解决这个问题，但我们根本没有解决它。
It’s going to be a disaster if we have another spike in unemployment insurance claims.
如果失业保险索赔再次激增，那将是一场灾难。
Part of that is because it goes back to the 1935 Social Security Act.
部分原因是它可以追溯到 1935 年的《社会保障法》。
You have 90-something years now of just adding, adding, adding, adding.
你现在已经有 90 多年的时间了，只是不断地添加、添加、添加、添加。
You’ve got literally thousands of pages of active regulations that make something that should be a very simple program, like I get some portion of my salary under some circumstances for some number of weeks.
你实际上有数千页的有效法规，这些法规制定了一些应该是一个非常简单的程序，就像我在某些情况下在几周内获得部分工资。
It just shouldn’t be that hard, but because we have let the policy accumulate and accrete over decades .
这本来不应该那么难，但因为我们已经让政策在过去几十年里不断积累和发展。
.
。
.
。
The challenge isn’t digitization.
挑战不是数字化。
You can digitize something.
你可以将一些东西数字化。
The challenge is creating a system that is resilient and scalable with that much policy craft.
面临的挑战是创建一个具有如此多的政策技巧、具有弹性和可扩展性的系统。
I think both Estonia and Singapore have the advantage of just having less legacy that —
我认为爱沙尼亚和新加坡的优势在于遗产较少 -
And they’re small, right?
而且它们很小，对吧？
And they’re small, and they don’t have federalism.
而且它们规模很小，而且没有联邦制。
On 50-state capacity
拥有 50 个州的容量
Sure.
当然。
Let me give you a weird hypothesis.
让我给你一个奇怪的假设。
Tell me what you think of it.
告诉我你对此有何看法。
If someone argued the US has the highest state capacity in the whole world because the number one feature of state capacity is that you can convince enough of your citizens to fight for your country and die for it, the US does pretty well for that.
如果有人认为美国拥有全世界最高的国家能力，因为国家能力的首要特征是你可以说服足够多的公民为你的国家而战并为之而死，那么美国在这方面做得很好。
But to do well on that, your country, in some ways, has to be nutty, a bit militaristic, or maybe you need gun culture or diverse regions.
但要想在这方面做得好，你的国家在某些方面必须是疯狂的，有点军国主义，或者你可能需要枪支文化或多样化的地区。
A lot of the military comes from the south, which is a more conservative part of the country, and so on, and that a lot of the other problems we have actually stem from our high state capacity because we’ve decided to emphasize talking people into fighting for their country, being willing to die for it.
很多军队来自南方，这是这个国家比较保守的地区，等等，我们遇到的许多其他问题实际上源于我们的高国家能力，因为我们决定强调说服人们为自己的国家而战，愿意为之而死。
Maybe Israel is pretty good at that, too.
也许以色列在这方面也很擅长。
That’s just another way of diagnosing the problem, that we’re doing way better than we think.
这只是诊断问题的另一种方式，我们做得比我们想象的要好得多。
We prefer to be big and really strong and militarized, and the rest is collateral damage, but we live with it.
我们更喜欢做大、真正强大和军事化，其余的都是附带损害，但我们忍受它。
I’m not sure I agree with the definition of state capacity.
我不确定我是否同意国家能力的定义。
I could see that being part of it, but I’d also not accept the notion that because we can convince people to go in the military — though we’re having terrible recruitment problems in the military.
我可以看到这是其中的一部分，但我也不接受这样的观点，因为我们可以说服人们参军——尽管我们在军队中面临着可怕的招募问题。
We’re doing poorly on that —
我们在这方面做得很差 ——
But compared to other countries, we’re way ahead of just about anyone.
但与其他国家相比，我们几乎领先于任何人。
Sure, but that is not translating into an ability to deter our adversaries.
当然，但这并不能转化为威慑我们对手的能力。
We lose our war games with China.
我们在与中国的战争游戏中输了。
COWEN: We protect more of the world than maybe any country ever has before, I would say.
考恩：我想说，我们保护的世界可能比任何国家都多。
Well, we did.
好吧，我们做到了。
COWEN: Well, it’s somewhat less now.
COWEN：嗯，现在少了一些。
Somewhat less now.
现在少了一些。
It’s still at an all-time world historical peak.
目前仍处于世界历史最高水平。
US soldiers are incredible fighters.
美国士兵是令人难以置信的战士。
You could have them in Afghanistan, Iraq.
你可以在阿富汗、伊拉克拥有它们。
Maybe very complex missions, connection to life back home is highly unclear, and they fight incredibly well.
也许任务非常复杂，与家乡生活的联系非常不清楚，但他们的战斗力却非常出色。
Maybe that’s at least half of state capacity that matters, and we’re masters of it.
也许这至少是重要的国家能力的一半，而我们是它的主人。
I think you’re getting at one thing which I agree with — that the separation between the parts of our country that are involved in the military and the rest of the country is pretty damaging.
我认为你正在理解我同意的一件事——我们国家参与军队的部分与国家其他部分之间的分离是相当具有破坏性的。
I think that’s a big problem.
我认为这是一个大问题。
I’d also, I think, somewhat agree with something behind that question, which is that when we have too much of something, we get bad at it in a certain way.
我想，我也有点同意这个问题背后的一些观点，那就是当我们拥有太多某样东西时，我们就会在某种程度上变得不擅长。
When I talk about capacity of the state to do anything — and my background spans from food stamps to military readiness; people often go to resources — that capacity is money, essentially, and people.
当我谈论国家做任何事情的能力时——我的背景涵盖从食品券到军事准备；人们经常寻求资源——能力本质上就是金钱和人。
I think very often it’s, in fact, the situations where there is less money and fewer people where you get services delivered better.
事实上，我认为很多时候，在资金较少、人员较少的情况下，你可以获得更好的服务。
I’ll give you an example of that.
我给你举个例子。
When we started working on food stamps in, I think it was 2012 in California, California had the second lowest participation rate in supplemental nutrition assistance in the country.
当我们开始研究食品券时，我认为是 2012 年在加利福尼亚州，加利福尼亚州的补充营养援助参与率是全国第二低的。
The only state with a lower rate was Wyoming.
唯一比率较低的州是怀俄明州。
Maine, on the other hand, was, I can’t remember, somewhere in the top five or ten.
另一方面，我记不清了，缅因州曾跻身前五名或前十名。
Maine spent orders of magnitude less on the systems to enroll people.
缅因州在招生系统上的花费少了几个数量级。
We had tons of money.
我们有很多钱。
You think about California being tech-forward.
你认为加州是科技前沿的。
It’s where Silicon Valley is.
这就是硅谷所在的地方。
You would think that the online enrollment system would be great, but no. Because we could put a ton of money into it, we way overspec’d it, gathered way too many requirements, gave it to expensive vendors, and we ended up with an enrollment system that had 212 questions.
您可能会认为在线注册系统会很棒，但事实并非如此。因为我们可以投入大量资金，所以我们过度规范了它，收集了太多的要求，将其提供给昂贵的供应商，最终我们得到了一个包含 212 个问题的注册系统。
Just put everything into this.
把所有的东西都放进去就可以了。
It took far longer to fill out that form on a computer than you could spend on a computer at the library, which is where a lot of people fill out food stamps applications.
在计算机上填写该表格所花费的时间比在图书馆的计算机上花费的时间要长得多，而图书馆是很多人填写食品券申请的地方。
When the computer time’s out after 30 minutes, you haven’t finished your application.
当计算机超时 30 分钟后，您还没有完成申请。
There’re a lot of these little friction-y ways that we kept people out of the system, which starts to account for that really low enrollment rate.
我们有很多这样的小摩擦方式将人们排除在系统之外，这就是入学率非常低的原因。
It wasn’t lack of resources.
这并不是缺乏资源。
It was too many resources.
资源太多了。
As you know, government does not typically have its own AI, not in the United States.
如您所知，政府通常没有自己的人工智能，在美国更是如此。
As AI becomes more important, will that lead to a de facto mass privatization through procurement?
随着人工智能变得越来越重要，这是否会导致通过采购实现事实上的大规模私有化？
The government will contract out services to the major AI companies.
政府将把服务外包给主要的人工智能公司。
That will be done privately.
这将在私下进行。
Procurement will become far more important.
采购将变得更加重要。
The government itself — it won’t quite vanish, but it will be fundamentally different than what we’ve all grown up with.
政府本身——它不会完全消失，但它将与我们成长过程中的政府有着根本的不同。
Is that just going to happen?
这会发生吗？
I think that there is a world in which you get a government with enough technical competence to procure AI and manage AI well.
我认为，在这个世界里，政府拥有足够的技术能力来采购人工智能并妥善管理人工智能。
The problem with our procurement today is that we buy software the way we buy pencils and cars.
我们今天采购的问题是我们购买软件就像购买铅笔和汽车一样。
We’ve bought a thing.
我们买了东西。
AI isn’t like that, and actually, software isn’t like that.
人工智能不是那样的，实际上，软件也不是那样的。
This is a lesson we should have learned in the Internet era, and now we need to learn even better in this AI era, is that you can’t spend five years developing requirements and sending it out for bid, and then having it come back, and then say, “Okay, I bought this thing.” You need the internal competence to do that process far better, far faster, and then to actually own and run that software.
这是我们在互联网时代应该吸取的教训，现在我们在人工智能时代需要更好地学习，就是你不能花五年时间开发需求并发出招标，然后让它回来，然后说“好吧，我买了这个东西。”您需要内部能力来更好、更快地完成该过程，然后真正拥有并运行该软件。
It has to be yours.
它必须是你的。
I think we could do that.
我认为我们可以做到这一点。
There are rumors that DOGE is actually pro-insourcing more tech talent in government.
有传言称，DOGE 实际上支持政府内吸纳更多科技人才。
I know you’re not hearing about that now.
我知道你现在没有听说过。
It may just be a rumor, and it may not be true, so don’t quote me on this.
这可能只是谣言，也可能不是真的，所以不要引用我的话。
I certainly think that folks in Musk’s world came in and looked at government, and said, “How do you even operate with so little technical competence in-house?
我当然认为马斯克世界里的人们进来审视政府，并说：“内部技术能力如此之少，你们如何运作？
That’s crazy.” And it is crazy.
这太疯狂了。”这太疯狂了。
They’re right about that.
他们是对的。
We’ll either end up, I think, even further privatizing not just the software, but the whole operations as the software and the operations are increasingly melded — again, this is not new — or we’ll be forced finally to gain the internal competence that we have always needed and start to do this a little bit better.
我认为，我们最终要么不仅将软件进一步私有化，而且将整个运营进一步私有化，因为软件和运营越来越融合——“这并不是什么新鲜事”——或者我们最终将被迫获得我们一直需要的内部能力，并开始做得更好一点。
On AI and national sovereignty
论人工智能与国家主权
Let’s say you’re the nation of Peru, and AI becomes more important.
假设你是秘鲁国家，人工智能变得更加重要。
You run a lot of your education system through American AI, a lot of your military, your cybersecurity, processing of social services.
你通过美国人工智能来运行你的很多教育系统、你的很多军队、你的网络安全、社会服务的处理。
At the end of all that, after, I don’t know, 15 years, are you even a sovereign nation still?
到最后，我不知道，15年后，你还是一个主权国家吗？
Are we seeing this fundamental shift in what a government is?
我们是否看到政府的本质发生了根本性的转变？
If the US government does something, at least it’s US AI.
如果美国政府有所作为，至少是美国人工智能。
Other than the US and China, it’s far from clear how many countries will have their own AI.
除了美国和中国之外，尚不清楚有多少国家将拥有自己的人工智能。
What’s going to become of Peru?
秘鲁将会变成什么样？
I can’t answer that question, but it’s an excellent question.
我无法回答这个问题，但这是一个很好的问题。
I think you may see countries realize this and take more drastic steps to maintain their sovereignty, which I don’t know how they’re going to do it.
我想你可能会看到各国意识到这一点，并采取更严厉的措施来维护自己的主权，我不知道他们将如何做到这一点。
I think it’s just stay backward, right?
我认为这只是落后，对吗？
They could just not use AI, and probably some will make that decision.
他们可以不使用人工智能，也许有些人会做出这样的决定。
I think some will.
我想有些人会的。
But that’s a huge cost.
但这是一笔巨大的成本。
Then there’re countries like France, where maybe they can have their own AI.
还有像法国这样的国家，也许他们可以拥有自己的人工智能。
They haven’t succeeded so far, but they could at least make a run at it.
到目前为止，他们还没有成功，但至少可以尝试一下。
Would you tell France, “Make sure you develop your own AI so you’re controlling your own government”?
你会告诉法国，“确保你开发自己的人工智能，这样你就能控制自己的政府”吗？
Question back to you.
问题回复给你。
Is there some way in which the market fixes this because there’s a market for AI that doesn’t implicate that there’s Serenity?
市场是否有某种方法可以解决这个问题，因为人工智能市场并不意味着存在宁静？
I worry that the economies of scale are in conflict with a number of nations in the world today.
我担心规模经济与当今世界上的许多国家发生冲突。
We’re going to see a very radical shaking out that will go fully unadvertised, but at the end of it all, geopolitics will be very different.
我们将看到一场非常激进的变革，这种变革将完全不为人所知，但最终，地缘政治将会非常不同。
I don’t know that France can build an AI good enough, actually.
事实上，我不知道法国能否打造出足够好的人工智能。
They had Mistral.
他们有米斯特拉尔。
They still do.
他们仍然这样做。
It’s not making money.
它不赚钱。
People want to buy it.
人们想买它。
Macron says we’re going to basically prop it up, but you can’t just prop it up.
马克龙说我们基本上会支撑它，但你不能只是支撑它。
It has to be good enough to work and be competitive.
它必须足够好才能工作并具有竞争力。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
Won’t there be companies that have enough AI expertise that they’re able to cater to the needs of a sovereign nation and say, “I’ll do this for you in the way that fits your needs”?
难道不会有一些公司拥有足够的人工智能专业知识，能够满足一个主权国家的需求，并说：“我会以适合你需求的方式为你做这件事”？
It could be France contracts with Anthropic, and Anthropic, in a sense, runs the French government, and maybe we trust Anthropic.
可能是法国与 Anthropic 签订的合同，从某种意义上说，Anthropic 管理着法国政府，也许我们信任 Anthropic。
I’m not necessarily opposed to that by any means, but again, it’s a very different world.
我并不一定反对这一点，但同样，这是一个非常不同的世界。
It is a very different world, and it is very hard to game this out.
这是一个非常不同的世界，很难解决这个问题。
America and China, for sure, will have their own AIs, and maybe those countries just become much more powerful.
美国和中国肯定会有自己的人工智能，也许这些国家会变得更加强大。
Then you’ve got to decide, whose network are you in anyway?
然后你必须决定，你到底属于谁的网络？
Yes.
是的。
This is all coming at us very, very fast.
这一切都非常非常快地向我们袭来。
I think the point’s been made that this is the first time that such a transformational technology hasn’t fundamentally come out of US government resources.
我认为有人指出，这是第一次这种变革性技术从根本上不是来自美国政府的资源。
This is not one that you can ultimately trace back to DARPA or DOD.
这不是你最终可以追溯到 DARPA 或 DOD 的问题。
At least then, even if it was privatized, and so much of the value came out of the commercialization of DOD or DARPA investments.
至少在那时，即使它被私有化，而且大部分价值来自国防部或国防高级研究计划局投资的商业化。
Since that’s not the case this time, they don’t really even understand it.
既然这次不是这样，他们根本就不明白。
I think even before you get to the questions about other sovereign nations, we have the question of the relationship between the companies and the US government —
我认为，即使在讨论有关其他主权国家的问题之前，我们也有公司与美国政府之间关系的问题 ——
Of course.
当然。
— and how we’re going to sort that out.
——以及我们将如何解决这个问题。
Not to mention federalism, right?
更不用说联邦制了，对吧？
Not to mention federalism.
更不用说联邦制了。
We have plenty of governments in this country.
我们这个国家有很多政府。
What’s your favorite novel about bureaucracy?
您最喜欢哪本有关官僚主义的小说？
A novel about bureaucracy?
一部关于官僚主义的小说？
A novel.
一本小说。
I would say a number of Kafka novels.
我会说一些卡夫卡小说。
Maybe that’s too negative for you.
也许这对你来说太消极了。
Can I use a TV show?
我可以使用电视节目吗？
You can use a TV show.
您可以使用电视节目。
There’re so many.
有这么多。
Just for a positive vision, I’ve got to call it Parks and Rec.
为了一个积极的愿景，我必须将其称为“公园和休闲”。
COWEN: Parks and Rec.
COWEN：公园和休闲中心。
What does Parks and Rec show you?
Parks and Rec 向您展示什么？
I’ve never seen the show.
我从来没有看过这个节目。
You’ve never seen the show?
你从来没有看过这个节目吗？
Yes.
是的。
It just indulges in that banality of things like public meetings that are dominated by the loudest voice and how ultimately humor and just communities get through it.
它只是沉迷于诸如公共会议之类的平庸事物，这些事情由最大的声音主导，以及最终幽默和公正的社区如何度过它。
It’s a very funny show.
这是一个非常有趣的节目。
It often highlights just how mind-numbing bureaucracy can be, but also how people end up making it beautiful and funny.
它常常凸显出官僚主义是多么令人麻木，但也凸显了人们最终如何让它变得美丽和有趣。
The Kurosawa movie, Ikiru, is very good if you haven’t seen it.
如果你还没看过黑泽明的电影《生》，那会非常不错。
I talked Ezra into watching it.
我说服以斯拉观看它。
Isn’t that the one that’s been remade in the UK recently?
这不是英国最近重拍的那部吗？
I’m not sure.
我不知道。
Maybe.
或许。
Oh, I’m going to forget the name of this movie , but it is excellent.
哦，我忘记了这部电影的名字，但它很棒。
I believe this is the British version of that, about a civil servant near the end of his life —
我相信这是英国版本的故事，讲述的是一位即将结束生命的公务员的故事 ——
Yes, exactly.
是的，完全正确。
That’s it.
就是这样。
— and the playground.
——还有操场。
Correct.
正确的。
It’s coming back.
它回来了。
I’ve heard about this.
我听说过这个。
I’ve seen the British version, and I should have named that.
我看过英国版本，我应该给它起个名字。
It’s an excellent, excellent movie.
这是一部非常优秀的电影。
That would be my favorite movie about bureaucracy.
那将是我最喜欢的关于官僚主义的电影。
On working in gaming
关于从事游戏行业
Do you still do gaming?
你还玩游戏吗？
No.
不。
How do you think about not doing gaming, this previous part of your life?
您如何看待不玩游戏作为您生活的前一部分？
I don’t play chess anymore, and I feel I can’t, I shouldn’t, I won’t.
我不再下棋了，我觉得我不能，我不应该，我不会。
Gaming takes up a lot of time.
游戏会占用很多时间。
It’s hard to be a casual gamer.
做一个休闲玩家很难。
My gaming now is, I do The New York Times games every day: Wordle and New York Times crossword.
我现在的游戏是，我每天都玩《纽约时报》游戏：Wordle 和《纽约时报》填字游戏。
So, you are still a gamer.
所以，你仍然是一名游戏玩家。
Yes.
是的。
Since you’re referring to me working in the video game industry, running the Game Developers Conference for many years of my life.
既然你指的是我在视频游戏行业工作，多年来一直在运行游戏开发者大会。
You can’t play Doom for five minutes on the bus.
你不能在公交车上玩《毁灭战士》五分钟。
Many, many hours have gone into many PlayStation games and Xbox games in an earlier part of my life, and it’s just not part of my life anymore.
在我生命的早期阶段，我花了很多很多时间玩很多 PlayStation 游戏和 Xbox 游戏，但它已经不再是我生活的一部分了。
What do you think you learned from that being such a big part of your life?
你认为你从这成为你生活的重要组成部分中学到了什么？
That’s a good question.
这是一个好问题。
I went from working in essentially little bureaucracies — my first job out of college, I worked in a child welfare agency, and then at a healthcare think tank.
我从本质上在小官僚机构工作——大学毕业后的第一份工作，我在一家儿童福利机构工作，然后在一家医疗保健智库工作。
Then I went away for a year and came back, and I got this job in tech.
然后我离开了一年又回来了，我得到了这份科技工作。
It was amazing to me how creative game developers are.
让我惊讶的是游戏开发者的创造力。
They have this completely unconstrained ability to just imagine entirely different worlds, and of course, the economies of those worlds and build the systems that simulate all sorts of aspects of our lives.
他们拥有完全不受限制的能力，可以想象完全不同的世界，当然还有这些世界的经济，并构建模拟我们生活各个方面的系统。
Then I moved from that into this Web 2.0 era, and then went back into government.
然后我从那个时代进入了 Web 2.0 时代，然后又回到了政府。
I think what I kept with me is that you can imagine fundamentally different things.
我认为我一直坚持的一点是，你可以想象根本不同的事情。
This is an imagination that is so powerful.
这想象力真是太强大了。
The quote I chose for the book Recoding America is a David Graeber quote: “The ultimate hidden truth of the world is that it is something that we make and could just as easily make differently.” I think I got that from the designers of Ultima Online.
我为《重新编码美国》一书选择的引言是大卫·格雷伯的一句话：“世界上隐藏的终极真相是，它是我们制造的，并且可以很容易地做出不同的改变。”我想我是从《网络创世纪》的设计师那里得到的。
My first husband was on the game Spore.
我的第一任丈夫参与了《孢子》游戏。
It was a Will Wright game.
这是威尔·赖特的游戏。
You can have a whole different world, and once you realize that, all these constraints in our daily lives — you realize they’re manufactured.
你可以拥有一个完全不同的世界，一旦你意识到这一点，我们日常生活中的所有这些限制 ——你就会意识到它们都是人为制造的。
I think we have a little bit of that right now.
我想我们现在已经有一点了。
This is going to sound extremely boring compared to what I just said, but since we’ve been touching on federalism a little bit — you talk about the federal civil service and people are like, “It’s a thing.
与我刚才所说的相比，这听起来非常无聊，但既然我们已经稍微触及了联邦制，你谈论联邦公务员制度，人们就会说，“这是一件事。
It can’t change.
它无法改变。
It hasn’t changed since 1978 really, little changes here and there.”
事实上，自 1978 年以来，它就没有改变过，到处都没有什么变化。”
But we don’t just have the federal civil service.
但我们不仅仅有联邦公务员制度。
We have 50 civil services in states that are wildly different.
我们在各州设有 50 个公务员服务机构，各州情况各不相同。
Some states have at-will employment.
有些州实行随意就业。
We can’t imagine that in the federal civil service, and I’m not advocating for that, but I am advocating for us getting out of the trap of “this is the only way it can be” when clearly, even in our own country, there are 50 different models that we could pull from.
我们无法想象在联邦公务员系统中会出现这种情况，我并不提倡这样做，但我提倡我们摆脱“这是唯一的办法”的陷阱，因为显然，即使在我们自己的国家，我们也可以借鉴 50 种不同的模式。
On the best-run state
处于最佳运行状态
Which do you think is our best-run state?
您认为我们哪个州运行得最好？
I really can’t answer that, but I am very interested in Pennsylvania under Shapiro.
我真的无法回答这个问题，但我对夏皮罗领导下的宾夕法尼亚州非常感兴趣。
Great paper by Don Moynihan recently about the work that they’ve done to just speed up things, like permits.
Don Moynihan 最近发表了一篇很棒的论文，介绍了他们为加快审批速度所做的工作。
Maybe it’s boring stuff, but it matters to people.
也许这很无聊，但对人们来说很重要。
Their schools aren’t that great.
他们的学校不是那么好。
Their roads are fine, but he can’t have changed that much.
他们的路很好，但他不可能改变那么多。
The state as a whole doesn’t seem to me exceptionally well governed.
在我看来，整个国家的治理并不是特别良好。
Maybe in the middle somewhere.
也许在中间的某个地方。
I’m more talking about where I see interesting change happening that others could follow.
我更多地谈论我看到其他人可以效仿的有趣变化的地方。
Colorado as well — I think what Polis is doing is really interesting.
科罗拉多州也是如此 —— 我认为 Polis 所做的事情非常有趣。
That seems to me a well-run state overall.
在我看来，总体而言，这是一个运行良好的国家。
Yes.
是的。
Utah.
犹他州。
Yes.
是的。
I don’t know enough about Utah to say that with great certainty, but yes, I think I could see some of that.
我对犹他州的了解还不够，无法肯定地说出这一点，但是，是的，我想我可以看到其中的一些。
There are states that I think have either tackled that procedural accretion or just not let as much procedure accrete in the first place that are going to have an easier time.
我认为有些州要么已经解决了程序增加的问题，要么只是一开始就不让那么多程序增加，这样会更容易。
California, sadly, is not one of those, where I used to live.
遗憾的是，加利福尼亚州不是我曾经居住过的地方之一。
Tell me what you think of Virginia since we’re in the state of Virginia, and I live here now.
告诉我你对弗吉尼亚的看法，因为我们在弗吉尼亚州，而我现在住在这里。
It used to be one of the top few.
曾经是前几名之一。
It’s declined somewhat, but still well above average.
虽然有所下降，但仍远高于平均水平。
It has genuine two-party competition, which I think is a good thing.
它有真正的两方竞争，我认为这是一件好事。
Yes.
是的。
It has this cash cow, the Pentagon, which creates jobs and revenue, yet no one in state government can touch it.
它拥有五角大楼这棵摇钱树，可以创造就业机会和收入，但州政府中没有人能碰它。
You can’t grab from it.
你无法从中获取。
You can’t take corruption from it.
你无法从中消除腐败。
It’s not like Alaska oil revenue.
这不像阿拉斯加的石油收入。
That’s a huge permanent plus that is fully protected.
这是一个受到充分保护的巨大永久优势。
That’s a great natural endowment.
这是一种伟大的自然禀赋。
Again, it’s one of the best states to live in, I would say.
我想说，这是最适合居住的州之一。
I chose well.
我选的不错。
Yes.
是的。
Where did you grow up?
你在哪里长大？
I was born in a naval base in Maryland, but very quickly moved to Austin, Texas, and then moved to New York when I was in 4th grade.
我出生在马里兰州的一个海军基地，但很快就搬到了德克萨斯州奥斯汀，然后在四年级时搬到了纽约。
I grew up in New York City.
我在纽约长大。
New York City.
纽约市。
New York City.
纽约市。
How well run is New York City today, in your opinion?
您认为纽约市如今的管理状况如何？
It’s certainly cleaner and safer than it was in the ’80s when I was growing up.
与我成长过程中的 80 年代相比，这里确实更干净、更安全。
Is that because it’s run better or just because it’s richer?
这是因为它运行得更好还是仅仅因为它更富有？
Probably just because it’s richer.
可能只是因为比较有钱吧。
To be honest, it was smelly , and I got mugged a couple times, but I don’t regret growing up under those circumstances.
说实话，那里很臭，还被抢劫过几次，但我不后悔在那样的环境下长大。
I think it made me who I am.
我认为它造就了现在的我。
I have a fond affection for New York in the ’80s, even though it was a mess.
我对八十年代的纽约怀有深厚的感情，尽管那里一片混乱。
I was there often in the ’80s.
八十年代我经常去那里。
It was a great time.
那是一段美好的时光。
I went to a public school.
我去了一所公立学校。
I went to Bronx High School of Science.
我去了布朗克斯科学高中。
I grew up in New Jersey right across the river.
我在河对岸的新泽西州长大。
They call you into New York City.
他们叫你到纽约市。
“We’ll do whatever you tell us.” What do you tell them to do?
“我们会按照你的吩咐去做。”你告诉他们做什么？
I have a great answer for this because we just wrote a paper.
我对此有一个很好的答案，因为我们刚刚写了一篇论文。
If you want your government to be able to achieve its goals — and I think New York’s got some good goals that they’re not achieving — you need to be able to hire the right people and fire the wrong ones, so you’ve got to look at that civil service system.
如果你希望你的政府能够实现其目标 ——我认为纽约有一些他们没有实现的良好目标—— 你需要能够雇用合适的人并解雇错误的人，所以你必须考虑公务员制度。
New York in particular has a very bad way of hiring.
尤其是纽约的招聘方式非常糟糕。
They still are stuck in these artifacts from the Moses era, where you do these civil service exams, and they only happen at certain times of the year.
它们仍然停留在摩西时代的这些文物中，在那里你进行这些公务员考试，而且它们只在一年中的特定时间进行。
All this stuff that just makes hiring really, really hard.
所有这些事情让招聘变得非常非常困难。
You’ve got to fix that.
你必须解决这个问题。
Second, reduce procedural bloat.
其次，减少程序臃肿。
That’s sort of my favorite one these days.
这是我这些天最喜欢的一个。
These go together.
这些是相辅相成的。
The procedural bloat is what creates that ineffective hiring system.
程序臃肿是导致招聘系统效率低下的原因。
The third thing is you have to invest in digital infrastructure.
第三件事是你必须投资数字基础设施。
Lots to say about that.
对此有很多话要说。
Then the fourth thing is that you have to close that feedback loop between policy and implementation.
第四件事是你必须关闭政策和实施之间的反馈循环。
What that would look like in New York City — I guess it’s the same that it would look like a lot of different places — is that your relationship between law- and policymakers and those that implement those laws has to change.
纽约市的情况 ——“我想在很多不同的地方都是一样的”—— 法律和政策制定者以及执行这些法律的人之间的关系必须改变。
You’ve got to stop firing and forgetting as you make policy, and figure out how to build the affordances for that ongoing iterative feedback.
在制定政策时，你必须停止解雇和忘记，并弄清楚如何为持续的迭代反馈建立可供性。
To close, tell us about your work with Niskanen.
最后，请告诉我们您与尼斯卡宁的合作。
I am loving working with Niskanen.
我很喜欢和尼斯卡宁一起工作。
They were the only think tank that had anything on state capacity when I was finishing my book.
当我完成我的书时，他们是唯一一个拥有有关国家能力的智库。
I hope I’m helping build a team there that can do much more to articulate how any government, especially in the US, at any level, can increase its ability to achieve its policy goals.
我希望我能帮助在那里建立一个团队，该团队可以做更多的事情来阐明任何政府，尤其是美国的任何级别的政府如何提高实现其政策目标的能力。
We have a wonderful team there led by Ben Bain.
我们有一支由本·贝恩 (Ben Bain) 领导的出色团队。
We’re getting a lot of interest from people that never used to pay attention to things like technical infrastructure in the agencies, even from health staffers and members of Congress.
我们从以前从未关注过机构内技术基础设施之类的人那里得到了很大的兴趣，甚至包括卫生工作人员和国会议员。
I’m very hopeful that we’ll start to make a real impact, not just in Congress, but working with states and cities around the country to tackle these four pillars I just talked about.
我非常希望我们能够开始产生真正的影响，不仅在国会，而且与全国各州和城市合作解决我刚才谈到的这四个支柱。
Jennifer Pahlka, thank you very much.
詹妮弗·帕尔卡，非常感谢你。
Thank you.
谢谢。
This was a lot of fun.
这很有趣。