Jack Clark on AI's Uneven Impact (Ep. 242)
Thanks to an anonymous listener for sponsoring this transcript.
感谢一位匿名听众赞助这份文字记录。
Hello everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好,欢迎回到与泰勒对话。
Today, I am at Anthropic with Jack Clark.
今天,我和杰克·克拉克一起在 Anthropic。
As you may know, there is now an Anthropic Economic Index which is measuring the effect of advanced AI on the US economy.
如您所知,现在有一个人类经济指数正在衡量先进人工智能对美国经济的影响。
There are two associated reports as of March 2025, and soon, more to come.
截至 2025 年 3 月,已有两份相关报告,很快还会有更多报告。
Jack, of course, is the co-founder of Anthropic.
当然,杰克是 Anthropic 的联合创始人。
Before that, he was the policy director at OpenAI, a reporter at Bloomberg, and originally, has his background in the humanities.
在此之前,他曾担任 OpenAI 的政策总监、彭博社的记者,原本就有人文背景。
He comes from Brighton, England.
他来自英国布莱顿。
Jack, welcome.
杰克,欢迎。
Well, thanks for having me, Tyler.
好吧,谢谢你邀请我,泰勒。
Pleasure to be here.
很高兴来到这里。
Where is it in our economy that AGI will affect last in a significant manner?
AGI 将对我们经济中的哪些部分产生最后的重大影响?
Ooh, I’d hazard a guess that it’s going to be things that are the trades and the most artisanal parts of them.
哦,我大胆猜测这将是交易以及其中最具手工性的部分。
You might think of trades as having things like electricians or plumbing, or also things like gardening.
您可能会认为行业包括电工或管道工,或者园艺等。
I think within those, you get certain high-status, high-skill parts, where people want to use a certain tradesman, not just because of their skill but because of their notoriety and sometimes an aesthetic quality.
我认为在这些中,你会得到某些地位高、技能高的部分,人们想要使用某个商人,不仅仅是因为他们的技能,还因为他们的恶名,有时还因为审美品质。
I think that my take might be gardening, actually.
实际上,我认为我的兴趣可能是园艺。
They won’t use AGI to help design the garden?
他们不会使用 AGI 来帮助设计花园吗?
Or just the human front will never disappear?
或者只是人类阵线永远不会消失?
I think the human front will never disappear.
我认为人类战线永远不会消失。
People will purchase certain things because of the taste of the person, even if that taste looks like certain types of modern art production, where the artist actually backs onto thousands of people that work for them, and they’re more orchestrating it.
人们会因为这个人的品味而购买某些东西,即使这种品味看起来像某些类型的现代艺术作品,艺术家实际上支持成千上万为他们工作的人,并且他们更多地精心策划它。
How about in the more desk-bound part of the service sector?
服务业中更多的办公桌部分又如何呢?
Where will it come last?
最后会去哪里?
Come last?
最后来?
Ooh, good question.
哦,好问题。
I think that on this, there are certain types of desk-bound work that just require talking to other people and getting to alignment or agreement.
我认为在这方面,某些类型的办公桌工作只需要与其他人交谈并达成一致或一致。
If you count certain types of sales —
如果算上某些类型的销售 —
But it’s great at doing that already, right?
但它已经很擅长这样做了,对吧?
It’s a wonderful therapist.
这是一位很棒的治疗师。
It is, but we don’t send Claude to sell Claude, yet.
是的,但我们还没有派克劳德去卖克劳德。
We send people to sell Claude, even though Claude could probably generate the text to do the sales motion.
我们派人去推销克劳德,尽管克劳德可能会生成文本来执行销售动议。
People want to do commerce with other people, so I think that there’ll be certain relationships which get mediated by people, and people will have a strong preference, probably, for deals that they make on behalf of their larger pools of capital, where the deals are done by human proxies for large automated organizations or pools of capital.
人们希望与其他人进行商业往来,所以我认为某些关系是由人来调解的,而且人们可能会对代表更大的资本池进行的交易有强烈的偏好,这些交易是由大型自动化组织或资本池的人类代理人完成的。
Where will AGI encounter the strongest legal obstacles?
AGI会在哪里遇到最强的法律障碍?
I think a few years ago, it was encountering quite strong obstacles in the law itself because lawyers tended to like being able to charge very high prices and had a dislike of things that could bid them down.
我认为几年前,它在法律本身遇到了相当大的障碍,因为律师往往喜欢能够收取非常高的价格,并且不喜欢可以压低价格的东西。
My less flippant answer is, probably big chunks of healthcare because it’s bound up in certain things around how we handle personal data, all of the standards around that.
我不那么轻率的回答是,可能是医疗保健的很大一部分,因为它与我们如何处理个人数据的某些事情以及与之相关的所有标准有关。
All of those standards are probably going to need to be changed in some form to make them amenable to being used by AI.
所有这些标准可能都需要以某种形式进行改变,以使其适合人工智能的使用。
We’ve had a really hard time updating or changing data standards in general.
总的来说,我们在更新或改变数据标准方面经历了一段非常困难的时期。
Once you can put the AI on your own hard drive, which will be pretty soon, won’t that all change?
一旦你可以将人工智能放在你自己的硬盘上(这很快就会发生),这一切不会改变吗?
It will change in the form of gray market expertise, but not official expertise.
它将以灰色市场专业知识的形式发生变化,但不会以官方专业知识的形式发生变化。
I had a baby recently.
我最近生了孩子。
Whenever my baby bonks their head, while I’m dialing the advice nurse, I talk to Claude just to reassure myself that the baby isn’t in trouble.
每当我的宝宝撞头时,当我给咨询护士打电话时,我都会和克劳德交谈,只是为了让自己放心,宝宝没有遇到麻烦。
I don’t think we actually fully permit healthcare uses via our own terms of service.
我认为我们实际上并没有通过我们自己的服务条款完全允许医疗保健用途。
We don’t recommend it because we’re worried about all of the liability issues this contains, but I know through my revealed preference that I’m always going to want to use that, but I can’t take that Claude assessment and give it to Kaiser Permanente.
我们不推荐它,因为我们担心其中包含的所有责任问题,但通过我透露的偏好,我知道我总是想要使用它,但我不能接受克劳德的评估并将其交给凯撒永久。
I actually have to talk through a human to get everything else to happen on the back end to work out if they need to prescribe my child something.
实际上,我必须与一个人交谈,让后端发生其他所有事情,以确定他们是否需要给我的孩子开一些药。
So, the number one job will be surreptitiously transmitting the generation of information that comes from AIs, in essence?
那么,第一项工作本质上是秘密传输人工智能生成的信息?
Some of it may be that.
其中一些可能是这样的。
Some of it is about laundering the information that comes from AIs into human systems that are not predisposed to that information going in directly.
其中一些是关于将来自人工智能的信息洗白到不倾向于直接输入这些信息的人类系统中。
On AI’s adoption curve in government
人工智能在政府中的采用曲线
I was thinking you might say the United States government, or some parts of it, would be where strong AI would come last.
我想你可能会说美国政府或其某些部门将是强人工智能最后出现的地方。
I think that would be my forecast.
我想这就是我的预测。
They still use software from the ’60s or maybe even the ’50s sometimes.
他们有时仍然使用 60 年代甚至 50 年代的软件。
They do, but I actually suspect that that could be a place where we see really rapid changes, actually, and for a couple of reasons.
他们确实如此,但我实际上怀疑这可能是一个我们看到真正快速变化的地方,实际上,有几个原因。
One, we know that AI has relevance to national security.
第一,我们知道人工智能与国家安全相关。
It develops certain types of capabilities.
它发展某些类型的能力。
Oh, yes, that will happen quickly —
噢,是的,这很快就会发生 ——
Yes, that’ll happen quickly.
是的,这很快就会发生。
— but the rest of government.
——但是政府的其他部门。
The rest of government.
政府的其余部分。
The Department of Education, HHS, HUD.
教育部、HHS、HUD。
The non-scary, sharp parts of government.
政府中不可怕、尖锐的部分。
I would wager that it will become surprisingly easy to get it into really hard parts of government, and then there will be a question of political will.
我敢打赌,将其纳入政府真正困难的部分将会变得出人意料地容易,然后就会出现政治意愿的问题。
All around the world — and I’m sure you experience this — governments desperately want growth, and they desperately want efficiency.
世界各地 ——我相信你也经历过这一点—— 政府迫切需要增长,他们迫切需要效率。
We see that here today in —
我们今天在这里看到——
Do they?
他们有吗?
They say that.
他们这么说。
Oh, I agree there.
哦,我同意。
But I think if you look at, also, things like voter polling and other things, people want to see more changes out of government than they’re currently getting.
但我认为,如果你也看看选民投票和其他事情,人们希望看到政府做出比目前更多的改变。
I think, sometimes, constituent preferences do ultimately change what their elected officials do.
我认为,有时,选民的偏好最终确实会改变他们选出的官员的行为。
I would just take the other side of this, that government may move slightly faster than you think.
我只想从另一方面来看,政府的行动可能比你想象的要快一些。
It may be very large, established companies that end up having some of the greatest resistance to this in certain areas.
可能是非常大的、成熟的公司最终在某些领域遇到了最大的阻力。
Let’s say it was decided that half of the staff of HUD or Department of Education could be replaced by strong AI or AGI.
假设 HUD 或教育部的一半员工可以被强大的 AI 或 AGI 取代。
Do we first need to hire more people to make that happen?
我们首先需要雇佣更多的人来实现这一目标吗?
Who is it we can hire and at what wage that switches the system so you can lay off the remaining half?
我们可以雇用谁,以多少工资来切换系统,以便您可以解雇剩下的一半?
I don’t understand how that’s ever going to work.
我不明白这将如何运作。
I think that it will only work in a scenario where the system has got so powerful that you can bring the AI system in itself to help you think through this.
我认为它只有在系统变得如此强大以至于你可以将人工智能系统本身引入来帮助你思考的情况下才会起作用。
Then there will be a question of political will, which is where this all might break down.
然后就会出现政治意愿问题,而这正是这一切可能崩溃的地方。
What do you think is the chance that we decide to protect, say, half of the jobs in existence today with laws analogous to those we find in law and medicine against strong AGI?
你认为我们决定通过类似于我们在法律和医学中发现的针对强大通用人工智能的法律来保护现有的一半工作岗位的机会有多大?
I think there is a high chance for a political movement to arrive which tries to freeze a load of human jobs in bureaucratic amber as a way to deal with the political issues posed by this incredibly powerful technology and how fast the changes are going to come from.
我认为很有可能会出现一场政治运动,试图将大量人类工作冻结在官僚琥珀中,以此来解决这种极其强大的技术所带来的政治问题以及变化的速度。
I don’t think that we’ll do this in a reasoned way.
我认为我们不会以合理的方式这样做。
I think it’ll be driven by the chaotic winds of political forces.
我认为这将是由政治力量的混乱之风推动的。
It feels like the sort of outcome that happens if we, as the companies building this stuff, and our customers don’t generate enough examples of what good transitions look like.
如果我们作为构建这些东西的公司和我们的客户没有提供足够的例子来说明什么是良好的过渡,那么就会出现这种结果。
The fewer bits of evidence you have there and the more evidence you have of larger economic changes, probably the higher chance there’ll be a desire to step in and protect workers in different domains, which comes from an impulse based around wanting to help people, but it might ultimately not be the most helpful thing over the course of decades to do that.
你掌握的证据越少,而关于更大的经济变化的证据越多,可能就会有更大的机会介入并保护不同领域的工人,这种愿望来自于想要帮助人们的冲动,但最终可能不是几十年来最有帮助的事情。
But is it possible that’s actually, in a constrained sense, the very best outcome?
但从某种意义上来说,这实际上有可能是最好的结果吗?
People will still have a job.
人们仍然会有工作。
They’ll go somewhere in the morning.
他们早上会去某个地方。
A lot of the work, especially the hard work, will be done by the AIs.
很多工作,尤其是艰苦的工作,将由人工智能来完成。
Obviously, we’ll be richer, so we can afford this.
显然,我们会变得更富有,所以我们负担得起。
All of a sudden, it won’t feel that bad to people.
突然之间,人们就不会感觉那么糟糕了。
Life will look familiar.
生活将会看起来很熟悉。
Isn’t that, in a sense, what we should be aiming for?
从某种意义上说,这不正是我们应该追求的目标吗?
I think we should be aiming for a —
我认为我们的目标应该是——
In the same sense, you might need, say, a generous welfare state to have free trade.
从同样的意义上说,你可能需要一个慷慨的福利国家来实现自由贸易。
The welfare state isn’t always the most efficient, but if people accept freer trade, it’s an okay bargain.
福利国家并不总是最有效的,但如果人们接受更自由的贸易,这是一个不错的讨价还价。
Isn’t this, in a sense, the welfare state for the service workers?
从某种意义上来说,这不就是服务业人员的福利国家吗?
And they still get to go somewhere in the morning if they want to, but they don’t have to.
如果他们愿意的话,他们仍然可以在早上去某个地方,但他们不必这样做。
I believe that all people, have a desire for meaning and salience to what they do on a day-to-day basis.
我相信所有人都渴望自己每天所做的事情具有意义和显着性。
My worry with what you describe — it might not feel like it has sufficient meaning.
我对你所描述的内容感到担忧 ——它可能感觉没有足够的意义。
I think that there is some giant class of activity that we want to continue happening in the world that people do and from which they draw meaning, but I don’t know that the best way to get there is to take some class of work and say this is work that we’re protecting and from which meaning will spring.
我认为,我们希望人们在世界上继续进行一些巨大的活动,并从中汲取意义,但我不知道实现这一目标的最佳方法是采取某种工作,并说这是我们正在保护的工作,并且意义将从中产生。
Because I’m not confident that you’ll pick a load of jobs which naturally create their own meaning in that sense.
因为我不相信你会选择一堆自然而然地创造出自己意义的工作。
Hasn’t this succeeded in academia pre-AI?
这在人工智能之前的学术界不是已经成功了吗?
Most academic jobs are not that meaningful.
大多数学术工作并没有那么有意义。
The research people do — it’s not read by anyone.
人们所做的研究——没有人会读。
Maybe they’re decent teachers, but people take great pride in their research.
也许他们是体面的老师,但人们对他们的研究感到非常自豪。
They put a lot of effort into it.
他们为此付出了很多努力。
It’s meaningless.
这是没有意义的。
It seems we solved that problem already.
看来我们已经解决了这个问题。
We’re just going to take the academic model, but instead of it being research, bring it to, say, half of our current economy just to keep it going.
我们只是要采用学术模型,但不是将其用于研究,而是将其应用到我们当前经济的一半,只是为了让它继续下去。
Isn’t there a kind of angst and nihilism even within high-achieving parts of academia for this reason?
学术界的高成就人士难道不因此而产生一种焦虑和虚无主义吗?
Seems like when you speak to people, even very smart people who sometimes are doing the things you describe, they know they could be doing different things, and they are trapped into some kind of status game.
似乎当你与人们交谈时,即使是非常聪明的人,他们有时会做你所描述的事情,他们知道他们可以做不同的事情,并且他们陷入了某种地位游戏。
There’s some of that, but even the Nobel laureates — they’re rivalrous with each other.
确实有一些这样的情况,但即使是诺贝尔奖得主,他们之间也存在竞争。
They can be very bitchy, very petty, but that’s just human nature, right?
他们可能非常恶毒、非常小气,但这就是人性,对吗?
If the Nobel laureates aren’t happy, there’s no post-AI world that’s going to do much better than how we’re doing for the Nobel laureates today, right?
如果诺贝尔奖获得者不高兴,那么没有一个后人工智能世界会比我们今天为诺贝尔奖获得者所做的更好,对吗?
Maybe my pushback is, I think that all of this could happen sufficiently quickly that we might have the opportunity to just play different higher-status games that are afforded to us via AI and the productive capacity it unlocks.
也许我的反对意见是,我认为所有这一切都可能发生得足够快,我们可能有机会玩通过人工智能及其释放的生产能力为我们提供的不同的更高地位的游戏。
There are definitely going to be entirely new jobs that involve marshaling and fielding AI systems for all kinds of work.
肯定会出现全新的工作,涉及为各种工作编组和部署人工智能系统。
I think there’ll be —
我想会有 ——
But those are hard jobs, right?
但这些都是艰苦的工作,对吧?
Yes, but I think that there are going to be analogs which look more like creative, fun exercises in getting AIs to build things, or make things, or almost carry out competitions and games where people can play them with one another.
是的,但我认为将会有一些类似的东西看起来更像是创造性的、有趣的练习,让人工智能来建造东西、制造东西,或者几乎进行人们可以互相玩的比赛和游戏。
And I think there’ll be entirely new forms of entertainment that has some amount of meaning, and perhaps an economic engine wired into it that people can participate in.
我认为将会出现具有一定意义的全新娱乐形式,也许还会有一个人们可以参与的经济引擎。
On AI teddy bears
关于人工智能泰迪熊
I believe we’re not that far from the age of what I call the AI teddy bears.
我相信我们距离人工智能泰迪熊的时代已经不远了。
You know what I mean when I say that?
你知道我这么说的意思吗?
Yes.
是的。
What percentage of parents now will buy those teddy bears for their kids and allow it?
现在有多少比例的父母会为他们的孩子购买这些泰迪熊并允许这样做?
I’ve had this thought since I have a person, that is my child, that’s almost two.
自从我有了一个人,那就是我的孩子,快两岁了,我就有这个想法。
Sure.
当然。
I am annoyed I can’t buy the teddy bear yet.
我很生气我还买不到泰迪熊。
I think most parents —
我想大多数父母 ——
You’re an outlier .
你是个异类。
No. I don’t know.
不,我不知道。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
You are cofounder of Anthropic, right?
你是 Anthropic 的联合创始人,对吗?
I don’t think I’m an outlier.
我不认为我是一个局外人。
I think that once your lovable child starts to speak and display endless curiosity and a need to be satiated, you first think, “How can I get them hanging out with other human children as quickly as possible?” So, we’re on the preschool list, all of that stuff.
我认为,一旦你可爱的孩子开始说话并表现出无尽的好奇心和满足的需要,你首先会想:“我怎样才能让他们尽快与其他人类孩子一起出去玩?”所以,我们在学前班名单上,所有这些东西。
I’ve had this thought, “Oh, I wish you could talk to your bunny occasionally so that the bunny would provide you some entertainment while I’m putting the dishes away, or making you dinner, or something.” Often, you just need another person to be there to help you wrangle the child and keep them interested.
我有过这样的想法,“哦,我希望你能偶尔和你的兔子说话,这样我在收拾盘子、给你做晚饭什么的时候,兔子就能给你一些娱乐。”通常,您只需要另一个人在那里帮助您与孩子争论并保持他们的兴趣。
I think lots of parents would do this.
我想很多家长都会这么做。
Say that the kid says to you, “Daddy, I prefer the bunny to my friends.
假设孩子对你说:“爸爸,比起朋友,我更喜欢兔子。
Can I stay at home today?” Do you take the bunny away?
我今天可以呆在家里吗?”你把兔子带走吗?
That’s the tough part, right?
这是最困难的部分,对吧?
I think that’s the part where you have them spend more time with their friends, but you keep the bunny in their life because the bunny is just going to get smarter and be more around them as they grow up.
我认为这就是你让他们花更多时间和朋友在一起的部分,但你把兔子留在他们的生活中,因为随着兔子的成长,兔子会变得更聪明,更多地在他们身边。
If you take it away, they’ll probably do something really strange with smart AI friends in the future.
如果你把它拿走,他们将来可能会和聪明的人工智能朋友一起做一些非常奇怪的事情。
No, I don’t think I’m an outlier here.
不,我不认为我是这里的局外人。
I think most parents, if they could acquire a well-meaning friend that could provide occasional entertainment to their child when their child is being very trying, they would probably do it .
我认为大多数父母,如果他们能找到一个善意的朋友,可以在孩子非常努力的时候偶尔为他们提供娱乐,他们可能会这么做。
I feel the word “occasional” is doing a lot of work in that sentence.
我觉得“偶尔”这个词在这句话中发挥了很大的作用。
COWEN: If you can just ration how much your kid has the bunny, parents are going to love it, I agree.
考恩:如果你能定量给你的孩子养兔子的数量,父母就会喜欢它,我同意。
The same as with screens.
与屏幕相同。
A lot of children — they keep on wanting it.
很多孩子——他们一直想要它。
It’s hard to tell the child you can’t have it now.
很难告诉孩子你现在不能拥有它。
In the old days, it was watching television.
古时候,就是看电视。
“Oh, Mom, can I watch Star Trek again?
“哦,妈妈,我可以再看一遍《星际迷航》吗?
Can I watch TV seven hours a day?” Well, that’s not good, and that’s hard to ration.
我可以每天看七个小时电视吗?”嗯,这不好,而且很难定量。
Yes, so there’s some question here of how we portion this out.
是的,所以这里有一些关于我们如何分配的问题。
We do this today with TV, where if you’re traveling with us, like on a plane with us, or if you’re sick, you get to watch TV — the baby — and otherwise, you don’t, because from various perspectives, it seems like it’s not the most helpful thing.
我们今天通过电视来做到这一点,如果你和我们一起旅行,比如和我们一起坐飞机,或者如果你生病了,你可以看电视 —— 婴儿 —— 否则,你就不会看,因为从不同的角度来看,这似乎不是最有帮助的事情。
You’ll probably need to find a way to gate this.
您可能需要找到一种方法来控制这一点。
It could be, “When mom and dad are doing chores to help you, you get the thing.
可能是,“当爸爸妈妈帮你做家务时,你就明白了。
When they’re not doing chores, the thing goes away.”
当他们不做家务时,事情就会消失。”
Do you end up with too much surveillance over your kid?
您是否对您的孩子进行了过多的监视?
You’ll know everything if you want to, right?
只要你愿意,你就会知道一切,对吗?
That might be a reason why you give the kid the bunny all the more.
这可能就是你给孩子更多兔子的原因。
I think it comes down to frequency, which I mentioned, and also what you are and aren’t allowed to know.
我认为这取决于我提到的频率,以及你知道什么和不被允许知道什么。
I find surveillance puzzling.
我觉得监控令人费解。
We have one of these smart webcams that we got when the kids were early, so that you just see that they’re asleep.
我们有一个智能网络摄像头,是在孩子们早起时安装的,这样你就可以看到他们睡着了。
If they’re waking up, you work out if they’re okay or not.
如果他们醒来了,你就可以知道他们是否还好。
The main thing that that meant is that when the baby cries at night, sometimes we go in less than if we didn’t have the camera because if we didn’t have the camera, we’d have to go and check.
这意味着,当婴儿在晚上哭泣时,有时我们会比没有相机时进去得少,因为如果我们没有相机,我们就必须去检查。
As a consequence, my baby tends to sleep through the night a lot more because they don’t get occasionally interrupted.
因此,我的宝宝往往会睡得更多,因为他们不会偶尔被打扰。
Sometimes they wake and cry for a minute and just go back to sleep.
有时他们会醒来并哭泣一分钟,然后又继续睡觉。
I think sometimes this stuff allows you to actually interfere less in a person’s life if you know certain things about it.
我认为有时候,如果你了解某人的某些事情,这些东西实际上可以让你更少地干预一个人的生活。
Say you have the hypothesis that so many seven-year-olds — they talk to themselves.
假设你有这样的假设:很多七岁的孩子都会自言自语。
They say weird things, and the AI bunny is going to report back to you, “Your kid says — “
他们说奇怪的话,人工智能兔子会向你报告,“你的孩子说 — ”
If the bunny says your kid is saying strange stuff —
如果兔子说你的孩子在说奇怪的话 ——
But they all say strange stuff.
但他们都说一些奇怪的话。
I might have been chattering on about the New York Mets at age seven, and it would have been perfectly harmless, but it may not have sounded that way.
我七岁时可能一直在谈论纽约大都会队,这本来是完全无害的,但听起来可能并非如此。
You’re going to need to create spaces for unmonitored creativity in people.
你需要为人们不受监控的创造力创造空间。
Actually, the same as how we have an approach to AI research today.
实际上,就像我们今天的人工智能研究方法一样。
Now, AI systems can output their chains of thought, which is the reasoning they use to come up with answers.
现在,人工智能系统可以输出他们的思维链,这是他们用来得出答案的推理。
We’ve had this question at Anthropic of how much should we monitor the chains of thought?
我们在 Anthropic 提出了这样一个问题:我们应该在多大程度上监控思想链?
If you actually monitor them, you might create an anti-goal where the system ends up wanting to have chains of thought which are safe to be monitored and which don’t cause demerits, which might actually break how it thinks in a bunch of ways.
如果你真的监控它们,你可能会创建一个反目标,系统最终希望拥有可以安全监控且不会造成过失的思想链,这实际上可能会在很多方面打破它的思维方式。
I think this analog applies here, where you’re going to need to choose how much you actually decide to know about people, or you risk creating incentives that change their behavior such that they have a negative effect.
我认为这个类比适用于这里,你需要选择你实际上决定了解人们的程度,否则你就有可能创建改变他们行为的激励措施,从而产生负面影响。
You’ll go out on a date, and your date will say, “Please show me your AI report, what you’ve been talking to yourself about for the last three months.” You can not show it, which is a negative signal, or show it.
你出去约会,你的约会对象会说:“请给我看看你的人工智能报告,看看你在过去三个月里一直在自言自语。”你不能表现出来,这是一个负面信号,或者表现出来。
We all learn what other people are really like, and we just grow to accept that?
我们都了解其他人的真实情况,然后我们就逐渐接受这一点?
Yes.
是的。
Although, if the person asked you to do that on the first date, it’s fine.
不过,如果对方在第一次约会时就要求你这么做,那也没关系。
If they ask on a second date, you probably shouldn’t be dating that person.
如果他们要求第二次约会,你可能不应该和那个人约会。
Even during the swipe, the AI — you’re asked to upload it.
即使在滑动过程中,AI — 也会要求你上传它。
The AI just reads the other AI report, and the person never sees it, and it tells you when you should swipe in the correct way.
人工智能只是读取其他人工智能报告,而该人永远不会看到它,它会告诉你何时应该以正确的方式滑动。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
I don’t know if that’s so bad.
我不知道那是不是那么糟糕。
I met my wife on OkCupid.
我在 OkCupid 上认识了我的妻子。
I don’t know if you recall this.
我不知道你是否还记得这一点。
It was an online dating site where you would fill out a survey.
这是一个在线约会网站,您可以在其中填写一份调查。
Of course.
当然。
Match.com, for me, is where I met my wife.
Match.com 对我来说是我认识我妻子的地方。
Exactly.
确切地。
Then I met her.
然后我遇见了她。
Our non-AI but automated system had said, “You guys might get along.” So, we met each other that way.
我们的非人工智能但自动化系统说:“你们可能会相处得很好。”于是,我们就这样认识了。
I don’t know that this is so different to previous things we’ve used.
我不知道这与我们以前使用过的东西有如此不同。
But that’s information you’re putting in voluntarily as opposed to it watching you all the time.
但这是你自愿输入的信息,而不是它一直监视你。
Yes.
是的。
I just think that this is an area where we’re going to figure out the new norms of this technology and what seems appropriate and not appropriate.
我只是认为,我们将在这个领域找出这项技术的新规范,以及什么是合适的,什么是不合适的。
Some of that is just going to be solved through the logic of business, and other things through usage.
其中一些问题将通过业务逻辑来解决,而其他问题则通过使用来解决。
On the new economics of media
论媒体的新经济
What will the economics of media look like?
媒体经济学会是什么样子?
If you can read a digest of everything that is probably better than the original, or certainly not worse, or more synthetic.
如果你能阅读所有内容的摘要,那么它可能比原始版本更好,或者肯定不会更差,或者更综合。
Who gets paid for what?
谁因什么而获得报酬?
I think that this is one of the toughest questions in front of us.
我认为这是我们面前最棘手的问题之一。
As you know, I’m a former journalist.
如你所知,我是一名前记者。
I grew up as a professional during the period when online ad market changes were altering the business model of journalism.
在我作为一名专业人士成长的时期,在线广告市场的变化正在改变新闻业的商业模式。
They were switching from what you might think of as value that you derive through quality, through subscriptions or people buying your stuff to value that you derive from just large-scale attention because that became a lot of the model for funding this stuff.
他们正在从你可能认为的通过质量、订阅或人们购买你的东西获得的价值转变为你从大规模关注中获得的价值,因为这成为了资助这些东西的很多模式。
As a consequence, you saw the need to cross-subsidize journalists with journalists that got loads of eyeballs, and journalists like me, who would write about databases got less eyeballs.
因此,你会看到有必要对那些拥有大量眼球的记者进行交叉补贴,而像我这样撰写有关数据库的记者则获得较少的眼球。
We were cross-subsidized by the people that wrote about Justin Bieber or what have you.
我们得到了那些写贾斯汀·比伯之类的文章的人的交叉补贴。
I think for media — it’s going to be really challenging to think through how the economics of this work.
我认为对于媒体来说——思考其经济效益如何运作将是非常具有挑战性的。
I think that it’ll change in a couple of ways.
我认为它会在几个方面发生变化。
One, you might move to some of these larger-scale publishing house–style models for certain types of fictional universes which have subsidy and cross-subsidy within them.
第一,对于某些类型的虚构宇宙,您可能会转向一些大型出版社风格的模型,这些模型内部有补贴和交叉补贴。
Where does the cross-subsidy come from?
交叉补贴从哪里来?
Bloomberg — we know how that works.
彭博社 ——我们知道这是如何运作的。
If AGI is truly general, and it’s based on what’s out there already, it should be able to do better than media on all dimensions.
如果 AGI 真正具有通用性,并且它基于已有的内容,那么它应该能够在所有方面都比媒体做得更好。
I think some things, you want to have come from a person for reasons that are based on the fact that we’re people.
我认为有些东西,你希望来自一个人,因为我们是人这一事实。
I think people will preferentially select the media which is fronted by other people, even if they’re making it using other means.
我认为人们会优先选择由其他人主导的媒体,即使他们使用其他方式制作。
I also think you want a kernel of humanity in a load of this stuff.
我还认为你想要在这些东西中包含人性的核心。
Then there’ll be another type of media which is maybe attached to these subscription models, which is just on-tap permutations of anything and everything.
然后,可能还会有另一种类型的媒体附加到这些订阅模型上,这只是任何事物的即时排列。
So, there might be two markets that emerge.
因此,可能会出现两个市场。
Even the things we want to come from humans — say we want Ann Landers, the advice columnist, to come from an actual Ann Landers.
甚至我们希望来自人类的东西——比如我们希望建议专栏作家安·兰德斯来自真实的安·兰德斯。
The Ann Landers of the world — they’re using AIs, maybe surreptitiously, but the value of that is bid down because anyone can do that for the price of energy.
世界上的安·兰德斯(Ann Landers)——他们正在使用人工智能,也许是偷偷摸摸的,但其价值被低估了,因为任何人都可以以能源价格做到这一点。
So, we don’t really end up with this one part of the revenue-generating sector that can cross-subsidize the other parts.
因此,我们最终并没有真正获得可以对其他部分进行交叉补贴的创收部门的这一部分。
Just if intelligence is pretty cheap, that hits all of media.
如果情报相当廉价,那么所有媒体都会受到影响。
It hits all of media, and you will end up wanting to pay individuals.
它影响了所有媒体,你最终会想付钱给个人。
I think that happens even in the world we’re in today.
我认为即使在我们今天所处的世界也会发生这种情况。
People want to subsidize individual creators who may be using a whole bunch of this stuff.
人们想要补贴可能使用大量这些东西的个人创作者。
It’s like Substack world.
这就像子堆栈世界。
It’s Substack Patreon world for a large chunk of people, some of which will be incredibly successful.
对于很多人来说,这是 Substack Patreon 的世界,其中一些人将会取得令人难以置信的成功。
Then, I think, there’s also going to be universe world for certain universes which are very large and rich, which are being extended by AI systems.
然后,我认为,对于某些非常大和丰富的宇宙来说,也会有宇宙世界,这些宇宙正在被人工智能系统扩展。
You mean, like a Lord of the Rings universe.
你的意思是,就像指环王的宇宙一样。
Yes, or Warhammer 40k, to show my nerd credentials.
是的,或者是《战锤 40k》,以展示我的书呆子资格。
They’ll publish fictional news, right?
他们会发布虚构的新闻,对吗?
Yes.
是的。
Real news will come from Substack?
真正的消息会来自 Substack 吗?
Substack is not an obvious cross-subsidy.
Substack并不是一个明显的交叉补贴。
There might be within the Substack company.
Substack公司内部可能有。
Real news — I genuinely don’t know.
真正的新闻 —— 我真的不知道。
I think some real news comes from analysis of publicly available facts, and it being composed together in a way that shows you insights that didn’t exist.
我认为一些真实的新闻来自对公开事实的分析,并将其以一种向你展示不存在的见解的方式组合在一起。
Semianalysis on Substack is a good example of this, a lot of public stuff leading to interesting conclusions.
Substack 上的半分析就是一个很好的例子,很多公开的东西都得出了有趣的结论。
But news in the moment that has loads of context was subsidized by previous business models which mostly no longer work, and I genuinely don’t know what happens to it.
但目前有大量背景信息的新闻是由以前的商业模式补贴的,这些商业模式大多不再有效,我真的不知道它会发生什么。
On the economics of LLM providers
论LLM提供者的经济学
If we think about what we now call LLMs, five or ten years from now, that kind of AI — how concentrated or how competitive do you think the sector will be?
如果我们想想我们现在所说的法学硕士,五年或十年后,那种人工智能 ——你认为这个行业的集中度或竞争力如何?
I don’t know if number of firms is exactly the right measure, but how do you see it evolving?
我不知道公司数量是否是正确的衡量标准,但您如何看待它的演变?
Right now, there’s at least six firms.
目前,至少有六家公司。
Depending how you count China, there are some complications, but there’s a bunch of firms, a lot of competition.
这取决于你如何看待中国,这会带来一些复杂的情况,但那里有很多公司,竞争也很激烈。
I would expect that there will be, for quite some time — many, many years — areas where there are slightly different specialisms on all of these things.
我预计,在相当长的一段时间内——“很多很多年”——所有这些领域的专业知识都会略有不同。
They’ll be concentric circles that have got massively large in terms of the space that they cover, and they’ll have edges which are slightly differentiated.
它们将是同心圆,其覆盖的空间非常大,并且它们的边缘略有不同。
But in those edges will be where the frontier of certain types of human value stacks on top of AI value to lead to people choosing one or the other.
但在这些边缘,某些类型的人类价值的前沿将叠加在人工智能价值之上,导致人们选择其中之一。
Claude is more poetic, for instance.
例如,克劳德更有诗意。
A bad example due to the economics of poetry aren’t particularly great.
诗歌经济学的坏例子并不是特别好。
Coding might be a better example.
编码可能是一个更好的例子。
Or there could be cases for things like certain types of scientific experimentation where, actually, taste might come to matter a lot for composing experiments.
或者,在某些情况下,例如某些类型的科学实验,实际上,品味对于撰写实验可能非常重要。
I expect we enter a world where you have a single digit number of these very, very large-scale models which are servicing a much larger set of wrappers on top of them that change the form factor by which they get integrated into your life, and which have a load of helper functions or knowledge, probably built by those AIs in partnership with some kind of other specialized AI system, or expert knowledge from that domain to chain it in.
我希望我们进入这样一个世界:你拥有这些非常非常大规模的模型的个位数,这些模型为它们之上的一组更大的包装器提供服务,这些包装器改变了它们融入你的生活的形式因素,并且具有大量的辅助功能或知识,可能是由这些人工智能与某种其他专门的人工智能系统合作构建的,或者来自该领域的专家知识来链接它。
Here’s a worry I have.
这是我的一个担忧。
My former colleague, Vernon Smith, once wrote a paper on this.
我的前同事弗农·史密斯(Vernon Smith)曾经就此写过一篇论文。
He argued that, as you approach six competitors or more, a sector essentially behaves like perfect competition, even if it’s not exactly perfectly competitive.
他认为,当你接近六个或更多竞争对手时,一个行业本质上表现为完全竞争,即使它并不完全是完全竞争。
If that’s the case, how is it that AI, or indeed, any other companies, can behave ethically above and beyond what they need to do to stay in the market and earn profit?
如果是这样的话,人工智能,或者任何其他公司,如何能够在道德上超越他们留在市场并赚取利润所需的行为?
What room is there to be better than the next company?
与下一家公司相比,还有哪些空间可以做得更好?
I think right now, it’s like we’re car companies, and we are mostly selling cars to teenagers who say, “How fast is it?
我认为现在,就像我们是汽车公司,我们主要向青少年销售汽车,他们会问:“速度有多快?
And can I get it in red?” We’re beginning to find customers that are businesses that operate fleets of cars and say, “What seat belts does it have?
我可以把它变成红色吗?”我们开始找到经营车队的企业客户,他们会问:“它有什么安全带?
What is your accident rate?
您的事故率是多少?
What are all of these other properties?” The teenager has never asked us about, but these businesses do because it ties to their business model, or to liability, or to other things.
所有这些其他属性是什么?”这个青少年从来没有问过我们这个问题,但这些企业却这样做了,因为这与他们的商业模式、责任或其他事情有关。
I think, therefore, there are technologies to be built that look like the safety equivalents that we have in cars or other things, which will change the logic of competition.
因此,我认为,有些技术看起来就像我们在汽车或其他事物中所拥有的安全技术,这将改变竞争的逻辑。
We’re in competition right now.
我们现在正处于竞争之中。
That competition will change as we unlock different markets that have different properties that they need to be present in the AI system.
当我们解锁具有不同属性的不同市场时,这种竞争将会发生变化,这些属性需要出现在人工智能系统中。
Those properties will often ladder up to certain types of safety technology.
这些特性通常会升级到某些类型的安全技术。
So, the price of insurance is carrying the mechanism, so to speak?
那么,保险的价格是承载机制,可以这么说吗?
I believe that this will be one of the ways that it helps, yes.
是的,我相信这将是有帮助的方式之一。
How do we need to change or improve liability law for the price of insurance to actually carry that?
我们需要如何改变或改进保险价格的责任法才能真正承担这一责任?
Because right now, liabilities from AI of all sorts.
因为现在,人工智能带来了各种各样的负债。
It’s highly unclear.
这非常不清楚。
I have thought less about liability and more about information that should be made available by the companies, but I think these have an interplay where, today, there isn’t really a common labeling or disclosure standard about what are in these AI systems or the industrial practices you’ve used when making them.
我较少考虑责任,更多地考虑公司应提供的信息,但我认为这些之间存在相互作用,目前,对于这些人工智能系统中的内容或制造它们时使用的工业实践,并没有真正通用的标签或披露标准。
I think that this is ultimately an area where you can do interventions to get some common level of transparency.
我认为这最终是一个你可以进行干预以获得一定程度的透明度的领域。
That’ll interplay with both liability and also things like negligence, which will change the behavior of these companies over time.
这将与责任和疏忽等因素相互作用,随着时间的推移,这将改变这些公司的行为。
There’s some level of common information we can start providing about these systems, which will also change corporate behavior.
我们可以开始提供有关这些系统的某种程度的通用信息,这也将改变企业行为。
The information part worries me, though.
不过,信息部分让我担心。
I’m more inclined to be an accelerationist and hope the benefits outrace the costs, which I definitely think they will.
我更倾向于成为一个加速主义者,并希望收益超过成本,我肯定认为他们会的。
But information only picks up the private value, so the social cost to the decision you make.
但信息只会体现私人价值,因此你做出的决定会产生社会成本。
The information doesn’t change what you do very much.
这些信息不会对你所做的事情产生太大改变。
People know a lot about global warming.
人们对全球变暖了解很多。
Some people eat less meat, but for the most part, they don’t, right?
有些人吃肉较少,但大多数情况下,他们不吃肉,对吗?
Well, one of the things that you do is, you create information which becomes truly common.
嗯,你所做的事情之一就是,你创造了真正变得普遍的信息。
The economic index work we’ve done is from one single firm, but ultimately, you might want to generalize that to all firms, but then link it to large-scale data gathering that governments might do.
我们所做的经济指数工作来自一家公司,但最终,您可能希望将其推广到所有公司,然后将其与政府可能进行的大规模数据收集联系起来。
I think if that became the case, you would have a higher chance of tying it to actual policy responses that would be larger in scope.
我认为,如果情况确实如此,你将更有可能将其与范围更大的实际政策反应联系起来。
I also think, on climate change, just by measuring things like parts per million — stuff like that has helped catalyze large-scale amounts of capital to get re-mobilized around the economy in different areas to deal with this perceived negative impact that that has.
我还认为,在气候变化方面,仅仅通过测量百万分之一之类的东西,就有助于催化大规模资本在不同领域的经济中重新动员起来,以应对由此带来的负面影响。
Do you agree with my view that we will not have meaningful international agreements on the hard parts of AI?
您是否同意我的观点,即我们不会就人工智能的困难部分达成有意义的国际协议?
Maybe on the simple parts.
也许是在简单的部分。
Ninety percent agreement.
百分之九十的同意。
I think there is a chance of something that looks like a nonproliferation agreement between states, including the US and China in the limit.
我认为,包括美国和中国在内的国家之间有可能达成类似防扩散协议的协议。
The US and China enforce it, and we become vaguely allied with them in this one crusade?
美国和中国强制执行这一政策,而我们在这场十字军东征中却与他们隐约结盟?
It might be deciding that certain things, certain capabilities of AI systems might be so potentially destabilizing that you don’t want them broadly available while recognizing that each government may be privately developing them.
它可能会认为人工智能系统的某些事物、某些功能可能会潜在地破坏稳定,因此您不希望它们广泛可用,同时认识到每个政府可能都在私下开发它们。
But you might have some common standard for what’s available to everyone, where you’ve decided, ooh, this would lead to just all kinds of chaos in our countries as well as in other countries.
但是你可能对每个人都可以使用的东西有一些共同的标准,你已经决定,哦,这会导致我们国家以及其他国家的各种混乱。
And it would be enforced by the UN or by America?
它将由联合国或美国执行?
Or just international norms, sanctions?
或者只是国际规范、制裁?
My assumption is a lot of this gets enforced by checking and then throwing policy punches at each other on things like tariffs or exports or other issues.
我的假设是,其中很多都是通过检查然后在关税、出口或其他问题上相互施以政策打击来强制执行的。
I don’t know that there’re global governance bodies that will be formed.
我不知道是否会成立全球治理机构。
Some people feel optimistic about stuff like IAEA-style models for this, but I think things that require mutual inspection regimes end up being very, very hard to do under certain rivalrous dynamics.
有些人对国际原子能机构式的模式感到乐观,但我认为,在某些竞争动态下,需要相互检查制度的事情最终会变得非常非常困难。
I worry we’re in a world where NAFTA has not stuck, and NAFTA is one of the easiest agreements.
我担心我们正处于一个北美自由贸易协定尚未生效的世界,而北美自由贸易协定是最简单的协议之一。
NAFTA should have been easy.
北美自由贸易协定本来应该很容易。
It should have been easy, and it’s not, to say the least.
这本来应该很容易,但至少可以说,事实并非如此。
On AI-fueled economic growth
论人工智能推动的经济增长
Say 10 years out, what’s your best estimate of the economic growth rate in the United States?
假设 10 年后,您对美国经济增长率的最佳估计是多少?
The economic growth rate now is on the order of 1 percent to 2 percent.
现在的经济增长率在1%到2%左右。
There’s a chance at the moment, we’re entering a recession, but at average, 2.2 percent, so let’s say it’s 2.2.
目前我们有可能进入衰退,但平均为 2.2%,所以假设是 2.2。
I think my bear case on all of this is 3 percent, and my bull case is something like 5 percent.
我认为我对这一切的悲观看法是 3%,而我的乐观看法是 5% 左右。
I think that you probably hear higher numbers from lots of other people.
我认为您可能从许多其他人那里听到了更高的数字。
20 and 30, I hear all the time.
20和30,我一直听到。
To me, it’s absurd.
对我来说,这是荒谬的。
The reason that my numbers are more conservative is, I think that we will enter into a world where there will be an incredibly fast-moving, high-growth part of the economy, but it is a relatively small part of the economy.
我的数字更加保守的原因是,我认为我们将进入一个经济中存在令人难以置信的快速移动、高增长部分的世界,但它只是经济中相对较小的部分。
It may be growing its share over time, but it’s growing from a small base.
随着时间的推移,它的份额可能会不断增加,但它的增长基数很小。
Then there are large parts of the economy, like healthcare or other things, which are naturally slow-moving, and may be slow in adoption of this.
然后,经济的很大一部分,例如医疗保健或其他领域,自然发展缓慢,并且采用起来可能会很慢。
I think that the things that would make me wrong are if AI systems could meaningfully unlock productive capacity in the physical world at a really surprisingly high compounding growth rate, automating and building factories and things like this.
我认为,如果人工智能系统能够以令人惊讶的高复合增长率有意义地释放物理世界的生产能力,实现自动化和建造工厂等,那么我就会错了。
Even then, I’m skeptical because every time the AI community has tried to cross the chasm from the digital world to the real world, they’ve run into 10,000 problems that they thought were paper cuts but, in sum, add up to you losing all the blood in your body.
即便如此,我还是持怀疑态度,因为每次人工智能社区试图跨越从数字世界到现实世界的鸿沟时,他们都会遇到 10,000 个他们认为是剪纸的问题,但总而言之,加起来会让你失去体内所有的血液。
I think we’ve seen this with self-driving cars, where very, very promising growth rate, and then an incredibly grinding slow pace at getting it to scale.
我想我们已经在自动驾驶汽车上看到了这一点,它的增长率非常非常有希望,但规模化的速度却极其缓慢。
I’m skeptical because every time the AI community has tried to cross the chasm from the digital world to the real world, they’ve run into 10,000 problems that they thought were paper cuts but, in sum, add up to you losing all the blood in your body.
我对此表示怀疑,因为每次人工智能社区试图跨越从数字世界到现实世界的鸿沟时,他们都会遇到 10,000 个他们认为是剪纸的问题,但总而言之,加起来会让你失去体内所有的血液。
I think we’ve seen this with self-driving cars, where very, very promising growth rate, and then an incredibly grinding slow pace at getting it to scale.
我认为我们已经在自动驾驶汽车上看到了这一点,它的增长率非常非常有希望,但规模化的速度却极其缓慢。
I just read a paper two days ago about trying to train human-like hands on industrial robots.
两天前我刚刚读到一篇论文,内容是关于尝试在工业机器人上训练类似人类的双手。
Using reinforcement learning doesn’t work.
使用强化学习是行不通的。
The best they had was a 60 percent success rate.
他们最好的成绩是 60% 的成功率。
If I have my baby, and I give her a robot butler that has a 60 percent accuracy rate at holding things, including the baby, I’m not buying the butler.
如果我有了我的孩子,我给了她一个机器人管家,它在抓东西(包括孩子)方面的准确率高达 60%,我不会购买这个管家。
Or my wife is incredibly unhappy that I bought it and makes me send it back.
或者我的妻子对我买了它非常不满意并让我将其退回。
As a community, we tend to underestimate that.
作为一个社区,我们往往低估了这一点。
I may be proved to be an unrealistic pessimist here.
在这里我可能被证明是一个不切实际的悲观主义者。
I think that’s what many of my colleagues would say, but I think we overestimate the ease with which we get into a physical world.
我想我的许多同事都会这么说,但我认为我们高估了进入物理世界的容易程度。
As I said in print, my best estimate is, we get half a percentage point of growth a year.
正如我在印刷品中所说,我的最佳估计是,我们每年增长半个百分点。
Five percent would be my upper bound.
百分之五是我的上限。
What’s your scenario where there’s no growth improvement?
您认为没有增长改善的情况是什么?
If it’s not yours, say there’s a smart person somewhere in Anthropic — you don’t agree with them, but what would they say?
如果不是你的,就说 Anthropic 的某个地方有一个聪明人—— 你不同意他们的观点,但他们会说什么?
I think one is something that you touched on earlier, where we could get the politics of this really wrong, and the technology could just get put in a relatively small box that does some economic good somewhere, but at a very, very small constrained amount.
我认为你之前提到过一个问题,我们可能会在政治上犯下真正的错误,而这项技术可以放在一个相对较小的盒子里,在某个地方产生一些经济好处,但数量非常非常小。
That’s the nuclear-power-failure-mode story, where we do some kind of large-scale regulatory scheme.
这就是核电故障模式的故事,我们制定了某种大规模的监管计划。
We make it hard to do this stuff, and it ceases to have much of an effect.
我们让做这些事情变得困难,并且它不再有太大的效果。
Maybe it has an effect elsewhere.
也许它对其他地方也有影响。
The other case I’d give would be .
我要举的另一个例子是。
.
。
.
。
It’s very hard for me to give a 0 percent case because we know today it’s incredibly useful for coding.
我很难给出 0% 的情况,因为我们知道今天它对于编码非常有用。
If you just stopped all of it today, all further progress, I think the coding use case alone is going to be incredibly useful because it grows the ability to digitize parts of the economy, which we know drives faster loops in different parts of the economy, but generates value.
如果你今天停止了所有这一切,所有进一步的进展,我认为仅编码用例就将非常有用,因为它提高了经济部分数字化的能力,我们知道这会推动经济不同部分的更快循环,但会产生价值。
I think 0 percent is basically sub-1 percent chance of happening.
我认为 0% 基本上是低于 1% 的可能性。
If it did, it would be a Luddite thing, or something that looked like war with Taiwan, leading to everything else looking different as well.
如果确实如此,那将是勒德分子的事情,或者看起来像是与台湾的战争,导致其他一切看起来也不同。
In the 5 percent scenario — put aside San Francisco, which is special — but do cities become more or less important?
在 5% 的情景下 —— 抛开旧金山这个特殊的地方 —— 但是城市会变得更重要还是更不重要呢?
Clearly, this city might become more important.
显然,这座城市可能会变得更加重要。
Say, Chicago, Atlanta, what happens?
比如说,芝加哥、亚特兰大,会发生什么?
I think that dense agglomerations of humans have significant amounts of value.
我认为人类的密集聚集具有巨大的价值。
I would expect that a lot of the effects of AI are going to be, for a while, massively increasing the superstar effect in different industries.
我预计人工智能的许多影响将在一段时间内大规模增加不同行业的超级明星效应。
I don’t know if it’s all cities, but I think any city which has something like a specialism — like high-frequency trading in Chicago or certain types of finance in New York — will continue to see some dividend from sets of professionals that gather together in dense quantities to swap ideas.
我不知道是否所有城市都是如此,但我认为任何拥有某种专业性的城市——比如芝加哥的高频交易或纽约的某些类型的金融——都将继续从大量聚集在一起交换想法的专业人士中获得一些红利。
Could it just be easier to stay at home, and more fun?
呆在家里会不会更轻松、更有趣?
I find I’m an outlier, but my use of AI — I either want to go somewhere very distant and use the AI there to learn about, say, the birds of a region, or I want to stay at home.
我发现自己是个异类,但我对人工智能的使用 —— 我要么想去很远的地方并使用那里的人工智能来了解某个地区的鸟类,要么我想呆在家里。
It’s a barbell effect.
这是杠铃效应。
The idea of driving 35 minutes to Washington, DC — that seems less appealing than it used to be.
开车 35 分钟到达华盛顿特区的想法似乎不像以前那么有吸引力了。
Maybe I just have a different personality, or maybe it’s that I work in a really, really confusing domain, and I need to go and talk to other people who work in the confusing domain to get remotely oriented.
也许我只是有不同的个性,或者也许是因为我在一个非常非常混乱的领域工作,我需要去和在这个令人困惑的领域工作的其他人交谈以获得远程导向。
I also think that people are more .
我还认为人更多。
.
。
.
。
their revealed preference from stuff like COVID is that they have a greater desire for certain types of social things that they may have thought, and now they’re bouncing back to it, but it’s going to interplay slightly differently with cities.
他们对新冠病毒等事物的偏好是,他们对他们可能想到的某些类型的社交事物有更大的渴望,现在他们正在反弹,但它与城市的相互作用会略有不同。
If so much of labor and capital is going to be revalued, is quality land the best investment?
如果这么多劳动力和资本要重新估值,优质土地是最好的投资吗?
Because I don’t know which firms will benefit the most.
因为我不知道哪些公司会受益最大。
You might bet on AI firms — sure, that’s kind of easy, though it’ll be priced in.
你可能会押注人工智能公司——当然,这很容易,尽管它会被定价。
But the other firms, who knows?
但其他公司,谁知道呢?
So, buy land in Los Angeles, say.
所以,比如说,在洛杉矶购买土地。
I think that electricity and the production of electricity is going to be of tremendous value.
我认为电力和电力生产将具有巨大的价值。
What’s the thing you would buy?
你会买什么东西?
I think you buy components that go into things like gas turbines and other things which are the base of the technology tree for generating electricity, of which you know people are going to want to do lots of.
我认为您购买的组件用于燃气轮机和其他设备,这些设备是发电技术树的基础,您知道人们会想做很多事情。
You could buy a basket of different components here.
您可以在这里购买一篮子不同的组件。
I would expect that to be of durable, meaningful value.
我希望这具有持久且有意义的价值。
Let’s say it’s 10 years from now.
假设现在是 10 年后。
GPUs are their successor.
GPU 是它们的继任者。
They’re not that scarce.
它们并不那么稀缺。
There’s a lot of idle capacity just sitting around, and let’s say it’s very cheap.
有大量的闲置产能,而且可以说非常便宜。
What do you have it do in its spare time?
你让它在空闲时间做什么?
Ooh, that’s fun.
哦,这很有趣。
I think one of the things is you might just pay AI systems by giving them access to compute.
我认为其中一件事是,你可以通过向人工智能系统提供计算访问权来向它们付费。
You could imagine some kind of barter economy.
你可以想象某种易货经济。
Now, for a range of bone-chilling safety problems with what I just said, but let’s put that aside and assume that those are mostly dealt with.
现在,对于我刚才所说的一系列令人毛骨悚然的安全问题,但让我们把它放在一边,假设这些问题大部分已经得到解决。
I think there’ll be some form of trade with powerful AI systems or agents that work on people’s behalf, and you may want to trade with them a form of compute because agents may be able to use compute for themselves as well.
我认为将会与强大的人工智能系统或代表人们工作的代理进行某种形式的贸易,并且您可能希望与他们进行某种形式的计算交易,因为代理也可能能够为自己使用计算。
That’s some of it.
这就是其中的一些。
I think the other part is generating interesting permutations of stuff that you find valuable or interesting.
我认为另一部分是生成你认为有价值或有趣的东西的有趣排列。
I also suspect that there are going to be very weird things we can’t anticipate that look like .
我还怀疑将会出现一些我们无法预料的非常奇怪的事情。
.
。
.
。
and a form of entertainment that looks like parallel history generation or parallel future generation.
以及一种看起来像是平行历史一代或平行未来一代的娱乐形式。
People are always fascinated by what ifs and rollouts of what ifs.
人们总是着迷于假设和假设的推出。
Fan fiction, I think, will grow immensely.
我认为同人小说将会大幅增长。
And fan fiction.
还有同人小说。
Yes.
是的。
I think large amounts of compute get used to generate alternate realities.
我认为大量的计算被用来生成替代现实。
But some of the alternate realities will be sliding-door versions of today, where it’s a very accurate portrayal, but with one difference.
但一些替代现实将是今天的滑动门版本,这是一个非常准确的写照,但有一点不同。
What would you do personally?
你个人会做什么?
I’m not saying the world, but just you, Jack Clark.
我说的不是全世界,而是你,杰克·克拉克。
You have all this free compute.
您拥有所有这些免费计算。
Will you have it try to write another play by Shakespeare or something else?
你会让它尝试写另一部莎士比亚的戏剧还是其他什么吗?
Or how Brighton might have developed differently from year 1830?
或者布莱顿的发展与 1830 年有何不同?
What are you going to do with it?
你打算用它做什么?
The thing which I currently do with Claude Code is, I’m trying to write a really detailed good paperclip factory simulator, partly because of the inherent comedy of it, but also because I find these very complex simulation games incredibly fun and engaging.
我目前对 Claude Code 所做的事情是,我正在尝试编写一个非常详细、优秀的回形针工厂模拟器,部分原因是它固有的喜剧性,但也因为我发现这些非常复杂的模拟游戏非常有趣和引人入胜。
I also think there’s a massive space in which you can create them, of which we’ve only created a tiny subset.
我还认为有一个巨大的空间可以让你创建它们,而我们只创建了其中的一小部分。
One of the things that we haven’t ever really done — because it’s computationally so unbelievably expensive — is actually put AIs as agents inside the games.
我们还没有真正做过的事情之一——“因为它的计算成本非常昂贵”——实际上是将人工智能作为游戏中的代理。
Really early attempts are actually .
真正早期的尝试实际上是。
.
。
.
。
Demis of DeepMind, before he did DeepMind, he did a game called Black & White, which had actual, very primitive reinforcement-learning–driven agents playing in the game.
DeepMind 的 Demis 在创建 DeepMind 之前,做了一款名为 Black & White 的游戏,游戏中有实际的、非常原始的强化学习驱动的代理。
There’re tons of stuff you can do there, which would be amazingly interesting.
你可以在那里做很多事情,这会非常有趣。
On governing AI agents
关于治理人工智能代理
Speaking of agents, how should the law deal with agents that are not owned?
说到代理人,法律应该如何对待非所有代理人?
Maybe they’re generated in a way that’s anonymous, or maybe a philanthropist builds them and then disavows ownership or sends them to a country where, in essence, there’s not much law.
也许它们是以匿名的方式生成的,或者也许是慈善家建造了它们,然后否认所有权或将它们发送到一个本质上没有多少法律的国家。
I’m not talking about terrorism; that’s separate.
我不是在谈论恐怖主义;我在谈论恐怖主义。那是分开的。
But just someone sends an agent to Africa, and 98 percent of what it does helps people, but as with every charity, some things go wrong.
但只要有人派一名特工到非洲,98% 的工作都会帮助人们,但就像每个慈善机构一样,有些事情会出错。
There’re some problems.
有一些问题。
Can someone sue the agent?
有人可以起诉代理人吗?
How is it capitalized?
它是如何大写的?
Does it have a legal identity?
有合法身份吗?
I will partially contradict myself where, earlier, I talked about maybe you’re going to be paying agents.
我会部分地自相矛盾,早些时候,我谈到也许你会付费给代理人。
I think that the pressure of the world is towards agents having some level of independence or trading ability.
我认为世界的压力是针对具有一定程度的独立性或交易能力的代理商。
From a policy standpoint, I’m reminded of that early thing that IBM said, which was, a computer cannot be accountable to a decision; only humans can.
从政策的角度来看,我想起了 IBM 早期说过的一句话,那就是,计算机不能对决策负责;计算机不能对决策负责。只有人类可以。
I think it got at something quite important where if you create agents that are wholly independent from people but are making decisions that affect people, you’ve introduced a really difficult problem for the policy and legal systems to deal with.
我认为这是非常重要的,如果你创建完全独立于人们但做出影响人们的决策的代理,你就会给政策和法律体系带来一个非常棘手的问题来处理。
So, I’m dodging your question because I don’t have an answer to it.
所以,我回避你的问题,因为我没有答案。
I think it’s a big problem question.
我认为这是一个大问题。
My guess is we should have law for the agents, and maybe the AIs write that law, and they have their own system.
我的猜测是我们应该为特工制定法律,也许人工智能会制定该法律,并且他们有自己的系统。
I worry that if you trace it all back to humans, someone could sue Anthropic 30 years from now.
我担心如果你把这一切追溯到人类,30 年后可能会有人起诉 Anthropic。
Oh, someone’s agent was an offshoot of one of your systems.
哦,某人的代理是您的系统之一的分支。
It was mediated through Chinese Manus, but that, in turn, may have been built upon things that you did.
它是通过中国手抄来调解的,但反过来,这可能是建立在你所做的事情之上的。
I don’t think you should be at all liable for that.
我认为你根本不应该为此承担责任。
I see liability getting out of control in so many cases.
我发现在很多情况下责任都失控了。
I want to choke it off and isolate it somewhat from the mainstream legal system.
我想扼杀它,并将其与主流法律体系隔离开来。
If need be, you require that an independent agent is either somewhat capitalized, or it gets hunted down and shut off.
如果需要的话,你要求独立代理人要么有一定的资本,要么就会被追捕并关闭。
Yes.
是的。
It might be that, along with what you said, having means to control and change for resources that agents use could be some of the path here because it’s the ultimate disincentive.
正如您所说,拥有控制和更改代理使用的资源的方法可能是这里的一些途径,因为这是最终的抑制因素。
Although I will note that this involves pretty tricky questions of moral patienthood, where we’re working on some notions around how to get clearer on better anthropic.
尽管我会指出,这涉及到道德耐心的相当棘手的问题,但我们正在研究一些关于如何更清楚地了解更好的人择的概念。
If you actually believe that these AI agents are moral patients, then turning them off introduces pretty significant ethical issues, potentially, so you need to reconcile these two things.
如果你真的相信这些人工智能代理是道德患者,那么关闭它们可能会带来相当重大的道德问题,所以你需要协调这两件事。
I was, not too long ago, at an event with some highly prestigious people.
不久前,我和一些享有盛誉的人士一起参加了一个活动。
This was in New York, of course, not San Francisco.
当然,这是在纽约,而不是旧金山。
Oh, it’s where prestigious people hang out.
哦,那是有名望的人闲逛的地方。
I used the phrase AGI, and not one of the five even knew what I meant.
我使用了“AGI”这个词,但五个人中没有一个人知道我的意思。
I don’t mean they were skeptical in the deep sense, which maybe one should be.
我并不是说他们在深层意义上持怀疑态度,也许人们应该如此。
They just literally didn’t know what I meant.
他们只是字面上不知道我的意思。
What’s your model of why so many people are still in a fog?
为什么这么多人仍然迷雾重重?你的模型是什么?
I am a technological pessimist who became an optimist through repeated beatings over the head of scale.
我是一个技术悲观主义者,但由于规模的反复打击,我变成了乐观主义者。
What I mean by this is, I’ve consistently underestimated AI progress.
我的意思是,我一直低估人工智能的进步。
Maybe I am today in this conversation when I talk about 3 percent to 5 percent growth rates.
也许我今天在这次谈话中谈论的是 3% 到 5% 的增长率。
What has happened is, I have just endlessly seen the AI system get to where I thought it couldn’t, or thought would take a long time, much faster than I thought.
发生的事情是,我不断地看到人工智能系统达到了我认为无法达到的水平,或者认为需要很长时间的水平,比我想象的要快得多。
So, I’ve had to internalize this repeatedly.
所以,我不得不反复内化这一点。
Nonetheless, we, ourselves, find it surprising.
尽管如此,我们自己还是感到惊讶。
Last year here people were saying, “Oh, well soon Claude is going to be doing most of the coding at Anthropic.” We’re now on the way to that, where Claude Code and other things are writing tons of code here.
去年,这里的人们说:“哦,很快克劳德就会在 Anthropic 完成大部分编码工作。”我们现在正朝着这个目标迈进,克劳德·科德(Claude Code)和其他人正在这里编写大量代码。
It still felt surprising internally even though we have docs from last year predicting it would happen about now.
尽管我们去年的文档预测现在就会发生这种情况,但内部仍然感到惊讶。
Most people outside of the AI labs have no experience of pre-registering their predictions about AI and getting it proved wrong to them repeatedly, because why would you do this unless you work here?
人工智能实验室之外的大多数人都没有预先记录他们对人工智能的预测并反复证明其错误的经验,因为除非你在这里工作,否则你为什么要这样做呢?
I found that the only way to break through is to take their domain and show them what AI can do directly in the domain, which they can evaluate it within, which is an expensive process.
我发现突破的唯一方法是占领他们的领域并向他们展示人工智能可以直接在该领域做什么,他们可以在其中对其进行评估,这是一个昂贵的过程。
On manager nerds
关于经理迷
Silicon Valley up until now has been age of the nerds.
迄今为止,硅谷一直是书呆子的时代。
Do you feel that time is over, and it’s now era of the — I don’t know — humanities majors —
你是否觉得时代已经结束了,现在是 — 我不知道 — 人文专业 —的时代
Yes.
是的。
— or the charismatic people or what?
— 或者有魅力的人还是什么?
It’s my time, Tyler, finally.
终于到了我的时间了,泰勒。
Your time.
你的时间。
CLARK: I think it’s actually going to be the era of the manager nerds now, where I think being able to manage fleets of AI agents and orchestrate them is going to make people incredibly powerful.
克拉克:我认为现在实际上将是管理者书呆子的时代,我认为能够管理人工智能代理团队并协调它们将使人们变得异常强大。
I think we already see this today with start-ups that are emerging but have very small numbers of employees relative to what they used to have because they have lots of coding agents working for them.
我认为我们今天已经在新兴的初创企业中看到了这一点,但与过去相比,其员工数量非常少,因为他们有很多编码代理为他们工作。
Like Midjourney, right?
就像中途一样,对吧?
I think it’s actually going to be the era of the manager nerds now, where I think being able to manage fleets of AI agents and orchestrate them is going to make people incredibly powerful.
我认为现在实际上将是经理书呆子的时代,我认为能够管理人工智能代理团队并协调它们将使人们变得异常强大。
I think we already see this today with start-ups that are emerging but have very small numbers of employees relative to what they used to have because they have lots of coding agents working for them.
我认为我们今天已经在新兴初创企业中看到了这一点,但与过去相比,其员工数量非常少,因为他们有很多编码代理为他们工作。
Yes.
是的。
Incredibly efficient start-up in terms of the people.
就人员而言,初创企业的效率令人难以置信。
We’re going to see this rise of the nerd-turned-manager who has their people, but their people are actually instances of AI agents doing large amounts of work for them.
我们将看到由书呆子转变为拥有员工的经理的崛起,但他们的员工实际上是人工智能代理为他们做大量工作的实例。
It’s still like the Bill Gates model or the Patrick Collison model.
它仍然像比尔·盖茨模型或帕特里克·科里森模型。
Yes.
是的。
So, it’s not that different.
所以,这并没有那么不同。
People who have played lots of Factorio model, yes.
玩过很多异星工厂模型的人,是的。
Will the English major rise or fall in status?
英语专业的地位会上升还是下降?
I suspect that humanities majors might rise in status while being given impossible problems.
我怀疑人文专业的学生在解决不可能的问题的同时,地位可能会上升。
I’m a humanities major originally, and I’m being given problems like, solve the economic policy challenges implied by technologically driven unemployment.
我本来是人文学科专业的,我面临的问题包括解决技术驱动的失业所带来的经济政策挑战。
That’s easy, right?
这很容易,对吧?
Easy, right?
容易,对吧?
Or some people are saying, “Yes, what should we do about moral patienthood?
或者有些人会说:“是的,对于道德忍耐我们该怎么办?
And what should the policy situation be?” I think there’s going to be a recognition — and we see this today — that there are other skills needed, but the problems that those skills are needed for are often problems which have proved to be impossible for humans to adequately solve for thousands of years.
政策形势应该如何?”我认为人们将会认识到————我们今天看到了这一点————还需要其他技能,但这些技能所需要解决的问题往往是人类几千年来都无法充分解决的问题。
So, there’s lots of work, I guess.
所以,我想还有很多工作要做。
What do you think will be the life expectancy of your child, accidents aside?
除了意外事故之外,您认为您孩子的预期寿命是多少?
Just normal life.
只是正常的生活。
I feel like 130 to 150, I wouldn’t find surprising, often good, because I feel like we are discovering that there’re tons and tons of stuff that we’re learning about the body and about gene therapies and other things, which seem like there’s a load of interventions you can do that might stack on one another to actually durably extend healthy lifespans for some period of time.
我觉得 130 到 150,我不会感到惊讶,通常是好的,因为我觉得我们正在发现我们正在了解大量关于身体、基因疗法和其他事情的东西,这似乎是你可以采取的大量干预措施,这些干预措施可能会相互叠加,以在一段时间内真正持久地延长健康寿命。
I was going to say 110, but I tried to be a technological optimist, so I added a couple of decades on top, which I’m assuming comes from magic AI-driven advances that I have underestimated in this response.
我本来想说 110,但我试图成为一名技术乐观主义者,所以我在上面加上了几十年,我假设这来自神奇的人工智能驱动的进步,而我在这个回应中低估了这一点。
I think the brain is very hard to fix.
我认为大脑很难修复。
If you just wanted to keep someone alive literally, perhaps 130, but for them to be the same person, I think I’m stuck at 100 for most people.
如果你只是想让某人活下去,也许是 130,但如果他们是同一个人,我想对于大多数人来说我会停留在 100。
It’s just hard to replace the brain without killing someone.
只是很难在不杀人的情况下更换大脑。
You can replace all the other organs, right?
你可以更换所有其他器官,对吗?
Yes.
是的。
Here I subscribe to the idea that there’s a ton we don’t understand about the brain, and AI is going to help us understand loads more.
在这里,我同意这样的观点:关于大脑,我们还有很多不了解的地方,而人工智能将帮助我们了解更多。
There might be things that can be done here, which have eluded us because they are so unbelievably complicated, we needed AI-mediated tools to help us figure out the experiments and approaches.
也许有些事情可以在这里完成,但我们却无法做到,因为它们是如此令人难以置信的复杂,我们需要人工智能介导的工具来帮助我们弄清楚实验和方法。
On AI consciousness
论人工智能意识
When Geoffrey Hinton says that, right now, the AIs are conscious, which I think is what he says, I believe he’s crazy.
当杰弗里·辛顿说,现在人工智能是有意识的,我认为这就是他所说的,我相信他疯了。
What do you think?
你怎么认为?
I think that he’s —
我认为他是 ——
You can be more polite than I am.
你可以比我更有礼貌。
That’s fine.
没关系。
CLARK: Well, no. How I would phrase this is that I agonize about this.
克拉克:嗯,不。我要表达的是,我对此感到痛苦。
You read my newsletter.
你读了我的时事通讯。
I write fictional stories in it often, which are me grappling with this question.
我经常在里面写虚构的故事,这就是我在努力解决这个问题。
I worry that we are going to be bystanders to what in the future will seem like a great crime, which is something about these things being determined to be conscious and us taking actions which you think are bad to have taken against conscious entities.
我担心我们将成为未来看似重大犯罪的旁观者,这就是这些东西被确定为有意识,而我们对有意识的实体采取了你认为不好的行动。
Internally, I say, there’s a difference between doing experiments on potatoes and on monkeys.
我想说的是,在内部,用土豆做实验和用猴子做实验是有区别的。
I think we’re still in the potato regime, but I think that there is actually a clear line by which these things become monkeys and then beyond in terms of your moral relationship to them.
我认为我们仍然处于马铃薯政权中,但我认为实际上有一条明确的界限,这些东西变成猴子,然后就你与它们的道德关系而言,超越了它们。
To Hinton’s point, I think that these things are conscious in the sense that a tongue without a brain is conscious.
对于辛顿的观点,我认为这些东西是有意识的,就像没有大脑的舌头是有意识的一样。
It takes actions in response to stimuli that are really, really, really complicated.
它会采取行动来响应非常非常复杂的刺激。
In a moment, it has a sense impression of the world and is responding, but does it have a sense of self?
瞬间,它对世界有了感知印象,正在做出反应,但它有自我感知吗?
I would wager, no, it doesn’t seem like it does.
我敢打赌,不,看起来并非如此。
These AI systems — we instantiate them, and they live in a kind of infinite now where they may perceive, and they may have some awareness within a context window, but there’s no memory or permanence.
这些人工智能系统 ——我们将它们实例化,它们现在生活在一种无限的状态中,它们可以感知,并且它们可能在上下文窗口内有一些意识,但没有记忆或持久性。
To me, it feels like they’re on a trajectory heading towards consciousness, and if they’re conscious today, it’s in a form that we would recognize as like a truly alien consciousness, not human consciousness.
对我来说,感觉他们正走在通往意识的轨道上,如果他们今天有意识,那么它的形式我们会认为是真正的外星意识,而不是人类意识。
In what year do you think you’ll be able to speak directly to a dolphin, and it will talk back?
您认为哪一年您将能够直接与海豚交谈,并且它会回应?
With a translator, of course.
当然有翻译。
I think 2030 or sooner.
我认为2030年或更早。
I think that one’s coming soon.
我认为那个很快就会到来。
What will you ask the dolphin?
你会问海豚什么?
Because you’ll be early in the queue to ask.
因为你会排在较早的队列中询问。
Yes.
是的。
I think —
我认为 —
What do you want to know?
你想知道什么?
How do you have fun?
你玩得怎么样?
Dolphins seem to have fun.
海豚似乎玩得很开心。
They’re almost a famously fun-having species.
它们几乎是出了名的有趣的物种。
I think you’d ask that.
我想你会这么问。
I think you’d ask them if they dream.
我想你会问他们是否做梦。
I think you’d ask them if they had a notion of grief.
我想你会问他们是否有悲伤的概念。
I think you’d also ask them what is mysterious to them about their world, besides the fact you’re talking to them, which hopefully they’d find somewhat surprising.
我想你还会问他们,除了你正在与他们交谈这一事实之外,他们的世界还有什么神秘之处,希望他们会觉得有些惊讶。
I also think that you can talk to dogs as well, but I think those conversations —
我还认为你也可以和狗说话,但我认为那些对话 -
But you can do that now.
但你现在就可以这样做。
— will be comedically unsurprising.
— 在喜剧上不会令人惊讶。
You’re like, “What do you want to do?” He’ll say, “Walk.” I am like, “Okay, well we didn’t need a translator for this one.”
你会说,“你想做什么?”他会说:“走吧。”我想,“好吧,我们不需要翻译这个。”
What’s a book you think more and more about these days?
最近你越来越想念哪一本书?
There Is No Antimemetics Division by qntm, which is this book about a government agency that is dealing with antimemes, ideas that erase themselves from your memory after you’ve dealt with them but are themselves important.
qntm 的《没有逆模因部门》是一本关于一个正在处理逆模因的政府机构的书,这些想法在你处理完后会从你的记忆中抹去,但它们本身很重要。
It’s about creating a bureaucracy that can handle ideas which are themselves dangerous and self-erasing because I think it gets at some of the problems that we’re experiencing.
这是关于创建一个官僚机构,可以处理本身危险且自我消除的想法,因为我认为它解决了我们正在经历的一些问题。
The other book that I think about a lot and might be especially relevant to you is, a historian and economist called Fernand Braudel wrote a book called Capitalism and Material Life.
我经常思考并且可能与您特别相关的另一本书是一位名叫费尔南·布罗代尔(Fernand Braudel)的历史学家和经济学家写了一本名为《资本主义与物质生活》的书。
Oh, I love those.
哦,我喜欢那些。
Three volumes — they’re incredible.
三卷 —— 它们令人难以置信。
Yes.
是的。
I read it in university, and I returned to it recently because it makes this point that you can look at how people’s lives change through just the things they had available, like cutlery or whatever, or basic tools.
我在大学读过这本书,最近我又重新读了一遍,因为它表明你可以通过人们现有的东西(比如餐具或其他东西或基本工具)来了解人们的生活如何改变。
I think about AI through that lens.
我从这个角度思考人工智能。
How is AI going to actually change my material life?
人工智能将如何真正改变我的物质生活?
It comes to why I’m skeptical about some of the more ambitious forms of change is, the actual change in our day-to-day lives has been very, very, very slow even with these advances.
这就是为什么我对一些更雄心勃勃的变革形式持怀疑态度的原因是,即使有了这些进步,我们日常生活的实际变化仍然非常、非常、非常缓慢。
But if you read those books, it seems like the most significant things stem from changes in everyone’s material day-to-day.
但如果你读过这些书,你会发现最重要的事情似乎源于每个人日常材料的变化。
They’re reissuing the antimimetic book, by the way.
顺便说一句,他们正在重新发行这本反模仿的书。
Yes?
是的?
At a much higher price.
以更高的价格。
But what would be an antimeme today?
但今天什么是反模因呢?
Or maybe you can’t remember them.
或者也许你不记得它们了。
A self-erasing idea?
一个自我消除的想法?
Yes.
是的。
Well, what’s a good example?
嗯,有什么好的例子吗?
I think that maybe it’s more that the challenge of policy is, you are building a bureaucracy for an alien that arrives at some point in the future that you don’t know the shape of and which may, upon the moment of its arrival, be far smarter and more capable than you.
我认为政策的挑战也许更多的是,你正在为一个外星人建立一个官僚机构,这个外星人将在未来的某个时刻到来,你不知道它的形状,但在它到来的那一刻,它可能比你更聪明、更有能力。
So, you don’t know if this is just an insane exercise to do.
所以,你不知道这是否只是一个疯狂的练习。
I oscillate between being a, “Hey, we should build all of these institutions so that we can measure stuff and see what happens and be able to take responses,” to a cyberpunk accelerationist where, actually, we just need companies to create benefits as quickly as possible, and then the system will figure out how to deal with that.
我在“嘿,我们应该建立所有这些机构,这样我们就可以衡量东西,看看会发生什么,并能够采取回应”和赛博朋克加速主义者之间摇摆不定,实际上,我们只需要公司尽快创造利益,然后系统就会弄清楚如何处理这个问题。
I find this to be a crazy-making thing I’m trapped inside.
我发现这是一件让我陷入疯狂的事情。
I suspect we’re stuck with the latter, even if we don’t prefer it.
我怀疑我们只能选择后者,即使我们不喜欢它。
No one loves that though.
但没有人喜欢这样。
A small number of people — some in San Francisco — love that, but if you say to politicians, “What we’ll do is, we’ll create really fast-moving companies but completely break conventions and change everything, and you’ll have to figure it out,” it’s a hard pill to swallow, and it may be what actually naturally happens.
一小部分人(旧金山的一些人)喜欢这一点,但如果你对政治家说,“我们要做的是,我们将创建真正快速发展的公司,但完全打破惯例并改变一切,你必须弄清楚它,”这是一个难以吞咽的药丸,而这可能是实际自然发生的事情。
They say they don’t love it, and I believe they’re sincere, but they don’t take quick action to be on the other course.
他们说他们不喜欢它,我相信他们是真诚的,但他们没有迅速采取行动转向其他路线。
So, in that sense, they accept it.
所以,从这个意义上说,他们接受它。
Yes, by revealed preference, it’s what they accept.
是的,根据显示的偏好,这就是他们所接受的。
But the system is not well geared to respond in any case, right?
但该系统在任何情况下都无法很好地做出响应,对吧?
Yes, the system is a big, slow-moving cog, and we have a really fast-moving cog here, and we have none of the gears between them that translate the movement from one into the other.
是的,该系统是一个大的、缓慢移动的齿轮,而我们这里有一个非常快速移动的齿轮,并且它们之间没有任何齿轮可以将运动从一个齿轮转换为另一个齿轮。
On AI and national sovereignty
论人工智能与国家主权
What will happen to a lot of national governments?
许多国家政府会发生什么?
Let’s say I’m the government of Peru, and I turn my education system over to AIs, which are probably American.
假设我是秘鲁政府,我将我的教育系统交给人工智能,而人工智能可能是美国的。
Then, well, my Social Security system, my national defense — just keep on adding to the stack, and all of a sudden, most of Peru is, run by — in a sense, it’s not run by — but American AI companies.
然后,好吧,我的社会保障体系,我的国防——不断增加,突然间,秘鲁的大部分地区都由美国人工智能公司运营——从某种意义上说,它不是由美国人工智能公司运营。
What is the government of Peru in that scenario?
在这种情况下,秘鲁政府是什么样的?
What is the government of Peru in a world with Google and Facebook?
在拥有谷歌和 Facebook 的世界里,秘鲁政府是什么样的?
Is it the same or?
是一样还是?
They don’t make better decisions in Peruvian government than the current Peruvian government.
他们在秘鲁政府中做出的决策并不比现任秘鲁政府更好。
Peruvian bureaucrats make Google things.
秘鲁官僚制造了谷歌的东西。
That’s just added on top to current Peruvian government, but for all their decisions or a lot of the big decisions.
这只是在现任秘鲁政府之上添加的,但对于他们的所有决定或许多重大决定而言。
The kids are taught by AI.
孩子们由人工智能来教。
AI drones and detection systems, it’s all AI.
人工智能无人机和检测系统,都是人工智能。
Some of it’s LLMs.
其中一些是法学硕士。
What’s the Peruvian part in there?
秘鲁的部分是什么?
We did some work on this called collective constitutional AI at Anthropic, where Claude has a constitution.
我们在 Anthropic 做了一些关于集体宪法人工智能的工作,克劳德在那里制定了宪法。
Then we did this exercise of looking across America to find additional constitutional principles that might need to be included in it.
然后我们进行了遍及美国的调查,以寻找可能需要纳入其中的其他宪法原则。
We looked for ones of high agreement and also ones of low agreement.
我们寻找高度一致的和低度一致的。
I think governments will have some role of making sure that things reflect the normative preferences of their populations, which are going to continue to be varied, although perhaps AI means a certain homogenization takes place over time, but a lot of the role of government, I think, has always been to represent and encode the revealed values of a certain population.
我认为政府将发挥一定的作用,确保事物反映其人口的规范偏好,这些偏好将继续变化,尽管人工智能可能意味着随着时间的推移会发生一定的同质化,但我认为,政府的很多作用一直是代表和编码特定人群所揭示的价值观。
I think that work is not going away.
我认为工作不会消失。
You’re going to need to adapt these systems and inject certain values into them for the people that are using them and customers of them.
您将需要调整这些系统,并为使用它们的人和它们的客户注入某些价值。
A lot of that could be fig leaves, though.
不过,其中很多可能是无花果叶。
Maybe the AIs — they speak with Peruvian accents.
也许人工智能 ——他们讲秘鲁口音。
There’re the Peruvian flags on all the smartphones or their successor devices.
所有智能手机或其后续设备上都有秘鲁国旗。
Then they goes to the AI break room and take it all off or something.
然后他们去人工智能休息室,把它全部脱掉什么的。
Just act like AIs and do the right thing.
就像人工智能一样,做正确的事。
To me, it seems that world actually is better.
对我来说,似乎世界实际上更加美好。
I’m not sure people want it.
我不确定人们是否想要它。
That’s the world we’re in now with certain forms of capital and capitalism, you’ll say stakeholder capitalism, and there’ll be a very small amount of stuff, like what you just described, and then the actual thing is just capital making decisions.
这就是我们现在所处的世界,有某种形式的资本和资本主义,你会说利益相关者资本主义,并且会有非常少量的东西,就像你刚才描述的那样,然后实际的事情只是资本做出决策。
Right.
正确的。
If Manus and DeepSeek are, to some extent, built upon American models, does that mean we’ve won the soft power war, that these models have a kind of soul — the soul of Claude, soul of GPT — and China, if it embraces them — I wouldn’t say surrendering, but the CCP , over time, loses control?
如果Manus和DeepSeek在某种程度上是建立在美国模式之上的,这是否意味着我们赢得了软实力战争,这些模式有一种灵魂 ——克劳德的灵魂,GPT的灵魂——以及中国,如果它拥抱它们的话—— 我不会说投降,但随着时间的推移,中共会失去控制?
I think the former might be true, and the latter is probably not true.
我认为前者可能是真的,后者可能不是真的。
The former is, the values of the most widely used systems will have some cultural export effect.
前者是,使用最广泛的制度的价值观会产生一定的文化输出效应。
Just like media today, where so much of Hollywood defined a cultural imprint from which many, many other forms of media stemmed, the same will be true of AI systems.
就像今天的媒体一样,好莱坞的大部分内容都定义了一种文化印记,许多其他形式的媒体都源于此,人工智能系统也是如此。
I don’t think that this is going to particularly change how well-positioned the CCP or other governments are because, just as they did with media, they recognize AI is a technology, but it also has a media technology property, and they will very carefully work on that.
我不认为这会特别改变中共或其他政府的有利地位,因为就像他们对媒体所做的那样,他们认识到人工智能是一种技术,但它也具有媒体技术属性,他们将非常谨慎地致力于这一点。
It’s notable that if you look at DeepSeek, the one form of safety training they did do was about adherence to certain parts of CCP ideology.
值得注意的是,如果你看看 DeepSeek,他们所做的一种形式的安全培训是关于遵守中共意识形态的某些部分。
It’s one of the only parts —
这是唯一的部分之一 ——
It won’t talk about Taiwan in various ways.
不会以各种方式谈论台湾。
Yes, quite careful.
是的,相当小心。
But in terms of its soul, isn’t it still rather cosmopolitan, rather friendly, of good humor, and the CCP ends up imbibing that soul, and slowly but surely, a funny case for nonalignment is what you want.
但就其灵魂而言,不是仍然相当国际化、相当友好、幽默,而中共最终吸收了这种灵魂,慢慢地但肯定地,一个有趣的不结盟案例就是你想要的。
The CCP, no longer being the smartest entity in China, in essence, is turning over the keys to the shop.
中共不再是中国最聪明的实体,实质上正在交出商店的钥匙。
I think that’s a very positive vision, and I also think that it’s something that it would be obvious to everyone, including people in the CCP today.
我认为这是一个非常积极的愿景,而且我也认为这对每个人来说都是显而易见的,包括今天的中共人士。
So, I imagine that there is going to be a pushback against what you described and an attempt to create very powerful AI systems with radically different values.
因此,我认为您所描述的内容将会遭到抵制,并会尝试创建具有完全不同价值观的非常强大的人工智能系统。
I think there’s also a chance they just try to shut the whole thing down as they gave up on an AV much earlier in their history in China.
我认为他们也有可能试图关闭整个事情,因为他们在中国历史上很早就放弃了自动驾驶汽车。
Do you think there’ll be many countries that just refuse .
您认为会有很多国家拒绝吗?
.
。
.
。
AI is a loosely defined term, but you know, they just refuse AI and strong LLMs.
人工智能是一个定义松散的术语,但你知道,他们只是拒绝人工智能和强大的法学硕士。
I think there’ll be a very small minority of countries that do this.
我认为只有极少数国家会这样做。
I think that over time, most countries have been integrated into this global capital system, partly through strong incentives, and they may have preferences that are different, but it hasn’t often held.
我认为,随着时间的推移,大多数国家已经融入了这个全球资本体系,部分是通过强有力的激励措施,他们可能有不同的偏好,但这种偏好并不经常成立。
It will be a much bigger change than just having smartphones, right?
这将是一个比仅仅拥有智能手机更大的变化,对吗?
Some of this will appear as more minor than smartphones or as riders on top of the smartphone.
其中一些看起来比智能手机更小,或者作为智能手机顶部的骑手。
I think that there might be countries that choose how fully to alter themselves or life around this technology.
我认为可能有些国家会选择如何围绕这项技术彻底改变自己或生活。
There will be some countries where you get it as an add-on, or it’s a tool you occasionally use.
在某些国家/地区,您可以将其作为附加组件获得,或者它是您偶尔使用的工具。
In other countries you’re much more immersed in it.
在其他国家,你会更加沉浸其中。
How do you think about the aesthetics of the Anthropic office, where we are right now?
您如何看待我们现在所在的 Anthropic 办公室的美学?
It looks a certain way.
它看起来是某种方式。
Why?
为什么?
Some of it is that we inherited it, and it was slightly cheap.
有的是我们继承的,稍微便宜一点。
It wasn’t fully changed over.
它并没有完全改变。
It partly reflects our kind of brand, which is oriented around trying to be tasteful and thoughtful, and also not too flashy.
它在一定程度上反映了我们的品牌风格,即注重品味和体贴,但又不太浮华。
There’s a certain kind of cheerful blankness to it, which I quite like.
其中有一种令人愉快的空白,我很喜欢。
I’m very sorry to any of our designers that may see this section of the podcast, but we have to keep it in the spirit of being epistemically honest.
我对任何可能看到播客这一部分的设计师感到非常抱歉,但我们必须本着认识上诚实的精神。
I think that one thing we do, though, is, we chose to have these human illustrations of our systems, and that was an early intentional choice.
不过,我认为我们做的一件事是,我们选择为我们的系统提供这些人类插图,这是一个早期的有意选择。
I and others looked at some of the earlier designs, and there were designs that were very tech-focused and also brand identities which involved collage and other things, but we went for these human drawings because we are going to forever be trying to describe an increasingly complicated world that we are also creating.
我和其他人看了一些早期的设计,有些设计非常注重技术,也有涉及拼贴和其他东西的品牌标识,但我们选择了这些人类绘画,因为我们将永远试图描述我们也在创造的一个日益复杂的世界。
I think in the limit, a lot of what Anthropic is actually going to be doing as a company is telling the story of what an increasingly automated AI Anthropic has done.
我认为,在极限范围内,Anthropic 作为一家公司实际上要做的很多事情就是讲述日益自动化的 AI Anthropic 所做的事情。
So, some of our brand links through to what I think will ultimately be where we spend most of our time.
因此,我们的一些品牌与我认为最终将成为我们花费大部分时间的地方有联系。
For the ongoing AI revolution, what’s the worst age to be?
对于正在进行的人工智能革命来说,最糟糕的年龄是什么时候?
Ooh.
哦。
Say the best age is just to have been born if you’re going to live to maybe 130.
如果你想活到 130 岁,最好的年龄就是出生。
If you’re very old and retired, it probably isn’t going to make you any worse off.
如果你年纪很大并且退休了,这可能不会让你的生活变得更糟。
It’ll help you in some ways.
它会在某些方面帮助你。
I feel like people who worked on AI for many years and are now in their 60s might be feeling very shortchanged because they’re like, “I love this technology.
我觉得那些在人工智能领域工作多年、现在已经 60 多岁的人可能会感觉自己受到了很大的亏待,因为他们会说,“我喜欢这项技术。
I really wanted to make this technology real, but technology is now becoming real, and I’m going to maybe miss some of the most interesting parts of it as it makes its way into the world.” I think that could be galling.
我真的很想让这项技术成为现实,但技术现在正在成为现实,当它进入世界时,我可能会错过它的一些最有趣的部分。”我认为这可能会令人难堪。
But they can retire, right?
但他们可以退休,对吗?
Say I’m 40, and I did something upper middle-class but fairly routine.
假设我 40 岁了,我做了一些中上阶层但相当常规的事情。
It feels a bit old to easily retrain.
轻松重新训练感觉有点老了。
My guess is people who are 40 are the worst off in relative terms, even though they might live longer.
我的猜测是,相对而言,40 岁的人生活最差,尽管他们可能寿命更长。
You could be right.
你可能是对的。
I also think that there’s some chance that the worst age to be is maybe 10 or so, because you are now computer literate, you’re sophisticated.
我还认为,最糟糕的年龄可能是 10 岁左右,因为你现在已经懂电脑了,你已经很成熟了。
You’re going into an education system that is needing to react to this technology.
您将进入一个需要对这项技术做出反应的教育系统。
You will be using the technology in a way completely different to your education system, and it might just feel violently confusing.
您将以与您的教育系统完全不同的方式使用该技术,这可能会让人感到非常困惑。
I see that being a really difficult time.
我认为那是一段非常困难的时期。
Let’s say you’re flown into Washington — put aside any idiosyncrasies of the current administration — and you’re asked for advice.
假设你飞往华盛顿——“抛开现任政府的任何特质”——并且有人向你寻求建议。
What do we do with these government agencies to get them ready for AGI?
我们如何与这些政府机构合作,让他们为通用人工智能做好准备?
What do you tell them?
你告诉他们什么?
One of the things is just try to deploy AI right now and discover all of the things that makes it incredibly difficult and then walk through those things.
其中一件事就是立即尝试部署人工智能并发现所有使其变得异常困难的事情,然后逐步解决这些问题。
What does “deploy AI” mean?
“部署人工智能”是什么意思?
People are reluctant to send legal queries to Anthropic, to OpenAI.
人们不愿意向 Anthropic、OpenAI 发送法律查询。
They’re not going to do that just yet, even if it might make sense.
他们暂时不会这样做,即使这可能有意义。
What should they actually do now?
他们现在应该做什么?
Concretely, it’s you work back from, what does it take to get it on every single computer of every single person?
具体来说,你需要做什么才能将它放到每个人的每台计算机上?
Then you discover some of the concerns.
然后你就会发现一些问题。
Some of the concerns might be like, where does the data go, or other things.
有些问题可能是,数据去了哪里,或者其他事情。
Then you work out if that’s a problem you care about or not.
然后你就会弄清楚这是否是你关心的问题。
If you don’t care about it, you ignore the problem and consciously do.
如果你不关心它,你就会忽略这个问题并有意识地去做。
If you do care about it, you turn that into a very small number of prescriptions that the companies need to follow, but you need to attach that, probably, to a market signal.
如果你确实关心它,你就会把它变成公司需要遵循的极少数处方,但你可能需要将其附加到市场信号上。
Or, you do a project of trying to take some of the open weights models, some of which are very good, and just get them on computers.
或者,你做了一个项目,尝试采用一些开放权重模型,其中一些非常好,然后将它们放在计算机上。
Then once they’re on computers, you can work out, “Hey, maybe we want to buy this.
然后,一旦它们出现在计算机上,你就可以计算出,“嘿,也许我们想买这个。
What are the requirements?”
有什么要求?”
I think you start from the most ambitious possible goal, which is it being available to every single person, and you work back from that.
我认为你从最雄心勃勃的目标开始,那就是让每个人都能获得它,然后再从这个目标开始。
Is the UK going to become an important AI hub?
英国会成为重要的人工智能中心吗?
I hope so.
我希望如此。
But will they?
但他们会吗?
And what should they do?
他们应该做什么?
I think they have a chance of it.
我认为他们有机会。
We have a memorandum of understanding with the UK government, which we signed, which is about trying to see if we can find ways this can be helpful.
我们与英国政府签署了一份谅解备忘录,旨在看看我们是否能找到有用的方法。
I think the onus is really on governments to figure out where they’re willing to take big swings.
我认为政府确实有责任弄清楚他们愿意在哪些方面做出重大调整。
The UK has digitized huge amounts of its data.
英国已将大量数据数字化。
It also has gov.uk, which is, similar almost to Estonia, a highly digitized front end to many different UK government services.
它还拥有 gov.uk,它几乎与爱沙尼亚类似,是许多不同英国政府服务的高度数字化前端。
That’s the kind of thing where surely AI can be used to make a difference, so try and use.
在这种情况下,人工智能肯定可以发挥作用,所以请尝试使用。
Also, if you have a load of post-industrial areas where you provision loads of power that is no longer being used, try to see if you can allocate that for compute.
此外,如果您有大量后工业化区域,您提供的电力负载不再使用,请尝试查看是否可以将其分配给计算。
I think thinking about the economics of this is important.
我认为思考这个问题的经济学很重要。
I feel like the economics of inference are going to become important.
我觉得推理经济学将变得重要。
There might be something we want to think about on taxing inference differently according to where it happens, but it could present an opportunity as well.
我们可能需要考虑一些事情,根据推理发生的地点,对推理进行不同的征税,但这也可能提供一个机会。
Will it be cost-effective for Singapore to build its own quality AI systems?
新加坡建立自己的优质人工智能系统是否具有成本效益?
Because they have money, but they’re small, right?
因为他们有钱,但他们很小,对吗?
Yes.
是的。
It’ll be cost-effective for Singapore to build things that make large-scale AI systems built outside of Singapore work in a Singaporean context.
对于新加坡来说,构建能够使在新加坡境外构建的大规模人工智能系统在新加坡环境中运行的东西将具有成本效益。
I think it’s going to be very difficult for them to build, say, a foundation model that is going to cater to their needs better than the ones that are offered by the large companies in the US and perhaps China today.
我认为他们将很难建立一个基础模型,比美国甚至中国大公司提供的模型更好地满足他们的需求。
So, they’ll take open source but make it Singaporean?
那么,他们会采用开源但将其变成新加坡的吗?
They will also probably do that as well.
他们也可能会这样做。
Or the major companies will somehow allow governments to custom-design systems.
或者大公司会以某种方式允许政府定制设计系统。
Yes.
是的。
I think today you have fine-tuning services which are offered.
我认为今天你们提供了微调服务。
You could imagine fine-tuning AI systems into a sovereign AI system, which then has some governance arrangement attached to it, but Singapore has.
你可以想象将人工智能系统微调为主权人工智能系统,然后附加一些治理安排,但新加坡做到了。
That doesn’t seem out of the realm of possibility.
这似乎并非不可能。
Very last question.
最后一个问题。
What is it you hope to learn about next?
接下来您希望了解什么?
There are two things that I’m spending a lot of time on.
我花了很多时间在两件事上。
One is just theory of mind.
一种只是心理理论。
How do we actually figure out how things are thinking, and also maybe ways to test for theory of mind.
我们如何真正弄清楚事物是如何思考的,以及测试心理理论的方法。
I’m reading a lot of the literature on that.
我正在阅读很多这方面的文献。
The other thing, which is a lot more mundane, is, I’m learning to juggle.
另一件更平凡的事情是,我正在学习杂耍。
I go on long walks, and I’m trying to juggle while going on these walks, which, I think, looks like completely crazy-person behavior, but I find it very centering.
我会进行长途散步,并且在散步时我会尝试杂耍,我认为这看起来完全是疯狂的行为,但我发现它非常集中。
How good are you at juggling?
你杂耍有多厉害?
Very bad right now, but that’s good.
现在很糟糕,但那很好。
It gives me something that I can derive meaning from as we head into an increasingly AI-driven age.
当我们进入一个日益由人工智能驱动的时代时,它给了我一些可以从中获取意义的东西。
Jack Clark, thank you very much.
杰克·克拉克,非常感谢你。
Thanks very much.
非常感谢。