Henry Farrell on Weaponized Interdependence, Big Tech, and Playing with Ideas (Ep. 78)

He has popularized and developed the notion of weaponized interdependence and done in fact much, much more in the popular sphere.

他普及并发展了武器化相互依存的概念，事实上，他在大众领域做了很多很多的事情。

He is an incoming editor at Monkey Cage blog at the Washington Post and has written just about everywhere else you can imagine.

他是《华盛顿邮报》猴笼博客的新任编辑，写过几乎所有你能想象到的地方。

Henry, welcome.

亨利，欢迎。

Now, it’s not clear whether the US is going to deliver on this.

现在，尚不清楚美国是否会兑现这一承诺。

And this is one of the problems that the current administration has, which is that there’s an implicit break between, on the one hand, people like Donald Trump who think primarily in terms of trade and some very strange ideas about what victory in trade is, and on the other hand, people who are more concerned with the long-term security relationship, who have viewed Huawei as a threat for a number of years.

这是本届政府面临的问题之一，一方面是像唐纳德·特朗普这样的人，他们主要从贸易角度思考，对什么是贸易胜利抱有一些非常奇怪的想法；另一方面，更关心长期安全关系的人，多年来一直将华为视为威胁。

What I would suggest is probably going to happen is that we’re going to see some kind of a compromise where Trump is going to offer — and indeed, has suggested that he will offer — some concessions on Huawei, which is going to make people in the defense establishment very unhappy because they see Huawei as a long-term threat, because they fear that the 5G network that has been constructed around the world could be used by Huawei to give China access to people’s communications in more or less the same way as the NSA was able to help the United States listen in on the world for a number of years.

我建议可能会发生的是，我们将看到某种妥协，特朗普将提供——事实上，他已经暗示他将提供——对华为的一些让步，这将使国防机构中的人们非常不满，因为他们将华为视为长期威胁，因为他们担心华为可能会利用在世界各地建造的5G网络，让中国获得人们的通信，就像美国国家安全局能够帮助美国的方式一样。美国多年来一直在倾听世界的声音。

And there is a good reason why a number of countries, including US allies, have decided to opt for Huawei because they figure they’re already being listened into by the United States.

包括美国盟友在内的许多国家决定选择华为是有充分理由的，因为他们认为美国已经在倾听他们的声音。

They’re probably going to be listened into by China anyway.

无论如何，他们可能会被中国倾听。

So what matter does it make?

那么这有什么关系呢？

It probably doesn’t make all that much difference.

这可能没有多大区别。

Whichever technology you’re going to use, there’s probably going to be some way of penetrating it.

无论您要使用哪种技术，都可能有某种方法可以渗透它。

The more complicated, more difficult question is whether or not Huawei, or other kinds of technology companies like it, could be linked into other forms of systems in ways which might pose an active security threat which goes further than just listening.

更复杂、更困难的问题是，华为或其他类似的科技公司是否可以以可能构成主动安全威胁的方式连接到其他形式的系统，而不仅仅是监听。

This is something that Bruce Schneier, for example, has talked about in a wonderful book that came out about nine months ago called Click Here to Kill Everybody, where he more or less talks about the huge security risks which are associated with the so-called internet of things, which turns out to be an internet of really, really badly designed and badly secured things.

例如，布鲁斯·施奈尔（Bruce Schneier）在大约九个月前出版的一本精彩的书《点击这里杀死所有人》中谈到了这一点，他在书中或多或少地谈到了与所谓的物联网相关的巨大安全风险，事实证明物联网是一个由非常非常糟糕的设计和安全保障的事物组成的互联网。

And when one thinks about the ways in which, for example, what kinds of consequences it might have if you have a breakdown of communication at the time that there is a military attack — that’s the kind of thing that people really need to think carefully about.

当人们思考如何采取这种方式时，例如，如果在发生军事袭击时通讯中断，可能会产生什么样的后果，这才是人们真正需要仔细考虑的事情。

So I would guess that the best way to think about this is to, on the one hand, accept the fact that there’s going to be some level of surveillance that is happening; that given current technologies, there’s always going to be some kind of a back door there to be exploited.

因此，我认为思考这个问题的最佳方法是，一方面，接受将会发生某种程度的监视的事实；另一方面，接受这一事实。鉴于当前的技术，总会有某种后门可供利用。

On the other hand, try to make critical systems as secure and robust as possible and think as much as possible about things like multiple redundancies, not necessarily economically efficient in terms of market, but nonetheless things which will allow you to secure yourself and have possible backup systems in the case that something major is suddenly compromised.

另一方面，尝试使关键系统尽可能安全和健壮，并尽可能多地考虑诸如多重冗余之类的事情，这些事情在市场方面不一定具有经济效率，但仍然可以让您保护自己并在重大事件突然受到损害的情况下拥有可能的备份系统。

I think that’s where we’re moving towards — a world which is much less going to be about trying to pare things down to the minimum in search of economic efficiency and much more about robustness, redundancy, and trying to think carefully through the fact that we live in a fundamentally insecure world.

我认为这就是我们正在走向的世界——一个不再是为了追求经济效率而试图将事情削减到最低限度的世界，而是更多地注重稳健性、冗余性，并试图仔细思考我们生活在一个根本不安全的世界这一事实。

People are beginning to take advantage of it, and we need to gear up in order to think better about this.

人们开始利用它，我们需要做好准备以便更好地思考这一点。

I remember being told by a lawyer what they did was, they used to effectively take bids from Huawei in order to scare Ericsson and Nokia and other companies into offering them better terms, but with the presumption that they were never going to use Huawei because this would get them into too much trouble in security.

我记得一位律师告诉我，他们的做法是，他们过去常常有效地接受华为的投标，以吓唬爱立信、诺基亚和其他公司向他们提供更好的条件，但前提是他们永远不会使用华为，因为这会给他们带来太多的安全麻烦。

So the question for the US is straightforward.

所以美国的问题很简单。

The question for other countries is much less straightforward.

对于其他国家来说，问题就没那么简单了。

Do they see China as being a fundamental threat?

他们认为中国是根本威胁吗？

Or do they just view this as being another nuisance along with the fact that the NSA is listening into their phone calls?

或者他们只是认为这与国家安全局正在窃听他们的电话这一事实一样是另一个麻烦？

And it’s interesting to see that some countries, including close allies such as the United Kingdom, have been much, much less forthright on the US side than one might expect.

有趣的是，一些国家，包括英国等亲密盟友，在美国方面的表现远没有人们想象的那么直率。

Roughly speaking, one could say that there is a .

粗略地说，可以说有一个 .

.

。

.

。

if one wants to look at the ways in which countries have responded, I think a lot of it has to do with their geopolitical or geo-strategic exposure to China.

如果想了解各国的应对方式，我认为很大程度上与它们对中国的地缘政治或地缘战略接触有关。

So places like Australia and Japan have been far, far more willing to listen to the US on these kinds of things than places like the United Kingdom, which see that there is a plausible threat from Huawei but think that, at the end of the day, the balance between that and having cheap telecommunications infrastructure is such that they’re willing to allow Huawei to provide at least some parts of the machineries that they are looking to have subcontracted out.

因此，澳大利亚和日本等国家在此类问题上比英国等国家更愿意听取美国的意见，英国认为华为确实存在威胁，但认为最终，在华为与拥有廉价电信基础设施之间取得平衡，他们愿意允许华为提供至少部分他们希望分包的机械部件。

There are ways in which, I think, if the European Union were to get serious in this, it would probably be less about trying to create an alternative system to SWIFT than trying to bring SWIFT more under its own command.

我认为，如果欧盟认真对待这一问题，可能会采取多种方式，而不是试图创建 SWIFT 的替代系统，而是试图让 SWIFT 更多地处于自己的指挥之下。

At the moment, SWIFT is nominally European but in fact has a lot of influence from the United States.

目前，SWIFT名义上是欧洲的，但实际上受到美国的影响很大。

The United States has provided many of its senior decision makers, including people like Lenny Schrank.

美国提供了许多高级决策者，包括像莱尼·施兰克这样的人。

And it has also provided a large number of board members.

并且还提供了大量的董事会成员。

The European path forward, I think, if Europe wanted to try and minimize its exposure, would be to start to impose a much clearer and more substantial mandate upon SWIFT to effectively force SWIFT — under circumstances where the United States tells it to do one thing and Europe tells it to do another — SWIFT would effectively have much stronger reasons than it does at the moment to comply with the European threats.

我认为，如果欧洲想要尽量减少其风险，欧洲的前进道路将是开始对 SWIFT 施加更明确、更实质性的授权，以有效地迫使 SWIFT — 在美国要求其做一件事、欧洲要求其做另一件事的情况下 — SWIFT 实际上将有比目前更有力的理由来遵守欧洲的威胁。

Now, the problem without, from Europe’s point of view, is that that involves creating much, much heavier institutional paraphernalia at the EU level, which is going to be something that is going to be problematic for a number of the member states who don’t like to see the European Commission and European institutions taking up that level of power.

现在，从欧洲的角度来看，问题在于，这涉及在欧盟层面建立更重的机构设备，这对于一些不希望看到欧盟委员会和欧洲机构掌握这一级别权力的成员国来说将是一个问题。

But at the same time, there is, I think, a much, much clearer case being made.

但与此同时，我认为，有一个更加清晰的案例正在出现。

And if one looks, for example, at the comments that have been made in the run-up to the new commission, it’s very, very clear from Josep Borrell and other people that they’re looking to really create the European Union as an economic power in a way that hasn’t been true in the past.

例如，如果人们看看新委员会成立前夕发表的评论，就会发现何塞普·博雷尔和其他人非常非常清楚地表明，他们正在寻求以一种过去从未实现过的方式真正将欧盟打造为一个经济强国。

To the extent that member states begin to buy into that kind of agenda, they probably are going to have to buy into much, much heavier regulatory cloud at the EU level, including the kinds of things that could be used to bring SWIFT to heel.

如果成员国开始接受这种议程，他们可能就不得不接受欧盟层面更加严格的监管云，包括那些可以用来让 SWIFT 就范的事情。

So if we say to European companies, banks, whatever, “If you do business with the US financial system, you must adhere to some long list of restrictions that may be as simple as Iranian sanctions,” what does the equilibrium actually look like where they can just say, “No, we’re going to go ahead and trade with Iran”?

因此，如果我们对欧洲公司、银行等说，“如果你与美国金融体系做生意，你必须遵守一长串可能像伊朗制裁一样简单的限制”，那么他们可以说“不，我们将继续与伊朗进行贸易”时，实际上的平衡是什么样的？

Isn’t that really quite distant, given the importance of New York as a banking center?

考虑到纽约作为银行中心的重要性，这不是很遥远吗？

In particular what they’re worried about is Russia.

他们尤其担心的是俄罗斯。

I think that the counterexample to what you say is assume, for example, that we have a 2020 election in which Donald Trump is ignominiously defeated.

我认为你所说的反例是假设，例如，我们有一场 2020 年的选举，唐纳德·特朗普在其中可耻地被击败。

What we are going to see then, plausibly, is a situation where a presidency and a Congress, even if the Republicans still have the majority in the Senate — they are going to be loaded for bear.

届时我们将看到的情况是，即使共和党在参议院仍占多数，总统和国会也将不堪重负。

They are going to go after Russia with sanctions of one sort or another.

他们将通过某种制裁来对付俄罗斯。

Many of those sanctions are plausibly going to implicate the European Union.

其中许多制裁措施可能会牵涉到欧盟。

So, when one looks at the policy debate in the EU at the moment, a lot of that policy debate is gearing up for perceived likely fights with the United States over the relationship between Europe and the Russian economy because, of course, Europe depends much more heavily on Russia for energy and has a wide variety of other economic relations with Russia.

因此，当人们审视目前欧盟的政策辩论时，会发现很多政策辩论都在为欧洲与俄罗斯经济之间的关系可能与美国发生争执做好准备，因为当然，欧洲在能源方面更加依赖俄罗斯，并且与俄罗斯有着各种各样的其他经济关系。

I think that’s the situation in which Europe would care much more substantially than the United States, or would care as substantially as the United States and would be prepared to push back hard.

我认为在这种情况下，欧洲会比美国更加关心，或者会像美国一样关心并准备强力反击。

Those are the circumstances under which there has been a recent paper by the European Council on Foreign Relations, which has talked about ways in which Europe could deter United States actions.

在这种情况下，欧洲外交关系委员会最近发表了一份文件，其中谈到了欧洲可以阻止美国行动的方式。

One of the actions that is proposed there is that the European Union think about licensing requirements for US firms that want to operate in Europe, such that if they cooperate with sanctions against European entities that Europe doesn’t like, that these licenses to operate would be withdrawn.

提议的行动之一是，欧盟考虑对想要在欧洲经营的美国公司的许可要求，这样，如果它们配合对欧洲不喜欢的欧洲实体的制裁，这些经营许可证将被撤销。

That’s the kind of circumstance in which I could see actual, at the very least, posturing happening at a very, very substantial scale between Europe and the United States and perhaps actual low-level economic warfare if the US steps in to try to push back against what Europe regards as being its core interests.

在这种情况下，我至少可以看到，欧洲和美国之间会发生大规模、非常大规模的姿态，如果美国介入，试图反击欧洲视为其核心利益的东西，也许会发生真正的低水平经济战争。

That equilibrium has broken down.

这种平衡已经被打破。

It has broken down in the US.

它在美国已经崩溃了。

It has broken down in Europe, and it has broken down in authoritarian societies in particular.

它在欧洲已经崩溃，特别是在威权社会。

So I think we’re going to see more and more efforts to try and use the platform companies effectively as a means of extending reach into other jurisdictions and imposing universal-type restrictions on what they can or cannot do.

因此，我认为我们将看到越来越多的努力尝试有效地利用平台公司作为将影响力扩展到其他司法管辖区并对他们可以做什么或不能做什么施加普遍类型的限制的手段。

There was a kind of an equilibrium in which the United States managed to persuade everybody that self-regulation and platforms looking after their own business was more or less okay for most purposes.

有一种平衡，美国设法说服每个人，自我监管和照顾自己业务的平台对于大多数目的来说或多或少都是可以的。

That equilibrium has broken down.

这种平衡已经被打破。

It has broken down in the US.

它在美国已经崩溃了。

It has broken down in Europe, and it has broken down in authoritarian societies in particular.

它在欧洲已经崩溃，特别是在威权社会。

So I think we’re going to see more and more efforts to try and use the platform companies effectively as a means of extending reach into other jurisdictions and imposing universal-type restrictions on what they can or cannot do.

因此，我认为我们将看到越来越多的努力尝试有效地利用平台公司作为将影响力扩展到其他司法管辖区并对他们可以做什么或不能做什么施加普遍类型的限制的手段。

If I want to think about this as an individual, what I would say is that I’m not at all happy with what the European Union is doing in specific here, but I do think that there needs to be much greater regulation of platform companies.

如果我想作为个人来思考这个问题，我想说的是，我对欧盟在这方面的具体做法一点也不满意，但我确实认为需要对平台公司进行更严格的监管。

And in the absence of the United States, I think that the European Union is the most plausible actor which has got the regulatory clout and the willingness to do so in a manner which is at least somewhat compatible with broad liberal norms.

在美国缺席的情况下，我认为欧盟是最有可能的参与者，它拥有监管影响力，并且愿意以至少在某种程度上与广泛的自由主义规范兼容的方式这样做。

So my basic attitude will be to push back against a specific decision but to say that if the choice is between the United States not regulating or perhaps regulating — perhaps that will be different under a possible Warren administration — and authoritarian states, that I would much prefer to have a robust European Union than any of the other actors that I can think of that have the clout and the ability to try and bring the platform companies to heel.

因此，我的基本态度是反对具体决定，但要说的是，如果要在美国不监管或可能监管（在可能的沃伦政府下情况可能会有所不同）和独裁国家之间做出选择，那么我更愿意拥有一个强大的欧盟，而不是我能想到的任何其他有影响力和能力试图让平台公司屈服的参与者。

On the NBA and China

关于NBA和中国

And of course, we’ve seen Hollywood for the last number of years has been quite sensitive to the Chinese market, most recently as exemplified by the decision to remove, I think it was the Taiwanese flag from the remake of Top Gun from the back of Tom Cruise’s jacket because this was perceived as being possibly provocative.

当然，我们看到好莱坞在过去几年里对中国市场相当敏感，最近决定从汤姆·克鲁斯夹克后面删除我认为是翻拍版《壮志凌云》中的台湾国旗就是一个例子，因为这被认为可能具有挑衅性。

So this is pretty standard stuff, and this tells us something about the way that businesses operate.

所以这是非常标准的东西，这告诉我们一些有关企业运营方式的信息。

You can see the way that businesses operate globally as having both great benefits and great weaknesses.

您可以看到企业在全球范围内运营的方式既有很大的好处，也有很大的弱点。

If one wants to think about the standard story about how interdependence, at least under some circumstances, creates peace because businesses have an incentive to try and create peaceful and happy relations between nations in order to secure their commerce, I think that there’s something to it, although as my work with Abe on weaponized interdependence suggests, there also are some clear limits to that as well.

如果人们想思考一下这样一个标准故事：至少在某些情况下，相互依赖如何创造和平，因为企业有动力尝试在国家之间建立和平和幸福的关系，以确保其商业安全，我认为这是有道理的，尽管正如我与安倍在武器化相互依赖方面的工作所表明的那样，这也存在一些明显的局限性。

But the obverse of this is that business is obviously in the business of making profits, and when there are clear political risks associated to business doing certain kinds of things, by and large, businesses are not going to be especially courageous.

但它的反面是，企业显然是为了盈利，当企业做某些事情存在明显的政治风险时，总的来说，企业不会特别勇敢。

And this is particularly likely to be true of big firms, which I think are more likely to come under this kind of pressure.

对于大公司来说尤其如此，我认为它们更有可能面临这种压力。

One saw this already with regards to Hong Kong.

关于香港，人们已经看到了这一点。

There have been that airways chief executive who effectively got ousted.

曾经有一位航空公司首席执行官实际上被赶下台了。

I’m trying to remember the company, but I can’t.

我试图记住这家公司，但我记不起来。

I think that this is, in a sense, if you want to outsource a lot of our decision-making about culture, about the ways that things ought to be done to business, this is what you’re going to expect, for better or for worse.

我认为，从某种意义上说，如果你想将我们的很多关于文化、关于做事方式的决策外包给企业，这就是你所期望的，无论好坏。

On the shift to multipolar international relations

论国际关系向多极化的转变

So I think that we are moving from a world of unipolarity — to use the standard term that international relations scholars use — to a world of multipolarity.

因此，我认为我们正在从单极世界（用国际关系学者使用的标准术语）转向多极世界。

And one of the things that we can expect from that is that multipolarity tends to lead to a lot of danger of things screwing up and things going wrong.

我们可以从中预料到的一件事是，多极化往往会导致很多事情搞砸和出错的危险。

So I think that we are moving from a world of unipolarity…

所以我认为我们正在摆脱单极世界……

to a world of multipolarity.

走向多极化的世界。

And one of the things that we can expect from that is that multipolarity tends to lead to a lot of danger of things screwing up and things going wrong.

我们可以从中预料到的一件事是，多极化往往会导致很多事情搞砸和出错的危险。

When one looks at how the US has done this over the last number of years, it has managed to prosecute its interests reasonably well while not pushing other countries too far, until the Trump administration.

看看美国在过去几年里是如何做到这一点的，它在维护自身利益方面做得相当好，同时又没有把其他国家逼得太紧，直到特朗普政府上台。

That’s not true anymore.

这不再是真的了。

And I think that as other countries come in, many of which are less sophisticated about thinking about what kinds of things they can or cannot do without messing up things for other countries or for their own companies, we’re going to see far, far more mistakes being made.

我认为，随着其他国家的加入，其中许多国家不太成熟地思考自己可以或不能做哪些事情而不会给其他国家或自己的公司带来麻烦，我们将看到犯下更多的错误。

This is especially true because nobody really understands what the networks are, but they’re trying to weaponize.

尤其如此，因为没有人真正了解网络是什么，但他们正试图将其武器化。

There was one very interesting example of this, which happened with the United States, in fact, when it went after Oleg Deripaska, who is one of the Russian oligarchs.

有一个非常有趣的例子，事实上，美国正在追捕俄罗斯寡头之一奥列格·德里帕斯卡。

Deripaska had a big interest.

德里帕斯卡对此很感兴趣。

He effectively had control of the Russian aluminum industry.

他实际上控制了俄罗斯铝业。

The US Treasury Department OFAC sanctioned Deripaska but didn’t realize that when it was sanctioning Deripaska’s companies, it was going to mess up the entire West European car manufacturing industry, which relies upon specific aluminum products that only Deripaska’s companies can create.

美国财政部 OFAC 制裁了德里帕斯卡，但没有意识到，当它制裁德里帕斯卡的公司时，将会扰乱整个西欧汽车制造业，因为该行业依赖于只有德里帕斯卡的公司才能生产的特定铝产品。

This led to this very, very complicated ballet dance in which the Treasury sought to both extend the sanctions and to specify them in ways that would allow for the unwinding, at least the nominal unwinding, of Deripaska’s formal control of the company, so as to create an exit strategy.

这导致了这场非常非常复杂的芭蕾舞表演，财政部试图既延长制裁，又以允许解除（至少是名义上解除）德里帕斯卡对公司的正式控制的方式具体化制裁，从而制定退出策略。

But one can see that, as we’re going to have more and more countries trying to do this stuff, and as they are doing so in a competitive way rather than one country trying as a unipolar power to impose it on everyone else, that the possibilities of mistakes being made and mistakes leading to escalation, and minor trade wars blowing up into substantial spats and even outright economic warfare — I think that that possibility is going to get much, much worse.

但人们可以看到，随着越来越多的国家尝试做这些事情，而且他们以竞争的方式这样做，而不是一个国家试图作为单极大国将其强加于其他国家，因此有可能犯下错误并导致升级，小规模的贸易战升级为大规模的口角，甚至是彻底的经济战——我认为这种可能性会变得非常非常糟糕。

If some parts of what they do are bad, and you get more competition in the bad, don’t we just want to put in GDPR barriers to entry, not quite public utilities, but keep them big and fat and happy and somewhat not so dynamic, yes or no?

如果他们所做的某些事情很糟糕，而你会在不好的方面遇到更多的竞争，我们难道不只是想设置 GDPR 的进入壁垒，而不是公共事业，而是让他们保持大、胖、快乐，但有点不那么有活力，是或否？

If, alternatively, you value things like privacy and other kinds of rights, then you probably want to move towards an equilibrium in which there are far, far fewer big firms.

或者，如果您重视隐私和其他类型的权利，那么您可能希望走向一种大公司数量少得多的平衡。

So that’s where I see the fight being played out.

这就是我所看到的战斗正在上演的地方。

I see the fight being played out between people who value security and people who value privacy.

我看到重视安全的人和重视隐私的人之间正在展开斗争。

I think they point in somewhat different directions.

我认为它们指向了有些不同的方向。

This is something that I’ve actually been struggling with and thinking about because there’s another interesting aspect to this as well, which is, if one thinks, for example, about a possible Warren administration — which is quite plausible at the moment, as the most plausible candidate perhaps at the moment on the Democratic side, although who the hell knows — then I think that what we’re going to see is, we’re going to see the Warren administration trying to pursue a much more energetic foreign policy agenda, especially on economic policy, than we have seen for a number of years.

这是我实际上一直在努力解决和思考的事情，因为这还有另一个有趣的方面，例如，如果有人认为可能的沃伦政府——目前这是相当合理的，作为民主党方面目前最有可能的候选人，尽管谁知道呢——那么我认为我们将看到的是，我们将看到沃伦政府试图推行比我们更有活力的外交政策议程，特别是在经济政策方面。已经见过很多年了。

And I think that this is especially going to be true in places like tax evasion.

我认为在逃税等领域尤其如此。

The Warren administration is going to begin to leverage some of these powers that have been used for other purposes, primarily for security purposes.

沃伦政府将开始利用其中一些已用于其他目的（主要是安全目的）的权力。

It is going to leverage these against Swiss banks, against other countries which are not willing to jump up to the need to try and push back against international financial flows and so on.

它将利用这些手段来对付瑞士银行、其他不愿立即采取措施阻止国际金融流动的国家等等。

And from my perspective, that will be awesome.

从我的角度来看，那会很棒。

That said, I also think that the problem .

这么说来，我也觉得有问题。

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and this is getting away from the question of corporate power to the question of unipolarity, which is perhaps the question I’d be more interested in and I’ve been more trying to think about.

这正在从企业权力问题转向单极问题，这也许是我更感兴趣、也更努力思考的问题。

The other side of that, of course, is that unipolarity and the US willingness to use its power in order to crush all opposition has been used in a variety of problematic ways over the last few years.

当然，另一方面是单极性和美国愿意利用其权力来镇压所有反对派，在过去几年中被以各种有问题的方式利用。

Sometimes I see myself .

有时我看到我自己。

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。

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。

I’m interested in trying to provide advice to businesses about how to push back against this.

我有兴趣尝试向企业提供如何抵制这种情况的建议。

So Abe and I have a piece that is under editing at the moment for the Harvard Business Review, where we are providing a sense for businesses as to what the landscape is that they’re going to face.

因此，安倍和我​​目前正在为《哈佛商业评论》编辑一篇文章，我们将在其中让企业了解他们将面临的形势。

Sometimes I think that will be very good, to see a big, powerful government beginning to pursue the wholesale reform of the international financial system, which has become problematic for democracy in a variety of ways.

有时我认为看到一个强大的大政府开始对国际金融体系进行大规模改革是件好事，而这在很多方面都给民主带来了问题。

And quite frankly, which side of that debate I’m going to end up on over the longer term is going to depend on who the particular actors are on the two sides, and which seems to me to be most compatible with a broad, small-l-liberal understanding of the good life and the good society.

坦率地说，从长远来看，我最终会站在这场辩论的哪一边，将取决于双方的特定参与者是谁，而在我看来，这最符合对美好生活和美好社会的广泛的、小自由主义的理解。

On Facebook’s new Oversight Board

Facebook 新成立的监督委员会

North and Weingast, I’m sure you’re familiar with, and many of your listeners will be familiar with.

诺斯和温加斯特，我相信你很熟悉，你的许多听众也会熟悉。

They have this great article on tying the king’s hands, where they argue that the Glorious Revolution — this crucial moment in British history — why it was so incredibly important was that it effectively allowed the monarch to make promises.

他们有一篇关于束缚国王手脚的伟大文章，他们认为光荣革命——英国历史上的这个关键时刻——之所以如此重要，是因为它有效地让君主做出了承诺。

Previously, monarchs had been able to borrow money and then renege on their debts.

此前，君主可以借钱然后又赖账。

Once Parliament is instituted, the monarch can’t do that nearly so easily anymore.

一旦议会成立，君主就不再那么容易做到这一点了。

And this weakness turns out to be an incredible source of power for the British crown over the next couple of centuries.

事实证明，这种弱点在接下来的几个世纪里成为了英国王室令人难以置信的权力来源。

It effectively allows it to borrow money, and to borrow money freely, because the lenders don’t have to worry that the money’s going to be confiscated.

它有效地允许它借钱，并且可以自由地借钱，因为贷方不必担心钱会被没收。

And as people like John Brewer have discussed in their discussion of the British fiscal state of the 18th and 19th century, this turns out to be an enormous source of power projection.

正如约翰·布鲁尔（John Brewer）等人在讨论 18 世纪和 19 世纪英国财政状况时所讨论的那样，这被证明是权力投射的巨大来源。

The problem is, I think, that if you look at Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook at the moment, he does not have the power to tie his hands.

我认为，问题在于，如果你看看马克·扎克伯格和 Facebook 目前的情况，你会发现他没有权力束缚自己的手脚。

You have this very, very strange corporate structure where Zuckerberg is effectively CEO.

你有一个非常非常奇怪的公司结构，扎克伯格实际上是首席执行官。

He is in control of the board.

他控制着董事会。

He has the majority of the shares that count.

他拥有大部分重要的股份。

And this means that it’s very, very difficult for Zuckerberg or anyone who is in Facebook to really credibly commit to tie their own hands in this kind of way.

这意味着扎克伯格或 Facebook 的任何人都很难真正可信地承诺以这种方式束缚自己。

I think that this is going to work up to the point where there are serious implications for Facebook’s business model, and past that point Zuckerberg is going to have a very, very strong incentive to renege.

我认为这将会对 Facebook 的商业模式产生严重影响，而一旦超过这一点，扎克伯格就会有非常非常强烈的食言动机。

And there’s a more general problem if we think about platform economies, that platform companies have become too powerful to commit to behave in good ways.

如果我们考虑平台经济，就会出现一个更普遍的问题，即平台公司已经变得过于强大，以至于无法承诺以良好的方式行事。

If you look, for example, at Amazon, if you look at Google, all of these — they’re not only businesses, but they’re also effectively microeconomies in their own right.

例如，如果你看看亚马逊，如果你看看谷歌，所有这些——它们不仅是企业，而且它们本身也是有效的微观经济。

They’re both market players and they are the marketplace itself for key aspects of the information economy.

他们都是市场参与者，也是信息经济关键方面的市场本身。

That makes it really, really difficult for them to guarantee credibly to other market actors that they are not going to take advantage of the unique power, the unique access to information, access to ability to shape market conditions that they have.

这使得他们很难向其他市场参与者可信地保证他们不会利用他们所拥有的独特权力、独特的信息获取渠道和塑造市场条件的能力。

And even if they want to, it’s going to be extremely difficult, I would imagine, for somebody like Jeff Bezos, when he’s got all of these hungry young executives who are trying to make money and whose future depends on their ability to make money, to stop them from pushing the envelope in ways.

即使他们愿意，我想，对于像杰夫·贝佐斯这样的人来说，当他拥有所有这些渴望赚钱、他们的未来取决于他们赚钱能力的年轻高管时，要阻止他们以各种方式挑战极限，这将是极其困难的。

And that may undermine Amazon or Google’s or indeed Facebook’s market position over the longer run.

从长远来看，这可能会损害亚马逊、谷歌甚至 Facebook 的市场地位。

So I think that this is a much, much more general problem, and we know far less about the internal hierarchies of these companies and the internal political economies of these companies than we ought to.

所以我认为这是一个非常非常普遍的问题，我们对这些公司的内部等级制度和这些公司的内部政治经济的了解远远少于我们应该了解的。

But what we do know, and here Tim O’Reilly’s recent book is quite good on this, gives us some reason to suspect that they may have some real problems.

但我们确实知道，蒂姆·奥莱利最近的书在这方面做得很好，让我们有理由怀疑他们可能存在一些真正的问题。

Machine learning can do wonderful things, but machine learning simply is not going to ever be able to keep up with the multifarious ways in which human beings can use language in order to communicate nasty and unpleasant things to each other.

机器学习可以做一些奇妙的事情，但机器学习根本无法跟上人类使用语言来相互交流令人讨厌和不愉快的事情的多种多样的方式。

So the completely unsatisfactory answer I have to your question is, I just don’t think that one can come up with a satisfactory solution, either in political terms or in terms of effectiveness — given the economy that we have at the moment — to the problem of policing free speech.

因此，我对你的问题的完全不满意的答案是，我只是认为，无论是在政治方面还是在有效性方面（考虑到我们目前的经济状况），人们无法就监管言论自由的问题提出令人满意的解决方案。

First of all, there are no universal standards.

首先，没有通用的标准。

Secondly, even if there were universal standards, I don’t think that we have the appropriate technical tools to be able to implement them when we’ve got companies that have billions of users and thousands or tens of thousands of employees.

其次，即使有通用标准，我认为当我们的公司拥有数十亿用户和数千或数万名员工时，我们也没有适当的技术工具来实施这些标准。

I’ve never even wanted to visit, but I read about what’s on there, and we can’t stop them either, so it doesn’t seem the problem is Facebook or the structure of the economy.

我从来都不想去参观，但我读到了那里的情况，而且我们也无法阻止他们，所以问题似乎不在于 Facebook 或经济结构。

Isn’t it just the case we now have technologies where everything that can be said will be said, and we’re not going to stop that?

难道我们现在拥有的技术不就是可以说的一切都会被说出来，而且我们不会阻止吗？

So here are the arguments, something as follows.

以下是论点。

If you think about 8chan, and if you think about 4chan before it, they were basically meme factories.

如果你想想 8chan，如果你想想之前的 4chan，它们基本上都是模因工厂。

They were basically these places where these bored individuals hung out.

它们基本上就是这些无聊的人闲逛的地方。

You also created these memes in a kind of process of frenzied Darwinian evolution, where you desperately want to make sure that whatever you had said was on the front page because otherwise it would disappear forever.

你还在疯狂的达尔文进化过程中创造了这些模因，你迫切希望确保你所说的一切都出现在首页上，否则它将永远消失。

So you’ve got this survival-of-the-fittest thing, where incredibly valuable or incredibly effective memes go out and begin to populate the entire space.

所以你已经得到了这种适者生存的东西，其中非常有价值或非常有效的模因出现并开始填充整个空间。

But you need two things for that to work.

但你需要两件事才能使其发挥作用。

First of all, you need a process of generation, and secondly, you need some kind of process of dissemination.

首先，你需要一个产生的过程，其次，你需要某种传播的过程。

You need other platforms which have far greater reach, which can then allow for these memes to propagate through the atmosphere.

您需要其他具有更大影响力的平台，以便这些模因能够在大气中传播。

I suspect that if we were in a world in which everything was at the scale of 8chan, rather than having a mixture of companies at the scale of 8chan and companies at the scale of Facebook, that the likelihood of this stuff spreading and becoming epidemic across the entire community of internet users would be far, far less.

我怀疑，如果我们生活在一个一切都达到 8chan 规模的世界，而不是拥有 8chan 规模的公司和 Facebook 规模的公司的混合体，那么这种东西在整个互联网用户群体中传播和流行的可能性就会小得多。

Obviously, we would have other problems then.

显然，那时我们还会遇到其他问题。

But I think that the problems that we would face would be a very, very different set of problems from the problems that we face in the current environment.

但我认为我们将面临的问题将与我们在当前环境中面临的问题非常非常不同。

My understanding is that FISA is still perhaps problematic from a civil liberties perspective, but it is far, far less problematic than it used to be.

我的理解是，从公民自由的角度来看，外国情报监视法案可能仍然存在问题，但问题比以前要少得多。

So I think that it is possible to do this kind of stuff.

所以我认为做这种事情是可能的。

It takes careful institutional design, and in general, I think that it is okay to have some legal access to heavily encrypted information.

这需要仔细的制度设计，总的来说，我认为对高度加密的信息进行合法访问是可以的。

The problems, of course, are going to be (a) as you say, this is likely to be something which is going to be swept up into the security state, and (b) let’s really implement this properly — we’re going to have to see the creation of some kind of a system, probably among advanced industrial democracies in Western Europe, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and a small number of other countries where there is some set of shared standards and shared agreements around this.

当然，问题将是（a）正如你所说，这可能会被卷入安全状态，以及（b）让我们真正正确地实施这一点——我们将不得不看到某种系统的创建，可能是在西欧、美国、日本、韩国的先进工业民主国家和少数其他国家之间，这些国家对此有一套共同的标准和共同的协议。

We’re beginning to see the battles starting over that with agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom over access to electronic evidence.

随着美国和英国之间就获取电子证据达成协议，我们开始看到这场斗争开始了。

I worry that this discussion is going to be dominated by the security side of the House, but to the extent that privacy advocates, privacy officials are able to get into this debate as well, I think that one could plausibly come up with something which is going to be reasonably respectful of civil liberties.

我担心这场讨论将由众议院的安全方面主导，但只要隐私倡导者、隐私官员也能够参与这场辩论，我认为人们可能会提出一些合理尊重公民自由的方案。

To the extent that it is true, I think that if one wanted to come up with a half-baked social science theory which might or might not be correct, it might be because the valences of the service are much more about their quasi solidaristic .

就其真实性而言，我认为，如果有人想提出一种可能正确也可能不正确的半生不熟的社会科学理论，那可能是因为服务的效价更多地是关于它们的准团结性。

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about creating affirmations of shared values, of shared communities in ways that plausibly work.

以可行的方式创造对共同价值观和共同社区的肯定。

But then, arguing against myself, I would immediately think the same thing ought to be true of a variety of conservative communities.

但随后，我与自己争论起来，我立即认为同样的事情也应该适用于各种保守派社区。

When I look at my Twitter, my Twitter is certainly much more left-wing, but that is also —

当我查看我的推特时，我的推特肯定更左翼，但这也是——

Because if you think about the conversation that we’re involved in, it’s a conversation which you might call small-l liberal, that is, people who are on either side of the aisle but who are plausibly committed to a kind of Popper or Gellner way of thinking about the world, in which you want to have debate on both sides of the aisle because this is how you advance argument, advance your understanding of society.

因为如果你想想我们所参与的对话，你会发现这是一场你可能称之为“小自由派”的对话，也就是说，那些站在过道两边但似乎都致力于波普尔或盖尔纳思考世界的方式的人，在这种方式中，你希望在过道两边进行辩论，因为这是你推进论点、增进你对社会理解的方式。

But on the Right side of that, there has been a truncation where a lot of people have peeled off, and where Donald Trump has had some very, very substantial consequences for debate.

但在右边，出现了一个截断，很多人都离开了，而唐纳德·特朗普对辩论产生了一些非常非常重大的影响。

I don’t follow many people who are avid followers of Donald Trump, and I follow them more or less in a clinical way rather than a these-are-people-who-are-going-to-have-interesting-and-unexpected-things-to-say-to-me kind of way.

我关注的唐纳德·特朗普的狂热追随者并不多，我或多或少以一种冷静的方式关注他们，而不是一种“这些人将会对我说一些有趣和意想不到的事情”的方式。

So I wonder whether or not that perception is much more a result of the fact that, if you are a certain kind of libertarian, the people you want to talk to are going to be far more on the left side of the aisle right now than they would have been five or six years ago.

所以我想知道这种看法是否更多地是由于这样一个事实：如果你是某种自由主义者，那么你想与之交谈的人现在将比五六年前更多地站在过道的左侧。

But I also see a lot of very interesting conversations happening on Twitter that I would never have been exposed to before.

但我也看到 Twitter 上发生了很多非常有趣的对话，这是我以前从未接触过的。

And over time, maybe I’ve mellowed.

随着时间的推移，也许我变得成熟了。

I’ve become much nicer.

我变得更好了。

I’ve become much more deliberate and not getting involved in confrontations or fights on Twitter myself because I just don’t have time in my life.

我变得更加深思熟虑，不再参与 Twitter 上的对抗或争吵，因为我生活中没有时间。

As a result, I found it a much, much more pleasant experience to get to know people and not feel that when they say something that you think is idiotic or reprehensible, that you necessarily have to argue with them because maybe tomorrow or the next day they’ll say something that’s more interesting, and that brings you back into a feeling of communion with them.

因此，我发现结识别人是一种非常非常愉快的经历，当他们说一些你认为愚蠢或应受谴责的事情时，你不会觉得自己必须与他们争论，因为也许明天或后天他们会说一些更有趣的事情，这会让你重新回到与他们交流的感觉。

On things under- and overrated

关于被低估和高估的事情

If you think about Bitcoin, it purports to be a technological hack.

如果你想到比特币，它据称是一种技术黑客。

It’s really an effort at a sociological hack, and I don’t think it’s particularly worked.

这确实是一种社会学黑客的努力，但我认为这并不是特别有效。

But the ideology of Bitcoin, the idea that you could effectively, like the villain in Rapunzel, that you would create this machine for sowing value out of rubbish — basically, that’s what Bitcoin is.

但比特币的意识形态，即你可以像《长发公主》中的反派一样，有效地创建这台机器，从垃圾中播种价值——基本上，这就是比特币。

It’s turning wasted computer cycles into something that people view as being a thing of value.

它正在将浪费的计算机周期变成人们认为有价值的东西。

It succeeded among a significant enough community that it’s going to survive and be around for a while.

它在一个足够重要的社区中取得了成功，它将生存并存在一段时间。

I don’t think it’s ever going to take off beyond that community.

我认为它永远不会在那个社区之外起飞。

But nonetheless, the basic underlying idea, which is that if you bring together rationalist perspectives with a direct concern with power relations and a desire to understand power relations in the Marxist and the Weberian way, that this is something which is coming to the fore again, which is extremely valuable.

但尽管如此，基本的基本思想是，如果你把理性主义的观点与对权力关系的直接关注和以马克思主义和韦伯的方式理解权力关系的愿望结合起来，那么这将再次脱颖而出，这是极其有价值的。

Somebody else who I think is underrated in this context is Mancur Olson.

我认为在这方面被低估的另一个人是曼瑟·奥尔森。

For example, if you want to understand where Elizabeth Warren is going, you want to go back to Mancur Olson’s book, The Rise and Decline of Nations, because I think what Elizabeth Warren is pursuing is very much an Olsonian view of how markets work: that drag and dross and corruption builds up and that in order to allow markets to achieve their full potential, you basically need to cleanse them at a certain point.

例如，如果你想了解伊丽莎白·沃伦的走向，你想回到曼库尔·奥尔森的书《国家的兴衰》，因为我认为伊丽莎白·沃伦所追求的很大程度上是奥尔森式的市场运作观点：拖累、糟粕和腐败不断累积，为了让市场充分发挥潜力，你基本上需要在某个时刻清理它们。

I see Warren as being somebody who has very much taken on the law and economics training, and you see big marks of that in her thinking, but who has turned it in a very different ideological direction.

我认为沃伦是一个接受过很多法律和经济学培训的人，你可以在她的思想中看到这一点，但她把它转向了一个非常不同的意识形态方向。

Now the question is, for Italy, that its big strength was in manufacturing.

现在的问题是，对于意大利来说，其最大的优势在于制造业。

It was not in computer science or in any of the new data-related economy.

它不属于计算机科学或任何新的数据相关经济。

Italy’s problem is that it is, more than anything else, it is stuck in a previous cycle, except in certain areas such as luxury eyewear, which are not going to power an economy.

意大利的问题在于，它最重要的是陷入了先前的周期，除了某些领域，例如奢侈眼镜，这些领域不会为经济提供动力。

It’s going to have a very great difficulty clambering out.

爬出去将会有很大的困难。

The interesting question is, to what extent is the Chinese state kind of like Italy writ large?

有趣的问题是，中国政府在多大程度上与意大利很像？

You can see the same kinds of problems with this massive bloated state sector in China, these big companies, which are closely and intimately related with the state.

你可以在中国庞大臃肿的国有部门、这些与国家密切相关的大公司中看到同样的问题。

You have these small private companies, which have been incredibly powerful, incredibly dynamic, incredibly successful.

这些小型私营公司非常强大、充满活力、非常成功。

I wonder whether China may suffer from a version of the Italian disease two or three decades from now, and perhaps even more starkly because of the lack of democracy.

我想知道二三十年后中国是否会遭受意大利病的困扰，而且由于缺乏民主，情况可能更加严重。

Because it really is only possible to maintain that private dynamism for a period of time while the public economy does not provide the appropriate public goods.

因为只有在公共经济无法提供适当的公共产品的情况下，才能在一段时间内维持私人活力。

Sooner or later, it just becomes impossible to maintain.

迟早，它会变得无法维护。

I think that they really are one of the essential groups.

我认为他们确实是重要的群体之一。

That album, which they released three or four years ago, I don’t think was quite as good as they released back in their heyday, but it was still pretty damn good compared to what most of their contemporaries are doing.

他们三四年前发行的那张专辑，我认为不如他们全盛时期发行的那么好，但与大多数同时代人的专辑相比，它仍然非常好。

He was a lecturer in classics, as I recall, at the predecessor to University College Dublin.

我记得，他是都柏林大学学院前身的古典学讲师。

Had problems with gambling, had problems with alcohol, and ended up, more or less, being alienated from his family and dying alone in a boarding house decades after.

他有赌博问题，有酗酒问题，最终或多或少地与家人疏远，几十年后独自死在寄宿屋里。

A rather sad story.

一个比较悲伤的故事。

But if one is to look at neoliberalism as a kind of global power structure, plausibly Ireland managed to figure out very creatively, very ingeniously, ways to fit into that power structure that allowed for massive inward investments.

但如果将新自由主义视为一种全球权力结构，那么爱尔兰似乎设法找到了非常有创意、非常巧妙的方法来适应这种允许大规模外来投资的权力结构。

Here specifically, a lot of what Ireland has done over the last number of years is to figure out a combination of a regulatory play and a taxation play.

具体来说，爱尔兰在过去几年中所做的很多事情都是将监管手段和税收手段结合起来。

So it has been a relatively lax place in regulating various financial activities, in regulating platform economies.

因此，它在监管各种金融活动、平台经济方面一直是一个相对宽松的地方。

And it has also been relatively willing to facilitate some very exotic tax arrangements.

而且它也相对愿意促进一些非常奇特的税收安排。

I think that the former of these still continues and has managed to kickstart a genuine native industry, which will continue to do very well.

我认为前者仍在继续，并成功启动了一个真正的本土产业，该产业将继续表现良好。

I think that the latter part, the taxation game, is coming to an end, and it’s very clear that it’s coming to an end.

我认为后一部分，即税收游戏，即将结束，而且很明显它即将结束。

People in the Central Bank have been making statements about it, more or less warning the government of the fiscal implications to a cessation of Ireland’s ability to finesse the global tax system.

央行人士一直在就此发表声明，或多或少地警告政府，爱尔兰失去巧妙调整全球税收体系的能力将产生财政影响。

This is coming to an end, and the Irish state is suddenly going to have a fiscal headache as a result, which, added to a possible Brexit headache, could have some pretty significant implications.

这种情况即将结束，爱尔兰政府将突然陷入财政困境，再加上英国退欧可能带来的麻烦，可能会产生一些相当重大的影响。

But I would say that Polanyi is a very, very .

但我想说波兰尼是一个非常非常。

.

。

.

。

There are two things that are fuzzy in it.

其中有两件事是模糊的。

First of all is his ideal alternative, which is based on a kind of specifically Christian notion of socialism that I think he derives from people like Tawney, which is very, very hard to create in the modern era.

首先是他的理想选择，它基于一种特殊的基督教社会主义概念，我认为他源自像托尼这样的人，这在现代很难创造。

So there’s a lot of pretty overt nostalgia for a previous, almost quasi-medieval sense of organic connection between society and economy, which I think simply cannot be reestablished under liberal conditions.

因此，人们对以前的、几乎是中世纪的社会与经济之间的有机联系有很多明显的怀旧感，我认为在自由条件下根本无法重建这种联系。

And the other thing that, of course, is very, very vague and wafty in Polanyi is how it is that “society” reacts against the market, reacts against these depredations of the marketplace’s double movement that he talks about.

当然，波兰尼的另一件事非常非常模糊和飘忽不定，那就是“社会”如何对市场做出反应，对他所说的对市场双重运动的掠夺做出反应。

Personally, I tend not to believe in big abstractions such as society as explanations or as social causes.

就我个人而言，我倾向于不相信诸如社会之类的大抽象概念作为解释或社会原因。

I think that he captures something real.

我认为他捕捉到了真实的东西。

And if you want, alternatively, to say what Polanyi gets right, I think that there is something that can be said very plausibly about the ways in which many of the aspects of Trump are, alternatively, what we see happening with people like Orban and Kaczynski in Central and Eastern Europe, that these can be explained as being reactions against overly harsh market forces of one sort or another.

或者，如果你想说波兰尼说得对的话，我认为特朗普的许多方面都可以说得非常有道理，或者，我们看到中欧和东欧的欧尔班和卡钦斯基这样的人正在发生的事情，这些可以被解释为对某种过于严厉的市场力量的反应。

But the specific micromechanics, which it happens are really, really important, and we still haven’t really figured out what those micromechanics are.

但它所发生的具体微观力学确实非常重要，而我们仍然没有真正弄清楚这些微观力学是什么。

And trying to figure out how to create a better society is really going to force us to look at this much more specifically than a Polanyian framework would allow us to do.

试图弄清楚如何创造一个更好的社会确实会迫使我们比波兰尼框架允许我们做的更具体地看待这个问题。

Now this may be very, very different, just as the platform economy involves a greater degree of disaggregation in standard work practices.

现在这可能非常非常不同，就像平台经济涉及标准工作实践更大程度的分解一样。

One could imagine that we’re going to have to see labor unions being very, very different in form, but I think that they’re important.

人们可以想象，我们将不得不看到工会的形式非常非常不同，但我认为它们很重要。

And it’s also very interesting to see people like Acemoglu and Robinson making a very important political case for labor unions, saying that if you’re an economist, you can’t think about labor unions as being a first-best solution because, clearly, they’re about distribution and distribution of stuff to their members.

看到阿西莫格鲁和罗宾逊这样的人为工会提出一个非常重要的政治理由，他们说，如果你是一名经济学家，你就不能认为工会是最佳解决方案，因为很明显，工会是关于向其成员分配和分配东西的。

But if you’re thinking about maintaining the underlying conditions for a democracy, which presumably is a good thing for markets and for capital, then having something like labor unions is necessary.

但如果你正在考虑维持民主的基本条件（这对市场和资本来说可能是一件好事），那么像工会这样的组织是必要的。

And I think that the way that Niskanen has moved and, in particular, the way that people like Brink Lindsey, together with Steve Teles, have moved towards endorsement, albeit with a certain amount of grudgery of labor unions, really points to the realization by smart people on the center right and on the libertarian-tinged center right that this is something that maybe libertarians have gotten wrong over the last couple of decades.

我认为尼斯卡宁的行动方式，特别是布林克·林赛（Brink Lindsey）和史蒂夫·泰勒斯（Steve Teles）等人走向认可的方式，尽管工会有一定程度的怨恨，但确实表明中右翼和带有自由主义色彩的中右翼的聪明人认识到，这可能是自由主义者在过去几十年里犯的错误。

And you don’t look to Wolfe any more than you look to other science fiction for characterization.

你不会向沃尔夫寻求更多的帮助，就像你不会向其他科幻小说寻求人物塑造一样。

I don’t think that’s the particular strength.

我不认为这是特别的优势。

What you do look for is a kind of a sense of the world.

你所寻找的是一种对世界的感觉。

And in Wolfe, in particular, he provides this real understanding of how it is that the workings of society, and interestingly, conservative understanding of the workings of society.

尤其是在沃尔夫身上，他提供了对社会运作方式的真正理解，有趣的是，对社会运作方式的保守理解。

I think of him almost as being Proust in reverse.

我认为他几乎是相反的普鲁斯特。

Proust is describing a world in which the modern world is overtaking aristocracy.

普鲁斯特描述了一个现代世界正在超越贵族的世界。

And that clearly is one of the great problems of Proust, what is happening on the social level.

这显然是普鲁斯特面临的重大问题之一，即社会层面正在发生的事情。

You have all of these aristocratic understandings: the Merovingian, all of these histories, all of these castles, all of this wonderful art, and they are being replaced by the modern world with its telephones, with its electric lighting, and so on.

你拥有所有这些贵族式的理解：墨洛温王朝，所有这些历史，所有这些城堡，所有这些美妙的艺术，它们正在被带有电话、电灯等的现代世界所取代。

And how do you think about this?

您对此有何看法？

How would you try to preserve what was happening in the past?

你会如何努力保留过去发生的事情？

What Wolfe does, which I think is an extraordinarily interesting thing, which would be impossible for anybody who is not a science fiction writer, is to take that and to reverse this and to imagine a world in which modernity has disappeared.

沃尔夫所做的，我认为这是一件非常有趣的事情，对于任何不是科幻小说作家的人来说都是不可能的，他所做的就是接受这一点并扭转这一点，想象一个现代性已经消失的世界。

So it is at the other end of the telescope.

所以它在望远镜的另一端。

It is this tiny image which is barely discernible if you look through the telescope the wrong way.

如果你以错误的方式通过望远镜观察，这个微小的图像几乎无法辨别。

It has been surrounded and replaced and, to some extent, supplemented by medieval ways of thinking, medieval ways of organizing the world, and what that looks like.

它已经被中世纪的思维方式、中世纪组织世界的方式以及它们的样子所包围和取代，并在某种程度上得到了补充。

And it’s very, very interesting.

这非常非常有趣。

There’s this beautiful image.

有这样一个美丽的画面。

One of my favorite images from The Book of the New Sun is of the famous picture that was taken, not by Armstrong himself, but of Armstrong in his helmet on the moon — with Neil Armstrong, with the flag in the background, and the reflection of the other astronauts.

《新太阳之书》中我最喜欢的一张照片是那张著名的照片，这张照片不是由阿姆斯特朗本人拍摄的，而是阿姆斯特朗戴着头盔在月球上拍摄的——和尼尔·阿姆斯特朗在一起，背景是旗帜，还有其他宇航员的倒影。

Wolfe has that as a picture which has been preserved for thousands of years, perhaps, in this art gallery, which is maintained in this forgotten citadel.

沃尔夫的这幅画也许已经保存了数千年，在这座被遗忘的城堡里的美术馆里。

It gives you this wonderful sense of what it would be to have an image like that taken and ripped entirely out of context and seen through an entirely alien set of eyes.

它让你有一种奇妙的感觉，就像这样一张完全断章取义、通过完全陌生的眼睛看到的图像会是什么样子。

And that’s what science fiction does when it does it well, is to make the strange familiar and the familiar strange in the Novalis sense of the word.

这就是科幻小说做得好的时候所做的，就是让陌生的变得熟悉，让熟悉的变得陌生（诺瓦利斯意义上的这个词）。

And that’s why, for me, Wolfe is a head trip.

这就是为什么对我来说，沃尔夫是一次令人兴奋的旅行。

What Dick gets much, much better than his sense of politics and such — or, for that matter, than his sense of character because he is absolutely terrible on character, especially when it comes to women characters.

迪克得到的比他的政治意识等要好得多——或者就这一点而言，比他的性格意识要好得多，因为他的性格绝对很糟糕，尤其是在女性角色方面。

His women characters — they’re all expressions of Dick’s own personal anxieties in one way or another.

他笔下的女性角色——她们都以某种方式表达了迪克自己的个人焦虑。

What he gets better is the sense of massive complex systems that don’t work particularly well — the kinds of constraints that they impose upon individuals and the kinds of ways that people try to respond to those constraints.

他变得更好的是对运行效果不是特别好的庞大复杂系统的感觉——它们对个人施加的各种限制以及人们试图应对这些限制的各种方式。

And also, of course, the sense of a profound unreality in his novels, which I think is really why Dick, much more than, say, Orwell or Huxley or any of the other people you might think of — Zamyatin — is really the person who captures the kind of dystopian characteristics of the society that we live in at the moment, which isn’t a society where we have a state telling everybody what to think, but it’s a world in which nobody knows quite what to believe is true anymore.

当然，他的小说中还有一种深刻的不真实感，我认为这就是为什么迪克比奥威尔、赫胥黎或你可能想到的任何其他人——扎米亚京——真正捕捉到了我们目前所生活的社会的反乌托邦特征，这个社会不是一个国家告诉每个人该想什么的社会，而是一个没有人知道该相信什么是真实的世界。

And you have multiple different versions of the truth.

而且你有多种不同版本的事实。

Philip K.

菲利普·K.

Dick would have just reveled in QAnon.

迪克一定会陶醉于匿名者Q。

He would have had a very, very good sense of how it is that we could end up in a world with people like Donald Trump and QAnon reinforcing each other in a kind of a feedback loop.

他会对我们如何最终进入一个像唐纳德·特朗普和匿名者Q这样的人在某种反馈循环中相互加强的世界有一个非常非常好的感觉。

I think that the works that are most important are Ubik and Martian Time-Slip.

我认为最重要的作品是Ubik和Martian Time-Slip。

Both of these are the quintessential Dick novels about how it is that reality can break up and what it feels like to be in that kind of world.

这两部作品都是迪克小说的精髓，讲述了现实是如何破裂的，以及身处那样的世界中的感觉。

When I feel depressed about the way in which somebody like Donald Trump seems to dominate in very unhealthy ways our collective imagination so that it’s almost impossible to get away from, I really think about one of the kinds of psychic predators that Wolfe describes — Jory Graham, I think it is, if my memory is correct — in Ubik.

当我对像唐纳德·特朗普这样的人似乎以非常不健康的方式主导我们的集体想象力以至于几乎无法摆脱而感到沮丧时，我真的想到了沃尔夫所描述的一种精神掠夺者——乔里·格雷厄姆，如果我没记错的话，我认为是在乌比克。

There’s this sense of the world in which all of these paths converge towards a single actor who just gobbles up all of our attention.

有一种世界感，所有这些路径都汇聚到一个演员身上，他吞噬了我们所有的注意力。

Dick doesn’t have any very plausible way of getting out from that.

迪克没有任何非常合理的方法来摆脱这种情况。

He suggests, more or less, that we need some kind of divine intervention.

他或多或少地表明，我们需要某种神圣的干预。

But it captures some of the reasons why the world that we live in very often feels so unpleasant.

但它抓住了我们生活的世界常常让人感到如此不愉快的一些原因。

Even when we don’t want to pay attention to Donald Trump in the United States, we find everybody around us wants to pay attention to Donald Trump.

即使我们不想在美国关注唐纳德·特朗普，我们也会发现我们周围的每个人都想关注唐纳德·特朗普。

And Trump, if nothing else, seems to have a unique mastery of the skill of remaining at the center of attention.

如果不出意外的话，特朗普似乎拥有一种独特的技巧，能够保持成为人们关注的焦点。

And that’s very, very comforting to be in.

身处其中非常非常令人欣慰。

It’s also somewhat constraining and constricting.

它也有一定的限制和限制。

So what I love about the United States is the precise opposite, that nobody much cares about where you come from.

所以我对美国的喜爱恰恰相反，没有人太关心你来自哪里。

If they think about Ireland at all, they think about it as being a small, quaint place with leprechauns and green fields and what have you.

如果他们想到爱尔兰，他们会认为这是一个小而古雅的地方，有妖精和绿色的田野等等。

So you have a much greater opportunity to make yourself and to decide who you are in the United States than in Ireland, at least if you have the economic wherewithal to do it.

因此，与在爱尔兰相比，在美国你有更多的机会来塑造自己并决定自己是谁，至少如果你有足够的经济实力的话。

That makes Ireland in some ways a much more confining, a much more restrictive place than the United States, again, assuming that you have enough money in the United States to be able to realize yourself.

这使得爱尔兰在某种程度上成为一个比美国更受限制的地方，前提是你在美国有足够的钱来实现自己的梦想。

We saw a massive wave of preference revelation happening, and it’s pretty possible to pinpoint the point at which it happened.

我们看到一波偏好揭露浪潮正在发生，而且很有可能查明它发生的时间点。

One of my professors was a character called Brian Farrell, who was very well known for being quite careful and reticent because he was also a television broadcaster.

我的一位教授名叫布莱恩·法雷尔（Brian Farrell），他以谨慎和沉默寡言而闻名，因为他也是一名电视广播员。

He ran the big Ireland current affairs show.

他主持了大型爱尔兰时事节目。

Then one day, we had the revelation that a bishop who had become the spokesperson for the Irish church had been found to have had a child and had been supporting that child for 17 years, using church funds.

然后有一天，我们获悉，一位成为爱尔兰教会发言人的主教被发现有一个孩子，并使用教会资金抚养这个孩子长达17年。

The following morning, I saw Brian in the car park in University College Dublin, and I saw him in absolute glee saying, “The bastards, they’ve lost.

第二天早上，我在都柏林大学学院的停车场看到了布莱恩，我看到他非常高兴地说：“这些混蛋，他们输了。

Finally, the bastards have lost.”

最后，这群混蛋输了。”

And he was right because at that moment, the stranglehold which a certain version of conservatism had held on Ireland — it began to evaporate very, very quickly.

他是对的，因为在那一刻，某种形式的保守主义对爱尔兰的束缚——它开始非常非常快地消失。

And after that, I think that having the church as a center of society, as a center of all these social functions — all of these things began to disappear.

在那之后，我认为教会作为社会的中心，作为所有这些社会功能的中心——所有这些东西开始消失。

Material prosperity helped substantially, as well.

物质繁荣也起了很大的作用。

But I really think the reason why it happened so fast was because it should have happened 20 or 25 years before.

但我真的认为它发生得这么快的原因是因为它应该在 20 或 25 年前发生。

And it took a shock to the system to really cause this cascade of norm degeneration.

系统受到冲击才真正导致规范退化的连锁反应。

So the people switched rapidly from one equilibrium to another.

因此，人们迅速从一种平衡转向另一种平衡。

On the Henry Farrell production function

关于亨利·法雷尔生产函数

If you look at the world that we began writing in, this was the world where the Iraq War was beginning.

如果你看看我们开始写作的世界，这就是伊拉克战争开始的世界。

We started writing just around the time that the Iraq War took off, in which there wasn’t much of an organized Left and a coherent and systematic intellectual Left in the United States.

我们在伊拉克战争爆发前后开始写作，当时美国没有太多有组织的左派和连贯、系统的知识分子左派。

There was more of one in the United Kingdom.

英国还有更多这样的地方。

I think that in a sense, that isn’t true anymore.

我认为从某种意义上来说，这已经不再是事实了。

If you look at the Left, you may disagree or you may agree with what it says, but there’s a lot of thriving debate.

如果你看看左派，你可能不同意，也可能同意他们的说法，但有很多激烈的争论。

There’s a lot of argument.

有很多争论。

There are a whole bunch of journals, schisms, factions, all of these things — much more lively, much more thriving intellectual debate than there was back then.

现在有一大堆期刊、分裂、派系，所有这些东西——比那时更加活跃、更加繁荣的知识辩论。

So in a sense we came into being at a moment when a lot of the energy of the Left had run out.

因此，从某种意义上说，我们是在左派的大量能量耗尽的时刻诞生的。

You had places like Dissent and other places which were really running on the accumulated energy of the 1960s and 1970s, but which weren’t particularly strongly .

像 Dissent 这样的地方和其他地方确实依靠 20 世纪 60 年代和 1970 年代积累的能量运行，但并不是特别强劲。

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They weren’t oriented towards the present-day circumstances that they found themselves in.

他们并没有以自己所处的现状为导向。

Now I think we’re in a very different world, where there just isn’t as much need for Crooked Timber as there used to be because there are so many other places where people can write, where people can argue, where people can find things to say.

现在我认为我们处于一个非常不同的世界，不再像以前那样需要弯曲的木材，因为有很多其他地方人们可以写作，人们可以争论，人们可以找到话要说。

And I think it’s a very interesting intellectual phenomenon, and you have a vibrant Left, which is also beginning to engage with the policy process again, in a way that it hasn’t for a long, long time.

我认为这是一个非常有趣的知识分子现象，而且你有一个充满活力的左翼，他们也开始再次参与政策进程，以一种很长很长时间没有的方式。

And most of the time, that’s not going to work.

大多数时候，这是行不通的。

Most of our intellectual products are failures, but we live in a world where it’s possible to throw these failures at a far, far more rapid rate at other people and try to figure out what works than in the past.

我们的大多数智力产品都是失败的，但我们生活在一个可以以快得多的速度将这些失败抛给其他人的世界，并试图找出比过去有效的方法。

I found that to be an extremely useful way of thinking through things and playing with initial ideas.

我发现这是一种非常有用的思考事物和尝试最初想法的方式。

So people are talking about weaponized interdependence with respect to a much wider and broader and diffuse range of phenomena than what we talked about.

因此，人们谈论武器化的相互依赖所涉及的现象比我们谈论的范围更广泛、更广泛和更分散。

And that’s just the way that these things work.

这就是这些事情的运作方式。

Second thing that I’m interested in is the informational content of democracy.

我感兴趣的第二件事是民主的信息内容。

Here, maybe the intuition is something like the following.

在这里，也许直觉是这样的。

We have a standard set of arguments that have been extremely influential among libertarians and, I think, more broadly in the world, which are derived from people like Hayek.

我们有一套标准的论点，这些论点在自由主义者中极具影响力，我认为在世界上更广泛的范围内，这些论点都源自哈耶克这样的人。

We have this set of arguments which are beautifully expressed and which are very important arguments that Hayek makes about how markets work extraordinarily well to gather all of this diffuse information, this information which is simply unencodable, and to make it into something that can be useful through the price mechanism.

我们有这组论证，这些论证表达得很漂亮，而且是哈耶克提出的非常重要的论证，关于市场如何非常有效地收集所有这些分散的信息，这些信息根本无法编码，并通过价格机制将其变成有用的东西。

The price mechanism takes all of this tacit knowledge and makes it actionable in important ways.

价格机制吸收了所有这些隐性知识，并使其在重要方面具有可操作性。

The Hayek and the Mises story is, of course, one where they contrast this with state planning, and they argue very plausibly that if you look at central planning processes, that these central planning processes are never plausibly going to be able to compete with the market, at least for doing that kind of thing.

当然，哈耶克和米塞斯的故事将这一点与国家计划进行了对比，他们很有道理地认为，如果你看看中央计划流程，就会发现这些中央计划流程永远无法与市场竞争，至少在做这类事情时是如此。

I think that states can do lots of other things.

我认为国家可以做很多其他事情。

They underestimate that, but that’s a different argument.

他们低估了这一点，但这是一个不同的论点。

What I also think is that democracy also has a set of techniques or tools for capturing information because — and again, this is going back in a certain way to what I was saying about the Gellner or the Popper view of society, which is more or less that we have all of these people with different understandings, different aims, different aspirations within society.

我还认为，民主也有一套捕获信息的技术或工具，因为——这在某种程度上又回到了我所说的盖尔纳或波普尔的社会观，或多或少，我们社会中所有这些人都有不同的理解、不同的目标、不同的愿望。

And you want to do two things.

你想做两件事。

First of all, you want to maintain peace among all of these quarreling people with their very different aims and aspirations.

首先，你要在所有这些有着截然不同的目标和愿望的争吵者之间维持和平。

You want to try and figure out how you can stop them from going to war with each other.

你想尝试找出如何阻止他们互相开战。

But secondly, there also is going to be a lot of information which is captured precisely in their disagreements, in their differences, in their different perspectives.

但其次，也会有很多信息，这些信息正是在他们的分歧、分歧和不同观点中被捕捉到的。

So my ideal for democracy is, as a machinery, to try and get as much information out of those differences as possible, to take things like partisanship — which is messy and rancorous and squalid much of the time — but to recognize that the clash of different ideas, the clash of perspectives also has a lot of information value and does things that markets can’t capture.

因此，我对民主的理想是，作为一种机制，尝试从这些差异中获取尽可能多的信息，处理诸如党派之争之类的事情——这种情况在很多时候是混乱、充满敌意和肮脏的——但要认识到不同想法的冲突、观点的冲突也有很多信息价值，并且会做市场无法捕获的事情。

So, trying to think through much more systematically, what are the modes under which democracy is better or worse at doing this?

那么，尝试更系统地思考一下，民主在什么模式下在这方面做得更好或更差？

What are the kinds of institutions that allow democracy to do this better or worse?

什么样的制度可以让民主在这方面做得更好或更差？

This is a major set of questions.

这是一系列主要问题。

Obviously, there are lots of other people who are doing good things on it, but if I think about the other work that I’m doing with people like Cosma Shalizi, who you are familiar with, with Hugo Mercier and Melissa Schwartzberg, these are the kinds of ideas that we are trying to get at.

显然，还有很多其他人在这方面做了很好的事情，但如果我想想我正在与你熟悉的 Cosma Shalizi、Hugo Mercier 和 Melissa Schwartzberg 等人一起做的其他工作，这些就是我们试图获得的想法。

And also work with Bruce Schneier, which is thinking about the opposite side of this, which is that democracy is likely to be overwhelmed under circumstances where people disagree too much on basic facts, on basic information.

并且还与布鲁斯·施奈尔（Bruce Schneier）合作，他正在考虑相反的一面，即在人们对基本事实、基本信息存在太多分歧的情况下，民主可能会被压倒。

And in what ways can you try to make democracy less vulnerable and more robust against various forms of informational attacks?

您可以通过哪些方式尝试让民主变得不那么脆弱，并且更强大地抵御各种形式的信息攻击？

Not only Russian-type attacks, but the kinds of attacks that domestic political actors seek to use in order to pursue their own short-term aims.

不仅是俄罗斯式的攻击，还有国内政治行为者为了实现自己的短期目标而寻求使用的攻击类型。