Gita Gopinath on Trade, Currencies, and Economic Transformation (Ep. 291)
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today, I’m honored to be speaking with Gita Gopinath, who is professor of economics at Harvard, formerly first deputy director at the International Monetary Fund, which is number two in that institution; formerly chief economist at the International Monetary Fund; and one of the leading figures in international trade and finance and economics more generally.
今天，我很荣幸能与吉塔·戈皮纳特（Gita Gopinath）交谈，她是哈佛大学经济学教授，曾任国际货币基金组织第一副主任，该机构排名第二。前国际货币基金组织首席经济学家；也是国际贸易、金融和经济领域的领军人物之一。
Gita, welcome.
Gita, welcome.
Thank you, Tyler.
谢谢你，泰勒。
Thanks so much for having me on your show.
非常感谢您邀请我参加您的节目。
On why currencies don't adjust the way models predict
为什么货币不按照模型预测的方式进行调整
Today I have only easy questions.
今天我只有简单的问题。
We’re economists, right?
我们是经济学家，对吗？
Relative prices matter, but it seems that trade balances are fairly weakly correlated with real exchange rates.
相对价格很重要，但贸易差额与实际汇率的相关性似乎相当弱。
How could you explain that?
你怎么解释呢？
If you look at just what goes into a trade balance equation, it depends upon the relative price of your goods in international markets, but it also depends upon the relative level of demand in the two different countries for just overall consumption.
如果你看看贸易平衡方程的内容，它取决于你的商品在国际市场上的相对价格，但它也取决于两个不同国家总体消费的相对需求水平。
For example, if in the US consumption is strong, while in China consumption is weak, even if relative prices were to favor, for example, US goods, just the overall level of demand being lower in China would reduce the overall level of exports from the US to China.
例如，如果美国消费强劲，而中国消费疲软，即使相对价格有利于美国商品等，只要中国总体需求水平较低，就会降低美国对中国出口的总体水平。
Both those variables matters, not just the relative price, but also the relative levels of demand in countries.
这两个变量都很重要，不仅仅是相对价格，还包括各国的相对需求水平。
Why doesn’t, at some point, the real exchange rate keep on adjusting so that the substitution effect finally has some importance relative to the income effect?
为什么实际汇率在某个时刻没有继续调整，使得替代效应最终相对于收入效应具有一定的重要性？
There is this notion that, if you were to write an economic model, that our models would predict necessarily that a country that’s running a current account deficit, for instance, would experience a depreciation of their real exchange rate, and a country that’s running a current account surplus would experience an appreciation of their real exchange rate.
有一种观点认为，如果你要编写一个经济模型，我们的模型必然会预测，例如，经常账户赤字的国家将经历实际汇率贬值，而经常账户盈余的国家将经历实际汇率升值。
I think that’s an incorrect statement.
我认为这是一个不正确的说法。
This is the formal statement.
这是正式声明。
It’s partly correct, but here’s the accurate statement: The only thing the models tell you is, as you know, we have what is a no-Ponzi condition, which is some sort of an intertemporal budget constraint.
这在一定程度上是正确的，但准确的说法是：模型告诉您的唯一信息是，如您所知，我们存在非庞氏骗局条件，这是某种跨期预算约束。
What it tells you is that a country that is, for example, running deficits and therefore accumulating a lot of liabilities to the rest of the world will have to repay those liabilities because we have a condition, or either way, you default; one of the two.
它告诉你的是，一个国家，例如，存在赤字，因此对世界其他国家积累了大量债务，将不得不偿还这些债务，因为我们有一个条件，或者无论如何，你违约；两者之一。
How do you repay those liabilities?
你如何偿还这些负债？
You repay those liabilities in the model, and the equation will tell you that, at some point, you have to start running trade surpluses to repay those liabilities.
您偿还模型中的这些负债，方程会告诉您，在某个时候，您必须开始产生贸易顺差来偿还这些负债。
You’re assuming you don’t have an exorbitant privilege in the sense that the debt you’re showing to the world is always not much cheaper than what you owe to the rest of the world in terms of interest payments, is not always that much cheaper than what the rest of the world owes from you.
你假设你没有过高的特权，因为你向世界展示的债务在利息支付方面并不总是比你欠世界其他地方的债务便宜多少，并不总是比世界其他地方欠你的债务便宜很多。
There are periods in US history when that’s been true, that’s less true now, and I don’t think we can assume that’s going forward.
在美国历史上的某些时期，这种情况曾经是正确的，但现在情况已不再如此，而且我认为我们不能假设这种情况会继续下去。
A country that’s accumulating a lot of debt to the rest of the world, or liabilities to the rest of the world, for instance, our model will say, at some point, have to run trade balance surpluses.
例如，一个国家对世界其他地区积累了大量债务，或者对世界其他地区有负债，我们的模型会说，在某个时候，它必须保持贸易平衡盈余。
Now, there are two ways that those trade balance surpluses can come about.
现在，实现这些贸易顺差的方式有两种。
One is through a real exchange rate depreciation, so that is true; that could be one channel.
一是通过实际汇率贬值，这是事实；二是通过实际汇率贬值。这可能是一个频道。
The other channel is if the country’s overall level of demand were to collapse, then that would also mean that they would import less, relative to the rest of the world, whose demand is higher, and they would import more.
另一个渠道是，如果该国的整体需求水平崩溃，那么这也意味着相对于世界其他地区的需求而言，他们的进口量会减少，而他们的进口量会增加。
Either of those channels, or both of those, can be in play, and if you look at the evidence in the data and you try to do some kind of a decomposition of how much of it is real exchange rate versus demand, there is no clear mapping from the fact that if you’re a country that’s running current account deficits or running trade deficits for a long period of time, that you necessarily should see a weakening currency.
这些渠道中的任何一个或两个都可能发挥作用，如果你查看数据中的证据，并尝试对实际汇率与需求的比例进行某种分解，就会发现，如果你是一个长期存在经常账户赤字或贸易赤字的国家，那么你必然会看到货币走弱，这一事实并没有明确的映射。
That puzzles me all the more.
这让我更加困惑。
If we think of Australia, which does not have exorbitant privilege, as you know, they ran trade deficits for decades steadily.
如果我们想到澳大利亚，正如你所知，它没有过高的特权，他们几十年来一直稳定地存在贸易赤字。
There was no reason to think Australian demand would suddenly collapse.
没有理由认为澳大利亚的需求会突然崩溃。
Australia’s done fine, has strong fundamentals, yet the intertemporal constraint on that process, it never seems pushed into the present.
澳大利亚做得很好，有强大的基本面，但这一过程的跨期限制，似乎从未被推到现在。
Why is the inter-temporal constraint so weak, and how should that shape how we think about how economies actually work?
为什么跨期约束如此弱？这应该如何影响我们对经济实际运作方式的思考？
Is everything just flashed period by period, like in the very simple Keynesian models, or is it something else?
难道一切都只是一个时期一个时期地闪现，就像在非常简单的凯恩斯主义模型中一样，还是有别的什么东西？
Well, it is a constraint that says that if you have net foreign liabilities to the rest of the world, then in a present discounted sense, at some point you have to be running surpluses to be able to pay that off.
嗯，这是一个约束条件，如果你对世界其他地区有净外债，那么从目前的贴现意义上来说，在某个时候你必须有盈余才能偿还债务。
That’s the only thing that that constraint says, and that can happen through a combination of things.
这是该约束所规定的唯一内容，并且可以通过多种事物的组合来实现。
It can happen either because you have a discovery of a resource that you then export to the rest of the world and therefore your exports start booming because of that, or you have a recession in your country, and imports collapse.
这种情况的发生可能是因为你发现了一种资源，然后将其出口到世界其他地方，因此你的出口开始蓬勃发展，或者你的国家经济衰退，进口崩溃。
The real exchange rate does play a role.
实际汇率确实发挥了作用。
To be clear, I am not saying that the real exchange rate never comes into play; it does.
需要明确的是，我并不是说实际汇率永远不会发挥作用；而是说实际汇率永远不会发挥作用。确实如此。
You have seen countries whose incomes have grown over time, have had their real exchange rates appreciate; it just takes a long period of time.
你已经看到，收入随着时间的推移而增长的国家，其实际汇率却在升值；只是需要很长一段时间。
To assume that on a year-to-year basis that if a country is running a trade balance deficit, it should necessarily have a weaker real exchange rate, I think making that tight link would be problematic not just from the theory, but from the theory side and from the empirical side.
假设在逐年的基础上，如果一个国家出现贸易平衡赤字，那么它的实际汇率必然会走弱，我认为，建立这种紧密的联系不仅从理论上来说是有问题的，从理论方面和实证方面来看也是如此。
Now when exchange rates move, as you well know and have written plenty about, there’s very often not that much pass-through to the prices of imports and exports.
现在，正如您所知道的并且已经写过很多文章一样，当汇率变动时，进出口价格通常不会有太大的传导。
That seems to be another case where relative prices, at least superficially, are not mattering in the way we would expect them to.
这似乎是另一种情况，相对价格至少从表面上看并不像我们期望的那样重要。
What’s your best explanation for that?
你对此最好的解释是什么？
There are important distinctions here.
这里有一些重要的区别。
The question is: What relative prices are we talking about?
问题是：我们谈论的相对价格是多少？
There is the question of imports and exports, and their link to the relative price of exports and imports.
存在进口和出口及其与进出口相对价格的联系的问题。
There you absolutely do have a pass-through, and you do have a quantity response.
在那里你确实有一个传递，并且你确实有一个数量响应。
Then when you go to the real exchange rate, which is the nominal exchange rate adjusted by the consumer price indices, those consumer price indices include a whole bunch of stuff that’s nontraded, like healthcare, and that is less sensitive to an exchange rate movement or to the terms of trade itself.
然后，当你考虑实际汇率时，即根据消费者价格指数调整的名义汇率，这些消费者价格指数包括一大堆非贸易的东西，比如医疗保健，而且对汇率变动或贸易条件本身不太敏感。
Therefore, the pass-through to overall consumption from the real exchange rate can be much more muted as compared to what we see in terms of imports and exports.
因此，与我们在进出口方面看到的情况相比，实际汇率对总体消费的传导可能要小得多。
Now, the work that I did on the dominant currency paradigm was to point out that, unlike the typical assumption that was made, which was the Mundell-Fleming, Keynesian, Friedman assumption, that the relative price of your imports to exports moves almost one-to-one with your nominal exchange rate, because the idea is that, “Okay, I’m the US; when I sell to China, I’m pricing my goods in dollars, and that dollar price is relatively sticky.”
现在，我在主导货币范式上所做的工作是要指出，与所做出的典型假设（即蒙代尔-弗莱明、凯恩斯主义、弗里德曼假设）不同，进口与出口的相对价格几乎与名义汇率一一对应，因为这个想法是，“好吧，我是美国；当我向中国出售产品时，我以美元定价我的商品，而美元价格相对具有粘性。”
When China sells to the US, it’s pricing goods in the renminbi, and that renminbi price is relatively sticky.
当中国向美国销售商品时，它以人民币定价，而人民币价格相对具有粘性。
Therefore, when the dollar-renminbi price moves around, exchange rate moves around, that causes the relative price of my exports relative to my imports, which is the terms of trade, to move very much closely with the nominal exchange rate.
因此，当美元兑人民币价格波动时，汇率也会波动，导致我的出口相对于进口的相对价格，也就是贸易条件，与名义汇率的变动非常接近。
If you look at the way the world works, is that when the US sells to China, it prices its goods in dollars, and that dollar price is relatively stable.
如果你看看世界的运作方式，就是当美国向中国出售商品时，它以美元定价，而且美元价格相对稳定。
When China sells its goods to the US, it also prices in dollars; close to 90 percent of China’s exports to the US are priced in dollars, and it’s relatively stable in dollars.
中国向美国出售商品时，也是以美元定价；中国对美国的出口近90%都是以美元计价，而且美元相对稳定。
When the renminbi-US exchange rate moves around, the relative price of the terms of trade doesn’t move around that much.
当人民币对美元汇率波动时，贸易条件的相对价格波动幅度不大。
That particular channel works differently from the standard theory.
该特定通道的工作原理与标准理论不同。
Now, I want to be clear that there is still expenditure switching here because, unlike the Friedman hypothesis, what you do not have is that when the US dollar, for example, depreciates, that means it’s going to reduce imports from China because, in the world, the dollar price hasn’t changed.
现在，我想澄清的是，这里仍然存在支出转换，因为与弗里德曼假设不同，你所不知道的是，例如，当美元贬值时，这意味着它将减少从中国的进口，因为在世界范围内，美元价格没有变化。
That doesn’t have much of an effect on imports coming into the US.
这对美国的进口没有太大影响。
On the other hand, US’s exports do expand because it’s priced in dollars, and in terms of Chinese renminbi, the cost or the price of that good has gone up.
另一方面，美国的出口确实扩大了，因为它以美元计价，而以人民币计算，该商品的成本或价格上升了。
You get like half of the channel, which is when the dollar depreciates, you don’t get the import channel, but you get the export channel.
你得到了一半的渠道，即当美元贬值时，你没有得到进口渠道，但你得到了出口渠道。
Flipped around from the China perspective, because of this asymmetry, because of the dominance of the dollar, when the renminbi depreciates, they don’t really get the big export kick, but they get the adjustment through imports.
从中国的角度来看，由于这种不对称性，由于美元的主导地位，当人民币贬值时，他们并没有真正受到出口的巨大推动，而是通过进口获得了调整。
Say if I look at the Trump tariffs, which you’ve written on in Journal of Economic Perspectives, there seems to be almost complete pass-through that’s well described by a simple model of more or less perfect competition.
假设我看一下您在《经济展望杂志》上所写的特朗普关税，似乎存在几乎完全的传导，这可以通过或多或少完美竞争的简单模型很好地描述。
When we look at exchange rate movements, it’s all of a sudden a different model, even though they’re both changes in relative prices.
当我们观察汇率变动时，它突然变成了一个不同的模型，尽管它们都是相对价格的变化。
What’s the meta model that explains how those two facts fit together?
解释这两个事实如何结合在一起的元模型是什么？
Yes.
是的。
The meta model is, if you look at the simplest story, which I’m going to break down, if you were to think of the truly prices are sticky when China sells to the US, it sets a dollar price, and then the tariff is slapped onto it.
元模型是，如果你看一下我将要分解的最简单的故事，如果你想到中国向美国销售时真正的价格是粘性的，它会设定美元价格，然后征收关税。
Then that’s just mechanically full pass-through; US importers pay for it, inclusive of tariffs.
那么这就是机械上的完全直通；美国进口商支付费用，包括关税。
Of course, that begs the question as to why is it that China is keeping that price in dollars relatively sticky.
当然，这就引出了一个问题：为什么中国保持以美元计算的价格相对粘性。
Sure.
当然。
What we do know is, in the case of many countries in the world and many exporters, they also tend to be importers.
我们所知道的是，就世界上许多国家和许多出口商而言，他们也往往是进口商。
The value-added component of trade has declined over time, and because of the dollar’s dominant role in the trading system, everybody is pricing their goods to each other in dollars.
随着时间的推移，贸易的增值部分已经下降，而且由于美元在贸易体系中的主导地位，每个人都以美元为彼此的商品定价。
In a way, the way you want to think about it is that when China is exporting some certain goods to the rest of the world, if its imports are priced also in dollars, then those inputs that are going into its production function are priced in dollars and sticky in dollars, then you have an incentive to just price in dollars, and your dollar price is not going to move that much because the exchange rate adjustment is not doing much, because an important part of your cost of production is also in dollars.
在某种程度上，你要思考的是，当中国向世界其他地区出口某些特定商品时，如果它的进口也以美元定价，那么进入其生产函数的那些投入也以美元定价并粘性美元，那么你就有动机只以美元定价，而你的美元价格不会变动那么大，因为汇率调整作用不大，因为你的生产成本的重要组成部分也是美元。
That’s the reason why we see a fair amount of dollar pricing in the world.
这就是为什么我们在世界上看到相当多的美元定价的原因。
The sense that somehow China should be able to, or any other country should be able to, cut their dollar prices by a lot when their currency depreciates is not the case, because they are also importing inputs from the rest of the world that are priced in dollars, and they don’t have that much of a margin to squeeze.
当人民币贬值时，中国或任何其他国家应该能够以某种方式大幅降低美元价格，但事实并非如此，因为他们也在从世界其他地区进口以美元计价的投入品，而且他们没有那么多的空间可以挤压。
Now, of course, there’s variation across goods.
当然，现在不同的商品存在差异。
Some goods rely more on inputs that are dollar-priced, some depend less, and you do see in the data that that variation matters.
有些商品更多地依赖于以美元计价的投入，有些则较少依赖，而且您确实在数据中看到这种变化很重要。
You do see that the pricing behavior is a function of how much do these firms rely on imported inputs.
你确实看到定价行为是这些公司对进口投入的依赖程度的函数。
It does seem to me odd that simply the unit of account, to some extent, determines whether firms behave competitively or as if they have some market power.
在我看来，奇怪的是，在某种程度上，记账单位就决定了企业的行为是否具有竞争力，或者是否具有一定的市场力量。
That goes against all my economic intuitions, and it puzzles me.
这违背了我所有的经济直觉，让我感到困惑。
No, this is not the unit of account.
不，这不是记账单位。
The invoicing currency.
The invoicing currency.
I would say there’s a few things.
我想说有几件事。
One is there is the short term.
一是存在短期性。
There is the near term when the invoicing currency matters, but just the example I just gave you tells you why people have chosen to invoice in one currency versus another.
近期内，开票货币很重要，但我刚才给您的例子就告诉您为什么人们选择使用一种货币而不是另一种货币开票。
The way you think about it is that, ideally, if you could flexibly adjust your price at every instant in time, then obviously invoicing currency is irrelevant, but companies do sign longer-term contracts.
你的想法是，理想情况下，如果你可以在每个时刻灵活调整价格，那么显然以货币计价是无关紧要的，但公司确实会签署长期合同。
One of the things I looked into when I was doing the research on this was to say, “If companies are signing long-term contracts, is this both about prices and about quantities?” It’s not just that I sign a contract that says I’m going to sell to you at this per-unit price, but it’s also that I’m only going to sell X amount of quantity, in which case then these prices are not allocative.
当我对此进行研究时，我研究的一件事是：“如果公司签订长期合同，这既与价格有关，也与数量有关吗？”我不仅签署了一份合同，规定我将以这个单价出售给您，而且我只会出售 X 数量，在这种情况下，这些价格不是可分配的。
If you look at the contracts, that’s actually not the case.
如果你仔细看一下合同，你会发现事实并非如此。
The way it works is that the companies say, “We’ll sell it to you at this price.
它的运作方式是，公司说：“我们会按照这个价格卖给你。
The quantities, we have a range.
数量，我们有一个范围。
Obviously, it’s not like we can send you any amount.
显然，我们无法向您发送任何金额。
There is a range of quantities at which we will send to you,” so there’s that much more flexibility.
我们将向您发送一系列数量，”因此灵活性更大。
There is the short term, and then there is the medium term.
有短期，然后有中期。
I think what’s important to recognize is that the invoicing decision itself is not just some Calvo fairy.
我认为重要的是要认识到发票决定本身不仅仅是卡尔沃仙女的决定。
It’s not just some “Here, we’re going to assume that we wake up and somebody’s told me to price in dollars.”
这不仅仅是“在这里，我们假设我们醒来，有人告诉我要以美元定价。”
There is a reason why the dollar is used as a pricing currency around the world.
美元在世界各地被用作定价货币是有原因的。
From a pure first principle, it’s not a decision about which currency to invoice.
从纯粹的首要原则来看，这不是决定用哪种货币开具发票。
There’s evidence consistent with that.
有证据与此相符。
Now, as you know, the gravity equation is one of the most reliable regularities in international trade economics.
现在，如您所知，引力方程是国际贸易经济学中最可靠的规律之一。
Basically, the quantity of trade is inversely proportional to the distance of countries once you adjust for incomes and some other matters.
基本上，一旦考虑到收入和其他一些因素，贸易量与国家之间的距离成反比。
That seems to be another case where the relative price doesn’t matter that much because few people think the gravity equation is about transportation costs.
这似乎是另一种情况，相对价格并不那么重要，因为很少有人认为重力方程与运输成本有关。
Why is it, in your view, that the gravity equation holds so reliably and so consistently?
在您看来，为什么引力方程如此可靠且一致？
Again, I’m not an expert on the gravity equation, but what we do see is it is the case that physical distance does matter.
再说一遍，我不是重力方程方面的专家，但我们确实看到物理距离确实很重要。
There’s a reason why trade between the US and Mexico and Canada should be as close as it should be, setting aside the tariffs that are happening right now.
抛开目前正在发生的关税不谈，美国与墨西哥和加拿大之间的贸易应该尽可能接近，这是有原因的。
There’s a reason why it makes a lot of sense for countries that are physically closer that this should be the case.
对于地理上距离较近的国家来说，这样做是有道理的。
Distance does matter.
Distance does matter.
Over time, obviously, once you build up these networks and you’ve built up these relationships, they can persist over time.
显然，随着时间的推移，一旦你建立了这些网络并建立了这些关系，它们就会随着时间的推移而持续存在。
You can, of course, build pipelines and you can build other kinds of logistical networks to get goods around, but distance does matter.
当然，你可以建造管道，也可以建造其他类型的物流网络来运送货物，但距离确实很重要。
We also do know that the relative incomes of the countries do matter too.
我们也确实知道，各国的相对收入也很重要。
There’s more trade happening between the countries that are large, and that also plays a role.
大国之间发生了更多的贸易，这也发挥了作用。
Distance matters because of networks.
由于网络，距离很重要。
If we take US and India, which have pretty strong networks—Indians in the United States have earned very well, started lots of businesses, have tech ties back home—that then should violate the gravity equation if we consider the networks being strong?
如果我们以美国和印度为例，它们拥有相当强大的网络——在美国的印度人收入很高，创办了很多企业，在国内有技术联系——如果我们认为网络很强大，那么就应该违反引力方程？
The biggest exports in terms of what it does to the US are service exports, which is the business process outsourcing.
就对美国的出口而言，最大的出口是服务出口，即业务流程外包。
That’s the main form of export that happens.
这是发生的主要出口形式。
That, of course, is less constrained by physical distance in terms of literally shipping a product across the seas.
当然，就跨海运输产品而言，这较少受到物理距离的限制。
Yes, again, depending upon the nature of the product that you’re exporting, the physical distance may or may not matter that much.
是的，再次强调，根据您要出口的产品的性质，物理距离可能很重要，也可能不太重要。
On Argentina after triple-digit inflation
三位数通胀后的阿根廷
I have some Argentina questions for you.
我有一些阿根廷问题要问你。
Now, you’ve worked on Argentina.
现在，你已经在阿根廷工作了。
This is late August 2026.
这是 2026 年 8 月下旬。
Why is it that right now inflation in Argentina is still so hard to bring down?
为什么目前阿根廷的通胀仍然难以降低？
It seems stuck, right?
It seems stuck, right?
It’s gone down a lot, but it’s not obvious there’s a lot more progress to be had easily.
它已经下降了很多，但并不明显有更多的进展可以轻松实现。
Yes.
是的。
That’s actually a lesson we learn every time with countries that are in this disinflation process where you’re starting off with inflations of three-digit numbers.
这实际上是我们每次从处于通货紧缩过程中的国家学到的一个教训，一开始的通货膨胀就是三位数的数字。
Two years ago, I think Argentina’s inflation was around 150%, so coming down to 30 percent, that was tough.
两年前，我认为阿根廷的通胀率为 150% 左右，因此降到 30% 是很困难的。
Bringing it down is impressive, but it’s always the last mile going from here to anything like a single-digit number, always takes much, much longer.
降低它令人印象深刻，但从这里到任何像个位数的数字总是最后一英里，总是需要非常非常长的时间。
This is nothing special about Argentina.
这对阿根廷来说没什么特别的。
Now, in the case of Argentina, what would it take to bring it down much faster?
现在，就阿根廷而言，怎样才能让它更快地垮掉呢？
Firstly, I think there’s got to be a lot more confidence in policy continuity.
首先，我认为人们必须对政策连续性更有信心。
I think what the Milei administration has done very well compared to the previous administrations is recognize that the problem was fiscal, that as long as Argentina was running the kinds of deficits that they were doing and using monetary financing, basically money printing to pay for it, there was no possibility of getting out of this trap.
我认为，与前几届政府相比，米莱政府做得非常好，那就是认识到问题出在财政上，只要阿根廷继续实行他们正在做的那种赤字，并使用货币融资，基本上是印钞来支付赤字，就不可能摆脱这个陷阱。
He has been running primary surpluses since he came to power.
自上台以来，他一直维持基本盈余。
He’s absolutely completely committed to it.
他完全致力于此。
I remember I had conversations with him when I was at the IMF.
我记得我在国际货币基金组织时曾与他交谈过。
This is something he absolutely will not budge from, but there are questions whether the rest of the political class has signed on to this.
这是他绝对不会让步的事情，但其他政治阶层是否已经同意这一点还存在疑问。
There’s question marks around that.
对此还存在疑问。
There are elections coming around.
即将举行选举。
There was a midterm last year.
去年有一次期中考试。
There is a national election in 2027 October.
2027 年 10 月将举行全国大选。
It’s very reasonable for everybody to pause and ask the question whether the reforms will continue or will there be a relapse, as we have seen many, many times in the past in Argentina.
每个人都停下来问一下改革是否会继续还是会重蹈覆辙，这是非常合理的，正如我们过去在阿根廷多次看到的那样。
Say we knew that either he would be reelected or someone similar would be reelected, would then simple crude monetarism solve the inflation problem, if backed by enough will, or is there still some other thing that makes it hard to bring down the inflation?
假设我们知道要么他会连任，要么类似的人会连任，那么如果有足够的意愿支持，简单粗暴的货币主义会解决通货膨胀问题吗？还是还有其他因素导致通货膨胀难以降低？
There is inertia in this process.
这个过程有惯性。
The good news is that inflation expectations have been trending down in Argentina, so that’s great.
好消息是阿根廷的通胀预期一直在下降，所以这很好。
It was at very high levels.
当时的水平非常高。
Argentina’s inflation was completely deanchored at the time when he took over.
在他接任时，阿根廷的通货膨胀已完全消除。
Any news of the possibility of the exchange depreciating even by 1 percent or 2 percent would immediately show up in prices.
任何有关汇率可能贬值的消息，哪怕是 1% 或 2%，都会立即反映在价格中。
This was an example of a case where just simply doing a nominal depreciation is not enough.
这是一个仅进行名义折旧是不够的例子。
There were previous governments who were doing nominal depreciations, and in three months, the real exchange rate was basically back up to where it was before.
之前有政府搞名义贬值，三个月的时间，实际汇率就基本回到以前的水平了。
Nothing changed because it just got priced into goods.
一切都没有改变，因为它只是被定价到商品中。
That takes time.
这需要时间。
Anchoring inflation expectations is part science but also part art.
锚定通胀预期既是科学，也是艺术。
Sticking the course and just showing you’re committed to keeping fiscal deficits low and having the central bank be independent, which is another step he’s taking right now, which is having central bank independence so that there is no monetization of deficits.
坚持到底，只是表明你致力于保持低财政赤字并让央行保持独立，这是他现在采取的另一个步骤，即让央行保持独立，这样就不会出现赤字货币化。
Argentina will also have to build up foreign exchange reserves, even though the goal is obviously to have floating exchange rates.
阿根廷还必须建立外汇储备，尽管目标显然是浮动汇率。
We know that every country, pretty much, with the rare exceptions, can have disorderly market conditions.
我们知道，几乎每个国家，除了极少数例外，都可能出现无序的市场状况。
Given Argentina’s history with the currency, it will need to build up reserves much faster than it’s doing on foreign exchange reserves and what it’s doing right now.
考虑到阿根廷使用货币的历史，它需要以比外汇储备和目前所做的更快的速度建立外汇储备。
Also keeping in mind the elections that are coming around next year.
还要记住明年即将举行的选举。
In some recent times, it’s been quite expensive to fly down to Buenos Aires and buy a good steak because the real exchange rate was kept high.
最近一段时间，由于实际汇率居高不下，飞往布宜诺斯艾利斯购买优质牛排的价格相当昂贵。
Now that may be a signal of credibility, but many economists criticize that decision that simply trying to peg exchange rates high has a pretty bad record historically.
现在这可能是一个可信度的信号，但许多经济学家批评这一决定，认为单纯地试图将汇率钉在高位在历史上有着相当糟糕的记录。
Was that the correct decision, and has reality vindicated it?
这是正确的决定吗？现实证明了这一点吗？
That semi-peg hasn’t really been broken.
那个半钉并没有真正被打破。
Bessent backed it.
贝森特对此表示支持。
At the time I thought that was a big American mistake.
当时我认为这是美国的一个重大错误。
That too seems to have worked out okay.
这似乎也很顺利。
What’s your view on all of that?
您对这一切有何看法？
I do believe the Argentinian peso needs to adjust more and needs to be allowed to depreciate more than it is doing right now.
我确实认为阿根廷比索需要进行更多调整，并且需要允许比现在贬值更多。
They have a framework where they moved from what looked like an exchange rate peg in previous regimes to a crawling exchange rate to now a crawling band.
他们有一个框架，从以前制度中看起来像钉住汇率的制度转变为爬行汇率，再到现在的爬行区间。
That band has gotten pretty wide.
该频带已经变得相当宽。
In a sense, their framework should allow for more movement in the exchange rate.
从某种意义上说，他们的框架应该允许汇率进行更多变动。
I think they’re being far too hesitant in buying dollars to build up their foreign exchange reserves than they should.
我认为他们在购买美元以建立外汇储备方面过于犹豫。
I think that’s something that they could do much faster because if they did that, yes, they would get some more depreciation, but it would be still well within the crawling band.
我认为他们可以做得更快，因为如果他们这样做，是的，他们会得到更多的折旧，但仍然在爬行区间内。
Short answer, I do think that they need to let the nominal exchange rate move more.
简而言之，我确实认为他们需要让名义汇率有更大的变动。
That, combined with fiscal policy and monetary policy that doesn’t have that depreciation feed directly into prices, that combination will generate some real exchange rate depreciation.
再加上不会将贬值直接影响价格的财政政策和货币政策，这种组合将产生一定程度的实际汇率贬值。
I think that is valuable for them to do.
我认为这对他们来说很有价值。
Now, the thinking behind why do you not want to leave the exchange rate to depreciate more, you can make an economic case for that when you say you worry about deanchored inflation expectations.
现在，为什么你不想让汇率进一步贬值，当你说你担心通胀预期下降时，你可以为此提出一个经济理由。
This is not the world where our models work.
这不是我们的模型发挥作用的世界。
It’s a world where when people wake up in the morning, see the newspaper, see that the peso is depreciated, immediately they want post higher prices, which are even higher than what the depreciation is, because they think that this is going to feed into all the prices that they have to deal with too.
在这个世界里，当人们早上醒来，看到报纸，看到比索贬值时，他们立即想要公布更高的价格，甚至比贬值的价格还要高，因为他们认为这也会影响到他们必须处理的所有价格。
When you have deanchored inflation expectations, there is this argument about, “Okay, we don’t want the nominal exchange rate to move around too much.” I think, over the past couple of years, thanks to the other policies, inflation expectations have come down, and that should give them some more confidence in letting the exchange rate move around.
当你解除通胀预期时，就会出现这样的争论：“好吧，我们不希望名义汇率波动太大。”我认为，过去几年，得益于其他政策，通胀预期有所下降，这应该会让他们更有信心让汇率波动。
If further depreciation is required and indeed good, why isn’t the crawling peg just broken now?
如果进一步贬值是必要的，而且确实是好事，那么为什么爬行钉住汇率现在不被打破呢？
It’s not that thick a liquid market, right?
流动性市场并没有那么稠密，对吧？
Oh, there is fairly a wide band right now.
哦，现在的频段相当宽。
Actually, because the crawl is now tied to inflation from two months ago, it’s actually opening, and it’s getting fairly wide.
实际上，由于现在的爬行与两个月前的通货膨胀有关，所以它实际上正在开放，而且范围变得相当广泛。
You’d have to do quite a bit of intervention to do something for it to happen, but at the same time, there are a lot of positives about the country.
你必须进行大量干预才能实现这一目标，但与此同时，这个国家也有很多积极的一面。
There’s a lot of reasons to actually want to invest in Argentina and to have a positive view of the country.
有很多理由真正想要在阿根廷投资并对这个国家有积极的看法。
The rest of the fundamentals would be consistent with attracting money into the country.
其余的基本原则将与吸引资金进入该国保持一致。
How should they deal with debt deflation issues?
他们应该如何应对债务通货紧缩问题？
People in Argentina took out plenty of loans under the expectation inflation would remain pretty high.
阿根廷人民预计通胀将保持在相当高的水平，因此获得了大量贷款。
Now inflation is much lower.
现在通货膨胀要低得多。
They feel quite pinched.
他们感觉很拮据。
There are also people who vote.
也有人投票。
What should Milei do?
米莱该怎么办？
Yes, the nonperforming loans have gone up.
是的，不良贷款增加了。
What Milei should do is put in place rapidly a resolution process for these loans, a market-driven resolution process.
Milei 应该做的是迅速建立这些贷款的解决流程，一个市场驱动的解决流程。
As I see it, Argentina is going through a major structural transformation, a major one.
在我看来，阿根廷正在经历一场重大的结构转型，一场重大的转型。
These will take years, not months.
这些将需要数年，而不是数月。
We would expect to see nonperforming loans also because sectors that were previously very protected have now been exposed to much more competition.
我们预计会出现不良贷款，因为以前受到严格保护的行业现在面临着更加激烈的竞争。
Putting in place a resolution process that is market-driven—it’s not bailing out banks; I think that would be a mistake—I think that would be helpful.
建立一个市场驱动的解决流程——这不是救助银行；而是建立一个以市场为导向的解决方案。我认为那是一个错误——我认为这会有帮助。
You do need to deal with it.
你确实需要处理它。
The idea that somehow you want to prevent this from happening, I think, would be problematic.
我认为，想要以某种方式阻止这种情况发生的想法是有问题的。
What is needed—and that’s the challenge right now for Argentina—is that while inflation has come down to 30 percent—it’s interesting.
所需要的——这也是阿根廷目前面临的挑战——是，虽然通货膨胀率已降至 30%，但这是很有趣的。
It’s one of those countries that understands the second and the third derivative of the price levels very well.
它是非常了解价格水平的二阶和三阶导数的国家之一。
They look at what’s happening with inflation, and they think, “Okay, this is pretty good,” but what’s less good, of course, is what’s happening with jobs.
他们观察通货膨胀的情况，然后想，“好吧，这相当不错”，但当然，不太好的是就业情况。
Growth is there, but it’s coming mainly from mining and agriculture, and much less from the job-intensive sectors—manufacturing—because they’ve also been open to competition now.
增长是存在的，但主要来自采矿业和农业，而不是来自就业密集型行业——制造业——因为它们现在也已经开放竞争。
There is going to be a difficult transition, and I don’t think the government should ignore that.
这将会是一个艰难的过渡，我认为政府不应该忽视这一点。
The idea is to help workers and not necessarily protect the industry.
这个想法是为了帮助工人，而不一定是保护行业。
The more it can do on that front, the better.
它在这方面能做的越多越好。
Should we as economists be happy to see stablecoins introduced into Argentina becoming significant, possibly over the longer run, supplementing or even replacing the peso?
作为经济学家，我们是否应该高兴地看到引入阿根廷的稳定币变得重要，可能从长远来看，补充甚至取代比索？
Is that good or is it bad?
这是好事还是坏事？
It harms their state capacity too much?
这对他们的国家能力伤害太大了吗？
What do you think?
你怎么认为？
The way I think about it is that some of these innovations serve as a disciplining device.
我的想法是，其中一些创新可以作为一种约束手段。
The fact that people in the country have an option to hold their money in more stable forms of currency is a disciplining device on the government and what it can do, and therefore, puts pressure on having good policies in the country.
事实上，该国人民可以选择以更稳定的货币形式持有自己的资金，这是对政府及其所能采取的行动的一种约束手段，因此，对该国制定良好的政策施加了压力。
Right now, we know, but do we want to move to a situation where Argentina is dollarized?
现在，我们知道，但我们是否想进入阿根廷美元化的局面？
By the way, initially, actually, Milei campaigned on the grounds that he was going to move to a dollarized economy, and he hasn’t done that.
顺便说一句，事实上，最初米雷竞选的理由是他将转向美元化经济，但他并没有这样做。
I would say that I think that’s good because, first of all, there is no panacea in terms of saying just because you’re dollarized, you are safe, or you’re a well-managed country.
我想说，我认为这很好，因为首先，仅仅因为你是美元化的，你是安全的，或者你是一个管理良好的国家，就说没有灵丹妙药。
The two main dollarized economies of the world—Ecuador, El Salvador—are all in programs with the IMF because ultimately, if you don’t have the right fiscal policies, you’re going to end up needing a bailout in any case.
世界上两个主要的美元化经济体——厄瓜多尔和萨尔瓦多——都参与了国际货币基金组织的计划，因为最终，如果没有正确的财政政策，无论如何最终都将需要救助。
That’s not a panacea.
这不是万能药。
Of course, I am of the view that monetary policy is still very valuable for stabilizing economies.
当然，我认为货币政策对于稳定经济还是非常有价值的。
If you can get the credibility and the central bank independence, then having your own currency gives you much more ability to stabilize your economy.
如果你能够获得信誉和央行独立性，那么拥有自己的货币可以让你更有能力稳定经济。
On living with the euro
论与欧元共存
Take, say, the euro area.
以欧元区为例。
Both Milton Friedman and Paul Krugman thought the euro was a mistake.
米尔顿·弗里德曼和保罗·克鲁格曼都认为欧元是一个错误。
They disagree on many other things.
他们在许多其他事情上存在分歧。
There was a major euro crisis.
发生了一场严重的欧元危机。
What did Friedman and Krugman get wrong?
弗里德曼和克鲁格曼错在哪里？
If fixed exchange rates aren’t so great, why not just let the different European nations have floating rates to some extent?
如果固定汇率没有那么好，为什么不让不同的欧洲国家在某种程度上实行浮动汇率呢？
Maybe Benelux would be a fixed rate, but the others let them float.
也许比荷卢经济联盟采用固定利率，但其他国家则允许浮动利率。
Same argument.
同样的论点。
As you know, the origins of the formation of the European Union and then the euro was a political contract.
如您所知，欧盟和欧元的形成的起源是一份政治契约。
Sure, but we as economists, should we be happy about the euro or regret it?
当然可以，但作为经济学家，我们应该对欧元感到高兴还是后悔呢？
We could ask ourselves the same question.
我们可以问自己同样的问题。
Let’s take the United States.
我们以美国为例。
It’s a large country.
这是一个大国。
There’s states like California—very, very high income—and states with a much less high income.
有些州的收入非常非常高，比如加利福尼亚州，而有些州的收入则低得多。
We are part of a currency union.
我们是货币联盟的一部分。
Is there an argument to be made that it would be better off if everybody didn’t have?
是否有人认为，如果每个人都没有的话，情况会更好？
No. There is, again, this optimal currency area argument.
不。这又是关于最佳货币区的争论。
In the case of Europe, the way I think about it is, if they can get increasingly to the goal of actually being truly integrated in terms of their product markets, have much less regulation that prevents trade across the borders of countries, then in that case, these are the benefits from having that.
就欧洲而言，我的想法是，如果他们能够逐渐实现产品市场真正一体化的目标，减少阻止跨境贸易的监管，那么在这种情况下，这些就是这样做的好处。
At this point, I don’t think the debate of whether the euro is useful is really not that important anymore.
至此，我认为关于欧元是否有用的争论真的不再那么重要了。
I think that it is we are here, and there is a lot that can be gained if the European Union and the euro countries were to be truly integrated in the sense of having a lot more trade across their borders, a lot less restrictions.
我认为，正是我们在这里，如果欧盟和欧元区国家真正实现一体化，即跨境贸易更多、限制更少，我们可以获得很多好处。
Right now, as we know that there is an issue with not having enough scale in their companies.
目前，我们知道他们的公司存在规模不够的问题。
All of that can be fixed.
所有这些都可以解决。
I think that’s the more interesting question than whether the euro makes sense.
我认为这是比欧元是否有意义更有趣的问题。
There’s countries that are not on the euro, right?
有些国家不使用欧元，对吗？
They face decisions.
他们面临决定。
Denmark has had a very strict peg, but they don’t actually formally use the euro, and that’s a choice they face.
丹麦实行非常严格的盯住汇率制度，但他们实际上并没有正式使用欧元，这是他们面临的选择。
Iceland faces this choice, Armenia.
冰岛面临这样的选择，亚美尼亚。
We, as economists, I would be inclined to tell them not to enter the eurozone and to stay put.
作为经济学家，我倾向于告诉他们不要进入欧元区并留在原地。
That seems like a pretty important choice.
这似乎是一个非常重要的选择。
What would you tell them?
你会告诉他们什么？
Again, this is very country-specific because there are countries that could gain the credibility by actually tying their hands with their currencies.
同样，这也是针对具体国家的，因为有些国家实际上可以通过用货币束缚自己来获得信誉。
They get the access to the markets, and they get better terms for it, and they get funding from the union.
他们获得了进入市场的机会，获得了更好的条件，并且从工会获得了资金。
That’s been very helpful for a lot of countries.
这对很多国家都非常有帮助。
They get transfers.
他们得到转会。
From their own personal perspective, that can be helpful.
从他们个人的角度来看，这可能会有所帮助。
If you’re a country otherwise that’s well managed, no need for resources from other countries or anything of that kind, then in that case, your flexible exchange rates are helpful.
如果你是一个管理良好的国家，不需要来自其他国家的资源或类似的东西，那么在这种情况下，你的灵活汇率会很有帮助。
On China's problematic surpluses
关于中国的盈余问题
Now, Scott Sumner argues we shouldn’t be worried about trade imbalances at all.
现在，斯科特·萨姆纳认为我们根本不应该担心贸易失衡。
We don’t worry about them across American states.
我们不担心美国各州的他们。
A lot of the EU has a pretty big current account surplus.
欧盟许多国家都有相当大的经常账户盈余。
Not many people are worried about that.
没有多少人担心这一点。
Yet when it comes to China, the talk is all about trade imbalances.
然而，谈到中国时，人们谈论的都是贸易失衡。
Scott argues that’s more of a political project than an actual economic argument.
斯科特认为，这更多的是一个政治项目，而不是实际的经济争论。
Do you agree with Scott or not?
你同意斯科特的观点吗？
I would agree with Scott along the following lines, which is that the trade imbalance in and of itself is not something that we should be focused on.
我同意斯科特的以下观点，即贸易失衡本身并不是我们应该关注的问题。
I think what we care about is welfare, and welfare involves jobs and consumption, what’s inflation, purchasing power, and so on.
我觉得我们关心的是福利，福利涉及到就业和消费，什么是通货膨胀、购买力等等。
People do not wake up in the morning saying, “Okay, my current account deficit is too big, or my current account surplus is too big.” If all of your policies that were delivering good outcomes for your country were to bring along a deficit or a surplus, that’s perfectly fine.
人们不会早上醒来说：“好吧，我的经常账户赤字太大了，或者我的经常账户盈余太大了。”如果你所有为你的国家带来良好成果的政策都会带来赤字或盈余，那就完全没问题了。
There are lots of good reasons to be running deficits and surpluses we know.
我们知道，出现赤字和盈余有很多充分的理由。
There’s nothing that tells you that you shouldn’t.
没有什么告诉你不应该这样做。
The problem arises when you have policies that countries have in place that are inconsistent with any kind of a balanced growth model, and they manifest themselves in that trade deficits and surpluses.
当国家制定的政策与任何一种平衡增长模式不一致时，问题就会出现，并且这些政策会表现为贸易赤字和顺差。
This is what I’m saying as an economist.
这就是我作为经济学家所说的。
Now, of course, from a politician’s perspective, there are other arguments for why they would point to it.
当然，现在从政客的角度来看，他们为什么会指出这一点还有其他论据。
What we have seen historically over and over again is that whenever you had these increases in these deficits and surpluses, you’ve had trade wars or calls for protectionism.
我们在历史上一再看到的是，每当赤字和盈余增加时，就会发生贸易战或呼吁保护主义。
That’s what happened during Reagan’s time, 1980s.
这就是 20 世纪 80 年代里根时代发生的事情。
That’s what led to the Plaza Accord and then all the adjustments that followed after that.
这就是《广场协议》以及之后所有调整的原因。
Then you also do worry about the possibility of crises.
那么你也确实担心危机的可能性。
The Great Financial Crisis was preceded by growing imbalances.
大金融危机之前，失衡现象日益严重。
There was a sense in which all this big savings glut.
从某种意义上说，所有这些巨额储蓄过剩。
All this money flushing around.
所有这些钱都在流动。
All these large surpluses and deficits were part of the problem.
所有这些巨额盈余和赤字都是问题的一部分。
Now I would say where we are now in this third wave of concern about imbalances.
现在我要说的是，我们现在处于对失衡的第三波担忧中。
To be clear, it’s not the imbalance itself.
需要明确的是，这并不是不平衡本身。
As an economist, I would say that it’s not the imbalance in itself.
作为一名经济学家，我想说这并不是失衡本身。
You don’t wake up and say, “This is what I’m trying to prevent.
你不会醒来后说：“这就是我想要阻止的事情。
I’m trying to prevent us from having a deficit.
我正在努力防止我们出现赤字。
I want us to have balanced trade.” I think that’s bad economics.
我希望我们能够实现平衡的贸易。”我认为这在经济学上是很糟糕的。
Say China is channeling what would have been wage income into investment, and that’s plausibly the case.
假设中国正在将工资收入用于投资，情况似乎确实如此。
Now, it may be politically unstable in the sense that we Americans object to it, but that’s not an argument per se, right?
现在，从我们美国人反对的意义上来说，它可能在政治上不稳定，但这本身并不是一个论点，对吧？
We have a choice as to whether or not we should object to it.
我们可以选择是否反对。
It doesn’t seem that rigorous to say, well, this will cause another financial crisis like 2008.
说这会导致另一场像 2008 年那样的金融危机似乎并不严格。
There’s just not real evidence for that.
只是没有真正的证据证明这一点。
Scott Sumner would say, “Let’s just be happy we have cheaper goods.
斯科特·萨姆纳 (Scott Sumner) 会说：“我们应该庆幸我们拥有更便宜的商品。
We send them paper.
我们给他们寄纸。
We get back stuff and go our merry way.” Why is that wrong?
我们拿回东西，然后快乐地走下去。”为什么这是错误的？
A few things.
有几件事。
Firstly, I could go into these differences between trade deficits and surpluses versus what I would call sectoral imbalances, or the fact that China’s running a big manufacturing surplus, which is different from a trade surplus itself, or that it has big EV production.
首先，我可以探讨贸易逆差和顺差与我所说的部门失衡之间的差异，或者中国拥有大量制造业顺差（这与贸易顺差本身不同）的事实，或者中国拥有大量电动汽车产量。
What we do recognize, again, is that we do a pretty bad job in moving or helping workers that have lost their jobs in certain sectors.
我们再次认识到，我们在转移或帮助某些行业失业工人方面做得相当糟糕。
We’re at full employment now or very close to it.
我们现在已经实现或非常接近充分就业。
Again, we’re at full employment right now, but we’ve had this period of time when we had communities that were deeply affected by—not just trade—automation was a big part of it too.
再说一遍，我们现在处于充分就业状态，但我们也曾经历过一段时期，我们的社区深受影响，而不仅仅是贸易，自动化也是其中的一个重要组成部分。
We don’t do a great job in terms of getting people back into jobs, and that can affect, depending upon your ideal welfare function for the country, if you care a lot about those people, then obviously in that case, that’s something that should matter in your policy decisions.
我们在让人们重返工作岗位方面做得并不好，这可能会影响到，这取决于你对国家的理想福利函数，如果你非常关心这些人，那么显然在这种情况下，这在你的政策决策中应该是重要的。
In the case of China, I would say firstly that, in both the case of the US and China, we’re very far from the world where countries are doing good policies, and this is all about comparative advantage, and this is all about this would be the outcome we would have in a world where every country was doing the right policy.
就中国而言，我首先要说的是，就美国和中国而言，我们距离各国都采取良好政策的世界还很遥远，而这一切都与比较优势有关，而这就是在一个每个国家都采取正确政策的世界中我们会得到的结果。
We’re very far from that.
我们离那还很远。
China’s surpluses are a reflection of things going wrong in China.
中国的顺差反映了中国出现的问题。
It’s not a reflection of strength in China.
这并不是中国实力的体现。
It’s a reflection of weak consumption.
这是消费疲软的反映。
It’s a reflection of misallocated resources going into different sectors.
这反映了资源分配不当进入不同部门。
They did that with their property markets.
他们在房地产市场上做到了这一点。
Now they have a huge property market problem that they haven’t been able to fix in five years.
现在他们面临着一个巨大的房地产市场问题，五年来都无法解决。
They have this now with other markets, including EVs and the other sectors.
他们现在已经在其他市场上做到了这一点，包括电动汽车和其他领域。
They have the problem with inflation being too low.
他们面临通货膨胀过低的问题。
They’re trying to do so called anti-involution policies, bringing companies together and telling them, “You’ve got to keep prices higher than what you’re doing right now.” This is not the world where they’re playing good policies, and this is all comparative advantage, and this is the outcome that we see.
他们正试图采取所谓的反内卷政策，将公司聚集在一起并告诉他们，“你必须将价格保持在高于现在的水平。”这不是他们实行良好政策的世界，这都是比较优势，这就是我们看到的结果。
I wouldn’t push the argument that this is, “Oh, we should be just happier with cheaper goods from China.”
我不会提出这样的论点：“哦，我们应该对来自中国的更便宜的商品感到更满意。”
On digital currencies
关于数字货币
Should there be a digital euro?
应该有数字欧元吗？
If so, how do we control or regulate access so there’s not too much disintermediation of private sector banking?
如果是这样，我们如何控制或规范准入，以免私营部门银行业务过度脱媒？
It seems the more people can use the digital euro, the more disintermediation you get.
似乎越多的人可以使用数字欧元，脱媒就越多。
If only a few parties can use it, maybe that’s fine, but there’s hardly any advantage to a digital euro.
如果只有少数各方可以使用它，也许那很好，但数字欧元几乎没有任何优势。
How do you think about those tradeoffs?
您如何看待这些权衡？
I have a particular view on the whole discussion on digital money broadly.
我对有关数字货币的整个讨论有独特的看法。
In this space, stablecoins comes in too, which is the closest to digital money because it’s basically backed one-to-one by a fiat currency and can be used for payments, unlike the others.
在这个领域，稳定币也出现了，它是最接近数字货币的，因为它基本上由法定货币一对一支持，并且与其他货币不同，可以用于支付。
There is the question, do we need this technology?
那么问题来了，我们需要这种技术吗？
The best argument I’ve heard from it is that, okay, well, it’s going to help cross-border payments because that’s where the true frictions are.
我从中听到的最好的论点是，好吧，它将有助于跨境支付，因为这才是真正的摩擦所在。
If you look at the data in terms of the actual cost of doing a transfer using stablecoins, when you include the on-ramping and the off-ramping into fiat currency, it’s not clear at all that this is a cheaper way of doing it.
如果您从使用稳定币进行转账的实际成本来查看数据，那么当您将流入和流出纳入法定货币时，根本不清楚这是一种更便宜的方式。
Then there is the argument that we need to be able to do 24 hours banking, and we need to tokenize all the assets so that we can move them at fractional amounts at infinite speed.
还有一种观点认为，我们需要能够进行 24 小时银行业务，并且我们需要对所有资产进行代币化，以便我们能够以无限的速度以小额金额转移它们。
Again, what’s the true value of that?
再说一遍，它的真正价值是什么？
It’s somewhat unclear.
有点不清楚。
There is somehow this sense that we are in this equilibrium.
不知怎的，我们有一种处于这种平衡之中的感觉。
There is private money in the form of private stablecoins coming out.
有私人稳定币形式的私人资金出现。
By the way, one thing I do like about stablecoins is that they’re finally putting pressure on the traditional banks to actually pay attention to the prices that they charge for their services, especially across the border.
顺便说一句，我喜欢稳定币的一件事是，它们最终向传统银行施加压力，要求它们真正关注他们的服务收费，尤其是跨境服务的价格。
I love that.
我喜欢那个。
That’s a good competitive fringe argument for them.
这对他们来说是一个很好的竞争边缘论点。
Over and above that, what is the benefit of all of this?
除此之外，这一切有什么好处呢？
It would be weird if money stopped evolving.
如果货币停止发展那就很奇怪了。
Money evolves over centuries, millennia.
货币的演变经历了几个世纪、几千年。
To think that we’ll never have digital monies seems highly counterintuitive.
认为我们永远不会拥有数字货币似乎非常违反直觉。
If we’re going to have them, shouldn’t we have quality ones through central banks, like the European Central Bank, which at least talks about doing it?
如果我们要拥有它们，我们难道不应该通过中央银行（例如欧洲中央银行）拥有高质量的东西吗？至少他们谈论过这样做？
Thus, we should do it because the alternative is worse.
因此，我们应该这样做，因为替代方案更糟糕。
We’ll get a worse digital money.
我们会得到更糟糕的数字货币。
Firstly, Tyler, we have digital money.
首先，泰勒，我们有数字货币。
All of the banking that happens is based on ledgers, and it’s all digital.
所有发生的银行业务都是基于分类账的，而且都是数字化的。
Truly digital programmable money, right?
真正的数字可编程货币，对吧？
You could do that with the ledgers that exist.
您可以使用现有的分类帐来做到这一点。
It’s not as if the technology doesn’t exist.
这并不是说这项技术不存在。
This is about whether you want to use blockchain technology versus another technology.
这是关于您是否想要使用区块链技术而不是其他技术。
We’ve come so far from using any kind of physical cash.
到目前为止，我们已经不再使用任何形式的实物现金。
It’s all digital right now.
现在都是数字化的。
It’s also about giving more people direct access to central bank payment systems.
它还旨在让更多人直接访问央行支付系统。
That’s where the disintermediation would come in?
这就是去中介化的用武之地吗？
What is the need for that?
有什么必要呢？
Why do they need to have accounts with central bank?
为什么他们需要在中央银行开设账户？
If you want to go along and say, “Now it exists, this exists.
如果你想跟着说：“现在它存在了，这个存在了。
Should there be central bank digital currencies?” I think the concern there is that if you are in a world where it’s all privately issued stablecoins, and for some reason we all gravitate to that world, and at some point, one of those stablecoin issuers decides that, “Well, we’re going to not be linked to the dollar, but linked to something else.” That’s the kind of difficult scenario that one would need to worry about.
应该有央行数字货币吗？”我认为令人担忧的是，如果你身处一个全是私人发行的稳定币的世界，并且出于某种原因，我们都被这个世界所吸引，并且在某个时候，其中一个稳定币发行人决定，“好吧，我们不会与美元挂钩，而是与其他东西挂钩。”这是一种需要担心的困难场景。
Then you are saying, “Okay.
然后你说：“好吧。
Well, again, the central bank digital currency works like a competitive fringe,” and says, “We are there.
好吧，再说一次，央行数字货币的运作就像一个竞争边缘，”并说，“我们就在那里。
We can step in when there is any misuse of this kind of power that the private firms may have.”
当私营公司可能拥有的这种权力被滥用时，我们可以介入。”
Again, there’s a reason why central banks everywhere are still scratching their head about what exactly they should do about this.
同样，世界各地的央行仍在摸不着头脑，不知道到底应该采取什么措施，这是有原因的。
Look, if you think of the countries that have introduced central bank digital currencies, you think of China.
看，如果你想到推出央行数字货币的国家，你就会想到中国。
Nigeria has experimented with it.
尼日利亚已经进行了尝试。
There hasn’t been much take-up at all.
根本没有太多的吸收。
Again, this is August 2026.
再说一遍，这是 2026 年 8 月。
Some of my friends are quite worried, whether correctly or not, that possibly the marginal buyer for US Treasuries today is both private and with some leverage.
我的一些朋友非常担心，无论正确与否，今天美国国债的边际买家可能既是私人的，又具有一定的杠杆作用。
Some people say, “Oh, this is UK hedge funds.” I don’t know if that’s true or not, but if I want to set their minds at ease and tell them the Treasury market is going just fine, what argument should I make back to them?
有人说，“哦，这是英国对冲基金。”我不知道这是否属实，但如果我想让他们放心，告诉他们国债市场一切都很好，我应该向他们提出什么论据呢？
Alternatively, you might agree with them, but what’s your view?
或者，您可能同意他们的观点，但您的观点是什么？
Well, I guess if I were really trying to be the advocate for saying, “Don’t worry too much about Treasuries,” I would just say that the alternatives could look worse.
好吧，我想如果我真的想倡导“不要太担心国债”，我只会说其他选择可能看起来更糟。
The question is, if you want safe assets, where would you put it?
问题是，如果你想要安全资产，你会把它放在哪里？
There is the US, which has the most liquid, largest Treasury market.
美国拥有流动性最强、规模最大的国债市场。
Then if you look outside and you say, well, maybe one country that looks very good, Switzerland, but it is so tiny in terms of relative scale of its market that you’re going to lose money when you put your money in there.
然后，如果你看看外面，你会说，好吧，也许有一个国家看起来非常好，瑞士，但就其市场的相对规模而言，它是如此之小，以至于当你把钱投入那里时，你会赔钱。
The markets are very small.
市场很小。
If you look at France or Germany or any other country, Japan, it’s not as if you would look around and you’d say that there are great alternatives.
如果你看看法国、德国或任何其他国家，比如日本，你不会环顾四周并说有很好的选择。
That said, that’s if I was trying to make an advocate for the Treasury versus others.
也就是说，如果我试图为财政部而非其他人辩护的话。
I do think there is a problem.
我确实认为有问题。
We have a problem in America with our fiscal situation, with what’s happening with debt, with Treasuries.
美国的财政状况、债务和国债都存在问题。
I suspect more and more people are going to go into the short end in terms of what they hold, as opposed to the long end.
我怀疑越来越多的人会选择持有的短期资产，而不是长期资产。
You can see that with yield curves going up, because if you look at debt trajectories compared to other countries, including France, Germany, Japan, and the others, it’s the US debt trajectory going forward that is particularly concerning in addition to what the levels that we’re seeing right now.
你可以看到，随着收益率曲线上升，因为如果你看看与其他国家（包括法国、德国、日本和其他国家）的债务轨迹相比，除了我们现在看到的水平之外，美国未来的债务轨迹尤其令人担忧。
On AI and the productivity question
关于人工智能和生产力问题
I have another group of friends, and they say that AI, or artificial general intelligence, it will raise US productivity maybe by half a percentage point a year.
我还有另一群朋友，他们说人工智能，或者通用人工智能，它将使美国的生产力每年提高半个百分点。
This will be like 1995 to 1998, and the budget won’t balance, but debt to GDP will converge at a ratio at something like 100 percent, 120 percent, and things will just be fine.
就像 1995 年到 1998 年一样，预算不会平衡，但债务与 GDP 的比率将收敛到 100%、120% 左右，一切都会好起来的。
Do you agree?
你同意？
I think what I would say is that if what you said is true and we do get growth going up persistently at half a percent or so, yes, that would absolutely help in terms of the debt-to-GDP trajectory, just in terms of the math.
我想我想说的是，如果你说的是真的，而且我们确实让经济增长持续保持在 0.5% 左右，是的，就债务与 GDP 的比率而言，仅从数学角度来看，这绝对会有所帮助。
I think that’s very helpful.
我认为这非常有帮助。
Do you think it will?
你认为会吗？
At this point, I cannot say that that will necessarily be the case for the following reasons, because even if the technology seems wonderful—I use it a lot, I’m impressed with it—as you can see, there’s a lot of pushback against the use of AI.
在这一点上，我不能说情况一定会如此，原因如下，因为即使这项技术看起来很棒——我经常使用它，它给我留下了深刻的印象——正如你所看到的，对于人工智能的使用存在很多阻力。
Whether there will be widespread adoption is to be seen.
是否会被广泛采用还有待观察。
How much more can this technology penetrate?
这项技术还能渗透多少？
The way it gets used, I think there’s question marks around that.
就其使用方式而言，我认为还存在疑问。
Also, we could have a financial market correction that could happen, even if the technology is wonderful, as we know.
此外，正如我们所知，即使技术很棒，我们也可能会发生金融市场调整。
You could have a correction, which then later on, you could have something better, but you could go through a correction.
你可以进行修正，然后，你可以得到更好的东西，但你可以进行修正。
In this difficult time, given everything else that’s happening in the world economy, I don’t know whether we are going to be on this glide path to just having half a percent higher growth.
在这个困难时期，考虑到世界经济中发生的其他一切，我不知道我们是否会走上这条仅增长半个百分点的下滑之路。
Now, I have yet another group of friends who think that as AGI approaches, you probably end up with stagflation because real interest rates are quite high, because the private demand for capital is so extreme, and that may even crowd out government borrowing to some extent, and some people will be losing their jobs, and you end up with pretty high inflation and some degree of unemployment, and that’s an altogether new problem for central bankers.
现在，我还有另一群朋友认为，随着AGI的临近，最终可能会出现滞胀，因为实际利率相当高，因为私人对资本的需求如此极端，这甚至可能在一定程度上挤出政府借贷，一些人会失业，最终会出现相当高的通胀和一定程度的失业，这对央行行长来说是一个全新的问题。
Agree or disagree?
同意还是不同意？
That seems a bit odd.
这似乎有点奇怪。
If this is going to deliver the productivity boom—
如果这能带来生产力的繁荣——
There’s an intermediate period where you get the demand for capital, which right now is very high, but the productivity gains from AI in this moment, we would agree, are quite small.
在中间阶段，你会遇到对资本的需求，目前这种需求非常高，但我们同意，目前人工智能带来的生产力收益相当小。
For a while, you have stagflation, and then a radical deflation later on.
有一段时间会出现滞胀，然后会出现剧烈的通货紧缩。
We’re talking about now, where we could have this period where, with the build-out of all the AI infrastructure, we would get in demand-side effect, and I believe that is correct.
我们现在正在讨论，随着所有人工智能基础设施的建设，我们可能会经历一段时期，我们将产生需求侧效应，我相信这是正确的。
I think that, as of now, we are seeing the effect of the build-out of AI which is more of a demand story, affecting prices and inflation, and there is.
我认为，到目前为止，我们正在看到人工智能发展的影响，这更多的是一个需求故事，影响价格和通货膨胀，而且确实如此。
It’s not a huge amount, but you’re certainly seeing that show up, but you’re going to see it increasingly if the scales of investment that are projected actually materialize.
这不是一个巨大的金额，但你肯定会看到它的出现，但如果预计的投资规模真正实现，你会看到它越来越多。
There are some question marks around that too.
对此也存在一些问号。
Yes, in that case, the concern for if it’s a purely demand-driven shock, of course, the central banks, that tends to be an easier problem to manage in the following sense, which is worse is that there’s no tradeoff between inflation and output gaps or inflation and employment.
是的，在这种情况下，如果是纯粹的需求驱动的冲击，当然是央行，那么从以下意义上来说，这往往是一个更容易管理的问题，更糟糕的是，通胀与产出缺口或通胀与就业之间没有权衡。
That is true when you have a demand-driven increase in inflation.
当需求驱动的通胀上升时，情况确实如此。
The concern is if you have a supply shock, then obviously you do have a tradeoff in that case.
令人担忧的是，如果出现供应冲击，那么显然在这种情况下您确实需要进行权衡。
If it’s a demand-driven inflation shock, then the right thing to do is to tame demand.
如果是需求驱动的通胀冲击，那么正确的做法就是抑制需求。
It’s private sector stimulus.
这是私营部门的刺激措施。
It’s hard to tame that demand.
很难抑制这种需求。
People want to build all these data centers and compute.
人们想要构建所有这些数据中心和计算。
Real interest rates are high, and maybe that’s bad for borrowing economies.
实际利率很高，这可能对借贷经济体不利。
We all know what the Volcker disinflation did to make the third world debt crisis worth back in the ’80s.
我们都知道沃尔克通货紧缩是如何让上世纪 80 年代的第三世界债务危机变得值得的。
Are we going to see a rerun of that, and then the IMF will just be super busy over the next 10 years?
我们是否会看到这样的情况重演，然后国际货币基金组织在未来 10 年将变得非常忙碌？
No. Firstly, I do hear about this fact that AI spend is insensitive to interest rates.
不。首先，我确实听说人工智能支出对利率不敏感。
On the margin argument, if it turns out, if Kevin Warsh at Jackson Hole were to say that we are going to now start raising interest rates going forward and that’s because we’re in an inflationary environment, I bet that that will change, if there will be an effect on AI spend.
关于边际争论，如果事实证明，如果杰克逊霍尔的凯文·沃什说我们现在将开始提高利率，那是因为我们处于通货膨胀环境中，我敢打赌，如果人工智能支出受到影响，情况将会改变。
I don’t think that that’s the case.
我认为情况并非如此。
It’s a matter of degree of shift that’s going to happen.
这是即将发生的转变程度的问题。
Debt crises and so on—that’s a good question.
债务危机等等——这是一个好问题。
It’s been very interesting because when I was at the IMF, I spent a lot of time on debt restructuring.
这非常有趣，因为当我在国际货币基金组织工作时，我花了很多时间在债务重组上。
The G20 created the Common Framework, which is basically how do we restructure a country’s debt, and do that with a platform that brings in official creditors, multilaterals, and the private sector and so on together.
G20 创建了共同框架，这基本上是我们如何重组一个国家的债务，并通过一个将官方债权人、多边机构和私营部门等聚集在一起的平台来实现这一目标。
That seems like an efficient way to do it.
这似乎是一种有效的方法。
Yes, that platform was created, the G20 was created, and I think what has been, in a way, surprising is that we haven’t had that many debt crises, despite everything we’ve seen up and down and sideways in terms of shocks.
是的，这个平台已经创建了，G20 也已经创建了，我认为，在某种程度上，令人惊讶的是，尽管我们在冲击方面看到了起起伏伏，但我们并没有发生那么多债务危机。
That does not mean it won’t happen, with interest rates going up.
这并不意味着随着利率上升，这种情况不会发生。
Even more than we’ve seen, we could see more countries in debt crisis.
我们可能会看到更多国家陷入债务危机，甚至比我们所看到的还要多。
Though I think the new question right now is what is the framework in a world where developed country bond markets are in trouble, real trouble?
尽管我认为现在的新问题是，在发达国家债券市场陷入困境、真正陷入困境的世界中，框架是什么？
I don’t think we have that.
我认为我们没有。
When I see what Secretary Bessent is doing, it clearly seems like there’s not that framework.
当我看到贝森特部长正在做的事情时，显然似乎没有这个框架。
That could be an important area, maybe in terms of thinking about what would that look like.
这可能是一个重要的领域，也许就思考它会是什么样子而言。
What do you think the future of academic economics looks like if, say, an advanced AI could write a top-five paper within two years with maybe modest human assistance, but nonetheless, could do most of the hard work?
如果先进的人工智能可以在两年内写出一篇排名前五的论文，也许需要适度的人类帮助，但仍然可以完成大部分艰苦的工作，你认为学术经济学的未来会是什么样子？
That seems quite plausible today.
今天看来这似乎很有道理。
Have I seen such a paper?
我见过这样的论文吗？
I have not.
我没有。
Certainly, it can write for third-tier journals today.
当然，今天可以写三级期刊了。
It’s probably doing a lot of that.
它可能做了很多这样的事情。
Again, two years, progress is extremely rapid.
又是两年，进步极其迅速。
Two years ago it didn’t know how many R’s were in strawberry, and now they prove math theorems or disprove them.
两年前，人们还不知道草莓中有多少个 R，而现在，它们要么证明数学定理，要么反驳数学定理。
Things like differences and differences, they’re quite automatable, and have the human work for a week and set the agents on the problem and come back with a Review of Economic Studies piece.
像差异和差异之类的事情，它们是相当自动化的，并且让人类工作一周，让代理人解决问题，然后带着经济研究评论文章回来。
In fact, do 30 of those a year.
事实上，每年做 30 次。
Review of Economic Studies is a top five.
经济研究评论是前五名。
In this case, what I would say is that as economists, we’re a social science.
在这种情况下，我想说的是，作为经济学家，我们是一门社会科学。
We’ve always, for decades, wanted to be associated with the science part of it because that makes us look more impressive, maybe.
几十年来，我们一直希望与其中的科学部分联系起来，因为这也许会让我们看起来更令人印象深刻。
Maybe what’s going to happen now is that we’re going to be associated more with the social side of the social sciences.
也许现在会发生的是，我们将更多地与社会科学的社会方面联系起来。
I see that.
我明白了。
Again, we’ll see what happens in two years and what the technology can do, but as of now, it’s very good at coding.
同样，我们将看看两年后会发生什么以及该技术可以做什么，但到目前为止，它非常擅长编码。
Once you set up a problem and ask it to solve it, it’ll do it very well, but it doesn’t have a good sense of what are the right ingredients to throw into the model because there’s an art to it.
一旦你提出了一个问题并要求它解决它，它会做得很好，但它并不能很好地了解什么是应该放入模型中的正确成分，因为它是一门艺术。
Therefore, I’m waiting to see whether that’s the case, whether there is good, new insights that can come out of just an AI-written paper.
因此，我正在等待看看情况是否如此，是否可以从一篇人工智能撰写的论文中得出好的、新的见解。
Quite a few of the graduate students, especially from MIT, seem to be taking jobs at Anthropic or maybe OpenAI.
相当多的研究生，尤其是来自麻省理工学院的研究生，似乎正在 Anthropic 或 OpenAI 工作。
What does this tell us about the future of the academic job market?
这对学术就业市场的未来有何启示？
Will there be an increasing brain drain of the smartest people into the private sector, which, of course, does pay a lot more?
最聪明的人才会越来越多地流失到私营部门，当然，私营部门的工资要高得多吗？
Well, I think there are actually two things that are also encouraging that shift, which is the other factor is what’s happening with funding, what’s happening with National Science Foundation grants, what’s happening with the tax on endowments.
嗯，我认为实际上有两件事也鼓励这种转变，另一个因素是资金方面的情况，国家科学基金会拨款方面的情况，以及捐赠税方面的情况。
That is leading us everywhere, including at Harvard, to hire fewer faculty.
这导致我们各地，包括哈佛，减少聘用教师。
There is less demand; there’s going to be fewer academic positions available because of what we’re seeing right now in terms of the policies coming out of this administration.
需求减少；由于我们现在所看到的本届政府的政策，可用的学术职位将会减少。
Maybe that’s a good thing, who knows?
也许这是一件好事，谁知道呢？
That’s what the facts are.
事实就是这样。
That’s what the market is.
这就是市场。
Then, on the other hand, you have where the jobs are and where the money is much higher, which is in AI.
另一方面，哪里有工作机会，哪里的钱也高得多，那就是人工智能。
I think we’re going through this period where, I can see why more good students and more PhD students and so on would be looking for jobs in the private sector.
我认为我们正在经历这个时期，我可以理解为什么更多的优秀学生和更多的博士生等会在私营部门寻找工作。
Immigration is tougher also, as you must know.
您必须知道，移民也更加困难。
Does that mean there’s a golden age of academic economics that lies immediately behind us?
这是否意味着学术经济学的黄金时代就在我们身后？
Now, more or less, at least for humans, it’s just going to get worse?
现在，或多或少，至少对于人类来说，情况只会变得更糟？
I think that maybe is my own prognosis, but do you agree?
我想这也许是我自己的预测，但你同意吗？
There’s one sense in which this feels a bit like the golden age for economics because of the big transformations that are taking place.
从某种意义上说，这感觉有点像经济学的黄金时代，因为正在发生巨大的变革。
There’s AI, but there’s what we just talked about, the debt markets, there’s what’s happening with demographics, there’s numerous areas where it seems like the whole global economy is churning and shifting.
有人工智能，但还有我们刚才谈到的债务市场，人口统计数据正在发生的事情，有许多领域似乎整个全球经济正在搅动和转变。
Therefore, I think we all wake up, in a sense, very curious and excited about what we should be trying to help answer.
因此，我认为从某种意义上说，我们都对我们应该试图帮助回答的问题感到非常好奇和兴奋。
Yes, so this is not the great moderation period when we were, I think, writing papers on the derivatives.
是的，所以我认为现在并不是我们撰写衍生品论文的伟大缓和时期。
This is the period where we have big structural changes.
这是我们发生重大结构性变化的时期。
I think this is a good period.
我认为这是一个很好的时期。
I think it’s the responsibility of everybody, including economists, to engage on what we’re going through in terms of major transformation.
我认为每个人，包括经济学家，都有责任参与我们正在经历的重大转型。
On why Kerala keeps electing communists
为什么喀拉拉邦不断选举共产党人
Now, you’re from a family from Kerala.
现在，您来自喀拉拉邦的一个家庭。
Why does Kerala keep on electing communists?
为什么喀拉拉邦继续选举共产党人？
How communist are they really at this point?
他们现在到底有多共产主义？
It’s been a long time, right?
已经很久了，对吧？
Are they just another party, in essence, or is there something still communistic about them?
从本质上讲，他们只是另一个政党，还是仍然有共产主义的成分？
Yes, so as you know, in every part of the world, whether you’re a liberal or not liberal, or whether you’re a Democrat or Republican, that definition of that just adjusts over time.
是的，正如你所知，在世界各地，无论你是自由主义者还是非自由主义者，无论你是民主党人还是共和党人，这个定义都会随着时间的推移而调整。
First of all, in the case of Kerala, with the exception of one election, the government in Kerala has always switched between being communist for one term, and then it goes to the Congress Party for another term.
首先，就喀拉拉邦而言，除了一次选举外，喀拉拉邦政府总是在共产主义任期和国大党任期之间切换。
The label of the Congress Party is, it’s Congress Party.
国大党的标签是国大党。
It doesn’t say it’s communist.
它并没有说它是共产主义的。
If you look at the policies of Congress, there are quite a lot to be left in the state of Kerala.
如果你看看国会的政策，喀拉拉邦还有很多事情要做。
Just to clarify to what you said, which was that we do have, in Kerala, it switches between the Communist Party and Congress Party, with the exception of one election since independence.
只是为了澄清你所说的，在喀拉拉邦，除了独立以来的一次选举之外，它在共产党和国大党之间切换。
Why do they tend to be very left-leaning?
为什么他们往往非常左倾？
This goes to the history of Kerala also, in terms of the maharajas and the way things were done, and the communists and levels of education were highest in Kerala for a long period of time.
这也适用于喀拉拉邦的历史，就王公和做事方式而言，共产主义者和教育水平在很长一段时间内是喀拉拉邦最高的。
There are many factors behind it.
其背后有很多因素。
Kerala does benefit from repatriated income from the Middle East.
喀拉拉邦确实受益于中东汇回的收入。
They get a lot of it.
他们得到了很多。
That also helps, but they are moving.
这也有帮助，但他们正在搬家。
Kerala is actually moving toward doing more and more encouraging businesses and the private sector and so on.
喀拉拉邦实际上正在朝着越来越多鼓励企业和私营部门等方向发展。
I think they are also moving in that direction, but what they do have is a very large social safety net.
我认为他们也在朝这个方向前进，但他们拥有的是一个非常庞大的社会安全网。
In both Kerala and many parts of Sri Lanka, they seem to have much higher social indicators than many other parts of South Asia.
在喀拉拉邦和斯里兰卡的许多地区，他们的社会指标似乎比南亚许多其他地区要高得多。
There’s better rights for women, however imperfect that may be.
女性拥有更好的权利，尽管这可能不完美。
There’s higher literacy.
还有更高的识字能力。
Public health indicators are much better.
公共卫生指标要好得多。
Why is that?
这是为什么？
Since it’s Sri Lanka and Kerala, which are at least in parts ethnically or culturally similar, it doesn’t seem it would be the Communist Party or some very particular concrete explanation.
由于斯里兰卡和喀拉拉邦至少在种族或文化上有部分相似，因此似乎不是共产党或某种非常具体的具体解释。
It seems more general.
看起来比较一般。
Well, that’s a good question, and I can tell you what I think, but the honest truth is, and I haven’t exactly investigated this particular question.
嗯，这是一个很好的问题，我可以告诉你我的想法，但诚实的事实是，我还没有完全调查这个特定的问题。
I just know that in the case of Kerala, the maharajas of Kerala were very big on educating women.
我只知道就喀拉拉邦而言，喀拉拉邦的王公非常重视教育女性。
There’s some reason to think that that filtered through.
有一些理由认为这已经渗透进来了。
There’s also important large communities in Kerala where I come from, which is matriarchal and not patriarchal where who gets the property, it’s the women and not the men.
我来自喀拉拉邦，那里也有一些重要的大型社区，那里是母系社会，而不是父系社会，获得财产的是女性，而不是男性。
I suspect that that plays a role because in all of India it’s a patriarchy except in some of these communities in Kerala, though, like you, I would say that it’s an imperfect patriarchy.
我怀疑这发挥了作用，因为在整个印度，除了喀拉拉邦的一些社区之外，它都是父权制，尽管像你一样，我会说这是一个不完美的父权制。
There is still a lot that doesn’t really seem fair to women.
还有很多事情对女性来说似乎并不公平。
There are some of these unique characteristics about it.
它有一些独特的特征。
I think when I was growing up in India, I do remember having a lot of friends who made the point that their parents tried very hard to have a son, while I always grew up with the sense that girls were very important because, again, the matriarchy lineage.
我想，当我在印度长大时，我确实记得有很多朋友都指出，他们的父母非常努力地想要一个儿子，而我一直觉得女孩非常重要，因为母权制血统。
Maybe that plays a role too.
也许这也发挥了作用。
I am, at this point, way outside my area of expertise.
在这一点上，我远远超出了我的专业领域。
You grew up in Calcutta with the Keralite family.
您在加尔各答与喀拉拉邦家族一起长大。
Is that correct?
这是正确的吗？
I was born there.
我出生在那里。
I was very young when we moved out.
我们搬出去的时候我还很小。
I was like maybe three years old or four years old or something.
我当时大概三岁或四岁什么的。
You went to an all-girls Catholic school?
你上的是天主教女子学校吗？
Yes.
是的。
What’s your view of unisex education?
您对男女皆宜的教育有何看法？
Do you have one?
你有吗？
It worked for you, right?
这对你有用，对吧？
I’m in favor of it.
我赞成。
My poor son, I was very excited to send him to Roxbury Latin School because it’s an all-boys school, and I thought that it was great as an education.
我可怜的儿子，我很高兴送他去罗克斯伯里拉丁学校，因为这是一所男子学校，我认为这是一种很棒的教育。
My take on this, on the single sex one was, it was great because we did everything.
我对此的看法，对单一性别的看法是，这很棒，因为我们做了一切。
There was no roles defined in what girls can do and boys do.
没有明确女孩可以做什么和男孩可以做什么的角色。
When we put up a play, the girls were in the play.
当我们上演戏剧时，女孩们也在戏剧中。
They acted, but they also built the stage.
他们表演了，但他们也搭建了舞台。
They did it all.
他们做到了这一切。
I don’t know, I think that’s cool.
我不知道，我认为这很酷。
On what comes next
关于接下来会发生什么
Very last question.
最后一个问题。
Now your IMF tenure ended in 2025.
现在您的国际货币基金组织任期将于 2025 年结束。
You’re back at Harvard, presumably recovering to some extent.
你回到了哈佛，想必已经在一定程度上康复了。
For your future, what do you plan on doing next, working on next, writing next, researching next?
对于你的未来，你下一步计划做什么、下一步工作、下一步写作、下一步研究？
What for you is coming up?
你会遇到什么？
Thank you.
谢谢。
First of all, I’m really excited to be back and in the thick of all the discussions here, given the times that we live in.
首先，考虑到我们生活的时代，我很高兴能回来并参与这里所有的讨论。
I think these are very interesting times to be an academic too.
我认为对于一名学者来说，现在也是非常有趣的时刻。
I’m working on digital money, stablecoins.
我正在研究数字货币、稳定币。
Because of my work on dollar dominance, I’m curious to know how this can affect dollar dominance or not.
由于我对美元主导地位的研究，我很好奇这会如何影响美元主导地位。
That’s one big area, but also working on a project on AI.
这是一个很大的领域，而且还致力于人工智能项目。
What’s your AI project?
你的人工智能项目是什么？
The AI project, which I’ve just kick-started, is actually looking at the impact of AI on jobs; everybody else is doing that.
我刚刚启动的人工智能项目实际上是在研究人工智能对就业的影响；其他人都在这样做。
There is one difference I think that’s not coming up in the conversations, which is people are tracking what the effect is on what’s happening to jobs right now with the advent of AI, but what we’ve seen through past cycles of automation is that something like 85 percent of automation-related job losses happened in the first year of recessions.
我认为对话中没有提到这一点，那就是人们正在追踪人工智能的出现对当前就业形势的影响，但我们通过过去的自动化周期看到的是，大约 85% 的与自动化相关的失业发生在经济衰退的第一年。
There is a sense in which there is a latent build-up of the fact that a pool of workers who, when there is a recession and you are in cost-cutting mode, companies lay off and then you have jobless recoveries.
从某种意义上说，潜在的事实是，当经济衰退且处于削减成本模式时，公司会裁员，然后出现失业复苏。
We saw that after the Great Financial Crisis.
我们在金融危机之后看到了这一点。
With my co-authors, I am working on trying to understand to see what we can do right now in terms of tracking what that latent pool could look like.
我正在与我的合著者一起努力了解我们现在可以在跟踪潜在池的情况方面做些什么。
I’m also interested in AI and financial markets and frictions and so on.
我还对人工智能和金融市场以及摩擦等感兴趣。
The last thing that I’m doing is I’m launching a Global Economics Lab at Harvard with the mission to help advance an international economic order that benefits people everywhere.
我要做的最后一件事是在哈佛大学成立一个全球经济实验室，其使命是帮助推进造福世界各地人民的国际经济秩序。
The way I see it is that we’re at obviously a historic time in terms of the global economy: big transformations, shifts of protectionism, geopolitics, AI.
在我看来，就全球经济而言，我们显然正处于一个历史性时刻：重大转型、保护主义、地缘政治、人工智能的转变。
Because now economics and politics are getting a bit intertwined, I think it’s harder for other institutions and multilateral institutions to be able to do full justice to the big questions that we face.
因为现在经济和政治变得有点交织在一起，我认为其他机构和多边机构更难完全公正地解决我们面临的重大问题。
I think independent researchers have a role to play here.
我认为独立研究人员可以在这里发挥作用。
That’s what I am investigating.
这就是我正在调查的。
Great.
伟大的。
Gita Gopinath, thank you very much.
吉塔·戈皮纳斯，非常感谢你。
Thank you, Tyler.
谢谢你，泰勒。