Eric Schmidt on the Life-Changing Magic of Systematizing, Scaling, and Saying “Thanks” (Ep. 53 - Live)
It’s an honor to be with you.
很荣幸能和你在一起。
Eric.
埃里克.
Let’s try doing a whirlwind tour of your career and life.
让我们尝试对您的职业和生活进行一次旋风之旅。
Between the ages 10 and 20, what did you have as a formative intellectual experience that helped make you into Eric Schmidt?
在 10 岁到 20 岁之间,您有哪些形成性的智力经历帮助您成为了埃里克·施密特?
I wanted to be an astronaut as all the boys of my age did because this was during the moon-landing period.
我想像所有同龄男孩一样成为一名宇航员,因为当时正值登月时期。
My father, who you are the natural successor to, I must say, as an economist, took us to Italy, and I grew up in Italy as a boy.
我必须说,我的父亲,作为一名经济学家,你是他的自然继承者,他带我们去了意大利,而我小时候也在意大利长大。
And this is at a time when people didn’t travel the way they do today, and so it was quite exotic to grow up Italian, and I think that really changed me.
当时人们并没有像今天那样旅行,所以在意大利长大是非常有异国情调的,我认为这确实改变了我。
As an American, I’ve always thought Americans were very, very locally focused, and even today in the world you all live in, we’re still too locally focused and not globally focused.
作为一个美国人,我一直认为美国人非常非常注重本地化,即使在今天,在你们生活的世界中,我们仍然过于注重本地化,而不是全球化。
How did it influence you having a father who was a famous economist?
拥有一位著名经济学家的父亲对您有何影响?
He wrote on balance of payments crises.
他撰写了有关国际收支危机的文章。
What did you draw from him?
你从他身上得到了什么?
Did that have a role in using so much economics in Google?
这对谷歌如此大量地运用经济学有作用吗?
Well, what’s interesting is, I asked my father, “If you’re such a good economist, why are we not rich?”
有趣的是,我问父亲:“如果你是这么优秀的经济学家,为什么我们还不富有呢?”
And his answer is lost to history but .
他的答案已经消失在历史之中了。
.
。
.
。
Give it time, right?
给点时间吧?
But I have a lot of respect for economics because people really do study these platforms that people build on.
但我非常尊重经济学,因为人们确实研究了人们构建的这些平台。
My personal success, I think, has largely been because I’m interested in network economics and network platforms.
我认为,我个人的成功很大程度上是因为我对网络经济和网络平台感兴趣。
Pretty much everything you all build on is essentially a platform.
几乎所有构建的东西本质上都是一个平台。
Platforms have unique structures and scales, and they, in fact, follow economics laws.
平台具有独特的结构和规模,实际上遵循经济规律。
Now I learned through Google, of all sources, that in college, you were at first a major in architecture.
现在我通过谷歌从各种渠道了解到,在大学里,你最初主修建筑。
What was your thinking behind that?
你的想法是什么?
Well, I was a terrible architect, but I turned out to be a pretty good engineer, and this was at a time when computer science didn’t exist.
好吧,我是一个糟糕的建筑师,但结果证明我是一个非常好的工程师,而那是在计算机科学还不存在的时代。
At Princeton, I walked in, and I said, “Look, I think I’d rather do computers.” Well, they talked to me for a bit, and they put me in their advanced class, and then that’s sort of how it happened.
在普林斯顿,我走进去,说:“听着,我想我宁愿做计算机。”好吧,他们和我聊了一会儿,然后把我安排到了他们的高级班,然后事情就这样发生了。
So whatever you think you’re going to do, you may do something very different.
因此,无论您认为自己要做什么,您都可能会做一些非常不同的事情。
I just naturally liked computer science.
我天生喜欢计算机科学。
I graduated with a degree in electrical engineering, but I did none of the EE classes, so never asked me to repair anything.
我毕业时获得了电气工程学位,但我没有上过任何 EE 课程,所以从来没有要求我修理任何东西。
Now early on, you were an intern at Bell Labs, and also PARC, which belonged to Xerox, and I think of those two institutions as stemming from earlier glory years of American science.
早些时候,你是贝尔实验室和施乐旗下帕洛阿尔托研究中心的实习生,我认为这两个机构源于美国科学早期的辉煌岁月。
Is it fair to think of your career as in some sense, you’re the person who spans those two eras, the Bell Labs-PARC era of doing things, and then the tech era of manipulating information, and that your ability to bring expertise from those two areas together is what has made you a unique figure?
从某种意义上来说,你的职业生涯跨越了这两个时代,贝尔实验室-帕洛阿尔托研究中心的做事时代,然后是操纵信息的科技时代,你将这两个领域的专业知识结合在一起的能力使你成为一个独特的人物,这是否公平?
Is that a fair assessment of how you fit into the picture?
这是对你融入情况的公平评估吗?
It’s very flattering.
非常讨人喜欢。
I would say I’m defined by luck, and I think almost anyone who’s successful has to start by saying they were lucky — lucky of birth, lucky of having intellectual and intelligent family home life, upbringing, global upbringing, etcetera.
我想说,我是由运气来定义的,我认为几乎所有成功的人都必须首先说他们是幸运的——出生时的幸运,拥有聪明智慧的家庭生活、成长、全球成长等的幸运。
I was lucky because when I worked at Bell Labs, I wrote a program called Lex, which is still in use today, which is disturbing, given that was 40 years ago.
我很幸运,因为当我在贝尔实验室工作时,我编写了一个名为 Lex 的程序,该程序至今仍在使用,这令人不安,因为那是 40 年前的事了。
And the people at the time — you have this notion that some of the tech industry is like it is now, it was then.
当时的人们有这样的观念:科技行业的某些部分就像现在一样,过去也是如此。
Back then it was just technical nerds, right?
那时候只是技术宅,对吧?
There was no business context.
没有商业背景。
There’s no formation.
没有阵型。
Just really interesting stuff.
只是非常有趣的东西。
And Bell Labs, of course, came out of a monopoly agreement around AT&T, and as part of the way the monopoly was set up, Bell Labs was funded to do interesting things.
当然,贝尔实验室是从 AT&T 的垄断协议中诞生的,作为垄断建立方式的一部分,贝尔实验室得到资助去做一些有趣的事情。
About 90 percent of what Bell Labs did was related to signal processing and telephony.
贝尔实验室大约 90% 的工作与信号处理和电话技术有关。
Remember I didn’t take those classes in college?
还记得我在大学时没有上过这些课吗?
But the 10 percent that did pure research and computer science ultimately had this enormous impact.
但从事纯粹研究和计算机科学的 10% 最终产生了巨大的影响。
Xerox PARC came out of a similar structure.
施乐帕洛阿尔托研究中心 (Xerox PARC) 也采用了类似的结构。
Xerox, at the time, was a structural monopoly, although not a legal one, because they were the only people building xerographic copiers, and so they had the ability to create these research centers.
施乐公司当时是一种结构性垄断,尽管不是合法的垄断,因为他们是唯一制造静电复印机的公司,因此他们有能力创建这些研究中心。
And during this sort of golden age of research centers, this is where a lot of American science happened because they had enough money — universities didn’t have it.
在研究中心的黄金时代,许多美国科学研究都是在这里发生的,因为他们有足够的资金 ——大学却没有。
Today, you wouldn’t create a separate lab on the hill today.
今天,你不会在山上创建一个单独的实验室。
We’ve been through this in my career, now over 40 years.
我的职业生涯至今已超过 40 年,我们也经历过这样的情况。
I’ve tried to set up these research labs and they don’t work when they’re separate.
我曾尝试建立这些研究实验室,但当它们分开时,它们就无法工作。
So at Google, when we did the same thing, what we did is, we created integrated labs that, actually — there’s not much distinction between the research part and the product development part.
因此,在谷歌,当我们做同样的事情时,我们所做的是,我们创建了综合实验室,实际上,研究部分和产品开发部分之间没有太大区别。
Indeed, the researchers and the developers work as a team.
事实上,研究人员和开发人员作为一个团队工作。
So you then moved on to Sun Microsystems.
所以你后来转到了 Sun Microsystems。
You worked with Scott McNealy.
你和斯科特·麦克尼利一起工作过。
What’s the most important thing you learned from him?
你从他身上学到的最重要的事情是什么?
Well Scott was a very strong leader, and Scott was a person of great charisma.
斯科特是一位非常强势的领导者,斯科特也是一位极具魅力的人。
He’s now retired.
他现在已经退休了。
And what I learned about .
以及我了解到的情况。
.
。
.
。
I’ll give an example: The first month I was in the company, the products didn’t work at all, which is characteristic of most of the first year of the company.
我举个例子:我进公司的第一个月,产品根本不起作用,这是公司第一年大部分时间的特点。
It was because at the time we were doing breadboarding, and we would do wires to the computers, and so forth, and nothing ever worked.
这是因为当时我们正在做面包板,我们会连接到计算机等等,但没有任何效果。
I know it’s hard to imagine, but this is what the state of the computers were.
我知道这很难想象,但这就是计算机的状态。
I remember one evening, Scott gave this impassioned speech that we would all stay overnight in order to get enough hardware built so that we could make the quarter.
我记得有一天晚上,斯科特发表了一篇慷慨激昂的演讲,我们都将过夜,以便建造足够的硬件,以便我们能够完成本季度的任务。
I was shocked that people actually did this.
我很震惊人们真的这么做了。
And what I realized is that charismatic leaders can get people to do stuff that they would otherwise not rationally do, but because we were a team and because we believed in our mission, right at the time — these were work stations and we were battling the man in the sense that we were battling the older generation of computers — somehow we were motivated to do this.
我意识到,有魅力的领导者可以让人们做一些他们原本不会理性地做的事情,但因为我们是一个团队,因为我们相信我们的使命,就在当时 ——这些是工作站,我们正在与人作战,就像我们在与老一代计算机作战一样——不知何故,我们有动力这样做。
That motivation works and it works today.
这种动机是有效的,而且在今天仍然有效。
You’ve said that praise is underused and underappreciated as a management tool.
您说过表扬作为一种管理工具没有得到充分利用和重视。
Why is it you think other CEOs don’t understand the importance of praise?
为什么你认为其他首席执行官不理解表扬的重要性?
There’s no simple formula for success, and there’s no simple formula for being a great leader.
成功没有简单的公式,成为伟大领导者也没有简单的公式。
It’s a unique set of skills.
这是一套独特的技能。
But it is well understood that if you yell at people enough, they will quit, and if you’re nice enough to them, they are less likely to quit.
但众所周知,如果你对别人大喊大叫,他们就会放弃,而如果你对他们足够好,他们就不太可能放弃。
And since slavery was outlawed many decades ago, as it should have been, you’re stuck with the problem that you actually need people to support you.
由于奴隶制在几十年前就被取缔了(本来应该如此),你就陷入了一个问题:你实际上需要人们支持你。
All of the great leaders I’ve worked with have not used enough praise, although they’ve dragged along people because of their unique skills and so forth.
我共事过的所有伟大领导者都没有使用足够的赞美,尽管他们因为独特的技能等而拖累了人们。
But it just seems to me that if you take a moment, and you add the preamble of “Thank you” or “I appreciate it,” or “I recognize it,” people’s hearts sing, and you get a lot more work out of them.
但在我看来,如果你花点时间,加上“谢谢”或“我很感激”或“我认识它”的序言,人们的心就会歌唱,你就会从他们身上得到更多的工作。
But you think there’s some quality correlated with being a strong leader or a kind of disagreeableness that actually makes it harder for those individuals to see the value of praise?
但你认为有一些品质与成为一名强有力的领导者有关,或者是一种令人不愉快的品质,实际上使这些人更难看到赞扬的价值?
Or it’s just like a loose $20 bill sitting on the table, and they ought to praise employees more and they would do better.
或者就像桌上放着一张松散的 20 美元钞票,他们应该多表扬员工,他们会做得更好。
Most of the great, great founders are disagreeable in the sense that they disagree, but that doesn’t mean that they need to be disagreeable with humans.
大多数伟大的创始人都是令人不快的,因为他们不同意,但这并不意味着他们需要与人类不同意。
So it does not necessarily follow, to me, that because you’re an iconoclast, and because you are a very clear thinker, that you are also rough with people.
因此,对我来说,这并不一定意味着因为你是一个反传统者,并且因为你是一个非常清晰的思想家,所以你对人也很粗鲁。
I don’t think that the two have to come to that.
我认为两人不必走到这一步。
Frankly, let’s use a stereotype — and stereotypes are always risky — but what’s the stereotype of the 20-something male founder?
坦率地说,让我们使用刻板印象 ——而刻板印象总是有风险的—— 但是对于20多岁的男性创始人的刻板印象是什么?
You know the stereotype person I’m talking about, right?
你知道我所说的刻板印象的人,对吧?
This person needs more social skills.
这个人需要更多的社交技能。
This person needs more teaching from their mother or something about how to behave in these kinds of situations.
这个人需要从母亲那里得到更多的教导,或者了解在这种情况下如何表现。
And inevitably, they grow up and they become softer, they become more insightful, and so forth.
他们不可避免地会长大,变得更加温柔,变得更有洞察力,等等。
So early intervention from mother would help.
因此,母亲的早期干预会有帮助。
So you receive an offer to run Google.
因此,您收到了运行 Google 的邀请。
Why were you so skeptical about Google at first?
为什么你一开始对谷歌如此怀疑?
Well, I assumed that search wasn’t very important, and I assumed the ads didn’t work.
好吧,我认为搜索并不是很重要,而且我认为广告不起作用。
I was so concerned about the ads that, after I accepted the offer — because it just seemed like it was interesting, and a lot of luck comes from doing things that are interesting, and sort of creating your own luck — I hauled the then–sales executive, whose name was Tim Armstrong, who you all know well, and I said, “Tim, prove to me that these ads work.”
我非常担心这些广告,以至于在我接受了这个邀请后——因为它看起来很有趣,而很多运气都来自于做有趣的事情,并且可以自己创造运气——我把当时的销售主管拉了过来,他的名字叫蒂姆·阿姆斯特朗,你们都很熟悉,我说,“蒂姆,向我证明这些广告是有效的。”
So they showed me a set of ads, and they looked pretty foolish to me.
所以他们给我看了一组广告,在我看来它们非常愚蠢。
So I said, “Well, let’s go find the finance person,” of which there was one, and the accounting system was done on QuickBooks.
所以我说,“好吧,我们去找财务人员吧”,财务人员是有的,会计系统是在 QuickBooks 上完成的。
I said, “Prove to me that people are paying for these ads,” and they did.
我说,“向我证明人们正在为这些广告付费”,他们确实这么做了。
We then did an ads conversion in the first year, which was called Project Drano, where we basically took three different ads databases, which were simple compared to today’s databases, and merged them into one.
然后,我们在第一年进行了广告转换,称为“Drano 项目”,我们基本上采用了三个不同的广告数据库(与今天的数据库相比很简单),并将它们合并为一个。
And I was terrified, absolutely terrified that the ruse that we had — because we had fixed pricing on our ads — that people would discover that our ads were not worth anything.
我很害怕,绝对害怕我们的诡计——“因为我们对广告有固定的定价”——人们会发现我们的广告一文不值。
So I organized what I called the cash restriction period, where the only thing you could do if you wanted to spend money, is you could only spend money on Friday at 10 AM, and you had to come to me to justify it, which very much shuts down spending.
所以我组织了我所谓的现金限制期,如果你想花钱,你唯一能做的就是你只能在周五上午 10 点花钱,而且你必须来找我证明其合理性,这在很大程度上限制了消费。
So we get to this conversion, we turn the thing over, and of course, we didn’t bother to build into the tools.
所以我们进行了这种转换,我们把事情翻了个底朝天,当然,我们没有费心去构建工具。
We had no metrics.
我们没有指标。
We didn’t know what was going on.
我们不知道发生了什么事。
I’m going, “Oh my God, the company is bankrupt.
我会说:“天哪,公司破产了。
My first year, I’ve done a terrible job.
第一年,我做得很糟糕。
What will the board think?” I did my best to notify everybody we were going to go kaput.
董事会会怎么想?”我尽力通知每个人我们要倒闭了。
The auction produced a price that was three times higher than the previous prices.
这次拍卖的价格比之前的价格高出了三倍。
Very interesting.
非常有趣。
So much for the cash restriction period, and the rest is history.
现金限制期就讲这么多,剩下的就都成为历史了。
If you were so skeptical of Google at first, what was it that convinced Sergey and Larry to actually hire you?
如果您一开始对 Google 如此怀疑,那么是什么说服 Sergey 和 Larry 真正雇用您呢?
Why should they hire a skeptic about their core enterprise?
他们为什么要聘请对其核心业务持怀疑态度的人?
They had actually been interviewing for two years.
他们实际上已经面试了两年了。
They took the money from Connor Perkins and Sequoia, and part of the condition was they had to bring in somebody to run the company, and Larry and Sergei were okay with this as long as they liked that person.
他们从康纳·帕金斯和红杉资本那里拿了钱,部分条件是他们必须引进一个人来管理公司,而拉里和谢尔盖只要喜欢这个人就可以接受。
So they interviewed many people, and what they would do is give them a test.
所以他们采访了很多人,他们要做的就是对他们进行测试。
It usually involved hanging out with them and going skiing with them, or something like that.
通常包括和他们一起出去玩,和他们一起去滑雪,或者类似的事情。
And they typically failed.
他们通常都会失败。
Because they couldn’t ski or they weren’t relaxed enough?
因为他们不会滑雪或者他们不够放松?
I don’t know.
我不知道。
But when we met, I had had the same professors as they had.
但当我们见面时,我的教授和他们是一样的。
I was just an older version of their experience, and we clicked.
我只是他们经历的旧版本,我们一拍即合。
So they didn’t take me skiing.
所以他们没有带我去滑雪。
We had dinner a couple of times.
我们吃了几次晚餐。
I wrote a lengthy memo of everything we would do together, and then it was obvious that we should work together.
我写了一份很长的备忘录,记录了我们将一起做的所有事情,然后很明显我们应该一起工作。
If you think of one of the big successes of Google is scaling so quickly in terms of personnel without losing quality, what insights did you bring to bear on that process?
如果您认为 Google 的一大成功就是在不损失质量的情况下如此迅速地扩大人员规模,那么您对这一过程有何见解?
Because obviously it worked, right?
因为显然它有效,对吧?
Let me make a different statement.
让我发表不同的声明。
You can systematize innovation, and you can systematize pretty much anything in a fast growing company.
你可以将创新系统化,并且你可以在快速发展的公司中将几乎所有事情系统化。
All you have to do is have a scale model of it.
您所要做的就是拥有它的比例模型。
You can systematize strategy; you can systematize hiring; you can systemize product development.
你可以将策略系统化;您可以将招聘系统化;您可以系统化产品开发。
At various stages, we improved each of those.
在各个阶段,我们都改进了其中的每一个。
So in hiring, what happened was, we were hiring along, and we hired basically Larry and Sergei’s friends, people from Stanford.
所以在招聘方面,我们一直在招聘,我们基本上雇佣了拉里和谢尔盖的朋友,来自斯坦福大学的人。
They were super smart, somewhat disorganized kinds of people.
他们是超级聪明,但有些杂乱无章的人。
They hired a bunch of managers, and then they decided they didn’t like the managers, so they got rid of all the managers.
他们雇佣了一群经理,然后他们发现他们不喜欢这些经理,所以他们解雇了所有经理。
This is called the Disorg.
这就是所谓的 Disorg。
We then had one manager managing 120 engineers, and Larry and Sergei said, “Well, there’s no problem here.
然后我们让一名经理管理 120 名工程师,Larry 和 Sergei 说:“好吧,这里没有问题。
That means the managers cannot interfere with the engineers’ work.” That’s kind of the engineering model of the time.
这意味着经理不能干涉工程师的工作。”这就是当时的工程模型。
Eventually, we brought in management that could handle this kind of management style.
最终,我们引进了能够应对这种管理风格的管理层。
The recruiting started off as informal, but it ultimately became very, very structured.
招聘一开始是非正式的,但最终变得非常非常结构化。
We were famously focused on the school you went to and your GPA and not your experience.
众所周知,我们关注的是你就读的学校和你的 GPA,而不是你的经历。
This caused all sorts of consternation, but it produced people who were both young in a sense of inexperienced in business.
这引起了各种各样的惊愕,但也让年轻人产生了一种缺乏商业经验的感觉。
It produced people that were aggressive and ignorant of what they were doing, so they didn’t know what they were doing, but they could make mistakes.
它造就了那些咄咄逼人、对自己在做什么一无所知的人,所以他们不知道自己在做什么,但他们可能会犯错误。
Our argument was that, in a fast growing company, we need people who can pivot around whatever the new challenge is, and we weren’t convinced that the people who had experience — since this was a new field — that that experience would allow them to pivot into the new problems, so it was a reasonable business analysis.
我们的论点是,在一家快速发展的公司中,我们需要能够应对新挑战的人,而且我们不相信那些有经验的人——“因为这是一个新领域”——这些经验能让他们解决新问题,所以这是一个合理的业务分析。
We did all sorts of things.
我们做了各种各样的事情。
My favorite example is that we would interview people to death.
我最喜欢的例子是我们会采访死亡的人。
We interviewed this one gentleman sixteen times, and we couldn’t decide.
我们采访了这位先生十六次,但我们无法做出决定。
So I picked a random number, which was half, and I said, “We should have a max of eight, and if we can’t decide after eight .
所以我随机选择了一个数字,即一半,然后我说,“我们最多应该有八个,如果八个之后我们无法决定的话。
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.” We’ve since done a statistical analysis, and the answer today is four to five interviews.
”。我们做了统计分析,今天的答案是四到五次采访。
What did he do wrong in the 15th interview?
他在第15次采访中做错了什么?
I just think it’s cruel.
我只是觉得这很残酷。
And companies can make mistakes, right?
公司也会犯错误,对吧?
Because you’re growing quickly, the systems that you put in place can produce outlying effects that are not okay, whether they’re illegal, inappropriate behaviors on individuals, or just the company’s mechanisms.
因为你成长得很快,所以你建立的系统可能会产生不好的外围影响,无论是非法的、对个人的不当行为,还是只是公司的机制。
So again, this is a benefit of being a computer scientist: You think of scale and mechanisms.
再说一遍,这是作为一名计算机科学家的好处:你会考虑规模和机制。
So I thought a lot about those things.
所以我对这些事情想了很多。
We would interview people to death.
我们会采访一些人到死。
We interviewed this one gentleman sixteen times, and we couldn’t decide.
我们采访了这位先生十六次,但我们无法做出决定。
So I picked a random number, which was half, and I said, “We should have a max of eight, and if we can’t decide after eight .
所以我随机选择了一个数字,即一半,然后我说,“我们最多应该有八个,如果八个之后我们无法决定的话。
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.” We’ve since done a statistical analysis, and the answer today is four to five interviews.
”。我们做了统计分析,今天的答案是四到五次采访。
There are many published accounts of Google.
谷歌有许多已发布的帐户。
As you know, they describe you as having been the adult in the room or the person who brought discipline to Google’s processes.
如您所知,他们将您描述为房间里的成年人或为 Google 流程带来纪律的人。
But if you step out of your modest self for a moment — and I’m trying to write a revisionist account of Google titled “Eric Schmidt as Innovator” — you are going to describe for me in, say, two or three minutes, what you did personally that was the most innovative, how you imposed your innovative stamp on the company.
但是,如果你暂时摆脱谦虚的自我,而我正试图写一篇关于谷歌的修正主义叙述,标题为“作为创新者的埃里克·施密特”,那么你将在两到三分钟内向我描述你个人所做的最具创新性的事情,以及你如何将你的创新印记强加在公司上。
What would be your story of Eric Schmidt as Innovator within Google?
您认为埃里克·施密特 (Eric Schmidt) 作为 Google 创新者的故事是什么?
And not just the adult in the room.
不仅仅是房间里的成年人。
It’s important to establish that Larry and Sergei were the technological and strategic brilliant minds here.
重要的是要确定拉里和谢尔盖是这里的技术和战略天才。
My job was to keep everything organized, and I had — and have — a bunch of rules in my mind about how you should run things.
我的工作是让一切井井有条,我脑子里有一堆关于如何管理事情的规则。
An example is, you have a room full of people.
举个例子,你有一个房间,里面挤满了人。
Inevitably, half the people talk, half the people don’t talk, and often the women are more likely to be dominated by the men.
不可避免的是,一半的人说话,一半的人不说话,而且女性往往更容易受到男性的支配。
Again, in general terms, in terms of interruptions and so forth.
再次,一般而言,就中断等而言。
What you want to do is, you want to basically call on somebody who’s not speaking — a typical scenario, you call on the woman who hasn’t had said anything.
你想做的是,你基本上想要拜访一个没有说话的人——一个典型的场景,你拜访那个没有说话的女人。
She will inevitably give an extraordinarily interesting and thoughtful answer.
她必然会给出一个异常有趣且深思熟虑的答案。
Then get people to respond to her, and let her speak.
然后让人们回应她,让她说话。
That kind of mechanism forces a leveling of the discussion and gets everybody on the same table.
这种机制迫使讨论变得公平,让每个人都坐在同一张桌子上。
Often in companies, if you see executives that don’t manage to build the .
通常在公司中,如果您看到高管无法构建团队。
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Things are happening so quickly, they don’t build common knowledge, things go off the rail.
事情发生得太快,没有形成常识,事情就偏离了轨道。
Market people are doing one thing; sales people are doing another.
市场人士正在做一件事;销售人员正在做另一件事。
Another thing that we did is we had a thing called 20 percent time, which was a safety valve.
我们做的另一件事是我们有一个叫做 20% 时间的东西,这是一个安全阀。
It would allow people to work on things that they thought were interesting.
它将允许人们从事他们认为有趣的事情。
And that was your idea.
这就是你的想法。
No, that was actually Larry and Sergei’s idea that I promoted.
不,这实际上是我提倡的拉里和谢尔盖的想法。
But Eric Schmidt as Innovator, what was the main innovation you brought to Google?
但是埃里克·施密特作为创新者,您给谷歌带来的主要创新是什么?
It’s hard to know.
很难知道。
Is it true you had a plastic slide leaving your office?
您的办公室真的有一张塑料幻灯片吗?
Yes, there are many such things that are true.
是的,有很多这样的事情是真实的。
And how did that fit into your vision of Google?
这如何符合您对谷歌的愿景?
The plastic slide.
塑料滑梯。
It’s very important not to do anything culturally inappropriate when you’re the adult.
当你是成年人时,不要做任何不符合文化的事情,这一点非常重要。
So in my case, whatever was happening, it was fine.
所以就我而言,无论发生什么,都很好。
One day, there was this telephone booth that showed up, and I said — sitting in the hall — and I said, “Who bought the telephone booth?” Everyone’s looking around.
有一天,出现了一个电话亭,我说:“坐在大厅里”,我说:“谁买了这个电话亭?”每个人都在四处张望。
And I said, “I thought we put in place a proper procurement rule.”
我说,“我认为我们制定了适当的采购规则。”
Well, turns out there were a few extra credit cards in the company floating around, and random things were showing up.
事实证明,公司里有几张额外的信用卡,而且随机出现了一些东西。
This is how I ran things.
这就是我处理事情的方式。
But it’s important not to go to the person who bought the telephone booth and say, “You’re fired.” The important thing to do is take their credit card away.
但重要的是不要去找购买电话亭的人说:“你被解雇了。”重要的是拿走他们的信用卡。
You’ve spent many years hiring very smart people.
你花了很多年聘请非常聪明的人。
In economics, there’s a debate about higher education: how much of it is human capital acquisition, how much of it is just signaling how smart you are.
在经济学中,关于高等教育存在着一场争论:其中有多少是人力资本获取,有多少只是表明你有多聪明。
If someone is coming out of a top school, do you think of the main contribution of Harvard or MIT — is it human capital or is it signaling?
如果某人是从顶尖学校出来的,你认为哈佛或麻省理工学院的主要贡献是人力资本还是信号?
It’s both.
两者都是。
And again, in our model of the world, the fact that top universities had sorted through these people was a pretty good piece of data for us to understand whether we should spend .
再说一次,在我们的世界模型中,顶尖大学对这些人进行分类的事实对于我们了解是否应该花钱来说是一个非常好的数据。
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It was a good selection process.
这是一个很好的选择过程。
Today, we are not quite as snooty as we were back then.
今天,我们不再像当年那样傲慢。
We’ve figured out better ways than even the ones I’m describing to bring in people.
我们已经找到了比我所描述的更好的吸引人才的方法。
So don’t despair if you don’t follow that exact profile.
因此,如果您没有遵循确切的配置文件,请不要失望。
But in the early days, we were quite rigorous about this.
但在早期,我们对此非常严格。
The other thing that happened, was, one day, I was talking to Larry, and I said — this is a long time ago — and I said, “Larry, we’re building glue people.” Glue people is my term for people who are very, very nice, who sit between two functions.
发生的另一件事是,有一天,我和拉里谈话,我说“这是很久以前的事了”,我说,“拉里,我们正在打造粘合人。” “胶水人”是我对那些非常非常友善、介于两个职能之间的人的术语。
You don’t need them, but everyone likes them because they carry the person’s bag, and they write memos, and so forth, but you don’t actually need them.
你不需要它们,但每个人都喜欢它们,因为它们提着人的包,它们写备忘录等等,但你实际上并不需要它们。
They make the system less efficient, if you will.
如果你愿意的话,它们会降低系统的效率。
And he said, “Well, it’s obvious.” I said “Like what?” He said, “We should just review all the offers.” And so we began a process of reviewing all the offers to make sure that we were achieving the kind of specialized skills that we thought, and we did this until the company was many thousands of people.
他说:“嗯,这是显而易见的。”我说:“比如什么?”他说:“我们应该审查所有的报价。”因此,我们开始审查所有的offer,以确保我们能够获得我们认为的专业技能,我们一直这样做,直到公司拥有数千名员工。
The simple example is, you get a big company, and you get some CEO, and they’re complaining, and I say, “Well, how many people will you hire this year?” And they go, “Well, we’re kind of flat.” That’s not the question I asked.
一个简单的例子是,你有一家大公司,有一些首席执行官,他们在抱怨,我说,“那么,你今年会雇用多少人?”他们说:“好吧,我们有点平淡了。”这不是我问的问题。
A typical American company has a turnover of about 10 percent.
典型的美国公司的营业额约为 10%。
Sometimes, it’s higher.
有时,它更高。
So if you have a 20,000-person company, you’re hiring 2,000 people, plus or minus, okay?
因此,如果您拥有一家拥有 20,000 名员工的公司,那么您将雇用 2,000 名员工,上下浮动,好吗?
That’s a lot of leverage over a few years in terms of the hiring pool, and yet the CEOs are unwilling to go in and do the surgery necessary to bring in the kind of talent to lead them to wherever they’re going in the next generation.
就招聘池而言,这在几年内具有很大的影响力,但首席执行官们却不愿意介入并进行必要的手术,以引进那种人才来带领他们到达下一代的任何地方。
Google saved a lot of money doing its own IPO, in essence.
本质上,谷歌通过自己的首次公开募股节省了大量资金。
Why don’t more companies do this?
为什么没有更多的公司这样做呢?
Spotify did a version, but it’s otherwise fairly rare.
Spotify 也做了一个版本,但在其他方面相当罕见。
Well, I’m not sure I agree with you that we saved a lot more money because, had we negotiated on a traditional IPO with the same cost structure, my guess is we would have paid the same fees.
好吧,我不确定我是否同意你的观点,我们节省了更多的钱,因为如果我们以相同的成本结构谈判传统的 IPO,我的猜测是我们会支付相同的费用。
The reason that we did our IPO — and I’ve written about this publicly — is that we were in the auction business, and we did more auctions than anyone else in the world by far.
我们进行首次公开募股 ——我已经公开写过此事—— 是因为我们从事拍卖业务,而且迄今为止我们进行的拍卖比世界上任何其他人都多。
It made no sense to us to do the traditional IPO, which is not really an auction.
对我们来说,进行传统的首次公开募股没有任何意义,因为这并不是真正的拍卖。
It’s really a placement, and it’s hand negotiated.
这实际上是一个安置,并且是手工协商的。
So from our perspective, the notion of a Vickrey auction or double blind auction, where people bid, made perfect sense.
因此,从我们的角度来看,维克里拍卖或双盲拍卖(人们竞价)的概念非常有意义。
There’s not evidence that it materially changed the outcome, but it was our way of doing it, and I’ve thought a lot about it, and I think the answer is, we would still do our own unique auction.
没有证据表明它实质性地改变了结果,但这是我们的做法,我想了很多,我认为答案是,我们仍然会进行自己独特的拍卖。
I think the reason people have never done it is, it hasn’t been sufficiently worth .
我认为人们从未这样做的原因是它还没有足够的价值。
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In other words, the gain has not been sufficiently worth to those companies, the cost of being different.
换句话说,对于这些公司来说,这种收益并不足以值得他们付出差异化的代价。
Now as you know, Google Groups never took off, and arguably Google failed with social networks.
如您所知,Google 网上论坛从未成功,并且可以说 Google 在社交网络方面失败了。
Maybe, in some ways, that was a blessing in disguise, but given all of the talent you had assembled, what was it that was missing in the Google cultural DNA that made it hard to succeed with social networks?
也许,在某些方面,这是因祸得福,但考虑到你所聚集的所有人才,谷歌的文化DNA中到底缺少什么,导致其在社交网络上难以取得成功?
Well, first place, I need to take responsibility for that failure.
嗯,首先,我需要为这次失败承担责任。
There were plenty of things that went unwell, but I think that in my CEO-ship, that was probably the one that I missed the biggest.
有很多事情不顺利,但我认为在我担任首席执行官期间,这可能是我最怀念的事情。
And my answer is because we didn’t use it, that we were of the age where we were more comfortable with telephones and email and that kind of stuff, and this was emerging.
我的答案是因为我们没有使用过它,我们处在一个更习惯使用电话和电子邮件之类的东西的时代,而这种情况正在出现。
And there really was a slightly younger generation that was really driving it.
确实有一个稍微年轻的一代在真正推动它。
The stuff was invented well past when I was in college.
这些东西是我上大学时发明的。
And because we didn’t collectively use it, I suspect we didn’t fully understand how to do it.
而且因为我们没有集体使用它,我怀疑我们并没有完全理解如何做到这一点。
I think we’ve remedied this.
我想我们已经解决了这个问题。
For example, today we have quite a powerful social network embedded inside of YouTube, but I think it would be fair to say that the rise of Facebook, etcetera, occurred on my watch.
例如,今天我们在 YouTube 中嵌入了一个相当强大的社交网络,但我认为可以公平地说,Facebook 等的崛起是在我的任期内发生的。
Given all the data that search companies and some of the other major tech companies have, why aren’t they bundled with hedge funds?
鉴于搜索公司和其他一些主要科技公司拥有的所有数据,为什么它们不与对冲基金捆绑在一起?
What do you mean by bundled?
你说的捆绑是什么意思?
Well, literally in the same company.
嗯,实际上是在同一家公司。
You’d have a tech company and a hedge fund, and there would be a synergy because the hedge fund would use the data generated by the tech company for investment.
你拥有一家科技公司和一家对冲基金,并且会产生协同效应,因为对冲基金将使用科技公司生成的数据进行投资。
So the hedge fund would have that data first.
因此对冲基金将首先获得这些数据。
We don’t see that in the market.
我们在市场上看不到这种情况。
Well, I’ll give you a more generic answer, which is, from the moment I joined the company, there were many people who said, “Why don’t you take this information and do something that will use it for marketing purposes?”
好吧,我给你一个更通用的答案,那就是,从我加入公司的那一刻起,有很多人说,“你为什么不利用这些信息并做一些将其用于营销目的的事情呢?”
And the answer is always the same, which is that you need people’s permission to do that, and you can be sure you won’t get that permission, if you follow that reasoning.
答案总是一样的,那就是你需要得到人们的许可才能这样做,而且如果你遵循这个推理,你可以肯定你不会获得许可。
So we decided that was a pretty bright line.
所以我们认为这是一条非常明确的界限。
For example, if a tech company that were a consumer company were bundled with a hedge fund, you would have to disclose that it was being used in that context.
例如,如果一家科技公司是一家消费公司,与一家对冲基金捆绑在一起,你就必须披露它是在这种情况下使用的。
The people would go crazy.
人们会发疯的。
But the other thing that’s true — and Google was good about this — is we took the position that it was important for us to disclose everything we were doing as well as we could.
但另一件事是真实的 —— 谷歌在这方面做得很好 —— 我们的立场是,尽可能披露我们正在做的所有事情对我们来说很重要。
I’ll give you a governance argument.
我会给你一个治理论点。
In a large company, the employees are independent citizens of humanity, and if they see corruption in your leadership — in other words, if they see you doing things which are inconsistent with the values, you will be criticized.
在大公司里,员工都是独立的人类公民,如果他们看到你的领导腐败了——也就是说,如果他们看到你做了不符合价值观的事情,就会受到批评。
Now, sometimes that criticism is incorrect and sometimes it’s correct, but the important point is that if you make a mistake, you better disclose it pretty quickly for obvious reasons.
现在,有时这种批评是不正确的,有时是正确的,但重要的是,如果你犯了错误,你最好尽快披露它,原因很明显。
So, if we were to do that kind of stuff, which we are not going to do — so we’re clear — we would have to disclose it, it would have to get debated, and then we would eventually say, “What a stupid idea, why did we decide to do that in the first place?” You don’t have an option — you can’t do these things in secret, nor would you want to.
所以,如果我们要做那种我们不会做的事情 —— 所以我们很清楚 —— 我们就必须披露它,必须进行辩论,然后我们最终会说,“多么愚蠢的想法,我们为什么决定这样做?”你别无选择——你不能秘密做这些事情,你也不想这样做。
Right now, there are various devices you can speak to, such as Alexa, and it will play a song for you or buy something for you on Amazon.
现在,您可以与多种设备交谈,例如 Alexa,它会为您播放歌曲或在亚马逊上为您购买东西。
Just in your mental wish list — something that doesn’t exist now — if there were a function where you could speak to a device, and the device would perform that function for you, what would it be?
就在你心里的愿望清单中 —— 现在不存在的东西 —— 如果有一种功能可以让你与设备对话,并且设备会为你执行该功能,那会是什么?
What do you want that you can’t get right now, as a consumer?
作为消费者,你想要什么现在无法得到的东西?
Well, if you look at the current generation of devices, what I really want is the Google Assistant to work at scale, which means that I want an assistant that I can talk to that talks back, that is like a human assistant and brilliant, that knows everything.
好吧,如果你看看当前一代的设备,我真正想要的是 Google Assistant 大规模工作,这意味着我想要一个可以与我交谈的助手,它就像一个人类助手,非常出色,知道一切。
As an economist, you might want to talk to your assistant and ask them theoretical questions of economics.
作为一名经济学家,您可能想与您的助手交谈并向他们询问经济学的理论问题。
I can imagine lots of things I would like to ask.
我可以想象很多我想问的事情。
Today, sitting there and saying to your Alexa or Google Home, please turn off the lights, strikes me as kind of a low level question.
今天,坐在那里对你的 Alexa 或 Google Home 说,请关掉灯,在我看来这是一个低级问题。
There must be some much more sophisticated things we can do.
我们一定可以做一些更复杂的事情。
Many people believe that we can get to the point where you can have incredibly intelligent assistants that are on these devices, and that much of the interface will be verbal, not text.
许多人相信,我们可以达到这样的程度:您可以在这些设备上拥有令人难以置信的智能助手,并且大部分界面将是口头的,而不是文本。
I look at you all’s generation, and people .
我看看你们这一代人和人们。
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I carry my computer around all day, which I’m very happy about.
我整天都带着电脑,这让我很高兴。
I used to have a computer that was immense, now I have a tiny computer.
我曾经有一台巨大的计算机,现在我有一台很小的计算机。
From your perspective, a smartphone is your computer, and you would prefer to just talk to it.
从您的角度来看,智能手机就是您的计算机,您更愿意与它交谈。
And I think the technology is finally there to be able to do that.
我认为技术终于能够做到这一点。
There have been many accomplishments that have surprised me.
有很多成就让我感到惊讶。
The quality of image recognition and voice recognition that we have today, I thought would be unachievable in my lifetime.
我们今天所拥有的图像识别和语音识别的质量,我认为在我的有生之年是无法实现的。
Those are phenomenal gains.
这些都是惊人的收获。
I want something that will answer the doorbell for me.
我想要一个能帮我按门铃的东西。
On things under- and overrated
关于被低估和高估的事情
Now, in all of these discussions, there’s a segment in the middle called overrated versus underrated.
现在,在所有这些讨论中,中间有一个部分称为高估与低估。
I’ll toss out some ideas or things, and you tell me what you think of them, if they’re overrated or underrated.
我会提出一些想法或事情,你告诉我你对它们的看法,如果它们被高估或低估。
Of course, feel free to pass on any of them.
当然,请随意传递其中任何一个。
Our first one, Antarctica.
我们的第一个目的地是南极洲。
So I went to Antarctica, and it is underrated.
所以我去了南极洲,它被低估了。
Tell us why.
告诉我们原因。
There’s something amazing about being on a continent you’ve not been on.
来到一个你从未去过的大陆是件令人惊奇的事。
And let’s just say it was summer, and the weather was a 50 knot gale, so it’s a rough place.
假设那是夏天,天气是 50 节大风,所以这是一个恶劣的地方。
There are people who live there year round, and they’re very interesting to talk to.
有人常年住在那里,和他们交谈很有趣。
Blockchain, overrated or underrated?
区块链,被高估还是被低估?
In the public format, overrated.
在公开形式中,被高估了。
In its technical use, underrated.
就其技术用途而言,被低估了。
And what do you think that technical use will prove to be?
您认为技术用途将是什么?
What problem is it there to solve?
它要解决什么问题?
Well, today, blockchain is a great platform for Bitcoin and other currencies, and it’s a great platform for private banking transactions where people don’t trust each other.
那么,今天,区块链是比特币和其他货币的一个伟大平台,也是人们互相不信任的私人银行交易的一个伟大平台。
I think the most interesting stuff that’s going on are the beginning of execution on top of blockchain, the most obvious example being the capability of Ethereum.
我认为正在发生的最有趣的事情是在区块链之上执行的开始,最明显的例子是以太坊的功能。
And if Ethereum can manage to figure out a way to do global synchronization of that activity, that’s a pretty powerful platform.
如果以太坊能够找到一种方法来实现该活动的全球同步,那么这将是一个非常强大的平台。
That’s a really new invention.
这真是一项新发明。
The painter Cezanne.
画家塞尚.
I prefer Picasso, but I’m not sure if that’s helpful.
我更喜欢毕加索,但我不确定这是否有帮助。
How about late Picasso, overrated or underrated?
已故的毕加索怎么样,被高估还是被低估?
Many people dismiss it, but it’s priced much lower.
很多人不屑一顾,但它的价格要低得多。
A lot of works in the late period not yet discovered.
很多晚期作品尚未被发现。
I’d say I’m an earlier Picasso fan.
我想说我是毕加索早期的粉丝。
Early Picasso fan.
毕加索早期粉丝。
Effective altruism as a movement, that people should give away their money using quite rational standards, which can be derived by reason, using economics and philosophy?
有效的利他主义作为一种运动,人们应该使用相当理性的标准来捐赠他们的钱,这些标准可以通过理性、使用经济学和哲学来推导出来?
So what happens here — this is when economists think they actually understand how humans work.
那么这里发生的事情 ——此时经济学家认为他们真正了解人类是如何工作的。
And of course, you’ve done a great deal of work on this question of whether humans are rational or irrational, so my answer is different.
当然,你在人类是理性还是非理性这个问题上做了很多工作,所以我的答案是不同的。
You cannot take it with you as much as you want.
你不能随心所欲地随身携带它。
We have a subsidiary called Calico, and one of the things they work on is aging, and they put up a chart of how long people live and what they die from, and it’s stunningly sobering.
我们有一家名为 Calico 的子公司,他们的工作之一就是老龄化,他们制作了一张图表,显示人们的寿命和死亡原因,这令人震惊。
Everyone here is alive today — figure it out and make sure you use that opportunity to your best and serve the world with it.
今天这里的每个人都还活着 — 弄清楚并确保你充分利用这个机会并用它服务世界。
With respect to economic reason and rationalism, most of the stuff that’s not business is not very well managed.
就经济理性和理性主义而言,大多数非商业的东西都没有得到很好的管理。
So as a general rule, broadly speaking, health care, education, governments, philanthropies — they’re not well run compared to businesses.
因此,一般来说,医疗保健、教育、政府、慈善机构——与企业相比,它们的运营状况不佳。
Surely, systems that include measurement criteria, objectives, Google uses something called OKRs.
当然,在包含衡量标准、目标的系统中,谷歌使用了一种称为 OKR 的东西。
The ability to measure things and outcomes is now so much better.
现在衡量事物和结果的能力好多了。
Give your money and give your time to groups that actually can have an impact, and that measurable impact.
把你的钱和时间奉献给那些真正能够产生影响、并且是可衡量的影响的团体。
People are constantly asking me to do something for them, and the problem that I have is, show me what the outcome is.
人们不断地要求我为他们做点什么,而我面临的问题是,告诉我结果是什么。
And it’s an emotional pitch, it’s a marketing pitch, and everybody, including me, is subject to marketing, and I would say that’s a marketing pitch.
这是一种情感宣传,这是一种营销宣传,每个人,包括我,都受到营销的影响,我想说这是一种营销宣传。
Tell me what you’re going to accomplish, tell me the probability, and tell me how you’re going to get there, and then I’ll participate.
告诉我你要完成什么,告诉我概率,并告诉我你将如何实现目标,然后我就会参与。
Yellowstone Park, overrated or underrated?
黄石公园,被高估还是被低估?
Yellowstone is fantastic.
黄石公园太棒了。
I have a house in the Big Sky area, it’s fantastic.
我在大天空区有一所房子,非常棒。
Oh, wonderful.
哦,太棒了。
Your view on the Cuban economy.
您对古巴经济的看法。
Is it going to take off?
它要起飞了吗?
Or is it stuck with most of the other Caribbean economies, plus the heritage of communism and socialism?
或者它是否受困于大多数其他加勒比经济体,加上共产主义和社会主义的遗产?
I think I was the first person to meet the new president, from America.
我想我是第一个见到来自美国的新总统的人。
And he’s coming to New York in the next week, so I’ll see him again.
下周他就要来纽约,所以我会再次见到他。
Cuba is a very poor country.
古巴是一个非常贫穷的国家。
They need a lot of help.
他们需要很多帮助。
We have managed to blockade them, as they call it, for 50 years, and that’s not a good thing.
正如他们所说,我们已经成功封锁了他们 50 年,这不是一件好事。
So I’m in favor of opening it up.
所以我赞成开放。
I think the economy will do well if America works with Cuba.
我认为如果美国与古巴合作,经济将会表现良好。
At the moment, we’re going the wrong way.
目前,我们正走错路。
You’ve been to North Korea.
你去过朝鲜。
Most of us have not.
我们大多数人都没有。
What is it you think you might understand about the place, having been, that maybe we don’t?
关于这个地方,你认为你可能了解什么,而我们可能不了解?
The scariest thing about North Korea is the ability to control everyone’s behavior in a systematic way.
朝鲜最可怕的是能够系统地控制每个人的行为。
And as you all know, they have a system of both hierarchy, they have a particular religion which is called .
众所周知,他们有一个等级制度,他们有一个特定的宗教,称为。
.
。
.
。
I can’t pronounce it, but it’s a particular religious structure, which includes stratification, people in various levels, and various incentives and disincentives to play in it.
我无法发音,但它是一种特殊的宗教结构,其中包括分层、不同层次的人以及参与其中的各种激励和抑制因素。
It’s quite striking to be in a country where the kind of debate and bitching and complaining, and so forth and so on, does not seem to occur.
令人惊讶的是,在一个似乎没有发生这种辩论、抱怨和抱怨等等的国家。
Or if it occurs, it’s highly, highly suppressed.
或者即使它发生了,它也会被高度、高度压制。
And that’s the thing I took away from it.
这就是我从中得到的东西。
Now having said that, I also took away the fact that North Korea is very poor.
话虽如此,我也排除了朝鲜非常贫穷的事实。
Again, one of the vestiges of communism and socialism and so forth, is the economies aren’t very good and the people really suffer.
再说一遍,共产主义和社会主义等的残余之一是经济不太好,人民确实在受苦。
And so, I came away with great respect for the people and concern for the ability of such a strong-minded central state to keep people in such buckets.
因此,我带着对人民的极大尊重和对这样一个意志坚强的中央政府将人民留在这样的水桶里的能力的担忧离开了。
Now some very general questions.
现在一些非常普遍的问题。
If you could make one reform to American corporate governance, what would it be?
如果你可以对美国公司治理进行一项改革,你会改革什么?
Longer time frames.
更长的时间框架。
Pretty much everybody agrees that the quarterly cycle makes it very difficult for companies to invest and do .
几乎每个人都同意,季度周期使公司很难投资和开展业务。
.
。
.
。
But that’s voluntary though, right?
但这是自愿的,对吧?
So companies could move away.
这样公司就可以搬走。
It isn’t really voluntary because .
这并不是真正自愿的,因为。
.
。
.
。
Remember, systems run based on alignment of incentives.
请记住,系统的运行基于激励措施的协调。
If you create a situation where, when you get promoted, you get a rug in your office, and if you’re not promoted, you don’t have a rug, then you’ve created a market for a rug.
如果你创造了一种情况,当你升职时,你的办公室里会得到一块地毯,而如果你没有升职,你就没有地毯,那么你就创造了一个地毯市场。
So my goal was always to not have a market for the rug.
所以我的目标始终是让地毯没有市场。
I don’t want people to be focused on the wrong incentives.
我不希望人们关注错误的激励措施。
I want them to be focused on the right incentives, which is to change the world, have an impact, have scale, deliver great products, serve the customers.
我希望他们专注于正确的激励措施,即改变世界、产生影响、形成规模、提供优质产品、服务客户。
So what I worry about is that, in companies where you have misalignment between shareholder interests, hedge funds, short-term interest, short-term owners, I’d rather have long-term shareholders in corporations.
所以我担心的是,在股东利益、对冲基金、短期利益、短期所有者之间存在不一致的公司中,我宁愿在公司中拥有长期股东。
I think it would produce better governance.
我认为这会产生更好的治理。
So the quality of the shareholders, you think is the key feature here?
那么,您认为股东的素质是这里的关键特征吗?
Well, you don’t get to choose your shareholders unless you’re a private company.
嗯,除非你是一家私人公司,否则你无权选择股东。
Sure.
当然。
But my point is that in a situation where the shareholders can overthrow anything, you can have all sorts of interventions.
但我的观点是,在股东可以推翻任何事情的情况下,你可以进行各种干预。
You might not be getting optimal long-term governance.
您可能无法获得最佳的长期治理。
Most of the companies that I’m aware of are more focused on short-term earnings and paying their debts and so forth and so on, than they are building for the long term.
据我所知,大多数公司都更注重短期收益和偿还债务等等,而不是长期发展。
And most of their owners won’t reward them for taking risk, even if risk is the right thing for them to take.
大多数主人不会因为他们承担风险而奖励他们,即使风险对他们来说是正确的事情。
And that’s why, ultimately, you get sort of sheepish leadership as opposed to aggressive leadership.
这就是为什么最终你会得到一种羞怯的领导力,而不是积极进取的领导力。
One of the great things about Google, is, because we have a two-class system — now three-class system — we feel somewhat insulated from that, although I can tell you even then, the share price to our employees matters.
谷歌的一大优点是,因为我们有两级制度——现在是三级制度——我们感觉有点与此隔绝,尽管我什至可以告诉你,股价对我们的员工来说很重要。
We give options, people pay a lot of attention to these things.
我们提供选择,人们非常关注这些事情。
Putting aside all partisan issues of this current day, but do you think there are major or long-standing systemic flaws in US politics that could be remedied by structural reform?
抛开当今所有党派问题不谈,您认为美国政治中是否存在重大或长期存在的系统性缺陷,可以通过结构性改革来弥补?
Well, people who have looked at this all see the brilliance of our founding fathers, but also a rural bias in the structure.
那么,看过这个的人都看到了我们开国元勋的辉煌,但也看到了结构中的农村偏见。
So the fact of the matter is, in the senate, as more and more people move to the cities — and remember that when the country was founded, it was a rural country — as more and more a percentage of our population moves to cities, the more there is a disconnect between where the people are and where the leadership is from and how the leadership makes its decision.
因此,事实是,在参议院,随着越来越多的人搬到城市,请记住,当国家成立时,它是一个农村国家,随着越来越多的人口搬到城市,人民在哪里、领导层来自哪里以及领导层如何做出决定之间的脱节就越大。
You see this every day in the way our government runs.
你每天都会在我们政府的运作方式中看到这一点。
So the leaders should be more rural is what you’re saying?
那么你的意思是,领导者应该更加农村化?
No, I think that the citizens should move to rural areas, or there should be more power allotted to where the people are.
不,我认为公民应该搬到农村地区,或者应该把更多的权力分配给人民所在的地方。
What is the chance, in your view, that the Internet simply fragments globally over, say, the next 20 years?
您认为,在未来 20 年里,互联网在全球范围内发生分裂的可能性有多大?
China has the Great Firewall.
中国有防火墙。
The European Union is going its own direction with tech and Internet regulation, and it’s mostly not their companies they’re regulating.
欧盟在技术和互联网监管方面正在走自己的方向,而且他们监管的大部分不是他们的公司。
What’s the chance that, say, 10, 15 years, we just have three or four separate Internets?
比如说,10 年、15 年之后,我们只有三到四个独立的互联网的可能性有多大?
We spend a lot of time worrying about this.
我们花了很多时间担心这个。
In one of my books, we wrote quite a bit about this subject, we called it balkanization.
在我的一本书中,我们写了很多关于这个主题的文章,我们称之为巴尔干化。
My friend from the Balkan says, “Please don’t use that term.”
我来自巴尔干的朋友说:“请不要使用这个词。”
So you use the right term, which is to splinter.
所以你用了正确的术语,那就是分裂。
I think the most likely scenario now is not splintering but rather a bifurcation into a Chinese-led Internet and a non-Chinese-led Internet, presumably led by America.
我认为现在最有可能出现的情况不是分裂,而是分裂成中国主导的互联网和非中国主导的互联网(大概由美国主导)。
If you look in China — I was just there — the scale of the companies that are being built, the services that are being built, the wealth that has been created is phenomenal.
如果你看看中国 ——“我就在那里”—— 正在建立的公司的规模、正在建立的服务、已经创造的财富都是惊人的。
The Chinese Internet is a greater percentage of the GDP of China, which is a big number, than the same percentage in the United States, which is also a big number.
中国互联网在中国GDP中所占的比例是一个很大的数字,而美国同样的比例也是一个很大的数字。
So, if you think of China as like, “Oh, yeah, you’re having good with Internet,” you’re missing the point.
所以,如果你认为中国是“哦,是的,你的互联网发展得很好”,那你就没有抓住重点。
Globalization means they get to play too.
全球化意味着他们也能参与其中。
And I think you’re going to see a fantastic leadership in products and services from China, and there’s a real danger that, along with those fantastic products and services, comes a different leadership regime from the government, which is censorship and controls and limits and so forth.
我认为你会看到中国在产品和服务方面具有出色的领导力,但真正的危险是,除了这些出色的产品和服务之外,还有来自政府的不同领导体制,包括审查、控制和限制等等。
And if you look at the way the BRI works, which is their Belt and Road Initiative — sort of 60-ish countries — it’s perfectly possible that those countries will begin to take on the infrastructure that China has as well, with some loss of freedom.
如果你看看“一带一路”的运作方式,即他们的“一带一路”倡议——“大约有 60 个国家”——那么这些国家很可能会开始采用中国也拥有的基础设施,但会失去一些自由。
Do you think the major Chinese tech companies have managerial strengths that the US tech companies do not?
您认为中国主要科技公司是否具有美国科技公司所没有的管理优势?
Or are they, in some ways, beyond our frontier?
或者在某些方面它们超出了我们的边界?
The managers I’ve met in the tech companies feel exactly like Google did 10 years ago.
我在科技公司遇到的经理们的感觉和 10 年前的谷歌一模一样。
Crazy growth, this problem, that problem, with one more problem, which is that, because they have regulators they have to deal with, they also manage up because the government can say yes or no to many of the things that they were doing.
疯狂的增长,这个问题,那个问题,还有一个问题,那就是,因为他们必须与监管机构打交道,所以他们也能管理得很好,因为政府可以对他们正在做的许多事情说“是”或“不是”。
But the leadership is impressive — they’re smart.
但领导层令人印象深刻——他们很聪明。
You once said the following, “People are surprised to find out that an awful lot of people think they’re idiots.” Is this still true?
你曾经说过这样的话:“人们惊讶地发现有很多人认为他们是白痴。”这仍然是真的吗?
If you go on Twitter, many people think you’re an idiot, people get offended.
如果你上推特,很多人会认为你是个白痴,人们会觉得被冒犯。
Are we getting better at this?
我们在这方面做得更好吗?
Or worse at this?
或者更糟?
As a general rule, I try to blame the Internet for everything because everyone else does, and I think some of this is true and some of it’s false.
一般来说,我试图将所有事情归咎于互联网,因为其他人都这样做,而且我认为有些是正确的,有些是错误的。
That was a joke by the way.
顺便说一句,这是一个笑话。
And you can’t joke anymore in the age of Twitter.
在推特时代你不能再开玩笑了。
I’m worried that — let’s see if I can say it right — I’m worried that the sum of the way social media works is organized around some human weaknesses, not human strengths.
我担心 ——“让我们看看我是否能说对”—— 我担心社交媒体的运作方式总体上是围绕着人类的弱点而不是人类的优势而组织的。
I’m worried that the sum of the way social media works is organized around some human weaknesses, not human strengths.
我担心社交媒体的运作方式总体上是围绕人类的弱点而不是人类的优势而组织的。
I’ll give you an example.
我给你举个例子。
There’s evidence that, if you’re shown a fake video, and you’re told it’s fake, you can’t eliminate that memory from your brain — it’s a human thing.
有证据表明,如果你看到一段假视频,并且被告知它是假的,你就无法从你的大脑中消除该记忆 ——这是人类的事情。
So if that’s true, then eventually, some startup will figure out a way to exploit that without necessarily the best societal outcomes.
因此,如果这是真的,那么最终,一些初创公司将找到一种利用这一点的方法,而不一定会产生最好的社会成果。
So, what I worry about is that the structure that we have now in the Internet allows an individual crazy person to be amplified, and there are many, many examples of this that occurred in 2016.
所以,我担心的是,我们现在互联网的结构允许个体疯狂的人被放大,2016年发生的这样的例子有很多很多。
Perhaps we’ll see this again in our election year in 2018.
也许我们会在 2018 年选举年再次看到这种情况。
But the important point is, crazy people always existed, but now we can sort them and hear them at a level and an amplification — especially if they serve someone else’s business interests — that’s not good.
但重要的一点是,疯狂的人一直存在,但现在我们可以对他们进行分类,并在一定程度上和放大的程度上听到他们的声音——尤其是如果他们为别人的商业利益服务——那就不好了。
We’ve known for a long time that disinformation would be a good business for some businesses.
我们很早就知道,虚假信息对于某些企业来说是一笔好生意。
So I worry that the sum of people who have special interests, which are governments, foreign governments, special interests of one kind or another, lobbyists, and so forth, will be able to create an environment where people are not able to distinguish between legitimate individual speech and marketing speech, in the sense of stuff that’s being sold to them or peddled to them by some foreign power.
因此,我担心拥有特殊利益的人们的总和,包括政府、外国政府、某种特殊利益、游说者等等,将能够创造一种环境,使人们无法区分合法的个人言论和营销言论,即某些外国势力向他们出售或兜售的东西。
It gets much worse with AI because you can imagine AI subtly learning what your preferences are and then learning how to manipulate you.
人工智能的情况会变得更糟,因为你可以想象人工智能巧妙地了解你的偏好,然后学习如何操纵你。
This again is a theoretical scenario.
这又是一个理论场景。
I’ve thought a lot about it, and I’m strongly in favor of free speech for humans.
我想了很多,并且我强烈支持人类的言论自由。
It makes sense, right?
这是有道理的,对吧?
But I think we have to deal, as a society, with this question of how much of an amplifier do you want to give to people who are truly insane?
但我认为,作为一个社会,我们必须解决这样一个问题:你想为真正疯狂的人提供多少放大器?
Silicon Valley has had a phenomenally successful team-building culture, and you see this in the productivity of the successful companies.
硅谷拥有非常成功的团队建设文化,这一点可以从成功公司的生产力中看到。
Other people allege there is excessive ideological conformity within some of the largest tech companies.
其他人则声称,一些最大的科技公司内部存在过度的意识形态一致性。
Is the success of team building and the ideological conformity two sides of the same coin, and if you have one, you get the other?
团队建设的成功和意识形态的整合是同一枚硬币的两个方面,如果你有一个,你就会得到另一个吗?
Or do you think there’s not excessive ideological conformity?
或者你认为意识形态上没有过度的整合?
Or is ideological conformity a separate problem that can just be peeled off and solve it on its own, without breaking down the team-building culture?
或者意识形态整合是一个单独的问题,可以单独解决,而不破坏团队建设文化?
Do you see what I’m asking?
你明白我在问什么吗?
I do.
我愿意。
I think it’s important to remember that the tech culture is not mainstream culture.
我认为重要的是要记住科技文化不是主流文化。
Tech people are always shocked that the rest of the country doesn’t vote with them.
科技界人士总是对全国其他地区不与他们一起投票感到震惊。
The average tech person, as a gross generalization, is socially liberal and fiscally conservative.
总体而言,普通科技人员在社会上是自由的,在财政上是保守的。
If you look at the quadrants of combinations, that percentage is the smallest percentage of the demographic of the United States.
如果您查看组合的象限,您会发现该百分比是美国人口中最小的百分比。
It’s not the largest.
这还不是最大的。
If you spend all day in tech, you assume that everyone else is like you, and I suspect this is true in the other gatherings, as well.
如果你整天都在科技领域,你会认为其他人都和你一样,我怀疑在其他聚会中也是如此。
There’s this sort of selection bias where you select your friends, and you all agree with the same thing.
当你选择你的朋友时,就会存在这种选择偏见,而你们都同意同样的事情。
So I think there is a uniformity in some values along the lines that I just described, with some reasonable variation among them.
因此,我认为一些价值观与我刚才描述的一致,但其中也存在一些合理的变化。
I don’t believe that that is necessarily a bad thing because, ultimately, teams have to work together.
我认为这不一定是一件坏事,因为最终,团队必须共同努力。
They have to have a common belief, and they produce amazing outcomes.
他们必须有共同的信念,才能产生惊人的成果。
The major tech companies have done very well, of course, but if we imagine some world in the future where some tech companies are at or near insolvency, and if we think maybe they have a fiduciary responsibility to sell off the information they hold on people, is that a regulatory problem we will need to address?
当然,主要的科技公司做得很好,但如果我们想象在未来的某个世界,一些科技公司处于或接近破产状态,并且如果我们认为他们可能有信托责任出售他们持有的人们的信息,那么这是我们需要解决的监管问题吗?
Obviously, a successful tech company is not going to do that.
显然,一家成功的科技公司不会这样做。
They would wreck their franchise.
他们会破坏他们的特许经营权。
Yeah, so the problem that you’re posing is, we have a company that has a great deal of useful information that’s also bankrupt.
是的,所以你提出的问题是,我们有一家拥有大量有用信息的公司也破产了。
Right.
正确的。
That’s not a scenario that’s likely because, if it has a great deal of useful information, then that can be monetized in a good way, in a way that’s valuable and serves their customers’ interest.
这种情况不太可能发生,因为如果它有大量有用的信息,那么就可以以一种良好的方式、以一种有价值的方式货币化,并服务于客户的利益。
So I think it’s an oxymoron.
所以我认为这是一个矛盾的说法。
I think it just is not going to happen.
我认为这不会发生。
A way of rephrasing your question would be, you have historic data in a company that’s in big trouble.
重新表述你的问题的一种方式是,你有一家陷入大麻烦的公司的历史数据。
Should there be some regulation?
是否应该有一些监管?
And I’m assuming that whoever would purchase that company would want to respect the value of that information, which includes the restrictions on it.
我假设无论谁购买该公司都会希望尊重该信息的价值,其中包括对其的限制。
So I think the scenario where somehow you have a bankrupt company, you have historic data, and somehow they just do something horrific — there’s no economic reason why that would occur.
所以我认为,如果你有一家破产的公司,你有历史数据,但不知何故他们只是做了一些可怕的事情——没有任何经济原因会发生这种情况。
There are plans for Google to help with planning part of a smart city in part of Toronto.
谷歌计划帮助多伦多部分地区规划智慧城市的一部分。
What’s the biggest obstacle toward that working well?
实现这一目标的最大障碍是什么?
Well, we have a subsidiary called Sidewalk Labs, which I’ve been helping out with and .
嗯,我们有一家名为 Sidewalk Labs 的子公司,我一直在帮助它。
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When I say Google, I’m meaning Google/Alphabet.
当我说 Google 时,我指的是 Google/Alphabet。
Yeah, technically part of Alphabet.
是的,从技术上讲,它是 Alphabet 的一部分。
Yeah.
是的。
This again came from the founders, who were interested in rethinking about cities along with rethinking about a lot of other things, which is why they’re so special.
这再次来自创始人,他们有兴趣重新思考城市以及重新思考许多其他事物,这就是它们如此特别的原因。
We were able to hire Dan Doctoroff, who’d done a lot of work in New York, to lead that.
我们聘请了丹·多克托罗夫(Dan Doctoroff)来领导这项工作,他在纽约做了很多工作。
What he’s been doing is, he first assembled all of the new ideas about cities, and everyone has lists of complaints about cities a mile long, right?
他一直在做的是,他首先汇集了所有关于城市的新想法,每个人都有一英里长的对城市的抱怨清单,对吗?
The traffic is bad, the air is bad, I can’t get a taxi, Uber doesn’t work here.
交通很糟糕,空气也很糟糕,我打不到出租车,优步在这里也不起作用。
There’s a long list of people’s complaints about cities.
人们对城市的抱怨有一长串。
They’re not safe, the education system isn’t strong enough.
他们不安全,教育系统不够强大。
The idea is to come up with urban settings where you can address a multiplicity of those.
我们的想法是设计出可以解决多种问题的城市环境。
Another issue is housing costs are too high.
另一个问题是住房成本太高。
Can we get the housing cost down?
住房成本能降下来吗?
We are doing a process of thinking through that, working with the friendliest and most helpful, if you will, government regulatory body that you can imagine, and it still take years.
我们正在思考这个问题,与最友好、最有帮助的政府监管机构(如果你愿意的话)合作,你可以想象,这仍然需要数年时间。
It takes years.
这需要数年时间。
The model we’ve chosen is a consensus-building one, and I think you’ll see some interesting outcomes.
我们选择的模型是一种建立共识的模型,我认为您会看到一些有趣的结果。
The most interesting thing about city building is city building is extremely rare.
城市建设最有趣的一点是城市建设极其罕见。
Even in cities where they go bankrupt or they get in big trouble, it’s almost impossible to change the planning assumptions about a city because of the way in which the human incentives and all of the very special interest groups that have locked themselves into a state.
即使在破产或陷入大麻烦的城市中,也几乎不可能改变城市的规划假设,因为人类的激励措施和所有非常特殊的利益集团都将自己锁定在国家之中。
So we won’t really see innovation in cities unless we’re willing to exempt from some rules or build completely new cities.
因此,除非我们愿意免除某些规则或建造全新的城市,否则我们不会真正看到城市的创新。
You are seeing new cities built in China and in Saudi Arabia and maybe in a few other countries, and we’ll see how that goes.
你会看到中国和沙特阿拉伯以及其他一些国家建造了新的城市,我们将看看情况如何。
What kinds of innovations do we need in cities or suburbs to lower housing costs in the Bay Area?
我们需要在城市或郊区进行哪些创新来降低湾区的住房成本?
And what will happen to the tech cluster here if we don’t have those innovations?
如果我们没有这些创新,这里的技术集群将会发生什么?
Well, the Bay Area is subject to a historic no-growth, slow-growth view, which benefits the incumbents and hurts immigrants into the area.
嗯,湾区受到历史性的无增长、增长缓慢的观点的影响,这对现有者有利,但对进入该地区的移民不利。
I am a landowner, and if I keep my land undeveloped, then the price goes up because there’s greater demand.
我是土地所有者,如果我不开发土地,那么价格就会上涨,因为需求更大。
There is a solution for this, which is to build skyscrapers in selected areas.
对此有一个解决方案,那就是在选定的区域建造摩天大楼。
That’s how other cities have done it.
其他城市也是这么做的。
For all sorts of reasons, the Bay Area has not allowed that.
由于种种原因,湾区不允许这样做。
But if you look at New York — the way New York has adapted itself over the over 100 years, is it built on very small parts of land, high, tall residential towers of one kind or another.
但如果你看看纽约——一百多年来纽约适应自身的方式,它是建在很小的土地上,还是建在这样或那样的高高的住宅楼上。
The Bay Area needs to solve its housing crisis because the Bay Area is not going to become less desirable.
湾区需要解决住房危机,因为湾区不会变得不那么受欢迎。
And it’s really discriminating and really hurting an awful lot of people.
这确实是一种歧视,并且伤害了很多人。
Skyscrapers are one.
摩天大楼就是其中之一。
There are other scenarios.
还有其他场景。
For example, there are ways in which you build very dense, low number of floors housing — which are dense and relatively small — in urban settings.
例如,可以通过多种方式在城市环境中建造非常密集、低楼层的住房——“密集且相对较小”。
And there are planners to that effect.
并且有为此目的的规划者。
The Bay Area needs to decide.
湾区需要做出决定。
But the current situation where any proposals get blocked is not good because the growth is not going to slow down.
但目前任何提案都被阻止的情况并不好,因为增长不会放缓。
There had been a plan to scan as many of the world’s books as possible and make them available online.
曾有一项计划扫描世界上尽可能多的书籍并将其发布到网上。
Do you think that will ever happen?
你认为这种事会发生吗?
And what’s the main obstacle preventing it right now?
目前阻止它的主要障碍是什么?
We made a good start at it.
我们在这方面取得了良好的开端。
As you know if you use Google Book Search, you’ll see quite a few there.
如您所知,如果您使用 Google 图书搜索,您会在那里看到很多图书。
Ultimately, we had a lot of issues with the rights holders because in many cases you’d have a 50-year-old book, but we couldn’t find the right holder, and we had to follow the copyright law.
最终,我们与权利持有人之间存在很多问题,因为在很多情况下,你拥有一本已有 50 年历史的书,但我们找不到权利持有人,因此我们必须遵守版权法。
I’m not suggesting copyright is wrong.
我并不是说版权是错误的。
I’m just saying that’s a problem if you want to scan everything.
我只是说如果你想扫描所有东西那就是一个问题。
Is it a solvable problem?
这是一个可以解决的问题吗?
We had a number of solutions, but we could not come to agreement with the book publisher industry and through legal process.
我们有很多解决方案,但我们无法与图书出版商行业达成协议并通过法律程序。
If you think about the dynamic future of venture capital and your role in Village Global, how is it you try to stay in touch with dynamic trends in venture capital?
如果您考虑风险投资的动态未来以及您在 Village Global 中的角色,您是如何努力与风险投资的动态趋势保持联系的?
Well, venture capital is not about venture capital.
嗯,风险投资并不是风险投资。
It’s about entrepreneurs.
这是关于企业家的。
So, if you’re in my situation or anybody else like me, you should have a pretty good map of where all the activity is.
因此,如果您处于我的情况或像我一样的其他人,您应该有一个很好的地图来显示所有活动的位置。
If you don’t, then you’re not really going to be able to have an opinion, you’re not really going to be able to see it.
如果你不这样做,那么你就无法真正发表意见,也无法真正看到它。
So, I work hard to hear the pitches.
所以,我努力听音调。
For example, I’ll sit through these life sciences pitches, and I really don’t have a feel for it.
例如,我会坐下来听完这些生命科学演讲,但我真的没有任何感觉。
I don’t really understand the claims, but I can at least draw the map of where everybody is.
我不太明白这些说法,但我至少可以画出每个人都在哪里的地图。
So my general advice is try to draw a map in technology of where the activity is.
所以我的一般建议是尝试用技术来绘制活动地点的地图。
I’ll give you an example.
我给你举个例子。
What’s the thing that’s going to explode in the next 10 years in a good way, explosion?
未来10年,什么东西会以一种好的方式爆炸,爆炸?
Sensors.
传感器。
Sensors, every conceivable kind of sensors.
传感器,各种可以想象到的传感器。
Why?
为什么?
Well, you already have Android phones, iPhones — there’s a huge number of sensors right there.
好吧,你已经有了 Android 手机、iPhone——那里有大量的传感器。
You already have very inexpensive cameras.
您已经拥有非常便宜的相机。
You have incredible connectivity now.
您现在拥有令人难以置信的连接性。
There’s every reason to think that every conceivable kind of sensor — in a good way of sensor — can become available.
我们有充分的理由认为,每一种可以想象到的传感器————以一种好的传感器方式————都可以实现。
What kind of businesses can you build on top of that?
在此基础上您可以建立什么样的业务?
What problems that the world has can you solve by virtue of that?
世界上有什么问题可以用它来解决?
What will these sensors do for us?
这些传感器将为我们做什么?
Well, if you go back to philanthropy — you give your money away, but you have no idea if any of the stuff gets used.
好吧,如果你回到慈善事业 - 你捐出了你的钱,但你不知道是否有任何东西被使用。
But now you can actually figure out, by putting sensors on things, whether they actually end up in the right place.
但现在,通过在物体上安装传感器,您实际上可以弄清楚它们是否真的到达了正确的位置。
Simple stuff like that.
诸如此类的简单事情。
RFID tagging alone meant an awful lot of misplaced and stolen activities got to the right place.
仅 RFID 标签就意味着大量丢失和被盗的活动都被送至正确的地方。
My point is, as a technological matter, the world .
我的观点是,从技术角度来看,世界。
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If you think about 20 or 30 years from now, you can be sure that we — and hopefully we’re all alive, but more importantly, our children and our grandchildren — will be facing lots of governance problems: the religious conflicts, and whether the Senate and the House should do A or B, and whether people are happy with the president, and on and on and on, and the Chinese, and so forth.
如果你想想20年或30年后,你可以肯定,我们——希望我们都还活着,但更重要的是,我们的子孙——将面临许多治理问题:宗教冲突,参议院和众议院应该做A还是B,以及人们是否对总统满意,等等,还有中国人,等等。
What will be different is it will have incredible information on wired and wireless networks, sensors, and databases, and tools which will help us make decisions.
不同的是,它将拥有有关有线和无线网络、传感器、数据库以及帮助我们做出决策的工具的令人难以置信的信息。
Now, we’re all just guessing at this question, but what do you think will be the expected life span of an upper middle-class American child born today?
现在,我们都只是猜测这个问题,但你认为今天出生的美国中上层阶级孩子的预期寿命是多少?
There are numbers that have been published to that.
有一些数字已经发布。
The generally accepted number is about 90 years old, and the generally accepted number is it goes up on the order of one year every few years.
普遍接受的数字是90岁左右,普遍接受的数字是每隔几年就以一年的数量级上升。
So it’s reasonable to expect that a child born in 2030 or 2040 could have a life span of about 100.
因此,有理由预计 2030 年或 2040 年出生的孩子的寿命约为 100 岁。
Human lifespans, on average, have been increasing for many, many reasons, starting with antibiotics, better water, and so forth, and now there is an explosion in later-life medical care and around cancer and heart and so forth.
人类的平均寿命一直在增长,原因有很多很多,首先是抗生素、更好的水等等,现在晚年医疗以及癌症和心脏病等方面的医疗保健呈爆炸式增长。
I was talking to my doctor, and he said, “It used to be that people just sort of died, and now you have to work with them.” So you better, for example, expect to have a daily or a weekly physical therapy thing to keep your muscles going, take your quarter aspirin, all that kind of stuff.
我正在和我的医生交谈,他说:“过去人们只是死了,现在你必须与他们一起工作。”因此,例如,您最好期望每天或每周进行一次物理治疗,以保持肌肉运转,服用四分之一的阿司匹林,诸如此类的东西。
And is there a cap or an asymptote on that process?
该过程是否存在上限或渐近线?
Or we just keep on going?
还是我们继续前进?
A lot of people have looked at this, and many people think that God’s design for us did have kind of an asymptote and that we’re sort of bumping up against it.
很多人都看过这个,很多人认为上帝对我们的设计确实有某种渐近线,而我们正在与它碰撞。
And we’re going to keep finding ways to extend it, and nature will keep finding ways of making it hard to extend it.
我们将不断寻找扩展它的方法,而大自然也会不断寻找使其难以扩展的方法。
Even with some of the fantastic cancer improvements, there’s evidence that other decay processes begin.
即使癌症有了一些惊人的改善,但有证据表明其他衰变过程开始了。
Remember these are averages, but remember that even if we could make the average life span five or ten years longer across the global cohort, that’s a huge increase in the number of people and their productivity.
请记住,这些只是平均值,但请记住,即使我们可以使全球人群的平均寿命延长五到十年,这也意味着人口数量及其生产力的巨大增长。
Why has there been so much middle-class wage stagnation in the United States?
为什么美国中产阶级的工资如此停滞?
Well, I’m going to ask Tyler Cowen this question.
好吧,我要问泰勒·考恩这个问题。
Well, I would say there’s been a technological slowdown, but I’m not sure you’re allowed that answer.
好吧,我想说技术正在放缓,但我不确定你是否可以接受这个答案。
A technological slow down .
技术放缓。
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In areas other than the service sector.
服务业以外的领域。
No, you mean a nontech slow down?
不,你的意思是非技术放缓?
Other than tech, most sectors have been fairly stagnant in my view.
在我看来,除了科技之外,大多数行业都相当停滞。
Okay, and why is that?
好吧,那是为什么呢?
We’ve run out of new ways to use fossil fuels and powerful machines, so we’re hitting an asymptote in many other sectors.
我们已经用尽了使用化石燃料和强大机器的新方法,因此我们在许多其他领域都遇到了渐近线。
Tech is doing wonderfully well, but it’s not a big enough sector to boost, say, GDP growth rates up to 3 percent.
科技行业表现非常好,但它的规模还不足以将 GDP 增长率提升至 3%。
People who export .
出口的人。
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Well, isn’t our GDP growth 3 percent at the moment?
那么现在我们的GDP增长不是3%吗?
At the moment.
眼下。
But some of that’s catch-up.
但其中一些是追赶的。
Year-over-year, it’s 2.7.
与去年同期相比,该数字为 2.7。
But if you think we .
但如果你认为我们。
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2.7 percent?
2.7%?
I’ll take 2.7 percent.
我会拿2.7%。
If we have the perfect labor market performance and a big fiscal stimulus, and the best we’re doing is 2.7, when, say, in the 1980s, we had 4 percent, maybe that’s underwhelming.
如果我们有完美的劳动力市场表现和大规模的财政刺激,而我们做得最好的是 2.7,而在 20 世纪 80 年代,我们的增长率是 4%,也许这并不算什么。
Well first place, the 4 percent could have been demographic rather than — our current demographics are not.
首先,4% 可能是人口统计而不是 ——我们目前的人口统计数据不是。
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Sure.
当然。
But that may be a reason why we’ve had wage stagnation also.
但这也可能是我们工资停滞的一个原因。
Yeah.
是的。
A couple of things.
有几件事。
First, I think the ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s had greater growth on average, largely because of the demographic boom of World War II and the baby boom generation.
首先,我认为 60 年代、70 年代和 80 年代的平均增长率更高,这主要是由于第二次世界大战和婴儿潮一代的人口繁荣。
We face the inverse going forward.
未来我们将面临相反的情况。
So I’m really glad to look at an audience of people who will be working very hard to fund my retirement.
因此,我真的很高兴看到一群为我的退休生活而努力工作的人。
And there are so many people like me, that you’re going to have to work even harder, right?
而且像我这样的人还有很多,你一定要更加努力吧?
And that drives a lot of the economics around productivity.
这推动了很多围绕生产力的经济学。
It’s why, for example, AI systems will make you more productive and not cause you to lose your jobs.
例如,这就是为什么人工智能系统会提高你的工作效率,而不会让你失业。
That’s a way to understand that.
这是理解这一点的一种方式。
With respect to the middle-class wages, I would argue that in many cases they’re missed opportunities to apply technology to these industries.
关于中产阶级的工资,我认为在很多情况下他们错过了将技术应用于这些行业的机会。
An example would be that, if we use technology to make cars faster, cheaper, more efficient, and so forth and so on, they would cost less or at least be easier to manufacture.
一个例子是,如果我们使用技术来制造汽车更快、更便宜、更高效等等,那么它们的成本就会更低,或者至少更容易制造。
So I’m all about applying technology to nontechnology sectors to improve their productivity.
因此,我致力于将技术应用于非技术领域,以提高其生产力。
I’m convinced that a small number of software people applied to each of these industries — looking at how they operate, redesigning the way their business processes work — will make a huge difference.
我相信,将少数软件人员应用于每个行业 ——观察它们的运作方式,重新设计其业务流程的工作方式——将会产生巨大的影响。
Indeed, Google has a set of businesses that are trying to do that across a set of industries.
事实上,谷歌有一系列业务正在尝试跨多个行业实现这一目标。
On the Eric Schmidt production function
关于埃里克·施密特生产函数
To close, I have a few questions about what I call the Eric Schmidt production function, that is how you have been productive.
最后,我有几个关于我所说的埃里克·施密特生产函数的问题,这就是你如何保持高效的。
First, very simple: What would you describe as your greatest talent in business?
首先,非常简单:您认为您在商业上最伟大的才能是什么?
I’m a systemic thinker, and I like people, and I like to think about how people behave.
我是一个系统思考者,我喜欢人,我喜欢思考人们的行为方式。
So the key thing in leadership is organizing — how do you get people to do things?
因此,领导力的关键是组织——如何让人们去做事?
My father taught me that the best way to get people to do stuff is to have it be their idea.
我的父亲告诉我,让人们做事的最好方法就是让他们有想法。
So if you can find a way that your idea is also their idea, then you can go back to working on the people whose idea you don’t agree with.
因此,如果你能找到一种方法,让你的想法也是他们的想法,那么你就可以回去为那些你不同意的想法的人工作。
My father taught me that the best way to get people to do stuff is to have it be their idea.
我的父亲告诉我,让人们做事的最好方法就是让他们有想法。
So if you can find a way that your idea is also their idea, then you can go back to working on the people whose idea you don’t agree with.
因此,如果你能找到一种方法,让你的想法也是他们的想法,那么你就可以回去继续研究那些你不同意的人的想法。
The ideal manager doesn’t ever have to do anything because all the people who they work with are self-functioning, they’re self-organizing.
理想的管理者不需要做任何事情,因为所有与他们一起工作的人都是自我运作、自我组织的。
It’s so obvious what they should do and they love it so much, they never have any problem.
他们应该做什么是非常明显的,而且他们非常喜欢它,他们从来没有任何问题。
They solve all their problems.
他们解决了所有的问题。
Of course, that’s not how it really works, but if you can’t motivate people around that, then you’re not really giving them an opportunity to be successful.
当然,事实并非如此,但如果你不能围绕这一点激励人们,那么你就没有真正为他们提供成功的机会。
What’s your media diet?
你的媒体饮食是什么?
And how do you consume it?
你如何消费它?
Well, for a long time, I read real newspapers.
嗯,很长一段时间,我读的是真正的报纸。
Nowadays, I use the various news aggregators to read the news on my various phones, which I view as suboptimal, but that’s sort of my reality as a person who moves around a lot.
如今,我使用各种新闻聚合器在各种手机上阅读新闻,我认为这不是最理想的,但这就是我作为一个经常走动的人的现实。
The reality is that first, you should read multiple stuff, and second, I’m careful now to look at the source of information because it’s so easy for people to mislead you and look like they’re legit, but in fact they’re not.
现实情况是,首先,你应该阅读多种内容,其次,我现在很小心地查看信息来源,因为人们很容易误导你,让你看起来像是合法的,但实际上并非如此。
And is there an underrated media source that you would direct our attention to?
您会引导我们关注哪些被低估的媒体来源吗?
The Economist.
经济学人。
The Economist.
经济学人。
Named after you.
以你的名字命名。
And your father, Wilson Schmidt.
还有你的父亲威尔逊·施密特。
Let’s say I’m a young person, and I’m coming up in the tech world, and I say to you, “I’d like to be the next Eric Schmidt.” And they cannot obviously copy your career or follow in exactly the same footsteps, but they want to be a next generation analogue of what you’ve done.
假设我是一个年轻人,即将进入科技界,我对你说,“我想成为下一个埃里克·施密特。”他们显然无法复制你的职业生涯或追随完全相同的脚步,但他们希望成为你所做的下一代类似物。
What advice would you give to that person?
你会给那个人什么建议?
Well, it goes back to the question of luck.
好吧,这又回到了运气的问题。
So I was lucky because I had good taste in friends, and they helped me out.
所以我很幸运,因为我的朋友很有品味,他们帮助了我。
So the most .
所以最。
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Isn’t that skill and not luck?
这难道不是技巧而不是运气吗?
Okay, I’ll let you define that.
好吧,我会让你定义它。
But basically, the best things in your life will come from the people that you hang out with.
但基本上,你生命中最好的东西将来自与你一起出去玩的人。
I mean the people that you love to work with, and the people with whom you have passionate talks all night about and that kind of stuff.
我指的是那些你喜欢一起工作的人,以及那些和你充满激情地谈论整夜之类的人。
And if you can find those people, sign yourself up on their ship.
如果你能找到这些人,就在他们的船上报名吧。
That has worked incredibly well for me.
这对我来说非常有效。
I had the benefit of being early in the computer industry, so that’s like super luck.
我的优势是很早就进入了计算机行业,所以这就像超级幸运。
But my real opportunity is, I look at each of these stages, I was picked early, I worked with smart people, people took a risk on me, and I learned.
但我真正的机会是,我审视了每个阶段,我很早就被选中,我与聪明的人一起工作,人们为我承担了风险,我学到了。
I want to make sure that you all hear that.
我想确保你们都听到了。
So today, when, as entrepreneurs, remember that the quality of the people that you work with — the people you hire, the people on your board, and so forth — will determine an awful lot of your outcome.
因此,今天,作为企业家,请记住,与你共事的人的素质——“你雇用的人、董事会成员等等”——将在很大程度上决定你的结果。
Today, as entrepreneurs, remember that the quality of the people that you work with — the people you hire, the people on your board, and so forth — will determine an awful lot of your outcome.
今天,作为企业家,请记住,与你一起工作的人的素质——你雇用的人、董事会成员等等——将决定你的很多结果。
In the media, there’s this fascination with founders and how brilliant they are, but corporate success is a team sport.
在媒体上,人们对创始人及其才华横溢很着迷,但企业的成功是一项团队运动。
As much as we love and identify our founders, it is the people who work for them every day, who worked the 16 hours a day, and they did so because they loved the founders, they loved the vision of the company, and they cared a great deal about that.
尽管我们热爱并认同我们的创始人,但每天为他们工作的人,每天工作 16 个小时,他们这样做是因为他们热爱创始人,热爱公司的愿景,并且非常关心这一点。
Then, when they went home to see their families, exhausted, they said, “I was proud to go to work, and I was proud to do this.” Those are the people you want to associate with because those are the people that will change the world.
然后,当他们筋疲力尽地回家看望家人时,他们说:“我很自豪能够去工作,我也很自豪能做到这一点。”这些是你想与之交往的人,因为他们将改变世界。
Eric Schmidt, thank you very much.
埃里克·施密特,非常感谢你。
Thank you very much.
非常感谢。