Eric Kaufmann on Immigration, Identity, and the Limits of Individualism (Ep. 70)
Hello.
你好。
This is Tyler Cowen with another episode of Conversations with Tyler.
这是泰勒·考恩的另一集《与泰勒对话》。
I’m here today with Eric Kaufmann, who is a political scientist at Birkbeck College here in London.
今天我和埃里克·考夫曼一起来到这里，他是伦敦伯贝克学院的政治学家。
He has just published the highly influential book Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities.
他刚刚出版了极具影响力的著作《白人转变：民粹主义、移民和白人多数的未来》。
Eric, welcome.
埃里克，欢迎。
Great to be here, Tyler.
很高兴来到这里，泰勒。
Let’s go back a bit earlier in your career.
让我们回顾一下您职业生涯的早期。
I have some questions about Northern Ireland.
我有一些关于北爱尔兰的问题。
Is real estate in Northern Ireland underpriced?
北爱尔兰的房地产价格是否被低估？
I’ve been to places, say, in Antrim, where you can buy a normal house that appears to be in good shape for about $60,000 or a beautiful, huge house on the water for $30,000.
我去过一些地方，比如在安特里姆，你可以花大约 6 万美元购买一栋看起来状况良好的普通房子，或者花 3 万美元购买一栋漂亮的巨大水上房子。
Why are those prices so low?
为什么这些价格这么低？
Is that an arbitrage opportunity?
这是一个套利机会吗？
Well, it depends.
嗯，这取决于。
Maybe it’s only about five or six days of sunshine a year.
也许一年只有五六天的阳光。
No, I’m just kidding.
不，我只是开玩笑。
But yeah, I agree with you.
但是，是的，我同意你的观点。
There’s some lovely parts of Northern Ireland.
北爱尔兰有一些可爱的地方。
One of the other things is the sectarian real estate market, which is another wrinkle that we could talk about.
另一件事是宗派房地产市场，这是我们可以谈论的另一个问题。
But is Northern Ireland undervalued by the market — its future prospects?
但北爱尔兰的未来前景是否被市场低估了？
Yeah, I think so.
是的，我想是的。
I certainly don’t think they’re going to have sectarian violence, so it may be an opportunity.
我当然不认为他们会发生宗派暴力，所以这可能是一个机会。
But am I wrong in thinking a kind of Coasian argument applies — that there are gains from trade, there won’t be much future conflict, they speak the English language.
但我认为适用一种科斯论点是错误的吗？——贸易可以带来收益，未来不会有太多冲突，他们说英语。
They’re a member of either the UK or the EU or, under some scenarios, both.
他们是英国或欧盟的成员，或者在某些情况下，两者都是。
And it will just be the world’s biggest boom area, say, 10, 15 years from now.
比如说，10 年、15 年后，它将成为世界上最大的繁荣地区。
Why is that wrong?
为什么这是错误的？
I don’t necessarily think it is wrong, other than the fact that, right now, the economy is about 85 percent government.
我并不一定认为这是错误的，除了目前经济约 85% 是政府主导的事实之外。
So unless there is some sort of private investment, then it’s going to be a government-run .
因此，除非有某种私人投资，否则它将是政府运营的。
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essentially an economy funded from mainland Britain.
本质上是一个由英国大陆资助的经济体。
So I’m just not sure it has the dynamism yet.
所以我只是不确定它是否具有活力。
But tourism’s increasing, and like you say, it’s a very pleasant place with a lot of advantages.
但旅游业正在增长，就像你说的，这是一个非常宜人的地方，有很多优势。
Why isn’t there more private investment?
为什么没有更多的私人投资？
Because, I think, for a long time, essentially, the security situation kept investors away.
我认为，因为长期以来，安全形势基本上让投资者望而却步。
Republic of Ireland drew a lot of the investment in.
爱尔兰共和国吸引了大量投资。
It remained a kind of dependency situation in relation to the UK.
它仍然是对英国的一种依赖状况。
For those reasons, I think, there just hasn’t been the investment.
我认为，正是出于这些原因，才没有进行投资。
But you’re right — it has a lot of potential, and the people are very smart, so I can’t see a reason why not.
但你是对的——它有很大的潜力，人们也很聪明，所以我看不出有什么理由不这么做。
What’s the most plausible scenario for Irish reunification?
爱尔兰统一最可能的情景是什么？
I think the most plausible scenario is that Northern Ireland Protestants don’t have the same hostility to the Republic that they have traditionally had, so maybe a kind of charm offensive.
我认为最可能的情况是，北爱尔兰新教徒对共和国没有像传统上那样的敌意，所以也许是一种魅力攻势。
In a way, the unionist population is the one they have to win over.
在某种程度上，工会主义者是他们必须争取的对象。
They are kind of foursquare against reunification.
他们有点反对统一。
Somehow, the Irish Republic has to find a way to reassure them.
无论如何，爱尔兰共和国必须找到一种方法来安抚他们。
That’s going to be the ticket to reunification, but it’ll never really happen just through economic integration.
这将成为统一的门票，但仅通过经济一体化永远不会真正实现。
I think there’s got to be something symbolic that will win over the unionists.
我认为必须有一些象征性的东西才能赢得工会成员的支持。
If the unionists feel so tied to Great Britain, why does, to me, Belfast feel so much more Irish than, say, Dublin does?
如果工会主义者觉得自己与英国如此紧密地联系在一起，那么为什么对我来说，贝尔法斯特比都柏林等地感觉更像爱尔兰人呢？
Really?
真的吗？
It does.
确实如此。
You obviously haven’t been to East Belfast and seen all of the Union Jacks, or down the Shankill.
您显然还没有去过东贝尔法斯特并见过所有的英国国旗，也没有去过尚基尔河。
You should visit the Orange Order’s headquarters, I think, in East Belfast.
我想你应该去参观位于东贝尔法斯特的橙色勋章总部。
I think that would cure you of that.
我想这会治愈你的病。
You mention the Orangemen.
你提到了国足。
Say I belong to a Grand Lodge of the Orangemen.
假设我属于橙人大会所。
What private benefits do I get?
我能得到什么私人利益？
Why might I be joining?
我为什么要加入？
Well, you get to take part in an annual spectacle, which is the July 12th parades where you’re parading in front of your community.
好吧，你可以参加一年一度的盛会，那就是 7 月 12 日的游行，你可以在社区前面游行。
I actually don’t think there are a whole lot of material benefits.
我实际上并不认为有很多物质利益。
I just don’t think that’s the reason people are drawn into it.
我只是不认为这就是人们被吸引的原因。
It’s a family tradition.
这是一个家庭传统。
It’s a communal thing, historical symbolic thing.
这是一个公共的事情，历史的象征性的事情。
That was different in the past when, really, that was the ticket to getting into the police force, the mayor’s office, a whole series of jobs at the aircraft factory or the shipyards.
这在过去有所不同，实际上，这是进入警察部队、市长办公室、在飞机厂或造船厂从事一系列工作的门票。
That’s no longer the case, so the incentives are different now.
但现在情况不同了，所以现在的激励措施也不同了。
You wrote in one of your books on Northern Ireland, “Parading is about power.” And also, “Parading is the issue which most concerns Orangemen today.” Explain that.
您在一本关于北爱尔兰的书中写道，“游行关乎权力。”而且，“游行是当今国足最关心的问题。”解释一下。
Why?
为什么？
Who cares about parading?
谁关心游行？
I don’t.
我不知道。
For many Orangemen it’s the .
对于许多国足来说，这就是。
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Many of them won’t really attend these lodge meetings, which are quite boring, and what they’re really in it for is that once-a-year spectacle.
他们中的许多人不会真正参加这些分会会议，这些会议非常无聊，他们真正参加的是一年一度的盛会。
If you take that away, that’s a big reason why they joined in the first place, so it’s very emotional.
如果你把这一点去掉，那就是他们最初加入的一个重要原因，所以这是非常令人激动的。
Also, these routes are, in some cases, hundreds of years old, so there is that symbolic attachment.
此外，这些路线在某些情况下已有数百年历史，因此具有象征意义。
It is also about power.
这也与权力有关。
Certainly, in the older days this was about showing who was in control, particularly in areas that were where the Protestants were parading through Catholic areas.
当然，在过去，这是为了表明谁在控制，特别是在新教徒穿过天主教区游行的地区。
But now most of those routes have been rerouted or closed.
但现在大多数路线已经改道或关闭。
So yeah, it’s very much a symbolic issue.
所以，是的，这在很大程度上是一个象征性的问题。
And the sense amongst the unionists is that their culture is being taken away from them in a way — that in a sense, only Protestant culture is being targeted, and other forms of cultural expression, such as the Irish language, are supported.
工会成员的感觉是，他们的文化正在以某种方式被夺走——从某种意义上说，只有新教文化成为目标，而其他形式的文化表达形式，例如爱尔兰语，则受到支持。
So I think that’s part of the issue there.
所以我认为这是问题的一部分。
If the Orange Order is some form of white identity politics, why is there an Orange Order in Ghana?
如果橙色勋章是某种形式的白人身份政治，那么为什么加纳会有橙色勋章？
And why does it appear to be growing?
为什么它似乎在增长？
I don’t think it is a form of white identity politics, actually, and that’s why you’re right, that in West Africa .
实际上，我不认为这是白人身份政治的一种形式，这就是为什么你是对的，在西非。
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Actually, by the way, there are native Indian lodges in Canada, for example, as well, which thrive.
顺便说一句，实际上，例如在加拿大也有一些印第安人旅馆，生意兴隆。
It’s mainly about being Protestant, so it’s a Protestant identity.
它主要是关于成为新教徒，所以它是新教身份。
Of course, it depends on the setting.
当然，这取决于设置。
In Northern Ireland, for a long time, the Protestants were the dominant ethnic group as well, and so it functioned as a sort of association and fraternity for that group.
在北爱尔兰，很长一段时间以来，新教徒也是占主导地位的民族，因此它起到了该群体的某种协会和兄弟会的作用。
Similarly, in Canada or in Newfoundland — both of which were very strong Orange jurisdictions — the Orange Order also functioned as a kind of association for the dominant ethnic group.
同样，在加拿大或纽芬兰——“这两个地方都是非常强大的奥兰治管辖区”——“奥兰治勋章也充当了占主导地位的种族群体的一种协会。
But it doesn’t have to be that way.
但事实并非一定如此。
In Northern Ireland today, what is roughly the rate of intermarriage across Catholic-Protestant?
今天在北爱尔兰，天主教与新教之间的通婚率大致是多少？
It is a few percent.
这是百分之几。
It is very, very small.
它非常非常小。
Yeah, extremely low.
是的，非常低。
No statistics I’ve seen have shown that unfreezing, so it’s extremely rare.
我见过的统计数据没有显示解冻的情况，所以这种情况极其罕见。
Many come over to Britain who — if they marry across the sectarian divide, they might just come over to Britain because life will be less complicated for them.
许多来到英国的人——如果他们跨越宗派分歧结婚，他们可能会来到英国，因为生活对他们来说不会那么复杂。
Let’s say I meet someone in Northern Ireland.
假设我在北爱尔兰遇到了一个人。
Other than what they might say, what’s the first thing they will do or show that might indicate they’re Catholic rather than Protestant or vice versa?
除了他们可能会说的话之外，他们会做或表现出的第一件事是什么可能表明他们是天主教徒而不是新教徒，反之亦然？
What’s the empirical correlation?
经验相关性是什么？
That they will show?
他们会展示什么？
Well, they’re very good at reading the signs.
嗯，他们非常擅长阅读标志。
It could be what clothing color you’re wearing.
这可能是你穿的衣服颜色。
They might ask innocuous questions like, “Which school did you go to?” And if it starts with a “Saint,” you know that’s Catholic.
他们可能会问一些无伤大雅的问题，比如“你去了哪所学校？”如果它以“圣人”开头，你就知道那是天主教徒。
These are the signs that they pick up on.
这些是他们注意到的迹象。
On fertility and assimilation
关于生育力和同化
If we think about Catholics and Protestants in the United States, it’s striking how much the fertility gap has closed.
如果我们考虑一下美国的天主教徒和新教徒，就会发现生育率差距已经缩小了多少，这是令人震惊的。
Why has that happened?
为什么会发生这种事？
Well, what happened is, the Protestants went through the demographic transition first in Northern Ireland, 80 years before the Catholics did.
事实是，新教徒首先在北爱尔兰经历了人口转变，比天主教徒早了 80 年。
But then the Catholics entered into that, so they started reducing their fertility.
但后来天主教徒也加入了这一行列，所以他们开始降低生育率。
By 1980 in the US, the two fertility rates were pretty much identical.
到 1980 年，美国的两个生育率几乎相同。
This is just a convergence as groups enter into the mature phase of demographic transition, but some groups are lagging a little bit behind.
这只是群体进入人口转型成熟阶段时的趋同，但有些群体稍微落后了一些。
Given that the Amish have apparently a total fertility rate of 5.3 and a high retention rate — that is, Amish stay Amish — why don’t they take over the world?
鉴于阿米什人显然拥有 5.3 的总生育率和很高的保留率——也就是说，阿米什人仍然是阿米什人——为什么他们不占领世界呢？
Or will this happen?
或者会发生这种情况吗？
What exactly is the limiting factor in this kind of calculus?
这种演算的限制因素到底是什么？
This is an interesting question because I don’t see the limiting factor yet.
这是一个有趣的问题，因为我还没有看到限制因素。
You could imagine in an authoritarian country like China, they would just impose a sort of two-child policy on the Amish.
你可以想象在像中国这样的专制国家，他们只会对阿米什人实行二胎政策。
But in the absence of that, you’re right.
但如果没有的话，你是对的。
There were, I think, 5,000 Amish in the US in 1900.
我认为 1900 年美国有 5,000 名阿米什人。
There are probably 300,000 now.
现在大概有30万。
In the 2200s there will be 300 million with this rate of growth.
到2200年代，按照这个速度增长的人口将达到3亿。
So what is the limiting factor?
那么限制因素是什么呢？
One of the test cases will be Israel with the ultra-Orthodox, where they were a few percent of the first-grade population in 1960.
测试案例之一是以色列的极端正统派，1960 年，极端正统派仅占该国一级人口的百分之几。
They’re now past a third of the Jewish school first-grade population.
他们现在已经超过犹太学校一年级学生人数的三分之一。
So yeah, at what point does a high-reproducing group that retains its members either drop their fertility or start bleeding into the rest of the population?
那么，是的，一个保留其成员的高繁殖群体在什么时候要么会降低生育率，要么开始渗透到其他群体中？
That’s going to be a big question, and Israel will be the test case for that.
这将是一个大问题，以色列将成为这个问题的测试案例。
With the Amish, could it be there’s a limited number of people who can either work in agriculture or sell to tourists?
对于阿米什人来说，从事农业工作或向游客出售商品的人数是否有限？
If we, say, double the number of Amish once again, in essence, they’ll stop making good livings and outmovement will be much higher, or they’ll have fewer kids?
比如说，如果我们再次将阿米什人的数量增加一倍，从本质上讲，他们将不再过上美好的生活，而迁出率会更高，或者他们的孩子会更少？
I think these world-denying, fundamentalist sects really are not that motivated by economic incentives.
我认为这些否认世界的原教旨主义教派实际上并不是出于经济动机。
One of the reasons their populations have exploded is partly because they reject modern contraception, but also limiting family size.
他们的人口激增的原因之一是他们拒绝现代避孕措施，但也限制了家庭规模。
They’re really setting their face against the modern trend toward secularism, liberalism, low fertility.
他们确实反对世俗主义、自由主义和低生育率的现代趋势。
They’re inoculated from a lot of these pressures, and particularly the material pressures, which really drove fertility in the past.
他们承受了很多这样的压力，尤其是物质压力，这些压力在过去确实推动了生育率。
Now that we have contraception, you don’t need to have a lot of kids to work the land anymore.
既然我们有了避孕措施，你就不再需要有很多孩子来耕种土地了。
The material incentives are no longer the driver.
物质激励不再是驱动力。
Fertility is cultural and religious.
生育力是文化和宗教的。
So I think we shouldn’t expect their fertility to come down even if they run out of land.
所以我认为即使他们耗尽了土地，我们也不应该指望他们的生育能力会下降。
Will the Mormon birth rate crash?
摩门教出生率会崩溃吗？
Or are they, too, going to take over the world?
或者他们也将接管世界？
They have a head start on the Amish, right?
他们比阿米什人领先，对吗？
Many more Mormons than Amish.
摩门教徒比阿米什人多得多。
That’s right.
这是正确的。
Six million versus 300,000 in America.
美国是 600 万，而美国是 30 万。
Their fertility rate is almost twice that of the rest of the population.
他们的生育率几乎是其他人口的两倍。
If the American fertility rate continues to go down, it could be that the Mormon one actually goes up to about twice as much.
如果美国的生育率继续下降，摩门教徒的生育率实际上可能会上升到两倍左右。
When you’re maintaining twice the fertility rate as the rest of the population and you have a fairly high retention, you multiply that over generations, and it rises exponentially.
当你保持两倍于其他人口的生育率并且你有相当高的保留率时，你的生育率会随着几代人的增加而增加，并且呈指数级增长。
So we should expect the Mormons to be more influential in future generations in the United States.
因此，我们应该期望摩门教徒对美国的后代产生更大的影响。
But there seems to be a lot of outmovement from the side of Mormon males who don’t repudiate Mormonism, but they might be willing to marry a Christian woman who is not Mormon, and they slowly bleed into just being Christian over time.
但似乎有很多摩门教男性并不否认摩门教，但他们可能愿意娶一个非摩门教的基督教女性，随着时间的推移，他们慢慢地变成了基督徒。
The number of unmarried Mormon women who are somewhat older seems to be an extreme imbalance, indicating retention rates are not as high as they’re measured perhaps?
年龄稍大的未婚摩门教女性数量似乎极度不平衡，这表明保留率也许没有测量的那么高？
I think it depends whether we’re talking about the core in Utah and perhaps spilling into Idaho versus Mormons who live outside the core.
我认为这取决于我们是否正在谈论犹他州的核心，以及可能蔓延到爱达荷州与居住在核心之外的摩门教徒。
I think Mormons outside the core have a higher intermarriage rate and perhaps are more likely to assimilate into the mainstream.
我认为核心之外的摩门教徒有更高的通婚率，也许更有可能融入主流。
But if you take that core settlement area, I think the intermarriage would be pretty low.
但如果你考虑那个核心定居区，我认为异族通婚的比例会相当低。
Do you think that the very religious will always have much higher birth rates than secular individuals?
您是否认为宗教人士的出生率总是比世俗人士高得多？
Is there some technology that could overturn that, or is that just baked into us?
是否有某种技术可以颠覆这一点，或者它只是我们固有的？
I think it’s pretty baked in.
我觉得它已经烤得很熟了。
If you look worldwide, next to women’s education, religiosity is the next strongest predictor of total fertility rate.
如果放眼全球，宗教信仰是仅次于女性教育程度的总生育率的第二强预测因素。
There’s almost no country in the world where committed religious women have a below-replacement fertility.
世界上几乎没有哪个国家的虔诚宗教女性的生育率低于更替水平。
The difference in Western developed countries — the religiosity actually matters more than women’s education.
西方发达国家的差异——宗教信仰实际上比女性教育更重要。
So I don’t see that factor going away.
所以我认为这个因素不会消失。
I think it’s going to be a key factor driving fertility differences going forward.
我认为这将成为推动未来生育率差异的关键因素。
If you look worldwide, next to women’s education, religiosity is the next strongest predictor of total fertility rate.
如果放眼全球，宗教信仰是仅次于女性教育程度的总生育率的第二强预测因素。
There’s almost no country in the world where committed religious women have a below-replacement fertility.
世界上几乎没有哪个国家的虔诚宗教女性的生育率低于更替水平。
The difference in Western developed countries — the religiosity actually matters more than women’s education.
西方发达国家的差异——宗教信仰实际上比女性教育更重要。
So I don’t see that factor going away.
所以我认为这个因素不会消失。
I think it’s going to be a key factor driving fertility differences going forward.
我认为这将成为推动未来生育率差异的关键因素。
Could wealth overturn that?
财富能推翻这一点吗？
Now it’s an in thing for, say, a billionaire family to have four kids, five kids.
现在，比如说，一个亿万富翁家庭有四个孩子、五个孩子已经是一件很平常的事情了。
Right.
正确的。
And of course, they can handle it rather readily.
当然，他们可以很容易地处理它。
But if you extrapolate out, say, 80 years, and many more people are quite wealthy.
但如果你推断一下，比如 80 年，就会发现更多的人相当富有。
And maybe there are cheap ways — using surveillance, robots, whatever — to take care of kids, and then the wealthiest families have the most kids.
也许有一些廉价的方法——“使用监控、机器人等等”——来照顾孩子，然后最富有的家庭拥有最多的孩子。
They may or may not be religious, but the gradient of extreme religion and fertility might go away?
他们可能有宗教信仰，也可能没有宗教信仰，但极端宗教和生育率的梯度可能会消失？
Possibly.
可能吧。
We’re already seeing that the wealthiest and the best educated women, actually, are now having more kids than those with just a BA or of moderate wealth.
事实上，我们已经看到，最富有和受过最好教育的女性现在比那些只有学士学位或中等财富的女性拥有更多的孩子。
So some of what you’re saying has already kicked in in the last, say, 10, 20 years.
所以你所说的一些内容在过去，比如说，10、20 年里已经开始发挥作用了。
But it’s still below replacement, even amongst that wealthy, high-educated group.
但即使在富裕、受过高等教育的群体中，它仍然低于替代水平。
But it’s certainly possible if, as you say, we get some cheap childcare.
但正如你所说，如果我们能得到一些便宜的托儿服务，这当然是可能的。
But I still fundamentally think there’s something there in the theology about “go forth and multiply” and women having a traditional role that tends to be associated with higher fertility.
但我仍然从根本上认为，神学中有一些关于“前进和繁衍”的东西，而女性所扮演的传统角色往往与更高的生育率相关。
The other part of this is, participation in a congregation gives a support network around child-minding, childcare, and creates a more pro-natalist atmosphere.
另一方面，参与教会活动可以建立一个围绕儿童看护、儿童保育的支持网络，并创造一种更支持生育的氛围。
To some extent, in Israel even, because of the high birth rate amongst the religious, it seems to have bled into the secular population as well.
在某种程度上，甚至在以色列，由于宗教人士的高出生率，它似乎也渗透到了世俗人口中。
So the secular Jewish women have, on average, 2.2 kids, which is extremely high for any secular population.
因此，世俗犹太女性平均有 2.2 个孩子，这对于任何世俗人口来说都是极高的。
Do conservative Muslims also have a much higher fertility rate?
保守的穆斯林的生育率也高得多吗？
The gradient between very conservative and sort of secular and liberal is not as strong in Islam as it is in Judaism or Christianity, but it’s about a twice higher fertility for women who are most in favor of Sharia compared to those who are most opposed to Sharia, in the cities.
在伊斯兰教中，非常保守与世俗和自由之间的梯度并不像犹太教或基督教那样强烈，但在城市中，最支持伊斯兰教法的女性的生育率大约是最反对伊斯兰教法的女性的两倍。
So I do think there is also this dynamic within Islam, yes.
所以我确实认为伊斯兰教内部也存在这种动力，是的。
If we look at a country such as Iran, which now has a very low total fertility rate, is that a sign they’re not actually very religious?
如果我们看看像伊朗这样的国家，它现在的总生育率非常低，这是不是表明他们实际上不太虔诚？
Or there’s something unusual about religion in Iran?
或者伊朗的宗教有什么不寻常的地方？
What accounts for that?
这是什么原因？
If you go back to Khomeini, they actually issued fatwas that endorsed the family policies.
如果你回到霍梅尼，他们实际上发布了支持家庭政策的教令。
The mullahs themselves, the religious authorities themselves, actually endorsed family planning and contraception.
毛拉本身，宗教权威本身，实际上支持计划生育和避孕。
So this is not a secular thing, necessarily, in Iran.
因此，这在伊朗不一定是世俗的事情。
But getting back to the question of whether the very religious might end up with lower birth rates, isn’t that a scenario?
但回到这个问题，宗教信仰是否会导致出生率降低，这不是一种情况吗？
Whatever reasons those religious leaders had to endorse birth control, why couldn’t a more distant future have, say, other religious leaders in the West doing the same?
无论这些宗教领袖出于何种原因必须支持节育，为什么在更遥远的未来，西方的其他宗教领袖就不能这样做呢？
I agree.
我同意。
If the religious leaders say so, then I think they can bring the birth rates down very quickly, as we saw in Iran in the space of, what was it?
如果宗教领袖这么说，那么我认为他们可以很快降低出生率，就像我们在伊朗看到的那样，那是什么？
20 years, from 6 to 1.8 per woman.
20 年，每位女性从 6 颗增加到 1.8 颗。
Yeah, that is a scenario.
是的，这是一个场景。
You could have leaders who would say, “We just can’t sustain this runaway population growth.
有些领导人可能会说：“我们无法维持这种失控的人口增长。
We have to bring the birth rate down.
我们必须降低出生率。
And by the way, God says it’s the right thing to do.”
顺便说一句，上帝说这是正确的做法。”
So that is certainly a scenario that I could imagine occurring, but by then, they’ve taken power, and for the seculars, you’d have to ask the question, “Do you want that?”
所以这当然是我可以想象发生的情况，但到那时，他们已经掌权了，对于世俗人士来说，你必须问一个问题：“你想要这样吗？”
So that’s, in your view, a kind of theological strength of Islam, that it can be flexible in this way that Western Christianity can’t?
那么，在您看来，这就是伊斯兰教的一种神学力量，它可以以西方基督教所不能的方式灵活？
If Iran needs a lower birth rate, Muslim theology has brought it there?
如果伊朗需要更低的出生率，穆斯林神学已经把它带到了那里？
Well, I’m one of these people who thinks the theology can be tweaked to give you any interpretation so that the Christians and Jews could come up with something similar in a pinch.
嗯，我是这样的人之一，他们认为神学可以被调整来给你任何解释，这样基督徒和犹太人就可以在紧要关头想出类似的东西。
I guess that would be my take on the matter, yeah.
我想这就是我对此事的看法，是的。
What’s your projection for the long-run percentage of Muslims in Western Europe?
您对西欧穆斯林的长期比例有何预测？
This is much debated.
这一点备受争议。
You hear a lot of exaggerated claims that by year X — fill in the blank — they’ll be more than half the population.
你会听到很多夸张的说法，说到 X —— 填空 —— 他们将超过人口的一半。
What should we actually think and why?
我们实际上应该思考什么以及为什么？
I don’t think we’re going to head to much more than about 20, 25 at the most, percent.
我认为我们最多不会超过 20%、25%。
There’s a number of reasons I say that.
我这么说有很多原因。
Number one, even if the European population consisted only of immigrants, if the immigration flow is only minority Muslim — I think the average is only about 20, 25 percent — then that’s going to be your population.
第一，即使欧洲人口仅由移民组成，如果移民流中只有少数民族穆斯林 —— 我认为平均只有约 20%、25% ——那么这将是你的人口。
The other thing is, the birth rates for Muslims are really not that different, including if we go into the Muslim world, particularly the Arab world.
另一件事是，穆斯林的出生率实际上并没有那么不同，包括如果我们进入穆斯林世界，特别是阿拉伯世界。
The birth rates have really come down dramatically in the last two decades.
在过去的二十年里，出生率确实急剧下降。
Added to that is that intermarriage is a route through which Muslims or their children lose religion.
除此之外，通婚是穆斯林或其子女失去宗教信仰的一种途径。
I’ve looked at individual-level census data in this country, where we can see that the offspring of people who are part, say, Pakistani or Arab and part white British — that kind of person, between 2001 and 2011, had quite a high chance of moving from saying, “I’m a Muslim,” to saying, “I have no religion.”
我查看了这个国家的个人人口普查数据，我们可以看到，具有巴基斯坦或阿拉伯血统和英国白人血统的人的后代，在 2001 年至 2011 年间，很有可能从“我是穆斯林”转变为“我没有宗教信仰”。
There are certain groups, like the Bosnians, who have a quite high, I would say, a kind of fall-off from religion.
我想说，有些群体，比如波斯尼亚人，对宗教的迷恋程度相当高。
There’s secularization potential through intermarriage, and also the immigration flow is just not Muslim enough to produce this majority.
通过异族通婚有世俗化的潜力，而且移民潮中的穆斯林还不足以产生如此多的人口。
So I don’t think it’ll ever be more than about 20, 25 percent.
所以我认为这个比例永远不会超过 20%、25%。
Which group of French Muslims has assimilated most successfully and why?
哪个法国穆斯林群体同化最成功？为什么？
Well, the outmarriage rate is almost 50 percent for French Algerian men, but even across the Franco-Algerian community, I think it’s in the 40 to 50 percent outmarriage —
嗯，法裔阿尔及利亚男性的异婚率几乎是 50%，但即使在整个法裔阿尔及利亚社区，我认为异婚率也有 40% 到 50%——
And they’re marrying ethnically white French women?
他们要娶法国白人女性吗？
Right, or men.
对了，还是男人。
I think part of this stems from Algeria in its history.
我认为这部分源于阿尔及利亚的历史。
You have a large Berber population in Algeria, many of whom are anti the regime.
阿尔及利亚有大量柏柏尔人，其中许多人反对现政权。
They’re anti the Arab-Islamist regime.
他们反对阿拉伯伊斯兰政权。
So they’re actually quite secular in many ways.
所以他们实际上在很多方面都很世俗。
That’s part of it, but even amongst the Moroccans in France, there’s quite a high outmarriage rate of like 40 percent.
这是其中的一部分，但即使在法国的摩洛哥人中，异婚率也很高，约为 40%。
So yeah, the French Muslims do seem to be melting in better than Muslims even of the same ethnicity.
所以，是的，即使是同一种族的穆斯林，法国穆斯林似乎确实比穆斯林更好地融入。
Compared to Moroccans in the Netherlands, for example, there’s a much higher outmarriage in France.
例如，与荷兰的摩洛哥人相比，法国的异婚率要高得多。
And that’s the Berber factor, in your view?
您认为这就是柏柏尔因素？
I think it is the Berber factor.
我认为这是柏柏尔因素。
I don’t think there’s anything magical that the French are doing that the Dutch are not in terms of integration policy.
我不认为法国人在一体化政策方面有什么神奇之处而荷兰人却没有。
I think too much is made of that.
我认为这太过分了。
What’s your assessment for Turkish assimilation in Germany?
您对土耳其在德国的同化有何评价？
Because a lot of the Turks have been there, now, quite a while.
因为很多土耳其人已经在那里呆了很长一段时间了。
Yeah, I would think that long term, they will intermarry.
是的，我认为从长远来看，他们会通婚。
If you look at Turkey itself, it’s actually a reasonably secular country, and the birth rates have come down quite a bit.
如果你看看土耳其本身，它实际上是一个相当世俗的国家，出生率已经下降了很多。
Intermarriage is going to be the route.
异族通婚将成为必经之路。
It’s not going to be Turks within the Turkish community moving away from Islam, but I think intermarriage is a route through which the offspring will then be relatively secular.
土耳其社区内的土耳其人不会远离伊斯兰教，但我认为异族通婚是后代相对世俗化的一条途径。
I do think, even though those rates are not high now, I think they probably will increase.
我确实认为，尽管现在这些比率并不高，但我认为它们可能会增加。
That would be my projection.
这就是我的预测。
I know this is a hard one to call, but what is your prediction for the Syrian refugees now living in Germany?
我知道这很难说，但您对目前居住在德国的叙利亚难民有何预测？
Again, they’re not a sort of strongly Salafist group.
再说一次，他们不是一种强烈的萨拉菲主义团体。
I would think groups from South Asia — Pakistanis in particular — tend to be very unlikely to intermarry.
我认为来自南亚的群体——尤其是巴基斯坦人——往往不太可能通婚。
In this country, for example, there’s a very low .
例如，在这个国家，这一比例非常低。
.
。
.
。
Whereas I would’ve thought the Syrians would have a higher intermarriage rate and a higher secularization rate long term.
而我本以为叙利亚人从长远来看会有更高的异族通婚率和更高的世俗化率。
So I do think they also will assimilate.
所以我确实认为他们也会同化。
Maybe it takes two, three generations, but that would be, again, a prediction I would make.
也许这需要两、三代人的时间，但这将是我再次做出的预测。
Why do Pakistanis in the United States seem to assimilate so much better?
为什么在美国的巴基斯坦人似乎更容易被同化？
They have very high per capita incomes, high rates of education.
他们的人均收入非常高，受教育率也很高。
It seems like almost a complete success.
看起来几乎完全成功了。
I would have to know the intermarriage rates there.
我必须知道那里的通婚率。
There are different meanings of assimilation.
同化有不同的含义。
One is acquiring the language and doing well in the economy.
一是学习语言并在经济中取得良好的成绩。
The other would be intermarrying in and essentially becoming part of the ethnic majority.
另一种则与多数民族通婚，并基本上成为其中的一部分。
But just no one complains about them.
但没有人抱怨他们。
Take that as a kind of brute standard.
将此视为一种残酷的标准。
The first thing is, they’re probably selected.
首先，他们可能被选中了。
Pakistan has a relatively educated urban elite in the cities, and then it has, let’s say, not tribal, but sort of areas of the country — particularly in the border with Afghanistan — Balochistan and other areas there, where people are more traditional, agricultural.
巴基斯坦的城市中有相对受过教育的城市精英，可以说，它不是部落的，而是国家的某种地区——特别是在与阿富汗接壤的俾路支省和其他地区，那里的人们更加传统、务农。
This is the issue with cousin marriage that we have here in Britain amongst a subset of the Pakistani population.
这就是英国部分巴基斯坦人口中存在的表亲婚姻问题。
My impression is that that’s not .
我的印象是事实并非如此。
.
。
.
。
Sylhet would be a region where people were — or was it Meerpur?
锡尔赫特（Sylhet）将是一个有人居住的地区——或者是米尔普尔（Meerpur）？
I keep getting mixed up — People were recruited into the textile factories, and you have these familial cousin-marriage links.
我一直搞混了 —— 人们被招募到纺织厂，还有这些表亲婚姻关系。
My impression is the American Pakistanis wouldn’t have been drawn from that same subpopulation.
我的印象是，美国巴基斯坦人不会来自同一人群。
So that might explain the difference.
这或许可以解释其中的差异。
Sometimes the argument is made — I think this comes from Jack Goody — that high rates of cousin marriage are inimical to liberalism or free society.
有时会提出这样的论点：“我认为这来自杰克·古迪”——高表亲结婚率不利于自由主义或自由社会。
You have an opinion on this?
您对此有何看法？
I know, again, data are hard to bring to bear, but you have an intuition?
我再次知道，数据很难应用，但你有直觉吗？
Yeah, that would certainly make sense to me.
是的，这对我来说肯定有意义。
When you’re oriented around family and extended family in that way, and that’s the worldview that you acquire, then yes, that is obviously the opposite of a kind of liberal, individualistic worldview.
当你以这种方式围绕家庭和大家庭时，这就是你获得的世界观，那么，是的，这显然与自由主义、个人主义的世界观相反。
So it makes sense to me, but again, I have no data on that.
所以这对我来说是有道理的，但同样，我没有这方面的数据。
But the most religious Americans with big families, sometimes extended families, they almost seem to be the strongest supporters of the American brand of liberal individualism.
但最虔诚的美国人，拥有大家庭，有时甚至是大家庭，他们几乎似乎是美国自由个人主义品牌的最坚定支持者。
They’re not marrying their cousins per se, but —
他们本身并没有嫁给他们的表兄弟，但是——
Well, depends which aspects of liberal individualism.
好吧，取决于自由个人主义的哪些方面。
They may give lip service to things like low tax and independence, but it’s not clear.
他们可能会口头上说低税收和独立等事情，但具体情况并不清楚。
If you consider individualism to also extend to expressive cultural forms, such as divorce or different forms of sexuality, then I think there would be more of a clash between that brand of, say, American Christianity or Christian fundamentalism and individualism.
如果你认为个人主义也延伸到表达文化形式，例如离婚或不同形式的性行为，那么我认为美国基督教或基督教原教旨主义与个人主义之间会有更多的冲突。
So yeah, I think economic individualism is probably okay, but the cultural or expressive kind, I think there would be more of a clash.
所以，是的，我认为经济个人主义可能还不错，但文化或表达方面，我认为会有更多冲突。
The data are imperfect on this one, but you often hear it claimed that many parts of Africa — when they urbanize, they’re relatively slow to undergo secularization and falling birth rates.
这方面的数据并不完美，但你经常听到有人声称，非洲的许多地区——当它们城市化时，它们经历世俗化和出生率下降的速度相对较慢。
If you go to Nigeria, just visually, this seems to be true.
如果你去尼日利亚，仅仅从视觉上看，这似乎是真的。
There are churches everywhere.
到处都有教堂。
Do you have an account of why this might be the case?
您知道为什么会出现这种情况吗？
The fertility stall in Africa, you mean?
你是说非洲的生育停滞？
No; when they move to cities, the fertility rate doesn’t fall much.
不;当他们搬到城市时，生育率并没有下降太多。
It doesn’t.
事实并非如此。
I mean, it does in some cases.
我的意思是，在某些情况下确实如此。
Addis Ababa in Ethiopia has got a two total-fertility rate, so it does seem to be happening in some places and not in others.
埃塞俄比亚亚的斯亚贝巴的总生育率达到了两倍，因此某些地方似乎确实出现了这种情况，而另一些地方却没有。
I don’t have a good sense of necessarily why that’s happening.
我不太清楚为什么会发生这种情况。
Some societies where there’s strong ethnic and religious competition, local politicians want to keep numbers up and their constituencies strong and growing.
在一些种族和宗教竞争激烈的社会，当地政客希望保持人数的增加以及他们的选民的强大和不断增长。
That could be one factor.
这可能是因素之一。
Patriarchal attitude’s another.
重男轻女的态度是另一种。
But it is the case that in some sub-Saharan African countries — clearly South Africa, where South African blacks have about a two, also a replacement-level fertility.
但事实是，在一些撒哈拉以南非洲国家——尤其是南非，南非黑人的生育率约为二，也达到更替水平。
So there are some countries where this has occurred.
所以有些国家已经发生过这种情况。
I know some people say the data might not be very accurate in some countries on fertility, but I think, in general, the consensus is that you’re right, that these fertility rates have not dropped.
我知道有些人说某些国家的生育率数据可能不太准确，但我认为，总的来说，共识是你是对的，这些生育率并没有下降。
I would put it down more to a cultural reason rather than anything economic in that case.
在这种情况下，我会将其更多地归因于文化原因，而不是经济原因。
I have some friends who obsess over the long term, and they’re fond of making the argument that Darwinian forces, over some time horizon, will bring almost the entire world to greater religiousness if religious families keep on having more children, and that maybe 400 years from now, we’ll have a world where most people are just flat-out religious.
我有一些痴迷于长远的朋友，他们喜欢提出这样的论点：在一段时间内，如果宗教家庭继续生更多的孩子，达尔文主义的力量将使几乎整个世界变得更加虔诚，也许从现在起 400 年后，我们将拥有一个大多数人都是彻头彻尾的宗教信仰的世界。
Do you attach any credence to this at all?
你对此有任何信心吗？
Well, with some caveats.
嗯，有一些警告。
It’s true that secular populations — defined as people who say they have no religion — everywhere in the world have very low, well below replacement, fertility.
确实，世俗人口 （定义为自称没有宗教信仰的人） 世界各地的生育率都非常低，远低于更替水平。
People who are regular attenders all have replacement or above, with fundamentalists having very high fertility.
经常参加的人都有替代或以上的人，其中原教旨主义者的生育率非常高。
Now you run that forward.
现在你向前跑。
It’s hard to see how we get to a situation in which it’s not mainly religious, unless there’s an equilibrium where the rate of religious loss is fast enough to offset the demographic deficit of the seculars.
很难看出我们如何达到一种不以宗教为主的局面，除非存在一种平衡，即宗教消失的速度足够快，足以抵消世俗人口的人口赤字。
There is a scenario — I do think that the kind of liberal, tolerant, secular society is quite an ideal one for religious groups to expand demographically.
有一种情况 —— 我确实认为那种自由、宽容、世俗的社会对于宗教团体扩大人口来说是相当理想的社会。
If we imagine China having Amish or ultra-Orthodox or these groups growing rapidly, the Chinese government would say, “Okay, you’re allowed to have two kids or one kid.” And that would be the end of it.
如果我们想象中国有阿米什人或极端正统派或这些团体迅速增长，中国政府会说，“好吧，你可以生两个孩子或一个孩子。”事情就这样结束了。
Right?
正确的？
So it’s within a certain environment that the religious can take over, and that is a sort of democratic, liberal environment.
所以只有在一定的环境下宗教才能接管，那就是一种民主、自由的环境。
But within an authoritarian environment, they do very badly.
但在独裁环境下，他们的表现却非常糟糕。
So it just depends on what is the environment in which they’re operating.
因此，这仅取决于他们的运行环境。
You’ve lived in Japan for, what, eight years?
你在日本住了大概八年了？
Why is Japanese fertility so low?
为什么日本的生育率这么低？
Well, the way it works with fertility is that, if you’re very patriarchal, you have high fertility.
嗯，它与生育率的关系是，如果你非常重男轻女，你的生育率就会很高。
If you are not patriarchal at all, you have moderate fertility.
如果你根本没有父权制，那么你的生育能力就中等。
And if you’re in the middle, you tend to have really low fertility.
如果你处于中间，你的生育率往往很低。
The thing in Japan is that women — they know that once they stop working, they will essentially just be folding shirts for their husband.
日本的情况是，女性——她们知道，一旦停止工作，她们基本上就只是为丈夫叠衬衫。
I think that part of this is that, because the society is still relatively patriarchal, it has that very low fertility.
我认为部分原因是，因为社会仍然相对父权制，所以生育率非常低。
Something similar in southern Europe that we see also, again, very low fertility.
在南欧，我们也看到了类似的情况，生育率非常低。
So one of the ways this is explained is that, if you give women the opportunity to enter and exit the workforce relatively easily and you don’t impose a very sort of patriarchal gender role, then you will get somewhat higher fertility.
因此，解释这一现象的一种方法是，如果你给女性相对容易地进入和退出劳动力市场的机会，并且你不强加一种非常重男轻女的性别角色，那么你会获得更高的生育率。
Japan fits that pattern of southern Europe.
日本符合南欧的模式。
How secular is Japan really?
日本究竟有多世俗？
If I watch a Miyazaki movie, there’s spirits all over the place.
如果我看宫崎骏的电影，到处都是鬼魂。
Is that just for kids and for fun?
这只是为了孩子和好玩吗？
Is that a substitute religion?
这是替代宗教吗？
Are they simply as secular as they appear to be?
他们真的像看上去那样世俗吗？
Yeah, it’s a hard one to know.
是的，这很难知道。
I remember in kindergarten having to kneel down with the Buddhist statue there.
我记得在幼儿园的时候，必须跪着那里的佛像。
There are all these quasi-religious rituals, but I don’t think they really believe in a cosmological way, in an otherworldly way.
有所有这些准宗教仪式，但我不认为他们真正相信宇宙论、超凡脱俗的方式。
I think it is a relatively secular society, but with these almost cultural rituals like Shintoism.
我认为这是一个相对世俗的社会，但是有这些几乎像神道教这样的文化仪式。
This is not really about praying to a god.
这实际上并不是向神祈祷。
I wouldn’t classify it as having a relationship with the otherworld, so not religious in my view.
我不会将其归类为与另一个世界有关系，因此在我看来不是宗教。
How pacifistic has Japan actually become in your opinion?
在您看来，日本实际上已经变得多么和平了？
I think pretty pacifist, and this is why there’s many dimensions of nationalism.
我认为相当和平主义者，这就是为什么民族主义有很多方面。
You can have a dimension which is about militarism and pride in your military, which Japan doesn’t have.
你可以有一个关于军国主义和对军队的自豪感的维度，这是日本所没有的。
But then they have a very strong attachment to an ethno-communal definition of the nation.
但他们对国家的民族社区定义有着非常强烈的依恋。
On populism and immigration
关于民粹主义和移民
A few questions about what’s sometimes called populism.
关于有时被称为民粹主义的一些问题。
It seems that Portugal is fairly immune to alt-right or populist politics.
葡萄牙似乎对另类右翼或民粹主义政治相当免疫。
Do you have any sense of why that’s the case?
你知道为什么会这样吗？
I think, really, it’s as simple as the share of Muslim non-Christian immigrants —
我认为，实际上，这就像穆斯林非基督教移民的比例一样简单——
Is low.
很低。
Is very low.
非常低。
So it’s your core thesis that populism is responding to immigration?
那么您的核心论点是民粹主义正在应对移民？
Yeah, if they were getting large numbers of Muslims or non-Christians, then I think you would see it there.
是的，如果他们有大量穆斯林或非基督徒，那么我想你会在那里看到它。
I don’t think they’re immune.
我认为他们不能幸免。
What about Canada, which is one of the most welcoming nations for immigrants?
加拿大是最欢迎移民的国家之一，那么加拿大呢？
Right, and of course, being Canadian I think I know Canada fairly well.
是的，当然，作为加拿大人，我认为我对加拿大相当了解。
There’s French Canada and English Canada.
有加拿大法语和加拿大英语。
French Canada is, I think, very similar to continental Europe and is responding.
我认为，法属加拿大与欧洲大陆非常相似，并且正在做出回应。
The CAQ, which won the provincial election on an immigration reduction platform, is something I would classify as a populist right party.
CAQ以减少移民为纲领赢得了省级选举，我将其归类为民粹主义右翼政党。
English Canada — we’ve obviously had elections such as in Ontario — the Doug Ford Conservative administration, which has elements of this populism.
加拿大 ——我们显然已经举行了像安大略省这样的选举——道格·福特保守党政府，其中含有这种民粹主义的元素。
Also, there’s a new party called the People’s Party, which did get 11 percent in a by-election in greater Vancouver.
此外，还有一个名为人民党的新政党，在大温哥华地区补选中确实获得了 11% 的选票。
So I think the idea that English Canada is immune from this is actually wrong, and we’re going to see more of it going forward.
因此，我认为加拿大英语不受此影响的想法实际上是错误的，我们将在未来看到更多这样的情况。
The electorate is now more polarized on cultural issues than it’s ever been in Canada.
现在，加拿大选民在文化问题上的两极分化程度比以往任何时候都更加严重。
We’re going to have to see where that goes, but I don’t think Canada will be the great exception that it has been for much, much longer.
我们必须看看这种情况会发生什么，但我认为加拿大不会是一个伟大的例外，这种情况已经持续了很长一段时间了。
So there’ll be more of a turn against immigration?
那么反对移民的声音会更多吗？
Yeah.
是的。
In Canada.
在加拿大。
Yes, and immigration attitudes are now very different, depending if you’re a Conservative or a Liberal voter.
是的，现在对移民的态度非常不同，这取决于您是保守党还是自由党选民。
That didn’t use to be the case even five years ago, so there is more of a politicization of that issue now.
即使五年前也不是这样的，所以现在这个问题更多地政治化了。
What about Scotland?
苏格兰呢？
When you poll Scots, they seem to be about as worried about immigration as are the English, but they’re not as strongly “leave by any means from the European Union.” Does that fit your story or run counter to it?
当你对苏格兰人进行民意调查时，他们似乎和英国人一样担心移民问题，但他们并没有那么强烈地“无论如何都要离开欧盟”。这符合你的故事还是与之相反？
It doesn’t run that counter to it.
它并不与之相反。
First of all, Scotland has a smaller immigration, less of a non-Christian population.
首先，苏格兰的移民较少，非基督教人口也较少。
But in addition, Scottish nationalism is explicitly kind of pro-European, pro-immigration.
但除此之外，苏格兰民族主义显然是支持欧洲、支持移民的。
That is the message that they have been running with.
这就是他们一直带着的信息。
Given that pressure, Scottish nationalism is, in some way, a cross-cutting cleavage to this sort of anti-immigration populism, and that explains some of the Scottish dynamics around “leave” and “remain.”
考虑到这种压力，苏格兰民族主义在某种程度上是与这种反移民民粹主义的交叉分裂，这解释了苏格兰围绕“脱欧”和“留欧”的一些动态。
You get upset at England instead of at the EU?
你对英国而不是欧盟感到不满吗？
That’s right.
这是正确的。
And you think of Scotland in the EU, so it’s Scottish independence within the European Union, although it is interesting that, actually, whether we’re looking at those who voted for or against independence in Scotland, they both have roughly similar views on Brexit.
你想到欧盟中的苏格兰，所以这是苏格兰在欧盟内的独立，尽管有趣的是，实际上，无论我们关注的是那些投票支持或反对苏格兰独立的人，他们对英国退欧的看法大致相似。
There’s a lot of people who want Scotland to leave who are also Brexiteers.
有很多希望苏格兰脱欧的人也是脱欧派。
I know this has been going on for years now, but do you in fact have a Brexit prediction?
我知道这种情况已经持续多年了，但您实际上有英国脱欧的预测吗？
I still believe it’ll sort of slouch towards some soft Brexit in the end, when people are looking over the cliff.
我仍然相信，当人们把目光投向悬崖后时，最终会走向软脱欧。
Only at the last minute will they come up with a decision because I think that the Labour Party has to come up with a story that it can get away with with its supporters.
只有在最后一刻他们才会做出决定，因为我认为工党必须想出一个可以摆脱其支持者的故事。
If they say, “We had to vote for this deal or else we would’ve had a hard crash out of Brexit.
如果他们说：“我们必须投票支持这项协议，否则我们将因英国脱欧而遭遇严重崩溃。
That’s the only reason we voted for this deal,” that might be acceptable to its “remain” supporters.
这是我们投票支持这项协议的唯一原因”，这可能会被“留欧”支持者接受。
Whereas, if they say, “We supported this deal, and now that’s pushed Britain out of the EU,” their supporters will punish them.
然而，如果他们说，“我们支持这项协议，但现在这将英国赶出了欧盟”，他们的支持者就会惩罚他们。
So I think it’ll be a last-minute, somewhat soft Brexit deal.
所以我认为这将是最后一刻达成的、有点软的脱欧协议。
That would be my undoubtedly wrong prediction.
这无疑是我的错误预测。
I have been saying that, but as time passes I wonder whether or not we can predict anything about this matter.
我一直这么说，但随着时间的推移，我想知道我们是否可以预测这件事。
Yeah, of course.
是的，当然。
Going back to the United States, as a group, why aren’t educated women more worried about immigration?
回到美国，作为一个群体，为什么受过教育的女性不更担心移民？
Because they don’t seem to be in polling data.
因为他们似乎没有出现在民意调查数据中。
No, they’re less worried, right?
不，他们不那么担心，对吧？
There’s still a lot of educated women who voted for Trump, for example, but just less so than other groups of people.
例如，仍然有很多受过教育的女性投票给特朗普，但比例比其他群体要少。
I don’t put a lot in the social categories, whether it’s class or even age or gender, in terms of predictors.
就预测因素而言，我并没有在社会类别中投入太多，无论是阶级，甚至是年龄或性别。
Most of the variation is within these groups and is, in my view, largely down to psychology — whether you like diversity or change — and disposition that would be linked to openness, one of the big five personality traits, or whether you prefer stability and continuity.
大多数差异都在这些群体内部，在我看来，很大程度上取决于心理学——“你喜欢多样性还是变化”——以及与开放性（五大人格特质之一）相关的性格，或者你是否喜欢稳定性和连续性。
We find those kinds of people amongst educated women, white working-class men, et cetera.
我们在受过教育的女性、白人工人阶级男性等中发现了这类人。
But I wouldn’t say that there’s necessarily much in the educated female experience per se that would make somebody be pro-immigration.
但我不会说受过教育的女性经历本身一定有很多东西会让某人支持移民。
How much of American politics do you think is explained by Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory?
您认为乔纳森·海特的道德基础理论可以解释多少美国政治？
Right.
正确的。
I know it works in his dataset, but when you, in other ways, try to measure personality differences across liberals and conservatives, they appear to be quite small.
我知道这在他的数据集中是有效的，但是当你以其他方式尝试衡量自由派和保守派之间的性格差异时，它们似乎很小。
So something is wrong somewhere.
所以某处出了问题。
Here’s the way I would make sense of it.
这是我理解它的方式。
Moving from those big five personality dimensions, which don’t explain that much of the variation in, let’s say, immigration attitudes or populist right voting.
从这五个主要的人格维度来看，这并不能解释移民态度或民粹主义右翼投票等方面的巨大差异。
But according to, say, Robert Plomin, once you have a particular disposition, you then select an environment that’s different.
但据罗伯特·普洛明（Robert Plomin）所说，一旦你有了某种特定的性格，你就会选择一个不同的环境。
If you are high in openness, you will select different environments, different newspapers to read, maybe different political parties, and they will reinforce those dispositions.
如果你的开放性很高，你就会选择不同的环境、不同的报纸来阅读，也许还会选择不同的政党，它们会强化这些倾向。
By the time you hit age 50 or 60, you’re way over here.
当你到了 50 岁或 60 岁的时候，你就已经到了这里。
So the effect is magnified over time.
因此，随着时间的推移，效果会被放大。
You start with these psychological dispositions that are different, but then they select environments which magnify and play on those differences.
你从这些不同的心理倾向开始，但随后他们选择了放大和利用这些差异的环境。
So it’s the interaction effect?
那么这就是交互效果吗？
Yes.
是的。
Do you think that’s becoming larger with time?
你认为随着时间的推移它会变得更大吗？
Because this issue strikes on that open v.
因为这个问题涉及到 open v。
closed cultural dimension, values dimension, more directly than the economic left/right — which didn’t engage that dimension as much — I think the fact that these immigration diversity–related issues very much do engage those psychological dimensions, I think that then becomes more the basis of politics over time.
封闭的文化维度、价值观维度，比经济左/右更直接——“它没有那么多地涉及到这个维度”——“我认为这些与移民多样性相关的问题确实涉及到这些心理维度，我认为随着时间的推移，这将成为政治的基础。
Yes.
是的。
In the United States, why have so few Catholics been elected president?
在美国，为什么天主教徒当选总统的人数如此之少？
No one seems to care, right?
似乎没有人关心，对吧？
No.
不。
But yeah.
但是是的。
It’s interesting because when John Kerry was running, really his Catholicism was just not an issue in a way it was for Kennedy, right?
这很有趣，因为当约翰·克里（John Kerry）竞选时，他的天主教信仰实际上对肯尼迪来说并不是一个问题，对吧？
I think a Catholic could easily be elected.
我认为天主教徒很容易当选。
I really think it’s just a random thing that they haven’t.
我真的认为这只是他们没有的随机事情。
Kerry could’ve been elected.
克里本来可以当选。
His Catholicism would not have been the issue.
他的天主教信仰不会成为问题。
It’s like the Supreme Court having a lot of Catholics and no Protestants.
这就像最高法院有很多天主教徒而没有新教徒。
I think it’s somewhat accidental, so I really think we could quite easily have a Catholic come in.
我认为这有点偶然，所以我真的认为我们可以很容易地让天主教徒进来。
I don’t think there’s any .
我认为没有。
.
。
.
。
Whereas prior to Kennedy, I think there was really a structural reason why you wouldn’t have had a Catholic president because there was a strong anti-Catholic dimension in the population.
而在肯尼迪之前，我认为确实有一个结构性原因导致你不会有一位天主教总统，因为人口中存在强烈的反天主教倾向。
But even if there’s no structural bias today in American electoral politics, could there be some “deep roots” reason why Catholics don’t end up in the positions to be successful presidential candidates?
但即使今天的美国选举政治不存在结构性偏见，天主教徒最终未能成为成功的总统候选人是否有一些“深层”原因？
I don’t think so, honestly.
老实说，我不这么认为。
Could it be said that a Catholic may be seen as less all-American, less presidential, and therefore would tend not to do as well?
是否可以说，天主教徒可能会被视为不那么具有美国特色，不那么总统化，因此往往不会做得那么好？
I’m not sure.
我不知道。
I just don’t think the electorate would be attuned enough into that to not select such a person going up the chain.
我只是认为选民不会对此有足够的了解，不会选择这样的人。
But again, there’s a good study in that.
但同样，这方面有一项很好的研究。
I think we’d have to see it.
我想我们必须看看。
Do you think American Muslims will evolve as a relevant interest group for either American foreign policy or any other set of issues?
您认为美国穆斯林会发展成为美国外交政策或任何其他问题的相关利益集团吗？
Or are they too diverse, and that will never happen?
或者它们太过多样化，而这种情况永远不会发生？
They will outnumber Jews soon, probably.
他们的数量可能很快就会超过犹太人。
Yes, the 2020s they will.
是的，2020 年代他们会的。
Yeah, probably they will evolve as an interest group.
是的，他们可能会发展成为一个利益集团。
But as you say, they are extremely ethnically diverse, and that will impede their ability to coordinate and organize.
但正如你所说，他们的种族极其多样化，这将阻碍他们的协调和组织能力。
What would their issue be?
他们的问题是什么？
Well, policy towards Israel-Palestine would be an obvious one.
嗯，针对以色列-巴勒斯坦的政策将是一个显而易见的政策。
But is there even a choice variable there at this point?
但此时是否还有选择变量呢？
I mean, years go on and the situation — I wouldn’t say it stays the same, but the role of the US in brokering a solution doesn’t really progress.
我的意思是，随着时间的流逝，情况 —— 我不会说情况保持不变，但美国在促成解决方案方面的作用并没有真正取得进展。
No, but the US is shoring up the Israeli side, even the moving of the embassy or defending Israel at the United Nations and all of these sorts of things, which one could imagine, with a stronger Islamic bloc, maybe countering that, perhaps.
不，但美国正在支持以色列方面，甚至搬迁大使馆或在联合国捍卫以色列以及所有这些事情，人们可以想象，一个更强大的伊斯兰集团可能会反击这一点。
But the whole Jewish thing will be interesting because the Jews have a very low fertility rate, but the ultra-Orthodox have a very high one.
但整个犹太人的事情会很有趣，因为犹太人的生育率非常低，但极端正统派的生育率非常高。
So that’s a whole other wild card.
所以这是另一个未知因素。
What did Tocqueville most get wrong about America?
托克维尔对美国最错误的是什么？
Hmm.
唔。
God, that’s a good question.
天哪，这是个好问题。
I have to think about that.
我必须考虑一下。
He made a lot of the associationalism and how that sort of buttressed American democracy — what Putnam talks about — the kind of social capital through associations.
他对结社主义做了很多阐述，以及这种如何通过结社来支撑美国民主——普特南所说的——那种社会资本。
We’ve seen that decline dramatically, so I think perhaps you might say that he overestimated the tenacity and durability of that associational life, that it may not survive the current secularization and individualism.
我们已经看到这种关系急剧下降，所以我想也许你可能会说他高估了这种社团生活的坚韧和持久性，它可能无法在当前的世俗化和个人主义中幸存下来。
Maybe that’s what he got wrong.
也许这就是他错了。
Do you think of yourself as Tocquevillian at all?
你认为自己是托克维尔式的吗？
Or you’re a descendant from Daniel Bell?
或者你是丹尼尔·贝尔的后裔？
Or where do your views come from, if you have to place yourself?
或者如果你必须给自己定位的话，你的观点从何而来？
I don’t mean in a partisan, political way, but intellectually.
我的意思不是以党派、政治的方式，而是以理智的方式。
Well, I think similar to Bell in that sense of being sort of center-center-left on economics, somewhat culturally conservative, politically liberal.
嗯，我认为与贝尔类似，在经济上有点中间偏左，文化上有点保守，政治上有点自由。
When I say culturally conservative, perhaps more on this dimension of social cohesion rather than religion, which I don’t have a strong affinity for.
当我说文化保守时，也许更多的是社会凝聚力这个维度，而不是宗教，我对宗教没有很强的亲和力。
But I don’t know about Tocqueville.
但我不了解托克维尔。
Tocquevillian in the sense I’m not a sort of libertarian individualist, and I do think there’s an importance in having social cohesion and a social fabric to underpin some of the good things that we enjoy in Western democracy.
从某种意义上说，托克维尔式的我不是一种自由主义的个人主义者，我确实认为拥有社会凝聚力和社会结构对于支撑我们在西方民主中享受的一些美好事物非常重要。
On things under- and overrated
关于被低估和高估的事情
In the middle of all these conversations, there’s a segment, underrated or overrated.
在所有这些对话的中间，有一个片段被低估或高估。
Are you game?
你是游戏吗？
Sure, okay.
当然可以。
COWEN: These are easy.
COWEN：这些很简单。
Hit me.
打我。
First one, Neil Young.
第一个是尼尔·杨。
You’re Canadian.
你是加拿大人。
I would say underrated.
我想说的是被低估了。
What’s his best stuff?
他最好的东西是什么？
I just like some of his older material.
我只是喜欢他的一些旧材料。
You know, “Old man, look at my life” — that sort of thing.
你知道，“老兄，看看我的生活”——诸如此类的话。
Glenn Gould.
格伦·古尔德.
I don’t know much about Glenn Gould except that he composed pieces about the north.
我对格伦·古尔德了解不多，只知道他写过一些关于北方的作品。
But I don’t know a whole lot about his music, so I can’t comment.
但我对他的音乐了解不多，所以无法评论。
Michel Foucault.
米歇尔·福柯。
Michel Foucault, I’d say overrated.
米歇尔·福柯，我想说被高估了。
Why?
为什么？
Well, even though I think he’s interesting, and that encountering him at that time, he would’ve been fresh and interesting.
嗯，虽然我觉得他很有趣，那个时候遇到他，也会觉得新鲜又有趣。
But by now, there have been so many imitators, and there’s been so much reprocessing that it’s just not that exciting anymore, in our day and age.
但到目前为止，已经有太多的模仿者，并且有太多的重新加工，以至于在我们这个时代，它不再那么令人兴奋了。
I’d say the number of people studying Foucault is vastly disproportionate to his importance for advancing human knowledge.
我想说，研究福柯的人数与他对人类知识进步的重要性是不成比例的。
French food in Tokyo.
东京的法国菜。
Where did you live in Japan when you lived there?
您在日本居住时住在哪里？
I lived in Tokyo.
我住在东京。
There was not much French food at the time.
当时法国菜不多。
I’d say it would be, well, overrated I guess.
我想说，我想这可能被高估了。
Horrendously expensive, no doubt.
毫无疑问，价格昂贵得可怕。
I wonder if they have the plastic models of the food with the French food as they do with the Japanese.
我想知道他们是否有法国菜和日本菜一样的塑料模型。
Sushi versus sashimi.
寿司与生鱼片。
Where’s your loyalty?
你的忠诚度在哪里？
I’d say sushi.
我会说寿司。
I don’t have any good reason for that.
我对此没有任何充分的理由。
Northern England, overrated or underrated — its future prospects?
英格兰北部，被高估还是被低估——它的未来前景？
I would say perhaps underrated.
我想说也许被低估了。
It’s certainly got, in many ways, a better quality of life than greater London.
在很多方面，它的生活质量肯定比大伦敦更好。
Unless you’re on a high income, you’d live much better there.
除非你收入很高，否则你在那里会生活得更好。
To the extent that the high-speed rail connections are put into place, maybe that’s where a lot of the activity will be in the future.
只要高铁连接到位，也许这就是未来很多活动的举办地。
Other than rentals, what’s the worst thing about living in London?
除了租房之外，住在伦敦最糟糕的事情是什么？
The crowding on the streets, on the roads.
街道上，马路上，人头攒动。
Driving is terrible here.
在这里开车很糟糕。
You mean just traffic congestion?
你的意思只是交通拥堵吗？
Traffic congestion, yeah.
交通拥堵，是的。
It’s no fun driving in London.
在伦敦开车一点也不好玩。
What’s your favorite movie?
你最喜欢的电影是什么？
Boy, maybe The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.
男孩，也许是好的、坏的和丑陋的。
Yeah, that’s a great one.
是的，那是一件很棒的事。
In your book, Whiteshift, what do you think is the best empirical argument that it’s immigration that is behind the political turmoil in the West as of late?
在你的著作《Whiteshift》中，你认为关于移民是近来西方政治动荡背后原因的最佳实证论据是什么？
You just see it time and time again — doesn’t matter which dataset you use.
你只是一次又一次地看到它—— 你使用哪个数据集并不重要。
You can look at Europe.
你可以看看欧洲。
You can look at the United States.
你可以看看美国。
It’s just about finding a correlation between voting for Trump or Brexit or Le Pen.
这只是为了找到投票支持特朗普、英国脱欧或勒庞之间的相关性。
What is it that predicts that?
是什么预示了这一点？
It’s not being poor versus being rich.
这不是贫穷与富有的对比。
It’s not disliking politicians, because far left voters are as likely to say that as populist right voters, so it is really around views on whether immigration should be reduced and by how much.
这并不是不喜欢政客，因为极左翼选民和民粹主义右翼选民一样可能这么说，所以这实际上是关于是否应该减少移民以及减少多少的看法。
And secondly, how important that issue is to you.
其次，这个问题对你来说有多重要。
Then we also see it over time, that as concern over immigration rises, populist right support rises —nine out of ten West European countries.
然后，随着时间的推移，我们还看到，随着对移民的担忧加剧，民粹主义右翼支持率上升——十分之九的西欧国家。
So I think the evidence is pretty strong in the fact that we’re still talking about the economically left behind and devolving power to localities as some way of somehow making this disappear.
因此，我认为证据非常充分，因为我们仍在谈论经济上落后的人以及向地方下放权力，以此作为某种方式让这种现象消失。
I think it’s more about hope over reality, I’d say.
我想说，我认为这更多的是希望而不是现实。
You argue in your book, Whiteshift, that we should, in some way, enable people to recognize and grant legitimacy to whiteness as an ethnic category that can have a dialogue about whiteness, which is not racist, not evil.
您在《Whiteshift》一书中指出，我们应该以某种方式让人们认识到白人作为一个种族类别并赋予其合法性，可以就白人进行对话，这不是种族主义，也不是邪恶。
Is that a fair way of putting your point?
这是表达你观点的公平方式吗？
Yeah, what I would say is that attachment to is not the same as hatred of the outgroup, right?
是的，我想说的是，对外群体的依恋并不等于对外群体的仇恨，对吗？
This is something Ashley Jardina points out also in her book.
Ashley Jardina 在她的书中也指出了这一点。
And if you look at the American National Election Study, the thermometer of whites who are warmer towards whites are not colder towards blacks, quite the opposite.
如果你看一下美国全国选举研究，就会发现对白人更温暖的白人温度计对黑人并不更冷，恰恰相反。
So there just isn’t .
所以根本就没有。
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。
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and this is, again, part of the psychological literature.
这又是心理学文献的一部分。
We’ve known that for a long time.
我们很早就知道这一点。
Unless there’s a violent conflict going on, attachment to your own group is not the same as hating an outgroup.
除非发生暴力冲突，否则对自己群体的依恋并不等同于仇恨外群体。
Attachment to being white or attachment to a North European ancestry is not a predictor of disliking a minority.
对白人身份的依恋或对北欧血统的依恋并不意味着不喜欢少数族裔。
The problem is, if we try and mash those together and outlaw this identity, we store up more trouble than if we simply say, “Okay.
问题是，如果我们尝试将这些混杂在一起并取缔这种身份，那么我们会比简单地说“好吧。
This is fine.
这很好。
You can express this identity like anybody else, but it’s got to be moderate, and you have to bear in mind the common good, so it should be subordinate to that.”
你可以像其他人一样表达这种身份，但它必须是温和的，你必须牢记公共利益，所以它应该服从于公共利益。”
Unless there’s a violent conflict going on, attachment to your own group is not the same as hating an outgroup.
除非发生暴力冲突，否则对自己群体的依恋并不等同于仇恨外群体。
Attachment to being white or attachment to a North European ancestry is not a predictor of disliking a minority.
对白人身份的依恋或对北欧血统的依恋并不意味着不喜欢少数族裔。
What do you think of the argument that appeasement in politics, ethnic politics, rarely works, and that even if the view you’re putting forward is logically sound, it will, de facto, just encourage the crazies.
对于政治、种族政治中的绥靖政策很少奏效，即使你提出的观点在逻辑上是合理的，但实际上只会助长疯狂的说法，你怎么看？
And we need to be a bit Straussian and keep a lid on talk about whiteness — realize a lot of it’s going to happen, but penalize it a bit more than, ideally, we ought to just to keep things under control?
我们需要有点施特劳斯式的态度，不要谈论白度问题 ——意识到很多事情将会发生，但对它的惩罚要多一点，理想情况下，我们应该只是让事情处于控制之下？
So the question is this: Is penalizing going to make things less dangerous or more dangerous?
所以问题是：惩罚会让事情变得更危险还是更危险？
If you penalize, let’s say, then the far right is able to say, “Okay, everyone else gets to have an identity, we don’t.
比方说，如果你惩罚的话，那么极右翼就可以说：“好吧，其他人都有身份，我们没有。
That’s a double standard.” Which, actually, I’m afraid is true.
这是双重标准。”事实上，我担心这是真的。
That, then, is the sort of foundation that they build the crazy stuff on, you know — Jews and globalists wanting to have race suicide for white people, et cetera, or I think they call it white genocide, right?
那么，这就是他们建立疯狂事物的基础，你知道，犹太人和全球主义者想要白人种族自杀等等，或者我认为他们称之为白人种族灭绝，对吗？
What you’ve then done is, if you look at the Christchurch or the Breivik shootings, where are they getting their ideas from?
然后你所做的是，如果你看看基督城或布雷维克枪击事件，他们的想法从哪里来？
The sort of furthest corners of the dark internet, where these conspiracy theories grow.
黑暗互联网最遥远的角落，是这些阴谋论生长的地方。
And those conspiracy theories, I think, thrive on this double standard, much more than if the argument was out in the open.
我认为，这些阴谋论是在这种双重标准的基础上蓬勃发展的，比公开争论的情况要多得多。
For example, if you look at even the correlation between populist right support and far right attacks, there’s actually an inverse correlation if you look.
例如，如果你看看民粹主义右翼支持和极右翼攻击之间的相关性，你会发现实际上存在负相关性。
From 1990 to 2015, Jacob Ravndal in Norway has looked at this quite systematically.
从 1990 年到 2015 年，挪威的 Jacob Ravndal 相当系统地研究了这个问题。
And part of the reason is that, if you get this out into the light, you can shoot down the bad arguments.
部分原因是，如果你把这件事公之于众，你就可以驳倒那些不好的论点。
Populists come out — they can be attacked in the newspapers.
民粹主义者出来了——他们可能会在报纸上受到攻击。
Their arguments can be shown to be false, whereas if you really suppress it, it goes underground.
他们的论点可以被证明是错误的，而如果你真的压制它，它就会转入地下。
I think that’s actually the worst solution, quite apart from the fact that you’re doing violence to this idea of equal treatment, which is always problematic.
我认为这实际上是最糟糕的解决方案，更不用说你对平等待遇的想法施加了暴力，而这总是有问题的。
And you believe that, for the most part, American Latinos will assimilate into whiteness?
你相信，在大多数情况下，美国拉丁裔会融入白人吗？
I think, for the most part, they will.
我认为，在大多数情况下，他们会的。
Maybe I’m partly an example of that, being a quarter Latino myself, but I do think that just the pull of the culture will tend to lead to this mixing, and that over time .
也许我自己就是一个例子，因为我自己有四分之一的拉丁裔血统，但我确实认为，随着时间的推移，文化的吸引力往往会导致这种混合。
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Part of the thing is that there is a sort of white majority now, but as that group becomes more admixed, there won’t be such a clear monolithic white group to riff off.
部分原因在于，现在白人占多数，但随着这个群体变得更加混杂，将不会有如此明显的单一白人群体可以重复。
The mixed population will, therefore, be more inclined to identify with a kind of majoritarian aspect of their identity.
因此，混合人口将更倾向于认同他们身份的某种多数主义方面。
So yeah, I think the direction of assimilation will be towards the majority.
所以，是的，我认为同化的方向将是面向大多数人。
We already see it to some extent, where, I think, 60 percent of people who have at least one Mexican grandparent identify as white rather than Latino.
我们已经在某种程度上看到了这一点，我认为，60% 的至少有一位墨西哥祖父母的人认为自己是白人而不是拉丁裔。
So this is already occurring to some extent.
所以这在某种程度上已经发生了。
I think it will occur more so as we move into the future.
我认为随着我们进入未来，这种情况会发生得更多。
There are already fewer pupusa restaurants in northern Virginia.
弗吉尼亚州北部的普普萨餐馆已经越来越少了。
And they’re not as good as they used to be.
而且他们不再像以前那么好。
Some questions about Switzerland, which you’ve written about.
您写过一些关于瑞士的问题。
All right.
好的。
On the surface, Switzerland appears to be so diverse, and yet it also has this incredibly strong national identity, perhaps falling less under question than almost anywhere else in Western Europe.
从表面上看，瑞士似乎如此多元化，但它也拥有令人难以置信的强烈民族认同，也许比西欧其他任何地方都更少受到质疑。
What’s the secret to that blend?
这种混合的秘诀是什么？
What is it that we outsiders don’t get about Switzerland?
关于瑞士，我们外人不了解的是什么？
Well first of all, it is diverse, but the German component is much larger than the French and Italian or Romansh.
首先，它是多样化的，但德语的成分比法语、意大利语或罗曼什语要大得多。
That’s number one.
这是第一。
The other thing is that the identity — it’s built up from the commune level.
另一件事是，身份 ——它是从公社层面建立起来的。
Communes and cantons tend to be ethnically and religiously homogenous.
市镇和州在种族和宗教上往往是同质的。
When they’re not, they will tend to .
当他们不这样做时，他们就会倾向于这样做。
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.
。
Jura, for example, broke off, I think it was the Canton of Bern.
例如汝拉州，我认为是伯尔尼州。
So at the subnational level, there’s a high degree of cultural homogeneity.
因此，在国家以下各级，存在高度的文化同质性。
Then they federate into a larger whole.
然后它们联合成一个更大的整体。
It’s not the case that this is a highly multicultural society down to the lowest level.
事实并非如此，这是一个深入到最底层的高度多元文化的社会。
It’s multicultural in the cities, but at the communal and cantonal level outside those, it isn’t.
城市里是多元文化的，但在城市之外的社区和州层面却不是。
So I’m not sure it’s really a great countercase, really.
所以我不确定这真的是一个很好的反例吗？
Is this all an accident, or was it political engineering?
这一切到底是一场意外，还是政治工程？
How did the Swiss end up having such a strong and effective national identity?
瑞士人如何最终拥有如此强烈而有效的民族认同？
A number of things.
有很多事情。
First of all, the line between Catholicism and Protestantism cut across the German-French line in terms of language, so that cross-cutting cleavage, I think, helped.
首先，天主教和新教之间的界线在语言上与德法界线相交叉，因此我认为交叉的分裂有所帮助。
If the language and the religion were aligned, as in, say, Quebec versus the rest of Canada, then you would have had much stronger pressures towards a breakup.
如果语言和宗教是一致的，就像魁北克与加拿大其他地区一样，那么你们就会面临更大的分手压力。
The other thing is a relatively successful society economically.
另一件事是经济上相对成功的社会。
I think that helps, although that is more recent.
我认为这有帮助，尽管那是最近的事。
But the main thing is the fact that, at a time when religion was the most important thing, Geneva was Protestant and also other parts of German-speaking Switzerland were Protestant, whereas the central Swiss cantons were Catholic.
但最重要的是，在宗教最为重要的时代，日内瓦是新教，瑞士德语区的其他地区也是新教，而瑞士中部各州则是天主教。
But yet that held together because of that cross-cutting cleavage.
但由于这种交叉的分裂，它们仍然结合在一起。
Why is Switzerland now so much richer than the rest of Europe?
为什么瑞士现在比欧洲其他国家富裕得多？
It’s a marked difference, right?
这是一个明显的区别，对吧？
Yeah, I’m not the economist, so I don’t —
是的，我不是经济学家，所以我不——
But you know plenty about Switzerland.
但你对瑞士了解很多。
They’ve done something right.
他们做了正确的事。
They have done something.
他们已经做了一些事情。
What have they done?
他们做了什么？
I’m thinking about their economy.
我正在考虑他们的经济。
It’s sort of a relatively free-market type of economy, and yet the culture seems to have a high enough degree of social cohesion.
这是一种相对自由市场类型的经济，但其文化似乎具有足够高的社会凝聚力。
So they all can keep a rifle at home, and they’re not all shooting each other.
所以他们都可以在家里备有步枪，而且他们不会互相射击。
Somehow, they’ve managed to get that combination right, of having enough social cohesion and also having a dynamic market with good education.
不知何故，他们成功地做到了这一点：拥有足够的社会凝聚力，同时拥有充满活力的市场和良好的教育。
I don’t have the Swiss silver bullet, unfortunately.
不幸的是，我没有瑞士银弹。
Why doesn’t India fragment more politically?
为什么印度没有在政治上更加分裂？
Its future as a nation-state seems fairly secure, but if you just read about it on paper, you would think, “My goodness, this couldn’t last.” So many languages, religions, caste system.
作为一个民族国家，它的未来似乎相当安全，但如果你只是读到纸面上的内容，你会想，“天哪，这不会持续太久。”如此多的语言、宗教、种姓制度。
Right.
正确的。
Again, I think there was partly a cross-cutting cleavage issue there with caste and religion.
我再次认为，种姓和宗教在一定程度上存在交叉的分裂问题。
Even though you have the Muslim-Hindu divide, you then have the caste divide, which to some extent pushes against a simple Hindu-Muslim division.
即使存在穆斯林与印度教的分歧，也会存在种姓分歧，这在某种程度上阻碍了简单的印度教与穆斯林的分歧。
Some lower-caste Hindus will not vote for the BJP, for example.
例如，一些低种姓的印度教徒不会投票给印度人民党。
They’ll vote for Congress, along with Muslims.
他们将与穆斯林一起投票支持国会。
That could be one reason.
这可能是原因之一。
The other thing, by the way, is the Indian states, as I understand it, have moved more towards being more ethnically delineated.
顺便说一下，另一件事是，据我了解，印度各邦已经朝着更加种族化的方向发展。
I don’t know, I’m trying to remember when that occurred.
我不知道，我正在努力回忆那件事是什么时候发生的。
It was sometime in the last few decades.
那是最近几十年的某个时候。
The other thing, of course — there is a kind of Hindu overlay.
当然，另一件事 —— 有一种印度教的覆盖。
Even though, yes, 80 percent Hindu — so you’re right that there are Tamils, and there are different languages, Marathi and these different languages, but still you could argue that the Hinduism offers a commonality, at least to 80 percent of the population.
尽管，是的，80% 的人信奉印度教——所以你说的是对的，有泰米尔语，有不同的语言，马拉地语和这些不同的语言，但你仍然可以说印度教提供了一个共同点，至少对 80% 的人口来说是这样。
How should the French rebuild Notre Dame?
法国人该如何重建巴黎圣母院？
In my view, they should just rebuild it as it was.
在我看来，他们应该按原样重建它。
I think that adding bells and whistles wouldn’t do much for it.
我认为添加花哨的东西并没有多大作用。
Do you think that reflects anything about your underlying worldview?
你认为这反映了你潜在的世界观吗？
Or it’s just an arbitrary aesthetic opinion?
或者这只是一种任意的审美观点？
No, no, I think you’re probably right, as I guess I’m relatively .
不，不，我想你可能是对的，因为我想我是相对的。
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We should, obviously, have new architecture and change, but iconography like that should be preserved in the form that it was.
显然，我们应该有新的建筑和改变，但像这样的图像应该以原来的形式保留。
That’s what people are attached to.
这就是人们所执着的。
Now, it doesn’t mean I’m closed to an argument for making some alterations, but I think the essence of it should be preserved.
现在，这并不意味着我不再接受进行一些修改的论点，但我认为应该保留它的本质。
If we’re in the middle of the 19th century, and the French are debating whether to put up that spire at Notre Dame, are you for that or against it?
如果我们身处 19 世纪中叶，法国人正在争论是否要在巴黎圣母院修建尖塔，您是支持还是反对？
I think I probably would be against it.
我想我可能会反对。
So perhaps that does suggest a certain leaning, that things of beauty that have a long provenance — I tend to want to preserve them.
因此，也许这确实表明了某种倾向，即具有悠久来源的美丽事物 —— 我倾向于保存它们。
This brings up this other issue about preservation versus change.
这就提出了关于保存与改变的另一个问题。
You have to have some change and some preservation, and then people are oriented differently towards both.
你必须进行一些改变和一些保留，然后人们对两者的取向就会有所不同。
Actually, if you’re consistent, if you want local communities and historic buildings and things which are associated typically with progressivism, then that’s also, actually, consistently associated with things like preservation of existing ethnic compositions or histories, which is a more populist-right thing.
事实上，如果你是一致的，如果你想要当地社区和历史建筑以及通常与进步主义相关的东西，那么实际上，这也始终与诸如保存现有民族成分或历史之类的事情相关，这是一个更民粹主义正确的事情。
This brings up this other issue about preservation versus change.
这就提出了关于保存与改变的另一个问题。
You have to have some change and some preservation, and then people are oriented differently towards both.
你必须进行一些改变和一些保留，然后人们对两者的取向就会有所不同。
Actually, if you’re consistent, if you want local communities and historic buildings and things which are associated typically with progressivism, then that’s also, actually, consistently associated with things like preservation of existing ethnic compositions or histories, which is a more populist-right thing.
事实上，如果你是一致的，如果你想要当地社区和历史建筑以及通常与进步主义相关的东西，那么实际上，这也始终与诸如保存现有民族成分或历史之类的事情相关，这是一个更民粹主义正确的事情。
Some people suggest the age of modernism in the Western world was a kind of aesthetic peak.
有人认为西方世界的现代主义时代是一种审美巅峰。
Take the 1920s.
以 20 年代为例。
You have Picasso, you have Thomas Mann, you have Proust, you have Rilke.
你有毕加索，你有托马斯·曼，你有普鲁斯特，你有里尔克。
You have so much in art.
你在艺术方面有很多东西。
Classical music is still quite a live tradition, though coming to an end.
古典音乐虽然即将结束，但仍然是一个相当活跃的传统。
And after that, something weird happens, and we never somehow got on track.
在那之后，一些奇怪的事情发生了，我们再也没有走上正轨。
What’s your take on that view?
您对这种观点有何看法？
Is it correct?
正确吗？
I take more the Daniel Bell view, that essentially modernism represents a break towards the end of the 19th century with tradition, that it’s about novelty, difference, immediacy.
我更倾向于丹尼尔·贝尔的观点，即现代主义本质上代表了 19 世纪末与传统的决裂，它关乎新颖性、差异性和即时性。
It’s kind of an expressive individualism where you’re constantly negating the past, negating tradition.
这是一种富有表现力的个人主义，你不断地否定过去、否定传统。
I don’t see a whole lot of difference between the 1920s and pop art and Jackson Pollock, or even what you find in the Tate Modern.
我看不出 20 年代的波普艺术和杰克逊·波洛克，甚至你在泰特现代美术馆看到的艺术之间有什么区别。
I think they’re all —
我认为他们都是——
But that’s now old stuff mostly.
但现在这些大多都是旧东西了。
Andy Warhol — that’s a long time ago.
安迪·沃霍尔——那是很久以前的事了。
But even the new stuff — it’s all about trying to be shocking and new and different, which is fine, but I think it’s the same sensibility and it’s the same thing that’s driving the art.
但即使是新的东西——也都是为了令人震惊、新颖和不同，这很好，但我认为这是相同的敏感性，也是驱动艺术的相同因素。
But has it been exhausted for decades?
但几十年来已经耗尽了吗？
Yeah, I think it’s probably been exhausted since the ’30s, as Bell says.
是的，正如贝尔所说，我认为自 30 年代以来它可能已经筋疲力尽了。
The most creative phase was where you still had a traditional culture to push against, and that gave creativity to modernism.
最具创造力的阶段是你仍然有传统文化需要反抗，这给现代主义带来了创造力。
Most of the modernism that I like is from that period of the 1910s, ’20s, ’30s.
我喜欢的现代主义大多来自1910年代、20年代、30年代那个时期。
Beyond that, it gets a bit — well, I think there’s a lot of repetition.
除此之外，它有点“——”好吧，我认为有很多重复。
It’s not as interesting, for me anyway.
无论如何，对我来说，这并不那么有趣。
Do you think of yourself as a kind of cultural pessimist for this reason?
因此，您是否认为自己是一种文化悲观主义者？
I’m not a pessimist.
我不是悲观主义者。
I don’t think things are going to hell in a handbasket.
我不认为事情会变得一团糟。
I think, though, that there has been a downgrading of respect for people who want continuity and tradition and who want to rework those traditions perhaps, but who are not on board with the modernist aesthetic of novelty, difference, and complete individuality.
不过，我认为，对于那些想要连续性和传统、或许想要改造这些传统，但又不接受新颖、差异和完全个性的现代主义美学的人们的尊重已经被降低了。
I think there has to be a balance between those two.
我认为这两者之间必须保持平衡。
The high culture has moved, as Bell writes, really heavily in that direction of just the expressive individualism and the novelty.
正如贝尔所写，高雅文化已经在很大程度上朝着表达个人主义和新奇的方向发展。
I think some balance perhaps, some more respect from the high culture for that tradition.
我认为也许需要一些平衡，高雅文化对这一传统给予更多的尊重。
There’s respect for foreign traditions and exotic traditions, but there isn’t really a respect for kind of Western native traditions.
对外国传统和异国传统有尊重，但对西方本土传统并没有真正的尊重。
Martin Gurri has put forward the thesis that, because of the internet, people get a much closer look at their elites, including political elites.
马丁·古里（Martin Gurri）提出这样的论点：由于互联网，人们可以更近距离地了解他们的精英，包括政治精英。
They see how crummy they are, and they’re disillusioned.
他们看到自己有多么糟糕，他们的幻想破灭了。
And this turns politics into something negative.
这使政治变得消极。
Do you agree?
你同意？
I think that television kind of began that, perhaps.
我认为电视也许是这一切的开始。
I’m not sure the internet really explains that much.
我不确定互联网是否真的解释了那么多。
I always return to East Asia because you can see where they have the internet and they’ve got a lot of modernity, but I’m not sure that politics has changed anywhere near as much there as it has, say, in the West.
我总是回到东亚，因为你可以看到他们有互联网，而且有很多现代性，但我不确定那里的政治变化是否与西方一样大。
Again, the difference, I would say, is around issues of migration and multiculturalism.
我想说，差异在于移民和多元文化主义问题。
Similarly, if you look at support for the populist right, those who are heavy internet users or heavy social media users are not more likely to be populist-right voters.
同样，如果你看看对民粹主义右翼的支持，那些重度互联网用户或重度社交媒体用户的人并不更有可能成为民粹主义右翼选民。
So I’m less convinced by the technological arguments.
所以我不太相信技术论点。
On the Eric Kaufmann production function
关于埃里克·考夫曼生产函数
Two questions on your development, also known as the Eric Kaufmann production function.
关于您的发展的两个问题，也称为埃里克·考夫曼生产函数。
Having lived for eight years in Japan, how has that influenced your research and your subsequent views?
在日本生活了八年，这对您的研究和随后的观点有何影响？
Definitely, I think, when you grow up abroad and you are a foreigner in another country, you think more about identity, and particularly national identity.
当然，我认为，当你在国外长大并且你是另一个国家的外国人时，你会更多地考虑身份，特别是国家身份。
So this is how that question —
所以这个问题就是这样的——
You say abroad.
你说的是国外。
Just give us your history.
只需向我们提供您的历史即可。
You were born in Hong Kong?
你出生在香港？
Born in Hong Kong, but that was just for a year.
出生在香港，不过才一年。
Then moved to Japan for about six years, and then back to Canada for two, and then over to Japan for another two before moving back to Canada.
然后移居日本大约六年，然后回到加拿大两年，然后又移居日本两年，然后再搬回加拿大。
It’s more that second phase, particularly age 10 and 11 in Tokyo.
更重要的是第二阶段，尤其是东京的 10 岁和 11 岁。
You just become aware at school.
你只是在学校才意识到。
I went to an international school, so you have a day where everybody has their booth with their country, and there’s 60 countries.
我去了一所国际学校，所以有一天，每个人都在自己的展位上写着自己的国家，有 60 个国家。
It just makes you more aware of that, whereas if I’d just grown up in the middle of Alberta somewhere, I probably wouldn’t be looking into these questions, no.
它只会让你更加意识到这一点，而如果我只是在艾伯塔省中部的某个地方长大，我可能不会研究这些问题，不。
Final question.
最后一个问题。
How did writing your first two books about Northern Ireland influence your subsequent views and research directions?
您写的关于北爱尔兰的前两本书对您后来的观点和研究方向有何影响？
Well, the work on the Orangeism was kind of .
嗯，关于橙色主义的工作有点像。
.
。
.
。
My first book, which was on the US, was looking at the decline of WASP in the 20th century in the United States.
我的第一本书是关于美国的，探讨了 20 世纪美国 WASP 的衰落。
Oh, so that’s before the Ireland books.
哦，那是在爱尔兰书之前。
This is before the Ireland book, but the Orange interest was partly because very few Canadians realize that four Canadian prime ministers and almost every mayor of Toronto from 1870 to the 1950s was an Orangeman.
这是在爱尔兰书之前，但橙色人的兴趣部分是因为很少有加拿大人意识到从 1870 年到 1950 年代的四位加拿大总理和几乎每一位多伦多市长都是橙色人。
So I was very interested in this, but it’s also in keeping with this interest in ethnic majorities, right?
所以我对此非常感兴趣，但这也符合少数民族的这种兴趣，对吧？
That’s sort of an understudied area that I’ve been in for some 20-odd years.
这是一个未被充分研究的领域，我已经研究了 20 多年。
The Northern Ireland question was really about the Protestants, who are a declining dominant group in Northern Ireland, and that was kind of a similar interest in the American case with the Anglo-Protestant decline.
北爱尔兰的问题实际上是关于新教徒的，新教徒是北爱尔兰一个正在衰落的主导群体，这与美国新教衰落的情况有类似的兴趣。
So I was just focusing very much on another instance of a decline demographically, and in the Northern Ireland case, also economically declining majority group.
所以我只是非常关注另一个人口下降的例子，在北爱尔兰的例子中，大多数群体的经济也在下降。
Isn’t it also a region where everyone, in a sense, is some kind of white nationalist?
从某种意义上说，这不也是一个每个人都是某种白人民族主义者的地区吗？
Not necessarily in a racist way, and they may even disagree as to what the nation should be, but they’re some form of nationalist and they identify that with whiteness, and that’s just taken for granted.
不一定是以种族主义的方式，他们甚至可能不同意国家应该是什么样子，但他们是某种形式的民族主义者，他们将其等同于白人，而这被认为是理所当然的。
I think the whiteness really doesn’t play in Northern Ireland, actually.
事实上，我认为白色在北爱尔兰确实不起作用。
It’s interesting.
这很有趣。
I’ve seen black spectators at the Twelfth will be welcomed, whereas there’s a lot of suspicion of anyone Catholic.
我见过第十二届的黑人观众会受到欢迎，但对天主教徒却有很多怀疑。
I think it’s very much a nonracial thing in that sense, but you’re right that people take history and identity quite seriously, and they see themselves connected to feats of their ancestors, et cetera.
我认为从这个意义上来说，这是一件非种族的事情，但你是对的，人们非常认真地对待历史和身份，他们认为自己与祖先的功绩息息相关。
So history very much lives in the present even though the society looks totally modern.
因此，尽管社会看起来完全现代化，但历史仍然活在当下。
That’s what fascinated me about Northern Ireland — the argument that societies are going beyond history is clearly untrue for Northern Ireland, where history is very present, even as many other dimensions of modernity continue.
这就是北爱尔兰让我着迷的地方——关于社会正在超越历史的论点对于北爱尔兰来说显然是不正确的，在那里历史依然存在，尽管现代性的许多其他方面仍在继续。
Oh, one final question, actually.
哦，实际上还有最后一个问题。
What is it you’re going to do next?
接下来你要做什么？
Your book is out, published.
你的书已经出版了。
What now?
现在怎么办？
One part of the book, of course, is about progressivism, and that liberal left synthesis, which is not socialism and not liberalism.
当然，这本书的一部分是关于进步主义和自由左翼综合体，这不是社会主义，也不是自由主义。
I kind of want to look at the history of that — all the good things it did, but also, perhaps, where it’s overshot, and perhaps some of the places where it’s going wrong now.
我有点想回顾一下它的历史——它所做的所有好事，但也许还有它做过头的地方，也许还有它现在出错的地方。
This is an idea that I have.
这是我的一个想法。
Whether I will pursue that, I’m not sure.
我是否会追求这一点，我不确定。
Eric Kaufmann, thank you very much.
埃里克·考夫曼，非常感谢你。
Thanks, Tyler.
谢谢，泰勒。